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EX POST FACTO LAW AND was lawful;

(vi) Every law which deprives
BILL OF ATTAINDER persons accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to
Ex post facto law and Bill of attainder.
which they have become
Sec. 22. Art. Ill: “No ex post facto law or bill
entitled, such as the protection
of attainder shall be enacted. ”]
of a former conviction or
acquittal, or of a proclamation
of amnesty;
EX POST FACTO LAW

KINDS:
Q: What are the three
(i) Every law that makes criminal (3)CHARACTERISTICS of Ex post facto
an action done before 
 the laws?
passage of the law and which
(i) It refers to criminal matters;
was innocent when done, and
(ii) It is retroactive in application;
punishes such action;
and
(ii) Every law that aggravates a
(iii) It works to the prejudice of the
crime, or makes it greater than
accused.
it was when committed;
(iii) Every law that changes
punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment than the In Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA
law annexed to the crime when 383, the amendatory law to RA 3019
committed; imposing suspension pendente life of
(iv) Every law that alters the legal public officers accused of offenses
rules of evidence, and receives involving fraudulent use of public funds,
less or different testimony than was held not to be an ex post facto law,
the law required at the time of because the suspension was not punitive,
the commission of the offense, but merely preventive.
in order to convict the
offender; In People v. Ferrer, 43 SCRA 381, the
(v) Every law which, assuming to Anti-Subversion Act was held not to be an
regulate civil rights and ex post facto law, because the prohibition
remedies only, in effect applied only to acts committed “after the
imposes a penalty or the approval of the Act”. In People v.
deprivation of a right for Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, the
something which when done Supreme Court ruled that the provision of

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BP 195, amending Sec. 11, RA3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), which
would increase from 10 to 15 years the
prescriptive period for the offenses
punished therein, cannot be given
retroactive effect, as it would then be an
ex post facto law.
In Wright v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA
341, it was held that the retroactive
application of the Treaty of Extradition
(between the Philippines and Australia)
does not violate the prohibition against ex
post facto laws, because the Treaty is
neither a piece of criminal legislation nor
a criminal procedural statute; it merely
provided for the extradition of persons
wanted for offenses already committed at
the time the treaty was ratified.
In Sesbreno v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, it
was held that the imposition of back taxes
on the property of the petitioner does not
violate the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws.
In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
128096, January 20, 1999, it was held
that R.A. 8249, which defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is not
an ex post facto law, because it is not a
penal law. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their violations,
or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment.
R.A. 8249 is clearly a procedural statute,
i.e., one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws
of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249
cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
The contention that the right of the
accused to a two-tiered appeal under R.A.
7975 has been diluted by R.A. 8249 has
been rejected by the court several times
considering that the right to appeal is not
a natural right but statutory in nature that
can be regulated by law.
In People v. Judge Nitafan, G.R. Nos.
107964-66, February 1, 1999, it was held
that the judge cannot, motu propio,
initiate the dismissal and subsequently
dismiss a criminal information or
complaint without any motion to that
effect being filed by the accused based on
the alleged violation of the latter’s right
against ex post facto law and double
jeopardy. Every law carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality until
otherwise declared by the Supreme Court,
and lower courts may not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute or rule nor
declare it void unless directly assailed in
an appropriate action. Since neither the
private respondent nor the Solicitor
General challenged the validity of Central
Bank Circular No. 960, it was error for the
lower court to declare the same ex post
facto.
In Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128508, February 1, 1999, the Court
held that P.D. 1990 is not ex post facto,
because like the Probation Law that it
amends, it is not penal in character, and it
applies only to an accused who has been

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convicted after the effectivity of the P.D. government. The accused will be tried in
proper courts and there would still be a
trial.

