The Journal of Value Inquiry (2020) 54:41–57

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-019-09683-8

Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through

Personhood: The Individual or Community?

Motsamai Molefe1 

Published online: 5 March 2019

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

1 Introduction

One of the outstanding debates in African philosophy involves accounting for the
relationship between the individual and community. The debate precisely resides on
the questions whether (1) the community takes priority over the individual or (2) the
individual takes priority over the community. The debate is ambiguous regarding
whether these two competing theses are metaphysical and/or moral. As a metaphysi-
cal thesis, it concerns the question of personal identity whether it is best construed
in terms of individual properties like a soul or memory or by emphasizing social
relationships.1 As a moral thesis, it involves the question of the ultimate location
or even foundations of moral value – (1) does morality fundamentally reside in the
individual or (2) does is it ultimately reside in some social/relational properties. It is
the moral question that will be the focus of this article.
This moral debate in African philosophy is best reflected in the discourse on the
nature of Afro-communitarianism, where the aim of scholars is to plausibly charac-
terize it. On the one hand, there are scholars of African moral thought that defend
the view that the entire project of morality is founded on some shared communal
goods/social relationships, and this (in my estimation) is the dominant understand-
ing of African ethical thinking.2 On other hand, we have the influential Kwame

1
  See Ifeanyi Menkiti, “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought”, Richard Wright, ed.,
African Philosophy: An Introduction. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), 170–181; Kwame
Gyekye, “Person and Community in African Thought”, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, eds., Person
and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1. (Washington DC: Council for Research in Values
and Philosophy, 1992), 101–122; Motsamai Molefe, “Individualism in African Moral Cultures”, Cultura
14, No. 2, (2017a).
2
 See John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, (New York: Doubleday, 1969); Muxe Nkondo,
“Ubuntu as a Public Policy in South Africa: A Conceptual Framework”, International Journal of African
Renaissance Studies 2, (2007); Thaddeus Metz, “Towards an African Moral Theory”, Journal of Politi-
cal Theory 15, No. 3, (2007).

* Motsamai Molefe
motsamai.molefe@wits.ac.za
1
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, Robert Sobukwe Building, Room 104,
Johannesburg, South Africa

13
Vol.:(0123456789)
 42 M. Molefe

Gyekye’s defense of moderate communitarianism that ultimately locates it in both

the individual (autonomy) and the community/social relationships.3 With regards to
the moral question pertaining to the ultimate location of moral value in African phi-
losophy, a promising or even a plausible solution is still out for grabs.
In this article, I defend the under-explored and not so common view among
scholars of African moral thought that a proper understanding of African ethical
thought will reveal that it is best construed in terms of the individual taking priority
over the community – a view I describe in terms of moral individualism.4 Prop-
erly construed, the focus of African ethical thought is the individual through and
through, and the community, at best, serves as the best and only means to secure the
individual good. The major contribution of this article is that it properly captures the
relationship between the individual and community, by arguing that the individual
and her good are foundational and the community is secondary insofar as it serves as
a useful framework to secure the individual good.
It is crucial for the reader to notice that this project is not an anthropological
one, which seeks to find answers to this moral question by doing an empirical study
among cultures below the Sahara. Rather it is a (moral) philosophical one that aims
to proffer what it considers to be the best moral reasons to believe that African cul-
tures, in some fundamental sense, are individualistic.
To secure this ambitious thesis that defends the individual as taking priority over
the community in African moral thought, I rely entirely on the salient normative
notion of personhood in African philosophy. This move is premised on the ration-
ale that if we want to have as philosophically robust and plausible understanding of
African moral thinking, it is crucial that we rely on indigenous moral resources that
most African scholars take to be foundational and characteristic of it.5 It is uncon-
troversial to submit that the idea of personhood embodies one salient way to under-
stand African moral thought.
For example, in his analysis of the literature on the idea of personhood in African
philosophy, specifically with regards to Masolo and Wiredu, Kevin Behrens notes
the following about it:
… there is an African conception of personhood that is not only distinct from
Western notions, but is also foundational and characteristic of African philo-
sophical thought.6

3
  See Kwame Gyekye, “Tradition and Modernity”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
4
  See Molefe, op, cit.
5
  See Menkiti, op. cit.; Kwasi Wiredu, “Moral Foundations of an African Culture”, Kwasi Wiredu and
Kwame Gyekye, eds., Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1, (Washington DC:
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992); Dismas Masolo, Self and Community in a
Changing World, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004).
6
  Kevin Behrens, “Two Normative Conceptions of ‘Personhood”, Quest 25, No. 1–2, (2013), p. 105.

