DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE

Interference with contract or business

SUBJECT

Law of Torts

NAME OF THE FACULTY

Prof. Dr. P. Sri Devi

Name of the Candidate

Sriya Sindhoor Kompally

Roll No. & Semester

1st SEMESTER

2017093

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Acknowledgement ---------------------------------------------------------- Page 3

 Abstract ---------------------------------------------------------- Page 4
 Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------- Page 5
 Various elements -----------------------------------------------------------
 Related case laws
 Conclusion ----------------------------------------------------------- Page 19
 Bibliography ----------------------------------------------------------- Page 20

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I want to express my special thanks to my teacher Prof. Dr.P.Sridevi ma’am who gave me
this golden opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic ‘interference with contract
or business’ , which also helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know about a lot
of things.

Secondly, I would also like to thank my friends and seniors who helped me in finishing the
project.

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ABSTRACT :

Tortious interference is the legal term that describes an intentional interference with
contractual relations. The definition of tortious interference includes the wrongful
interference in a business relationship. Based on common law tort and contract principles,
courts can order damages to compensate individuals or business owners for economic harm
caused by someone who tortiously interferes with their business relationships. State laws vary
as to the specific principles required for a party to successfully assert a tortious interference
claim.

Tortious interference occurs when someone wrongfully interferes with your business
relationship. If you are a small-business owner, you can sue another party for tortiously or
wrongfully interfering with your business relationships. For example, if a competitor contacts
your employee and persuades him to leave your company to work for him or persuades a
customer to breach a contract with you, you may sue him for tortious interference.

Damages

Courts can award damages to contracting parties who prove tortious interference. They may
award actual or compensatory damages if you can prove the amount of harm actually
suffered. Courts may award expectation damages or the amount of lost profits or foregone
business opportunities and expected profits had the tortious interference not occurred. You
may also receive punitive damages if you can prove emotional distress. Courts may order an
injunction or award you equitable relief by ordering the losing party to refrain from further
attempts to contact your customers or employees.

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INTRODUCTION:

Tortious interference with contract or business expectancy occurs when a person intentionally
damages the plaintiff’s contractual or other business relationship with a third person. This
common law tort strikes a delicate balance between two ideals: the promotion of healthy
economic competition and the protection of existing or reasonably certain prospective
contractual relations

Basic principle is that "every act of another which unlawfully interferes with the enjoyment
of personal property is a tort for which an action shall lie." 

In order to support a claim for tortious interference with contract there must also be proof of a
contractual relationship. A claim for tortious interference with business relations, however,
may be actionable even when there is no contract. "Business relations" has been broadly
defined to include inchoate rights which a party has or hopes to have.

Basic Elements A plaintiff must establish four elements in order to state a prima facie cause
of action for tortious interference with an existing contract:

1. Existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy;

2. Knowledge of the contractual relationship or expectancy by the defendant;

3.Intentionalinterference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the contractual
relationship or expectancy

4. Resultant damage to the party whose contractual relationship or expectancy has been
disrupted

Actual Malice is not an Essential Element of the Claim A key component of a tortious
interference with contract claim is the third party’s intent as summarized by a noted treatise
as follows: it is clear that liability is to be imposed only if the defendant intends to interfere
with the plaintiff’s contractual relations, at least in the sense that he acts with knowledge that
interference will result, and if, in addition, he acts for an improper purpose. This emphasis on
intent occasionally misleads counsel into believing that that a plaintiff must prove malice in
the traditional sense of ill-will or spite.

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The various elements include:

INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT:

It is tortious to knowingly and without lawful justification induce one person to make a
breach of a subsiding contract with another as a result which that other person suffers
damage.

LUMLEY vs. GYE,1

In this case, the inducement to make a breach of contract was recognised as an independent
tort. In this case, Johanna Wagner, a famous operatic singer, was under a contract to sing for
the plaintiff. The defendant paid her a large sum of money to induce her to break her contract
with the plaintiff and to sing for the defendant. The defendant was held liable.

