Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Science and History of Science

Author(s): Nancy J. Nersessian

Source: Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 10, Constructing Knowledge in the History of Science (1995),
pp. 194-211
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 OpeningtheBlack Box: Cognitive
Scienceand Historyof Science
By NancyJ. Nersessian*

A NEW INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD, cognitivescience, has emergedover

1A thelast twentyyears.Cognitivescience is a loose confederation of cognitive
psychology,artificialintelligence,cognitiveneuroscience,linguistics,philosophy,
and cognitiveanthropology. Recentlya researchfrontier I call cognitivehistoryhas
emergedwithinthehistoryof science and is findingits place in thisconfederation.
The emphasisof cognitivehistoryis on the"thinking practices"throughwhichsci-
entistscreate,change,and communicatetheirrepresentations of nature.I view the
taskof thisarticleas largelyprogrammatic; thatis, to discussthetheoreticalpresup-
positionsof cognitivehistoryand to outlinea sampleof researchprojectsand prob-
lems.WhatI hope to persuadethereaderis thatcognitivehistoryof scienceprovides
new insightsinto science as a humanenterprise.While my own contributions to
cognitivehistoryhave been inherently multidisciplinary, I will concentrate the dis-
cussionhereon issues of concernto historians.My objectivesare to introducehisto-
rians of science to developmentsin cognitivescience; to argue and demonstrate
thatin some areas historicalinterpretation has alreadybeen enrichedby "cognitive-
historical"analysis;to outlinepotential areas of researchwithinhistoryof science;
and to enticehistorians of science into collaborative researchwithcognitivescien-
tistson topicsof mutualinterest.

I. WHAT IS COGNITIVE HISTORY OF SCIENCE?

Cognitivehistoryofscienceexaminesthecognitive employandthe
toolsscientists
theyconstruct
artifacts andexperimental
intheoretical thinking Itattempts
practices.
toreconstruct dimensions
thecognitive oftheprocessesthrough whichvaguespecu-
intoscientific
lationsgetarticulated understandings,arecommunicated toothersci-
andcometoreplaceexisting
entists, representationsof a domain.These reconstruc-
method,
tionsemploya "cognitive-historical" which joins historical
inquiries with
in of
thosecarriedout thesciences cognition. Dimensions ofthehistoryof science
analysisincludedevisingand executing
thatare amenableto cognitive-historical
real-worldand thought experiments,constructingarguments, inventing and using

Communication,
*Schoolof Literature, and Culture,GeorgiaInstitute Atlanta,
of Technology,
Georgia30332-0165.
forthecomments
I am grateful ofnumerous colleagues,especiallythoseofAnneHarringtonand
StephenKosslyn.Researchforthisarticlewas supportedinpartbytheNationalScienceFoundation,
ScholarsAwardsDIR 8821422andDIR 9111779,andthePrinceton Committee
University on Re-
andtheSocial Sciences.
searchin theHumanities

ofScienceSociety.All rights
? 1995byThe History 0021-1753/95/8401-0001$01.00
reserved.

OSIRIS 1995,10: 194-214 194

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 195

mathematical tools,creating conceptual innovations, devisingmeansofcommuni-

catingideasandpractices, andtraining practitioners.
Cognitive history also addressesmetatheoretical issuescentralto thepracticeof
history of science.Theseincludesuchproblems as thestatusofdifferent kindsof
sourcematerials (e.g.,notebooks, diaries,andpublishedpapers);whatcountsas a
"method"in science(e.g., whether visualrepresentation is ancillaryor essential
whenit is used); how culturalresourceswithinand externalto scienceenterthe
representationalcontent ofa theory;andhowrepresentations aretransportedoutof
theirinitialcultural milieu.
As withotherformsofhistory of science,cognitive history viewsa widerange
ofhistorical recordsas resources forgainingaccesstothepractices throughwhich
scientistscreate,change,and communicate understanding. These includediaries,
laboratory notebooks, publications,correspondence, experimental equipment, draw-
ings,diagrams, andpedagogicalnotesandtexts.In cognitive historythetemporal
and contextual perspective of historyprovidesan integrated pictureof a set of
achievements-not necessarily "successes"-overa periodof timeand againsta
background ofcommunity andwidercultural resources.
Whatmakesthemethodofanalysis"cognitive" is thatitsinterpretationscreatea
working synthesis betweencase studiesofhistorical scientificpracticesandinvesti-
gationsofhumanreasoning andrepresentation bythecognitive sciences.Cognitive
history assumesscienceis one productof theinteraction of thehumanmindwith
theworldandwithotherhumans.It presupposes thatthecognitive practicesscien-
tistshaveinvented anddevelopedoverthecourseofthehistory ofsciencearesophis-
ticatedoutgrowths of ordinary thinking. Understanding howsciencedevelopsand
changesrequires knowledge bothofwhattheactualpractices ofscientists
areandof
howhumancognitive abilitiesandlimitations produceandconstrain thesepractices.
Neitherof thesecan be determined a priori.Empiricalresearchis neededin both
cases. Thuscognitive historians drawon scientific investigations of howhumans
reason,judge,represent, andcometounderstand.
At theoutset,thecognitive historianneedsto grapplewithan obviousmethod-
ologicalproblem.Whatepistemological statusshouldbe accordedto the"knowl-
edge"drawnupon?Is itlegitimate to use scientific
knowledge to developa theory
oftheproduction andcommunication ofscientificknowledge? Thisproblem is not
uniqueto cognitive history.Historians whodrawon knowledge in otherdomains,
sociology,anthropology, politicalscience,forexample, mustaddressthesameissue.
Although thisis nottheplace to arguethepointin detail,theapproachtakenby
cognitive historians is similarto thatof philosophers practicing naturalized,anti-
foundational epistemology, whohavearguedextensively foritslegitimacy.'Cogni-
tivehistoriansdrawon cognitive theories andmethods insofar as theyhelpinterpret
thehistoricalcases,whileatthesametimeexamining towhatextent currenttheories
I See, e.g.,RonaldN. Giere,ExplainingScience:A Cognitive
Approach(Chicago:Univ.Chicago
Press,1988);AlvinGoldman,Epistemology and Cognition
(Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniv.Press,
1986);NancyJ.Nersessian, FaradaytoEinstein:ConstructingMeaninginScientific Theories(Dor-
drecht:MartinusNijhoff, 1984); ThomasNickles,"Reconstructing Science:DiscoveryandExperi-
ment," in Theoryand Experiment: RecentInsightsand NewPerspectives on TheirRelation,ed. Di-
derickBatensandJ.P. vanBendegem(Dordrecht: D. Reidel,1988),pp. 33-53; WillardV. 0. Quine,
"Naturalized Epistemology,"
OntologicalRelativity
and OtherEssays(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ.Press,1969),pp. 69-91; and DudleyShapere,Reasonand theSearchfor Knowledge(Dor-
drecht:Kluwer,1984).

