Methane Pipeline Pigging Risk Management 421 Case Study

Methane Pipeline Pigging
Risk Management 421 Case Study
Team Leader:
Andrew Simms 1485 7397
Team Members:
Jonathan Clare 1552 3071
Ross Gustafsson 1551 3179
Alex Neamtu 1554 7437
Nicholas Rodan 1484 1073
Nabil Tiba 1550 9547
METHANE PIPELINE PIGGING

0
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................................................2
Background.................................................................................................................................................................2
Objective and Scope of Work.....................................................................................................................................2
Methodology...............................................................................................................................................................3
Process Description....................................................................................................................................................3
Process Diagram – Overall Sketch.............................................................................................................................5
Process Diagram – Node 1.........................................................................................................................................6
Process Diagram – Node 5.......................................................................................................................................10
Risk Assessment – HAZID......................................................................................................................................11
Risk Assessment – HAZOP Overall........................................................................................................................15
Risk Assessment – HAZOP Node 1.........................................................................................................................17
Recommendations....................................................................................................................................................28
Conclusions..............................................................................................................................................................31
References................................................................................................................................................................32
Appendix A: Risk Likelihood/Consequence Tables................................................................................................33
Appendix B: HAZOP Guidewords...........................................................................................................................36
Appendix C: Ranking Matrix...................................................................................................................................37
Appendix D: P+ID Symbols.....................................................................................................................................38
Appendix E: Meeting Minutes.................................................................................................................................39
Meeting 1 Minutes....................................................................................................................................................39
Meeting 2 Minutes....................................................................................................................................................40
Meeting 3 Minutes....................................................................................................................................................41
Meeting 4 Minutes....................................................................................................................................................42
Meeting 5 Minutes....................................................................................................................................................43
1
Introduction
In the oil and gas industry, there are many maintenance issues which arise from the processing and
handling of process fluids and products. One of these issues is the maintenance and cleaning of the inside
of pipelines between key extraction, processing and distribution centres. These jobs are completed
through the use of the pigging process. This risk management report details the hazards and risks
associated with the assembly, operation and maintenance of pigging equipment.
Background
Pigging is used in the oil and gas industry as an integral part of the maintenance regime for many
companies throughout the world. Pigs are used for many reasons which may include:
 Corrosion prevention through the removal of water

 Keeping pipelines operating at optimal conditions by removing blockages
 Inspection of internal pipeline surfaces and valves for issues which may affect production
When using a pig launcher/receiver assembly, very high pressures are involved in the launching and
retrieval of the pig. These high pressures mean that many hazards are present when operating a pig
launcher/receiver.
Objective and Scope of Work
The aim of this study is to firstly identify all of the hazards that would be present or could potentially
exist during the assembly, operation and maintenance of the pigging equipment for a methane gas
pipeline. Following this, this study aims to suggest ways to minimize or eliminate the impact of these
hazards, to promote a safe working environment and limit negative social and environmental
consequences.
To accomplish this, the study will do the following items:
1. Analyse and interpret a sample process and instrumentation diagram (P+ID)
2. Analyse and interpret several user manuals outlining the assembly, operation and maintenance of
pigging equipment
3. Separate the sample P+ID into individual nodes for a safety analysis including nodal HAZID and
HAZOP risk assessments on the existing safeguards and equipment.
4. Provide recommendations that could potentially improve process safety, targeting inadequate
safeguards or procedures.
2
Methodology
This risk management report uses current industry tables and figures (detailed in the appendix) for a
complete and through risk management study of pig launchers and receivers to be completed. From this
risk assessment HAZID and HAZOP tables could be created, which could then be used in a real world
situation.
Process Description
The pigging process has a diverse number of applications and hence there are several types of pig
launcher/receiver configurations, resulting in there being different operating procedures. For the purpose
of this report, a general process description will be provided.
The following general pig launching and receiving procedure is adapted from one written by Girard
Industries and can be found on the Tremco pipeline website.
Pig Launching
1. Make sure the trap isolation valve and the valve on the kicker line are closed.
2. Open the vent on the launching barrel and allow the launching barrel to vent to atmospheric
pressure.
3. When the launching barrel is completely drained (Barrel at atmospheric pressure), with the vent
and drain valves still opened, open the trap closure door.
4. Install the pig into the launching barrel.
5. Clean the trap closure seal and other sealing surfaces, applying a lubricant if necessary. Close and
secure the trap closure door.
6. Close the drain valve. Slowly fill the trap by gradually opening the valve on the kicker line and
venting through the the vent valve.
7. When filling is complete, close the vent valve to allow pressure to equalise across the trap
isolation valve.
8. Open the isolation valve – the pig is now ready for launching.
9. Partially close the main line valve. This will increase flow through the kicker line and hence
increase flow behind the pig. Continue to close the main line valve until the pig leaves the trap
into the main line as indicated by the pig signaller.
10. After the pig leaves the trap into the main line, fully open the main line valve. Close the trap
isolation valve and the valve on the kicker line.
Pig Receiving
1. Ensure that the receiver is pressurised.
2. Fully open the valve on the bypass line.
3. Fully open the trap isolation valve and partially close the main line valve.
4. Monitor the pig signal indicating pig arrival.
3

