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Working Together but in Opposition: An

Examination of the "Good-Cop/Bad-Cop"
Negotiating Team Tactic

Article  in  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · February 2000

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Vol. 81, No. 2, March, pp. 155–177, 2000
doi:10.1006/obhd.1999.2879, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

Working Together but in Opposition:

An Examination of the “Good-Cop/Bad-Cop”
Negotiating Team Tactic
Susan E. Brodt
Duke University

and

Marla Tuchinsky
INSEAD

Unlike solo negotiators, members of negotiating teams may for

strategic reasons choose to play different roles; the familiar “good
cop/bad cop” distributive bargaining tactic is one example of role
differentiation designed to enhance a team’s success at the bar-
gaining table. In two empirical studies about a hypothetical
three-person work group, we examined the cognitive processes
underlying this tactic using a social-cognitive decision model
(Brodt & Duncan, 1998) that conceptualizes the negotiators’ deci-
sion tasks and persuasion processes. Results generally supported
the model except for an intriguing asymmetry depending on a
person’s initial inclination (accepting, rejecting). This research
extends findings on the tactic and on contrast effects (Cialdini,
1984) and supports the model’s usefulness as an approximate rep-
resentation of negotiator cognition. 䉷 2000 Academic Press

Psychological research on conflict and negotiation has tended to focus on

interactions between two people. Hence, we have a growing body of knowledge
about how individuals think about conflict and negotiate agreements (Neale &

We thank Lisa Cavanaugh, Steve Hoeffler, Juan Carlos Duque, and Erich Studer-Ellis for helping
run our experiments. Portions of this paper were written with the help of a Duke University
CIBER grant to the first author. An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the annual
meetings of the Academy of Management.
Address correspondence and reprint requests to Susan Brodt, Fuqua School of Business, Duke
University, Durham, NC 27708-0120; or to Marla Tuchinsky, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance,
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France. E-mail: susan.brodt@duke.edu or marla.tuchinsky@insead.fr.
155
0749-5978/00 $35.00
Copyright 䉷 2000 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
156 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

Bazerman, 1991; Northcraft & Neale, 1990; Pinkley, 1990). Recently, research
has extended the social context of negotiation to include theoretically important
variables such as culture (Brodt & Seybolt, 1998; Brodt & Tinsley, 1999; Carnev-
ale, 1996), multiple parties (Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1996), various relation-
ships between parties (Sheppard & Tuchinsky, 1996; Valley, Neale, & Mannix,
1995), and negotiating teams (Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996; O’Connor,
1997; Polzer, 1996).
The purpose of this article is to study negotiating teams and their internal
dynamics, specifically the adoption of different negotiator roles and its effects
on negotiator cognition and on negotiation processes and outcomes. We use
Brodt and Duncan’s (1998) model of strategic role differentiation in negotiating
teams, testing its predictions using the familiar “good-cop/bad-cop” distributive
bargaining tactic (Kamisar, 1980). We examine this tactic as it might appear
in organizational settings (e.g., coalitions that form within work groups), how-
ever, and make specific predictions about cognitive underpinnings, limitations
of the tactic’s success, and implications for subsequent social interaction among
group members.
In a nutshell, we propose that the good-cop/bad-cop tactic, in which negotiat-
ing team members work together but in opposite directions, promotes accep-
tance of a team’s offer because the negotiators choreograph a sequence of
distinct persuasive appeals. Each appeal is directed at a different aspect of a
target individual’s perception of the joint decision task underlying the negotia-
tion. The goal of this choreography is to alter the target’s perception of the
conflict situation such that the individual comes to accept the team’s offer. Not
surprisingly, because individuals may bring different initial perceptions to a
conflict situation (e.g., a proclivity to accept or reject a team’s offer), the order
of persuasive appeals may affect the negotiating team’s success. Moreover, the
choreography can also affect interpersonal relations among members of the
group. We ground this proposal in research on negotiating teams and strategic
role differentiation and then test it by conducting two empirical studies. The
first study examines the two-cop (i.e., two-appeal) tactic, testing the interaction
between a target’s initial inclination (accepting or rejecting) and the ordering
of the persuasive appeals (i.e., bad cop then good cop, good cop then bad cop).
The second study addresses an unanswered question raised by study 1, namely:
are both appeals necessary to change perceptions and enhance acceptance, or
does an all-positive or all-negative appeal have the same effects? In this follow
on study we further identify the tactic’s cognitive underpinnings.

NEGOTIATING TEAMS AND STRATEGIC ROLE DIFFERENTIATION

Unlike solo negotiators, negotiation team members may choose for strategic
reasons to play different roles during a negotiation. Such role differentiation
may be based on many factors including individual expertise. For example, if
one team member excels at imagining creative solutions while another can
rapidly calculate the value of various agreements, these team members may
decide to play to their strengths and adopt distinct roles during a negotiation.
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 157

Strategic role differentiation, therefore, may enhance a party’s ability to craft

agreements as well as persuade the other side to accept a proposal.
This implicit belief about role differentiation underlies the familiar good-
cop/bad-cop distributive bargaining tactic (Kamisar, 1980) in which negotiating
team members work together but in opposite ways to promote compliance or
acceptance of an offer. Specifically, these two negotiators choreograph a se-
quence of distinct appeals differing in emotional tone, motivation, and negotiat-
ing approach. In its original context, the tactic involves two police officers and
an obdurate arrestee. The first detective (the bad cop) assails the accused,
threatening the inevitability of insufferable consequences if she remains unco-
operative. After the bad cop leaves the room, the second detective (the good
cop) comforts the accused and emphasizes the benefits that will result from
cooperation.
The good-cop/bad-cop paradigm is not limited to cases of police interrogation.
Imagine two members of a faculty committee or task group, for example, as
they confront a fellow group member who is reluctant to take on a particular
responsibility. One team member assails the recalcitrant peer, threatening the
inevitability of poor performance and evaluation if the peer remains unwilling
to accept the task. Later, another team member comforts the individual and
emphasizes the benefits that will result from accepting the role.
The traditional good-cop/bad-cop paradigm is an instance of negotiation (e.g.,
Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). As in our detective example,
the two parties are engaged in a social interaction in which they believe their
interests conflict. The accused wants to be released and the detectives want to
strengthen their case. Neither party, however, may act independently; as is
generally the case in negotiation, each is dependent on the other to achieve its
goals or to come to some accommodation. The detectives want the accused to
cooperate, admit to committing the crimes, and perhaps implicate her accom-
plice. The accused wants the detectives to set her free. Their mutual dependence
limits what each side can accomplish alone and motivates the parties to con-
tinue negotiating. Through discussion, persuasion, and exchange of offers each
side may gain information about the other’s preferences and may share infor-
mation in attempts to alter the other party’s understanding of the conflict
situation. Finally, the parties prefer negotiation to impasse due to impasse’s
presumed consequences: the accused returns to her jail cell and the detectives
relinquish the matter to the District Attorney, having failed to enlist the ac-
cused’s cooperation.
The interrogation room is the venue for whatever discussion and negotiation
takes place: information gathering and sharing, persuasion, social influence,
and general problem solving, each one being an important aspect of negotiation
(Thompson, 1990; Walton & McKersie, 1965). A basis for distributive bar-
gaining exists, furthermore, due to “opportunistic potential” (Lax & Sebenius,
1986, p. 10); that is, each party may engage in self-interested maneuvering
and not be completely open about its motives. Although the parties have entered
into negotiation, they may not be agreeable to cooperative problem solving.
Instead, they may engage in distributive bargaining and strategic interaction,
158 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