BILL OF ATTAINDER

Note: A bill of attainder is always an ex

post facto law, and an ex post facto law is
not always a bill of attainder.
Q: What is bill of Attainder?
ANS -It is a legislative act that inflicts
punishment without trial.
CHARACTERISTICS: It substitutes
legislative fiat for a judicial determination
of guilt. Thus, it is only when a statute
applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without judicial trial that it becomes
a bill of attainder.
In People v. Ferrer, supra.,the Supreme
Court held that the Anti-Subversion Act is
not a bill of attainder, because it does not
specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for
the purpose of punishment; what it does
is simply declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government; and the term “Communist
Party of the Philippines” is used solely for
definitional purposes.
Gabby: In people vs ferrer, it simply
declared the party communist to be an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the
THE UNITED STATES vs. VICENTE DIAZ
CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE.
EX POST FACTO LAWS, ESSENCE. Unless
they are favorable to the defendant, are
prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law
that makes an action, done before the
passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action, is an ex post facto
law. In the present case Act No. 2655
made an act which had been done before
the law was adopted, a criminal act, and
to make said Act applicable to the act
complained of would be to give it an ex
post facto operation. The Legislature is
prohibited from adopting a law which will
make an act done before its adoption a
crime. A law may be given a retroactive
effect in civil action, providing it is
curative in character, but ex post facto
laws are absolutely prohibited unless its
retroactive effect is favorable to the
defendant.
For the reason, therefore, that the acts
complained of in the present case were
legal at the time of their occurrence, they
cannot be made criminal by any
subsequent or ex post facto legislation.
What the courts may say, considering the
provisions of article 1255 of the Civil
Code, when a civil action is brought upon

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said contract, cannot now be determined. imprisonment in accordance with the

A contract may be annulled by the courts provisions of the law. From that sentence
when it is shown that it is against morals each of the defendants appealed to this
or public order. court.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of
the opinion, and so decide, that the acts
complained of by the defendants did not
constitute a crime at the time they were
committed, and therefore the sentence of
the lower court should be, and is hereby,
revoked; and it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the complaint be dismissed,
and that the defendants be discharged
from the custody of the law, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
THE UNITED STATES vs. VICENTE DIAZ
CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE.
FACTS:It appears from the record that on
the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was
presented in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila, charging the
defendants with a violation of the Usury
Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint
they were each arrested, arraigned, and
pleaded not guilty. The cause was finally
brought on for trial on the 1st day of
September, 1921. At the close of the trial,
and after a consideration of the evidence
adduced, the Honorable M. V. del Rosario,
judge, found that the defendants were
guilty of the crime charged in the
complaint and sentenced each of them to
pay a fine of P120 and, in case of
insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
The appellants now contend:
a) That the contract upon which the
alleged usurious interest was collected was
executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted;
(b) that at the time said contract was made
(December 30, 1915), there was no usury
law in force in the Philippine Islands;
(c) that said Act No. 2655 did not become
effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or
four months and a half after the contract
in question was executed;
(d) that said law could have no retroactive
effect or operation, and
(e) that said law impairs the obligation of
a contract, and that for all of said reasons
the judgment imposed by the lower court
should be revoked; that the complaint
should be dismissed, and that they should
each be discharged from the custody of the
law.
That on the 30th day of December, 1915,
the alleged offended persons Bartolome
Oliveros and Engracia Lianco executed
and delivered to the defendants a contract
(Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the
former had borrowed from the latter the
sum of P300, and that, by virtue of the
terms of said contract, the said Bartolome
Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated
themselves to pay to the defendants
interest at the rate of five per cent (5%)
per month, payable within the first ten

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days of each and every month, the first
payment to be made on the 10th day of
January, 1916. There were other terms in
the contract which, however, are not
important for the decision in the present
case.
The lower court, in the course of its
opinion, stated that at the time of the
execution and delivery of said contract
(Exhibit B), there was no law in force in
the Philippine Islands punishing usury;
but, inasmuch as the defendants had
collected a usurious rate of interest after
the adoption of the Usury Law in the
Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), they
were guilty of a violation of that law and
should be punished in accordance with its
provisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a
violation of Section 22
RULING:The law, we think, is well
established that when a contract contains
an obligation to pay interest upon the
principal, the interest thereby becomes
part of the principal and is included
within the promise to pay. In other words,
the obligation to pay interest on money
due under a contract, be it express or
implied, is a part of the obligation of the
contract. Laws adopted after the
execution of a contract, changing or
altering the rate of interest, cannot be
made to apply to such contract without
violating the provisions of the
constitution which prohibit the adoption
of a law "impairing the obligation of
contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12 Corpus Juris,
1058-1059.)
The obligation of the contract is the law
which binds the parties to perform their
agreement if it is not contrary to the law
of the land, morals or public order. That
law must govern and control the contract
in every aspect in which it is intended to
bear upon it, whether it affect its validity,
construction, or discharge. Any law which
enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intention of the parties,
necessarily impairs the contract itself. If a
law impairs the obligation of a contract, it
is prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null
and void. The laws in force in the
Philippine Islands prior to any legislation
by the American sovereignty, prohibited
the Legislature from giving to any penal
law a retroactive effect unless such law
was favorable to the person accused.
(Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)
A law imposing a new penalty, or a new
liability or disability, or giving a new right
of action, must not be construed as having
a retroactive effect. It is an elementary
rule of contract that the laws in force at
the time the contract was made must
govern its interpretation and application.
Laws must be construed prospectively
and not retrospectively. If a contract is
legal at its inception, it cannot be
rendered illegal by any subsequent
legislation. If that were permitted then
the obligations of a contract might be
impaired, which is prohibited by the
organic law of the Philippine Islands. (U.S.