Inducement can be in various ways:

i.By direct inducement:

The defendant must do the same either by offering some temptation to one of the parties to
make a breach of his contract, for example, by offering higher remuneration to a servant than
he is already receiving under a subsiding contract or by giving some threat of harm if the
contract is kept alive, say a threat of strike until the plaintiff is dismissed. Mere advice is not
actionable. If a person breaks his contract of service because of medical advice, or a girl
breaks her contract of marriage on her parent’s advice, no action can be brought either against
the doctor or the parent for inducing the breach of contract. It is however, possible that the
person making a breach of contract of service or of marriage may himself be liable for the
breach of contract.

ii.By doing some act which renders the performance physically impossible:

Examples of it are, physically detaining one of the parties to the contract or removing the
tools which are necessary for the performance of the contract with a view to preventing the
performance of the contract.

1
(1853) 2 E & B. 216 : 95 R.R. 501.

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iii.knowingly doing an act, which if done by one of the parties to the contract, would
have been a breach of the contract.

G.W.K LTD. vs DUNLOP RUBBER COMPANY LTD2

this case is a good illustration of this kind of interference. G.W.K. LTD, who were the
manufacturers of car, had entered into a contract with A Co. that all cars manufactured by the
former were to be fitted with the tyres manufacture by the latter whenever the cars were sent
to exhibitions. When the cars were sent to an exhibition, Dunlop Rubber Co., knowing about
the above-stated contract, secretly removed such tyres from two of the cars and replaced them
with the tyres of their own manufacture. The defendants were held liable towards A. Co. for
interference with the contract and towards G.W.K. LTD. for trespass to the goods.

The rule that inducement of breach of contract is a tort is subject to the following
qualifications:

i. Although inducing the breach of subsiding contract is a tort, there is no wrong to

persuade a person to refrain from entering into a contract. It is also no tort to persuade
a person to refrain from entering into a contract. It is also no tort to persuade a person
to terminate an existing contract lawfully.

ALLEN vs. FLOOD3

There the plaintiffs, who were shipwrights, were employed by the shipowners to make repairs
of woodwork on the ship. Their services were terminable at will. Due to some past
grievances, some iron workers objected to the plaintiff’s employment there and through their
representative, the defendant, they conveyed to the shipowners a warning that unless the
plaintiffs were dismissed the very day. Since the services of the plaintiffs were terminable
lawfully, the House of Lords held that howsoever malicious motive the defendants may be
having, the plaitiffs had no cause of action.

ii.

GENU GANAPATI vs. BHALACHANDVJIVRAJ4

2
(1926) 42 T.L.R. 376
3
(1898) A.C. 1.
4
A.I.R. 1981 Bom. 170

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A filed a suit against B, one of the allegations against B was that by a suit against A & C, he
had procured a breach of contract between A & C, viz. he had prevented A from performing
the contract, which A had entered into with C.
It was however found that there was another contract between B and C regarding the same
subject-matter and what B had done was to enforce his own contractual rights. The result of
B’s suit was that A was simply not able to reap the benefit of his contract with C. it was held
that A had not been prevented from performing the contract, but from reaping any benefit
under the contract. Under these circumstances, B was held not liable for interfering with
contract or business of A.

(ii) Inducing breach of such agreements which are null and void is not actionable. Thus, no
action lies to induce the breach of a wagering agreements or an infant;s agreement which is
oppressive and unreasonable.

(iii) An action lies when the inducement to make a breach of contract is without any
justification. Inducing the breach with a justification is good defence.

BIRMELOW vs. CASSON,5

In this case, it was held that members of an actor’s protection society were justified in
inducing a theatre manager to break his contract with the plaintiff, who paid his chorus girls
such low wages that they were forced to resort to prostitution. A father is also justified in
persuading his daughter to make a breach of contract of marriage with a scoundrel.