with substantial potential for gains and losses by either or both sides. Despite
impediments to cooperation, they implicitly believe they are better off continu-
ing the negotiation rather than abandoning it, and they negotiate to forge an
agreement more favorable than impasse.1
Whether used by committee members at a university or by cops in a precinct,
does this familiar good-cop/bad-cop tactic actually promote chances that the
targeted individual will acquiesce and accept an offer? According to both lay
intuition and research, the answer appears to be yes (Hilty & Carnevale, 1993;
Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Among Rafaeli and Sutton’s (1991) bill collectors, for
example, good cop/bad cop appeared to be both the most commonly used tactic
and the most successful in engendering cooperation. Qualitative data from
their field study highlighted the tactic’s richness and the conviction with which
these professionals intuitively believe the tactic works. What are not clear,
however, are the reasons for the tactic’s success and under what conditions it
increases the chances that an offer will be accepted. For example, does the
tactic lead to mere compliance without engendering commitment or to altering
a person’s understanding (representation) of a conflict situation?2
Rafaeli and Sutton (1991) have proposed psychological contrast (Cialdini,
1984) as the mechanism responsible for the tactic’s success: a good cop who
follows a bad cop is perceived to be warmer and friendlier than a good cop
who either goes it alone or precedes a bad cop. Hilty and Carnevale (1993)
experimentally tested this proposition, confirming the tactic’s effectiveness and
the importance of psychological contrast. Contrary to lay intuition, however,
their results suggested that two persons might not be necessary to achieve the
good-cop/bad-cop effect; they found similar results when a single negotiator
enacted the two roles. Taken together, these studies show that negotiating
team tactics, particularly the good-cop/bad-cop distributive bargaining tactic,
are widely used and seemingly quite successful in engendering compliance.
Psychological contrast appears to be part of the tactic’s success although the
precise nature of the mechanism and influence process remains unclear.
Brodt and Duncan (1998) have offered a model for studying the tactic’s
psychological underpinnings. They propose a specific cognitive representation
and persuasion process and speculate about the conditions under which the
tactic will be most effective in altering perceptions and enabling agreements.
We briefly describe their model in the next section.

THE BRODT AND DUNCAN MODEL

Drawing on research on negotiation, persuasion, role theory, and decision

analysis, Brodt and Duncan (1998) isolated the decision-making and social

1
Note that there may be instances in which no such agreement exists and the parties are better
served, therefore, by accepting impasse rather than continuing to negotiate.
2
One might ask if level of commitment is important or is it necessary to change another’s
underlying perception of a conflict—as long as a party agrees to one’s demands, does it matter
that his or her “heart isn’t in it”? For implementation beyond the letter of the agreement, perhaps
it is. However, exploring the degree of commitment elicited through the good-cop/bad-cop strategy
is beyond the scope of this article. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 159

influence aspects of the good cop/bad cop tactic. They represent in a precursory
decision theoretic model the joint decision task facing the parties, where in
the course of bargaining one can alter another’s perceptions of key decision-
making elements (see Schelling, 1960), particularly through a team approach.
They explain their analysis using the prototypical case of two detectives and
an accused. For our purposes, we discuss their model using the organizationally
relevant and functionally equivalent case of a three-person committee or work
group negotiating task assignments. Imagine that two committee members
have decided how to allocate committee task assignments and must now per-
suade the third member to accept their general view of the situation and their
offer (i.e., task assignment). Team members include bad cop Bart and good cop
Gert, trying to negotiate with and persuade target Tam.
According to the model, a person such as Tam begins to form an understand-
ing of a decision structure’s basic components as negotiations proceed. He
learns from interacting with his teammates about various possible actions he
might take, possible consequences of those actions, and their likelihood. He also
develops some preferences about action/consequence combinations (Clemen,
1996). Negotiation and decision-component specification are simultaneous, in-
teractive, social-cognitive activities. At any point in the negotiation, if forced
to make a decision each party would do so based on its current perception of
the situation, which is likely to change as the negotiation proceeds.
In this simple case, Tam faces a decision problem with two possible actions:
accept the offer or reject it. Initially, he is unsure whether the consequences
of taking either action will be positive or negative. Figure 1 represents the
structure that is evolving under bargaining and confrontation of the issues. In
this decision tree, the “accept” and “reject” branches emerge from the basic
action node.
Sometimes in negotiation, Tam begins in a rejecting, uncooperative mode.

FIG. 1. Negotiator decision tree (from Brodt & Duncan, 1998).