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vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39
Phil., 552; Aguilar vs. Rubiato and
Gonzales Vila, 40 Phil., 570.)
Ex post facto laws, unless they are
favorable to the defendant, are prohibited
in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes
an action, done before the passage of the
law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal, and punishes such action, is an
ex post facto law. In the present case Act
No. 2655 made an act which had been
done before the law was adopted, a
criminal act, and to make said Act
applicable to the act complained of would
be to give it an ex post facto operation.
The Legislature is prohibited from
adopting a law which will make an act
done before its adoption a crime. A law
may be given a retroactive effect in civil
action, providing it is curative in
character, but ex post facto laws are
absolutely prohibited unless its
retroactive effect is favorable to the
defendant.
For the reason, therefore, that the acts
complained of in the present case were
legal at the time of their occurrence, they
cannot be made criminal by any
subsequent or ex post facto legislation.
What the courts may say, considering the
provisions of article 1255 of the Civil
Code, when a civil action is brought upon
said contract, cannot now be determined.
A contract may be annulled by the courts
when it is shown that it is against morals
or public order.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of
the opinion, and so decide, that the acts
complained of by the defendants did not
constitute a crime at the time they were
committed, and therefore the sentence of
the lower court should be, and is hereby,
revoked; and it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the complaint be dismissed,
and that the defendants be discharged
from the custody of the law, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
US VS DIAZ-CONDE
FACTS: On December 30, 1915,
complainants Bartolome Oliveros and
Engracia Lianco entered into a contract
with the defendants concerning a debt of
P300. Oliveros and co. were obligated to
pay five percent interest per month
within the first ten days of every month.
On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and
Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with
violating the Usury Law in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila. They
were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine
of P120 and in case of insolvency, to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with the provisions of law.
They took it to SC to plead.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Usury Law has a
retroactive effect in this case
2. WoN the law impaired the contract

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that, if the Act should be interpreted as

HELD:
No. The Usury Law, a penal law, cannot
become retroactive unless it is favorable
to the person accused. (Art. 21 and 22
Penal Code)
Yes. If a contract is legal at its inception, it
cannot be rendered illegal by any
subsequent legislation.
DOMINGA CONCEPCION, vs. GREGORIO
GARCIA, as special Deputy Sheriff
STREET
EX POST FACTO LAW. "The Act in
question is not an ex post facto law, as it is
not penal in its nature. It has long been
settled that the phrase "ex post facto laws"
is not applicable to civil laws, but to penal
and criminal which punish a party for acts
antecedently done which were not
punishable at all, or not punishable to the
extent or in the manner prescribed. In
short ex post facto laws relate to penal
and criminal proceedings, which impose
punishment or forfeitures, and not to civil
proceedings, which affect private rights
retrospectively.
The present petition seeks to compel the
respondent, by mandamus, to surrender
the property, consisting of the household
effects described in the petitioner's third-
party claim" and the theory underlying
the petition is that Act No. 3531 is not
applicable to the situation described, and
applicable thereto, it should be held
unconstitutional. In this connection it is
claimed that, if the Act be interpreted as
applicable to the subject matter of the
aforesaid attachment, it would thereby be
given an ex post facto effect inconsistently
with that portion of section 3 of our
organic law which prohibits the
enactment of ex post facto laws.
Under section 442 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the sheriff is not under legal
duty to surrender attached property
when no bond is given. On the contrary,
said section leaves the officer entirely free
to hold the property or not, and merely
leaves him at liberty, in the ordinary case
where the Government is not a party, to
surrender the property if the bond
indicated in that section be not given. It
results that the sheriff is under no legal
duty to surrender the property, and the
enactment with respect to the giving of
bond was made exclusively for his
protection. In the case before us the
sheriff is content to hold the property in
reliance upon the protection given by the
amendment
DOMINGA CONCEPCION, vs. GREGORIO
GARCIA, as special Deputy Sheriff
STREET, J.: G.R. No. L-
32380 November 29, 1929
FACTS: This is an original petition
presented in this court by Dominga
Concepcion wherein she seeks to obtain a

