1 The extra statutory materials that can be used for the purpose of interpretation are called extrinsic or extemal aids to interpretation. They are so used for the limited purpose of ascertaining the context in which the words have been used in the statute. Such materials ‘can be conveniently grouped under the following heads:- vA. Travaux preparatories or preparatory material 2+ Historical facts ‘J. Other statutes C Kefnence & Legislation) 4, Contempornea expositio \-5: Dictionaries 1. Preparatory material: The process of legislative enactment of a statute produces a range of material that can throw a light on the purpose & rationale of the enactment. As a matter of principle such material-cannot be used to gi ins Jan of all statutes. Lord Halsbury in Kilder v/s Dexter (1902) has observed that “the ‘worst person to construe a statute is the person who is responsible of its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which, in fact, has been employed.” Nevertheless such material is relevant in determining the circumstances in which the statute was enacted & the language which has been used in its enactment. Lauterpacht has given three reasons for the attitudes of the courts in England. Firstly, that the declarations of a single house of the Parliament do not constitute law, secondly, the deliberations of the houses were not published till the 18" century & finally the courts asserted an independence from parliamentary control in the performance of their functions. The value of materials depends upon its kind & can be profitably discussed with reference to that. Range of available material can be divided under the following heads: 1) Statement of the object & reasons: The statement of objects & reasons is / appended to each bill at the time of its introduction in the house of the legislature. The statement of the objects & reasons is not admissible for the purpose of determining the intention of the legislature. i anguage used in the statutes. However, it can be used for the limited purpose of (i) ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time of introduction 1 of the bills & (ii) determining the purposes for Which the Bill was proposed. _ Lt ih. The reason for which the statement of objects & reasons is not admissible as an aid to ascertainment of the intention of the legislature is that the statement merely reflects the intention of the mover of the bill & during its passage through legislature that intent may be modified, lost or abandoned. In Ashwin Kumar Ghosh v/s Arbind Bose (1952) Reliance was placed on the statement of objects & reasons of the Bill, which was later, enacted as the S.C. Advocates (Practice in H.C.) Act 1951 to show the meaning of the expressiontice in Secti ; Practice in Section 7 Of the Act, Shastri C.J, held that the statement of the objects & ons should led out as an aid to the intention of the language. oe Seals state of Madras & Kerala y Justice Subba Rao eae eee stil : objects & reasons for the (4 Amendment) bill pesnanran An cea determining the circumstances et & purpose of the th Du inte ed id that the purpose of Art 31A are intende to protect agrarian In T. Manickram & Co vain ag SC, the statement was used determine the nature of the amefding legislation Tt was held that he seme clarificatory. = i Tn Jagdish Chandra Sinha v/s Eileen K. Patricia D’ Rozarie, it was held by the \C that the statement of the object & res : n accompanying a legislative Bill cannot ete Meta the true meaning effect of he substantive povsion the substantive provision of the legislation but it can certainly be pressed in to service for the limited b purpose of understanding the background, antecedent state of affairs & object of the legislation it sought to achieve. eeereer eee ere eeeeeeeeereeee eee HH evadoss v/s Veera Makali Ammau Koli Athalur AIR 1998 SC, the SC tuled that statement of objects & reasons can be used for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs & the evil sought to be remedied by the statute, In P.V. Narsimha Rao v/s State (CBI/SPE) AIR 1998 SC, Agarwal J said in his judgement in the SC that the statement of the minister who had moved the Bill in the Parliament can be looked at to ascertain the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation & the object & the purpose for which the legislation is enacted. The statement of the minister however, is not taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the provision Of Ihe POF ont £ obfecli can nats Lonwver, peshice Ke Bhese sneaning 24 de poocds Used hy legichydise. qi 2) Speech at introduction of Bill: The speech made by the mover of the Bill at the time of introduction in the House cannot be looked as a guide to the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute. However, like the statement of reasons & object, the speech is admissible only as a circumstantial evidence leading to the enactment of _the statute. ‘The rule is same in England as well is ‘India. aH In Re Mew (1862), the Presiding Judge referred to his own speech at the time of introduction of the Bankruptcy Bill, but he was careful to observe that he did not do so in determining the meaning of the language used in the statue. Court refused to rely on the speech of the Presiding Judge, who moved the Bill to construe the enactment. In State of West Bengal v/s UOI, the Supreme Court