Received: 2 October 2017 Revised: 27 December 2018 Accepted: 4 February 2019

DOI: 10.1111/caim.12309

ARTICLE

How to manage creativity time? Results from a social

psychological time model lab experiment on individual creative
and routine performance

Alexander Brem1,2 | Verena Utikal1

1
Faculty of Business and Economics, Friedrich‐
Alexander‐Universität Erlangen‐Nürnberg Companies have long used various approaches for organizing their employees' time
(FAU), Germany
for creative and routine tasks in order to improve innovative performance. In
2
Faculty of Engineering, University of
Southern Denmark (SDU), Sønderborg, this paper, we examine how work schedule autonomy affects individuals' creative
Denmark and routine performance. We then evaluate non‐commissioned time models. Results

Correspondence
Alexander Brem, Faculty of Business and
Economics, Friedrich‐Alexander‐Universität
Erlangen‐Nürnberg (FAU), Germany
Email: alexander.brem@fau.de
of laboratory experiments with 233 participants reveal that while average routine
performance is not affected by schedule autonomy, the effect of schedule autonomy
on creative performance depends on the subject's impulsiveness. There is evidence of
an inverse relationship between schedule autonomy and creative performance among
subjects of low impulsiveness. Hence, our results indicate that the optimal manage-
ment policy depends on the manager's focus on creative or routine performance
and the types of employees the manager supervises. For routine performance, the
creativity time model has no significant impact.

1 | I N T RO D U CT I O N
Each organization faces the challenge of employing their members in a
way that is beneficial for innovation. This is not only true for industries
that rely on creative performance, like arts or services, but also for
companies operating in high‐technology industries. Schultz,
Schreyoegg, and von Reitzenstein (2013) indicate in their study that
providing employees with creativity time in addition to the time they
have to perform routine tasks is a very profitable approach for compa-
nies. Employees that engage in both creative and routine tasks are
generally more creative than their counterparts who engage exclu-
sively in creative tasks. The application of time constraints to complete
tasks also helps to avoid employee boredom (Shalley & Gilson, 2004)
and to promote employee creativity (Baer & Oldham, 2006). Hence,
the question arises, how people should effectively allocate their time
for working on new products and services (creative tasks) on the
one hand, and to take care of daily operational activities, like writing
bills (routine tasks) on the other hand, with the aim of achieving
high‐quality outputs in both processes.
We know that many organizations give employees the freedom to
use a certain amount of their time to work creatively. However, we
know little about the effects of the different time models on individ-
uals' creative and day‐to‐day performance. This is particularly surpris-
ing, given that companies have developed and implemented different
organizational time approaches for creative work for years, but with-
out knowledge of their efficacy. Prominent examples are the 15% rule
of 3M, or the 20% rule for creative time at Google. To this end, differ-
ent models for such time management approaches exist. Whereas
some companies allow fixed time slots for employees to engage in
innovative projects (i.e. the predetermined or transient time model),
others allow employees schedule autonomy in their organization of
creative time (spontaneous time model). Hence, the aim of this paper
is to identify the optimal amount of scheduling autonomy employees
should be granted. This paper is the first to experimentally investigate
the respective effects of established work time models on creativity
and routine work output.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, we give an
overview of earlier research on the organization of creativity time.
There we focus on the concept of non‐commissioned time. Next, we
introduce our three hypotheses based on literature in this field.
This is the basis of our laboratory experiment, which we explain in
Section 3. There we describe the chosen experimental design as well