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196 NANCY J. NERSESSIAN

of cognitiveprocessescan be appliedto scientific practicesand indicating where

thesetheories mightneedextension, refinement, and revision.Assessments of the
fitbetweenthecognitive analysesandthehistorical practicesarefedbackintocog-
nitivescience.Theseassessments areevaluatedandusedin developing richerand
morerealistic modelsofcognition, which,inturn, willbe appliedandevaluatedin
furtherhistoricalanalyses.The assumptions, methods, andresultsfrombothsides
are subjectedto criticalevaluation, withcorrective insights movingin bothdirec-
tions.The goal is to bringhistorical and cognitive interpretationsintoa stateof
reflective
equilibrium, so as tomakethecircularity inherent intheapproach virtuous
ratherthanvicious.
Although someassumptions mustinitially be accordedprivileged statusinorder
to gettheanalysisofftheground, theexpectation is thatat somepointfurther on
theseassumptions too will be subjectto criticalscrutiny. Consider,forexample,
one assumption ofcognitive psychology thathistorians findparticularlytroubling.
Although therehas notbeenmuchexplicitdiscussionofit,cognitive scientistsdo
presumethatforat leastthelastfewmillennia, nothing muchhas changedin how
humancognition takesplace. Most wouldagreethatwhatpeoplethinkaboutis
affected by context,butuntilquiterecently mosthaveassumedthathowpeople
thinkis notso affected.Thatis,cognitive scientists havepresumed thattheirmodels
ofproblemsolving,learning, decisionmaking, andso forth do notthemselves need
to be historicized.Whilethispresupposition serveda purposein thepreliminary
analysesofcognition, enriched analysesrequirethatitnowbe subjectedto critical
scrutiny.
Fromthehistorian's perspective it is muchmorelikelythatoverthecourseof
historycontextual assumptions andvaluesanddevelopments suchas instrumenta-
tion,mappingtechniques, mathematical structures-to namejusta few-have af-
fectedhumancognition. Thereis evolutionary warrant forassuming thatthe"wir-
ing"of thebrainhas notchanged much in theperiod for which thereare written
recordsof humanthinking. But whether and to what extent human cognition is
shapedbythehistorical-cultural context in which ithas taken placeought tobe seen
as an open question.Recentencounters of cognitive psychologists withresearch
fromcognitive anthropology and from the history philosophy sciencehave
and of
putthequestionon theagenda ofsome researchers. Forexample,intheircompara-
tivestudyofhowalchemists, modem and
scientists, experimental subjectshaverea-
sonedby means of the
analogy, cognitive psychologists Dedre Gentner andMichael
Jeziorskihaveproposedthatonlytheabilities torecognize similarities,
patterns,and
structurearebasicaspectsofcognition, whereashowhumansusethoseabilitieshas
beenaffected bythehistorical context in whichtheyhavebeenused.2Theyargue
thatsuchcontextual factors as metaphysical presuppositions, cognitivevalues(e.g.,
whatcountsas "simplicity"), andcultural assumptions havehistorically influenced
whatkindsofsimilarities aretakentobe significant, whatcountsas a chainofasso-
ciation,andhowcorrespondences aremappedin analogicalreasoning. Thisrepre-

2 DedreGentnerandMichaelJeziorski, "TheShiftfromMetaphor toAnalogyinWestern Science,"

inMetaphorand Thought, ed. A. Ortony,2nded. (Cambridge/NewYork:Cambridge Univ.Press,in
press).Forcognitiveanthropology in Practice:Mind,Mathematics,
see, e.g.,JeanLave,Cognition
and Culturein EverydayLife(New York:CambridgeUniv.Press,1988); and LucyA. Suchman,
Plans and SituatedActions:The Problemof Human-Machine Communication (Cambridge/New
York:Cambridge Univ.Press,1987).

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 197

sentsa significant modification toGentner's "structure mapping" theory ofanalogy,

in whichonlystructural features oftheanalogicalsourcedomainaredirecting the
mappingprocess.The newanalysissuggests thatpastreasoning practices have im-
plicationsforcurrent accountsof cognition and lendssupport to thosewhoargue
thatcognition is alwayscontextually "situated."
The cognitive-historical methoddiffers fromother, well-known approaches that
haveattempted to integrate psychology, one ofthecentraldisciplines of cognitive
science,withhistorical analysis.Attempts at integrationhave,primarily, takentwo
forms. First,someanalyseshaveviewedtheroleofscientists' personalities intheir
achievements through the lens of Freudianpsychoanalytic theory. Second,Jean
Piagetandothershavetriedto fitepisodesof scientific change-indeedtheentire
developmental historyof science-intotheframework of his theoryof cognitive
development. Additionally, whilenotstrictly attempts atintegration, ThomasKuhn,
PaulFeyerabend, andothers havesoughttoreinforce andtoexplaintheirconception
of scientific
changeby adoptingtheoriesfromthepsychology of perception and
fromGestaltpsychology.
Whatall of theseearlierattempts shareis thattheyfitthehistory of scienceto
modelsof thinking andbehaviorimported frompsychology. In so doingtheyhave
muchin commonwiththereconstructive approachesofphilosophers thathistori-
ans-and somephilosophers-have foundso objectionable. As withall interpreta-
tion,cognitive historyconsistsofreconstruction. However, itdoes notfithistorical
cases to modelsdrawnfromthecognitive sciences,butattempts to integrate the
cognitiveandthehistorical findingsinmodelsthatsuittheactualscientific practices
encountered inthehistorical record.Cognitive historians
strive tocreatea truesyn-
thesis,hopingto avoidtheexcessesandpitfalls oftheearlierapproaches.
Finally,myownvisionoftheresearch program includesworking inactivecollab-
orationwithcognitive scientiststo forgeinterpretive frameworks thatwillaccom-
modatescientific change.Therehasbeena longhistory ofmutualinfluence between
historyandpsychology. I believethatmoreprogress can be madeon problems of
commoninterest to bothdisciplinesby havingsomepractitioners fromeach dis-
ciplineworking together.Mostcognitive historianshave,atsomepoint,beendrawn
intocollaborations. Nevertheless, historiansofsciencecanprofit fromcognitive sci-
encewithout havingto adoptmyfullagenda.Insights fromthecognitive sciences
can be used in thecontextof a largerhistorical argument to assistreconstruction
andcanopennewavenuesforinvestigation. Forexample,artificial intelligence (Al)
programs modelingscientific discoveries can,as FredericL. Holmesremarked of
an Al modelof Hans Krebs'sdiscovery of theornithine cycle,furnish "us with
meanstoreflect on thedegreeofcontingency andfluidityinherent inthehistorical
discovery processeswe seektoreconstruct."3

II. WHAT IS COGNITIVE SCIENCE?

Cognitivescienceemploysexperimental
techniquesandcomputer
modelingto in-
howknowledge
vestigate is producedandis represented
bythemind.4
The central

I FredericL. Holmes,"ResearchTrailsandtheCreativeSpirit,"
MS (1993), p. 22.
4 Foran engagingpopularhistoryofcognitivesciencesee HowardGardner, TheMind'sNewSci-
ence:A HistoryoftheCognitiveRevolution(New York:Basic Books, 1985). BarbaraVonEckardt,

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198 NANCY J.NERSESSIAN

assumption ofthestrong, reductionist version is thatthesameinformation processes

can be implemented in computer hardware and in thebrain.The weakerversion
holdsthatitis possibleto simulate hypotheses abouthumanreasoning bymeansof
computer modeling inmuchthesamewaythatastrophysicists usecomputer simula-
tionsto investigate cosmologicalmodels.For both"computational assumptions"
computer modeling, basedon empirical investigations carriedoutin cognitive psy-
chology, is an essentialtoolthrough whichtoexploreandexperiment withtheories
ofhumanreasoning andrepresentation.
Cognitive sciencehasmadesignificant advancements inunderstanding themental
structuresandprocessesunderlying knowledge representation,acquisition, andcon-
struction.It hasnowproducedsophisticated cognitive theories oflanguageacquisi-
tion,conceptualdevelopment, decisionmaking,problemsolving,learning,and
brainfunctioning. Cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology (including psycho-
linguistics),andartificial intelligence constitute thecoredisciplines-andthethree
levelsofanalysis-incognitive science.In thecurrent stateofthefield,research in
cognitive psychology has themostto offerimmediately to history of science.Al-
thoughthefindings of neuroscience act as a constraint on anytheoryof human
cognitive theanalysesinthatfieldareattoobasica leveltomakea direct
activities,
contribution toourunderstanding ofscientific practice.5 TheroleofAl incognitive
historyis also mainlyindirect atpresent.
Al is centralto cognitive scienceas it is now conceivedbecauseall cognitive
scientists have adoptedone of the two "computational assumptions" discussed
above.Yettheydisagreeon whatkindof computational modeling, standard Al or
neural-connectionist, is bestformodeling humancognition. Still,a significantbody
of Al researchthatattempts to modelknowledgerepresentation, qualitativerea-
soning,and analogicalreasoninghas formedthebasis of theworkdiscussedin
SectionIV. Al programs formodelingscientific discovery couldwell be used to
testhistorians' hypotheses aboutthecognitive activitiesofearlierscientists, to en-
richand expandknowledge of theheuristics processesemployedin scientific in-
vestigations, and to exhibitmultiplepotential pathways to a scientific discovery.
Butexisting"discovery" programs, suchas thoseimplemented byHerbert Simon
and his coworkers thusfar,althoughtheproductof highlysophisticated Al re-
search,havetackledonlyrather simpleproblem-solving heuristicsemployed bysci-
entists.
Within cognitivepsychology theareaswiththemosttocontribute totheanalyses
ofcognitive arethosefocusedon cognitive
historians development andconceptual
changeand on problemsolving,understanding, the
and reasoning-specifically,
areasofanalogicalproblem solving, and
expert novicereasoning, reason-
qualitative
ing,heterogeneous reasoning,andmentalmodeling. (I discusspertinent
investiga-
tionsin SectionIV.)
Theusefulness ofcognitive
psychology standstoincrease
historians
to cognitive
as itdevelops.As WilliamBevanhasnotedina recentanalysisofthestateofcogni-