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peremptory order of mandamus directed
to the respondent. Gregorio Garcia, as
special deputy sheriff in civil case No.
35867, in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila, requiring him to surrender
the possession of certain personal
property claimed by the petitioner, as
third-party claimant in an attachment
issued in the civil case mentioned, with
general relief and with costs. The case has
now been submitted upon answer of the
respondent.
It appears that on August 9, 1929, the
Government of the Philippine Islands
instituted a civil action (No. 35867) in the
Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, against Florencio Reyes, former
chief of the stamp division in the Bureau
of Posts, for the purpose of recovering the
sum of P212,349.42, the value of stamps
alleged to have been misappropriated by
him. In connection with the complaint in
said case the Government obtained an
attachment against the defendant, by
virtue whereof the respondent, in the
capacity of deputy sheriff, levied upon
certain household effects as the property
of the defendant. On September 20, 1929,
the present petitioner, Dominga
Concepcion, the wife of Reyes, presented
in writing to the sheriff a third-party
claim asserting ownership in the
household effects which had been taken
upon attachment, all pursuant to section
442 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Upon
receiving this claim the respondent Garcia
demanded that the Government should
give bond to secure him against liability
from said claim; and inasmuch as the
estimated value of the property was in the
amount of P5,500, the respondent
demanded an indemnity bond in the
amount of P11,000. At the request of the
Attorney-General the period for the giving
of this bond was extended until October
10, 1929, and before this date arrived the
Legislature enacted a statute (Act No.
3531) adding an amendment, in the form
of a proviso, to both sections 442 and 451
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
proviso has the same wording in the
additions to each of the provisions
mentioned, to the following effect:
Provided, however, That when the
plaintiff, or the person in whose
favor the writ of attachment runs,
is the Insular Government, or any
officer duly representing it, the
filing of such bond shall not be
required, and in case the sheriff or
attaching officer is sued for
damages as a result of the
attachment, he shall be
represented by the Attorney-
General and if held liable therefor,
the actual damages adjudged by
the court shall be paid by the
Insular Treasurer out of such
funds as may be appropriated for
the purpose.
This Act was approved on September 28,
1929, and it was therefore in full effect
upon October 10, 1929, when the period
expired within which the bond demanded
by the sheriff should have been given.

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However, under the authority of the
amendment above mentioned, the
respondent deputy sheriff maintained the
attachment, and he now admittedly has
the attached property in his possession.
The present petition seeks to compel the
respondent, by mandamus, to surrender
the property, consisting of the household
effects described in the petitioner's third-
party claim" and the theory underlying
the petition is that Act No. 3531 is not
applicable to the situation described, and
that, if the Act should be interpreted as
applicable thereto, it should be held
unconstitutional. In this connection it is
claimed that, if the Act be interpreted as
applicable to the subject matter of the
aforesaid attachment, it would thereby be
given an ex post facto effect inconsistently
with that portion of section 3 of our
organic law which prohibits the
enactment of ex post facto laws.
RULING: The criticism directed to the
statute is not well founded. Act No. 3531
is an Act dealing exclusively with
remedies and modes of procedure. Such
an Act is repugnant to no constitutional
provision, and its legality is beyond
question. A person has no vested right in
any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal,
of any other than the existing rules of
procedure. Statutes making the changes
in the remedy or procedure are laws
within the discretion of the lawmaking
power, and are valid so long as they do
not deprived the accused of any
substantial right, or conflict with specific
and applicable provisions of the Federal
Constitution (6 R.C.L., p. 294). Moreover,
the term "ex post facto," as applied to
statutes, in section 3 of our organic law, is
a technical term, used only in connection
with crimes and penalties. The term is
never used to indicate the obnoxious
character of statutes dealing retroactively
with civil rights. Of course retroactive
statutes dealing with civil rights may also
be unconstitutional if they impair the
obligations of contracts or deprive a
person of a vested right, but this remedial
Act is not subject to criticism on this
ground. As was said in Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38
Phil., 367, 377), "The Act in question is
not an ex post facto law, as it is not penal
in its nature. It has long been settled that
the phrase "ex post facto laws" is not
applicable to civil laws, but to penal and
criminal which punish a party for acts
antecedently done which were not
punishable at all, or not punishable to the
extent or in the manner prescribed. In
short ex post facto laws relate to penal
and criminal proceedings, which impose
punishment or forfeitures, and not to civil
proceedings, which affect private rights
retrospectively."
What has been said is sufficient to dispose
of the petition, but, as pointed out in the
memorandum of the Attorney-General,
there is an additional obstacle to the
granting of the writ of mandamus in this
case. This is found in the circumstance