5. After the pig has been received, close the trap isolation valve and the valve on the bypass line.
6. Open the drain valve and the vent valve.
7. Allow time for the receiving barrel to depressurise. Check the pressure inside the barrel via the
pressure gauge.
8. Open the trap closure door and remove the pig from the barrel.
9. Clean the trap closure seal and other sealing surfaces, applying a lubricant if necessary. Close and
secure the trap closure door.
10. Return the receiver to original condition.
11.
4
Process Diagram – Overall Sketch
5

Figure 1: Overall P+ID
6
Process Diagram – Node 1
7

Figure 2: Kicker Line
8
Figure 3: Balance Line
9
10

Figure 4: Bypass Line
11
n3 xt
I-1 I-4
P-9
n5 downstream
P-27 HV-2 P-28 SDV-1 P-29
n4: main pipeline
Figure 5: Main Pipeline
12
P-20 To flare
RAV-2
P-18 P-19
V-46
P-17
P-22
vent
n2 Check valve 2
pg xt pt
Sb-2
V-5 n1 V-6 P-30 P-31 P-32 V-8
P-12 P-16 P-14
P-15 P-21
n5:launcher barrel n4
V-11
P-23 P-24
V-9 V-10
Sb-3 Sb-4
P-25 Closed drum drain

Figure 6: Launcher Barrel
13
Risk Assessment – HAZID
Table 1: HAZID
Project: Methane Pipeline Pigging Date: 23rd April 2014

HAZID Lead: Nabil Tiba HAZID Scribe: Andrew Simms
Hazard Prevention/ Risk Assessment

Hazard
Category Consequences Detection/ Consequence Recommendations
Description Likelihood Ranking Actions
(Guideword) Barriers Severity
Regular
Maintenance
Failure to PDI, HV, maintenance to
and engineering
Process Pressure launch pig, Balancing line, ensure pressure
Possible Major Extreme to ensure
Upsets Deviation equipment Flare on bypass differential
instrumentation
damage line and barrel instrumentation is
is working
working
Possible
Bypass is
damage to
not fully
upstream and
opened
downstream
before Pressure Automatic pressure
Process equipment,
starting to monitoring Possible Critical Extreme relief on upstream Design team
Upsets possible pipe
isolate the equipment process
over pressure
launcher /
and rupture,
receiver
production
station
interruption
Air is an
oxidant that Regular checks of
Process
could lead to the oxygen level in
Air entering engineer,
Human Error the None Possible Major Extreme the system, purging
the process maintenance
combustion of the system with an
team
flammable inert gas (N2)
hydrocarbons
Human Error Not Destruction of Monitoring of Possible Major Extreme Install the closure Design Team
completely equipment, pressure gauge doors facing away
14

from any normal
operational areas
de- ( let it face a safe
pressurising potential location),
the vessel injury to Introduction of an
during pig personnel automated locking
receiving system when Pig
receiver is
pressurized
Procedure for
Ensure installation
correct
process is
Incorrect Damage of installation is Maintenance
Human Error Unlikely Moderate Moderate supervised by
Installation equipment provided with personnel
adequately trained
the pigging
personnel
system
Procedure for
correct testing
Corrosion of
regime is
equipment, Proper training on
Incorrect provided with
over testing of pigging
equipment pigging system.
pressurization system, Ensure
testing/use Have access to Maintenance
Human Error of equipment Unlikely Minor Low testing process is
of incorrect an anti- personnel
leading to supervised by
testing corrosive agent
damage of adequately trained
medium and a
launcher and personnel
mechanically
valves
clean water
source on site
Pressure Regular inspection
monitoring and testing of
Over-
Operation of equipment and monitoring and
pressurization Operation and
equipment control systems, control equipment.
of equipment maintenance
Human Error outside of limiting Unlikely Major High Proper training on
leading to personnel,
limiting parameters the operation of
destruction of management
parameters defined by equipment and the
equipment
process importance of
engineer limiting values
Human Error Escaping Release of Ventilation Unlikely Moderate Moderate Training on proper Operation and
media gases that are system for methodology for maintenance
during toxic upon proper release venting of gases, personnel
15