WhatIs CognitiveScience?(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT/Bradford in-

Books, 1993),presentsthefirst
depthanalysisofthefoundationsofthefield.
assessment
5For a different see Paul M. Churchland, TheNa-
Perspective:
A Neurocomputational
tureofMind and theStructureof Science (Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199

tivepsychology, thedisciplinedoes notyetcomprisea coherentbodyofknowledge.6

On the one hand, most cognitivepsychologistsare reluctantto createoverarching
theoriesthatwould synthesizethe vast body of empiricalresearchtheyhave con-
ductedin specificareas and thusto develop the "unifiedtheoryof cognition"that
Allen Newell called forand attempted.7 On theotherhand,thosewho do speculate
oftenpresentlittlesubstantivebackingforsweepingclaims thatborderon specula-
tivemetaphysics.Althoughmuch of theresearchis sophisticated,too much of the
literaturein cognitivepsychologyreportson narrowlyfocused experiments,re-
flectingmoretheempiricistspiritof thenineteenth centurythanthecognitiveaspira-
tionsof thelate twentieth century.
To be fullyadequate, a theoryof humancognitionhas to supplyan accountof
what it means to be a human thinkeractingin the world. JamesGreeno, among
others,has suggestedthatthestronginformation-processing modelofcognitioncan-
not be made to accommodatethe factthathumanreasoningalways takes place in
a social context.8Having a betterunderstanding of how people create collective
understandings is criticalto bothcognitivescience and historyof science.Achieving
thisend will requireextensiveinvestigations intocognitionin complex,interactive
contexts,includingtherole of personalityin cognition.However,thatcognitionis
inherently contextualdoes notmean thatwe can learnnothinggeneralabout it.As
Edward Hutchins,who has workedextensivelyon cognitionin the workplace,has
put it,

Therearepowerful regularities
tobe describedata levelofanalysisthattranscends
the
detailsof thespecificdomain.It is notpossibleto discovertheseregularities
without
understanding thedetailsofthedomain,buttheregularities arenotaboutthedomain
specificdetails,theyareaboutthenatureofcognition inhumanactivity.9

The interdisciplinarynatureof thefieldof cognitivescience providesgreatbene-

fitsforthose who probe cognitionas a socioculturalphenomenon.For example,
much of theresearchon social cognitionto date has been carriedout by cognitive
psychologistsand anthropologists workingtogetheron science and mathematics
educationor on workpractices.Practitioners of thesedisciplineswere attractedto
collaborativeprojectsbecause theyrecognizedthatthecognitiveactivitiesinvolved
in learningsituationsand in the workplaceare inherently social and collectiveac-
tivities.
If cognitivescience is in an embryonicstate,is it perhapsprematureeven to at-
temptcognitivehistory?My own response is no. Creatinga workingsynthesis
does notmean importing interpretations,
methods,and assumptionsof thecognitive
sciences wholesale into historicalanalysis. Rather,the heart of the cognitive-
historicalmethodis reflexive.Input fromhistoricalinvestigationsis requiredto

6 WilliamBevan,"A TourInsidethe
Onion,"American Psychologist,1991,46:475-483.
7Allen Newell,Unified
TheoriesofCognition(Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniv.Press,1990).
8
JamesG. Greeno,"Situations,
MentalModels,and Generative Knowledge,"in ComplexInfor-
mationProcessing,ed. D. Klahr and K. Kotovsky(Hillsdale,N.J.:LawrenceErlbaum,1989),
pp. 285-318.
9As quotedin David D. Woods,"Towardsa Theoretical Base forRepresentation Designin the
Computer Medium:EcologicalPerception andAidingHumanCognition," inTheEcologyofHuman-
MachineSystems,ed. J.Flachetal. (Hillsdale,N.J.:LawrenceErlbaum,inpress),p. 15.

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200 NANCY J.NERSESSIAN

producecomprehensive modelsofcognition. Cognitive scientistsneedanalysesof

thesophisticated reasoningpracticesof scientists-living and dead,ordinary and
genius-to createtheirmodelsofhumanreasoning justas cognitive historians need
modelsof humancognition to assisttheirreconstructions of thehistorical record.
The methodemploysthekindof bootstrapping procedure commonly used in sci-
ence.Cognitive sciencehas advancedto thestatewhereproductive interaction of
thissortis possible.Some of theseinteractions, whichin a fewcases are actually
collaborativeendeavors, will be discussedin SectionIV, buta concreteexample
mightbe inorderhere.
As Martin Rudwickhaspointed out,thevisualrepresentationsinscientific papers,
notebooks, and thelike,although largelyignoredby historians, seemto perform
morethananancillary function incommunicating research.
scientific In hisstruggle
tofinda waytotalkaboutthecognitive function ofthesepractices, Rudwickended
bylayinga "cognitive grid"on thehistorical analysis.Butas he acknowledged, in
orderto understand howthenewvisualmodesof representation changedtheway
peopledid geology,one mustbe able to explainthecognitive function of visual
10Recentresearch
representation. incognitivesciencehasposedthequestionofwhat
valuepictorialrepresentation mighthaveoverlinguistic representation in textsfor
problem solvingandreasoning. I haveusedinsights fromtheseanalysesinmyinter-
oftheroleofvisualrepresentation
pretation intheconstruction ofMichaelFaraday's
andJamesClerkMaxwell'sfieldrepresentations ofelectromagnetic forces."I These
analysesprovideassessments and critiquesof cognitive researchthatare in turn
beingfedback intocognitive psychology, in partthrough mycollaboration with
JamesGreenoon thepossiblerolesof visualrepresentation in creatinga shared
scientific
understanding.12
Beforediscussing theresearchprogram of cognitivehistory,I wantto consider
theplaceofthatprogram within thedisciplineofhistory ofscience.

III. HOW DO COGNITIVE HISTORIANS VIEW THEIR DISCIPLINE?

The conceptionof thedisciplineof historyof science withwhichcognitivehistori-

ans workis pluralist.There are manykinds and levels of historicalanalysis,and
historianshavelongused theresources,insights,and tools of manyotherdisciplines
to deepen historicalunderstanding. The mode of analysis and the resourcesthat
historiansuse in any given analysis will depend on what theywantto learn from
history
thatanalysis.Contemporary degreeon the
ofsciencedrawstoa significant
sociologyof scientific forexample.However,
knowledge, of muchof
therhetoric
"sociohistorical"analysis-the attemptto integratehistoryand sociology-is re-
ductionistand openlyanticognitivein stance.In its mostradical form,sociologyof

10MartinJ.S. Rudwick,"The Emergence of a VisualLanguageforGeologicalScience,1760-

1840"'HistoryofScience,1976,14:149-195.
"1NancyJ.Nersessian, "ReasoningfromImageryandAnalogyin Scientific ConceptFormation,"
in PSA, 1988(l):41-47; and Nersessian,"How Do ScientistsThink?Capturing theDynamicsof
ConceptualChangein Science,"in CognitiveModelsofScience,ed. R. N. Giere,MinnesotaStudies
in thePhilosophy of Science,15 (Minneapolis:Univ.MinnesotaPress,1992),pp. 3-44.
12 NancyJ.Nersessian and JamesS. Greeno,"MultipleAbstracted Representations in Problem
Solvingand Discoveryin Physics,"Proceedings oftheCognitiveScienceSociety,1990,11:77-84;
and Nersessianand Greeno,"Constructive Modelingin CreatingScientificUnderstanding" (in
progress).

