Bosch India'S Starter Motor and Generator Division: Pioneering A Network Form of Organization

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IMB 471
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ABHOY K OJHA
BOSCH INDIA’S STARTER MOTOR AND GENERATOR DIVISION:

PIONEERING A NETWORK FORM OF ORGANIZATION
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Anil Kumar M.R., Regional President India, Starter Motor and Generator and A. Krishna, Senior Vice President and
Head Corporate Human Resources at Bosch Limited had a meeting at the Naganathapura Plant to reflect on the long
journey they had undertaken to turn around the fortunes of the Starter Motor and Generator (SMG) division in India.
When Bosch Limited restructured to form global product divisions in 2007, the India operations were integrated into
Bosch’s global operations. Since the SMG division had never generated profits since its inception, there were even
some discussions in global headquarters on shutting down the operations as part of the restructuring. However, with
their backs to the wall, the India-based management with the assistance of R. R. Nair, a management consultant, had
taken up the challenge to reinvigorate the business and transform it from a “laggard” to a high-growth high-profit
venture.
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In the early part of the journey, most of the management interventions focused on conventional strategies of cutting
costs, including logistics costs and inventory costs, improving labor productivity, and improving quality
performance. However, the second half of the journey focused on redesigning products to fit the local market
conditions to change the price to performance ratio for its customers, and most importantly on a new business
model, internally referred to as “Extended Workbench”, that re-defined the relationship between Bosch Ltd. and its
sourcing partners. The “Extended Workbench” was a first-of-its-kind network form of organization across Bosch’s
global operations and had contributed significantly to the turnaround of the SMG division.
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Although, there had been some reservations when the idea was mooted, positive results from the first experiment
had made it easier to implement the subsequent sourcing relationships and the division was well on the way to
establish a wide network of sourcing organizations using the same principles. Anil Kumar and Krishna noted that
several other Bosch divisions in India and elsewhere were keen to learn about the new arrangements, and this
provided them a sense of satisfaction. However, they were also aware of the pitfalls that were encountered during
the process of implementation, and the downsides of the new form of organization. They wanted to have a fresh look
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at the pros and cons of the new business model and its implementation process and document the learnings so that
others who chose to implement it were aware of what they were getting into and what modifications they might need
to make it successful in their context.
BOSCH’S STARTER MOTOR AND GENERATOR DIVISION IN INDIA

Robert Bosch GmbH had been a world leader in auto-electrical components for over 100 years with its entry into the
domain with the manufacture of high-voltage magnetos in 1902 in Stuttgart, Germany. Figure 1 shows the evolution
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of its starter motors and generators in the global markets and Appendix 1 provides a description of the products at
different stages of the evolution. Starter motors are required to start internal-combustion engines. When starting
these engines, there is considerable resistance from compression of the fuel mixture, piston friction, and bearing
friction, and also the flywheel. A starter motor draws on the electric power in the battery of the automobile to
provide the mechanical power to overcome these resistances until the engine can generate its own power. The
generator, on the other hand, generates electric power from the mechanical power produced by the combustion of
the fuel in the engine to provide for the needs of the running car and also replenishes the power in the battery.
Bosch Ltd. started its auto-electrical operations in India in 1989. The SMG Division with its major plant in
Naganathapura, near Bangalore, manufactured a wide range of starter motors and generators for the Indian market as
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well as for the export market. In 2012, the global business was about Euro 1.4 billion with SMG contributing
Abhoy K Ojha, Professor of OB & HRM, prepared this case for class discussion. This case is not intended to serve as an endorsement, source of
primary data, or to show effective or inefficient handling of decision or business processes. The author thanks the interviewees, particularly A.
Krishna and M. R. Anil Kumar, who provided all the assistance in acquiring the required information and provided comments on an earlier draft.
Copyright © 2014 by the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. No part of the publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise (including internet) – without the permission of Indian Institute of
Management Bangalore.
This document is authorized for educator review use only by Syed Muntazir Mehdi, Pakistan Institute of Management until February 2014. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860
Bosch India’s Starter Motor and Generator Division: Pioneering a Network Form of Organization Page 2 of 10
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substantially to that business. In the Indian market, SMG was the second largest player in the segment. Figure 2
illustrates two major products of the SMG division in India.