maintenance ingestion monitoring for toxic
of gases
activities (asphyxiate) gas release
Releases of Flare to burn
gases that can off methane in
Equipment/ Regular
Escaping cause controlled Maintenance
Instrument Unlikely Major High maintenance of
Media explosion if amounts, personnel
Malfunction equipment
contacted with stripper to
ignition source absorb gas
Incorrect
pressure
Equipment/ regulation, Regular Maintenance
PSV
Instrument exposure of None Unlikely Major High maintenance and and operational
Malfunction
Malfunction large inspection of PSV personnel
quantities of
gas to flare
Regular
maintenance on
Incorrect
PDI PDI, design
Equipment/ display of Design team,
malfunction modification to
Instrument pressure None Possible Major Extreme maintenance
on bypass include indicator
Malfunction difference on personnel
line when equipment is
bypass line
suspected to be
faulty
Release of
Regular
toxic gases,
maintenance and
Equipment/ potential Maintenance
Valve seal inspection of valve
Instrument damage to None Possible Major Extreme and operational
failure seals, have
Malfunction equipment, personnel
replacement parts on
production
site
loss
Instrumentatio
n malfunction,
Implement backup
Utility No loss of
None Possible Major Extreme power supply – Design team
Failure electricity automated
possibly generator.
control, loss of
production
External Dirt and Corrosion and Procedure for Unlikely Minor Low Good housekeeping, Maintenance
Effects Moisture increased wear pigging inspection of and operational
Buildup on equipment equipment equipment to be personnel
16

performed before
covers how to
each use and to be
clean
carried out by
equipment
trained personnel
Ignition source
External Install a lightning
Lightning for vented None Possible Major Extreme Design team
Effects rod
hydrocarbons
Release of
toxic gas
Install equipment
possibly Ventilation
Buildup or capable of detecting
causing system, purging
Composition release of Possible Major Extreme impurities Design team
asphyxiation, the system with
H2S (compositional
off- an inert gas (N2)
monitoring)
specification
product
Equipment Design include
damage and considerations
Site of operations
instrument for earthquake
should have real-
Natural malfunction, conditions – OH+S
Earthquake Unlikely Critical Extreme time information on
Disaster production equipment and department
local seismic
loss, injury or infrastructure to
conditions
death to withstand
personnel earthquake
Equipment
Ability to seal all
damage and
drains to contain
instrument
toxic chemicals,
malfunction,
Waterproof build critical
production Unlikely
seals for all electrical Design team,
Natural loss, injury or (assume
Flooding electrical Critical Extreme infrastructure high OH+S
Disaster death to near
equipment and above sea level, site department
personnel, river/sea)
infrastructure of operations should
release of toxic
have real-time
chemicals
information on local
collected in
conditions
drains
17
Risk Assessment – HAZOP Overall
Table 2: Overall HAZOP
Project: Methane Pipeline Pigging Date: 1st May 2014

P&ID No.: One Node No.: Overall
Node Description: Overall Diagram
HAZOP Lead: Jonathan Clare HAZOP Scribe: Andrew Simms
Possible Cause (s) Safeguard

Parameter Guideword Consequence Recommendations Action
Deviation (Existing)
Preform
Maintenance Pressure sensor to detect
Design
1 Maintenance No Broken Seals Leaks on equipment Addition of smell any pressure loss on
Engineer
for easy leak pipes
detection
Malfunctioning Valves, Testing of
2 Equipment Failure Instruments reading Same As Above instrumentation to Maintenance
incorrectly maintain accuracy
Leaks, Ruptures, Foreign
H2S, Water, Matter, Internal Pipe Maintenance and Water trap before kicker
3 Corrosion More Same As (1)
Foreign Particles damage, Malfunctioning inspection line, composition testing.
valves, change flow
Leaking, loss of control of
process, reverse flow, Inspection and Cathodic protection,
4 Emergencies Rupture Same As (1)
explosion, property Maintenance Pipe sealant/coatings
damage
Composition sensor on
Poisoning if leaks occur line P-1 Design
5 Composition Other than H2S in stream Greater corrosion - Regular testing of Engineer, Lab
occurring product Technician
6 Ingress of air Explosion Risk Pipe at greater Composition sensor to Same As (1)
pressure than monitor the level of
18

outside
Purge pig launcher oxygen in the system
before use
Water indicator in drain
7 Water Corrosion of pipe walls Maintenance line. Liquid/gas Same As (1)
separator on line P-1
Foreign Solid Strainer on line P-1 to
8 Corrosion - Same As (1)
Particles catch any solid particles
Strainer on line P-12
Valve Failure allowing
after the spectacle Design
for pieces of the valve to
9 Same As Above - Inspection of valves for Engineer,
become part of the
integrity (X-ray, Maintenance
product stream
ultrasonic)
Composition sensor on
Leakages of potentially line P-1
Same As (9)
10 Carbon Dioxide toxic gas - Personal gas monitors
Asphyxiation Regular Maintenance to
reduce leakages
11 Flow N/A
12 Pressure N/A
13 Temperature N/A
14 Level N/A
15 Draining N/A
19