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 201

scienceattempts
to explaintheproductionof scientific
knowledge whollyin terms
ofsocialfactors.
BrunoLatourandSteveWoolgarhavegoneso faras to call fora
"ten-yearmoratorium" on cognitive claimingthatat theendof that
explanations,
timesociologicalexplanations
willhaveestablished
thatthereis nothing
leftto ex-
plain.13
Although sociologicalinsights andmethods haveenriched thehistory ofscience,
theconcernsof thehistorian of sciencedo notreduceto thoseof thesociologist,
andnoneoftheworkproducedbysociohistorical analysissupports thereductionist
position.One valuablecontribution sociologists of sciencehavemadeto history is
to showhowpositivist philosophy of sciencehas undulyinfluenced thehistorian's
conception ofthescientific enterprise.Thisinsight is important becauseone'scon-
ceptionof sciencedoes motivate how one framesquestions,whatproblemsone
workson,whatavenuesofinquiry onepursues, andwhatfactors oneseesas relevant
totheexplanations thatareadvanced.Yetbecauseofthisverycircumstance histori-
ansshouldnotendup substituting onemonolithic conception foranother. Sociology
of scienceadvancesa specificconception ofthenatureandproduction ofscience.
Thecognitive historian contends thatalthough itis truethatscienceis a socialprod-
uct,it is also themostcerebralof enterprises andthecomplexcognitive activities
oftheindividual scientistareequallypertinent to a historicalunderstanding ofthe
product andtheprocessesthrough whichitis produced.
Whatfactorsare relevant to historicalexplanation is nota questionthatcan be
answereda priori.Historians of sciencefrequently use theresources of otherdis-
ciplines-anthropology, economics, politics,literature, sociology-tofurther their
analyses.Whatresourcesoutsideof history one drawsuponin anygivenanalysis
dependson thequestionsoneis asking.Drawingfromthecognitive sciencesinthe
wayoutlinedin SectionI can helpto makesenseofcertain theoreticalandexperi-
mentalpractices ofscientists.Butthecognitive is onlyonedimension totheseprac-
tices,andquestionsaboutscientific cognition arebyno meanstheonlyquestions
historians wantto ask.
Shouldhistorians ofscience,in thecurrent research climate,viewcognitive his-
toryas reactionary? As a harbinger ofa return totheexternal-internal distinctionin
a newguise?Cognitive historyis notreactionary becauseitspractitioners do notsee
themselves inconflict withthesociologyofscience.Manyoftheimportant concerns
raisedbysociohistorical analysisareconcerns forcognitive historiansas well.Both
cognitive and socialhistorians agree,forexample,that"thinking" is an inherently
social activity,it is notsomething thatsimplygoes on "in thehead."Wherethey
disagreeis overtheclaimthatsocial factorsare all thatcountin explaining the
production ofscientific knowledge.
Thereductionist claimthatknowledge production is purelya product ofenviron-
mentalinfluences has curiousresonanceswithbehaviorist psychology.'4 Indeed,
tacitpsychological assumptions do underliesociohistorical analysis.Forexample,

13 BrunoLatour,ScienceinAction:How toFollowScientists andEngineersthroughSociety(Cam-

bridge,Mass.: HarvardUniv.Press,1987),p. 247; andBrunoLatourandSteveWoolgar, Laboratory
Life:TheConstruction ofScientific
Facts,rev.ed. (Princeton:Princeton
Univ.Press,1986),p. 280.
14 Forthisargumentsee WilliamShadish,Jr.,etal., "ThePsychologyofScience:AnIntroduction,"
in Psychology ofScience:Contributionsto Metascience,ed. B. Gholson,W.R. Shadish,Jr.,R. A.
Neimeyer, and A. C. Houts(New York:CambridgeUniv.Press,1989),pp. 1-16; and Giere,Ex-
plainingScience(cit.n. 1).

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202 NANCY J.NERSESSIAN

in attempting to arguethatrationality is a factorin sociohistorical analysis,Steven

Shapinnotesthat"actors"arethemselves treated as iftheir"cognitive wiring"was
"inproperworking order,"as possessinga "natural 15 Buthowcan one
rationality."
makethisassumption without knowing whatitmeansto possess"natural rational-
ity"?Cognitive-historical analysisaddressesthequestionsof whatthe"cognitive
wiring"is and whatconstitutes "naturalrationality." Sociohistorical analysishas
"black-boxed" theindividual scientist.Cognitive history is attempting to openthe
boxandtoshowhowthecognitive andthesocialarefusedinthescientist's construc-
tionofknowledge.
As I notedearlier, therelationship betweenthesocialandthecognitive dimen-
sionsofthinking andreasoning is territoryripe for exploration.Multiple constraints
shapecognition, and social contextsand interactions haveto be figured intothe
account.Takingthemintoaccount may lead to substantial changes within cognitive
scienceitself,as someofthecognitive scientists citedearliercontend. Butacknowl-
edgingthatthe cognitiveactivities of scientists are embedded in complex social
contexts does not requirehistorians to "black-box" the individual. That is, an ac-
counting is still
required of how and what thecognitive activitiesof the individual
scientistcontribute intheconstruction ofknowledge.
In sum,cognitive history aimsat integrating thesocialandthecognitive dimen-
sionsofknowledge production byshowinghowtheyarelinkedin a scientist's life
workandhowtheindividual andgrouplevelsofknowledge production mesh.Thus,
whiletheconcernsofthecognitive historians do resonatewiththoseoftheearlier
intellectualhistorians,theiraimis togivea morecomprehensive andnuancedanaly-
sis of scientificknowledgeas theproductof cognitive, social,tool-using agents.
Traditional historyofideashastendedtotreatideasas havinga lifeanddynamic of
theirownandtoanalyzethemmainly inthecontext ofotherideas.Cognitive history
aimstoincludethecontextual embeddedness ofhumanagentsandtheirknowledge
products initsaccounts. Justas PeterBurkehasarguedthatmentality history occu-
piesa placeinthediscipline ofhistory "between an intellectualhistory withsociety
leftoutanda socialhistory withthought leftout,"16 so toocognitive history occupies
a place betweena traditional history of scientific ideas and a new sociological
history of sciencethattendsto marginalize thecognitive dimension of scientific
practices.

IV. WHAT PROBLEMS DO COGNITIVE HISTORIANS ADDRESS?

Cognitive addressproblems
historians customarilytreatedundertherubricsofsci-
entific scientific
revolutions, discovery,andindividual The
creativity. research
pro-
ducedthusfarencompasses workon conceptual andexperimen-
change,theoretical
andmethodological
talpractices, andtechnologicalinnovation.Workin thegenre
of cognitive
historyhas from the outsetbeen thustheresearch
interdisciplinary;
discussedhere includesthatcarriedoutby historiansof philosophers
science, of

Hist. Sci., 1982,

StevenShapin,"Historyof Science and Its SociologicalReconstructions,"
20:157-211.
16 PeterBurke,"Strengths HistoryofEuropean
and Weaknessesin theHistoryof Mentalities,"
Ideas, 1986,7:439-451,p. 440.