160 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

According to the decision-theoretic model, this reflects that initially and at

least in some vague sense,

paU(A, G) ⫹ (1 ⫺ pa)U(A, B) ⬍ prU(R, G) ⫹ (1 ⫺ pr)U(R, B),

where pa represents the probability of a good result given accepting the offer
(0 ⬍ pa ⬍ 1) and pr represents the probability of a good result given rejecting the
offer (0 ⬍ pr ⬍ 1). The four utility values U are functions of action [acceptance (A)
or rejection (R)] and consequence [bad (B) or good (G)]. Initially, the obvious
constraints are imposed, U(A, G) ⬎ U(A, B) and U(R, G) ⬎ U(R, B); that is,
Tam views good consequences as better than bad. As he gathers, or is fed,
information during negotiation, this relationship between the expected utilities
of accepting and rejecting can change.
How exactly does the good-cop/bad-cop tactic function within this decision
context? Negotiation theorists (e.g., Brodt & Dietz, 1999; Lax & Sebenius, 1986;
Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Raiffa, 1982) suggest that Bart and Gert can work
to change, or even create, Tam’s perception of the negotiation situation and
his aspirations. That is, they can persuade Tam to change his expectations
about the likelihood of the chance events—good versus bad outcomes—as well
as his assessments of the utility associated with various outcomes. Being team-
mates, they can be effective by specializing their appeals: bad cop Bart works
on Tam’s perceptions of the “reject” action branch while good cop Gert focuses
on the “accept” action branch.
Given their roles, how should the two teammates coordinate their activities?
According to the model, if Tam is inclined initially to reject the offer, the
tactic will be more successful if Bart begins the negotiation. Bart’s persuasive
arguments shake Tam’s positional inertia and debunk Tam’s perceptions re-
garding benefits following from rejecting. If, on the other hand, Tam were
initially favorably inclined toward the task and in an “accepting” mode, good
cop Gert alone would be more successful in persuading Tam; Gert’s arguments
further strengthen Tam’s commitment to accept the offer. In fact, Bart’s argu-
ments under these circumstances might prove confusing and even weaken
Tam’s initial resolve to accept the offer. During the process of debunking Tam’s
perceptions, Bart’s articulation of presumed benefits that follow from rejecting
might educate Tam and persuade him to raise his estimates of U(R,G) and pr .

HYPOTHESES

We propose and test two sets of hypotheses. The first set helps us understand
psychological contrast and cognitive mechanisms underlying this negotiating
team tactic. The second set embeds the tactic in the broader social context and
assesses its implications for perceptions of good cops and bad cops and the
relationships that they create in negotiation.

The Tactic’s Effects on Perceptions and Outcomes

According to the model, divergent good-cop/bad-cop roles permit specialized
influence on the opposing party’s perception of the joint decision task underlying
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 161

the negotiation (i.e., the opposing party’s decision tree). The bad cop, who
usually goes first, targets the person’s initial tendency to reject an offer and
aims to lower his or her assessment that desirable outcomes will follow from
rejection. The good cop, who usually goes second, targets the person’s slight
proclivity toward acceptance and aims to bolster his or her assessment that
desirable outcomes will follow from acceptance. The two roles work in harmony
to increase the likelihood that a negotiator will accept the offer and comply
with the team’s request. This model specifies the cognitive underpinnings of
psychological contrast (Cialdini, 1984).
As a result of this proposed dynamic, the ordering of roles will matter and
interact with the targeted person’s initial inclination; that is, the bad-cop/
good-cop ordering will work best—result in higher acceptance rates—when
individuals are initially disinclined toward the offer rather than inclined. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: The bad-cop/good-cop ordering will result in greater overall acceptance when
participants are initially rejecting versus accepting; opposite results are expected when the
order of presentation is reversed (good cop followed by bad cop).

The reasons for this hypothesized effect are the following:

HYPOTHESIS 2: For those who are inclined to reject, initial exposure to the bad cop will lower
their expected utility of favorable outcomes resulting from rejecting the offer ( pr).

HYPOTHESIS 3: For those who are inclined to accept, initial exposure to the bad cop will raise
their judged probability of favorable outcomes resulting from rejecting the offer ( pr).

Perceptions of Good Cops and Bad Cops and the Relationships They Create
Interactions with the good-cop/bad-cop team can influence a person’s percep-
tion of the situation and also create distinct impressions about team members.
These impressions may have long-lasting effects in the context of a work group
about to embark on a joint task. In general, based on the nature of their roles
alone (see role theory, Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, & Snoek, 1964), we would expect
that good cops will be perceived more positively than bad cops will. Targets
may be more inclined to cooperate with good cops because they find them
likable (Cialdini, 1984). The good cop and bad cop “halos” will result in divergent
perceptions of fairness, openness, trustworthiness, toughness, and a willing-
ness to work together in the future, leading to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4: An encounter with a good cop will be perceived more positively than one with
a bad cop, both overall and in terms of perceived fairness, openness, trustworthiness, toughness
and willingness to work together in the future.

A person’s initial frame of mind influences his or her perception of the other
party (Neale & Bazerman, 1991); therefore, an individual who is inclined to
accept an offer is likely to react more strongly (and negatively) to a bad-
cop approach than will someone who is initially disinclined. Moreover, this
unexpected approach’s distinctiveness suggests that the information imparted
would be processed carefully and would be highly memorable and accessible
162 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

(cognitively) during subsequent interactions (Stangor & McMillan, 1992). As

a result of this psychological process, the bad cop’s behavior will appear more
negative in the context of a positive expectation than it would in either the
absence of this positive context or in a negative context. Hence, the follow-
ing hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 5: When encountering the bad cop first, participants who are initially accepting
will judge him more negatively than will those who are initially rejecting.

Similarly, the context created by a team member’s partner also influences the
other party’s perceptions. Researchers (see Hilty & Carnevale, 1993; Rafaeli &
Sutton, 1991) have used this argument as a general explanation for the good-
cop/bad-cop tactic’s effectiveness: the good cop’s effectiveness is enhanced by
the context created by the bad cop. Part of this effect is due to the enhanced
positive emotion and likability associated with the good cop who follows the
bad cop (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). As a result of this psychological process, we
expect evaluations of bad cops who follow good cops to be more negative than
evaluations of bad cops who make the first encounter. Similarly, evaluations
of good cops who follow bad cops will be more positive than evaluations of good
cops who make the first encounter.
HYPOTHESIS 6: Impressions of good cops and bad cops will be more extreme when experienced
in the context of the partner’s role versus in isolation.

STUDY 1

Method
Participants. Seventy undergraduate students at Duke University partici-
pated in the study as part of a classroom exercise. They were enrolled in one
of two sections of an introductory management course (36 and 34 students
each) and participation was voluntary.

