La Metafísica de Pórfido y Plotino

PORPHYRY AND PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS
Author(s): STEVEN STRANGE

Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 98, STUDIES ON
PORPHYRY (2007), pp. 17-34
Published by: Wiley
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PORPHYRY AND PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS
STEVEN STRANGE
As editor and popularizer of his teacher Plotinus, as a founding figure of Neopla

and as an important commentator on Plato and Aristotle, Porphyry certainly deser
considered a major figure in the history of philosophy. But though a first-rate sc
philosophy as well as of other fields - and as such a worthy successor to his first
Platonic philosophy, the learned Longinus - it is much less clear to what extent Po
can be considered an original contributor to the development of ancient philosoph
Indeed, much of Porphyry's extant work consists of excerpts, often extensive
excerpts, from earlier writers: this is true of his On abstinence , of his Py
biography,2 and of his philosophical epistle to his wife, the To Marcella , and it
hold as well of his extant commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and on Pt
Harmonics , neither of which make any claim to originality and both of which se
to wish to present older material in readily accessible form. Porphyry's principa
metaphysical work, the so-called Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes - in
' Acf>op|iaL TTpòs1 Tà vorjTa - (which might more precisely be rendered as 'Res
for approaching the intelligible world') appears to be an attempt at a sketch of t
points of Plotinian Neoplatonism, and might usefully be compared with the Enche
the collection of excerpts made by Arrian of Nicomedia from his Discourses of E
Certainly, as A. C. Lloyd once remarked, the notion that a student looking to Po
Sententiae will find in it an easy introduction to the philosophy of Plotinus
survive experiment,3 but the chapters of the work do present well-defined disc
crucial points upon which one who wished to make progress in Plotinus' thought m
well to meditate.
The material of the Sententiae is for the most part purely Plotinian and often taken
verbatim or nearly so from the Enneads , as can be seen from the excellent apparatus
1 See on this point A. Smith, Porphyry's place in the Neoplatonic tradition (The Hague 1974)
Introduction xii -xviii. Part One of Smith's book, chapters 1-5, deals extensively with the question
of Porphyry's originality vis-à-vis Plotinus in psychology, rather than in metaphysics in general,
with which I will be concerned here. Cf. also Smith's 'Porphyry: scope for a reassessment' in this
volume.
2 The Life of Pythagoras originally formed part of the first book of Porphyry's Philosophical
history , from which come the fragments on Platonic metaphysics which will be discussed in the last
part of this paper.
3 A. C. Lloyd, 'The Later Neoplatonists', in The Cambridge history of later Greek and early med-
ieval philosophy , ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge 1967) 286.
17
1 8 STUDIES ON PORPHYRY
fontium in Lamberz's Teubner edition:4 w

intended to help clarify and only occasional
picture of the Sententiae as a sort of handbo
for Plotinian progressors, is correct, then an
work will have been unintentional on the
surprising to find the work cited somewh
thought. A. C. Lloyd in his important article
early medieval philosophy 6 did claim to fin
soul's return to the intelligible realm (b
particularity),7 but he admits that this c
Porphyry by the final chapter of Ennead 6.
Being in the sensible world (. Enn . 6.5.12). W
any specifically Porphyrian as opposed to Plo
Porphyry's originality vis-à-vis Plotinus, if
in fact to be found? I wish to approach this
apparent disagreements with Plotinus in m
disagreements or merely further cases wher
expanding upon or trying to explicate Pl
Porphyry thinks he is explicating Plotinus he
decide that this is so, we should first make
on the supposed disagreement in question. T
precisely how I think we should see Porphyr
Following that, I will focus specifically on w
hypostases in some of his attested fragment
4 Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes
5 A good example is Sententiae ch. 32 on the scale

rational reconstruction of Plotinus' discussion o
Ennead 1.2.
6 Ibid. 288-91.
7 Ibid. 289.
8 M. Zambón, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme (Paris 2002) 19-20 mentions two supposed

differences between the metaphysics of the Sententiae and that of Plotinus: a stronger contrast
between being and non-being, approaching a dualism, and a rigidification of the differences between
the various hierarchical levels. But if these are indeed genuine disagreements with Plotinus, which I
doubt, they amount at most to differences of emphasis, or would not have been seen as
disagreements by Porphyry himself.
9 This essay was completed before I had the opportunity to examine G. Karamanolis' monograph,
Plato and Aristotle in agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford
2006), which has some very clear discussions of Porphyry's agreement and disagreement with
Plotinus in his chapter on Porphyry (ch.7). I will restrict myself to a few footnote references to
Karamanolis' book.
10 There is quite a bit about the hypostases in the Sententiae as well, but I will not have anything
more to say about that work.
STEVEN STRANGE: PORPHYRY AND PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS 19
his master to a greater degree than has heretofore been recognized. I will cl
rather sketchy remarks about the relevance of this material to the fra
anonymous Commentary on Plato's Parmenides that has been attributed to
Pierre Hadot. Various features of this text turn out to reflect Porphyry's di
Plotinian hypostases, and this appears to buttress Hadot' s controversial attr
Porphyry.
We certainly do find areas of metaphysics where Porphyry is an innova
the sense that he rejects views that were held by his teacher Plotinus. One
was pointed out by P. Hadot in his classic article 'La métaphysique de
concerns the very notion of metaphysics itself as a special field of inq
metaphysics conceived on analogy with Aristotle's 'theology' or 'first philo
science that deals with supersensible reality, literally 'beyond' physics or t
nature. It is apparent from Plotinus' treatise On dialectic ( Ennead 1.3) that
not accept this Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of the status of metaphysics.
what deals with intelligible reality is rather dialectic, conceived on the
dialectical method of Plato's late dialogues, the Sophist , Statesman , and Ph
employs collection, division, and definition in order to induce contemplati
as the contents of Nous or the Divine Intelligence.12 Dialectic, that is,
collection and division, is for Plotinus the genuine method of inquiry of t
an excellent example of his application of it is his official treatment
structure of the intelligible world in the second book of his treatise On the k
Ennead 6.2. Dialectic is opposed for Plotinus to Aristotelian metaphysics be
that Aristotle conceives them as opposed as well: Aristotle's science of bein
first philosophy is explicitly a replacement and rejection of Plato's conceptio
as the method of the true philosopher - for Aristotle thinks Platonic diale
yield probabilities and opinion, not genuine apodeictic knowledge. Plotinus
hand asserts that dialectic, the developed ability or power to properly emp
and division, just is what philosophical knowledge or epistêmê is ( Enn . 1.3.5
example of Plotinus' rather deep understanding of differences betw
Aristotle, a rather important point, since Porphyry's disagreements with
often seen in terms of Porphyry's 'harmonizing' tendency to defend Arist
and to attempt to fit them with Platonist ones, while Plotinus tends to reject th
Porphyry, as Hadot points out, adopts from pre-existing Platonist
conception of the 'parts' of philosophical inquiry that classifies them in the
physics - theology or metaphysics, that is, the study of the divine,
sometimes called epoptic after the visionary aspect of the mysteries.13 This
11 P. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre', in Porphyre , Entretiens Fond