held that statement made by a Minister about the object & intention of the words used in the statute is capable of acquisition of State owned lands. HH InK P Varghese v/s IT Officer AIR 1981 SC, the SC observed that it is true that the speeches made by the members of the legislatures on the floors of the house when a Bill for enacting a statutory provision is being debated are inadmissible for the purpose of interpreting the statutory provision. But the speech made by the mover of the Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be amended by the legislature & the object & the purpose for which thelegislature is enacted. Theref movi : ore, the speech made moving the amendment i by the Finance Minister whil relevant. ntodiucing Section $2(2) ofthe 1 Act, 1961 is extremely 3) Debates in the Legislature: In Engl ee ‘ngland the rute is well extabli a — a ‘ be eee atthe intention of the Legislature ee Wer Rade ee 2¢ of ce aagets tn which the statute wan made In Rex vis Cor were held to tracunsidered ircev mt ane inerrant ar a earn tinier te ne ir ion of Pr United ; cL a earlier practice retembléd England In U.S, vi Teate Freigh ©. (1664), the U.S.A. Supreme Court held that the debates e Nd Not control the meaning of statutes, The reasons for this attitude were: — eee This trapossible to determine with certainty what construction was Put upon an Act by the members of the legislative body that passed it by resorting to speeches of the individual members thereof, Those who did not speak May not have agreed with those who did & those who spoke might differ from each other. ; However, congressional debates are admissible as evidence of circumstances jn which a statute was made & of the evil, which if sought to remedy. Use may also be thade of the debate to show ariy change in language, which was or was not made. In India, in older days the Bombay & Calcutta High Courts did not permit a refefence to thé debate in construirig a statute. The Allahabad HC in Kadir Baksh v/s ad tak iew. Later On in Advocate General of — Bhawani Prasad had taken the opposite view the PC held that the debates could not be used for Bengal v/s Premlal i tes the meaning of a sfatute. The Judicial Committee in this case was i Our SC has adoy i considered to ascertain the intention of the legislature. However, Kania CJ in Gopalan v/s State of Madras, Bhagwati J in Express Newspaper Ws UOI (1958) & Subba Rao CJ in Golaknath case (1967) used the debates to show whether a certain proposition was considered by the legislature, 4) Reports of Commissions: In England the practice is not to take into consideration the Reports of Royal Commissions leading to particular enactment in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Thus, in Katikaro of Uganda vis Attorney General (1960), the Court refused to look into a white paper containing the recommendation of Uganda constitutional conference to ascertain the intention underlying the order in council incorporating the Uganda agreement. ea On the contrary such commission Reports can be looked into to acces a historical circumstances, which led to the enactment ofa particular statute. - a Halsbury considered the Reports as the most accurate source of information il, which the statute was intended to suppress. ae SC in Mubarak Ali V/s State of Bombay (1957) held that the a “| - Indian Law Commission on the drafting of IPC could be taken into consideralas a matter of hi ae the TPC, 1860,” & P9888 legitimate guide to the meani In RS. Nayak v/s AR. Antul ee of the committee which Preceded A AIR 1984 SC, it was held by the SC that tiament 7 enactment of a legi eee parflamentary committee & report of a commission ace oP report of joint ee en pmo i ta 5) Reports of Legislative Committee: In f i Committee was considered on the me hen Cebus: RgPert of Legislative appropriately summarized the prevailing attitude in Eevee oT’ Deming has Commissions observing: *eolgne Properties v/s LR. We do not look at the exp ; preface the Bill before the Puamen ee ih Pages of Hansurd. All that the Court can do is ‘otake = Judicial notice of the previous state of law & of other matters generally known to well informed people. On the contrary, in U.S.A. the reports of the committee are considered more reliable & satisfactory source of assistance. In Imhoff-Bank Dyeing co vis USS, it was held by the Federal Court that Committee Report could be rightly Tegarded as possessing very considerable value of the explanatory nature Tegarding the legislative intent. In India, the English practice is followed. In Gopalan’s case, Kania CJ referred to the proceedings of the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly to ascertain the circumstances in which objectives ‘presonal’ was introduced in Art. 21 of the Constitution to qualify the word ‘liberty’. Thus, it is well settled that the report of the committee cannot control the meaning of the enactment but may be taken to examine the surrounding circumstances in construing the Constitution. In Lok Shikshan Trust v/s LT. Commissioner (1977), Beg J held that the report could be used to find out the reasons for an enactment. 