Creat Innov Manag. 2019;1–15. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/caim © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1
2 BREM AND UTIKAL
as the questionnaire used and all detailed procedures. After the pre-
sentation of the main results, a discussion with specific implications
for theory and practice follows. Finally, limitations and future research
potentials are highlighted.
2 | T HE O R E T I CA L B A CK GR O U N D
2.1 | Organization of creativity time:
non‐commissioned work
Earlier research suggests that jobs need to be redefined to facilitate
creativity and innovation through the management of complexity
and autonomy (Hammond, Neff, Farr, Schwall, & Zhao, 2011). So‐
called creativity time frames are such an approach. Burkus and Oster
(2012) define creativity time frames as “structured periods of auton-
omy during which employees choose what projects to work on and
how to complete such projects” (p. 49). The evolution of such time
frames can be seen before the background of developments in the last
decades, where hierarchical organizational structures moved to lower
management levels with high autonomy in their decision‐making pro-
cess (Humphrey, Hollenbeck, Meyer, & Ilgen, 2007). Employees with
freedom in how, when and where to work, tend to be more innovative
(Boh, Evaristo, & Ouderkirk, 2014), as such freedom supports the
motivation for implementing ideas later on (Hammond et al., 2011).
Many managers and researchers also refer to these designated periods
of creativity as non‐commissioned work time, a common form of a
corporate innovation programme.
First, persistent non‐commissioned work is characterized by
“autonomy given for a specific percentage of work time” (Burkus &
Oster, 2012, p. 50). Companies using this approach allow employees
to engage in creative work for a specific percentage of their total work
time. Employees can schedule their creative work and routine tasks
autonomously and spontaneously. Given this designation, we will
henceforth label this approach as the spontaneous time model. As early
as the 1940s, 3M adopted spontaneous non‐commissioned working
time models in which managers allowed employees – usually R&D
staff from PhD physicists to laboratory technicians (Nicholson, 1998)
– to use 15% of their working time for self‐initiated projects. In this
regard, 3M is a pioneer in the field of spontaneous non‐commissioned
work. Some businesses mimic the company's programme to this day
(Govindarajan & Srinivas, 2013; Mitsch, 1992). For example, Google
utilizes a similar method; they allow employees to use 20% of their
time for self‐initiated projects, for both R&D staff and managers (Iyer
& Davenport, 2008).
The second approach is transient (labelled in this paper as
predetermined) non‐commissioned work, which Burkus and Oster
(2012, p. 50) defined as “autonomy given for distinct time via struc-
tured events.” In this model, employees work creatively in fixed time
slots predetermined by the company. For example, Atlassian and
Twitter provide employees with an entire week per year to engage
in non‐commissioned work (Burkus & Oster, 2012). The main thrust
of predetermined non‐commissioned work is to set specific time slots
where employees can work on their ideas without being disturbed by
daily routine tasks. This typically involves a change of location or
other activities that limit distractions caused by routine tasks (e.g.
turning off one's smartphone or disabling a wireless connection). This
can be doubly useful, as individuals that share locations and time slots
to work on creative projects may generate new ideas through group
work.
Other companies like Neptune use a planned approach. They ask
their staff to declare how they want to distribute their non‐
commissioned work over time within their formal working time, which
is then reviewed by their supervisors (Criscuolo, Salter, & Ter Wal,
2013). Although this time model is used less frequently, we will
include it in our analysis for reasons of control. However, the main
focus is on the most frequently used approaches, the predetermined
and the spontaneous time models.
These time models create “‘safe havens’ for small amounts of
highly experimental work by all functions” (Zien & Buckler, 1997, p.
280). Researchers have shown that both spontaneous and
predetermined time models can increase creative output (Burkus,
2014; Burkus & Oster, 2012; Pink, 2011), but a comparative analysis
of their respective effectiveness has yet to be performed. The litera-
ture suggests that the benefits of implementing a programme that
allows employees to be creative are not in question. Instead, the ques-
tion emerges as to how the time for both should be allotted to maxi-
mize creative and routine performance.
2.2 | Prior research and hypotheses
The time models described above differ in several respects. Most
notably, when introducing “creativity time”, managers manipulate
employees' work scheduling autonomy, which is “the extent to which
workers feel they can control the scheduling/sequencing/timing of
their work activities” (Breaugh, 1985, p. 556). Hence, these time
models have a direct influence on the daily work of an employee to
pursue his or her daily task. Whereas employees have no scheduling
autonomy in the predetermined time model, they have full scheduling
autonomy in the spontaneous time model: employees can spontane-
ously switch between tasks at any point in time. Performance
differences across time models might therefore arise due to different
levels of schedule autonomy, but also due to different time schedules.
We turn to the effects of schedule autonomy first. Schedule
autonomy is part of job autonomy. Within the literature on the effect
of job autonomy,1 most studies have provided evidence that the exis-
tence of job autonomy increases performance (for research related to
routine performance, see, e.g., Fried & Ferris, 1987; Hammond et al.,
2011; Liden, Wayne, & Sparrowe, 2000; Morgeson, Delaney‐Klinger,
& Hemingway, 2005; for research concerning creative performance,
see Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Shalley, 1991;
Udwadia, 1990; Zampetakis, Bouranta, & Moustakis, 2010).2
Note, that although granted work schedule autonomy, some
employees may continue to work in accordance with the schedule to
which they were subjected before they were given schedule auton-
omy. Because the schedules in the spontaneous and in the
BREM AND UTIKAL
predetermined time model do not differ in this case, performance will
not be affected by switching behaviour, but may be affected by their
perception of granted schedule autonomy. The following hypothesis
is therefore valid for switchers (who alter their work agendas and
switch between tasks) and non‐switchers (who stay with the
predetermined work agenda even in the spontaneous time model):
Hypothesis 1. Creative and routine performance in the
spontaneous time model will be stronger than in the
predetermined time model.
Let us now turn towards switchers only: These are employees who
use their schedule autonomy to alter their work agendas and imple-
ment a new, more flexible schedule. Some research has suggested that
this increased flexibility can enhance creative performance, and that
individual motivation supports the predictability of creative perfor-
mance (Amabile, 1983). Past scholars have found that: (a) the promo-
tion of thoughts unrelated to common tasks can yield inspiration
(Baird et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006); and (b) distraction
can facilitate creativity (Wells, 1996). These effects are largely attrib-
utable to the fact that the generation of thoughts unrelated to tasks
that are performed in a familiar environment can stimulate creativity
(Baird et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006). Moreover, working
at their own pace can make individuals more creative (Jett & George,
2003; Kellogg, 1999; Shalley & Gilson, 2004; Zampetakis et al., 2010).
In addition, by switching between tasks, there is no time lost from cog-
nitive blocking or uncreative moments (Madjar & Shalley, 2008). Inter-
ruptions may help individuals avoid getting cognitively “stuck”
(Beeftink, Van Eerde, & Rutte, 2008), which should increase creative
as well as routine performance.
However, switching between tasks can also depress creative and
routine performance. In this vein, Buser and Peter (2012) compared
joint performance on two cognitive tasks and found that subjects that
were allowed to multitask performed significantly worse than subjects
who had to work on the tasks sequentially.3 This effect is likely due to
cognitive effects associated with processing two tasks simultaneously
(Langfred & Moye, 2004). When switching between tasks, employees
often need a “warming‐up” period during which they can gather
momentum on each task. As a result, they tend to be less committed
to either task on which they are working (Jett & George, 2003;
Monsell, 2003), and can experience difficulty in maintaining focus
when shifting mental effort between jobs over a short period of time
(Madjar & Shalley, 2008). This can explain a lower creative and routine
performance in the spontaneous time model.
Depending on the effect size of the benefits and costs of
switching, we will observe a stronger or weaker performance in the
spontaneous time model compared to the predetermined time model.
The effect size might well be influenced by various personality traits:
most commonly mentioned ones are extraversion, agreeableness,
emotional stability, intelligence or assertiveness. A key and widely
researched personality trait is impulsivity, the “tendency to respond
quickly rather than inhibiting the response” (Buss & Plomin, 1975, p.
7). On the one hand, if highly impulsive people feel an impulse to
switch to another task, they can be expected to do so. Lowly impulsive
3
people are more likely to control themselves and continue working on
their original task. Thus, impulsivity should be positively associated
with the extent of switching. Indeed, previous research has shown
that highly impulsive people have a stronger preference to switch
between tasks than lowly impulsive people (see König, Oberacher, &
Kleinmann, 2010). Also, highly impulsive people are more successful
in switching between tasks than lowly impulsive people (see
Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros‐Ward, & Watson, 2013). This leads
to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The effect of the spontaneous compared
to the predetermined time model on creative and routine
performance will be stronger for highly impulsive people
than for lowly impulsive people.
Langfred and Moye (2004) emphasized that task formalization can
moderate the effect of autonomy on performance. Highly formalized
tasks (i.e. tasks that allow for a very limited set of solutions) constrain
an individual's ability to exercise autonomy. We therefore expect that
the positive effect of work schedule autonomy on performance will
be more pronounced for creative tasks relative to formalized
routine tasks.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of the spontaneous compared
to the predetermined time model will be more pro-
nounced for creative than for routine performance.
3 | METHODS
To test these hypotheses, we utilize a laboratory experiment to mea-
sure individuals' performance under different time models. A labora-
tory experiment is a useful tool for exploring the questions posed
above, as it provides a controlled and simplified environment that cir-
cumvents heterogeneity across companies that can confound a com-
parative field study. Many social scientists are still hesitant to trust
laboratory evidence. Common complaints are that student participants
are unrepresentative and that sample sizes are small. However, the
objection that laboratory experiments are unrealistic is a misunder-
standing that is twofold. First, decisions in the experiment are real.
Real individuals with real preferences and abilities come to the lab,
and they do not know what the experiment is about. Decisions lead
to real monetary consequences. Second, most theoretical models are
“unrealistic” and ignore many aspects of reality. This simplification is
an advantage: it helps to understand the interaction of the relevant
variables. Whether the proximity to reality is an important criterion
for the evaluation of experiments depends on the purpose of the
respective experiment. It is often the goal of laboratory experiments
to test theories. The evidence gained is relevant to the improvement
of theoretical models and not to the immediate understanding of
reality. The simplest experiments are often the most interesting,
because they provide insights into fundamental behavioural patterns
and general principles of human motivation (see also Falk & Heckman,
2009).
4 BREM AND UTIKAL
3.1 | Experimental design
To simplify our experimental design to the highest possible degree, we
utilized one creative task and one routine task, which are both
established in research. Figure 1 gives an overview of our experimen-
tal design.
In the routine task, subjects were asked to add two random two‐
digit numbers (e.g. 58 + 54). After (correctly or incorrectly) responding
to each arithmetic question, subjects were presented with another
task. This procedure continued for the duration of the experimental
period. The task is similar to the one used by Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007), who stated that task performance depends on skill and effort.
The routine task was heavily formalized as there was only one correct
answer to the problem. We measured routine task performance as the
number of correctly solved mathematical problems.
For the creative task, we used a version of the word creation task
developed by Eckartz, Kirchkamp, and Schunk (2012).4 Specifically,
participants received a set of 12 letters arranged in alphabetical
order.5 Their task was to create as many words as possible from this
6
set of letters. The creative task was non‐formalized, allowing for var-
ious correct answers and a number of ways to approach the problem
at hand. We measured creative task performance as the number of
correctly entered words. The task is well suited for this study, because
(a) performance on this task is highly correlated with traditional mea-
sures of creativity,7 and (b) the test is repeatable by using a different
letter set for each treatment. Therefore, the task is appropriate for
our within‐subject design (see below). In addition, the computer sys-
tem through which the task was administered allowed for automatic
and immediate evaluation.
We implemented three treatments that reflect different creativity
time models. Two treatments mirror existing creativity time models
(predetermined and spontaneous), whereas the third treatment
(planned) serves as control.
In the predetermined time model treatment, time slots for creative
and routine tasks were exogenously predetermined. Subjects
responded to their respective questions sequentially for five minutes
each. In this condition, schedule autonomy was low. Subjects decided
which task to begin with, but subjects knew that the sequential
FIGURE 1 Relationship between performance, task and time model
schedule would be established. This scenario represents the imple-
mentation of a fixed time slot for creative work.
The spontaneous time model treatment reflected a scenario in
which subjects were able to individually choose their schedule. In this
condition, schedule autonomy was high. Subjects were restricted in
the amount of time they had to complete their respective tasks, but
were not constrained by any other factor. They were allowed to spon-
taneously switch between the tasks at any point in time and as often as
they liked. Participants could switch tasks by toggling a button on the
computer screen. As soon as the subject had worked on one of the
tasks for five minutes, the subject was no longer able to switch.
The predetermined and spontaneous treatments differed in two
respects: in the spontaneous condition participants were granted sched-
ule autonomy and could continuously and spontaneously switch
between tasks; in the predetermined condition participants could not
switch at all. Therefore, we ran a control treatment planned, where
subjects could continuously switch between tasks as often as they
preferred. However, unlike in the spontaneous condition, participants
were unable to switch between tasks spontaneously; instead, they were
forced to commit to a pre‐defined schedule. Before the treatment
began, subjects had to design their schedules, thereby prompting the
computer to switch between tasks as per their
individual predetermined preferences. Planned did not reflect an existing
time model, but served as a control for possible confounding effects.
Again, to simplify as much as possible, the amount of time allowed
for each task was set equal. Hence, subjects worked on the creative
and the routine task for the same amount of time.
We implemented two different working periods: 5 minutes per
task and 10 minutes per task. Figure 2 provides a visual overview of
the three treatments for the 5‐minute sessions. Note that the experi-
mental design ensures that working time for the two tasks is fixed
across all three treatments. In each of the treatment conditions, sub-
jects worked on both the creative and routine tasks for 5 minutes
each. Performance differences between treatments therefore measure
each model's effect on productivity.
Of course, in a real‐world setting, working time is substantially lon-
ger than 5 minutes, which might lead to differences in performance
not only due to treatment effects but also due to decreasing concen-
tration and “flow” (which, according to the argument of
Csíkszentmihályi (1996), relates to creativity). To control for these
possible effects, we replicated the study allowing 10 minutes for each
task – the maximum amount of time that was possible without risking
that subjects would get bored or exhausted.
We implemented a within‐subject design to account for treatment
order effects and measure adaptation to increased or decreased work
schedule autonomy.8 This means that subjects received all three treat-
ments in random order. Before the experiment started, subjects
received the instructions of the experiment9 explaining the general
setup, such as routine and the creative task. They were told that there
would be three parts and that at the beginning of each part, they
would receive instructions on screen. In addition, to control for possi-
ble learning effects, we assigned arithmetic problems and letter sets
randomly and independently across participants.
BREM AND UTIKAL
FIGURE 2 Overview of treatment
conditions, five‐minutes‐per‐task
For both the routine and creative tasks, we used a piece‐rate com-
pensation scheme. That is, for each correctly solved arithmetic prob-