(Vandœuvres-Geneva 1966) 125-64.
12 Contrast on this point A. C. Lloyd, The anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford 1990
my view fails to distinguish Plotinus' Platonic dialectic sufficiently from Aristotelia
13 Cf. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n.ll, above) 127-29. Politics is pr

classified with ethics. This arrangement is Aristotelian only in that it distinguish
metaphysics, which it places 'above' physics: it does not, for instance, resp
20 STUDIES ON PORPHYRY
the structure of philosophy is consistent w

Platonist traditions,14 in contrast to Plo
Porphyry was often willing to follow Plot
case of the theory of hypostases and the tr
of the Platonic ideas within Nous , where he
views of his earlier, more traditional teach
employs the threefold division of philosop
order the treatises of Plotinus in his editio
concerns ethics, the second and third phys
hypostases:15 the fourth Ennead soul, the fi
not explicitly say so in the Life of Ploti
category theory, and number, and the O
arrangement of the treatises of the Ennead
reading of Plotinus a not wholly appropriat
dialectic is not just another term for Aristo
fact anywhere directly address the questio
Porphyry's ordering of the Enneads also in
which is also the generally accepted view -
contemplation of and union with the One, t
Ennead 6, whereas it seems clear from Plot
he instead conceives of the telos or goal of
Intelligence or Nous ,18 The effect on our r
ment of the treatises deserves, I think, more
This raises again the issue of Porphyry's
harmonize Aristotle with Platonism, points
significantly from his master. In my view,
fundamental distinction between practical and

perhaps count as theoretical). But it does see
Aristotle, is an instrument or organon of philoso
Stoics, a view that Plotinus certainly also accep
to learning grammar as a propaedeutic study.
14 Cf. Zambón, Porphyre et le moyen-platonism
15 See below on Porphyry's interpretation of Enn
16 Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n.l 1,
17 An exception is Enn. 1.3.5-6, where dialecti

highest and most valuable part of philosophy an
of the Aristotelian sort is declared not to be a pa
- probably, not even as an organon (cf. 5.10).
18 Porphyry actually asserts at Life of Plotinus

the One. Insofar as Ennead 1.4 can be taken as a
to be the case.
have argued previously,19 following fundamental work of A. C. Lloyd,20 t

area of logic and metaphysics, it is Plotinus rather than Porphyry who
originating this 'Aristotelianizing' tendency within Neoplatonism. For Por
criticisms that Plotinus directs against the text of Aristotle's Categories
aporiai to be solved,21 and solves them in such a way that the Categorie
to be a work of logic and not of metaphysics, a work whose untoward m
plications - concerning the diminished reality of Platonic genera and sp
- can be defused and the text and the Organon as a whole made safe for u
This has usually been construed as Porphyry's response to an attack b
Aristotle's Categories , but in pursuing this project Porphyry was not n
untrue to Plotinus' intentions. No doubt many of the criticisms of the
Plotinus retails in the first book of On the kinds of Being were in
originators, such as the 2nd century CE (?) figures Lucius and Nicos
critiques of Aristotle. But in Plotinus they can be seen as directed not a
himself, but rather against the standard interpretation of Aristotle's Cate
Peripatetic commentators: one could mention Alexander of Aphrodisias'
on the work as among Plotinus' possible or even likely targets.22 For ex
the arguments in Ennead 6. 1 are directed against the assumption that the
to be construed as metaphysical summa genera. But it is very far from c
could have intended this interpretation, since for example he states in th
that quality is a homonym (8b25-26), which would be impossible if
quality were a genuine genus, which by definition is predicated syn
species. I think that we should assume that Plotinus is suggesting th
interpretation of the Categories is wrong, and not that it is Aristotle who
19 'Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Categories' ,