Design. There were two independent variables in the experiment: the target
person’s inclination (initially accepting or rejecting) and the order in which
the good cop/bad cop tactic was performed (bad cop begins or good cop begins).
Both were between-subject variables, creating four different combinations: (a)
initially accepting target, good cop begins; (b) initially accepting target, bad
cop begins; (c) initially rejecting target, good cop begins; and (d) initially re-
jecting target, bad cop begins. To control for actor effects, two individuals played
each role and two versions of each videotape were made to control for the actor
who played the good cop or bad cop role. This resulted in eight conditions in
the experiment and participants were randomly assigned to one condition.
Materials. We simulated an interaction between a student (target) and two
other members of a hypothetical group working on a term project for a college
course. The participant was cast in the role of the target student and the other
team members, who played the good cop and bad cop roles, were presented via
videotaped recordings. The videotape segments reflected casual encounters
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 163

between the participant and each team member as if they had run into each
other between classes. Encounters were presented sequentially and, in both
cases, the actor playing the good cop or bad cop role spoke directly to the
participant from the video screen (i.e., spoke directly into the camera).
The interaction centered on delegating tasks for the group project, namely
writing the paper, interviewing industry specialists, or making the presenta-
tion. The videotaped team members wanted the target student to write the
paper. Team members adopted good-cop/bad-cop roles in an attempt to persuade
the participant to accept the task. To add urgency and reality to the situation,
all three team members were presumed to be graduating seniors and poor
performance on the term project could potentially jeopardize their graduation.
Moreover, the group’s presentation and report was to be evaluated by a panel
of business executives, including the CEO of the firm the participant (target
student) was to join after graduation.
Two male doctoral students were used in the videotapes. Neither had had
contact with undergraduate students and hence both were unfamiliar to the
participants in the experiment. Both looked young enough to be undergraduate
seniors. Each doctoral student acted both good- and bad-cop roles and the
scripts were written so that the two segments could be edited to create tapes
including different combinations of actors and their roles. The videotape re-
cordings were shot in a typical classroom and lasted approximately 2 min
apiece. Four sets of videotapes were created, manipulating both the order of
the good-cop/bad-cop arguments and the actor playing the roles. In all cases,
both actors appeared in the videotape; in no case did the same person play
both roles on a single tape.

Procedure. After being randomly assigned to experimental conditions, par-

ticipants read a brief introduction to the simulation, which included the inclina-
tion manipulation. In the accepting condition, participants read: “You are a
strong writer and given a choice you would prefer to write the draft.” In the
rejecting condition, participants read: “You are a strong writer but you are
really more interested in developing your presentation skills. This may very
well be your last opportunity to practice making presentations before you begin
your new job. Given a choice, you would prefer to make the presentation.”
Participants also answered questions including manipulation checks and de-
scriptions and probability assessments of favorable and unfavorable outcomes
if they were to accept or reject their teammates’ offer.
Next, participants saw one of two videotaped segments after which they
answered a second set of questions including the probability they would accept
the offer, the likelihood of favorable and unfavorable outcomes, evaluations of
the team member (e.g., fairness, openness, trustworthiness), and their willing-
ness to work with that team member again in the future. Assessments were
made using either a full-range probability scale (0.0–1.0) or a 7-point Likert-
type scale, depending on the type of question. Participants then saw the second
videotape and answered questions identical to those following the first video-
taped “encounter.”
164 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

Afterward, they received information about the experiment and additional

readings, and were dismissed. The experiment took approximately 20–30 min
to complete.

Results

Study 1 examined cognitive mechanisms underlying the good-cop/bad-cop

tactic and the relationships it engendered. Hypotheses focused on: (a) effects
of the tactic on perceptions and outcomes and (b) impressions of good cops and
bad cops and the relationships they create.
Before turning to these results, we should note that no actor effects were
found. The two actors were equally successful at enacting the good-cop and
bad-cop roles (e.g., equally believable, similar effects on perceptions, outcomes).
Hence, data were collapsed into four experimental conditions: two orderings
of the team encounter (good cop then bad cop, bad cop then good cop) and two
levels of initial inclination (initially accepting, initially rejecting).
Also, we tested our inclination manipulation and the underlying assumptions
of the analytic model. Consistent with our manipulation, accepting participants
expressed higher acceptance rates (Maccept ⫽ .81) than did rejecting participants
(Mreject ⫽ .40), F(1, 66) ⫽ 9.56, p ⬍ .01, before encountering either teammate.
According to the model, a participant’s initial inclination to accept or reject is
expected to reflect judgments about four probabilities and four utilities:
pa, 1-pa, pr, and 1-pr, and U(A,G,), U(A,B), U(R,G), and U(R,B). We conjectured
that if participants were initially inclined to accept (i.e., accepting participants),
they would expect favorable outcomes to be likely when they accepted rather
than rejected the offer ( pa ⬎ pr); conversely, those who were initially inclined
to reject (i.e., rejecting participants) would hold the opposite beliefs ( pr ⬎ pa).
As predicted, accepting participants thought that good outcomes would be more
likely if they accepted versus rejected the offer (Mpa ⫽ .68, SD ⫽ .15 vs Mpr ⫽
.55, SD ⫽ .16), t(33) ⫽ 3.63, p ⬍ .01, and if they accepted, good outcomes would
be more likely than bad (Mpa ⫽ .68, SD ⫽ .15 vs M1-pa ⫽ .38, SD ⫽ .18),
t(33) ⫽ 6.1, p ⬍ .01. The converse was not true, however, for rejecting partici-
pants. They expected good outcomes to be about as likely to follow from rejection
as from acceptance (Mpr ⫽ .68, SD ⫽ .18 vs Mpa ⫽ .72, SD ⫽ .19), t(33) ⫽ 1.24,
p ⫽ .22. Evidently, being disinclined meant that acceptance was also a viable
option leading to good outcomes. Although not anticipated, this result was not
surprising; the scenario clearly notes the target individual’s writing strength.
Although not inclined to do the writing, participants felt competent to assume
that task.
We also conjectured that accepting participants would envision more favor-
able outcomes following from acceptance than rejection and vice versa for
rejecting participants. To test this we looked at two types of outcomes: expected
task performance (i.e., project grade, composed of expected individual and group
scores) and social evaluations (i.e., professor and CEO impressions and peer
evaluation). As expected, accepting participants believed that better out-
comes—better task performance as well as social evaluations—would follow
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 165

from acceptance than from rejection [expected task performance, overall:

t(33) ⫽ 4.03, p ⬍ .01; social evaluations, overall: t(33) ⫽ 3.13, p ⬍ .01; expected
outcomes, combined: t(33) ⫽ 4.22, p ⬍ .01; also, see Figs. 2 and 3]. Also as
predicted, rejecting participants made the opposite assessments but only for
their social evaluations: rejection was believed to lead to more positive impres-
sions by professor and CEO and impressions of teammates than would accep-
tance [social evaluation, overall: t(33) ⫽ ⫺3.57, p ⬍ .01; see Fig. 3]. They did
not, however, expect poorer task performance to follow from acceptance than
from rejection [task performance, overall: t(33) ⫽ 1.33, p ⫽ .19]. Again, this
may be because the target person, although disinclined to accept the team-
mates’ offer, was competent at performing the task.
Finally, we tested the efficacy of our good-cop/bad-cop tactic manipulation,
which was highly effective. As shown in Fig. 4, participants who encountered
the traditional bad-cop/good-cop ordering were significantly more likely to ac-
cept the offer than they had been initially (probability of acceptance Mpre ⫽
.60 vs Mpost ⫽ .85), t(38) ⫽ 5.68, p ⬍ .01. Moreover, the reverse ordering had
no significant influence on acceptance rates [Mpre ⫽ .61 vs Mpost ⫽ .59, t(29) ⫽
⫺.05, p ⫽ .95]. How do we explain this negotiating team effect? We begin by
looking at the cognitive underpinnings of this change.
The good-cop/bad-cop tactic and perceptions of the situation and out-
comes. We proposed that divergent negotiator roles would permit specialized
influence on the other party’s perception of the situation i.e., decision tree.
Moreover, because of coordination and selective influence, we argued that the
ordering of good-cop/bad-cop encounters would matter because of assumptions

FIG. 2. Mean assessments of task performance (i.e., expected individual and group project
scores) that would follow from rejection or acceptance of the team’s offer for participants who were
initially accepting or rejecting.
166 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

FIG. 3. Mean assessments of social evaluations (i.e., expected evaluations by professor, CEO,
and teammates) that would follow from rejection or acceptance of the team’s offer for participants
who were initially accepting or rejecting.

about the target person’s initial inclination. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 test the
effects of the tactic on targets’ perceptions of the situation and outcomes.
According to Hypothesis 1, the bad-cop/good-cop ordering would result in
greater overall acceptance among initially rejecting participants than among
initially accepting ones; the opposite results were expected when the ordering
was reversed. To test this hypothesis, we first compared acceptance judgments
made by the two experimental groups (i.e., accepting, rejecting participants)
after being exposed to the bad-cop and good-cop team members, in that order
(i.e., traditional order). We then made the same comparison for groups experi-
encing the tactic in the reverse order. Contrary to our prediction, after their
bad-cop/good-cop encounters, rejecting participants were less likely to accept
relative to their initially accepting peers, although both groups expressed very
high levels of acceptance after this traditional encounter (Mreject ⫽ .80, SD ⫽
.18 vs Maccept ⫽ .90, SD ⫽ .11), F(1, 38) ⫽ 3.99, p ⫽ .05. Consistent with our
prediction, however, after experiencing the tactic in its reverse order rejecting
participants were indeed significantly less likely to accept than were their
accepting peers (Maccept ⫽ .71, SD ⫽ .21 vs Mreject ⫽ .52, SD ⫽ .29), F(1, 28) ⫽
4.30, p ⫽ .04. As well, the two-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects
for both initial inclination and good-cop/bad-cop order, MEincline: F(1, 66) ⫽
8.99, p ⬍ .01, MEorder: F(1, 66) ⫽ 22.89, p ⬍ .01) [interaction term was not
statistically significant, F(1, 66) ⫽ 1.02, p ⫽ .31]. Despite not finding the
anticipated interaction, our hypotheses about the tactics’ effects on rejecting
participants were supported; those about its effects on initially accepting par-
ticipants were not.
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 167

FIG. 4. Mean probability of accepting the negotiating team’s offer before versus after exposure
to the good-cop/bad-cop team, acting in traditional or reverse-traditional ordering.

Dissecting these overall results revealed strong support for Hypothesis 2:

rejecting participants who were exposed to the bad cop lowered their probability
estimates of favorable outcomes resulting from rejection ( pr). The mean change
was ⫺.24, t(19) ⫽ ⫺4.36, p ⬍ .01, when comparing their initial assessments
of a good outcome should they reject (i.e., not agree) to their assessments made
after meeting the bad cop. Also as predicted, these participants’ judgments
about the probability and outcomes associated with the accept action branch
were unaffected by exposure to the bad cop; looking at the difference between
their initial assessment of a good outcome should they accept and their assess-
ment after meeting the first cop, the mean increased only slightly by .02,
t(19) ⫽ ⫺.50, p ⫽ .60.
According to Hypothesis 3, exposing initially accepting participants to the
bad cop will backfire. Because the bad cop argument targets pr and U(R, G)
and highlights potential (erroneous) reasons why good outcomes might follow
from rejection (and then debunks them), these initially accepting participants
may actually learn about the benefits of rejecting the offer. Hence, we predicted
that their estimate of pr would increase after exposure to the bad-cop team
member. This was not the case, however, and in fact results showed the opposite
trend. When comparing accepting participants’ initial probability assessments
of a good outcome following from rejection and their assessments made after
meeting the bad cop, the mean change was ⫺.17, t(19) ⫽ 3.64, p ⬍ .01. Similar
to their initially rejecting peers, they came to believe that it was less likely
that good outcomes would come from rejection. As predicted, exposure to the
bad cop only slightly tempered their judgments about the probability of good
168 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

outcomes should they accept: probability assessments of a good outcome follow-

ing from acceptance decreased by .09, t(19) ⫽ 1.77, p ⫽ .09.
Summarizing these results, we found strong support for our basic conjecture
that good-cop and bad-cop roles have specialized influence on the other party’s
perception of a conflict situation. After experiencing the bad cop, accepting and
rejecting participants alike decreased their assessments that good outcomes
would follow from rejection; moreover, the bad cop had little or no effect on
their assessments of good outcomes following from acceptance. Consistent with
our analysis, the bad cop appeared to target the reject branch of the party’s
decision tree. Correspondingly, exposure to the good cop enhanced assessments
associated with the accept branch (i.e., good outcomes would follow from accep-
tance), although this result was only true for initially accepting participants.
As predicted, the good cop alone had little discernible effect on participants
who were initially rejecting.