(iv) A statutory exception to the rule has been created by the (English) Trade Disputes Act,
1906. According to Sec. 3 of the Act:
“an act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be
actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of
employment or that it is an interference with the trade, business or employment of some other
person or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or labour as he wills.”

A similar provision has been made by Sec. 18(1), the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926, which
says:
5
(1924) 1 Ch. 302

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“No suit or other legal proceeding shall be maintainable against any registered Trade Union
or any officer or member thereof in resoect of any act done in contemplation or furtherance of
a trade dispute to which a member of the Trade Union is a party on the ground only that such
act induces some other person to break a contract of employment, or that is an interference
with the trade, business or employment of some other person or with the right of some other
person to dispose of his capital or of his labour as he wills.”

INTIMIDATION:
Intimidation is now an established tort. It “signifies a threat delivered by A to B whereby A
intentionally causes B to act (or refrain from acting) either to his own detriment or to the
detriment of C.” the essence of the wrong is the use of unlawful threats. The person
threatened may either be compelled to act to his own detriment or detriment of some third
person. Threatening a person with violence if he passes a particular way, continues his
business, or performs a particular contract, are the examples where a person may be
compelled to act to his own detriment.

ROOKES vs. BARNARD:6

This case is an important authority recognizing the tort of intimidation where a person may
be threatened to act to the detriment of some third person. The facts of the case are as
follows: the plaintiff was employed as draughtsman by British Overseas Airways Corporation
(B.O.A.C.) in their design office at London airport. The defendants were the officials of the
association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen (A.E.S.D), a registered trade
union. All members of the union had contracted with B.O.A.C that they will not resort to any
strike in the event of any dispute. The plaintiff resigned the membership of the union in the
design office passed a resolution and thereby decided to inform the B.OA.C. That if the
plaintiff was not dismissed, the members of the A.E.S.D. union will withdraw their labour.
The B.O.A.C was informed of the resolution by the defendants. In due course, the
corporation acceded to the threat and dismissed the plaintiff after giving him due notice. The
plaintiff did not have any remedy against the B.O.A.C. to terminate his services.

6
(1964) A.C. 1129

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It was held by the House of Lords that the threat to withdraw labour if the plaintiff’s services
were not terminated constituted intimidation and since the plaintiff suffered thereby, he was
entitled to succeed in his action.

It was contended on behalf of the defendants that to constitute intimidation, threatened

unlawful act should be either some violence or the commission of tort, a threat to make a
breach of the contract is not enough. The House of Lords rejected this contention.

Lord Reid said: “I can see no difference in principle between a threat to break a contract and
a threat to commit a tort. Threatening a breach of contract may be a much more coercive
weapon than threatening a tort, particularly when the threat is directed against a company or
corporation”
Another contention by the defendants was that even though there was a threat to break a
contract the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants because the plaintiff was a
stranger to the contract which was threatened to be broken. This argument was also rejected
by the House because the basis of the plaintiff’s action was a tort resulting in damage to
himself, rather than the breach of contract, for which the intimidated party could
independently bring a separate action.

To constitute the wrong of intimidation, there must be a threat to do an unlawful act to

compel a person to do something to his own detriment or to the detriment of somebody else.
If the threat is to do something which is not unlawful or the threat does not cause any
detriment, there is no intimidation.

VENKATA SURYA RAO vs. NANDIPATI MUTTAYYA7

In this case, a well-to-do agriculturist pleaded his inability to pay the arrears of land revenue
and the village munsif threatened to distrain the earrings worn by him if no other movable
property was readily available. The village goldsmith was also called but on his arrival, one
of the villagers made the necessary payment. Since the threat was not to do something
unlawful and had not compelled the plaintiff to do something to his detriment, it was held
that there was no intimidation in this case.