955-74.
20 'Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic', Phronesis 1 (1955-56) 58-72, 146-60. See also
especially F. J. de Haas, 'Did Plotinus and Porphyry disagree about Aristotle's Categories?' ,
Phronesis 46 (2001) 492-526 and 'Context and strategy of Plotinus' treatise On the genera of Being
VI. 1-3' in Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici ed. V. Celluprica and C. D'Ancona (Naples 2004)
39-53. I find myself in agreement with de Haas' view of the attitude of Plotinus and Porphyry to
Aristotle's texts: I only wish to emphasize a few salient points. For a thorough defence of the more
traditional view of Plotinus' attitude to Aristotle, see recently R. Chiaradonna, Sostanza movimento
analogia : Plotino critico di Aristotele (Naples 2002) and Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in
agreement? (n.9, above) chs. 6 and 7.
21 As is also seen, more explicitly, in the slightly later Categories commentary by the Iamblichean
Dexippus.
22 Again, see the works of de Haas cited above n.20. He notes the view of the Categories as being
about the genera of being, which is attacked by Plotinus, as being Alexander's, but does not, I think,
sufficiently stress this. De Haas also sees that Plotinus seems to be attributing to Aristotle the view -
which he thinks is correct - that the category-classes of the Categories are what Plotinus calls
katêgoriai and not genera of being.
point.23 Porphyry responds to this critiqu

intended to be a classification of sensible it
main point of Plotinus' critique, that the c
everything that exists. Porphyry certainly
ten categories of Aristotle are actually app
they are, but Porphyry accepts them.24 So
can be harmonized with Platonist metap
complete harmony is achievable, but still s
opposition that it has often been taken to
Porphyry (via Dexippus) argued that Plotin
substance (ousia) in On the kinds of Bein
fundamental harmony of the philosophies o
to argue that what this indicates is not so
opposition to Plotinus' more hard-line attit
Plotinus' deeper motivations.
Nevertheless Porphyry is surely fully
disagreements with Aristotle, some of the
view in Metaphysics A that the divine Nou
Good, with Nous relegated to the status of
this point Ennead 5.1.9.16-30). Porphyr
philosophy could not completely be reconc
wrote a work with the title On the dissensi
must have thought that this disagreement
wrote a work in three books On the unity o
if this indeed is not just an alternate title f
23 A similar situation arises with respect to Pl

treatise on eternity and time, Ennead 3.7. In c
subjects Aristotle's proposed definition of time f
to a devastating critique, but later explains tha
propose this characterization as a definition, an
point: he meant instead that time is what is mea
understand him because his text was intended
been attending his lectures, who would hav
(3.7.13.10-18). On Plotinus' critique here, see
Time', in Aristotle in Late Antiquity , ed. La
Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in agreement?
24 On all this, see now J. Barnes, Porphyry: Int
25 'L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et ď

Déxippe sur les Catégories ', in Plotino e il neo
31-47: English translation by V. Caston in Ari
their influence , ed. R. Sorabji (London 1990) 12
26 Porphyry's fragments will be cited in the

(Stuttgart and Leipzig 1993). The title of this wo
against the skeptical Academy, On the dissensio
affect the point I am trying to make.27 But this reflects the attitude toward A
we saw in Plotinus, and that as we saw Porphyry too recognized in him. We
that Porphyry wrote a work against the earlier Peripatetic Boethus, de
immortality of the human soul against Boethus* version of the entelech
Aristotle's De anima (P32 Smith: extensive fragments). Plotinus also criticize
view in his early treatise on the soul's immortality ( Ennead 4.7), but we cann
whether Porphyry thought that Boethus' interpretation of Aristotle was the c
Certainly there were later Platonists who thought that Aristotle could b
attacking the immortality of the rational soul (by identifying Aristo
intelligence with rational soul, and defending its imperishability), though the
that Plotinus read Aristotle in this fashion, or that Porphyry thought that
harmonizing interpretation of Aristotle on this point could descend from Porp
I think that Iamblichus is more likely as its source).
What I would suggest, then, is that Porphyry sees himself as a fairly faith
wholly uncritical follower of Plotinus and an adherent of Plotinus' new or r
of Platonism, in rather the same way as (in his view) Aristotle was a n
follower of Plato himself.29 In any case Porphyry seems to have been
'orthodox' Plotinian than his rival Amelius Gentilianus, Plotinus' other main
whom Porphyry seems to portray himself in the Life as supplanting
designated successor. We know that Amelius disagreed with Plotinus on
important points and we may sometimes see Plotinus criticizing him in the
instance on the topic of the unity of soul (. Enn . 4.3. 1-8).30 This impression o
27 George Karamanolis argues persuasively that they were indeed different works, bu
the essential agreement of Plato and Aristotle. See Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle
(n.9, above) 244-57.
28 I say this even though I assume that the title reported in the Suda lexicon Against
cerning whether the soul is an entelechy (P3 1 Smith) refers to the same work of Por
Boethus, for the report could be confused about the work's contents (see Smith's ap
for this possibility). See also A. Smith, 'A Porphyrian treatise against Aristotle?' in Fr
to Eriugena: essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in honor of John O 'Meara, e
and J. A. Richmond (Washington DC 1991) 183-86. The principal issue regards whe
and 245F Smith are directed against Aristotle himself, or against members of t
tradition (i.e. Boethus). George Karamanolis presents a new and interesting interpr
material from Porphyry's treatise against Boethus (Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle
(n.9, above) 291-98), and see his contribution to this volume, pp. 91-109.
29 It should be noted that according to the fragments of On providence of the 5th centu
Neoplatonist Hierocles (apud Photius codd. 214 & 251), the essential harmony of th
of Plato and Aristotle was a basic tenet of the school of Ammonius the teacher of Plotinus. This
testimony, though isolated, is perhaps not to be lightly dismissed, since it seems to come through the
Academy of Plutarch of Athens and may derive from the above-mentioned work or works of
Porphyry on the agreement or disagreement of Plato and Aristotle. See now on Hierocles' work
H. Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria (Oxford 2002).
30 See the commentary on this text by W. Helleman-Elgersma, Soul sisters: a commentary on

Enneads IV 3 (27), 1-8 of Plotinus (Amsterdam 1980), who is convincing on this point.
self-consciously the philosophical heir o