Perceptions of good cops and bad cops and the relationships they create. Ex-
posure to the tactic affected more than just perceptions of the decision task;
it also affected impressions of the individuals playing the good cop and bad
cop roles. Because our hypothetical project group was about to embark on its
task, social perceptions and the relationship created among the team members
were very important to assess.
In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that participants would generally view the
good cop more positively than the bad cop. Relative to bad cops, we expected
good cops to be perceived as more fair, open, trustworthy, and less tough,
leading participants to report being more willing to work again with the good
cop than with the bad cop. To test this hypothesis, we combined these five
indices into a single measure representing how positively participants viewed
their teammates. Results strongly supported our hypothesis. The average rat-
ings for good cops and bad cops were 4.26 and 1.94, respectively (using a
REGWQ test, ␣ ⫽ .05, this difference was significant; critical range ⫽ .43).
Next, we predicted that participants initially inclined to accept the writing
task would judge the bad-cop team member more negatively than would their
initially rejecting peers, especially when the bad cop began the negotiation;
the opposite result were predicted when the bad-cop/good-cop order was re-
versed. To test this hypothesis, we averaged three ratings—fairness, trust,
and willingness to work together in the future. When comparing assessments
made by those who encountered the bad cop first, accepting participants rated
him more negatively than did rejecting participants, although this difference
was only marginally significant (Maccept ⫽ 1.93 SD ⫽ .60 vs Mreject ⫽ 2.36,
SD ⫽ .84), F(1, 38) ⫽ 3.41, p ⫽ .06. This was also true when the bad cop was
encountered second (Maccept ⫽ 1.76, SD ⫽ .98 vs Mreject ⫽ 1.93, SD ⫽ 1.20),
F(1, 29) ⫽ 2.93, p ⫽ .09.
We predicted the opposite result for those who encountered the good cop
first, namely accepting participants would rate the good cop more favorably
than would rejecting participants. Although these data were in the predicted
direction (Maccept ⫽ 3.55, SD ⫽ .86 vs Mreject ⫽ 3.42, SD ⫽ 1.02), they were not
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 169

significantly different [F(1, 29) ⫽ .12, p ⫽ .73]. This was also true when the
good cop was encountered second (Maccept ⫽ 5.10, SD ⫽ 1.38 vs Mreject ⫽ 4.45,
SD ⫽ 1.21), F(1, 39) ⫽ .16, p ⫽ .69. Overall, it seems that these roles influenced
social perception independent of participants’ initial inclination, although en-
countering a bad cop first engendered slightly greater disfavor among accepting
versus rejecting participants.
Hypothesis 6 tested a version of the contrast effect (Cialdini, 1984; Rafaeli &
Sutton, 1991): evaluations of good cops and bad cops were expected to be more
extreme when they were made in the context of the other role. For example,
a good cop following a bad cop would have more positive evaluations than
would a good cop making the first encounter. Results for this hypothesis are
presented in Fig. 5. Bad cops who began the negotiation received an average
evaluation of 2.2, whereas those who followed a good cop received a slightly
lower rating of 1.8, F(1, 69) ⫽ 2.23, p ⫽ .14. On the other hand, good cops who
followed bad cops were rated significantly higher than were those who went
first (M ⫽ 4.78 vs M ⫽ 3.49), F(1, 69) ⫽ 21.19, p ⬍ .01. Hence, the contrast
effect is asymmetric, affecting good cops more than bad cops: a bad cop’s evalua-
tion was only slightly more negative when viewed in light of a good cop partner,
whereas a good cop’s evaluation was significantly enhanced by association with
a bad cop.

Discussion

Study 1 looked at the traditional bad-cop/good-cop negotiating team tactic,

showing empirically that the order of these two persuasive appeals matters.
The traditional ordering successfully increased compliance or acceptance rates,

FIG. 5. Mean evaluations of bad cops and good cops when they were encountered first or
second (i.e., after having encountered the other role).
170 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

whereas the identical appeals made in the reverse order had no such effect.
Also, the tactic’s success was greatest when the target was initially rejecting
or unsympathetic to the team’s appeal. Using an analytic model proposed by
Brodt and Duncan (1998), we went beyond these outcome effects and identified
some of the cognitive underpinnings or reasons for the tactic’s success. We
assessed respondents’ subjective probabilities about certain events and also
the values of various outcomes, showing specialized influence of each role on
targets’ perceptions of the situation. Specifically, the bad cop role targeted the
reject branch of the party’s decision tree, decreasing targets’ assessments that
good outcomes would follow from rejection; the role had little or no effect on
assessments of good outcomes following from acceptance. As well, the good
cop role enhanced assessments associated with the accept branch (i.e., good
outcomes would follow from acceptance), although this result was only true
for initially accepting participants.
As well, we found that the roles created distinct impressions, powerfully
influencing interpersonal relationships. Relative to the bad cop, the good cop
was perceived to be more fair, open, trustworthy, and less tough, leading partici-
pants to report being more willing to work with this individual than with the
bad cop. Moreover, encountering the bad cop first engendered somewhat greater
disfavor among initially accepting versus initially rejecting participants. In
organizational contexts (e.g., workgroups), these social implications may prove
to be very consequential. Juxtaposing the roles heightened these distinct im-
pressions, especially for good cops. Relative to assessments made in isolation,
participants perceived good cops more positively in the context of their bad
cop partners; this contrast effect did not occur, however, for bad cops. These
results support and extend the contrast effect proposed by Rafaeli and Sutton
(1991) and Hilty and Carnevale (1993), who also point out the asymmetry
between each role’s sensitivity to contrast effects.
Finally, we showed the generalizability of this negotiating team model well
beyond its original use in police interrogation. In our case, it worked success-
fully in describing and analyzing the dynamics of our simulated three-person
workgroups; moreover, this application brought to light new elements to con-
sider (e.g., social implications for ongoing workgroups).