7
A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 382

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CONSPIRACY:
When two or more persons without lawful justification, combine for the purpose of wilfully
causing damage to the plaintiff and actual damage results therefrom, they commit the tort of
conspiracy. Conspiracy is both a tort and a crime.

Criminal conspiracy is different from conspiracy as tort. Under criminal law, merely an
agreement between the parties to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is actionable.
If it is not necessary that the conspirators must have acted in pursuance of their agreement.
The tort of conspiracy is, however, not committed by a mere agreement between the parties,
the tort is completed only when actual damage results to the plaintiff.

When the object of persons combining is to protect or further their own interest rather than
causing damage to the plaintiff, that is a justification for their combination and they will not
be liable even though their concerted act causes damage to the plaintiff.

MOGUL STEAMSHIP COMPANY vs. McGREGOR, GOW AND COMPANY8

The defendants, certain firms of shipowners, who had been engaged in tea carrying trade
between China and Europe, combined together and offered reduced freight with a view to
monopolise the trade and the result was that plaintiff, a rival trader, was driven out of the
trade. The plaintiff brought an action for conspiracy. The House of Lords held that the
defendants were no liable for that because their object was a lawful one i.e. to protect and
promote their own business interests and they had used no unlawful means for achieving the
same.

SORREL vs. SMITH9

Similar was the decision in this case. The plaintiff, a retail newsagent, who was accustomed
to take his newspapers from R, withdrew his custom from R and started taking the
newspapers from W. The defendants, members of a committee of circulation managers of
London daily papers, threatening the cutting off the supply of newspapers to W, if W
continued to supply newspapers to the plaintiff.
Since the defendants had acted to promote their business interests, they were held not liable.
The following two prepositions were laid down:

8
(1892) A.C.. 25
9
(1925) A.C. 700

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 (1.)A combination of two or more persons wilfully to injure a man in his trade is an
unlawful act and, if it results in damage to him, it is actionable.
(2.)If the real purpose of the combination is not to injure another, but to forward or
defend the trade of those who enter into it, then no wrong is committed and no action
will lie although damage to another ensues.

The distinction between the two classes of cases is sometimes expressed by saying that in
cases of the former class there is not, while in cases of the latter class there is, just cause or
excuse for the action taken.

CROFTER HAND WOVEN HARRIS TWEED COMPANY LIMITED vs. VEITCH10

This is another illustration of a combination for a lawful purpose. There the defendants, a
trade union, instructed dockers, who were members of the union, to refuse to handle the
plaintiff’s goods (without there being any breach of contract). The object of this embargo was
to prevent competition in the yarn trade and thus help to secure economic stability of the
industry and thereby increase the wage prospects of the union members in the mills. It was
held that since the above action by the union was to promote the interest of its members, there
was no conspiracy.

SCALA BALLROOM (Wolverhampton) LTD. vs. RATCLIFF11

In this case, a combination to protect other than economic interests has also been considered
to be with justification. The plaintiffs in that case had refused to admit coloured persons to
their ballroom. With a view to compel the plaintiffs to remove the colour bar, the defendants,
officials of a musician’s union, served a notice on the plaintiffs that if the colour bar was not
removed, its members would not be permitted to play orchestra at the ballroom. The court
refused to issue injunction to restrain the defendants from making the proposed persuasion to
its members.

If the purpose of the association is to injure the plaintiff rather than the promotion of
legitimate interests, an action lies.

HUNTELEY vs. THORNTON12

10
(1942) A.C. 435
11
(1958) 1 W.L.R. 1057
12
(1957) 1 W.L.R. 321; (1957) 1 All E.R. 234

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In this case, the plaintiff, a member of a union, refused to comply with union’s call for strike.
The defendants, the secretary and some members of the union, wanted the expulsion of the
plaintiff from the union but the executive council of the union decided not to do that. The
defendants acting out of grudge against the plaintiff made efforts to see that the plaintiff
remained out of work. The defendants were liable as their acts, after the decision of the
union’s executive council, were not in furtherance of any union interest but were actuated by
malice and grudge.