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 43

Polycarp Ikuenobe one of the leading scholars of African philosophy, notes that
One feature of communalism, which is the core of African cultural traditions,
is its normative … conception of personhood.7
From the above, we are informed that the idea of personhood is foundational and
characteristic of African ethical thought. Ikuenobe informed us that personhood is
the core element of Afro-communitarian cultures.8 In another place, Ikuenobe avers
this notion is ‘germane’ in African philosophical discourses.9 Kwasi Wiredu, argua-
bly one of the most influential African philosophers, also informs us that considera-
tions pertaining to the normative idea of personhood are ‘more dominant’ in African
philosophy than ones concerning the ontological notion of personhood.10 Thaddeus
Metz, in his attempt to defend what he considers to be the most plausible theory of
right action in African ethics, observes that the idea of personhood ‘is probably the
dominant interpretation of African ethics’ in the literature.11
If the idea of personhood is as definitive and essential to African ethical thought
as these scholars would have us believe then it is not unreasonable to invoke it to find
answers regarding the question of where ultimately does moral value reside, in the
individual or community. The concept of personhood is surely not the only way to
find answers to the question I am pursuing here, but it is arguably one of the most
useful ways to do so given the overwhelming consensus among scholars regarding its
centrality in African philosophy. As such, I will find answers to my question regard-
ing where ultimate and fundamental moral value resides in African moral thought
by analyzing the moral idea of personhood. I do so because this idea of personhood
might offer one useful way to intervene on the debate regarding which holds priority
between the individual and the community. To invoke the idea of personhood in this
fashion should not be wrongly read to suggest that it is the only way to intervene in
this debate or that the idea of personhood, in and of itself, is plausible.
I engage in the philosophical analysis of personhood to repudiate the dominant
view that African ethics is best construed in terms of it prioritizing the community
over the individual. For example, consider Muxe Nkondo defends the view that
takes ‘the supreme value of society, the primary importance of social or commu-
nal interests, obligations and duties over and above the rights of the individual’.12
Or, Desmond Tutu’s claim that ‘Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods.

7
 Polycarp Ikuenobe, “The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart”, Philosophia
Africana 9, No. 3, (2006), p. 128.
8
  See also Gyekye, op, cit., p. 64; Kwasi Wiredu, “Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Pre-
liminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism”, South African Journal Philosophy 25,
No. 3, (2008), p. 335.
9
 Polycarp Ikuenobe, “The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart”, Philosophia
Africana 9, No. 2, (2006), p. 116.
10
 Wiredu, op. cit (1992), p. 199; Wiredu, “Introduction: African Philosophy in Our Time”, Kwasi
Wiredu, ed., A Companion to African Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 18; Wiredu,
“An Oral Philosophy of Personhood: Comments on Philosophy and Orality”, Research in African Litera-
tures 40, No. 2, (2009), 13.
11
  Metz, op. cit. (2007), p. 331.
12
  Nkondo, op. cit., p. 90.

13
 44 M. Molefe

Social harmony is for us the summum bonum - the greatest good’.13 Or, Ifeanyi Men-
kiti’s assertion that ‘ … In the African understanding, priority is given to the duties
which individuals owe to the collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be,
are seen as secondary to their exercise of their duties’.14
I seek to challenge the understanding of African ethics that construes it in the
light of it fundamentally locating morality (or, the good) in the primacy of social
or communal relationships, or one that grounds morality on social harmony as the
greatest good, or one considers the collective good to take priority over the individ-
ual good. At the heart of my argument is that the individual good is primary and the
community should be properly construed as at best offering socio-cultural-and-polit-
ical means for achieving the individual good.15 This line of reasoning that places the
basic good in the individual and conceives of the community as at the best offer-
ing the means for achieving the individual good, is suggested by Allen Wood in his
rejection of Metz’s defense of moral relationalism (more on this latter).
To pursue my argument for moral individualism as the feature that best character-
izes African moral thought, I structure this article as follows. I begin by defining the
moral concepts that are central to this project, specifically those of individualism
and relationalism. I proceed to distinguish several concepts of personhood in Afri-
can philosophy. I clarify that the focus will be on the agent-centred notion of person-
hood. Next, I proceed to demonstrate that the agent-centred notion of personhood
entails a self-realization approach to ethics, which has got interesting philosophical
implications for our understanding of morality. (1) It secures the individualism that
characterizes African thought – the goal of morality is the perfection of the individ-
ual; (2) It secures the community or social relationships as the only means to achieve
the individual good and (3) it also secures partiality (meta-ethically speaking) as a
feature that characterize thinking about African ethics in terms of this notion (I will
not pursue this implication in this analysis).

2 Defining Individualism and Relationalism

In this article, I wish to secure the conclusion that African ethics is best captured
in terms of individualism as opposed to relationalism/communitarianism. Before I
launch into this argument, it is crucial that I specify how I will be using these terms.
In the literature on bio-ethics, environmental ethics and even political philosophy,
scholars tend to distinguish among moral theories in terms of whether they are
individualistic, relational or holistic.16 Moral ‘individualism’ refers to those theo-
ries that account for morality by appeal to internal properties of the individual.17

13
  Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 35.
14
  Menkiti, op. cit. (1984), p. 181.
15
  See Gyekye, op. cit. (1992).
16
  See Kevin Behrens, African Philosophy, Thought and Practice and Their Contribution to Environ-
mental Ethics, (Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg, 2011).
17
  See Todd May, “Moral Individualism, Moral Relationalism, and Obligationsto Non-human Animals”,
Journal of Applied Ethics 31, No. 1, (2014).

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 45

In this sense, theories like ethical egoism, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, capabili-
ties approaches, are individualistic insofar as they base morality in some facet inter-
nal to the individual. On the part of utilitarianism, the relevant moral property will
be ‘welfare’ whether it is interpreted in terms of pleasure/preferences.18 The same
applies to capability approaches that construes morality to be a function of basic
capabilities, which refers to the ontological equipement of human nature, for exam-
ple, supposing the focus is on human beings, to account for a decent human life.19
Relational theories, on the other hand, tend to locate morality on certain kinds
of relationships.20 On the part of Metz, in his defense of ubuntu[African ethics],
he locates morality on the relationship of community/harmony or some version of
‘friendship’.21 With regards to the distinction between individualism and relational-
ism in (African) ethics, the following comments by Metz are instructive:
A different understanding of the morality of Ubuntu includes the idea that
moral value fundamentally lies not in the individual, but rather in a relation-
ship between individuals.22
In the same page, he continues to emphasize this distinction, thus –
Similarly, one might morally value something about people as they are in
themselves or as being part of certain relationships.23
This is the distinction between moral theories that are individualistic and those that
are relational. Individualistic theories locate ultimate moral value in some prop-
erty internal to the individual and relational ones locate it in certain interpersonal
relationships between individuals. Several points are worth noting regarding this
distinction.
First, the idea of individualism can be ambiguous in African philosophy. Often
when African scholars criticize Western moral-political philosophies to be individu-
alistic, they do not use the term in the way employed in this article. They use it as
a pejorative term to decry or even criticize cultures that promote selfishness/self-
centredness or competitiveness among agents.24 To say a theory is individualistic,
in the sense relevant in this analysis, it is not to make a claim about human conduct;
rather, it is to specify the location of ultimate moral value to be in the individual. In
this article, I use the idea of individualism to properly understand the nature of Afri-
can moral thought.