Risk Assessment – HAZOP Node 1
Table 3: HAZOP Kicker Line

P&ID No.: Two Node No.: One
Node Description: Kicker Line

Issues launching pig as
there is no flow of
product ( if V-1 isn’t
No Malfunctioning opened) Add flow indicator near Design
1 Flow -
Valve (V-1 or V-2) Issues with the pressure spectacle and after V-1 Engineer
balance around the pig if
V-2 is allowing a no flow
situation
Issues launching pig if a Flow indicator on line P-
2 Upstream issues sudden upstream flow - 1 before the tee to line P- Same As (1)
difference occurs 10
Issues with the pressure
Easily visible indicator
balance around the pig if Design
Spectacle (sb-1) in of spectacle position
3 the spectacle (sb-1) is - Engineer,
wrong position Tag out equipment when
allowing a no flow Maintenance
spectacle is in place
situation
4 Blockages and Blockage in pipe allows Mercaptan – Strong Flow indicators on line Same As (3)
Rupture for no product to flow Smell, easy P-11 and P-13.
through pipe detection of Emergency shutdown
Pipe rupture diverts leaks/ruptures button in case of pipe
product away from initial rupture, with an
path emergency shutdown
valve at the beginning of
P-1
20

Regular maintenance and
inspection of pipes
Issues in launching the Flow indicator on P-12
Less Blockages and
5 pig as a low flow Same As (4) Regular maintenance and Same As (1)
leaks
condition exists inspection of pipes
6 Upstream issues Same As (2) Same As (2) Same As (2) Same As (1)
Issues launching pig as
there is low flow of
product ( if V-1 isn’t
Malfunctioning opened enough)
7 Same As (1) Same As (1) Same As (1)
Valve (V-1 or V-2) Issues with the pressure
balance around the pig if
V-2 is allowing a low
flow situation
Issues with the pressure Flow indicator on line P-
balance around the pig if 12
Spectacle (sb-1) in
8 the spectacle (sb-1) is - Completely remove the Same As (1)
wrong postion
allowing a low flow spectacle when not in
situation use
Pressure difference
Malfunctioning detector between kicker
9 More Rear firing of pig - Same As (1)
Valve (V-2) and balance lines (P-12
and P-)
Allow flow of material Flow Indicator on line P-
10 Spectacle blind - Same As (1)
when not needed 12
Automatic control on
launcher which will stop
Downstream pressure
Lack of upstream launching from
overcomes upstream Pressure indicator
11 Reverse pressure when the occurring when Same As (1)
pressure, pushing pig on pig launcher
pig is to be fired downstream pressure is
back in the launcher
greater than upstream
pressure
Valve Failure (V-1 or V-
2) allowing for product
Startup/Shutdo flow to be effected Cleaning of pipes before
12 Dust - Maintenance
wn Degredation of product being put into service
Corrosive effect on inside
of pipes
13 Air in line Explosion Risk Purge line Composition sensor on Same As (1)
21

Remove ignition line P-12 to make sure
sources purge was complete
14 Pressure N/A
15 Temperature N/A
16 Level N/A
17 Composition N/A
18 Maintenance N/A
Corrosion/
19 N/A
Erosion
20 Draining N/A
22
Table 3: HAZOP Balance Line

P&ID No.: Three Node No.: Two
Node Description: Balance Line

No Malfunctioning balance around the pig if Add flow indicator after Design
1 Flow -
Valve (V-3) V-3 is allowing a no flow V-3 Engineer
situation
Issues launching pig if a Flow indicator on line P-
2 Upstream issues sudden upstream flow - 1 before the tee to line P- Same As (1)
difference occurs 10
Flow indicators on line
P-11 and P-13.
Blockage in pipe allows Emergency shutdown
for no product to flow button in case of pipe
Maintenance
Blockages and through pipe Mercaptan – Strong rupture, with an
3 and Design
Rupture Pipe rupture diverts Smell emergency shutdown
Engineer
product away from initial valve at the beginning of
path P-1
inspection of pipes
Loss of automated
4 Same As (1) Same As (1) Same As (1) Same As (1)
flow control
Flow indicator on P-14
Less Blockages and Issues in launching the
5 Same As (3) Regular Maintenance Same As (3)
leaks pig
and Inspection
23