Porphyry's treatise On abstinence , the long
defence of vegetarianism and 'animal right
subjects of justice) is addressed to Castriciu
Porphyry indeed seems to have inherited a
had abandoned the (Pythagorean) practice of
Plotinus C Life of Plotinus 2), and Porphyry
true path. There are a number of appeals t
teachings of the school - which Porphy
philosophy to which you were committ
principally to mean the Pythagorean variety
may involve personal loyalty or commitmen
the ascetic ethics and the moral psychology
27-47 of Book I of the On abstinence and e
seems essentially to be that of Plotinus, an
Ennead 1.4. The goal of this ethics is to r
personal nous or true self in the intelligib
into Becoming and embodiment, to reverse
mentally from material conditions and from
of diet, including vegetarianism, is one
advocated by Porphyry: this is something t
to Porphyry he did practise it), but the m
which Porphyry builds his case for it are th
idea that one reverts to one's true intelligib
spiritual realm.33 Along with the Sententiae
of Porphyry's 'Plotinian' work, where h
Plotinian thought.
31 1 exclude Porphyry's commentary on the H

passages of considerable philosophical interes
Aristotle in agreement? (n.9, above) 257-66). On
missing. The work is now conveniently accessi
notes, by Gillian Clark, Porphyry, On abstinence
32 Compare Amelius' reference in his letter

philosophy as 'our spiritual home' (i) olicela èc
33 There is a problem in that Porphyry seems to
in terms of complete detachment from worldl
whereas Plotinus appears to think that the sag
retaining his unbroken contemplation of the int
such terms in the Life of Plotinus). I am indeb
problem to my attention. The solution is perhap
conditions under which the re-ascent and rejoini
what would be possible for the 'ascended' sa
described in Ennead 1 .4.
Let us move on to the central question of Plotinus' theory of hypostase

which Porphyry accepted the Plotinian metaphysical hierarchy of hypost
and Soul, and in particular the Plotinian distinction between One and No
controversial and hard to determine. If we look only at the fragments of t
Porphyry's Philosophical history (220F-223F Smith, all cited by Cyril of
his tract against Julian) it seems that Porphyry does accept Plotinu
apparent differences do arise, but I shall suggest that what we see occurr
Porphyry attempting to explicate and expanding upon Plotinus. The fou
question all come from Porphyry's discussion of Plato's doctrine of princ
reveal, as we will see, that Porphyry wishes to accept Plotinus' hypostas
(the Philosophical history) as an interpretation of Plato's doctrine. This
Plotinus intended them to be, as he declares explicitly in the first treatis
theory of the Hypostases, On the three hypostases that are principles ( E
Porphyry's endorsement of Plotinus' theory is particularly evident from
Smith, which is connected closely with this particular passage of the En
shall argue that all four of the Porphyrian fragments on metaphysics fr
Philosophical history are very closely connected with Ennead 5.1.
Fragment 221F opens with Porphyry's statement that 'Plato claims th
of the divine extends to three hypostases' (11. 2-3), 35 which is a paraph
clause of Ennead 5.1.7, which closes Plotinus' extensive discussion of the
occupies the first seven chapters of this treatise: 'And as far as [p
Porphyry's axpi] these [= One, Nous , Soul] the divine things extend' (5.1
here calls his hypostases 'the divinities' or 'divine things' (ta theia ), wh
has instead the apparently by now standard term hupostaseis , which Pl
uses in this technical sense, and which Porphyry perhaps was responsible
It occurs in the well-known title of Ennead 5.1 already cited, On the thre
are principles (Tlepi toov Tpiwv dpxucoov uuocttckjégûv). There is anoth
of the same Plotinian phrase a few lines below in Porphyry's fragment
that] divinity ( theôtês ) reaches to the [level of] Soul' (11. 5-6).37 Porphy
following statement that Plato says that 'the rest is the non-divine ( atheo
corporeal differentiation' (11. 6-7), 38 which has puzzled comment
amplification of and expansion, through contrast and contrariety, upon t
that the hypostases are the 'divine things' that Porphyry is glossing. Wh
identifies the second hypostasis with the demiurge (line 5) rather than wit
34 There are actually five fragments of Book IV preserved by Cyril, but the firs
concerns only details of Plato's biography, not metaphysics.
35 axpi yap Tpicov WToaTdaecov ecķrļ llXdTcov tt)v toû 0£Íou TTpoeX0eív o
of the fragments of the Philosophical history are my own.
36 Kal pixpL toútcov ra 0eia, Enn. 5.1.7, 48.

37 axpi yap i^ux^s* OeÓTTyra TTpoeX0£Îv. This second parallel, but not the e
by Smith in his apparatus.
38 Xoittòv 8è to <ï0eov duo rf'ç acopan Kq? 6i/fļpx0ai 8ia<ļ>opas'
echo of Plotinus' own phrase 4 Nous is th

obvious disagreement in this fragment w
identification of the cosmic soul (f) roi>
Timaeus , with the Plotinian third hypost
the hypostasis soul is definitely to be dis
explicit for instance in Ennead 4.3, where
pupil Amelius.40 As nothing in Plotinus' e
hypostasis soul to be the world-soul, Porph
or misinterpreted Plotinus on this point,
variation into the doctrine here.41 But in a
is Plotinian and taken from a central Plot
Hypostases as a reading of Plato's metaph
Given the close connection of fragment
may suspect that fragment 222F too is co
Plotinus cites (Enn. 5.1.8.1-4) the sam
concerning the 'Three Kings' (312e) that P
unlike Plotinus quotes the Epistles directl
accurately, with only minor variation fro
clear what Plotinus does not, that the t
Numenius of Apamea43, whereas Plotin
Epistle. Cyril's remark following the direc
in fragment 222F is his gloss on what Por
Plato also indicates their coming into exis
39 Arnjuoupyos yap ò vous airnj.