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that, under section 442 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the sheriff is not under
legal duty to surrender attached property
when no bond is given. On the contrary,
said section leaves the officer entirely free
to hold the property or not, and merely
leaves him at liberty, in the ordinary case
where the Government is not a party, to
surrender the property if the bond
indicated in that section be not given. It
results that the sheriff is under no legal
duty to surrender the property, and the
enactment with respect to the giving of
bond was made exclusively for his
protection. In the case before us the
sheriff is content to hold the property in
reliance upon the protection given by the
amendment.
The petition, in our opinion, is without
legal merit, and the same is hereby
dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in
its body acts which are punishable under
the Labor Code. As it was proven that
petitioner had committed the acts she
was charged with, she was properly
convicted under the Labor Code, and not
under R.A. No. 8042.
There is no violation of the prohibition
against ex post facto law nor a retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by
petitioner. An ex post facto law is one
which, among others, aggravates a crime
or makes it greater than it was when
committed or changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when
committed.16 Penal laws and laws which,
while not penal in nature, nonetheless
have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation
operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot
be given retroactive effect, except when
they are favorable to the accused.

ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, TINGA, J.: G.R. No.
176169 November 14, 2008
The basic rule is that a criminal act is
punishable under the law in force at the
time of its commission. Thus, petitioner
can only be charged and found guilty
under the Labor Code which was in force
in 1993 when the acts attributed to her
were committed. Petitioner was charged
in 1998 under an Information that
erroneously designated the offense as
ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, TINGA, J.: G.R. No.
176169 November 14, 2008
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioner Rosario Nasi-Villar assailing
the Decision2 dated 27 June 2005 and
Resolution3 dated 28 November 2006 of
the Court of Appeals. This case originated
from an Information4 for Illegal

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Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 WHEREFORE, premises

and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) considered, the Court hereby finds
accused ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR
No. 8042 filed by the Office of the GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment and,
5 October 1998 for acts committed by in accordance with the penalty set
petitioner and one Dolores Placa in or forth under the Labor Code, as
about January 1993. The Information amended, said accused is hereby
reads: sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from FOUR YEARS
That on [sic] or about the month of as minimum to FIVE YEARS as
[January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta. maximum.
Cruz, Province of Davao del Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of On the civil aspect of the case,
the Honorable Court, the aforenamed there being no substantial proof
accused, conspiring together, presented to justify a grant of civil
confederating with and mutually helping damages, this Court makes no
one another through fraudulent pronouncement thereon.
representation and deceitful machination,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully With respect to accused Ma.
and feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for Dolores Placa, who is still at large,
employment abroad[,] demand and the records of this case are hereby
receive the amount of P6,500.00 sent to the archives to be retrieved
Philippine Currency [sic] as placement in the event that said accused
fee[,] the said accused being a non- would be apprehended. Issue an
licensee or non-holder of authority to alias warrant of arrest for the
engage in the recruitment of workers apprehension of said accused.
abroad to the damage and prejudice of the
herein offended party. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged
On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the error by the trial court in finding her
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of
City, Davao del Sur found the evidence the trial court's appreciation of the
presented by the prosecution to be more evidence presented by the prosecution.
credible than that presented by the
defense and thus held petitioner liable for The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated
the offense of illegal recruitment under 27 June 2005, following the principle that
the Labor Code, as amended.7 The an appeal in a criminal case throws the
dispositive portion of the decision reads: whole case wide open for review, noted