lem (for the routine task) or correctly offered word (for the creative
task), participants received one point.10
3.2 | Questionnaire
To ensure that performance in the creative task was correlated with
(and therefore a valid proxy for) creativity, we implemented one addi-
tional measure of creativity: the Creative Personality Scale (CPS)
(Gough, 1979) is based on Gough's Adjective Check List (Gough &
Heilbrun, 1965). The CPS was included because earlier research indi-
cates a correlation between the individual level of creativity and inno-
vative performance (Hammond et al., 2011; Oldham & Cummings,
1996; Zhou & Oldham, 2001). Furthermore, we controlled for individ-
ual characteristics that have been reported to affect creativity (see
Batey & Furnham, 2006; Feist, 1998; Prabhu, Sutton, & Sauser,
2008; Richards, Kinney, Benet, & Merzel, 1988; Sung & Choi, 2009).
Specifically, we incorporated questions to evaluate participants' impul-
siveness (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). For this, we used the
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS 11), one of the most commonly used
psychological tests, which consists of 30 items for impulsive or non‐
11
impulsive behaviours and preferences. Finally, we included ques-
tions to account for participants' socio‐demographics, their native lan-
guage,12 grades in school and experience with games like Scrabble.
3.3 | Procedures
In total, we collected data from 128 subjects (57% male) in the 5‐
minutes‐per‐task sessions and 105 subjects (39% male) in the 10‐
minutes‐per‐task sessions, each of which accounted for three obser-
vations per task. The sample consisted of both undergraduate and
graduate students.13 The questionnaire was programmed with z‐Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). We recruited participants using the online
recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each subject sat at a
5
randomly assigned PC terminal and was given a copy of the instruc-
tions (see Appendix A). To ensure that participants understood the
game, we administered a set of control questions. The experiment
did not begin until subjects answered this set of control questions cor-
rectly. To secure consistent working effort across treatments, only one
treatment was randomly selected to receive payment after the exper-
iment. In addition, subjects did not receive any feedback on their per-
formance during the experiment. For each condition, participants
earned €0.10 for every point they scored.14 Participants earned an
average of €8.20 (US$8.59) for their participation in addition to a flat
fee of €2 (US$2.08) for participation in the 5‐minute sessions and an
average of €14.70 (US$15.41) in addition to a flat fee of €4 (US
$4.19) in the 10‐minute sessions.
4 | RESULTS
We will first present results related to subjects' creative performance
across treatments and then turn to the results on routine
performance.
4.1 | Average creative performance
On average in the 5‐minute sessions, subjects created 20 words in the
creative task (min = 1, max = 70). More specifically, subjects created
an average of 19.63 (SD = 9.46) words in the predetermined condition,
19.47 (SD = 9.07) words in the spontaneous condition, and 19.43
(SD = 9.50) words in the planned condition (see Figure 3).
Apparently, creative performance is higher in the 10‐minute ses-
sions: subjects created 29 words in the creative task (min = 1,
max = 80). More specifically, subjects created an average of 30.35
(SD = 12.51) words in the predetermined condition, 28.53 (SD = 13.29)
words in the planned condition, and 27.36 (SD = 10.08) words in the
spontaneous condition (see Figure 3).
Combining data from the 5‐ and 10‐minute sessions, the regres-
sion analysis in Table 1 confirms that creative performance in the
6 BREM AND UTIKAL
FIGURE 3 Average creative performance across time periods of 5
and 10 minutes
spontaneous treatment is on average significantly lower than in the
predetermined condition (column 1). This contradicts Hypothesis 1.
Adding controls to the regression model (column 2) does not change
the general picture, but shows that a longer working period per task
(time) increases performance. Also, native German speakers and fre-
quent Scrabble players performed better on the creative task. In addi-
tion, we find that math skills,15 and creative ability (CPS) positively
affected creative performance.16 There are no treatment order (SEQ
first) or learning effects (period). Contrary to previous studies, we find
that Impulsiveness (BIS) exerted a slight negative effect on creative
performance.17
Columns 3–11 show regressions of specific subsamples. Besides
separating the effect for the 5‐ and 10‐minute sessions, we analyse
the impact of gender, the decision whether to switch in the spontane-
ous condition, and subjects' impulsiveness. To do so, we classify par-
ticipants in terms of their impulsiveness into one of the three
groups: high impulsiveness (IH), normal impulsiveness (IN), and low
impulsiveness (IL).18 We find that the negative effect of spontaneous
schedule autonomy is particularly present for the 10‐minute sessions
(column 4), female participants (column 5), participants who do not
switch in the spontaneous condition (column 10), and subjects with
low impulsiveness (column 9).
Why do lowly impulsive subjects perform differently across the
predetermined and the spontaneous treatments? To analyse whether
the treatment effect for subjects of low impulsiveness hinges on vari-
ations in switching behaviour, we split subjects into subgroups:
switchers (subjects who switched tasks in the spontaneous conditions,
n = 68) and non‐switchers (subjects who did not switch in the sponta-
neous conditions, n = 165). Recall that for non‐switchers, treatments
did not differ as those subjects worked on the tasks sequentially in
both treatments.
Results of our analysis show that actual switching behaviour does
not explain the effect of impulsiveness on creative performance.
Switching behaviours do not vary significantly across levels of impul-
siveness. In the spontaneous condition 29%, 30% and 29% of the high,
normal and low impulsive subjects switched between tasks, respec-
tively (χ2 = 0.028, p = 0.986).
However, we find that the effect of low impulsiveness on creative
performance across treatments is very robust: It matters regardless of
the subject's switching behaviour and the assigned working time (see
Table 2). First, the mere option to switch between tasks decreases cre-
ative performance among lowly impulsive subjects for both switchers
and non‐switchers. In the spontaneous compared to the predetermined
treatment, their performance suffers regardless of whether they actu-
ally switch tasks. Low impulsive switchers create 24 words in sponta-
neous compared to 33 words in predetermined. Low impulsive
subjects who do not switch in spontaneous create 25 words in sponta-
neous compared to 28 words in predetermined. Therefore, creative per-
formance of switchers and non‐switchers is lower in spontaneous
compared to predetermined, although the effect fails to be significant
for non‐switchers.
Second, subjects with low impulsiveness perform worse in the cre-
ative task in the 5‐minute sessions as well as in the 10‐minute ses-
sions, although the effect fails to be significant for the 5‐minute
sessions.
Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 2 for creative performance:
The effect of the spontaneous compared to the predetermined time
model on creative performance is worse for lowly impulsive subjects
than for highly impulsive subjects.
4.2 | Average routine performance
On average in the 5‐minute sessions, subjects solved 62 addition
problems in the routine task (min = 21, max = 117). More specifically,
subjects solved 62.42 (SD = 19.84) problems in the predetermined
condition, 61.00 (SD = 18.67) problems in the spontaneous condition,
and 61.94 (SD = 19.53) problems in the planned condition (see
Figure 4).
Naturally, routine performance is higher in the 10‐minute sessions:
subjects solved about 117 addition problems in the routine task
(min = 51, max = 220). More specifically, subjects solved 117.50
(SD = 32.60) problems in the predetermined condition, 116.64
(SD = 34.07) problems in the planned condition, and 117.75
(SD = 33.64) problems in the spontaneous condition (see Figure 4).
Combining data from the 5‐ and 10‐minute sessions, the regres-
sion analysis in Table 3 shows that routine performance across treat-
ments does not differ (column 1). This is not in line with Hypothesis
1. Adding controls to the regression model (column 2) does not alter
the result. However, it shows that male subjects performed better
on the routine task. In addition, we find that math skills,19 creative
ability (CPS) and a longer working period positively affected routine
performance.20 Subjects become better over time (period). There are
no treatment order effects (SEQ first).
Columns 3–11 show regressions of specific subsamples. The non‐
result is generally robust across subsamples: We only find that, for a
working period of 5 minutes, subjects on average perform slightly
worse in the spontaneous environment compared to the
predetermined condition (column 3). The effect of lowly impulsive
subjects performing worse in spontaneous compared to
predetermined is not present for routine performance (see Table 4).
We therefore do not find support for Hypothesis 2 for routine
performance.
TABLE 1 OLS regression, dependent variable: Creative performance