18
  See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990).
19
  Martha Nussbaum, “Nature, Functioning and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy (Supplementary Volume) 6, (1988).
20
  See Thaddeus Metz, “An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism
and Holism”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum 14, No. 3, (2012).
21
  Thaddeus Metz, “Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New
Philosophy of Human Rights”, Journal of Human Rights 9, No. 1, (2010), pp. 83 – 84.
22
  Metz, op. cit. (2007). p. 331.
23
 Ibid.
24
  See, Metz, op. cit. (2007); Wiredu, op. cit. (2008).

13
 46 M. Molefe

In the sense the idea of individualism used here, it is interesting to note that most
of the African theories actually count as individualistic.25
Consider, for example, Wiredu’s sympathetic impartiality, which postulates well-
being as the final good.26 Well-being is typically understood in terms of the quality
of life of the individual, which is patently individualistic27 (Sumner 1992). Gyekye,
in one instance, defends a moral theory that posits well-being as the ‘master-value’,
which view also espouses individualism.28 The same conclusion can be noticed
regarding religious interpretations of African ethical thought, which ground moral-
ity on the value of life or vitality.29 These moral properties inhere in the individual,
thus counting as individualistic.30 Below, I proceed to consider the idea of person-
hood central to my argument for moral individualism in African philosophy.

3 Notions of Personhood in African Philosophy

The idea of ‘personhood’ in African philosophy is used in very broad terms to

encapsulate various facets of human existence and functioning. In my analysis of
the literature regarding these facets of human existence and functioning, I distin-
guish four such facets, which I think embody four distinct concepts of personhood.31
Below, I unfold these four distinct facets or understandings of personhood in Afri-
can philosophy. Firstly, talk of ‘personhood’ could be concerned with ontological
considerations in terms of what properties, be they physical or spiritual, constitute
human nature.32 Is a human being a purely physical being? Or, is a human being
constituted by both physical and spiritual properties? This talk of personhood can be
understood in terms of philosophical anthropology insofar as it critically reflects on
the various accounts of human nature.33
Secondly, ‘personhood’ could be a philosophical inquiry into humanization or
socialization of human beings i.e., it refers to accounts that ascertain what descrip-
tive factors ultimately account for the formation of personal identity. The debate in
African philosophy is whether personal identity is a function entirely of communal

25
  Metz, op. cit. (2007); Molefe, op. cit. (2017a).
26
  Wiredu, op. cit. (1992).
27
  See Leonard Sumner, “Two Theories of the Good”, Social Philosophy & Policy 9, No. 1, (1992).
28
  Kwame Gyekye, Beyond Cultures: Perceiving a Common Humanity, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies,
(Accra: The Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2004), p. 41.
29
  See Laurenti Magesa, African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life, (New York: Orbis
Books, 1997); Benezet Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western
Morality, (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001); Augustine Shutte, Ubuntu: An Ethic
for a New South Africa, (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 2001).
30
  See Molefe, op. cit. (2017a).
31
  See Motsamai Molefe, “Revisiting the Debate Between Gyekye-Menkiti: Who is a Radical Commu-
nitarian?”, Theoria 63, No. 4, (2016a); Motsamai Molefe, “Personhood and Rights in an African Tradi-
tion”, Politikon 45, No. 1, (2008).
32
  See Ikuenobe, op. cit. (2006). Wiredu, op. cit, (2008).
33
  See Dedier Kaphagawani, “African Conceptions of a Person: A Critical Survey”, Kwasi Wiredu, ed.,
Companion to African Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Molefe, op. cit. (2016).

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 47

factors or is it a balance between communal factors and individual properties.34 This

kind of analysis is also metaphysical insofar as it simply identifies descriptive fea-
tures, be they cultural or some property internal to an individual, to account for per-
sonal identity.
Another facet of ‘personhood’ concerns itself with moral considerations pertain-
ing to identifying relevant ontological properties that pick out some entity, usually
human beings, as morally special and as such deserving our moral respect. Typi-
cally, in Western bioethical and political philosophy discourses, this kind of analysis
of human nature, to pick out the descriptive property that mark human beings as
deserving our moral regard, is usually discussed in terms of moral status and/or dig-
nity.35 In the Western tradition, for example, beings that have the capacity for pleas-
ure or rationality or basic capabilities (depending on a moral theory) have moral
status/dignity.36 In other words, by merely possessing the relevant property-not its
use-determines that being as deserving some moral respect.37 More recently, schol-
ars of African moral thought have started to philosophically reflect on theories of
moral status/dignity drawing from African moral cultures.38
The last facet of ‘personhood’, one that is crucial in this analysis, concerns itself
with identifying moral agents that have developed morally virtuous characters. On
this instance, when we refer to some human being as a person, we mean to bring cer-
tain moral facts to the fore regarding the fact that so and so deserves ‘high (moral)
praise’.39 That is, her moral deportment is outstanding in terms of the practice and
manifestation of moral virtue.40 This talk of personhood reports on the quality of the
character of the moral agent, which depends on her performance in relation to the
moral norms deemed suitable for a befitting human life.41 Failure to live up to these
norms leads to the denial of personhood.
The first two concepts of personhood are metaphysical, human nature and per-
sonal identity; and the last two are moral (moral status) and (moral excellence). The
focus of this article will be on the moral notion of personhood. It therefore becomes
urgent that we distinguish these two moral notions of personhood. Kevin Behrens
rightly distinguishes the two moral notions in terms of the first being patient-centred
notion of personhood insofar as it is concerned with specifying the relevant ontolog-
ical properties of the individual (like rationality, memory and so on) that mark her