Malfunctioning balance around the pig if
Valve (V-3) V-3 is allowing a low
flow situation
Loss of automated
8 Same As (7) Same As (1) Same As (1) Same As (1)
flow control
Pressure difference
Malfunctioning detector between kicker
9 More Rear firing of pig - Same As (1)
Valve (V-3) and balance lines (P-12
and P-14)
Downstream pressure
Lack of upstream launching from
12 Reverse pressure when the occurring when Same As (1)
pig is to be fired downstream pressure is
pressure
Valve Failure (V-3)
allowing for product flow
Start- to be effected Cleaning of pipes before
up/Shutdown Degradation of product being put into service
of pipes
Purge line Composition sensor on
12 Air in line Explosion Risk Remove ignition line P-14 to make sure Same As (1)
13 Pressure N/A
14 Temperature N/A
15 Level N/A
16 Composition N/A
17 Maintenance N/A
Corrosion/
18 N/A
Erosion
19 Draining N/A
24

Table 4: HAZOP Bypass Line

P&ID No.: Four Node No.: Three
Node Description: Bypass Line and Flare

Over flow of gas to flare –
No Malfunctioning waste of product Add flow indicator after Design
1 Flow -
Valve (V-4) Lack of flow in other V-4 Engineer
parts of system
Issues if a sudden
Flow indicator on line P-
2 Upstream issues upstream flow difference - Same As (1)
1 before the tee
occurs
P-2 and P-3. Emergency
Blockage in pipe allows
shutdown button in case
for no product to flow
of pipe rupture, with an Maintenance
Blockages and through pipe Mercaptan – Strong
3 emergency shutdown and Design
Rupture Pipe rupture diverts Smell
valve at the beginning of Engineer
product away from initial
P-1
path
inspection of pipes
Hand valve (HV-1) in
incorrect position Change hand valve to
4 Operator Error - Same As (1)
stopping flow through the automatic control valve
system
Flow indicator on P-2
Less Blockages and Issues in adjusting the
5 Same As (3) Regular Maintenance Same As (3)
leaks bypass
and Inspection
25

Malfunctioning Issues with the amount of
Valve (V-4) gas going to the flare
Flaring of too much gas Flow indicator on line P-
8 Over flow to flare allowing for a low flow - 8 after the tee going to Same As (1)
condition to exist the flare
Hand valve (HV-1) in
incorrect position
9 Operator Error - Same As (4) Same As(1)
reducing flow through the
system
Valve Failure (V-4)
allowing for product flow
Start- to be effected Cleaning of pipes before
up/Shutdown Degradation of product being put into service
of pipes
Purge line Composition sensor on
11 Air in line Explosion Risk Remove ignition line P-2 to make sure Same As (1)
Pressure difference
12 Rear firing of pig detector between kicker
and balance
Kicker line and
flare drawing gas Check Valve
13 Reverse Reduced flow
from downstream installed
pipeline
Purge line
Startup/Shutdo
14 Air in line Explosion Risk Remove ignition
wn
sources
15 Pressure N/A
16 Temperature N/A
17 Level N/A
18 Composition N/A
19 Maintenance N/A
Corrosion/
20 N/A
Erosion
21 Draining N/A
26
27

Table 5: HAZOP Launcher Line

P&ID No.: Five Node No.: Four
Node Description: Launcher Line

Malfunctioning Inability for the pig to be
No Add a flow indicator Design
1 Flow Valve (V-49 or V- fired into the main Maintenance
onto line P-29 Engineer
50) pipeline
P-29. Emergency
Blockage in pipe allows
for no product to flow Mercaptan – Strong
of pipe rupture, with an Design
Blockages and through pipe Smell, easy
2 emergency shutdown Engineer,
Rupture Pipe rupture diverts detection of
valve at the beginning of Maintenance
product away from initial leaks/ruptures
P-1
path
inspection of pipes
Pig will not fire Pressure interlocks
Low pressure in Reverse flow of process making sure launcher
3 Less - Same As (1)
pig launcher causing the pig to move pressure is greater than
backwards mainline pressure
Malfunctioning Inability for the pig to be
Add a flow indicator
4 valve (V-49 or fired into the main Maintenance Same As (1)
onto line P-29
V50) pipeline due to low flow
Causes low flow through
Automatic control of all
Bypass line too line P-27 before the
5 - valves with interlocks Same As (1)
much flow bypass line re-joins,
and a step process
launcher malfunction
6 Blockages and Blockage in pipe allows Mercaptan – Strong Flow indicators on line Same As (2)
28