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
BREM AND UTIKAL

Normal Non‐
All All 5 min 10 min Female Male High imp imp. Low imp. switchers Switchers

CONTINUOUS −0.927 −0.887 −0.202 −1.838* −2.232 0.530 −0.864 −0.614 −2.391 −1.332* −0.360
(0.617) (0.615) (0.717) (1.049) (0.858) (0.880) (1.404) (0.781) (1.576) (0.738) (1.157)
SPONTANEOUS −1.433 −1.393 −0.109 −3.003*** −2.431*** −0.279 −0.754 −0.588 −6.679*** −1.283* −1.377
(0.631) (0.636) (0.670) (1.135) (0.842) (0.964) (1.625) (0.706) (2.151) (0.763) (1.132)
German 7.496*** 7.185*** 7.587*** 7.263*** 7.105*** 4.903 7.011*** 13.32*** 8.360*** 5.539
(1.123) (1.185) (2.298) (1.616) (1.580) (1.891) (1.475) (2.376) (1.306) (2.333)
Age −0.0996 0.0873 −0.295 0.0338 −0.146 −0.128 −0.130 0.430* −0.172 −0.0269
(0.186) (0.186) (0.365) (0.293) (0.228) (0.215) (0.274) (0.247) (0.198) (0.394)
Male 0.866 1.649 0.268 0.221 1.313 6.446*** −0.0766 4.204*
(1.101) (1.203) (2.019) (2.193) (1.397) (1.818) (1.280) (2.239)
BIS −0.117 −0.0790 −0.167 −0.131* −0.112 0.292 −0.443*** −0.905*** −0.0738 −0.202
(0.0582) (0.0625) (0.104) (0.0749) (0.0939) (0.197) (0.152) (0.243) (0.0747) (0.0995)
CPS 0.427 0.497*** 0.437 0.331 0.488 0.217 0.435* 0.708 0.552*** 0.0938
(0.171) (0.185) (0.330) (0.247) (0.235) (0.374) (0.241) (0.482) (0.181) (0.335)
Scrabble 1.927*** 2.021*** 1.972* 1.134* 2.863*** 1.286 1.842*** 2.429*** 1.794 2.639
(0.609) (0.614) (1.015) (0.677) (1.007) (2.301) (0.693) (0.675) (0.742) (1.046)
Period 0.449 0.860 −0.0923 0.345 0.602 0.266 0.456 0.657 0.904 −0.485
(0.305) (0.343) (0.525) (0.414) (0.461) (0.840) (0.351) (0.845) (0.363) (0.539)
Math grade −1.176*** −1.103 −1.489 −0.830 −1.677*** −2.454*** −0.382 −1.160* −0.912* −1.540
(0.416) (0.476) (0.738) (0.591) (0.597) (0.656) (0.561) (0.628) (0.498) (0.732)
Time 1.784*** 1.985*** 1.525*** 1.697*** 1.574*** 2.521*** 1.830*** 1.823***
(0.214) (0.302) (0.290) (0.403) (0.278) (0.279) (0.267) (0.385)
SEQ first −1.023 −1.634 −0.226 −1.635 −0.583 −3.996 −1.076 5.850*** −0.102 −4.006
(1.085) (1.227) (1.992) (1.599) (1.496) (2.075) (1.338) (2.097) (1.201) (2.471)
Constant 24.46*** 14.60 14.92 42.68*** 12.27 17.56* −6.966 34.69 47.06*** 11.16 21.77
(0.797) (6.889) (7.152) (12.62) (9.212) (10.23) (17.82) (13.38) (12.01) (7.581) (14.20)
Observations 699 699 384 315 357 342 138 471 90 495 204
2
R 0.003 0.318 0.281 0.147 0.329 0.339 0.412 0.282 0.711 0.346 0.299

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on subject ID, omitted treatment variable predetermined.
***p < 0.01, *p < 0.1.
7
8 BREM AND UTIKAL
TABLE 2 Creative performance of lowly impulsive subjects in predetermined and spontaneous time models
Predetermined
All (n = 38) 29.44 (14.39)
Switchers (n = 11) 32.54 (12.38)
Non‐switchers (n = 27) 28.19 (14.09)
5‐minute sessions (n = 21) 22.86 (10.47)
10‐minute sessions (n = 17) 37.59 (14.67)
FIGURE 4 Average routine performance across the two time
periods
However, we can confirm Hypothesis 3. As we do not find a treat-
ment effect for routine performance, but find that the time model
matters for creative performance, we can state: The effect of the
spontaneous compared to the predetermined time model is more pro-
nounced for creative than for routine performance. Table 5 gives an
overview of our hypotheses and related results.
5 | DISCUSSION
In the following, we discuss implications for theory by reflecting our
results on the introduced theoretical background. In addition, we give
concrete suggestions for companies how to implement time models
for better creative and routine performance. Finally, we outline limita-
tions and future research potential.
5.1 | Implications for theory
Contrary to the supporting literature for Hypothesis 1, we do not find
evidence that the spontaneous time model increases creative or rou-
tine performance. On the contrary, we find that average creative per-
formance is lower in the spontaneous time model than in the
predetermined one and we do not find a robust treatment effect for
routine performance. Although contradictory to our hypothesis, our
findings on creative performance are in line with other studies who
found that subjects perform worse when they were allowed to multi-
task. In this vein, Buser and Peter (2012) compared joint performance
on two cognitive tasks and found that subjects that were allowed to
p‐value of Wilcoxon
Spontaneous signed‐rank test
24.63 (11.82) 0.022
24.00 (7.53) 0.041
24.89 (13.31) 0.167
19.62 (8.72) 0.123
30.82 (12.44) 0.058
multitask performed significantly worse than subjects who had to
work on the tasks sequentially. Langfred and Moye (2004) explain this
effect by cognitive effects associated with processing two tasks simul-
taneously. Also, when switching between tasks, employees often need
a “warming‐up” period and tend to be less committed to either task on
which they are working (Jett & George, 2003; Monsell, 2003). They
also might experience difficulty in maintaining focus when shifting
mental effort between jobs over a short period of time (Madjar &
Shalley, 2008).
To test Hypothesis 2, we classified subjects by their level of impul-
siveness. Our main effect is robust: Creative performance is lower in
the spontaneous time model than in the predetermined time for all
levels of impulsiveness, although the effect is largest and significant
for lowly impulsive subjects. We can therefore confirm Hypothesis 2
for creative performance: We find that the performance of lowly impul-
sive subjects in the spontaneous time model (compared to the
predetermined time model) suffers more than performance of highly
impulsive subjects. Hence, the spontaneous treatment harms creative
performance especially for subjects characterized by low impulsiveness.
They seem to enjoy the predetermined condition in which they have a
predefined, sequential schedule. It is important to note that actual
switching between tasks did not affect performance in this context;
but the availability of the option to switch did exert this effect.
We cannot confirm Hypothesis 2 for routine performance. For all
levels of impulsiveness, routine performance does not differ across
treatments. To maximize creative performance through the affordance
of schedule autonomy, it is critical to account for employees' impul-
siveness: non‐impulsive individuals seem to dislike it. These results
are in contrast with earlier research that suggests that personality fac-
tors do not have a relationship with creative performance (Zhou &
Oldham, 2001). Importantly, creative performance in our control treat-
ment planned (where subjects were autonomous but predefined) does
not significantly differ from performance in predetermined. This
shows that the observed differences between the predetermined
and the spontaneous time model cannot only be explained by granted
schedule autonomy but by the interplay of schedule autonomy and
the option to be spontaneous.
Although creative performance is lower in spontaneous than in
predetermined for women and men, the effect is significant for
women only. This finding adds to the ongoing discussion as to
whether women are uniformly and unequivocally better than men at
all multitasking (Ren, Zhou, & Fu, 2009, p. 13). Results are mixed. On
TABLE 3 OLS regression, dependent variable: Routine performance