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 203

science,and cognitive A briefoverviewof projectsin theresearch

psychologists.
program ofcognitive andavenuesforfurther
history researchfollows.17

in Experimental
Creativity Practice
Psychologists werethefirst tobegintouse theresources ofcognitive psychology in
studying scientific practices.Individualcreativity has been a focalpointof their
analyses.18Thepsychologist RyanTweney's examination ofFaraday's notebook, dia-
ries,andloose noteshas madesignificant contributions toourunderstanding ofhis
discovery of electromagnetic induction. Tweney'sfinely detailedanalysisprovides
an integrated modelof Faraday'sexperimental and theoretical reasoning between
his firstattempts at detectingelectromagnetic induction in 1821andhissuccessat
itin 1831.19 Therewas alreadya substantial literatureon thisdiscovery.PearceWil-
liams'sextensive examination ofFaraday'sactivities during thattenyearssucceeded
inconveying theimpression thatthediscovery wasnotsimplytheproduct ofa flash
ofcreative insight.Although Williamshadtheimportant intuitionthattheworkon
acousticalfigures andcrispations justpriorto thediscovery ofelectromagnetic in-
duction"musthaveaffected Faradaydeeply,"he did notrevealthepatterns lying
beneathFaraday'smanyactivities andthoughts during thatperiodthatwe getfrom
Tweney'sanalysis.20 By utilizing thenotionsdrawnfromcognitive psychology of
"schemata""scripts," and "heuristics," Tweneywas able to reconstruct thesepat-
ternsandprovidea plausibleinterpretation ofhowtheyled tothe1831discovery.
DavidGooding,too,has focusedon theroleofFaraday'sexperimental practices
in his conceptual innovations. In wrestlingwiththeproblemofhowto accessand
unraveltheprocedural knowledge thatinforms experimental practices,Goodingis
concerned moregenerally todevelopmethods ofrecovering andrepresenting exper-
imental procedures andtoexaminethepractical andinferential structureofexperi-
mentalproblemsolving.His recentbook providesdetailedanalysesof Faraday's
experimental procedures thataddmuchtoourunderstanding ofFaraday, laboratory
recordsingeneral, andthecognitive andsocialdimensions ofexperimental practice.
His latestworkextends theanalysistothought experiments andseesthemas rooted
intheprocedural knowledge ofhowexperimental processesworkintherealworld.2'
One analyticaltool thatGoodingused to capturethe "on-line"dynamicsof

For a longerversionof thisarticle,withextensivereferences to pertinent in the

literature
cognitivesciences,writeto Nancy Nersessian,at the addresson p. 194, for technicalreport
CSL 53.
18 HowardE. Gruber, Darwinon Man: A Psychological StudyofScientificCreativity(New York:
Dutton,1974), standsas thefirstmajorcognitive-historical
analysis,althoughit predatesmuchof
theliteraturein cognitive
psychologythatrecentcognitive drawson.
history
'9RyanD. Tweney, "Faraday'sDiscoveryofInduction:A CognitiveApproach," in FaradayRedis-
covered:Essays on theLifeand WorkofMichaelFaraday,ed. David Goodingand FrankA. J.L.
James(New York:Stockton Press,1985),pp. 189-210.
20 L. PearceWilliams,MichaelFaraday:A Biography (London:Chapman& Hall, 1965),quoting
fromp. 180. See also JosephAgassi,Faradayas a NaturalPhilosopher(Chicago:Univ.Chicago
Press,1971);andWilliamBerkson,FieldsofForce:TheDevelopment ofa WorldViewfrom Faraday
toEinstein(New York:Wiley,1974).
21 David Gooding,Experiment and theMakingofMeaning:HumanAgencyin Scientific Obser-
vationand Experiment (Dordrecht:Kluwer,1990); and Gooding,"The ProceduralTurn;or,Why
Did Faraday'sThoughtExperiments Work?"in Cognitive ModelsofScience,ed. Giere(cit.n. 11),
pp. 45-76.

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204 NANCY J.NERSESSIAN

experimental practice,endeavoring toremovethelayersofreconstruction thatoccur

whenexperiments arepackagedintonarratives, wasadaptedfroma toolusedinthe
cognitive sciences.Goodingdevised"experimental maps"to depictsequencesof
experimental procedures actingon physicalandconceptual objects.The mapsex-
hibithowexperimentation reflexive
is a nonlinear, process,withmultiple possible
pathways betweengoalsandsolutions. Theydisplaypossibleas wellas actualpath-
waysin theexperimental record.Whencomparedwithmapsoflaterexperimental
accounts,theyexhibithow contingent choicesin experimentation becomerecon-
structed as decisions.Thisprocessrevealsexperimental tobe as important
failures
as successesintheirinformative value.
Gooding'sexperimental mapselaborate a technique developedbycognitive scien-
tiststo analyze"think-aloud Theseprotocolsaretherecordsofevery
protocols."22
thought experimental subjectsverbalize during a problem-solving taskinwhichthey
havebeeninstructed to recordall of theirthinking. Tweneytookthefirststepin
extending thistechniqueto analysisof Faraday'sdiaries.He arguedthatspecific
features ofFaraday'srecordkeepingmakeitpossibleto viewhisdiaryas approxi-
matinga think-aloud protocol.23 The purposeof mappinga protocolin cognitive
psychology is todevelopa computer simulation ofthereasoning processesexhibited
intheprotocol. Tweney andCathy Hoffnermapped 135 conducted
experiments- after
thediscovery ofelectromagnetic induction; some of these werelater simulated by
a computer program.24 Although Gooding's originalpurpose was he
different, has
recently undertaken a research projectwithThomasAddis,anAl researcher, touse
in
themaps creating real-time, simulations
interactive of experimental expertise.25

ConceptualChange
Fromtheperspective ofcognitive theproblem
history, ofconceptual changeappears
as follows:Howis itthatscientists,workingalone orin collaboration, combinetheir
humancognitive with
abilities theconceptualresources available to them as mem-
bersofscientificcommunities and widersocialcontexts to createand communicate
newscientificrepresentations ofa domain?Thisformulation shiftsthefocusofthe
problem the
from customary preoccupationwithhow structures
linguistic changeto
in
theroleofhumanagency conceptual change.
My ownresearch centers on thetheoretical
reasoning andrepresentational prac-
whocreatedmajorconceptual
ticesof scientists innovations.Despiteall theatten-
tiongiventotheory inthehistory andphilosophy ofscience,thereis stillverylittle
understandingof thetheoretical practicesthatscientistsemployin general,andin
conceptualinnovation in particular.
Thus,myinvestigation is complementary to

22 See Alan Newell and Herbert A. Simon,HumanProblemSolving(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:

Prentice-Hall,1972);andKarlA. EricssonandHerbert A. Simon,ProtocolAnalysis:VerbalReports
as Data (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1984).
23 RyanD. Tweney, "A Framework fortheCognitivePsychology of Science,"in Psychologyof
Science,ed. Gholsonetal. (cit.n. 14),pp. 342-366; andTweney, "FieldsofEnterprise:On Michael
Faraday'sThought," in CreativePeople at Work,ed. D. B. Wallaceand H. E. Gruber(New York:
OxfordUniv.Press,1989),pp. 91-106.
24 RyanD. Tweney andCathyHoffner, "Understanding ofScience:An Experi-
theMicrostructure
ment,"Proc. Cog. Sci. Soc., 1987,9:677-681; and Deepak Kulkarni,The Processesof Scientific
Research:TheStrategy ofExperimentation (Ph.D. diss.,Carnegie-Mellon 1987).
University,
25 ThomasR. Addis,David Gooding, andJudith J.Townsend, "A FunctionalDescriptionofFara-
day'sDiscoveryoftheElectricMotor"(draft,1991).