STUDY 2

Study 1 focused on the overall effectiveness, cognitive underpinnings, and

relational ramifications of the traditional bad-cop/good-cop negotiating team
tactic when compared to its converse, the good-cop/bad-cop tactic. We also
studied the role of a target’s initial inclination. Like prior research, we assumed
that both good cop and bad cop roles were necessary and that psychological
contrast figured centrally into the tactic’s dynamics. Although we indeed
showed the role of psychological contrast and its cognitive underpinnings in
that study, we cannot say for certain that the effect required contrast or both
roles. That is, from Study 1 we do not know how target individuals might react
if faced with two cops but only one approach (e.g., bad cop followed by another
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 171

bad cop). Could a team achieve the same result, for example, without role
differentiation at all? This result would suggest that psychological contrast
might not fully account for our findings. A united front or twofold pressuring
by one’s teammates (i.e., the majority) might prove an even more effective
persuasion strategy than having a mixture of persuasive appeals. In terms of
the analytic model, having two people deliver similar arguments might bolster
one (targeted) branch of the decision tree to such an extent that it dominates
and tips the scales toward acceptance of the team’s offer.
Study 2 was designed to address these questions about a possible majority/
minority effect and clarify this issue. We examine hypotheses from Study 1 in
light of a single appeal or role, again organizing our results in terms of (a) the
tactic’s effects on perceptions and outcomes and (b) the impressions of good
cops and bad cops and the relationships they create.

Method
Participants. Fifty Duke University undergraduate students (7 women, 43
men) participated in the experiment. All were members of a service group and
each received $10 U.S. for participating. (This sample was not significantly
different from that of Study 1.)
Design. The two independent variables were inclination (initially accepting,
rejecting) and role or persuasive appeal (bad cop, good cop). In all cases, a
negotiating team enacted a single role, dividing the persuasive appeal between
them. Both variables were between subject, creating four different combina-
tions: (a) initially accepting target, good-cop/good-cop appeal; (b) initially ac-
cepting target, bad-cop/bad-cop appeal; (c) initially rejecting target, good-cop/
good-cop appeal; and (d) initially rejecting target, bad-cop/bad-cop appeal.
Materials. Materials were identical to those used in Study 1, with one
exception. To create the good-cop/good-cop and bad-cop/bad-cop encounters we
edited the videotapes from Study 1 and divided the teammates’ arguments in
half. So, the first teammate delivered the first part of the good cop or bad cop
argument and the second teammate completed the appeal.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that used in Study 1, with
one exception. Participants in Study 2 received $10 U.S. before leaving the
experiment.

Results and Discussion

Before presenting results about the tactics’ affects on perceptions, outcomes,
and relationships, we first report general efficacy. As expected, the one-sided
approach was not successful in changing compliance or acceptance rates. Parti-
cipants who encountered the good-cop/good-cop combination were no more
likely to comply afterward than initially (Mpre ⫽ .50, SD ⫽ .26 vs Mpost ⫽
.51, SD ⫽ .25), t(22) ⫽ .06, p ⬍ .94, and those who saw the bad-cop/bad-cop
combination were, in fact, significantly less likely to comply (Mpre ⫽ .62,
172 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

SD ⫽ .23 vs Mpost ⫽ .49, SD ⫽ .37), t(26) ⫽ ⫺2.65, p ⬍ .01. This basic finding
was also true for accepting and rejecting participants (Mpre-accept ⫽ .68, SD ⫽
.25 vs Mpost-accept ⫽ .60, SD ⫽ .34), t(23) ⫽ ⫺1.44, p ⬍ .16, (Mpre-reject ⫽ .45,
SD ⫽ .19 vs Mpost-reject ⫽ .41, SD ⫽ .27), t(25) ⫽ ⫺0.83, p ⬍ .41. Their initially
accepting or rejecting inclination was unchanged by exposure to the cops. These
results further strengthen our argument that both roles are needed and that
contrast serves to accentuate the persuasiveness of the (final) good-cop appeal.
Recall that in Study 1 using the traditional bad-cop/good-cop ordering, partici-
pants were more likely to comply after the two encounters than they had been
at the start (Mpre ⫽ .60 vs Mpost ⫽ .85), t(38) ⫽ 5.68, p ⬍ .01, and that this
was not true when the ordering was reversed (Mpre ⫽ .61 vs Mpost ⫽ .59),
t(29) ⫽ ⫺ .05, p ⫽ .95. These pre- and postencounter compliance estimates are
shown in Fig. 6.

Good-cop/good-cop and bad-cop/bad-cop tactics and perceptions of the situa-

tion and outcomes. Did the roles show specialized influence on perceptions
of the conflict situation? Yes and no. As predicted, exposure to the bad cops
decreased targets’ estimates of the benefits associated with rejecting the offer
(M ⫽ ⫺0.12, SD ⫽ .28), t(26) ⫽ ⫺2.21, p ⬍ .03. This was particularly true for
initially rejecting participants (M ⫽ ⫺0.15, SD ⫽ 27), t(13) ⫽ ⫺2.02, p ⬍ .06.
Also as predicted, the bad cops’ appeals had less affect on the accept action
branch (M ⫽ ⫺0.09, SD ⫽ .26), t(26) ⫽ ⫺1.73, p ⬍ .09. Again, this finding was
also true for initially rejecting participants (M ⫽ ⫺0.14, SD ⫽ .29), t(13) ⫽
⫺1.82, p ⫽ .09. The good-cop appeal, however, did not have its predicted affects.

FIG. 6. Mean probability of accepting the negotiating team’s offer before versus after exposure
to the bad-cop/bad-cop, and good-cop/good-cop teams. (Results for bad-cop/good-cop and good-cop/
bad-cop teams are included for completeness.)
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 173

That is, exposure to the good cops did not increase estimates associated with
acceptance (M ⫽ ⫺0.02, SD ⫽ .19), t(22) ⫽ ⫺0.63, p ⬍ .52.
Hence, results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1. We found the same
partial support for our basic conjecture that the two roles have specialized
influence on the target’s perception of the conflict situation. As in Study 1, the
bad cop appeared to target the reject branch of the participant’s decision tree.
After experiencing the bad cop, participants decreased their assessments that
good outcomes would follow from rejection; this exposure had little effect on
their assessments of good outcomes following from acceptance. Also, initial
exposure to the good cop did not have the expected effects on judgments related
to the accept branch.