40 See n.30, above.
41 This may be connected with Porphyry's c

Plato!) is the immanent nous of the world-so
formulation in our fragment may be deliberat
Porphyrios und Jamblich', in Der Philosophie
238-80. Note also that Numenius of Apamea' s
or at least with dianoia (Numenius fr. 22 Des
sensible cosmos (Numenius fr.21 Des Places
dianooumenon (Enn. 5.1.7.24) seems to be an a
Plotinus' dependence on Numenius' theology.
42 The mention of cosmic soul indicates that

derived from Porphyry and not directly from
Smith's apparatus to 221F3-12).
43 As in Numenius' reading of the Epistles pass

here: cf. Numenius frs. 21 and 22, and fr. 24.51
Socrates. I believe that fr.22 shows that Numen
hypostases One, Nous , and Soul, although Nume
fr. 21 from Proclus, identifying the third god
sort of confusion (as E. R. Dodds also thought
Plotin , Entretiens Fondation Hardt 5 (Vandœ
descent and diminution of those that follow upon the First, by say
"secondarily" and "thirdly", and that all things come from One and are
(11. 8-12).44 If this remark by Cyril is correct, as seems plausible, t
endorsing Plotinus' idea of the procession of the second and third hypo
first (as well as, presumably, the third from the second), what is usuall
misleadingly called 'emanation'. This procession is of course not to be fo
anywhere in Plato's dialogues, which is why Plotinus and Porphyry, fol
from whom Plotinus seems to have gotten the idea, are obliged to cite E
as textual support of it.45 The Timaeus , however, does present cosmic so
the demiurge (= Nous), which may help account for Porphyry's insisten
against Plotinus that the third hypostasis is to be taken as cosmic soul a
soul.
An earlier chapter of Ennead 5.1, chapter 5, cites the reports of

unwritten doctrines concerning the derivation of the Dyad from the One
procession of Nous (identified with the Definite Dyad) from the fir
suspicion is that Plotinus has taken this too from Numenius - perhap
known work, On the Good - and we know from Porphyry's notor
Dercyllides' On Plato's philosophy in Simplicius (fr.l46F Smith) that Porp
interested in Plato's unwritten doctrines. In the earlier passage, Plotinus
5.1.5.6-9) that Plato's Dyad has the One as its 'definer' ( horistês , 8), wh
Aristotle's report of the unwritten doctrines in Metaphysics A, but Ploti
Dyad first proceeds, in its indefinite form, from the One, by which it is t
transformed into Number (= the realm of the Ideas). That the indef
proceeds from the One is a feature of the account that is not found in the
unwritten doctrines - we should recall that the 1st century BCE 'Academ
Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria wished to add it to the report of
Aristotle's Metaphysics A6 (988al0-ll)46 - but it is ubiquitous in the
down in the Neopythagorean tradition,47 to which Numenius belonged a
Plotinus has inherited it as the basis for attributing the procession to Plato
44 Ä£8f|'ü)K€ 8è £|i<|>alviov Kal Tfļv à'Xf|'ojv ÚTTÓaTaaiv àpxópevr|v òtt

Kai TTļv irrroßaaiv Kal u<ļ)eaiv *iw ļi£Ta rò TTparrov 8ià toû "Tr-pcímos*"
Kal "rpÍTcoç" £Itt£Îv, Kal öti evòç rà uctvTa Kai 8i ' aÙToû aa)Í£Tai.
45 He also cites the closing passage of Epistle VI (323D) for this, concerning the 'Father of the
Cause' {Enn. 5.1.8.4), connecting it to a passage of the Sixth Ennead (6.8.14.37-38) with the
causality of the Idea of the Good with respect to the Ideas in Republic VI.
46 See Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in agreement? (n.9, above) 26, 82-83.
47 For instance as reported in Sextus Empiricus' Adversus mathematicos 9.261. This tradition is very
much concerned to avoid attributing a dualism of principles to Plato. It is interesting, however, that
Numenius, though a Neopythagorean Platonist, does maintain a dualist interpretation of Plato and
Pythagoras with regard to the independence of Matter from the First Principle - a dualism that
Plotinus wishes to reject. We may perhaps suspect here the influence of Plutarch of Chaeronea on
Numenius.
In the first fragment of Philosophical h

a little before fr. 222 in CyriTs text, Porp
itself, and attributes to him a sophisticate
much along the lines of that found in
claiming for Plato a belief in the One Go
Parmenides 142a) neither be fittingly
designations that we do use for God can
of him. That being said, the names that a
God are 'One' and 'Good', i.e., the terms t
the Parmenides and in Republic VI respec
self-sufficiency, while 'Good' communica
of all good things, in that all things stri
speak characteristic',49 as Porphyry puts
two designations, therefore, 4Good' revea
unknowable) divine nature, its as-it-were
things are made good by imitating God,
least paradigmatically so. If we could
platonists, associated the goodness of thin
help explicate the notion that all things de
Finally, let us turn to the fourth report
doctrine that Cyril cites, ff. 223F Smith (w
222F). This is in several ways the mos
fragments. I think that it too is connect
treatise on the Hypostases, Ennead 5.1, th
been discussed in this regard. Discussion o
distinction between eternity and pre-eter
Porphyry over Plotinus. However, I thin
Plotinian context may call this assumption
Fr. 223 again concerns Plato's concept
proper Plotinian name for the Second H
begins as follows:
From this [= the Good, as can be gathere

inconceivable to humans, there comes t
are contained the really real beings [= t
48 Smith's apparatus ad loc. collects some of

