VIRGINIA A.
SUGUE and THE HEIRS OF RENATO LA rendered a decision, declaring that Sugue and
S. VALDERRAMA, vs. TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL
(PHILS.), INC.,
G.R. No. 164804 & G.R. No. 164784 JANUARY 30,
2009
FACTS:
Triumph hired Sugue as its Assistant Manager for
Marketing and was subsequently promoted to
Marketing Services Manager on the other hand,
Valderrama was hired as Direct Sales Manager.
Their main function/responsibility was to ensure that
the company’s sales targets and objectives were met.
Triumph’s top management began to notice a sharp
decline in the sales of the company. On June 1,
2000, Sugue and Valderrama filed a complaint with
the NLRC against Triumph for payment of money
claims arising from allegedly unpaid vacation and
sick leave credits, birthday leave and 14th month pay
for the period 1999-2000.
Sugue and Valderrama personally attended the
preliminary conference of the said case. The
following day, a memorandum was issued by
Triumphs Managing Director/General Manager
Escueta, reminding all department heads of existing
company policy that requires department heads to
notify him before leaving the office during work hours.
Valderrama and Sugue were directed to submit a
written explanation as to why they used company
time and the company vehicle and driver in attending
the preliminary conference at the NLRC and why they
left the office without advising the Managing Director.
They explained that they believed they may use
company time and vehicle. Triumph charged the one-
half day utilized by Sugue and Valderrama in
attending the NLRC hearing to their vacation leave
credits.
Valderrama alleged that his request for sick leave on
those dates was disapproved because he failed to
submit a medical certificate as required by the
company’s rules and policies. Triumph issued a show
cause memo to Valderrama requiring him to explain,
within 48 hours from receipt. Valderrama wrote the
company a letter stating that he considered himself
constructively dismissed due to the unreasonable
pressures and harassments he suffered the past
months. His continued absences without official leave
made Triumph decide to terminate his employment
for abandonment of work.
Sugue also wrote the company stating that she
considers herself constructively dismissed. Her
charge of constructive dismissal was based on the
fact that her request for vacation leave was subject to
the condition that she first submits a report on the
company’s 2001 Marketing Plan. Triumph required
Sugue to explain why she should not be terminated
for continued absences without official leave. Sugue
failed to comply, thus, her employment was
terminated for abandonment of work.
Valderrama were constructively dismissed.
Triumph filed an appeal with the NLRC, and the latter
granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of Labor
Arbiter
Sugue and Valderrama elevated the matter to the CA
by way of a petition for certiorari and the latter partly
granted, set aside NLRC and the decision of labor
arbiter is reinstated, subject to the deletion of the
award of attorneys fees and the reduction of the
award of moral damages for each of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Valderama and Sugue were
constructively dismissed, and are entitled to
separation pay, backwages and damages.
RULING:
No. Constructive dismissal is defined as an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to an employee.
Sugue and Valderrama’s theory that Triumphs acts of
harassment, upon which they base their charge of
constructive dismissal, were in retaliation for their
filing of the aforementioned complaint for unpaid
benefits. The acts that purportedly show
discrimination and bad faith on the part of Triumph.
With respect to the first alleged discriminatory act, we
can conceive of no reason to ascribe bad faith or
malice to Triumph for charging to the leave credits of
Sugue and Valderrama the half-day that they spent in
attending the preliminary conference of the case they
instituted against Triumph. It is fair and reasonable
for Triumph to do so considering that Sugue and
Valderrama did not perform work for one-half day on
June 19, 2000.
 
As the NLRC correctly pointed out, as early as the
case of J.B. Heilbronn Co. v. National Labor Union,
this Court held that:
“The age-old rule governing the relation between
labor and capital or management and employee is
that a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor." If there
is no work performed by the employee there can be
no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was
able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
locked out, dismissed or suspended. It is hardly fair
or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate
against his employer on the employer's time.”
Regarding Sugue and Valderrama’s claim that they
were unjustly denied availment of their leaves as part
of a scheme on the part of Triumph to harass them,
the Court find the same patently without merit. In the
case of Valderrama, he applied for sick leave but this
was disapproved by Triumph. The record, however,
reveals that he failed to comply with the company’s
requirement for the application for sick leave for two
or more days must be supported by a medical
certificate, which must be verified by the company
physician.
In the case of Sugue, we find nothing discriminatory
in such a condition considering that she was unable
to show that she was the only employee whose leave
application has been subjected to a condition.
Discrimination is the failure to treat all persons
equally when no reasonable distinction can be found
between those favored and those not favored. As for
the nature of the condition itself, we do not see how it
can be deemed unreasonable or in bad faith for the
employer to require its employee to complete her
assignments on time or before taking a vacation
leave.
 
