People vs. Vera., 65 Phil. 56, No.

45685 November 16, 1937

ISSUE:

WON the Probation Act violates, the provision of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any
person of the equal protection of the laws.

RULING:

Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to
be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. In such
a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means
that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied
those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.

Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the
salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result.
Inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section
11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or
allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of
the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but
premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221, permits
of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. The Court see no difference
between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear
to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it
is within the constitutional prohibition.

PASEI vs. Drilon

WON --- is unconstitutional for being in violation of equal protection of law.

The contention that it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. it is because not all of them are similarly circumstanced.*

What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another
person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those
recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a
classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B."21 It would be
an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act.
(Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as
infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its
validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable
treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for
the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be
the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection.

In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the
contrary.

BIraogo case

The President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).. The Philippine TRuth Commsion is a special body created. to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration. Petitioners questioned the said creation of PTC for it usurps the constitutional authority
of the legislature to create a public office.

WON _ unconstitutional

RULING:

YES. Executive Order No. 1 is violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of
the questioned executive order.

Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.---- "Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification."82

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of
a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and
other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the
restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The reports of widespread
corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports
of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As
Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 88

Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain (GRP), 568 SCRA 402, G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the
MILF decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal
peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.)
security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations
were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its
body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands
of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the
freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The
sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the
territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial dom ains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space
above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance,
on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and
BJE was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With the formulation of the
MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates
constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order
No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws.
Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUE:

WON the contents of the MOA-AD is unconstitutional.

RULING:

The President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to
promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and
suppress rebellion and lawless violence. President—in the course of conducting peace negotiations—
may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but
she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if
the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.  
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office,178 only to preserve
and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional
act.

One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation
Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been
based on the budget prepared by the President, which—for all intents and purposes—is a proposal for
new legislation coming from the President.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even
be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations
either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s

authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the “consensus
points” found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.