this, but misses, I think, an especially apt one
will also say in fr. 220, that calling the One th
conveys nothing clear about it to our minds.
49TT'V 6K6LVOU, €1 XP"H ^dvotl, ISlOTTļTO.
beings. This is also primary Beauty and Beauty-Itself, having the

beautifulness from itself. . . (11. 3-7)50
So far this looks to be standard Plotinian doctrine, including the notion th

primary Beauty,51 save for the claim that the manner of the procession is i
humans. Now Plotinus himself clearly does not think that it is wholly inco
humans, since he tries to explain it in Ennead 5.1 chapters 6 and 7, though n
said, very successfully. In fact much scholarly ink has been spilled over th
attempted explanation.52 Porphyry may have had trouble making sen
explanation as well, and this may account for his characterization of it as
to humans'. It also seems that the details of Plotinus' explanation are what
in mind in the difficult passage concerning pre-eternity and eternity that f
7-20):
[Nous] has proceeded pre-eternally,53 starting from God as its cause, be

generated ( autogennêtos ) and father of itself (autopatôr). For it is not th
the generation has taken place when the former ( ekeinos = the Go
toward the generation of this one ( toutos = Nous), but rather this one h
forth self-generated from God. And it (Nous) has not come forth from any
beginning.54 For time did not yet exist, nor yet when time has come to be
all related to it.55 For Nous is always56 timeless and solely eternal. Just a
God is always one alone57 even if all things come from him, in virtue o
that he is not counted in with them nor is their value (axia) able to be c
with [literally: is not at the same level as] his existence ( huparxis ),58 so
ligence has come to be solely eternal and timelessly, and is itself time for
50 (ZTTÒ 8e toutou TpoTTOv ti và àv0pa)iTOiç àvemvór|Tov voûv yevéa0ai Te

èauTÒv íxf>eaTá)Ta, èv ¿ 8r' Tà outcoç övTa Kal t' Tràaa oùala twv övt
upooTídç KaXòv Kal aÙTOKaXòu Trap' êaurov Tf'ç KaXXovrj? ex°u tò eîôoç.
51 Cf. Ennead 5.8.
52 The fullest and perhaps most illuminating discussion is still that of A. C. Lloyd, 'P
genesis of thought and existence', OSAPh 5 (1987) 155-86. See also K. Corrig
Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, Intellect and the One: A reappraisal', ANRW 1136
who discusses the anonymous Parmenides commentator in connection with these
but not this fragment of the Philosophical History .
53 Accepting Hadot' s conjecture Trpoaitovíoas* at line 7.
54 Tivoç in line 12 should probably be retained, contra Smith.
55 I.e., presumably, time is not relevant to it.
56 This is the 'timeless always', as at Enn . 3.7.4 fin.
57 Omitting Smith's comma in line 15.
58 Note the parallel here with the terminology of the anonymous Parmenides comm
'existence' of the first god, fr. XIV.6.
that are in time, remaining in the samenes

cf. Timaeus 37D6 on eternity 'remaining in
It seems clear that Porphyry has in mind her

extremely obscure passage Enn. 5.1.6.15-27,
eration of Nous from the One.60 The allu
Kivoupévou TTpos yeveoiv tòv toutou at
(towards something), to the One at Enn.
between Plotinus' explanation of why time
lines 11-13 especially, are sufficient to estab
accepted, we can then ask how Porphyry
central issue, notoriously, is a grammatic
epistraphentos at Plotinus' line 18?61 Is the
One? In other words, is Plotinus saying tha
towards Nous - which at this point does not
it, that it must revert upon itself to accom
cannot move toward anything else), or is he
nature from doing anything at all in order
effect generate itself, by reverting (in its p
toward the One? Once the question is posed,
is adopting the second reading of epistraph
'reversion' ( epistrophê ) is being treated as a
is hence no notion here of any self-re versio
that Nous must 'first' generate or constitute
59 IT pof)X0£ ôè TrpOaiajVLOiS' CLÍT' a'lTÍOU TO

aÙT Ott QT Q)p * où yàp ¿Kelvou Kivoupévou
àXXà toùtou TrapeXGóvTos* aÙToyóvws* ck
XpoviKTļS" Outtco yàp xpóvoç qv. àXX' où8è
Xpóvoç- àxpovoç yàp àei Kal povos* alcóvios*
povos* àeí, Kav aiť aÙTOU yévr|Tai Tà TîàvT
à£iav cjuyKaTaTaTTea0ai 8ùvaa0ai tt1 ¿kclvo
Kal àxpóvcos* ÙTTOoràs*, Kal tcov èv xpóvto aÙ
éauToù alomas* ÙTrooTdaecos*.
60 Not noted by Smith ad loc. or by other commen
61 A perhaps related question concerns the re

following chapter, 5.1.7.6, though Lloyd, 'Plotin
above) 161, following J. Igal, 'La genesis de la in
(5.1.7.4-35)', Emerita 39 (1971) 133 n. 2, argues t
different subjects.
62 Corresponding to the Indefinite Dyad: see