P-29. Emergency
for low product to flow of pipe rupture, with an
Smell, easy
through pipe emergency shutdown
Leaks detection of
Pipe leaks diverts product valve at the beginning of
leaks/ruptures
away from initial path P-1
inspection of pipes
Causes high flow through
Underuse of bypass
7 More launcher, possibly causing - Same As (5) Same As (1)
line
instabilities
Valves too open allowing
Malfunctioning
8 for a high flow when a - Same as (5) Same As (1)
Valves
high flow is not needed
Downstream pressure
Higher launching from
9 Reverse Downstream than occurring when Same As (1)
Upstream pressure downstream pressure is
pressure
10 Pressure N/A
11 Temperature N/A
12 Level N/A
13 Composition N/A
14 Maintenance N/A
Corrosion/
15 N/A
Erosion
16 Draining N/A
29

Table 6: HAZOP Launcher Barrel

P&ID No.: Six Node No.: Five
Node Description: Launcher Barrel

Malfunctioning Pipe rupture, venting of Add flow indicators to
No Design
1 Flow Valve (V-5, V-11, gas, failure to launch, Maintenance lines P-15, P27, P-23
Engineer
V9 or V-10) Inability to drain and P-24
Hard wired
No flow entering the
communications so
2 Upstream issues barrel due to upstream - Same As (1)
operators can be easily
failure
notified of issues
Failure of Inability to launch or
3 - Regular Maintenance Same As (1)
automated control receive pig
Results in the possibility
Purge fully, composition
of air being left in the Same As (1),
4 Less Purge - sensor to allow for
system, corrosion and Operators
checking of air levels
explosive risk
Addition of a usage
Infrequent use of the drain
timer (won’t work until
5 Drain allowing for liquid build- - Same As (1)
it has been drained after
up
a period of time)
Hard wired
Low flow entering the
communications so
6 Upstream Issue barrel due to upstream - Same As (1)
failure
notified of issues
Low flow due to leak in
Thermal imaging, gas
7 Leak the system, possible Same As (1)
detector alarm
explosion
30

Malfunctioning Pipe rupture, venting of Add flow indicators to
8 Valve (V-5, V-11, gas, failure to launch, Maintenance lines P-15, P27, P-23 Same As (1)
V9 or V-10) Inability to drain and P-24
Hard wired
High flow entering the
communications so
9 More Upstream Issues barrel due to upstream - Same As (1)
failure
notified of issues
Usage of flare and vent
cause a higher flow of Flow indicators on P-17
10 Flare and Vent - Same As (1)
product through the and P-15
system
Results in the possibility
Purge fully, composition
Start- of air being left in the Same As (1),
11 Purge stream - sensor to allow for
up/Shutdown system, corrosion and Operators
checking of air levels
explosive risk
Addition of a usage
Infrequent use of the drain
Build-up of foreign timer (won’t work until
12 Draining No allowing for liquid build- - Same As (1)
matter it has been drained after
up
a period of time)
Start-up And Inability to drain or
13 Valve failure Redundant drains Emergency shutdown Same As (1)
Shutdown excess draining
14 Pressure N/A
15 Temperature N/A
16 Level N/A
17 Composition N/A
18 Maintenance N/A
Corrosion/
19 N/A
Errosin
31
Recommendations
1) Regular maintenance of pressure differential instrumentation to ensure pig launches are

successful and do not take any damage during use.
2) Automatic pressure relief on upstream pipeline to prevent damage to the pipe because of a
partially opened by pass line during start-up.
3) Switch all the manually operated valves to automatic valves with a manual over ride to reduce
human error during operation.
4) Key transfer in a linear sequence to prevent incorrect operation of HV on bypass line thus
minimizing the risk of leakage, damage to pipe and failure to launch the pig.
5) Purge the system with nitrogen while operation is suspended / stopped for maintenance to prevent
air from getting inside. The oxygen in the air is an oxidant and will cause various types of corrosion on
the internal wall of the pipe potentially being very costly to the company.
6) Install the closure doors facing away from any normal operational areas as the pig can blast and
destroy infrastructure in its pathway and injure nearby personnel. The introduction of an automated
locking system when the pig receiver is operating will also help alleviate this problem.
7) Provide appropriate training to all personnel on testing/installation of the equipment and ensuring
experienced supervisors are present to overlook the operation takes place correctly.
8) Regular inspection and maintenance on control equipment to ensure no damage has occurred
during operational shutdown/start-ups such as; gauges, pipelines.
9) Regular maintenance and inspection on equipment to check whether there are leaking vales and
seals of hazardous gases, consequently replacing parts when necessary.
10) Appropriate PPE should be worn at all times.
11) Always operate within permissible limits can install pressure gauges fitted to the pig launcher to
avoid bursting components/ system parts causing damage to equipment and possibly injury/ death to
nearby persons.
12) Alarms should be fitted to equipment if a malfunction has occurred allowing an operator to
analyse and solve the problem.
13) Equipment should have appropriate interlocks, preventing use of equipment if part of system has
failed. This will stop any chain reactions down the line causing an even bigger problem than necessary.
14) Vapour release should be monitored by permanent equipment to ensure safe working conditions
for all personnel around the pipeline. Mercaptan can be added into the stream as it is harmless gas with a
very pungent odour allowing workers nearby to detect the gas leak and act upon it quickly.
15) Implement a generator or backup power supply in case of an emergency or power outage causing
all systems to stop functioning. Uninterrupted Power Source is crucial for constant production.
32