It is worth stressing that in the grant of vacation and
sick leave privileges to an employee, the employer is
given leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement,
as the grant of vacation and sick leave is not a
standard of law, but a prerogative of management. It
is a mere concession or act of grace of the employer
and not a matter of right on the part of the employee.
Thus, it is well within the power and authority of an
employer to deny an employee’s application for leave
and the same cannot be perceived as discriminatory
or harassment.
 
Furthermore, they filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal without praying for reinstatement. By
analogy, we point to the doctrine that abandonment
of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal is not applicable where the
complainant does not pray for reinstatement and just
asks for separation pay instead In this case, Sugue
and Valderrama opted not to ask for reinstatement
and even for separation pay, which clearly
contradicts their stance that they did not abandon
their work, for it appears they have no intention of
ever returning to their positions in Triumph.
AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE V. NLRC, 323
SCRA 258 (2000)
FACTS:
On January 22, 1991, by way of a resolution of
the Board of Directors of AKELCO, it allowed
the temporary holding of office at Amon
Theater, Kalibo, Aklan upon the
recommendation of Atty. Leovigildo Mationg,
then project supervisor, on the ground that the
office at Lezo, Aklan was dangerous and
unsafe. Majority of the employees including
the herein complainants, continued to report
for work at Lezo, Aklan and were paid of their
salaries. The complainants claimed that
transfer of office from Lezo, Aklan to Kalibo,
Aklan was illegal because it failed to comply
with the legal requirements under P.D. 269,
thus the they remained and continued to work
at the Lezo Office until they were illegally
locked out therefrom by the respondents.
Despite the illegal lock out however,
complainants continued to report daily to the
location of the Lezo Office, prepared to
continue in the performance of their regular
duties. Complainants who continuously
reported for work at Lezo, Aklan were not paid
their salaries from June 1992 up to March 18,
1993.
The LA dismissed the complaints.
NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s decision
and ruling that private respondents are
entitled to unpaid wages. NLRC based its
conclusion on the following:
(a) the letter of Leyson, Office Manager of
AKELCO addressed to AKELCO’s General
Manager, Atty. Mationg, requesting for the
payment of private respondents’ unpaid wages
from June 16, 1992 to March18, 1993;
(b) the memorandum of said Atty. Mationg in
answer to the letter request of Leyson where
he made an assurance that he will recommend
such request;
(c) the private respondents’ own computation
of their unpaid wages.- 
Petitioner claims that compensable service is
best shown by timecards, payslips and other
similar documents and it was an error for
public respondent to consider the computation
of the claims for wages and benefits submitted
merely by private respondents as substantial
evidence
ISSUE:
Whether or not the refusal of private
respondents to work under the lawful orders of
AKELCO management are covered by the “no
work, no pay” principle (thus not entitled to
the claim for unpaid wages)
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner was able to show that the private
respondents did not render services during the stated
period. Also, private respondents in their
position paper admitted that they did not report at the
Kalibo office, as Lezo remained to be their office
where they continuously reported. Their excuse that
the transfer to Kalibo was illegal; however it was not
for private respondents to declare the management’s
act of transferring the AKELCO office to Kalibo as an
illegal act as there was no allegation of proof that
such was made in bad faith or with malice.
The unnumbered resolution returning the office from
Kalibo to Lezo was not a valid act of petitioner’s
legitimate board and was never implemented. Private
respondents were dismissed by petitioner effective
January 1992 and were accepted back, subject to the
condition of ‘no work, no pay” effective March 1993
which is they were allowed to draw their salaries
again. Since the burden of evidence lies with the
party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the
plaintiff or complainant has to prove his allegations in
the complaint.
The age-old rule governing the relation between labor
and capital, or management and employee of a "fair
days wage for a fair days labor" remains as the basic
factor in determining employees wages. If there is no
work performed by the employee there can be no
wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able,
willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed, or otherwise illegally
prevented from working, a situation which we find is
not present in the instant case. It would neither be fair
nor just to allow private respondents to recover
something they have not earned and could not have
earned because they did not render services at the
Kalibo office during the stated period.
SLL INTERNATIONAL CABLES SPECIALISTS V.
NLRC,
G.R. NO. 172161, MARCH 2, 2011
FACTS:
Private respondents were hired by Lagon as
apprentice or trainee cable/lineman and were paid
the full minimum wage and other benefits; they did
not report to work regularly, since they are trainees,
but came in substitutes for other regular workers.
After their training, they were engaged as Project
Employees in different parts of the Country (Bohol,
Anitpolo, Bulacan and Caloocan) upon which they
have to re-apply after every completion. Faced with
economic problems, Lagon was constrained to cut
down the overtime work of its workers. Thus, when
private respondents requested to work overtime,
Lagon refused. Private respondents went home to
Cebu and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of wages, holiday pay, 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay as well as damages and
attorney’s fees.
Petitioners admitted private respondents’
employment but claimed that the latter were only
project employees for their services were merely
engaged for a specific project or undertaking and the
same were covered by contracts duly signed by
private respondents. And since the workplaces of
private respondents were all in Manila, the complaint
should be filed there. Thus, petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
utter lack of merit.  to his employees provided that the subsidy shall not
The LA claimed that his office had jurisdiction under
Rule 4 Sec 1 of the NLRC rules because the
"workplace," as defined in the said rule, included the
place where the employee was supposed to report
back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel,
which in this case was Cebu. As to the status of their
employment, the LA opined that private respondents
were regular employees because they were
repeatedly hired by petitioners and they performed
activities which were usual, necessary and desirable
in the business or trade of the employer.
LA found that private respondents were underpaid. It
ruled that the free board and lodging, electricity,
water, and food enjoyed by them could not be
included in the computation of their wages because
these were given without their written consent.
However, petitioners were not liable for illegal
dismissal. The LA viewed private respondents’ act of
going home as an act of indifference when petitioners
decided to prohibit overtime work.
The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision. It noted that no
single report of project completion was filed with the
Public Employment office as required by DOLE. The
CA affirmed both the LA’s and NLRC’s decisions and
considered that petitioners failure to comply with the
simple but compulsory requirement to submit a report
of termination to the nearest Public Employment