34
  (John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, (New York: Doubleday, 1969), p. 169; Menkiti, op.
cit. (1984), p. 171; Gyekye, op. cit. (1997), p. 41.
35
  See Manuel Toscano, “Human Dignity as High Moral Status”, The Ethics Forum 6, No. 1, (2001).
36
  See Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal”, Tom Regan & Peter Singer, eds., In Animal Rights and
Human Obligations, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989); Nussbaum, op. cit, (1988).
37
  See, David DeGrazia,“Moral Status as a Matter of Degree”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, No.
2, (2008).
38
  Behrens, op. cit. (2011); Metz, op. cit. (2012); Motsamai Molefe, “A Critique of Thad Metz’s African
Theory of Moral Status”, South African Journal of Philosophy, 36. No. 4, (2017b); Munamato Chem-
huru, The Import of African Ontology for Environmental Ethics, (Johannesburg: University of Johan-
nesburg, 2017).
39
  Wiredu, op. cit. (2009), p. 15.
40
  Gyekye, op. cit, (1992), p. 113; Tutu, op. cit., p. 35; Metz, op. cit., (2010), p. 83.
41
  Gail Presbey, “Maasai concepts of personhood: The roles of Recognition, Community, and Individu-
ality”, International Studies in Philosophy 34, No. 1, (2002).

13
 48 M. Molefe

out as a moral patient.42 On this understanding, any entity with the relevant property
counts as a moral patient – this is the same thing as what Stephen Darwall refers to
as recognition respect.43 ‘Recognition respect’ refers to the kind of respect accorded
to some being merely for being the kind of a thing it is. One, merely on the basis
of the fact of being a president, deserves some kind of respect. The other norma-
tive notion of personhood is the agent-centred one insofar as it is concerned with
evaluating the quality of the conduct of the agent, which can ultimately attract moral
praise or blame. Here, respect depends on moral performance. To be called a person
just is to be praised for having achieved moral excellence.
It is the agent-centred notion of personhood that will be the focus of this article.
It is the agent-centred concept that African scholars usually have in mind when they
talk of personhood. In the next section, I philosophically elucidate on this notion of
personhood to demonstrate that it embodies moral individualism.

4 Agent‑Centred Personhood, Self‑Realization and Individualism

In this section, I offer a philosophical disquisition of the normative idea of person-

hood in African philosophy. Above, I provided prima facie evidence that points to
the fact that (most scholars take) the idea of personhood to be one of the outstanding
concepts that capture the essence of African moral cultures.44 Or, at any rate, I take
this idea to be so foundational and definitive of African ethical thought.
I begin by pointing out that scholars of African thought tend to interpret the idea
of personhood to embody a particular ethical framework. The approach to ethics
entailed by personhood is understood in terms of moral ‘perfectionism’ and/or ‘self-
realization’ approach to ethics.45 ‘Moral perfectionism’ is defined as an approach
to morality that imposes duties on agents to perfect their own human nature, or to
live up to the ideals of their human nature.46 Metz understands the self-realization
approach (qua personhood) to amount to the view that requires agents realize (or,
develop) the distinctive features of their nature.47 The ethical approach embodied

42
  Behrens, op. cit. (2013).
43
  Stephen, “Two Kinds of Respect”, Ethics, 88, No. 3, (1977): 36.
44
 (Dzobo, “Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors and God”, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi
Wiredu, eds., Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1, (Washington DC: Council for
Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992); Wiredu op. cit., (1992; 2004; 2009); Gyekye, op. cit. (1992).
Ikuenobe, op. cit., (2006);Jason Van Niekerk, Ubuntu and Moral Theory, (Johannesburg: University Wit-
watersrand, 2013); David Lutz, “African Ubuntu Philosophy and Global Management”, Journal of Busi-
ness Ethics 84, No, 1, (2009); Molefe, op. cit., (2016; 2018).
45
  Metz, op. cit. (2007), p. 331; Behrens, op. cit. (2013), p. 127.
46
  See Stephen Wall, “Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy”, Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/perfection-
ism-moral/. (Accessed 22 March 2017).
47
 Ibid.