16) Good housekeeping and inspection of equipment before and after using it to avoid dirt and water
building up in the pipeline and tank. The highest chance of this occurring is during the cleaning process of
the pig where the system is exposed to the surroundings/environment.
17) Install a lightning rod in preparation for a storm. Released hydrocarbons exposed to air are
flammable and can ignite from an ignition source such as lightning.
18) Install composition analyzing equipment in the pipelines to check for any foreign contaminants in
the gas such as H2S, which can cause corrosion to the internal wall of the pipe and tank potentially
weakening the structure.
19) Build all electrical infrastructures high above sea level to avoid water getting inside it creating a
hazardous situation.
33
Updated P+ID with recommended changes:
1 1
S-3 P-8 To flare
PSV-1
PAH PDIC
1
P-6 P-7
P-3 pdt P-4 1 V-4
AIT
P-5
S-4
P-1 P-37
P-10 V-11
P-2
V-1 P-20 To flare
PSV-2
P-18 P-19 Check valve-1

P-11
V-7
P-13 Purge
V-3
connection 2
PAH
2
P-14 PDIC
vent P-17 3
P-22 P-9
S-5
V-2 PAH Check valve 2
pg xt pt 2
Sb-2 S-6
V-5 P-12 V-6 P-30 P-31 P-32 V-8 pdt
P-15 Sb-1 P-16 P-21
xt
P-33 P-34 !-4
P-33
P-36
2
AIT
Pig launcher
V-11 V-12 SDV-1
P-27 P-28 P-29
PAH
pt
4
P-35
P-23 P-24
V-9 V-10
Sb-3 Sb-4
P-26
P-25 Closed drain drum
Figure 7: Updated P+ID with recommendations
34
35
Conclusions
This report focusses on a typical pig launcher/receiver system in a gas pipeline, looking at it from all
angles to complete a safety analysis. Firstly, we analysed and interpreted the P+ID instrumentation
diagram to get a better understanding of the intricate details of the pig launching/receiving system. From
here, we read numerous operator manuals to learn how it was assembled, operated and maintained
picking out hazards along the way. Combining both of these, we identified the specific hazards hidden
within the system. We found this was much easier when we split the P+ID into separate nodes allowing
us to be more specific on each segment of pipeline tailoring specific recommendations to each valve/
pipeline/ sensor. This taught us how to pay attention to detail and think outside of the box for any possible
situation that may occur within the system. HAZID and HAZOP risk assessments were used as tools in
this process aiding us in our analysis. Lastly, Recommendations were made based on the hazards
identified in the HAZID and HAZOP analysis teaching us how to solve problems with realistic
constraints.
36
References
Arjomandnia, Pooya. 2014. “Lecture 3: Risk – Classification, Factors and Estimation”. PDF Lecture
notes. https://lms.curtin.edu.au/bbcswebdav/pid-2923378-dt-content-rid-
12480625_1/courses/302269-CU-061-01-Sxx-x1/ChE%20421_Lect3%20PA.pdf
Arjomandnia, Pooya. 2014. “Lecture 4: Risk – The Safety Concept”. PDF Lecture notes.
https://lms.curtin.edu.au/bbcswebdav/pid-2923383-dt-content-rid-12539903_1/courses/302269-
CU-061-01-Sxx-x1/ChE%20421_Lect4%20PA.pdf
Jamison Products. Accessed 28th April 2014. “Pig Launchers/Receivers”.
http://www.jamisonproducts.com/pipeline-products/pig-launchers-receivers.html
Maynard, Nicoleta. 2012. “Lecture 5: Hazard Identification”. PDF Lecture notes.
https://lms.curtin.edu.au/bbcswebdav/pid-2924535-dt-content-rid-12845333_1/courses/302269-
CU-061-01-Sxx-x1/ChE%20421_Lect5.pdf
Girard Industries. 2014. “Launching and Retreiving Procedures”.
http://www.tremcopipeline.com.au/pdf/girard/launching_retrieving_procedures1.pdf
37

Appendix A: Risk Likelihood/Consequence Tables
Table 7: Likelihood Table
38
Table 8: Consequence Table
39
40