Office every time private respondents’ employment
was terminated was proof that the latter were not
project employees but regular employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to be
paid the minimum wage.
RULING:
Yes. As a general rule, on payment of wages, a party
who alleges payment as a defense has the burden of
proving it. Specifically with respect to labor cases, the
burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests
on the employer, the rationale being that the pertinent
personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and
other similar documents are not in the possession of
the worker but in the custody and absolute control of
the employer.
In the case at bar, petitioners, aside from bare
allegations that private respondents received wages
higher than the prescribed minimum, failed to present
any evidence, such as payroll or payslips, to support
their defense of payment. Thus, petitioners utterly
failed to discharge the onus probandi. Private
respondents, on the other hand, are entitled to be
paid the minimum wage, whether they are regular or
non-regular employees.
On whether the value of the facilities should be
included in the computation of the "wages" received
by private respondents, Section 1 of DOLE
Memorandum Circular No. 2 provides that an
employer may provide subsidized meals and snacks
be less that 30% of the fair and reasonable value of
such facilities. In such cases, the employer may
deduct from the wages of the employees not more
than 70% of the value of the meals and snacks
enjoyed by the latter, provided that such deduction is
with the written authorization of the employees
concerned.
Moreover, before the value of facilities can be
deducted from the employees’ wages, the following
requisites must all be attendant: first, proof must be
shown that such facilities are customarily furnished
by the trade; second, the provision of deductible
facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the
employee; and finally, facilities must be charged at
reasonable value. Mere availment is not sufficient to
allow deductions from employees’ wages.
These requirements, however, have not been met in
this case. SLL failed to present any company policy
or guideline showing that provisions for meals and
lodging were part of the employee’s salaries. It also
failed to provide proof of the employees’ written
authorization, much less show how they arrived at
their valuations. At any rate, it is not even clear
whether private respondents actually enjoyed said
facilities.
MAYON HOTEL AND RESTAURANT ET AL V.
ADANA, ET AL,
G.R. NO. 157634, MAY 16, 2005;
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired
herein 16 respondents as employees in its business
in Legaspi City.  Its operation was suspended on
March 31, 1997 due to the expiration and non-
renewal of the lease contract for the space it rented
in Rizal Street.  While waiting for the completion of
the construction of its new site, MHR continued its
operation in another site with 9 of the 16 employees
in Elizondo Street, Legaspi City.  When the new site
constructed and MHR resumed its business
operation, none of the 16 employees was recalled to
work.  must be tilted in favor of the latter — the employer
MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not
reinstating the respondents.  On various dates,
respondents filed complaints for underpayment of
wages, money claims and illegal dismissal.  from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor
of the employees. The LA awarded substantially all of
the respondents’ money claims, entitling some of
them with separation pay and retirement pay.
On appeal to NLRC, the decision of LA was reversed,
and all of the complaints were dismissed.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied.
On a petition for certiorari with the CA, the latter
reversed the NLRC decision and the employer’s
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents were illegally
dismissed by petitioner
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their
money claims due to underpayment of wages, and
nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP,
COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay.  by the trade;
RULING
1. This is clearly dismissal – or the permanent
severance or complete separation of the worker from
the service on the initiative of the employer
regardless of the reasons therefor. Since April 1997
until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision
in July 2000, or more than three (3) years after the
supposed “temporary” lay-off, the employment of all
the respondents with petitioner had ceased,
notwithstanding that the new premises had been
completed and the same resumed its operation. 
Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear — there is
termination of employment when an otherwise bona
fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The
cessation of employment for more than six months
was patent and the employer has the burden of
proving that the termination was for a just or
authorized cause.
While we recognize the right of the employer to
terminate the services of an employee for a just or
authorized cause, the dismissal of employees must
be made within the parameters of law and pursuant
to the tenets of fair play. And in termination disputes,
the burden of proof is always on the employer to
prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized
cause. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid
and legal cause for termination of employment, the
law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal.
If doubts exist between the evidence presented by
the employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence
that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. It is a
time-honored rule that in controversies between a
laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising
agreements and writing should be resolved in the
former’s favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to
a greater number of employees who can avail of the
benefits under the law, which is in consonance with
the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid
and protection of labor. 
2. The Supreme Court reinstated the award of
monetary claims granted by the Labor Arbiter.
The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to
respondents cannot be deducted as part of
respondents’ minimum wage. As stated in the Labor
Arbiter’s decision.
Even granting that meals and snacks were provided
and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could
not be deducted without compliance with certain legal
requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the
employer simply cannot deduct the value from the
employee’s wages without satisfying the following:
(a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished
(b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily
accepted in writing by the employee; and
(c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable
value. The law is clear that mere availment is not
sufficient to allow deductions from employees’
wages.
As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious
business losses, suffice to say that this is not a
defense to payment of labor standard benefits. The
employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay
minimum wages because of poor financial condition
of the company. The payment of minimum wages is
not dependent on the employer’s ability to pay.
The Court rule that Uy is entitled to the teller's
functional allowance since Uy's function as a teller at
the time of her dismissal was factually established
and was never impugned by the parties during the
proceedings held in the main case. Besides, BPI did
not present any evidence to substantiate its
allegation that Uy was assigned as a low-counter
staff at the time of her dismissal.  It is a hornbook rule
that he who alleges must prove. Neither was there
any proof on record which could support this bare
allegation.

