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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 149

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.
*
G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by

the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

Constitutional Law; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law;

Statutory Construction; There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
“deposit.”—It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be
made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” Nowhere does it appear
nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other
form. If it were the intention to include a “trust account” among
the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express,
or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it
can be fairly deduced that a “trust account” is allowed. In sum,
there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term “deposit.”

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Same; Same; Same; Administrative regulations cannot extend

the law and amend a legislative enactment for settled is the rule
that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law.—The conclusive effect of administrative
construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency
may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there
is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter
or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative
agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it
into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for
settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a
discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.
Same; Same; Same; The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of
its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9.—In the present suit, the DAR
clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and
regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is
no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that
the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” In the
same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29­A
and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh
the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not
commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9
for being null and void.

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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Social Justice; Social justice cannot be invoked

to trample on the rights of property owners who under our
Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.—The
promulgation of the “Association” decision endeavored to remove
all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom
of the farmer. But despite this, cases involving its implementation

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continue to multiply and clog the courts’ dockets. Nevertheless,

we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the
farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must
be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective,
vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important
because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights
of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also
entitled to protection.

PETITIONS for review of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for Land Bank of the
Philippines.
     Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect

the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out
to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner 1
whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. As
eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:

“x x x social justice—or any justice for that matter—is for the

deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper
in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are
called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But
never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice
must always be served,2
for poor and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law.”

______________

1 Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 615 (1992), quoting Justice
Alicia Sempio­Diy.
2 Ibid, p. 616.

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In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that

the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.

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Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745)
and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712)
following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA­
G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private
3
respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and
ruled as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari

and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is

declared null and void insofar as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or
bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit—
not merely ‘earmark,’ ‘reserve’ or ‘deposit in trust’—with
an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the
names of the following petitioners the following amounts
in cash and in government financial instruments—within
the parameters of Sec. 18(1) of RA 6657:

P1,455,207.31 — Pedro L. Yap

P 135,482.12 — Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P15,914,127.77 — AMADCOR;

c) The DAR­designated bank is ordered to allow the

petitioners to withdraw the above­deposited amounts
without prejudice to the final determination of just
compensation by the proper authorities; and
d) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the
just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving
the petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit
evidence and to 2) decide the cases
4
within 30 days after
they are submitted for decision.”

_________________

3 Rollo, p. 7.
4 Rollo, pp. 122­123.

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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

Likewise, petitioners seek the

5
reversal of the Resolution
dated January 18, 1995, denying their motion for
reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings
were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act
No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the
Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of
RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents
questioned the validity
6
of DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 19927 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite
the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally
determine the just compensation of their properties, and
the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts
respectively “earmarked,” “reserved” and “deposited in
trust accounts” for private respondents, and to allow them
to withdraw the same.
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated
February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and
disposition.
As found by respondent court, the following are
undisputed:

“Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that ‘(o)n 4 September 1992 the

transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally
cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred
in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the
request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank
that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been
earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands
covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in
lieu thereof TC­563 and TC­562, respectively, in the names of
listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES ‘C’ & ‘D’)

________________

5 Rollo, p. 149.
6 Which provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated under RA
6657.

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7 Which provides for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of
depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land
expropriated by the DAR.

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154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the

requirement of Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to deposit the
compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.’
(Rollo, p. 6).
“The above allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.
“Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of
Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at
Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by
TCT No. NT­60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in
November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners,
the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual
tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX ‘B’) to pay rentals to the
LandBank for the use of their farm lots equivalent to at least 25%
of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional
Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in
the amount of P135,482.12; that on 24 February 1992, the
Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano
F. Santiago. (ANNEX ‘E’; Rollo, p. 7); that the beneficiaries
stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the
Actual Tiller’s Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay
rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
“The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents
except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was
respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of
Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2)
that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did
not collect any amount as rental from the substituting
beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
“Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development
Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges—with respect to its
properties located in San Francisco, Quezon—that the properties
of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and
another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of
163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to
determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No.

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34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without

notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24
November 1992 (ANNEX ‘F’) fixing the compensation for the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215
hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or
establish a trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of
P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19
December 1991 (ANNEX ‘G’). With respect to petitioner

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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 155

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

AMADCOR’s property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the

property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T­
2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578
hectares; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area
of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988
but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the
compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account
in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of
P12,247,217.83, three notices of acquisition having been
previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8­9)
“The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents
except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to
participate in the DARAB proceedings 8
(land valuation case)
despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100).”

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No.

9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of
trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in
cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR,
the compensation for the land before it is taken and the
titles 9are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA
6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the
DAR and the Landbank merely “earmarked,” “deposited in
trust” or “reserved” the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, 10 the compensation must be
deposited in cash or in bonds.