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
BREM AND UTIKAL

Normal Non‐
VARIABLES All All 5 min 10 min Female Male High imp imp. Low imp. switchers Switchers

CONTINUOUS −0.652 −0.182 −0.503 0.711 0.365 −0.822 −0.213 −0.189 0.450 −1.130 2.501*
(0.798) (0.638) (0.568) (1.167) (0.976) (0.806) (1.343) (0.742) (2.545) (0.715) (1.274)
SPONTANEOUS −0.670 −0.199 −1.238** 1.252 0.267 −0.898 −1.179 0.129 0.142 −0.618 0.697
(0.864) (0.727) (0.614) (1.373) (1.173) (0.871) (1.642) (0.922) (1.855) (0.794) (1.678)
German −4.454 −6.517 −0.375 −12.72** 3.229 −10.18 −4.920 −0.715 −1.052 −13.51
(4.686) (4.299) (9.249) (5.913) (6.300) (8.438) (5.489) (9.766) (5.259) (9.401)
Age −0.402 −0.0199 −1.080 −0.178 −0.476 −1.100 −0.331 1.432 −0.264 −0.107
(0.490) (0.418) (1.030) (0.708) (0.690) (0.764) (0.618) (1.197) (0.548) (1.149)
Male 12.47*** 12.44*** 14.56** 16.13** 10.80*** 14.20* 12.53*** 13.75**
(3.319) (3.074) (6.276) (7.984) (4.012) (8.255) (3.742) (6.576)
BIS −0.142 0.0348 −0.404 −0.446* 0.154 1.558 −0.289 0.509 −0.218 0.144
(0.207) (0.177) (0.398) (0.227) (0.320) (1.275) (0.414) (1.241) (0.275) (0.324)
CPS 1.316** 0.759 2.871** 3.100*** −0.121 −0.642 2.246*** 0.997 0.931 1.476
(0.642) (0.544) (1.334) (0.966) (0.740) (1.226) (0.811) (1.656) (0.695) (1.308)
Scrabble 0.678 1.467 0.594 −2.162 3.184 0.460 0.828 1.801 1.257 −1.538
(1.539) (1.584) (2.498) (2.026) (2.171) (4.014) (2.006) (2.870) (1.623) (3.205)
Period 5.222*** 3.357*** 7.532*** 6.206*** 4.164*** 5.888*** 4.895*** 5.813*** 5.106*** 5.944***
(0.408) (0.296) (0.771) (0.649) (0.484) (0.910) (0.485) (1.394) (0.452) (0.942)
Math grade −4.096** −4.287*** −5.194* −4.018* −4.166** −10.10*** −2.090 −2.188 −4.302** −5.192**
(1.593) (1.458) (3.033) (2.119) (2.043) (2.909) (1.840) (3.104) (1.941) (2.409)
Time 11.70*** 11.75*** 11.45*** 9.068*** 12.04*** 13.66*** 10.67*** 13.72***
(0.685) (0.838) (0.982) (1.789) (0.811) (1.253) (0.824) (1.125)
SEQ first 5.895 2.628 10.84 6.232 3.298 −13.35 9.489 4.840 6.935* 3.750
(3.389) (3.429) (6.357) (4.489) (4.857) (9.501) (3.992) (7.930) (3.844) (7.015)
Constant 87.24*** 12.60 59.12*** 150.9*** 29.50 8.070 −55.27 10.31 −81.68 17.87 −15.04
(2.495) (19.93) (14.96) (40.28) (24.20) (28.87) (107.2) (32.97) (75.83) (24.38) (38.34)
Observations 699 699 384 315 357 342 138 471 90 495 204
2
R 0.000 0.592 0.225 0.161 0.622 0.608 0.616 0.599 0.823 0.579 0.616