2. Historical facts: \t is permissible to refer to historical facts & circumstances ing the t in construing it. However, such reference cannot override ¢ plain & unequivocal language of an enactment. It is only when the language is the . ambi recourse can be had to the historical facts to ascertain the state of law & the object of the statute. Lord Jessel in Holmes v/s Guy (1877) said that such an investigation enabled the Court to funle the inienton ofthe legislature In interpreting the old statutes the historical dimension can be of great importance. In Ridge v/s Baldwin (1964) the House of Lords added the requirement of hearing to the provisions of a statute, which empowered the Metropolitan aan to dismiss a police constable even though statutes never mention it. This was possi le on the ground that older statutes always presumed that such requirement woul read upreme i is relevant in ia, Si Court bas also held that the prior state of law is relevant seining dein er racarg of Taw, the process by which the law was evolved, & he determining the meses = (ena./ evil sought to be Temoved, in / “he Supreme Uae an State of West Bengal v/s MLN, Ba j subordinate judic / Constitution. Sin Ponto!” includ isciplinary process, ‘Owever, at this time of Passing of enact ir not meaner B lactment reference to the circumstances does sor ea iat Te anguage used should be h icable in later scientific, social, hi (1966), history of constitutional provisi sat nY '0 ascertain the meaning of control in An 235 ofthe ce in its opinion the expression was ambiguous t In Attorney General v/s Edisson Tele; hone Co (1 word Telephone Considered to be included in the connotation of the word "Telepan Teceh i telephone wn at the time of enactment of the statute, ___ There is a need | sive interpretation of enactment to meet changing situation applies with Greater force to constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court of India has acknowledged the need for the-need-for a liberal constructi — eral construction of pe Constitution. In State of West Ben v/s Anwar Ali Sarkar (1950) Vivian Bose “The Constitution must in my judgement be left elastic enough to meet from time to time the altering conditions of a changing world with its shifting emphasis & differing needs.” In S.P. Gupta v/s President of India AIR 1982 SC, observed that legislative history of a constitutional provision though not directly germane for the purpose of construing a statute may, however, be used in exceptional cases to denote the beginning of legislative process which results in the logical end & the finale of the statutory provision, but in no case the legislative history be a substitute for an interpretation which is in direct contravention of the Statutory provision concerned. Sf Other statutes: \n interpreting a statute both earlier & later statutes are relevant to a limited extent. The rationale behind the use of other statute is that the legislature is presumed to be conversant withthe stale ofexising ow. The extent of the aid that can be derived from the other statutes in interpreting the statutes depends on the nature of such other statutes. Three distinct groups have been identified by the Craines: : 1) Statutes in pari materia with the statutes under construction. ate 2) Earlier statutes not strictly in pari materia with the statutes under construction but in some way relating to or same subject matters. 3) Seen statutes amounting to parliamentary exposition of the statutes under construction. ‘Statutes in pari materia: in pari materia with each other if they are so Sind tocech other as vor a system or code of legislation in respect of a rel amen fener in US. v/s Bagle Bank has explained the phrase ‘pari materia’ in the following words:“Statutes are in pari ie orto the sania Pe which relates to the same person or thing, nt be confounded a a or things. The word ‘pari materia’ must intimating not likenewe Mes ‘similar’. It is used in opposition to it public statute or 7 Identity. It is a phrase applicable to the eneral laws i i i the same subject matter, made at different times & in reference to Thus, all statutes dealing with licensi : AS, 4 ig with licensing of solicitors hi te Pie Davis v/s Edmondson (1803). Two aie piltnetrehibaes 962) ing were considered in pari materia in Bolton Corp. v/s Owen However, it is not necessary that the entire subject m: saa atter ise baie Thus in State of Madras v/s Vaidyanath Aiyar cane lefinition of expression ‘shall presume’ contained in Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has been considered to be in pari materia with the expression ‘it shall be presumed’ in Section 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The two provisions were considered to enact rules dealing with the same subject matter, viz. burden of proof. Where an earlier statute is repealed & substituted by another statute which reproduces the language used in earlier statute. The two statutes are considered to be in pari materia. Thus in Bengal Immunity Co. v/s State of Bihar (1955), Articles 245 & 246 of the Constitution was pari materia with Sections 99 & 100 of Government of India Act, 1935. This presumption arises very strongly in case of consolidating statutes, as they prima facie do not intend any change of intention. The Doctrine of pari materia cannot apply where the legislature have a different scope. In State of Punjab v/s 0.G.B. Syndicate (1964), it was held that the Displaced Persons Debt ‘Administration Act, 1948 was not in pari materia with the Act of 1964 because the 1964 Act had a larger scope & was designed to secure greater advantages to displace person than the 1948 Act. Statutes in pari materia are to be taken as forming one system. Lord Mensfield has laid down the rule in R. v/s Loxdale (1758) that statutes in pari materia are to be considered together irrespective of the fact that they have been enacted at different times or do not refer to each other or even if some of them have expired. Aforesaid principle has been accepted in India & has been applied in large number of cases. Thus, in Vidyachand v/s Khubchand (1960) SC held that the Limitation Act, 1963 & C.P.C., 1908 were in pari materia with each other & must be considered as a single system. 