Appendix B: HAZOP Guidewords
Table 9: HAZOP Guidewords
HAZOP Parameter Guide Words

Flow No
Pressure Less
Temperature More
Level Reverse
Composition Other than
Maintenance As well as
Corrosion/Erosion Start-up / Shutdown
Draining Emergencies
41

Appendix C: Ranking Matrix
Table 10: Ranking Matrix
Likelihood or Consequence Severity

Frequency Low Minor Moderate Major Critical
Almost Certain High High Extreme Extreme Extreme
Likely Moderate High High Extreme Extreme
Possible Low Moderate High Extreme Extreme
Unlikely Low Low Moderate High Extreme
Rare Low Low Moderate High High
42

Appendix D: P+ID Symbols
Table 11: P+ID Symbols
Normally closed gate valve

Automatic control valve
Pressure safety valve
Flanges
Check valve
Spectacle blind
Shut down valve
sdv
vent
vent
pg Pressure gauge
xt Pig position transmitter
pt Pressure transmitter
Hand operated control valve
HV
Pressure differential indicator and controller

PDIC
Pressure alarm high

PAH
Analysis indicator and transmitter

AIT
Pressure differential transmitter

pdt
P-i Pipeline i
ni Outlet to node i
Gate valve
43

Appendix E: Meeting Minutes
Meeting 1 Minutes
Project title: PIG Receivers and Launchers

MOM No. 01 DATE: 07 / 04 / 2014 Group No. 03
Group Members:
1. Andrew Simms Student ID: 14857397 4. Alex Neamtu Student ID: 15547437
2. Jonathan Clare Student ID: 15523071 5. Nabil Tiba Student ID: 15509547
3. Ross Gustafsson Student ID: 15513179 6. Nicholas Rodan Student ID: 14841073
1. Attendees:
2. Project brief description:

Create a hazard safety report on the use of pig launchers and receivers by using hazard tools such
as HAZID and HAZOP tables.
3. Items discussed:
Items / Actions By Due date
1 Introduction to each other Everyone
2 Finding an operational manual Everyone 11/04/2014
3 Completion of a personal HAZID – Allow for differing Everyone 14/04/2014
views to be expressed
4 Report overview Everyone 14/04/2014
5 PID Drawings Everyone
4. Follow ups: (Next meeting actions and if anything remains from item 3)
44

1 Completion of a personal HAZID – Allow for differing Everyone 14/04/2014
views to be expressed
2 Report overview started Andrew 14/04/2014
3 PID Drawings started Nick 14/04/2014
Meeting 2 Minutes

Group Members:
1. Attendees:

3. Items discussed:
1 HAZID Everyone 14/04/2014
2 Report overview Andrew 14/04/2014
3 PID Drawings Nick 14/04/2014
4 Selecting nodes for HAZOP Everyone 18/04/2014
45
1 HAZID Compilation – send out once complete Andrew 18/04/2014
2 Node PID Drawings – send out once complete Nick 18/04/2014
3 Look into HAZOP, start having ideas for Friday Everyone 18/04/2014
Meeting 3 Minutes

Group Members:
1. Attendees:

46

3. Items discussed:
1 HAZID – review Everyone 18/04/2014
2 HAZOP – Started to complete Everyone 25/04/2014
3 Node PID drawings - Review Everyone 18/04/2014
1 HAZOP – Complete at next meeting Everyone 25/04/2014
2 Recommendations – based on HAZID Ross 25/04/2014
3 Type and edit first part of HAZOP Andrew 25/04/2014
Meeting 4 Minutes

Group Members:
1. Attendees:
47

3. Items discussed:
1 HAZOP – Complete Everyone 25/04/2014
2 Review recommendations Everyone 25/04/2014
3 Conclusion Ross ASAP
4 Pig operating procedure Alex, Nabil ASAP
5 Completing Draft Report Andrew 02/05/2014
6 PID with recommendations Nicholas 02/05/2014
1 Editing report Jonathan 05/05/2014
2 Any other reviews Everyone 02/05/2014
3 Ask lecturer/tutor for suggestions, include draft report Jonathan 02/05/2014
4 Ask about marking guides for report and presentation Jonathan 02/05/2014
Meeting 5 Minutes

Group Members:
1. Attendees:
48


3. Items discussed:
1 Editing report Jonathan 05/05/2014
2 Review of draft report before email for suggestions Everyone 02/05/2014
3 Ask lecturer/tutor for suggestions, include draft report Jonathan 02/05/2014
4 Ask about marking guides for report and presentation Jonathan 02/05/2014
5 Any other things to email to lecturers Everyone 02/05/2014
1 Report submission Andrew 05/05/2014
49

Methane Pipeline Pigging Risk Management 421 Case Study

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