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 205

thoseon experimental practice. Unlikesomeworkincognitive history, minemakes

extensive use of publishedas well as unpublished sources.I concurwithHolmes
thatwriting a scientific
paperis partof thecreativeprocessandthatmuchcan be
learnedfrompublished workabouttheconstructive andcommunicative practicesof
scientists.26In manycases a scientist's thinkingabouta problemis stillgoingon
andimportant transformations takeplaceinthe"final"paper.Thishistoriographical
assumption findssupport in thecognitive literatureon writing.27
Historians havelongbeendividedon theissueofhownewconceptual structures
emergein scientific revolutions andcometoreplaceexisting structures.Somehave
viewedconceptual changeas occurring suddenly and,following Kuhn,havelikened
theprocessto a psychological gestaltswitch.Others, suchas Holmes,GeraldHol-
ton,andR. S. Westfall, havevieweditas extending overa longperiod.28 Thisten-
sion,reflected in theworkofKuhnhimself, canbe characterized as thatbetweena
short-term cognitive approachanda long-term historicalone.It seemedto me that
manyoftheproblems of"incommensurability" plaguing boththehistory andphilos-
ophyof sciencewereartifacts of thetoolsand theimplicitpresuppositions with
whicheach approached theproblemof scientific change.The cognitive-historical
method specifically achievesa deeperandmorerefined understanding ofconceptual
changethanis possiblewitheitherapproach.
Numerousmetatheoretical presuppositions havelefttheirimprint on historical
writing. I havediscussedseveralfroma cognitive perspective elsewhere.29HereI
willonlymention one:thepresupposition thatscientificreasoning is limitedtode-
ductiveandinductive algorithms. Thisnotionof scientific methodhas led manyto
ignoretheconstructive practices recorded byscientists in theirpapers,diaries,and
notebooks. Manyscientists use analogies, visualrepresentations, andthought exper-
iments extensively whencreating andcommunicating newconcepts. Although these
thinking andcommunicative practices arewidespread, noneexceptanalogyhasre-
ceivedmorethanscantattention inthephilosophical literature
on scientificmethod.
The mainproblemphilosophers havehadin evencountenancing theseas methods
is thattheyarenotalgorithmic in application, andthusevenifusedcorrectly, they
mayleadtothewrongsolutionortono solution. Thisveryfeature, however, makes
themmuch morerealistichistorically. Historianstoo need to understand the
constructive practicesscientists use in theirresearchirrespective of whether the

26 Frederic L. Holmes,"The Fine Structure of Scientific Creativity,"

Hist.Sci., 1981,19:60-70;
Holmes,"Scientific WritingandScientificDiscovery," Isis, 1987,78:220-235; andHolmes,"Argu-
mentandNarrative inScientific inTheLiterary
Writing," StructureofScientificArgument: Historical
Studies,ed. PeterDear (Philadelphia: Univ.Pennsylvania Press,1991),pp. 164-181.
27 See, e.g., VernonA. Howardand J.H. Barton,Thinking on Paper (New York:WilliamMor-
row,1986).
28 ThomasS. Kuhn,TheStructure ofScientific
Revolutions (Chicago:Univ.ChicagoPress,1962);
FredericL. Holmes,Lavoisierand theChemistry of Life:An Explorationof Scientific Creativity
(Madison:Univ.WisconsinPress,1985); Holmes,"Patterns ofScientificCreativity,"Bulletinofthe
History ofMedicine,1986,60:19-35;GeraldHolton,Thematic OriginsofScientificThought:Kepler
toEinstein(Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniv.Press,1973);Holton,TheScientific Imagination: Case
Studies(New York:Cambridge Univ.Press,1978);andRichardS. Westfall, ForceinNewton's Phys-
ics: TheScienceofDynamicsin theSeventeenth Century (New York:American Elsevier,1971).
29 NancyJ. Nersessian, "Faraday'sField Concept,"in Faraday Rediscovered, ed. Goodingand
James(cit.n. 19),pp. 175-188;Nersessian, "A Cognitive-Historical ApproachtoMeaningin Scien-
tificTheories," in TheProcessofScience:Contemporary Philosophical Approachesto Understand-
ingScientificPractice,ed. Nersessian(Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff, 1987),pp. 161-178;andNerses-
sian,"How Do Scientists Think?"(cit.n. 11).

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206 NANCY J.NERSESSIAN

in questionwentdowndead ends,contributed
scientists to "winning" science,or
employed strategies
different in making a "simultaneous discovery." Cognitive re-
searchonordinary reasoning practicesprovides supportfortheir salienceandinsight
intohowtheyfunction reasoning.
in scientific
Thoughthetopicof scientific methodmightseemmoreappropriate fora philo-
sophicalaudience,historians do makeimplicit assumptions aboutmethod thataffect
theiranalysessignificantly.As is wellknown,the"whig"history of thepastwas
heavilyinfluencedbythepositivist conception ofmethod, andthatconception con-
tinuesto influencehistorical analysesand playsa criticalrolein somehistorical
controversies.
Witness thecaseofMaxwell.FromPierreDuhemtothepresent histo-
rianshavearguedwhether theanalogicalmodelMaxwellpresented in his second
paperonelectromagnetism wascritical tohisderivation oftheelectromagnetic field
equations.Thosewhosee theanalogicalmodelas offtotheside,while"theresults
areknownbysomeothermeansbeforeuseofthemodel," haveatleasttacitly bought
thephilosopher's
assumption thatreasoning is onlybymeansofinductive ordeduc-
tivealgorithms.30
Researchin cognitive psychology forcestheconclusionthatanalogiesare not
"merely suggestive"oran "unproductive digression" butarefundamental intherea-
soningprocess.An extensive psychological showshowprominent
literature a role
analogyplaysinproblemsolvingin general;theseinvestigations seektodetermine
howanalogygenerates solutionsandto differentiate betweenproductive andnon-
productiveuses.ViewingMaxwellas reasoning throughtheanalogyfitsthehistori-
andobviatestheneedto throwawayinconvenient
cal recordbetter pieces,suchas
his"errors."Indeed,thisviewbetter fitsMaxwell'sowninsights intohowwhathe
called"themethodofphysicalanalogy"functions inthemathematization process.
Fromtheperspective of cognitivehistory theanalogies,visualrepresentations,
and thought experiments scientistsemployin theirresearchare notancillary, but
playa crucialrolein thecreative process.Theyall involvecreating, manipulating,
and reasoningaboutintermediary models.3'Theyare also the principalmeans
through whicha scientisttransportsconceptual resourcesdrawnfromthewidercul-
turalmilieuintoscienceandtransmits novelrepresentations to thescientific com-
munity.
Innovation
Technological
newundertaking
A relatively analysisin studiesof
is to applycognitive-historical
MichaelGorman,
innovation.
technological andBernardCarlson,a
a psychologist,

30PierreDuhem,TheAimandStructure ofPhysicalTheory (NewYork:Atheneum, 1962),quoting

p. 68. See also Duhem,Les theorieselectriquesde J. ClerkMaxwell:Etudehistorique et critique
(Paris:A. Hermann, 1902);andforrecentstudies,Berkson,FieldsofForce(cit.n. 20); JoanBrom-
berg,"Maxwell'sDisplacement Current and His Theoryof Light,"Archive for theHistoryof the
ExactSciences,1968,4:218-234;Alan F Chalmers, "The HeuristicRole ofMaxwell'sMechanical
Model of Electromagnetic Phenomena," Studiesin theHistoryand Philosophyof Science,1986,
17:415-427; PeterHeimann,"Maxwelland theModes of Consistent Representation:'Arch.Hist.
ExactSci., 1970,6:171-213;Nersessian, "HowDo Scien-
FaradaytoEinstein(cit.n. 1); Nersessian,
tistsThink?"(cit.n. 11); and Daniel Siegel,"The Originof theDisplacement Current," Historical
StudiesinthePhysicalSciences,1986,17:99-145.
31 Nancy J. Nersessian, "WhyDo ThoughtExperiments Work?"Proc. Cog. Sci. Soc., 1991,
13:430-438; Nersessian, "Abstractionvia GenericModelingin ConceptFormation in Science,"in
Idealizationand Science,ed. N. Cartwright and M. R. Jones(Amsterdam: Rodophi,in press);and

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 207

joinedforcestocomparetheinvention
historian, ofthetelephonebyThomasEdison
andbyAlexander GrahamBell.32Theircomparative analysisexaminestheinterac-
tionbetweenmentalmodels,mechanical andheuristics
representations, in techno-
Thusfartheyhavedemonstrated
logicalinnovation. thecomplexrelation between
mentalmodelingandconducting experimentsandhaverevealedsignificant differ-
encesinthecognitivestylesofBell andEdison.GaryBradshaw, a cognitive
psychol-
ogist,hasappliedHerbertSimon'sproblem-solvingmodelofdiscovery totheinven-
tionoftheairplanetosee howwellitcanbe extended totechnological
innovation.33