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 49

by personhood is for agents to realize or perfect the distinctive facets of their human
nature.
The self-realization interpretation of the idea of personhood emerges in the litera-
ture, as follows. Wiredu informs us that Menkiti was the first one to philosophically
reflect on the idea of personhood.48 Thus, I begin by drawing from Menkiti –
As far as African societies are concerned, personhood is something at which
individuals could fail, at which they could be competent or ineffective, bet-
ter or worse. Hence, the African emphasized the rituals of incorporation and
the overarching necessity of learning the social rules by which the community
lives, so that what was initially biologically given can come to attain social
self-hood, i.e., become a person with all the inbuilt excellencies implied by the
term.49
For another, Augustine Shutte –
The moral life is seen as a process of personal growth … Our deepest moral
obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and
more deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal ful-
fillment, selfishness is excluded.50
Metz also avers
Personhood … in characteristic sub-Saharan worldviews [is] a value-laden
concept. That is, an individual can be more or less of a person, self, or human
being, where the more one is, the better. The ultimate goal of a person, self, or
human in the biological sense should be to become a full person, a real self, or
a genuine human being, i.e., to exhibit virtue in a way that not everyone ends
up doing.51
From the above, it emerges that the idea of personhood presupposes an ethical moral
framework.52 The ethical framework imagined by this moral term draws a distinc-
tion between being merely human and being a person. Personhood is the moral goal
of the moral agent. The agent is required to convert what was biologically given to
be an embodiment of in-built excellences. For the agent to acquire in-built excel-
lences, she must enter into the moral journey of moral development or growth. This
talk of ‘in-built excellences’ imagines the internalization of moral norms that exem-
plifies itself by the ‘moral practice’ of virtue.53 The aim of the moral journey just is
for the individual to achieve personhood or moral excellence.

48
  Wiredu, op. cit. (2004), p. 17.
49
  Menkiti, op. cit. (1984), p. 172.
50
  Shutte, op. cit., p. 30.
51
  Metz, op. cit. (2010), p. 83.
52
  See Wiredu, op. cit. (2009); Kwame Gyekye, “African Ethics”, Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Ency-
clopaedia of Philosophy, Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/african-ethics
(Accessed 16 January 2017).
53
  Gyekye, op. cit. (1992), p. 109; Ikuenobe, op. cit. (2016), p. 118.

13
 50 M. Molefe

In light of the above, we note that the idea of personhood imagines a moral the-
ory that requires moral agents to make their own humanity the focus of morality.
The specific moral focus requires that they develop certain (moral) excellences of
their human nature. Behrens comments thus on the ethical framework imagined by
personhood –
Menkiti’s association of the term ‘excellencies’ with personhood also implies
that the becoming a person is essentially related to developing virtue. Thus,
the African conception of personhood could be thought to propose a theory of
ethics that brings to mind what Western philosophy calls ‘perfectionism’: Per-
sons should seek to develop a good or virtuous nature in order to become true
or fully moral persons.54
Menkiti, in his analysis of personhood, associates this term with the idea of ‘excel-
lences’.55 He makes such a connection between these two terms, if my count is cor-
rect, four times.56 In one instance, he comments thus on this close association “…the
ingathering of the excellencies considered to be definitive of full personhood”. One
possible reading of this assertion by Menkiti is that moral excellence is constitutive
of personhood. Behrens construes this close association between excellences and
personhood to amount to a perfectionist moral theory, where the agent is required to
develop a virtuous nature.
From the above, we can freely note several crucial considerations. Firstly, the eth-
ical system imagined in the discourse of personhood makes some facets of human
nature the focus of morality. It makes the development and perfection of these fac-
ets of human nature the goal of morality. The goal of morality, on the perfection-
ist model, is for the agent to develop a virtuous human nature, which will tend to
consistently exhibit moral virtue or practice virtue. This last reflection secures the
view that this approach to ethics is character-centred. Thus, when Menkiti says that
personhood is something at which the individual could succeed or fail at, he spe-
cifically refers to the idea character as the measure of success and failure. The indi-
vidual could either succeed or fail to be develop a virtuous character. It is this self-
concerned-and-directed goal of morality (of character-development) posited by the
idea of personhood that renders it an individualistic morality.
Remember, to say the idea of personhood is individualistic is not to criticize it;
rather it is to properly account for where it ultimately locates moral value. Just like it
is wont in the Western literature to be told that Kantian ethics is individualistic, the
same observation is true regarding the ethical concept of personhood. Whereas Kant
locates morality on the individual property of rationality/autonomy, the idea of per-
sonhood locates it in the human capacity to develop moral virtue.57 This clarifica-
tion between individualism and relationalism is made lucid by Metz in this fashion:

54
  Behrens, op. cit. (2013), p. 111.
55
  See Menkiti, op. cit. (1984).
56
  Menkiti, op. cit., (1984), pp. 172 & 173.
57
  Gyekye, op. cit. (1992), p. 102.