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A recent study by Frost & Sullivan called, “Automotive Starters and Alternators Market in India” suggested that the
industry was poised to grow exponentially. Based on the analysis of various vehicle segments, namely passenger,
utility, light commercial, medium commercial, heavy commercial, two-wheeler, and three-wheeler, the report
suggested that growth would be driven by the emergence of India as the global hub of small car manufacturing and
the adoption of starters and generators in the two-wheeler and three-wheeler segments. However, the report also
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suggested that with the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) looking to trim costs, the intensity of competition
in the motor and generator industry would be very high and only those manufacturers who could increase production
capacity to obtain economies of scale, upgrade capabilities to improve quality, and eliminate waste to cut costs
would benefit from the growth.
GEARING FOR THE FUTURE

Until 2007, Bosch was organized globally as a matrix organization, but in practice it functioned with an emphasis on
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a geographic divisional structure. The India operations were headquartered in Bangalore and catered largely to the
needs of the Indian markets, and had limited contact with global headquarters or operations in other countries. The
SMG division was part of the geographic division in India with key decisions being made in Bangalore. In the
context of the geographic structure, the needs of the Indian market were met by local operations, and the SMG
continued to cater to the needs of the market, even when it was not profitable as a separate unit. The need to cater to
the requirements of important clients in India allowed the geographic head-office in Bangalore to justify the
continuation of the SMG division, even when it did not produce profits.
However, in 2007 the SMG division in India became a part of the global product division with key decisions shifting
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to Stuttgart, Germany. With this, the capacity in India was clubbed with capacity in other geographies: European
Union, North America, South America, China, and Africa with the headquarters focused on optimal use of global
capacities to meet global demand. SMG, which had not made a profit until 2007, was required to adapt to the
emerging market conditions or risk the prospect of being closed down. The global headquarters insisted on products
that met global or at least a regional market quality standards and costs for the operations to continue. The local
management knew that while a loss-making division was ‘‘accommodated’’ in a geographic divisional structure;
there were no incentives, other than business performance, for it to be ‘‘tolerated’’ in a global product division. This
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assessment led to the process of re-thinking the strategy and business model at SMG to ensure that the division met
the potential that it had failed to achieve until then.
In the first stage, the old business model was retained and the efforts focused on reducing costs even as efforts to
increased volumes were initiated. As a first step, the staffing levels for both direct and indirect labor were capped
which automatically improved labor productivity as volumes grew. Simultaneously, business processes were
improved and more importantly the factory layout and work flow was improved to a more ergonomic design to
facilitate labor productivity as well as improved internal logistics. These changes reduced space utilization and
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increased throughput, thus reducing costs. External logistics costs were also improved, and the introduction of
‘‘returnable’’ packaging boxes instead of the traditional cardboard packaging boxes that were discarded, contributed
significantly to reduced costs as well as improved the environment friendliness of the business. Efforts to reduce
inventory and improve inventory turnover also helped. Further, internal quality costs were reduced by improved
designs to allow for efficiency of production and external quality costs were curtailed by improved attention to
eliminating manufacturing errors. Cumulatively, these efforts contributed significantly to improving the business
performance of the division and also the motivation of the employees.
It was 2011, Anil Kumar returned from a role in Bosch Germany, to take over the leadership role at the SMG
division in India to strategize and implement changes for the next stage. He sustained the earlier initiatives, but also
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introduced some more changes. To facilitate the changes, Anil Kumar and Krishna, reconstituted the management
team by introducing some managers from other divisions to ‘‘bring in fresh blood’’ and in turn relocated the earlier
managers to roles in other divisions to initiate changes there – the cross-pollination helped all the divisions. To help
implement the changes in a smooth manner at SMG, a consultant, R. R. Nair, was engaged to design and facilitate
the “Journey of Transformation”. He helped Anil Kumar and Krishna to get the management team and the
operational staff to move from a mindset of being resigned to their fate (“failure of the division is our destiny”) as a
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result of 22 consecutive years of no profit, to create a momentum for change that led to a self-belief that they could
and would make a difference. A full-day workshop with the management team was conducted to re-establish a
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vision and a mission along with a set of tangible goals to be achieved. The team was convinced that “If we stay the
way we are, the results will be the same as they are”. At the end of the workshop, the team adopted a vision to
become the market leader in India and a major source of starters and generators to Bosch’s global market.
The mission was to become the market leader in India while continuing to improve profitability, with the goal of
achieving 40% of the market share by 2018. These targets were translated into intermediate milestones, and a
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change program called “Trust Transparency and Teamwork” (TTT) was rolled out to work toward the agreed
targets. The year 2011 was labeled the “Year of Momentum”, 2012 was the “Year to Breakeven”, 2013 was the
“Year to Profitability”, and 2014 was the “Year of Consolidation”. Throughout the process, quarterly workshops
were conducted to ensure that the transformation was on track and any course correction required was done. Table 1
shows the progress on some parameters of interest. Domestic market share had improved gradually according to
plan even when the overall market was not growing, exports had grown substantially although the depreciating
rupee exaggerated the figures, and the business had broken even and was set to be profitable in the future.