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 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
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that the criminal acts alleged to have been
committed happened sometime in 1993.
However, R.A. No. 8042, under which
petitioner was charged, was approved
only on 7 June 1995 and took effect on 15
July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals
declared that petitioner should have been
charged under the Labor Code, in
particular Art. 13(b) thereof, and not
under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made
its findings on the basis of the provisions
of the Labor Code and found petitioner
liable under Art. 38, in relation to Art.
13(b), and Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The
appellate court affirmed with
modification the decision of the RTC,
decreeing in the dispositive portion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Br. 18,
City of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur,
finding Rosario Nasi-Villar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt o the crime of Illegal
Recruitment is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that Rosario Nasi-
Villar is ORDERED to pay Nila Panilag the
sum of P10,000.00 as temperate damages.
On 28 November 2006, the appellate
court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1
effect and that the decision of the RTC
constitutes a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto law. Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet
exist in January 1993 when the crime was
allegedly committed, petitioner argues
that law cannot be used as the basis of
filing a criminal action for illegal
recruitment. What was applicable in 1993
is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 39, the violation of the
Code is penalized with imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than
eight (8) years or a fine of not less than
P20,000.00 and not more than
P100,000.00 or both. On the other hand,
Sec. 7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal
recruitment with a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than
twelve (12) years and a fine not less than
P200,000.00 nor more than P500,000.00.
Thus, the penalty of imprisonment
provided in the Labor Code was raised or
increased by R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner
concludes that the charge and conviction
of an offense carrying a penalty higher
than that provided by the law at the time
of its commission constitutes a violation
of the prohibition against ex post facto law
and the retroactive application of R.A. No.
8042.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition
for review.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to consider that
R.A. No. 8042 cannot be given retroactive
In its Comment dated 7 September 2007,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that the Court of Appeals'
conviction of petitioner under the Labor
Code is correct. While conceding that
there was an erroneous designation of the

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law violated by petitioner, the OSG
stresses that the designation of the
offense in the Information is not
determinative of the nature and character
of the crime charged against her but the
acts alleged in the Information. The
allegations in the Information clearly
charge petitioner with illegal recruitment
as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art.
13(b) of the Labor Code, and penalized
under Art. 39(c) of the same Code. The
evidence on record substantiates the
charge to a moral certainty. Thus, while
there was an erroneous specification of
the law violated by petitioner in the
Information, the CA was correct in
affirming the RTC's imposition of the
penalty for simple illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code, the OSG concludes.
The petition is denied. We find no
reversible error in the decision arrived at
by the Court of Appeals.
information, in the manner stated, then he
ought to be punished and punished
adequately, whatever may be the name of
the crime which those acts constitute.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation
of ex post facto law
RULING: In the case at bar, the
prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner had
performed the acts constituting the
offense defined in Art. 38, in relation to
Art. 13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the
Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the
Information. To prove illegal recruitment,
two elements must be shown, namely:
(1) the person charged with the crime
must have undertaken recruitment
activities, or any of the activities
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor
Code, as amended; and

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we held that
the real nature of the crime charged is
determined, not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have
been violated–these being conclusions of
law–but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. What controls
is not the designation but the description
of the offense charged. From a legal point
of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no
concern to the accused what the technical
name of the crime of which he stands
charged is. If the accused performed the
acts alleged in the body of the
(2) said person does not have a license or
authority to do so. Art. 13(b) defines
"recruitment and placement" as "any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising, or
advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not;
Provided that any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons,
is considered engaged in recruitment and
placement." The trial court found these
two elements had been proven in the case