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 51

Permissible acts … are a function of participating in certain kinds of desirable

relationships … The ultimate explanation of why a particular action is wrong,
or why one has moral reason to avoid performing a certain act, involves a fail-
ure to relate. Such a perspective differs from utilitarianism, in which moral
value is a function of the individual’s capacity for pleasure and pain, and from
Kantianism, in which it is a matter of the individual’s capacity for autonomy.58
As such, the idea of personhood is individualistic insofar as it makes the capacity to
develop moral virtue the basis for morality like utilitarianism makes the capacity for
pleasure and Kant the capacity for autonomy. In Kant’s moral theory, the essence of
morality is for the individual to self-govern; on personhood, it is for her capacity to
develop a virtuous character. In light of this analysis, it is beyond controversy that
the idea of personhood is individualistic.
Another way to illuminate on the individualism that characterizes the self-reali-
zation approach characteristic of personhood is in terms of the reasons it offers the
agent for acting. The tendency in the literature in moral philosophy is to draw a
distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for acting.59 Take act-
utilitarianism, for example, which accounts for morality in terms of maximizing cer-
tain desirable outcomes as the goal of morality. The reasons that utilitarianism offers
for acting are agent-neutral insofar as they are merely committed to producing cer-
tain maximal outcomes relative to pleasure or preference satisfaction.60 It is the best
configuration of consequences that informs the agent’s actions without having a duty
to prioritize anyone’s good in particular, including herself or her special relation-
ships. The reasons here are agent-neutral insofar as they do not have anyone as their
specific source, focus or target. The agent and target, in some sense, remain indiffer-
ent in the execution of morality; the most important moral consideration is the right
relationship with the desired maximal outcomes.
On the other hand, we have moral theories that make the agent herself and her
special relationships, like friends and family, to be the source that explains her moral
actions. Suppose I discover that two people are drowning in the river. I also realize
that I can only save one of the two individuals. According to utilitarianism, I should
save the one whose life will most likely maximize certain desirable outcomes for the
greater good.61 On the agent-relative reasons, if one of them happens to be related
to me, somehow, be she my neighbor, friend or family member, I will save the one
with whom I enjoy this relationship. I will do so merely because she is my friend.
On the agent-neutral account the explanation is centred on the general good. On the
agent-relative account the explanation is centred, in part, on my good.

58
 Thaddeus Metz, “The western ethic of care or an Afro-communitarian ethic? Specifying the right
relational morality”, Journal of Global Ethics 9, No. 4 (2013), p. 84.
59
  David MacNaughton & Piers Rawling, “Deontology”, David Copp, ed., Oxford Handbook of Ethical
Theory, (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2006), p. 426.
60
  See Jorg Loschke, “Partiality, Agent-Relative Reasons, and the Individuals View”, Social Theory and
Practice 40, No. 4, (2014), p. 677.
61
  William Godwin, Enquiry concerning political justice and its influence on general virtue and happi-
ness, (New York: Alfred A Knolf, 1973).

13
 52 M. Molefe

It is interesting to notice that the idea of personhood is characterized by agent-rel-

ative reasons. The idea of personhood requires the agent to perfect herself because,
in part, it is good for her as an agent. Commenting on the agent-relative reasons of
the idea of personhood, Metz notes:
If I ask why I should help others, for example, this theory says that the basic
justificatory reason to do so … is that it will help me by making me more of …
a better person.62
Jason Van Niekerk also recognizes this theory as being grounded on agent-relative
considerations, thus:
This is an autocentric account of moral normativity, casting moral values as
arising from and (in some sense at least) necessarily favoring the agent.63
These thinkers strongly point to the fact that moral actions on this moral theory are
explained in terms of reasons that are ultimately connected to the agent necessarily
favoring herself. According to this moral theory, an agent cannot be said to be prop-
erly engaged in morality if the actions she performs, even for others, have no bearing
on her character being perfected. It is also for this reason that some commentators of
African ethics have noted that morality below the Sahara is ‘anti-universalistic’ and
it is based on ‘indexical reasons’.64
To say that morality is anti-universalistic is, in some sense, to contrast it to Kant’s
understanding of morality as strictly universal. Right actions have a feature, accord-
ing to Kant, of being universalisable; otherwise that act is not moral. Properties that
are less than universal cannot properly ground morality. Not so, according to domi-
nant understandings of African ethics. Where morality is concerned, I have a duty
to perfect myself, in some sense that I do not have towards another. Further, even
in contexts where I exercise my other-regarding duties, the reasons that inform my
actions are indexical insofar as they are characterized by favoring my own over those
I can call outsiders/strangers.65 Indexical reasons are one and the same thing as talk
of agent-relative reasons.
Note, for example, Appiah makes this example to illuminate on the reasons that
inform African moral thought – ‘I might give shelter to someone because she is my
kinswoman’. The mere fact that she is related to me, in some way, a non-universal
property, informs my moral actions. So, what is coming out quite poignantly is that
African moral thinking is informed by the idea of personhood posits the goal for
morality as individual-based and the reasons for acting are also riveted on the indi-
vidual, her history and particular relationships in the world – this signals that the
idea of personhood is partial, as opposed to being impartial.66

62
  Metz, op. cit. (2007), p. 332.
63
  Jason Van Niekerk, “In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu”, South African Journal of Phi-
losophy 26, No. 2, p. 372.
64
  Anthony Appiah, “Ethical Systems, African”, Edward Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, (London: Routledge, 1999).
65
 Ibid.
66
 See Motsamai Molefe, “African Ethics and Partiality”, Phronimon 17, No. 2, (2016b); Motsamai
Molefe, “Personhood and Partialism in African Philosophy”, African Studies (forthcoming).