QUINN vs. LEATHEM13

In this case, also there was found to be malicious motive on the part of the defendants, certain
trade union officials. The plaintiff was a wholesale butcher and the defendants objected to his
employing the non-union labour. The defendant requested the plaintiffs to replace the non-
union labour defendants approached one of the plaintiff’s regular and big customer with the
threats of use of force against him if he continued to purchase meat from the plaintiff. The
customer stopped taking meat from the plaintiff, who suffered a loss thereby. The plaintiff
was held entitled to claim compensation from the defendants.

MALICIOUS FALSEHOOD

Malicious falsehood consists in making malicious statements concerning the plaintiff to some
third person adversely affecting the pecuniary interests of the plaintiff. This wrong is akin to
defamation, a statement made to a third person, causes damage to the plaintiff. However, the
two wrongs are much different. In defamation, the plaintiff’s interest affected is the
reputation, in malicious falsehood, it is the pecuniary interest. Further, in defamation, malice
in the sense of an evil motive is not necessary. For the wrong of malicious falsehood, an evil
motive is one of the essential ingredients of the wrong.

Malicious falsehood has a common point with the wrong of deceit and that is, the false
statement made by the defendant causes loss to the plaintiff.

But the two wrongs are to be distinguished by the fact that in deceit, the statement is made to
the plaintiff himself who suffers by acting upon it whereas in malicious falsehood, the false

13
(1901) A.C. 495

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statement is made to a third party in a way that proves injurious to the plaintiff’s pecuniary
interests.

A malicious statement by the defendant that the plaintiff’s business has been closed down
would result in pecuniary loss to the plaintiff because the natural consequence of that is the
loss of his custom. It is malicious falsehood for which the defendant would be liable.

The Defamation Act, 1952 makes it unnecessary to prove special damage in case of
malicious falsehood (a) if the words upon which action is founded are calculated to cause
pecuniary damage to the plaintiff and are published in writing or other permanent form or (b)
if the said words are calculated to cause the plaintiff pecuniary damage in respect of any
offence, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of
publication.

Important forms of this wrong are slander of title and slander of goods. In the former, there is
a false and malicious statement about a person’s property or business and does not relate
necessarily to his personal reputation, but to his title to property or his business or generally
to his material interest. For example, a false assertion that the defendant has a lien over the
plaintiff’s goods or he has a better title to them than that of the plaintiff is slander of title.
When the disparaging statement relates to goods, it is known as slander of goods, for
example, allegation of defects in the goods manufactured by the plaintiff. The obvious effect
of such statement is to depreciate the value of the plaintiff’s goods. The law permits making
of statement, however false and malicious, whereby a trader claims his goods to be better
than those of his rival traders but makes it actionable when there is false and malicious
depreciation of the quality of another’s goods.

PASSING OFF:

It is a wrong by which s trader uses deceptive devices to push up his sales and allows his
goods to pass off under the impression that the goods are of some other person.
“No man can have any right to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else.

If somebody uses the same or the similar name for his product as that of the plaintiff or by
the get-up makes it appear that they are the plaintiff’s goods, the wrong of passing off is
constituted. The defendant’s liability arises even without the proof of any knowledge of

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intention to deceive. It is also not necessary to prove that the plaintiff has suffered any
damage thereby because damage is presumed. “All that need be proved is that the defendant’s
goods are so marked, made up, or so described by them as to be calculated to mislead
ordinary purchasers and to lead them to mistake the defendant’s goods, for the goods of the
plaintiff.

PASSING OFF DISTINGUISHED FROM DECEIT:

1. In an action for fraud or deceit, there is deception of the plaintiff, who alleges that he
himself has been misled by the statement, whereas in passing off, the deception is not
that of the plaintiff, but of somebody else.