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The positive results shown in Table 1 were the outcomes of the various initiatives implemented since 2007
(described earlier) and three changes described below.
Process of Product Innovation
SMG (in partnership with Bosch divisions in other geographies) started developing exclusive products for India and
India-like markets. Rather than modify or strip down products originally developed for the European markets,
platforms and products fit for the India-like markets were developed. Understanding that a typical Indian customer
was willing to pay for only for ‘‘must-have’’ features and was happy with ‘‘nice-to-have’’ features, but was not
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willing to pay for them, SMG adopted the principles of frugal innovation. In this way, only features relevant for the
India-like market were included in products so that customers did not have to pay for features they did not want.
One baseline product developed using these principles and introduced in the market in 2011 had a significant
positive impact on market share and profitability. A second significant product based on the same principles was to
be introduced for a new segment in the market with a potential to further help consolidate the position in the market.
This initiative was very well received by the employees in India, and in other divisions to which design work was
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decentralized. However, initially there was resistance from research and development personnel in headquarters.
They were not sure of the design skills of people in Bangalore and the ability of the India operations to take
‘ownership’ of a product. It required tremendous support from top management to allow the migration of R&D work
to Bangalore. The initial phases involved strong oversight by design engineers from headquarters, but the initial
success has provided the comfort level to allow the India office to take on more R&D activity.
Mindset Change and Process (Business) Orientation

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Apart from optimizing processes and products, SMG focused more on people excellence which was possible by
developing leadership qualities across the pyramid. SMG adopted a ‘‘Process Organization’’ approach in order to
encourage process orientation while cutting across functional silos. Two process approaches initiated were ‘‘Race to
Profitability’’ (RTP) and ‘‘Value Stream Organization’’ (VSO) driving key business results while focusing on cross-
functional cooperation. The team leaders of RTP were drawn from the middle management, and team members from
across the functions were selected based on both personality traits and technical skills. The teams were empowered
to take business decisions with calculated risk, guided and supported by mentors from the senior management team.
The lowest levels of the teams felt empowered leading to a mindset change. Empowerment provided team members
opportunities to develop leadership qualities which in turn resulted in the teams meeting and exceeding internal
targets and goals that were established as part of the turnaround process. The VSO consisted of a value stream
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owner along with a cross-functional team that enabled strong shop-floor management. This matrix organization was
developed to overcome department barriers and slow progress for Quality, Cost and Delivery (QCD) problem
solving. The VSO approach enabled the team to come together and look holistically into the issues related to
sourcing, manufacturing, and delivery, and develop measures for improvement and implement them.
Unlike the initiative to shift R&D to India which was well received by the qualified engineers in India, these
changes affected the activities on the shop floor and were seen with a little bit of apprehension by those affected,
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some of them part of the workers union. For managers and supervisors used to working in functional silos to shop-
floor staff used to regimented processes, the changes required were significant. There was suspicion that these were
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the initial steps to diffuse the traditional roles and responsibilities and ultimately lead redundancies for some
contract employees and possibility permanent employees. However, the hands-on approach of Anil Kumar as he
managed the changes, support from Krishna to address potential HR issues, and the deep involvement of Nair in the
frequent workshops and interim course corrections, resulted in a change in mindset. The level of trust in
management and the belief that the changes were for the good of the organization and the employees was widely
accepted.
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Business Model
The third change was a business model innovation. There was a realization that the starter motor and generator
markets were becoming commoditized and the cost innovations, including frugal innovation, would provide a
breather but still not provide sustainable advantage. Bosch had a technological and quality edge over competition
but the gap was reducing as competition was also adopting new technologies. However, Bosch, because of its size,
had a significant disadvantage in terms of flexibility and operational costs relative to the competition. Anil Kumar
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and Krishna worked on a new business model that would increase flexibility and reduce operational costs even as it
maintained control over core technology and quality.