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 53

Above, we secured the conclusion that the idea of personhood imagines a char-
acter-based morality, where the goal of the agent is to perfect her own human nature
to be characterized by moral virtue. We also noted that personhood is characterized
by agent-relative reasons for acting. I imagine, however, that some might object to
the way I presented the idea of personhood in this analysis. The complaint could be
that I presented African moral thought qua personhood in a very Western mode of
thought, to the point that I have not factored in any role occupied by the community
in my analysis of personhood. The objector might proceed to remind me of the fol-
lowing considerations. He might point out that Menkiti whom I make reference to
as the first one to bring the idea of personhood to our attention, understood it to
function within a communitarian framework. He might point my attention to this
quotation by Menkiti -
… the processual nature of being in African thought–the fact that persons
become persons only after a process of incorporation. Without incorporation
into this or that community, individuals are considered to be mere danglers to
whom the description ‘person’ does not fully apply.67
The objector might further remind me that African scholars recognize the impor-
tance of social relationships by noticing that they are not ‘only its outstanding fea-
tures, but its defining characteristics’.68 He might also point that ‘Although African
cultures display awesome diversity, they also show remarkable similarities. Com-
munity is the cornerstone in African thought and life’.69 So, the thrust of the objec-
tion here is that a talk of personhood devoid of the mention and even prioritizing
the community is at best misleading and a gross misrepresentation of the idea of
personhood.
I respond by noting that thus far, I was doing the analysis of the ethical ideals
entailed by the concept of personhood. I argued that this ethical term is best under-
stood as individualistic insofar as it ultimately locates the moral good in some indi-
vidual property, specifically, the agent’s character. This particular analysis of the
idea of personhood was focusing on the moral end posited by the idea of person-
hood. The objector now presses me to consider another facet of the idea of person-
hood, which scholars in the literature refer to as the means necessary for achieving
the individual goal of moral perfection.70 Metz, for example, insists that we should
keep the questions of ends and those of means separate to avoid creating confusions
in our moral analysis of the idea of personhood (or African ethics).71
Above, my focus was on the question of moral ends, that is, the final good pos-
ited by the moral system riveted on the idea of personhood. Below, to respond to
the objection and to illuminate on how the idea of personhood can be said to be

67
  Menkiti, op. cit., (1984), p. 172.
68
  Gyekye, op. cit. (1992), p. 102.
69
  Lovemore Mbigi, The Spirit of African Leadership, (Randburg: Knowers, 2005), p. 75.
70
  See Mpho Tshivhase, “Personhood: Social approval or a unique identity?”, Quest 25, No 1–2, (2013).
71
  Thaddues Metz, “Two Conceptions of African Ethics in the Work of D A. Masolo”, Quest 25, No.
1–2, (2013), 143–145.

13
 54 M. Molefe

communitarian, I focus into the question of moral means necessary for pursuing or
achieving personhood. It is one thing to set the goal of ethics as achieving personal
(moral) perfection; and, it is quite another to delineate the means through which one
may achieve such a goal. I argue that the best way to understand the role of the com-
munity in African ethical thinking qua personhood is in terms of it being instrumen-
tally good as opposed to it being intrinsically valuable.
To say some thing is intrinsically good, it is to trace the source or location of
its goodness in itself. It is to recognize that it is good in and of itself.72 And, to say
something is instrumentally good, it is to claim that its goodness depends on factors
outside of it. The hammer, for example, insofar as it does well in fixing tables and
doors can be said to be instrumentally good. I cannot imagine the world in which a
hammer can be thought to be a final good.
I propose that a plausible way to understand the role of the community or social
relationships, in terms of African ethical thought, is in instrumental terms, whilst the
intrinsic good is a function of individuals achieving moral excellence.73 This line of
reasoning seems to be inherent in Menkiti’s analysis. For example, Menkiti regard-
ing the role of social relationships, notes that in the long process of pursuing person-
hood, the ‘the community plays a vital role as catalyst and as prescriber of norms’.74
It is one thing to prescribe norms and it is quite another for individuals to internalize
and exemplify them in their moral praxis. The prescription of norms is just one way
the community assists individuals in their moral journey. The same logic is entailed
by the chemical analogy of a catalyst to illustrate the function of social relationships.
A catalyst accelerates and contributes to the chemical process, but it is not the focus
or goal of the process. It is separate from the output being pursued.
In the discourse of personhood, the individual requires moral guides and to assist
in this regard the community plays the role of prescribing norms for moral excel-
lence. The individual may need encouragement and the community will have moral
proverbs, an archive of past and contemporary moral exemplars and the community
may provide social and political incentive for those whose deportment tends towards
personhood. Ultimately, it is the task of the individual to perfect herself. The instru-
mental role of social relationships is also evidenced thus by Ikuenobe –
The African idea of communalism implies that the community with, its values,
plays a central role in helping one to cultivate and then achieve the status of a
morally beautiful person.75
The role the community or social structures are imagined to play, at best, is an
instrumental one. It provides individuals with the content and context to pursue, cul-
tivate and possibly attain personhood. The importance of relationships is captured
thus by Mothlabi and Munyaka –

72
  See Christine Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness’, The Philosophical Review 2, No. 2, (1983).
73
 Ibid.
74
  Menkiti, op. cit. (1984), p. 172.
75
  Ikuenobe, op. cit. (2016), p. 146.

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 55

(1) An African individual is a communal being, inseparable and incomplete without

others.76
(2) A person is incomplete without others. He or she needs others to be fully human.
He or she needs community to be fully human.77
(3) It is in the human community that an individual is able to realize himself or
herself as a person.78

These quotations accentuate the point that social relationships are inescapable and
necessary for human beings. They are important because a human being is under-
stood be a social being by nature. Outside of the community, social and moral possi-
bilities elude the individual. For morality to be possible requires the individual to be
embedded in relationships of engagement and practice. Individuals can only realize
a truly human life or character perfection in the context of others. It is for this rea-
son that Menkiti would opine that African ‘morality demands a point of view best
described as one of beingness-with-others …’79
In the light of the above exposition of the instrumental role played by relation-
ships in the discourse of personhood, it makes sense why this discourse is under-
stood as communitarian. To say it is ‘communitarian’, it is to report that it posits
certain social relationships as the most important means to pursue and cultivate
personhood. In other words, in terms of moral ends, the concept of personhood is
best described in terms of individualism; and, in terms of moral means, it is best
described in terms of communitarianism. I think this approach of appreciating
means and ends in African ethical thought is best anticipated and captured thus by
Allen Wood’s response to Metz’s strictly relational moral theory of ubuntu [African
ethics], thus:
I think that, however important the values of social harmony and community
may be, these are probably best accounted for by an appeal to a more fun-
damental value, such as human dignity, self-realisation, or human happiness,
welfare or flourishing. For it seems that these are things that both African and
Western societies value equally, and what appears distinctive about African
ethics is the way in which African culture has appreciated the crucial role of
community in contributing to or even constituting them.80
In his criticism to Metz’s relational interpretation of African ethics, I understand
Wood to be drawing a distinction between what is the fundamental focus of moral-
ity and what is distinctive about African ethics. He takes morality to be the same in