Perceptions of good cops and bad cops and the relationships they create. Did
exposure to a single tactic, twofold pressuring affect impressions of the individu-
als playing the good cop and bad cop roles? Yes, it did. As in Study 1, distinct
impressions were created, leading participants to view the good cops more
positively than the bad cops in terms of fairness, openness, trustworthiness,
toughness (reverse coded), and willingness to work together in the future (com-
bined score: Mgood ⫽ 3.27, SD ⫽ 1.10 vs Mbad ⫽ 1.99, SD ⫽ 1.11), F(1, 48) ⫽
2.65, p ⬍ .01.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of this article was to examine the familiar good-cop/bad-cop

distributive bargaining tactic, especially the underlying cognitive processes
and the conditions under which the tactic was effective. Results support and
extend previous findings (e.g., Hilty & Carnevale, 1993; Rafaeli & Sutton,
1991), defining more precisely the dynamics of strategic role differentiation
and the contrast effect and supporting the usefulness of the model as an approxi-
mate, albeit simplified, representation of negotiator cognition. As well, by
applying our analysis to a familiar organizational setting (i.e., workgroups),
we enrich our understanding of the tactic and its generalizability beyond its
traditional domain.
We found that the tactic worked successfully in our simulated three-person
workgroup context. In Study 1, target individuals were indeed more likely to
accept an offer after encountering the bad-cop/good-cop team than they were
beforehand. Moreover, as predicted, the order of encounters made a difference:
the tactic’s effect was only found for the traditional order (bad cop followed by
good cop) and not when this order was reversed. However, we did not find the
predicted interaction between initial inclination and good-cop/bad-cop order.
Perhaps future research could study aspects of argumentation to help explain
this finding. One strategy might be to study actual good cops and bad cops in
the field, analyzing the psycholinguistic properties of these encounters and
coding them for certain types of arguments.
174 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

We further analyzed these outcome effects by looking at underlying cognitive

processes, proposing that the two negotiator roles have specialized influence
on the target’s perceptions of the decision situation. Results of both studies
confirmed that the bad cop did indeed target the reject branch. He educated
participants as to possible negative outcomes following from rejection and
lowered their assessments that rejection would lead to good outcomes. This
was especially true for initially rejecting participants. Also as predicted, the
bad cop did not influence judgments about the accept branch; that is, it did
not affect participants’ judgments about probabilities and outcomes following
from acceptance.
In contrast to these results, findings for the good-cop tactic were equivocal.
Although the good cop led participants to increase their estimates of good
outcomes following from acceptance, this was only true for initially accepting
participants in Study 1; good-cop exposure had little discernible effect on per-
sons who were initially rejecting. Although contrary to our general proposition
about specialized influence, this result supports our prediction of an interaction
between the tactic and participants’ initial inclination. We expected initially
rejecting participants to be unaffected by the good-cop appeal, which is exactly
what we found.
However, we also made a counterintuitive prediction about accepting individ-
uals that was not supported by our data. We predicted that when encountering
the bad cop, these participants would be inadvertently educated as to the
benefits of rejection, leading them to increase their assessments that good
outcomes would follow from rejection. We conjectured that the bad cop’s ap-
proach of spelling out (erroneous) reasons why good outcomes might follow
from rejection (and then debunking them) might provide evidence supporting
rejection that these participants might not have entertained. We found, how-
ever, that bad cop exposure lowered all participants’ probability estimates
about good outcomes following from rejection. Perhaps the bad cop’s argument
in our study did not provide enough (incidental) information about the benefits
of saying no. This inadvertent education and incidental learning process is
important to our analysis and we encourage researchers to study this process
in greater detail.
Finally, psychological contrast seemed to be critical to the tactic’s success.
We learned from Study 1 that good cops and bad cops created distinct impres-
sions and that their juxtaposition heightened this difference for good cops.
Relative to assessments made in isolation, our good cops were perceived more
positively in the context of their bad-cop partners; this contrast effect was not
found, however, for bad cops. Moreover, we learned from Study 2 that both
roles were needed to achieve the tactic’s effects. Neither a united front of
two good cops or two bad cops achieved the bad-cop/good-cop effect. In fact,
pressuring applied by two united bad cops backfired and actually lowered
participants’ acceptance levels.
Although we have answered questions through this research, other questions
remain. For example, how the tactic affects initially accepting individuals has
 GOOD COP/BAD COP NEGOTIATING TEAM TACTIC 175

not been addressed satisfactorily. For individuals who are initially rejecting,
the tactic appears to have the predicted effects on cognition and behavior. For
those who are initially accepting, however, the story is less clear. This finding
has both theoretical and practical implications. On the theoretical side, such
asymmetries have been shown in other areas of cognitive functioning (e.g.,
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and it may be fruitful to examine these differences
and integrate them into this growing body of evidence. On the practical side,
we need to understand the tactic’s dynamics when targets are initially accepting
because this proclivity may be quite common in organizational applications.
Although it may be reasonable for police officers to assume an arrestee is
initially rejecting, it may not be reasonable for two faculty members to make
that assumption about a colleague.
As mentioned previously, we showed that the two roles have specialized
influence on perceptions of the decision situation; however, we did not isolate
specific elements of argumentation that produced these effects. Research on
the psycholinguistics of argumentation and persuasion could help understand
these findings. Additionally, it might lend support to our counterintuitive pre-
diction regarding the bad cop’s inadvertent influence on accepting targets.
Our findings about the relationships created by the tactic deserve further
attention. The result of a social interaction like the one simulated in our
experiment extends beyond the agreement to perform a task; individuals must
live up to agreements and deliver on their promises. In our case, they needed
to complete the project, and we found some evidence that participants were
less willing to work with the bad cop again. Given that a target’s negative
feelings may persist for some time, it seems plausible that this tactic might
be reserved for single transactions or for those involving relative strangers.
Hence, do people use this tactic within ongoing relationships, or use it differ-
ently? Also, is a target more receptive within an ongoing work group, especially
as one’s goals and needs become entwined with those of the group? There is
some evidence that people, out of social-relational concerns, often adopt an
influencer’s position “in order to maintain or facilitate a (real or imagined)
relationship” (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1997, p. 715). It may be worth exploring
how the nature of parties’ relationships affect both the use and efficacy of
this tactic.
Finally, although we showed in Study 2 that both appeals are necessary for
the tactic’s success, the question remains as to whether the two roles (and their
associated effects on different aspects of individuals’ cognitive representations)
require two individuals or whether a single person could produce the same
results. Existing evidence suggests that one person can indeed produce these
effects (e.g., Hilty & Carnevale, 1993; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Acting as a
“reformed sinner,” the person transforms from bad cop to good cop without
seeming incoherent, unstable, or untrustworthy and creates the same results
as a negotiating team. The role of a social label or explanation for this transfor-
mation and the cognitive dynamics shown in our studies may help researchers
understand this phenomenon and its boundary conditions.
176 BRODT AND TUCHINSKY

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Received October 28, 1997

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