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on subject ID, omitted treatment variable predetermined.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
9
10
TABLE 4 Routine performance of lowly impulsive subjects in predetermined and spontaneous time models
Predetermined
All (n = 38) 90.61 (38.13)
Switchers (n = 11) 94.09 (36.05)
Non‐switchers (n = 27) 89.19 (39.52)
5‐minutes sessions (n = 21) 63.09 (18.79)
10‐minutes sessions (n = 17) 124.59 (26.45)
TABLE 5 Overview of hypotheses and results
Hypothesis
H1. Creative and routine performance in the spontaneous time model will be stronger than in the predetermined time model.
H2. The effect of the spontaneous compared to the predetermined time model on creative and routine performance will be more
positive for highly impulsive people than for lowly impulsive people.
H3. The effect of the spontaneous compared to the predetermined time model will be more pronounced for creative than for
routine performance.
the one hand, Stoet et al. (2013) have demonstrated female superior-
ity to males on specific elements of multitasking. On the other hand,
Buser and Peter (2012) found no gender‐related differences associ-
ated with task performance. Similarly, Morgan et al. (2013) argued that
multitasking ability does not vary across gender, but instead is an
individual‐difference variable. Finally, Mäntylä (2013) suggested that
gender differences in multitasking performance reflect differences in
spatial ability. Although these studies shed some light on gender dif-
ferences in multitasking, they all used different tasks to gauge multi-
tasking ability. It is therefore possible that in past research,
multitasking performance was driven by the task stimuli. Our study
provides further evidence that the negative effect of multitasking on
performance may depend on the composition of tasks. We also found
that this effect does not necessarily influence performance on both
tasks, but is instead dependent on participants' characteristics. Most
notably, we found that multitasking makes participants perform worse
on a creative task.
Finally, although there is evidence for learning over time, we do
not find evidence that creative or routine performance is affected by
the order of treatments. This means that experience with a certain
creativity time model is not crucial for subjects' performance in
another one. As Woodman and Schoenfeldt (1990) state, creativity
is a complex phenomenon through the interaction of individuals and
situations. Hence, these results must also be seen in the specific orga-
nizational context to apply.
This study has produced a new finding related to the influence of
allotted autonomy across tasks. Non‐impulsive participants perform
worse on creative tasks but not on routine tasks when they are
granted schedule autonomy. This indicated that when formalization
is lower (e.g. in the creative task), the magnitude of the effect of
autonomy on performance is higher. Highly formalized tasks (such as
the routine task) constrain an individual's ability to exercise autonomy
BREM AND UTIKAL
p‐value of Wilcoxon
Spontaneous signed‐rank test
89.76 (40.56) 0.454
92.45 (32.78) 0.593
88.67 (43.86) 0.420
60.67 (16.21) 0.265
125.71 (31.51) 0.963
Result
No evidence
Confirmed for creative
performance
Confirmed
and accommodate his/her impulsiveness (Langfred & Moye, 2004).
We can therefore confirm Hypothesis 3.
5.2 | Implications for practice
In this paper, we sought to identify the optimal amount of scheduling
autonomy employees should be granted. This paper is the first to
experimentally investigate the respective effects of established work
time models on creativity and routine work output. To address this
issue, it is important to recognize a manager's goals and the nature
of the manager's team in terms of their employees' impulsiveness.
In general, this study provides information that managers can use
to help their employees perform creative and routine tasks success-
fully. Complete autonomy without any direction in terms of time allo-
cation may be difficult for some employees to handle. When
individuals are given complete freedom to decide when they want to
work on one of multiple tasks, many experience difficulties in terms
of their performance (e.g. lowly impulsive people performing creative
tasks). In this case, managers can mitigate these difficulties by
assigning time slots for specific tasks as a means to achieve good per-
formance on creative and routine tasks simultaneously. This study's
findings therefore inform managers that it may be sensible to strategi-
cally plan scheduling autonomy together with their employees, bearing
their specific work environment in mind. Our results show that crea-
tive performance depends on the time model implemented. In partic-
ular, because low impulsiveness seems to have a strong impact on
employees' performance across different corporate time models, com-
panies should seek to allot work schedule autonomy accordingly. In
daily practice, it may be difficult to ascertain employees' precise level
of impulsiveness; however, simply keeping the influence of impulsive-
ness in mind might help managers to plan their activities. Given that
BREM AND UTIKAL
personality quotients such as the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator are
commonly used in hiring staff or in setting up work teams, the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale may serve as a viable extension to these ends.
This research might encourage companies to discuss potential work
autonomy time models, as earlier experience with a certain time model
did not have an impact on the individuals' performance.
It is also important to note that we could not find evidence that
creative or routine performance is affected by the order of treatments.
Hence, companies do not have to worry about potential performance
losses. Even if a specific corporate innovation programme for manag-
ing creative and routine time is already in place, it is worth trying a dif-
ferent setup to understand the effect on creative performance.
Hence, our results on the interaction effect of schedule autonomy,
task formalization and impulsivity on performance have important
managerial implications. Schedule autonomy in companies is very
important when task formalization is high, and people working there
have a high level of impulsiveness. In such setups, companies should
offer employees a working time model like 3M does with its 15% rule
and free time allocation. On the contrary, a low task formalization
combined with less impulsive people would lead to a comparable
low performance. In these environments, predetermined setups with
fixed time slots work best. As mentioned earlier, we do not find evi-
dence that creative or routine performance is affected by the order
of treatments. This means that experience with a certain creativity
time model is not crucial for subjects' performance in another one.
This is encouraging for companies that have already implemented a
specific corporate innovation programme and seek to implement
another one, but are worried about potential performance loss.
5.3 | Limitations and further research
By its nature, an experiment (mostly) ignores many of the contextual
factors that would greatly influence human behaviour. This is appar-
ently a significant limitation. On the other hand, an experiment offers
unique insights into creative behaviour: no participant knows what the
experiment is about. They receive an incentivized payment, and do the
tasks they are given. From that perspective, experiments give full
objectivity to what is measured, which is a key limitation in most cre-
ativity studies (Piffer, 2012). Although this study provides a number of
useful and new findings, it suffers with some limitations that may
affect the interpretation of those results.
First, there still exist a number of differences between the
predetermined and spontaneous models that warrant investigation.
Although we focused on employee schedule autonomy and flexibility,
we neglected to address other issues, including group spillover effects,
managerial control of employee compliance, and employee decision‐
making in relation to the creative projects they work on. The
predetermined approach might not only come with a fixed time slot,
but also a change in location. Also, some companies might offer their
employees not only the freedom to choose when to work on particular
tasks, but also how much time they would like to spend on it. Such a
distinction is not captured by our design. Moreover, the effect of
11
culture was also beyond the scope of our research, but it is definitely
an important aspect of creativity in organizations, as it is safe to
assume that cultural background affects creative performance
(Bouncken, Brem, & Kraus, 2016). Consider, for example, that whereas
Western social norms are more focused on novelty, Eastern norms
tend to be focused on utility (Morris & Leung, 2010). In addition, pref-
erence for autonomy may vary across cultures (Rudy, Sheldon, Awong,
& Tan, 2007).
Finally, our desire to simplify the study yielded a design that did
not realistically reflect an employee's working environment.
Employees typically face longer schedules. Behaviour could be very
different in real organizational settings, where employees cannot
maintain their intensive task attention and thus benefit from autono-
mously changing their task activities. Employees also face more com-
plex and a greater number of tasks that differ in their importance
and working time. Moreover, complex jobs tend to have less routine,
which might also promote idea generation (Amabile, 1988). Further-
more, routine tasks might include some creative elements. In addition,
managers may evaluate performance in a more qualitative fashion
than afforded by our evaluation metrics.
By avoiding the complexity associated with different tasks and
qualitative evaluation metrics, we reduced the study's external valid-
ity. To gain deeper insight into the effects of the predetermined and
spontaneous working time models, future researchers may find it use-
ful to utilize controlled experimental field studies. With these experi-
mental designs, real‐life environmental factors (e.g., company
location, group‐related factors) can be accounted for that are absent
from laboratory experiments. Experimental field studies may also pro-
vide opportunities for longitudinal analysis as a means to evaluate the
effect of different working time models over time. Another aspect is