76
  Mluleki Munyaka & Mokgethi Motlhabi, “Ubuntu and Its Socio-moral Significance”, . Felix Murove,
ed., African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics, (Pietermaritzburg: University of
KwaZulu Natal Press, 2009), p. 64.
77
  Ibid, 69.
78
  Ibid, 70.
79
  Ifeanyi Menkiti, “The Normative Concept of Personhood”, Kwasi Wiredu, ed., Companion to African
Philosophy, (A Companion to African Philosophy), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 324.
80
  Allen Wood, “Cross-Cultural Moral Philosophy: Reflections on Thaddeus Metz: ‘Toward an African
Moral Theory”, South African Journal of Philosophy 26, No. 2, 346.

13
 56 M. Molefe

all cultures insofar as it values some fundamental individual good, be it captured in

terms of dignity, self-realization or welfare. The distinctive feature of African ethi-
cal thought is the importance it attaches to the role social relationships play in assist-
ing individuals to achieve these individual ideals. As such, individualistic norms like
dignity, self-realization, and welfare are primary in moral discourse. And certain
relationships captured by norms like community and harmony are instrumental in
the pursuit of these final goods. As such, the essence of my argument, as anticipated
by Wood, is to argue that African ethics (qua personhood) is grounded on the final
value of self-realization; and, I take certain social relationships (like harmony or
community) to play a contributory (or instrumental) role.4 In line with this sugges-
tion, the argument being advanced here amounts to the view that the basic value to
be pursued is the perfection of the character of the individual and social relation-
ships are instrumentally good insofar as they help the individual to achieve such an
end.
Another objection might be the fact that I seem to be ignoring the fact that it is
the community that confers personhood on the individual, and not the individual to
herself.5 Two things are worth noting as a response to this objection. Firstly, this
objection, in and of itself, even if would turn out to be true (which I think it is not),
is not sufficient to dismantle the argument that the idea of personhood is individual-
istic. Secondly, the community does not in any literal sense confer or define person-
hood. Wiredu’s comments regarding the role of the community is illuminating –
One might say, in a manner of speaking, that personhood is, thus, defined by
the community … What is noted here cannot be taken to mean that the com-
munity does anything, let alone anything authoritarian, to the individual in this
supposed process. In the relevant sense every society … defines what counts
as a person in its own semantics. And it does not matter whether the defining
criteria are descriptive or prescriptive.81
Wiredu’s point is a straightforward one, which is: every community prescribes the
norms of excellence that will be used to define what is to count as a person. There-
fore to say that a community defines personhood just is to say that the community
prescribes the norms of evaluation and the members of society rely on these norms
to evaluate who among its members, have lived up to them. Thus, to claim of some
individual that she has indeed attained personhood, it is to report that she lives a life
consistent with the norms prescribed by society, and nothing more. The recognition
of personhood informed by standards prescribed by society does not take away the
fact that it is the individual that conforms or exemplifies these norms, which is man-
ifested in her deportment. As such, the community defines personhood by prescrib-
ing norms that serve as moral signposts as to what counts as a valuable human life.
It is crucial, however, to equally note that even if a society fails to properly recog-
nize one as a person that will be the failure of society, and not failure in personhood
as an ethical theory or even a failure to attain personhood.

81
  Wiredu, op. cit. (2008), p. 336.

13
Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through Personhood… 57

A robust society ought surely be able to identify those that have achieved person-
hood, but a society that fails to do so does not render the concept of personhood
itself otiose. The outstanding nature of one’s character does not depend on the rec-
ognition of others as such – it is an objective fact of how one has developed their
human nature. However, it is crucial to note that in the final analysis the aim of this
article is not to evaluate practitioners or even societies in terms of how they use the
idea of personhood well or fail to use it properly, rather it is a philosophical reflec-
tion on the idea of personhood itself.

5 Conclusion

A number of scholars have rightly noted that the community plays a decisive role
in African ethics. However, these scholars, in my opinion, have tended to misun-
derstand and to exaggerate the role of social relationships by interpreting it to be
the very goal of morality. This article sought to offer what it takes to be the proper
understanding of the relationship between the individual and community in the
moral context. Unlike others who have argued for the priority of the community
and those who take both the community and individual to be equally fundamen-
tal, this article argued that the individual project of character perfection ought to be
understood as fundamental in African ethical thought. This article does not seek to
demean or degrade the value of the community in African moral cultures; rather, it
seeks to place the it in its rightful place, as a useful social instrument for incubating,
prescribing and instilling morality among individuals.
In future, it will be worthwhile to increase the scope of this analysis to consider
the competing individualistic moral terms like dignity and welfare. One here would
have to consider these three moral norms, welfare, dignity and personhood, and
evaluate which among them promises the most plausible account of African ethics
– this will not be a promising project for those that are committed to moral plural-
ism. This will be worthwhile project in pursuing the line of defending the view that
African ethics like all morality, so far as I am concerned, is individualistic

Publisher’s Note  Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

13