2. In an action for deceit, the plaintiff claims compensation for the loss caused to him as
a consequence of his being deceived, but in an action for passing off, the plaintiff
seeks to protect his proprietary right in his goodwill or business, which is threatened
by the deception, or confusion or the likelihood of the deception or confusion of
others.
3. The wrong of deceit is constituted when the plaintiff has been actually deceived,
whereas in an action for passing off, the likelihood of the deception of, or confusion
amongst others is enough. Thus, in passing off, actual deception need not be proved.
4. Since in deceit, the action can be brought only when the wrong is completed, an
action for damages is the only and the proper remedy, whereas an action for passing
off can be brought even though there is likelihood of others being deceived or
confused, the remedy of injunction is also available for the same.

An action for the tort of passing off involves a combination of two elements, viz.

(i) That certain name had become distinctive of the plaintiff’s goods, and
(ii) That the defendant’s use of that name was likely to deceive and thus cause
confusion and injury to the business reputation of the plaintiff.
ELLORA INDUSTRIES vs. BANARSI DAS14

14
A.I.R. 1980 Delhi 254, at p. 256

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The purpose of this tort is to protect commercial goodwill; to ensure that the people’s
business reputation are not exploited. Since business “goodwill” is an asset, and therefore
species of property, the law protects it against encroachment as such. The tort is based on
economic policy, the need to encourage enterprise and to ensure commercial stability. It
secures a reasonable area of monopoly to traders. It is thus complimentary to trade marks and
the passing off action, for, while registration of relevant mark, itself gives title to the
registered owner, the onus in a passing off action lies upon the plaintiff to establish the
existence of business reputation which he seeks to protect. The asset protected is the
reputation, the plaintiff’s business has in the relevant market. This is a complex thing. It is
manifested in the various indicia which lead the client or customer to associate the business
with the plaintiff; such as the name of the business, whether real or adopted, the mark, design,
make up or colour of the plaintiff’s goods, the distinctive characteristics of services he
supplies or the nature of his special processes. And it is around encroachments upon such
indicia that passing off actions arise. What is protected is an economic asset.”

Facts of the above case:

The plaintiffs Banarsi Dass and Brothers were the registered proprietors of the trade mark
‘ELLORA’ in respect of watches, time pieces, clocks and their parts. They had been selling
clocks under this trade name since 1955. The defendants manufactured time pieces with the
trade mark ‘Gragon’ printed on the dial of the timepieces. On the card board container
containing the timepiece was printed : ‘ELLORA INDUSTRIES GARGON (PUNJAB)’ the
defendants adopted it as their trading style in 1962. The plaintiffs brought an action
requesting for an injunction to restrain the defendants from using the mark ‘ELLORA’ or any
other similar mark and to prevent them from passing off their goods as the goods of the
plaintiffs. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the injunction because it was a clear
case of passing off and also of infringement of the plaintiffs’ registered trade mark.

SCOTCH WHISKY ASSOCIATION vs. PRAVARA SAHAKAR15

in this case, the plaintiffs distill scotch whiskey and market it all over the world. They use
various well-known brand names or devices showing well-known Scottish figures or Scottish
soldiers or Scottish Headgears or Scottish emblems.
The defendants, manufacturing whiskey in India, use similar figures, with label, carton,
devise suggesting Scottish origin of the whisky, and they also use the word “Scotch” coupled
15
A.I.R. 1992 Bom. 294

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with the description “Blended with Scotch.” The plaintiffs were held entitled to temporary
injunction against the defendants as the act of the defendants amounted to passing their
whisky as that of the plaintiffs.

KALA NIKETAN, KAROL BAGH, NEW DELHI (plaintiff) vs. KALA NIKETAN G-
10 (Basement) SOUTH EXTENSION MARKET-1, NEW DELHI16
In this case, the plaintiff was carrying on business of selling sarees under the name ‘kala
niketan’ in Karol Bagh, New Delhi for more than 20 years. He had spent a lot of amount on
advertisement and had achieved unique reputation, name and the goodwill in the market, and
the business turnover was in several lacs. The defendant adopted the same trade name ‘kala
niketan’ and started his business in sarees in South Extension Area, New Delhi.