BPI EMP-UNION ET AL V. BPI/ BPI V. BPI EMP As to the vacation and sick leave cash conversion
UNION-MM, ET AL., benefit, it disagrees with the CA's pronouncement
G.R. NOS. 178699/178735, SEPT 21, 2011. that entitlement to the same should not be
necessarily proved. It is to be noted that this privilege
FACTS: is not statutory or mandatory in character but only
voluntarily granted.
On December 14, 1995, Zenaida Uy's services as a
bank teller in BPI's Escolta Branch was terminated on
grounds of gross disrespect/discourtesy towards an
officer, insubordination and absence without leave. 
Uy, together with the Union, thus filed a case for
illegal dismissal. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a
Decision finding Uy's dismissal as illegal and ordering
BPI to immediately reinstate Uy and to pay her full
back wages, including all her other benefits under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and
attorney's fees

CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the

Voluntary Arbitrator.  Instead of reinstatement, the
CA ordered BPI to pay Uy her separation pay. 
Further, instead of full back wages, the CA fixed Uy's
back wages to three years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Uy is entitled to backwages, including
the CBA benefits?

RULING:
No. Jurisprudence dictates that such award of back
wages is without qualifications and deductions, that
is, "unqualified by any wage increases or other
benefits that may have been received by co-workers
who were not dismissed." It is likewise settled that
the base figure to be used in the computation of back
wages is pegged at the wage rate at the time of the
employee's dismissal unqualified by deductions,
increases and/or modifications.
The full backwages, as referred to in the body of the
decision pertains to "backwages" as defined in
Republic Act No. 6715. Under said law, and as
provided in numerous jurisprudence, "full backwages"
means backwages without any deduction or
qualification, including benefits or their monetary
equivalent the employee is enjoying at the time of his
dismissal.

Furthermore, BPI contends that at the time of Uy's

dismissal, she was no longer functioning as a teller
but as a low-counter staff and as such, Uy is not
anymore entitled to the teller's functional allowance
pursuant to company policy.