Communicative
Practices
Manycontemporary historians
areexamining theformandrhetoric ofpresentations
of experimental and observational activitiesand results.Theyusuallyframetheir
studiesinterms ofhowscientists adoptcertain modesandconventions ofwritingin
orderto gainauthority andthusto persuadeothersof theirinferences. Whattends
tobe overlooked is thatthereis a significantcognitivedimension topersuasion. In
theprocessof persuading one has to getone'scolleaguesto comprehend thenew
ideas,and,again,in orderto negotiate one has to comprehend whatis beingpro-
posed.Theseareinterconnected, thoughnotnecessarily sequential, steps.Success
atcommunication, ofcourse,does notentailsuccessatpersuasion.
A cognitive historian takesthepubliccommunications of scientistspresenting
newrepresentations as attemptstocreatea sharedunderstanding. Thatis,thesecom-
munications are devisedto bridgethegap betweendoing,on theone hand,and
comprehending andevaluating, ontheother. Although StevenShapinandPeterDear
havepresented insightful analysesof RobertBoyle'scontributions to shapingthe
formofresearch papers,34 thereis moretobe toldinthisstory. Forexample,Shapin
claimsthatBoylecreatedhis literary techniques to gainauthority forhis conclu-
sions,devisinga wayof "witnessing" an experiment whilenotbeingpresent. But
howandwhydoes creating an "impression ofverisimilitude"
conveyauthority and
"compelassent"?My analysisofthought experiments pointsto a possibleanswer.
Boyle'stexts,
including boththenarrative andthevisualparts,assistreadersincon-
structingtheirownmentalsimulation, therebycreatingan understanding of what
theyhavenotactuallywitnessed themselves.
Holmes'sanalysisoftherelation betweenargument andnarrative inthescientific
paperarguesthatthedifference in stylebetweenresearchpapersproducedat the
RoyalAcademyandattheAcademiedes Sciencesstems,in part,fromthepractice
ofFrenchacademicians ofcarrying outcommunal investigations.
In theircase au-
thoritywasnotinquestion.35 A cognitive perspective wouldaddthatwhencreating

Nersessian,"In theTheoretician's
Laboratory: ThoughtExperimentingas MentalModeling,"PSA,
1992,2:291-301.
32 MichaelE. Gormanand W. Bernard Carlson,"Interpreting
Inventionas a CognitiveProcess:
The Case ofAlexanderGrahamBell,ThomasEdison,andtheTelephone," Science,Technology,and
HumanValues(forthcoming).
33 GaryBradshaw, "TheAirplaneandtheLogic ofInvention,"in Cognitive
ModelsofScience,ed.
Giere(cit.n. 11),pp. 239-250.
34 StevenShapin,"Pumpand Circumstance: RobertBoyle'sLiterary
Technology,"Social Studies
ofScience,1984,14:481-520;andPeterDear,"Totiusinverba.Rhetoric andAuthorityintheEarly
RoyalSociety,"Isis, 1985,76:145-161.
35 Holmes,'Argument andNarrative"(cit.n. 26).

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208 NANCY J.NERSESSIAN

a sharedunderstanding through mentalmodeling, theFrenchcouldalso cutthenar-

rativeshortbecausetheycouldpresume tacitandexplicitknowledge ofexperimen-
talprocedures andapparatus.
Onelastsignificant dimension ofhowscientists communicate novelideasis visual
representation.Scientifictextscontainmanydifferent kinds,amongthemdiagrams,
schematic representations,paintings, andphotographs. A cognitive historianwould
trytodetermine justhowtheycreateunderstanding within a community, keepingin
mindthattheymayservedifferent cognitive functions. The visualrepresentations
in physicsandgeologyoftenappearin abstracted, idealizedform, displayingwhat
therepresenter deemsessentialto theanalysisor forunderstanding it.Such sche-
maticrenderings and diagramsseekto reifysolutionsto problemsand to convey
understandings.
quantitative Depictionsin biologicaltextsorin earlyastronomical
mayincludeartistic
treatises embellishments, toheighten thesensesandfixattention
on specificfeatures of phenomena. Medicaland astronomical textsmaypresent
faithful
renderings orphotographic images.Quiterecenttextsin severalareasnow
includeimagesreconstructed fromcomputer datacollectedfromsuchobservational
devicesas satellitesandCAT scanners. Again,theseall providewaysoffixing the
phenomena, as thepresenter hasthought aboutthem,inthemindofthereader.
A conspicuous rolethesevisualrepresentations all playin communication is to
providea stableembodiment thatis public. Latour has called such embodiments
"immutable andcombinable mobiles."However, in theprocessofcommunicating,
they oftenmutate, creatingan enhanced or a different understanding. Forexample,
James Griesmer and William Wimsatt use modifications in "Weisman diagrams" to
document conceptual variationwithin a community ofunderstanding overa period
My analysisof schematic
of time.36 representations in physicsfindsthattheyhelp
readersconstruct mentalmodels,muchas theydo inthought experiments.

TrainingPractitioners
The roleof training changeand in sciencemoregenerally
in scientific has only
recently theattention
attracted of historians. The history
of pedagogicalpractices
offerspotentially groundforexamining
fertile howcognitive andsocialfactorsin-
teractin scientific
change.
Training, whether oras an experimentalist,
as a theoretician comprises morethan
learning throughtextsandworking problemexemplars. Kathryn Olesko'sstudyof
FranzNeumann's seminar attemptsto capturetheexplicitandimplicit pedagogical
practicesthatformed "theactivityof learning" withintheseminar.37Her analysis
reconstructs variousmethodsNeumanndevisedto teachmeasuring procedures,
theoreticaltechniques, mathematical She argues
skills,and evaluativestrategies.
thattheworkofindividual studentsexhibited techniquestheylearnedintheseminar
andthusshowshowtheseeducational practicesshapedthecontext andcontent of
thelocal scientific
practices.
36 JamesR. Griesemer andWilliamWimsatt, Weismannism:
"Picturing A Case StudyofConcep-
tual Evolution,"in WhatthePhilosophyof BiologyIs: EssaysforDavid Hull, ed. MichaelRuse
(Dordrecht:Kluwer,1989),pp. 75-137.
37 Kathryn M. Olesko,Physicsas a Calling:Disciplineand Practicein theKbnigsberg Seminar
forPhysics(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniv.Press,1991). See also Nersessian, Labora-
"Theoretician's
Think?"(cit.n. 11); and NersessianandGreeno,
"How Do Scientists
tory"(cit.n. 31); Nersessian,
"DynamicMentalModeling"(cit.n. 12).

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 209

A cognitivehistorian
wouldtakethisanalysisfurther
byexamining howhistorical
andpsychological intopedagogycouldenhanceoneanother.
inquiries Forexample,
of centralimportanceto bothis how a community's implicitknowledgeis made
explicitforpedagogicalpurposesandthenbecomestacitforthenewpractitioners.
The traineeinphysics,
inlearning modeling mustfirst
techniques, learnthegenera-
tiveprinciples
andconstraints
forphysicalmodelsina domain.Thesethentransform
intothetacitassumptionsofthethinking andcommunicative ofthecom-
practices
munity ofexpertphysicists.

V. APPLIED HISTORY OF SCIENCE

The bulkofthisarticleexamineshowcognitive sciencecouldenrichthehistory of

science.Whatdoes thehistory ofsciencehaveto offercognitivescientists
in turn?
JohnHeilbronhas called"appliedhistory of science"thatwhichis donewiththe
"client'spurposes"inmind.38
Although appliedhistorymostlikelydiffers
fromhis-
torydonewithhistorians'professional
interests
inmind,itis unlikely
todilutework
producedfortheprofession and verylikelyto makea valuablecontribution else-
where.I willindicatefertile
areasforsuchcollaboration in cognitive
psychology,
Al, andscienceeducation.