2) Assistance of earlier statutes dealing with the same subject matter: aid the language of the statute is ambiguous a comparison may be made with the ire language of earlier statutes relating to the same subject matter. This princip! many manifestations: @ if ‘a statute, upon which a particular construction has been rel . id cor in the past, is re-acted in the same language, it is presumed that the | fa aie jntends no change in the meaning. However, solitary decision, particularly not of the highest Court cannot give rise to such a presumption.i fed connotation of the expressi in Vijraveh Hector, A sc 1017's ij lu Mudiliar along time, Misa tw ein ‘has defined certain expressions in one statute it is a ‘€xpressions carry the same meaning if they are used in the later Statutes dealing with the same subject matter. In Knowles Itd. v/s Rand (1962), it was held that the expression ‘agricultural land’ in Agriculture holding Act, 1948 ‘was given the meaning assigned to it in the Agricultural Act, 1947, (iv) Where a single section of an earlier Act is incorporated by reference in a later statute, it has been held in Portsmouth Corp. v/s S. Smith (1885) that the Section is to be read in the sense it bore in Parent Act. Where, however, the whole of earlier statute or parts of it are incorporated in the later statutes, the incorporation has been held to cause a bodily ‘transportation of such provisions from the earlier to the later enactment. A repeal or the amendment of the earlier statutes does not affect the provisions incorporated in the later Act. . 3) Assistance of later statutes: Normally a later statute cannot be used as an aid to the construction of earlier one. However, certain exceptions are recognized: a) Where the later statutes seeks to amend an earlier statutes or the meaning of such earlier statute. b) Where the provisions of an earlier Act are ambiguous. It may be construed with reference to a later statute provided that the later statute is on the same subject & is itself free from ambiguity. . : ‘When an earlier Act is truly ambiguous, a pry ie may in certain i varliamentary exposition of the former. can SVP. Cement Co, vis General Mining Syndicate (1976), the SC held that a subsequent statute which amends a Parent Act to clarify it, amounts to a parliamentary exposition, 4. Contemporanea Expositio: Lord Coke firstly laid down the principle of = Contemporanea Expositio with reference to the Magna Carta, According to “a ancient grants statutes must be construed with reference to the law as it was al time when the statute or grant was made. Such Contemporanea Expositio may emerge out of long professional usage or judicial decisions. i th took into account the Thus, in Ohlon’s case (1891), the Court of Queens Bencl practice followed by Inland Revenue Commissioners for the past 16 years. InR. wisof jud; is 7 ne question whether the Courts had the Was taken ‘Into consideration for determining convict. © Power to im i The toon FA pose consecutive sentences on '¢ of Contemporane: iti In Clyde Navigation Trustees Wf Leto has no application to modem statutes. Navigation Consolidation Act, 1856 i ed Neti do arent the Clyde the river Clyde. Such tas NU 16 imposed ‘Navigation tax on the timber floated on placed on the u fo Xx Was paid Without protest from 1858 to 1882 & reliance was practice relevant a i Supporting the levy. Lord Watson refused to consider the ata, ground that the doctrine had no application to a modern This view of Lord Watson has beet i n affirmed in by the He i Campbell College vis Commissioner (1964). ee lia, as refused to follow the doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio wi f positio with Tespect to Evidence Act, 1882 in Raja Ram v/s State of Bihar (1964) & to the Telegraph Act in Senior Electric Inspector v/s Laxmi Narayan on the ground that the statutes had no application to moder statutes. 5. Dictionaries: Dictionaries can be resorted to, as aids to interpretation on the principle that the words used in the statutes should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense. uw In Re Ripon Housing Order (1939), the word ‘park’ had interpretedjits ordinary meaning in accordance with Oxford Dictionary. In India, dictionaries are referred to on the same principle. Thus, in Aziz Pasha vis UOI (1967), SC gave the expression ‘establighed? in Art. 30(1) of the Constitutio in its dictionary meaning & held that the A.M.U. was not established by a minority. In State of Orissa v/s Titagarh Paper Mills Co.Ltd AIR 1985 SC, held & observed that the dictionary meaning of a word can’t be looked at where that word has been statutory defined or judicially interpreted.