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 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
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at bar. Petitioner has not offered any
argument or proof that countervails such
findings.
The basic rule is that a criminal act is
punishable under the law in force at the
time of its commission. Thus, petitioner
can only be charged and found guilty
under the Labor Code which was in force
in 1993 when the acts attributed to her
were committed. Petitioner was charged
in 1998 under an Information that
erroneously designated the offense as
covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in
its body acts which are punishable under
the Labor Code. As it was proven that
petitioner had committed the acts she
was charged with, she was properly
convicted under the Labor Code, and not
under R.A. No. 8042.
There is no violation of the prohibition
against ex post facto law nor a retroactive
application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by
petitioner. An ex post facto law is one
which, among others, aggravates a crime
or makes it greater than it was when
committed or changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when
committed. Penal laws and laws which,
while not penal in nature, nonetheless
have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation
operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot
be given retroactive effect, except when
they are favorable to the accused.
R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code and gave a
new definition of the crime of illegal
recruitment and provided for its higher
penalty. There is no indication in R.A. No.
8042 that said law, including the penalties
provided therein, would take effect
retroactively. A law can never be
considered ex post facto as long as it
operates prospectively since its strictures
would cover only offenses committed
after and not before its enactment.18
Neither did the trial court nor the
appellate court give R.A. No. 8042 a
retroactive application since both courts
passed upon petitioner's case only under
the aegis of the Labor Code. The
proceedings before the trial court and the
appellate court did not violate the
prohibition against ex post facto law nor
involved a retroactive application of R.A.
No. 8042 in any way.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated 27 June 2005
and Resolution dated 28 November 2006
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SALVADOR VS MAPA
FACTS:
Commenting on the petition, respondents
argued that the petition suffers from a
procedural infirmity which warrants its
dismissal. they claimed that the PCGG

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 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
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availed of the wrong remedy in elevating
the case to the SC.
Though captioned as a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, we will treat this petition as
one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of
its contents reveals that petitioner
imputed grave abuse of discretion to the
Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint.
The averments in the complaint, not
the nomenclature given by the parties,
determine the nature of the action. In
previous ruling, we have treated
differently labeled actions as special civil
actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for
reasons such as justice, equity, and fair
play.
The issue of prescription has long been
settled by this Court in the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto where the Court
explained that the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense. This is
now a well-settled doctrine which the
court has applied in subsequent cases
involving the PCGG and the Ombudsman.
Since the prescriptive period commenced
to run on the date of the discovery of the
offenses, ans since discovery could not
have been made earlier than 8 October
1992, the date when the Committee was
created, the criminal offenses allegedly
committed by the respondents had not
yet prescribed when the complaint was
filed on 14 October 1996.
Even the Ombudsman in its Manifestation
and Motion conceded that the
prescriptive period commenced on the
date the Committee discovered the crime,
and not from the date the loan documents
were registered with the RD.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the
Ombudsman's declaration that
Administrative Order 13 and
Memorandum 61 violate the prohibition
against ex post facto laws for ostensibly
inflicting punishment upon a person for
an act done prior to their issuance and
which was innocent when done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed.
To justify nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable
implication; a law shall not be declared
invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable
doubt. The presumption is in favor of
constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
Even this Court does not decide a
question of constitutional dimension,
unless that question is properly raised
and presented in an appropriate case and
is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota presented.
Further, where petitioner raised the issue
of constitutionality, we had the occasion
to state that the Ombudsman had no
jurisdiction to entertain questions on the
constitutionality of a law. The
Ombudsman therefore, acted in excess of

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 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
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its jurisdiction in declaring protection to which he has become

unconstitutional the subject entitled, such as the protection of a
administrative and memorandum orders. former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
In any event, we hold that Administrative
Order 13 and Memorandum Order 61 are The constitutional doctrine that outlaws
not ex post facto laws. an ex post facto law generally prohibits
the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal
An EX POST FACTO law has been laws are those acts of the legislature
defined as one which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that
1. which makes an action done define crimes, treat of their nature, and
before the passing of the law and provide for their punishment.
which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; The subject administrative and
2. which aggravates a crime or makes memorandum orders do not come within
it greater than it was when the shadow of this definition.
committed; Administrative Order 13 creates the
3. which changes the punishment Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
and inflicts a greater punishment Committee on Behest Loans, and provides
than the law annexed to the crime for its composition and functions.
when it was committed;
4. which alters the legal rules of Memorandum Order 61 merely provides
evidence and receives less or a frame of reference for determining
different testimony than the law behest loans. Not being penal laws,
required at the time of the Administrative Order 13 and
commission of the offense in order Memorandum Order 61 cannot be
to convict the defendant. characterized as ex post facto laws. There
is therefore no basis for the Ombudsman
This Court added two more to the list, to rule that the subject administrative and
namely: memorandum orders are ex post facto.

1. that which assumes to regulate

civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful; or
2. that which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful

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