Cognitive
Psychology
The historyofscientific
changecouldwellcreatemoresophisticated psychological
modelsthatsee conceptualchange,creativity, and organization of knowledgeas
intertwinedwholes.Manycognitive psychologistsrecognizethis,andseveralhave
undertaken historical
studieson theirown.Since theyare nottrainedhistorians,
though,psychologistswouldprefer thathistorians
carryouttheanalytical worknec-
essary.Historical
analysis,
unliketheircustomary interviews andprotocol analyses,
providespsychologistswithanintegrated pictureofa significant
setofachievements
overan extended periodoftime-one thatcanenrichtheirdata.Used in combina-
tionwithinterviews, historicalanalysescan clarifyissuesandprevent misleading
interpretations,
suchas thosethatarosefromWertheimer's interviews ofEinstein.39
Theseanalysescaninform thedesignoflaboratory experiments andchallenge inter-
pretationsbased on psychological studiesalone.40Additionally,as scientistshave
reflected
throughout history on howto learnaboutandrepresent nature, theyhave
refinedand extendedtheirrepresentational and communicative practices.These
"metacognitive"reflectionsarea valuableresourceforcognitive psychologists con-
cernedwithlearning.
One prominent questionin thecontemporary psychologicalliteratureis,Arethe

38 JohnL. Heilbron,'AppliedHistoryofScience,"Isis, 1987,78:552-563.

31 Max Wertheimer,ProductiveThinking(NewYork:Harper& Row,1945).See also,e.g.,Gentner
andJeziorski,"ShiftfromMetaphor"(cit.n. 2): andMarianneWiserandSusanCarey,"WhenHeat
andTemperature WereOne,"in MentalModels,ed. DedreGentner andAlanL. Stevens(Hillsdale,
N.J.:Erlbaum,1983).
40 NancyJ.Nersessian, "ConceptualChangein Scienceand ScienceEducation," Synthese, 1989,
80:163-183; NersessianandGreeno,"MultipleAbstracted Representations
in Physics"(cit.n. 12);
andNersessianandLaurenB. Resnick,"Comparing HistoricalandIntuitive
Explanations ofMotion:
Does 'Naive Physics'Have a Structure?" Proceedingsof theEleventhAnnualConference of the
CognitiveScienceSociety(AnnArbor:Univ.MichiganPress,1989),pp.412-420.

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210 NANCY J.NERSESSIAN

conceptualchanges(or "restructurings") development

thattakeplace in cognitive
Severalpsychologists
revolutions'?
likethosein "scientific
or learning arguethat
theyare indeed.41The mainsupport forthishypothesiscomesfromresearchthat
ofa domainwith
representation
comparestheinitialstateofthechild'sorstudent's
thedesiredfinalstate.Thatresearchshowsthatthekindsofchangesnecessary to
getfromone stateto theotherresemblethosethathavetakenplace in scientific
byKuhn.However,
as characterized
revolutions, as withKuhn'sanalysis,thenature
oftheprocessesthrough whichconceptual changeoccurshas notbeenexploredin
anydepthinpsychology, anditis widelyacknowledged thatthisproblemnowneeds
tobe placedontheagenda.Myanalysisoftheconstructive ofFaradayand
practices
Maxwellindicated howimportant analogyandmentalmodeling arein conceptual
changeandurgedtheneedfora dynamical notionof"mentalmodel"whenanalyz-
ing change.Cognitivepsychologistscouldwell also explorethepossibleroleof
analogyinconceptual changeinlearning.
Intelligence
Artificial
Computer simulations reasoning
of scientific processesarea valuableresourcefor
thoseA! researchers whouse computer modelingin studyinghumanintelligence
andforthosewhowishtomodelexpertsystems onhumanproblem solving.Analy-
ses by historianshavebecomemoreimportant as thislatterprojecthas unfolded.
Computer "discoveryprograms" haveevolvedfromtheearlyBACON program,
whichwasconcerned notwithhistorical accuracybutratherwithexamining heuris-
ticsthrough whichKepler'slawscouldin principle havebeengenerated fromthe
empirical data.The morerealisticSTAHL program attemptsto modeleighteenth-
century stylesofreasoning aboutthecomponents ofsubstances,andtheKEKADA
program attempts to modeltheactualheuristics employedby Hans Krebsin his
discovery of theornithine cycle.Simonand his colleaguesmakeexplicituse of
theworkofhistorians, especiallyHolmes,in constructing theselatersimulations.42
Whether computer simulations will be successfulin capturingthecomplexity of
actualdiscovery processesinpastscienceandinextracting generalproblem-solving
heuristicsfromthemdependslargelyon thedevelopment of moresophisticated
computer-modeling techniques. Whatthehistorian to thisprojectis
can contribute
a deeperunderstanding of thenatureof thediscovery processesthatneed to be
modeled.
ScienceEducation
Historians thattheycanmakea significant
ofsciencehavelongrecognized contribu-
tionto science Earlier
education. attemptsto applythe of
fruits research
historical
41
See, e.g.,SusanCarey,ConceptualChangeinChildhood(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1985);
RichardA. Duschl,Restructuring ScienceEducation(New York:TeachersCollege Press,1990);
FrankC. Keil, Semanticand ConceptualDevelopment: An OntologicalPerspective(Cambridge,
Mass.: HarvardUniv.Press,1979); and StellaVosniadouandWilliamBrewer,"MentalModelsof
theEarth:A StudyofConceptualChangein Childhood," CognitivePsychology,in press.
42 Patrick Discovery:Computational
Langleyet al., Scientific Explorationsof theCreativePro-
cesses(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1987); JanW. ZytkowandHerbert A. Simon,"A Theoryof
Historical Discovery:The Construction Models,"MachineLearning,1986,1:107-
ofComponential
136;andDeepak Kulkarni andHerbert Simon,"TheProcessesofScientific
Discovery:The Strategy

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 COGNITIVE SCIENCE 211

toscienceteaching turned onthebeliefsthatexposingstudents tothehistoricalroots

of scientific ideas willfacilitate learning theideas themselves byplacingthemin
a context, and thatproviding examplesof scientific discovery enablesstudents to
understand scientificmethods. However, though therearegoodreasonsforteaching
sciencestudents somehistory of science,thehistorical examplescannotbythem-
selveshelpstudents learnscientific theories.
As I havearguedrecently, a newwayofincorporating thehistory ofscienceinto
sciencepedagogydoes further thataim.43A new interdisciplinary researcharea,
"cognition andinstruction," has developedat theintersection ofcognitive psychol-
ogyandresearch in scienceandmathematics education.A hallmark oftheresearch
in thefieldof cognition and instruction is a "constructivist" approachto learning,
basedon thebeliefthatas partoftheprocessoflearning a science,students needto
construct theirownrepresentations oftheextant conceptual structure ofthescience.
Cognitive historians too conceiveof whatis customarily called"scientific discov-
ery"as a processof construction. Scientists activelyconstruct representations
by
employing problem-solving procedures notunlikethosewe employin ordinary
problemsolving.On a constructivist account,thecognitive activity ofthescientist
is pertinent tolearning. Thusthehistorical cognitiveprocessescanprovidea model
forthelearning activityitself.Forthatpurposethehistory ofsciencewouldprovide
a repository ofstrategic knowledge ofhowtogo aboutconstructing, changing,and
communicating scientific representations. Historians, working in conjunctionwith
cognitive scientists,can "mine"historical recordsforthesestrategies andthende-
visewaysofintegrating andtransforming themorerealistic exemplars ofscientific
problemsolvingintoinstructional procedures.
This articlehas arguedforthesignificance to historyof scienceof cognitive-
historical analysisand has established theareasin whichhistory of scienceand
cognitive sciencecan be mutually enriching. Even so briefa surveydemonstrates
that,although a relatively newundertaking, cognitivehistory hasalreadyaddedsig-
nificant insights to thehistorical literatureon scientificchange,andthatcollabora-
tionswithhistorians, though fewthusfar,haveproven beneficial forcognitivescien-
tistsas well.

of Experimentation,"CognitiveScience,1988, 12:139-175. See also FredericL. Holmes,"Hans

KrebsandtheDiscoveryoftheOrnithine Cycle,"FederationProceedings, 1980,39:216-225.
43 NancyJ.Nersessian, and Instructing:
"Constructing The Role of 'AbstractionTechniques'in
Creatingand LearningPhysics,"in PhilosophyofScience,Cognitive Psychology, and Educational
Theoryand Practice,ed. R. DuschlandR. Hamilton(Albany:SUNY Press,1992),pp. 48-68; and
Nersessian,"ShouldPhysicistsPreachWhatTheyPractice?Constructing Modelingin Doing and
LearningPhysics,"
Scienceand Education,1995,4 (forthcoming).

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