In an action for injunction against the defendant against the use of trade name ‘Kala Niketan’
in Karol Bagh, New delhi for more than 20 years. He has spent a lot of amount on
advertisement and had achieved unique reputation, name and goodwill in the market, and the
business turnover was in several lacs. The defendant adopted the same trade name ‘kala
niketan’ and started his business in sarees in South Extension area, New Delhi.
In an action for injunction against the defendant against the use of trade name ‘kala niketan’
it was held that the disputed name ‘kala niketan’ had become distinctive of the plaintiff’s
business and the defendant’s use of the same name was calculated to deceive or cause
confusion and injury to the business reputation of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was, therefore,
entitled to a permanent injunction.

M/s. VIRENDRA DRESSES vs. M/s. VARINDER GARMENTS17

in this case, the plaintiffs were carrying on the business of ready-made garments under the
name and style of “Virendra Dresses”.
Two years thereafter, the defendants started the same kind of business in the same street
under the name and style of “Varinder Garments” it was held that the two trade names of the
plaintiffs and the defendants were not distinctly different but were similar. This was likely to
mislead the people, and the plaintiffs were likely to suffer in business and reputation if the
defendants were allowed to carry on that business that way. The plaintiffs were therefore held
entitled to an interim injunction till the decision of the suit by the trail court.

16
A.I.R. 1983 Delhi 161
17
A.I.R. 1982 Delhi 482

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If the defendant puts up his product with a similar get-up as that of the plaintiff but with a
different name, the wrong is constituted if the public is used to purchasing that article with
the description of get-up rather than by its name.

REDDAWAY vs. BANHAM18

In this case, the plaintiffs had for some years manufactured and sold “Camel Hair Belting”
and by the product being for a long time and exclusively associated with the plaintiff, it came
to be understood not only belting made from camel hair, but also belting manufactured by the
plaintiffs. The defendant, subsequently started manufacturing and selling belting made from
camel hair, marketing it also as “Camel Hair Belting”. It was taken to be misleading the
purchasers, and passing off the defendants’ goods as those of the plaintiffs’. It was held that
the defendants the same from that of the plaintiffs’ and an injunction was issued restraining
the defendants from marking their product as “Camel Hair Belting”.

It may be noted that the action for passing off is available to a trader for the protection of his
proprietary right in his goodwill or business. This remedy is not available to the consumers of
goods or services who allege deception or confusion, or the likelihood thereof, by the use of
some particular mark by a trader or manufacturer.

CONCLUSION:

18
(1896) A.C. 199

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 Tortious interference with contract is a business tort that allows two parties to a contract to
hold a third person liable if that person interfered with the contract in a way that caused one
or both of the parties to suffer damages. It is related to the tort of tortious interference with
business expectancy. The primary difference between these two types of tortious
interference – contract and business expectancy – is that the first one requires the two parties
to have a contract, while the second one applies to any kind of business relationship.

In order to prove a case of tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must be able to

demonstrate all of the following things are true:
 the plaintiff had a contract with another person or business,
 the defendant knew about the contract,
 the defendant deliberately acted in a way that would cause a breach of contract,
 the breach of contract occurred, and
 the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.

A defendant in a tortious interference with contracts case may be held liable for causing a
breach of contract between the plaintiff and the other contracting party in a number of
different ways. For instance, the defendant may have encouraged, threatened, or coerced one
of the parties to the contract into breaching. The defendant may also have interfered by
making it impossible for one of the parties to meet its obligations under the contract with the
intent that being unable to hold up its end of the bargain would force one of the parties to
breach the contract.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY:
 R.K. Bhangia, Law of Torts
 Ratanlal Dhirajlal, Law of Torts

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