existence' (n.52, above).
63 This is the more traditional interpretation, o

and Lloyd, 'Plotinus on the genesis of thought a
be the subject of the participle in question.
STEVEN STRANGE: PORPHYRY AND PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS 3 1
able to revert upon the One and so become definite (the stage that Plotinus thin
corresponding to the One 'defining' the Indefinite Dyad in Plato's unwritten doctr
This line of thought leads naturally, in both the Plotinus and the Porphyry pas
interpreted, to the problem of 'when', so to speak, these stages of generation are
to be taking place, that is, to the problem of the apparent essential temporality
process. There is also an apparent contradiction lurking - in that it would seem t
has first to generate itself in order to revert upon the One, that is, in order to gener
- but apparently this is supposed to be resolved, for Plotinus at least, by distingui
two stages of Nous , indefinite and definite: neither Plotinus or Porphyry is exp
dealing with this problem here, though Plotinus is more so elsewhere.64 In fact, i
the puzzling nature of this latter problem that led Porphyry to declare the whole
be, strictly, incomprehensible to humans. In his response to the general iss
temporality, Porphyry is satisfied merely to deny that the process is temporal.
adds the somewhat helpful point that the stages in the temporal account are suppo
analogues of (eternal) relations of causality and effect/product among the items
account, that is, to reflect the fact that the One is the cause of the generation
( Enn . 5.1.6.18-22). Plotinus seems to be thinking here of what might be called a
of 'eternal generation', but Porphryry goes farther and speaks of it as being 'pre-e
If Porphyry's notion of 'pre-eternality' is supposed to explain anything here, I t
must be that the process is supposed to account for the generation of eternity itsel
talk of eternal generation is out of place. But if this is so, we see Porphyry attem
clear up a difficult point in Plotinus' account by expanding on it.
How can the One be called the cause ( aition , fx. 223.7-8) of the generation of N
Nous is self-generated? The answer to this must again lie in the two stages of g
the One is the cause of the outflowing of the indefinite pre-Nous (cf. Enn. 5.2.1,
of the fountain overflowing), which then 'generates itself' or bootstraps it
existence in reverting on the One. Our Porphyry fragment, however, appears inn
all these complexities, perhaps because he thought them to be incomprehensible
human mind. What Porphyry does add to the Plotinian picture is the distinction
pre-eternity and eternity, which seems intended to express the idea that the gene
Nous (identified with eternity) takes place, not only before time, but so to spea
eternity as well.66
64 Again, cf. Lloyd, 'Plotinus on the genesis of thought and existence', (n.52, above).
65 Cf. J. Dillon, 'Porphyry's doctrine of the One', in LO&IHL MAIHTOPEE 'Cherc

sagesse': hommage à Jean Pépin , ed. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé et al. (Paris 1992) 363-64, wh
this passage of Porphyry with the Plotinian notion of pr e-Nous' also J. Dillon, 'Porph
Iamblichus in Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenide s' in Gonimos: Neoplatonic and B
studies presented to Leendert G. Westerink (Buffalo, NY 1988) 42.
66 This point was already made by Hadot in his discussion of the fragment in 'La métap
Porphyre' (n.l 1 above) 147, who sees the passage as concerning Porphyry's theory of the g
of Nous , with parallels in the anonymous Parmenides commentary , but not Plotinus' theo
generation. Another non-Plotinian feature here is that Nous or eternity is claimed to b
those things in time. This role in Plotinus would be played instead by the life of the
3.7.11-13).
Now the concept of pre-eternity is also found

principles from Proclus' Platonic theology
eternal element within the eternal Nous and co
in fr. 223 of its procession from the One or
seem to be linked to the notorious difficulty
Father of the so-called First Intelligible Tri
(Damascius Prin . L86 Ruelle; cf. also Proclus I
init.).67 Note that in our fr . 223 of the Philo
father, while in the On principles fragment
somehow identified with the One and per
Hypostasis Nous , so that, as it were, Nous con
our fragment the important and seemingly
'counted in with* (sunarithmeisthai) other thi
Porphyrian sequel to fr. 221 (11. 6-12), which
unnamed and mysterious68 persons are said
hypostases that the first principle should not
(line 9). This echoes known criticisms of Porp
principle as the father of the First Intelligib
may represent Porphyry himself stating this
own interpretation of Plotinus' metaphysical v
This paradox concerning the One in Porp
somehow a constituent of Nous and on the ot
source, has been connected by Hadot and Dillo
Parmenides commentary (fr. XI-XII) concerni
hypothesis, as both somehow being identical w
hypothesis and as also having its role as co
hypothesis, which on the Neoplatonic interpre
Nous.69 In my view, as in Hadot' s, these paral
of his attribution of the anonymous Commenta
have been sufficiently appreciated in recent c
discussion of this issue, however, would t
accomplish here. There are also rather str
doctrine between the anonymous Commen
67 See Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n.ll

chez Plotin et avant Plotin', in Les sources de P lo
Geneva 1960) 105-41. It is not clear if this is a fea
or of his interpretation of the Chaldaean version o
doctrine of the One' (n.65, above).
68 'The aforementioned ones' (oi TTpoeipripivoi) in
text, and thus presumably comes from his source,
own words.
69 Cf. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n

Victorinus , 2 vols (Paris 1968).
Porphyry's Philosophical history that we have been discussing. Most or all of th