the fact that different industries may exhibit different approaches to
managing creativity time. Given this, a comparison of corporate strat-
egies related to creativity in the fields of design, R&D, and production
could provide further insight into the dynamics of creative perfor-
mance. For this purpose, a focus on large corporations might offer
insights into the way innovators in such organizations acquire
resources for their early‐stage developments (Kannan‐Narasimhan,
2014). Also, specific groups like entrepreneurs should be taken into
consideration for future analysis, as earlier research indicates a special
role in their engagement in creativity (Globocnik & Salomo, 2015).
Finally, creativity in R&D usually happens in teams. Hence, these team
dynamics and their effect on creativity should also be taken into con-
sideration in future studies (Hülsheger, Anderson, & Salgado, 2009), as
well as intercultural aspects (Bouncken et al., 2016).
EN DNOTES
1
Work schedule autonomy is one of the three sub‐domains of job auton-
omy: work method autonomy, work criteria autonomy and work
schedule autonomy. Generally, job autonomy reflects the extent to
which a job provides employees with the discretion to schedule work,
make decisions, and select the methods used to perform tasks (Hackman
& Oldham, 1976).
2
A few other studies have reported that there is no significant association
or that there may be a negative correlation between job autonomy and
12
performance (e.g. Chang, Huang, & Choi, 2012; Farh & Scott, 1983;
Zhou, 1998).
3 (below) the mean as high (low) in impulsiveness.
See Stoet, O'Connor, Conner, and Laws (2013) for an experimental study
on gender effects of multitasking, or Coviello, Ichino, and Persico (2010)
for an analysis of the effect of task juggling on judges' speed of job com-
pletion. In addition, Monsell (2003) offers a psychological treatment of
“task‐switching”.
4
Crosetto (2010) and Mohnen and Ostermaier (2013) used similar tasks
to measure creativity. Charness and Grieco (2014) had their participants
write stories as another measure of creativity.
5
The three letter sets (number of possible words): aehklllprstt (326),
aeeeggllmnru (323), deehhimnnprt (321).
6 RE FE RE NC ES
Because we performed our study in Germany, respondents had to pro-
vide German response words listed in the German dictionary, Duden.
7 conceptualization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45,
Comprehensive evaluation of creativity is difficult (Batey & Furnham,
2006); both the task and the method for evaluating the performance
on the task must be chosen carefully. Due to the complexity of creativity
research (Brem, Puente‐Diaz, & Agogué, 2016), several methodological
and conceptual issues should be taken into consideration. Traditionally,
there are two main approaches. First, the Gough Personality Scale
(CPS) is a self‐report questionnaire (Gough, 1979). The Torrance Tests
of Creative Thinking (TTCT) is a task involving simple tests of divergent
thinking and other problem‐solving skills (Guilford, 1967). The creativity
of the answers is assessed by a committee, which invites bias into the
evaluations due to the subjectivity of committee members' judgments.
There was a significant, positive correlation between performance in
the creative task with the CPS. Pearson's correlation of performance in
the creative task with CPS: 0.263, p‐value 0.003.
8
Chang et al. (2012) demonstrated that autonomy reduces creative per-
formance if the employee had not previously engaged in task‐related
behaviours.
9
See Appendix A.
10
Several experimental studies have explored the impact of incentives on
creative performance. See, for example, Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Manso
(2011), Baer, Oldham, and Cummings (2003), Byron and Khazanchi
(2012), Charness and Grieco (2014), Eckartz et al. (2012), Eisenberger,
Armeli, and Pretz (1998), Mohnen and Ostermaier (2013), Toubia
(2006). Because we analyse treatment effects in this study, however,
the incentive structure is less important here.
11
Please see this website for further information on the Barratt Impulsive-
ness Scale and its measures: http://www.impulsivity.org/measurement/
bis11
12
Since words entered in the creative task had to be German, native Ger-
man speakers had a clear advantage.
13
For a discussion of using a student sample, see Druckman and Kam
(2011).
14
Charness and Grieco (2014) show that small incentives do not reduce
creative output.
15
According to the German grading system, which ranges from 1 (best) to 6
(worst).
16
The positive effects of CPS (Oldham & Cummings, 1996) on creativity
are consistent with past studies.
17
This is inconsistent with findings produced by past studies. Impulsive
people typically tend to be more creative (see Anderson, Glenwick, &
Levin, 1985; Canesi, Rusconi, Isaias, & Pezzoli, 2012; Feist, 1998; Feist
& Barron, 2003; Walker, Koestner, & Hum, 1995). Some studies have
also failed to find a correlation (Batey, Chamorro‐Premuzic, & Furnham,
2009; Broberg and Moran III, 1988; Funk, Chessare, Weaver, & Exley,
1993; Furnham & Nederstrom, 2010), but there has been no evidence
to suggest a negative relationship between impulsiveness and creativity.
BREM AND UTIKAL
18
In accordance with Stanford et al. (2009), we categorized subjects with a
BIS‐11 score that deviated one or more standard deviations above
19
The German grading system ranges from 1 (best) to 6 (worst).
20
The positive effects of CPS (Oldham & Cummings, 1996) on creativity
are consistent with past studies.
ORCID
Alexander Brem https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6901-7498
Verena Utikal https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4715-6200
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Alexander Brem is Professor of Technology Management at Frie-
drich‐Alexander‐Universität Erlangen‐Nürnberg (FAU) which is
located at the Nuremberg Campus of Technology in Germany.
His primary research interest is technology and innovation man-
agement with a special focus on interdisciplinary links to psychol-
ogy, marketing and entrepreneurship.
Verena Utikal is Professor of Behavioural Economics at Friedrich‐
Alexander‐Universität Erlangen‐Nürnberg (FAU), Department of
Economics, Germany. Her research focuses on moral behaviour
and non‐selfish preferences.
How to cite this article: Brem A, Utikal V. How to manage
creativity time? Results from a social psychological time model
lab experiment on individual creative and routine performance.
Creat Innov Manag. 2019;1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/
caim.12309
BREM AND UTIKAL
APPENDIX A
A.1. | Instructions for the experiment
Today, you will take part in a scientific experiment. If you read the fol-
lowing instructions carefully, you can—depending on your decisions—
make money. It is therefore important that you read the instructions
carefully.
For your participation you will receive €2. In addition, you can earn
money during the experiment by completing the tasks correctly.
During the experiment, we will not be talking in terms of Euros but
in terms of points. The points earned during the experiment are con-
verted into Euros as follows: 1 Point = €0.10. Please also read the
instructions on your screen carefully. If you have a question or if any-
thing is unclear, please let us know. We will then come to your seat
and answer your question privately.
Summary
In this experiment, you can earn points by completing two differ-
ent types of tasks: math problems and word puzzles.
The math problems are additions. For each correct solution, you
will receive one point. The word puzzles consist of 12 letters. For
every new and correct word you build from the letters, you will
receive one point.
Detailed procedure
The experiment consists of three parts, each comprising a math
problem and word puzzle tasks. For each part, you will have five
minutes, for both the math problems as well as the word puzzles.
A.2. | Math problems
In the math problems, one random addition calculation will be pre-
sented on the screen. Enter your solution in the space provided and
press the Return key. As soon as you have entered your solution, a
new task will appear. On the screen, you will receive information
about the remaining time per task and the number of answers you
have entered (not the number of correct answers). For each correctly
answered task, you will receive one point.
A.3. | Word puzzles
For the word puzzles, the screen displays a series of 12 letters. From
this series of letters, you are to find as many German words as possi-
15
ble. Enter the answers in the field provided and confirm with the
Return key. You can then enter another answer immediately. You
may use a letter twice (three times, etc.) only if the letter appears
twice (three times, etc.) in the series of letters.
You will receive information about the remaining time and the
number of words entered (not the number of correct answers). For
every new and correct word, you will receive one point. For each of
the three parts, you receive a new series of letters that you will need
to work with for the whole section. The length of the words is not rel-
evant. Please write all the words in lower case.
A correct answer to the example supplied is “share”. An incorrect
answer is “rare”.
Please note:
The procedure for the tasks is different in each of the three parts.
At the beginning of each new part, you will see the procedure in the
on‐screen instructions. Therefore, please read the instructions
carefully!
We recommend that you take a short break before starting the
next part.
Payment
After the completion of all three parts, the experiment ends. You
will then learn the total points obtained from all three parts of the
word puzzles and math problems. You will only be paid for one of
the three parts. This part will be randomly selected. The draw will take
place after the completion of the third part. The draw will be con-
ducted together with the participant in seat number 1. This participant
will roll a dice. With a 1, 2 or 3, the corresponding part is paid out for
all participants. With a 4, 5 or 6, the die is rolled again.
Therefore, you receive €2 for your appearance in addition to your
points total from the drawn part converted into Euros.
When you have read the instructions and answered the accompa-
nying control questions, please signal this clearly by raising your hand.
We will then come to your seat and start the experiment.
Thank you for your participation