_________________

8 Rollo, pp. 109­111.

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9 Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.—For purposes of

acquisition of private lands, the following shall be followed:

x x x     x x x     x x x
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

10 Rollo, p. 111.

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156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative

Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its 11
rule­making power
pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR
maintained that the issuance of the “Certificate of Deposit”
by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et
al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
12
Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the
issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance
with Circular Nos. 29, 29­A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where
13
the words
“reserved/deposited” were also used.
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the 14
assailed decision in favor of private respondents.
Petitioners filed a motion for 15
reconsideration but
respondent court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petitions.
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion
to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the
appeal has no merit and is merely16 intended to delay the
finality of the appealed decision. The Court, however,
denied the motion and17
instead required the respondents to
file their comments.
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1)
declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No.
9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of
trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2)

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in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter

of right to the immediate and provisional release of the
amounts deposited in trust pend­

_________________

11 Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations.—The PARC and the DAR shall have
the power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or
procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules
shall take effect ten (10) days after the publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
12 Rollo, pp. 111­112.
13 Rollo, p. 112.
14 Rollo, p. 107.
15 Rollo, p. 149.
16 Rollo, p. 63.
17 Rollo, p. 67.

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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 157

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

ing the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain
that the word “deposit” as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way
excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of
deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account
as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative
Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to
promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the
declared policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657
provides as follows:

“Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands—x x x

x x x     x x x.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. x x x x x x x x.” (italics supplied)

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It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made

only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” Nowhere does it appear
nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any
other form. If it were the intention to include a “trust
account” among the valid modes of deposit, that should
have been made express, or at least, qualifying words
ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced
that a “trust account” is allowed. In sum, there is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded construction of the term “deposit.”
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is
not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting
with either the letter or the spirit of
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158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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18
a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed
that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing
the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot19
extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing 20
rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the
limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in
“LBP bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke
LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29­A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear
provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not
commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular
No. 9 for being null and void.

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Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private

respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts
deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final
resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their
properties, petitioners assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction
between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 and

_______________

18 Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425, 432 (1992).
19 Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, 202 SCRA 507, 54 (1991) citing
Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 (1970), citing Santos vs. Estenzo, 109
Phil. 419 (1960); Animos vs. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214,
223­224 (1989).
20 Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162 SCRA
628 (1988).

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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 159

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payment
21
of final compensation as provided under Section
18 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of
the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his
behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon
by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged
by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the
trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection
by the landowner because the latter amount is only
provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the
property pending final valuation. To further bolster the
contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in
the case of “Association of Small Landowners
22
in the Phil.
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.”

“The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is

divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full
of just compensation, in contravention of a well­accepted principle
of eminent domain.
x x x     x x x     x x x
“The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds

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with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
x x x     x x x     x x x
“Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due
process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully
paid for must also be rejected.”

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by

respondent court in discarding petitioners’ assertion as it
found that:

“x x x          x x x despite the ‘revolutionary’ character of the

expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme
Court, in the

______________

21 Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation.—The LBP shall

compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR and LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.
22 175 SCRA 343.

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160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that ‘payments of

the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money’—even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case ‘that
the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other’—the Supreme Court in said case did not
abandon the ‘recognized rule . . . that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to 23the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just compensation.” (Italics supplied)

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The

ruling in the “Association” case merely recognized the
extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken
under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and
recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however,
dispense with the settled rule that there must be full
payment of just compensation before the title to the
expropriated property is transferred.

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The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit

of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is
unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf
as compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR’s valuation, and notwithstanding that
they have already been deprived of the possession and use
of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents’ properties was painful enough for them. But
petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding
that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in
exchange for the taking, under an authority (the
“Association” case) that is, however, misplaced. This is
misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the
Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between
provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising
the landowners’ right to appropriate the same. The
immediate effect in both situations is the same, the
landowner is deprived of the use and possession

_______________

23 Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 14.

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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 161

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

of his property for which he should be fairly and

immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the
cardinal rule that:

“x x x     x x x within the context of the State’s inherent power of

eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered ‘just’ for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before 24
actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.” (Italics supplied)

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The promulgation of the “Association” decision endeavored

to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program 25
and clear the
way for the true freedom of the farmer. But despite this,
cases involving its implementation continue to multiply
and clog the courts’ dockets. Nevertheless, we are still
optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers
from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be
stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective,
vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners, who under 26
our
Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

     Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), On official leave.

______________

24 Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 207, 213

(1990) citing Cosculluela vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA
393,400 (1988); Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya,
153 SCRA 291, 302 (1987).
25 175 SCRA 343, 392.
26 Mata vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 748, 753 (1992).

162

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in

court, the landowners cannot be deprived of its right over
the land. (Greater Balanga Dev. Corp vs. Municipality of
Balanga, 239 SCRA 436 [1994])

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