pointed out by Hadot in his monumental Porphyre et Victorinus ,70 but they also
been made enough of in the recent controversies over the authorship of the Comm
Let me just mention here two points from fragment 220F. First is the term pr
for the designations or denominations of the First God, which - though a
technical term of the period - occurs in the same context in Anonymous fr. I.18
doctrinal point is similar there too, concerning the applicability of the name 'On
first principle.72 Much of the text of the Commentary's fragments as we have
concerned with 'negative theology', the difficulty of talking sensibly about the fi
identified with the One of the First Hypothesis of Plato's Parmenides. The main
Anonymous ff.l seems to be, as in Philosophical history ir. 220, that 'One', t
some ways quite inadequate as a designation of the First, is nonetheless most app
among human names for this role: in particular it is the cause of the being of oth
(fr. 1.10-12, cf. fr. II.9-1073). Elsewhere the One is also said to be responsibl
'preservation' (, sôtêria , fr. V.674) of other things, recalling 220F15. Another st
parallel comes at the end of the first fragment of the Commentary , where it is de
the One can be conceived in terms of activity, thought, or simplicity, reca
statement of fr. 220F10-12 (which however affirms the One's simplicity and den
need of parts).75 There are other linguistic and doctrinal parallels noted by Hadot,
general impression certainly seems to support Hadot' s identification of the Ano
with Porphyry.
However Hadot, like other commentators, fails to note the close connectio
pointed to between Philosophical history fr. 223F and Plotinus' account of the ge
of Nous from the One in Ennead 5.1.6, where Porphyry seems to be identifying
account of Nous's so-called self-generation with Plotinus' account. Instead, Ha
record as advocating the alternative reading of the Ennead 5.1.6 passage, acco
which the One generates Nous by itself moving towards its generation.76 This d
much affect his case for identifying the anonymous commentator with Porphyry
does call attention to the parallels between the account of the relationship betwe
70 P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (n. 69, above). See the parallels listed in the Tndex d
cités' of that work, II 144. For Dillon, see the works cited in n.65 above.
71 Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (n.69, above) II 67 n. 1.
72 The name 'Good' is not at issue here, since we are dealing with a commentary on the
Hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides , where according to the Neoplatonic r
First Principle is referred to as 'the One', not as in the Republic as 'the Good'.
73 Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (n.69, above) II 69 n.9.
76 Taking the One as the subject of epistraphentos at Enn. 5.1.6.8, see above: cf. Hadot's
vol.2 of Henry and Schwyzer's OCT editio minor of the Enneads , Revue de l'histoire des
164 (1963) 92-96. This review is the origin of the modern controversy about the interpr
Enn 5.1.6-7.
First and Second Ones of the Parmenides in t

and Porphyry's account of the self-generation
as well as between the discussion of the relati
in fr. IX. 1-7 and fr. 223F and the Damascius p
Does my new reconstruction of Porphyry's
generation of Nous increase the probability th
This remains an open question, but certainly
proximity to Plotinus.78
Emory University
77 Cf. also fr. II.5-10, where the First One is said to
78 Insofar as the details of the generation of Nous

Numenian theology, my reconstruction may also
Commentary predates Plotinus.

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PORPHYRY AND PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS

Author(s): STEVEN STRANGE

As editor and popularizer of his teacher Plotinus, as a founding figure of Neopla

fontium in Lamberz's Teubner edition:4 w

4 Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes

5 A good example is Sententiae ch. 32 on the scale

8 M. Zambón, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme (Paris 2002) 19-20 mentions two supposed

11 P. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre', in Porphyre , Entretiens Fond

13 Cf. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n.ll, above) 127-29. Politics is pr

the structure of philosophy is consistent w

fundamental distinction between practical and

14 Cf. Zambón, Porphyre et le moyen-platonism

15 See below on Porphyry's interpretation of Enn

16 Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n.l 1,

17 An exception is Enn. 1.3.5-6, where dialecti

18 Porphyry actually asserts at Life of Plotinus

have argued previously,19 following fundamental work of A. C. Lloyd,20 t

19 'Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Categories' ,

point.23 Porphyry responds to this critiqu

23 A similar situation arises with respect to Pl

24 On all this, see now J. Barnes, Porphyry: Int

25 'L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et ď

26 Porphyry's fragments will be cited in the

30 See the commentary on this text by W. Helleman-Elgersma, Soul sisters: a commentary on

self-consciously the philosophical heir o

31 1 exclude Porphyry's commentary on the H

32 Compare Amelius' reference in his letter

Let us move on to the central question of Plotinus' theory of hypostase

36 Kal pixpL toútcov ra 0eia, Enn. 5.1.7, 48.

38 Xoittòv 8è to <ï0eov duo rf'ç acopan Kq? 6i/fļpx0ai 8ia<ļ>opas'

echo of Plotinus' own phrase 4 Nous is th

39 Arnjuoupyos yap ò vous airnj.

41 This may be connected with Porphyry's c

42 The mention of cosmic soul indicates that

43 As in Numenius' reading of the Epistles pass

An earlier chapter of Ennead 5.1, chapter 5, cites the reports of

44 Ä£8f|'ü)K€ 8è £|i<|>alviov Kal Tfļv à'Xf|'ojv ÚTTÓaTaaiv àpxópevr|v òtt

In the first fragment of Philosophical h

From this [= the Good, as can be gathere

48 Smith's apparatus ad loc. collects some of

49TT'V 6K6LVOU, €1 XP"H ^dvotl, ISlOTTļTO.

beings. This is also primary Beauty and Beauty-Itself, having the

So far this looks to be standard Plotinian doctrine, including the notion th

[Nous] has proceeded pre-eternally,53 starting from God as its cause, be

50 (ZTTÒ 8e toutou TpoTTOv ti và àv0pa)iTOiç àvemvór|Tov voûv yevéa0ai Te

53 Accepting Hadot' s conjecture Trpoaitovíoas* at line 7.

54 Tivoç in line 12 should probably be retained, contra Smith.

55 I.e., presumably, time is not relevant to it.

56 This is the 'timeless always', as at Enn . 3.7.4 fin.

57 Omitting Smith's comma in line 15.

that are in time, remaining in the samenes

It seems clear that Porphyry has in mind her

59 IT pof)X0£ ôè TrpOaiajVLOiS' CLÍT' a'lTÍOU TO

60 Not noted by Smith ad loc. or by other commen

61 A perhaps related question concerns the re

62 Corresponding to the Indefinite Dyad: see

63 This is the more traditional interpretation, o

65 Cf. J. Dillon, 'Porphyry's doctrine of the One', in LO&IHL MAIHTOPEE 'Cherc

Now the concept of pre-eternity is also found

67 See Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n.ll

69 Cf. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (n

Porphyry's Philosophical history that we have been discussing. Most or all of th

71 Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (n.69, above) II 67 n. 1.