The management team evaluated many options to re-engineer the business model of SMG for the growth and
profitability strategy. Table 2A and B provides a comparison of a few options on select parameters. A simple option
was to continue the hiring freeze on full-time staff and increase reliance on contract workers within Bosch plants for
further expansion. This would have no impact on capital costs as Bosch would still have to invest on the entire
manufacturing infrastructure. It would noticeably reduce wage costs, and also increase flexibility in terms of
responding to changes in market requirements as labor could be increased or decreased as per requirement. There
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were unlikely to be any benefits related to access to manufacturing skills or expertise not already available in the
organization. There may have been potential benefits of focusing regular employees on core strengths and allowing
the contract workers to be engaged with peripheral activity. There were unlikely to be any benefits of economies of
scale. On the hand, there would be little or no loss of control over the production process, very little concern over
loss of quality, no scope for loss of intellectual property, or concerns over future risks related to this arrangement.
There were unlikely to be branding or customer-related risks, and very little extra attention to managing the
contractual relationships.
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Another possible option was to adopt contract manufacturing. It would provide significant saving in terms of capital
costs and also, assuming that the contractor had a lower pay structure, there could be some positive effect of lower
wage costs. This arrangement would significantly increase flexibility and provide some advantage of access to
special manufacturing skills of the vendor. There would be limited gains in focus on core strengths and economies
of scale. However, there would be a significant loss of control over the production process leading to high levels of
concerns over quality. The potential for loss of intellectual property could be high, the future risks associated with
vendor behavior was high and risks for the Bosch brand and customer dissatisfaction were high. Finally, much
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attention would have to be paid to managing the relationship.
A third option was to purchase from the market as many of the items that were to be produced by contract workers
or by an external vendor. Similar to the contract manufacturing option, it would gain significant benefit on capital
cost and some benefit on wage costs. It would have a positive impact on flexibility but no gains in terms of expertise
and limited gains in terms of focus on core strengths. There would be potential gains from economies of scale if
there were volume manufacturers in the market. However, it would lead to a high loss of control over the production
process; very high concerns over quality, very high risks associated with future actions of the suppliers, and also had
significant implications for the brand and customer acceptance. It would, however, not lead to loss of intellectual
property and required limited attention to vendor management.
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The fourth option, labeled “Extended Workbench”, was the option that they finally selected. It required the SMG
division to partner with a preferred supplier and build a new relationship and hence a new business model. The
partner was to establish the non-machine infrastructure, thus significantly reducing the capital costs. Bosch Ltd. was
to provide the manufacturing plant as well as the processes to replicate a Bosch environment at the partner’s plant.
The partner would supply all the operational and managerial staff but would work under the direct supervision of
key Bosch managers stationed at the partner facilities leading to lower wage costs but with high attention to
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processes and quality. This option would provide the same flexibility as contract manufacturing and also provide
significant access to contemporary manufacturing skills. It would allow SMG to focus on its core strengths as it was
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to retain key technologies in-house. The relationship would benefit from the economies of scale of the partner.
Although, running operations outside would lead to some concerns, the presence of Bosch executives and
implementation of Bosch processes would reduce or eliminate any effects on control and quality. By retaining core
technologies, the threat of intellectual property loss was minimal and also the branding/customer risks were
minimal.
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From the perspective of implementation, each of the options had different advantages and disadvantages. The option
of relying on contract workers would appear the easiest to implement in the short-run. It would require no
significant change in terms of structures and processes, and the strength of the contract workers could be increased
or decreased as required. There would be no resistance from current officers or unionized staff as long as there was a
possibility that these changes would help them retain their jobs. There would be negligible resistance from existing
contract workers in the short run, and there was an abundant availability of qualified personnel who could be taken
on contract. However, there was a concern whether reliance on contract workers was a sustainable option if the
business was to fluctuate significantly requiring large scale upsizing or downsizing of the contract worker contingent
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both from a legal and reputational perspective.
Contract manufacturing would have difficult to implement as there would be resistance from officers and staff as
they would perceive it as the first steps to outsourcing the activities and hurt their job security. For contract
manufacturing to succeed, it requires the employees to develop and/or enhance the capabilities of the contractor and
then ensure that the capabilities are used to deliver according to the needs of the organization. It was unlikely the
organization would receive enthusiastic support from current officers and staff to help develop an organization that
would ultimately cost them their jobs. It was a real possibility that the drop in morale and resistance might hurt the
organization more that the gains from contract manufacturing.
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Purchase from market would have been quite easy to implement. Like the reliance on contract workers, it would not
require too many changes to current operations and hence there would be no affect current officers and workers.
While it may create uncertainties in the minds of employees, assurance that Bosch would rely on the market mainly
for excess demand would allow for implementation. Also, assuming that the market was able to supply quality
products, it would be easier to rely on the market relative to relying on contract workers for fluctuating demand.
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The extended work bench had some of the same concerns as contract manufacturing from the perspective of
implementation in terms of resistance of officers and workers. It would require Bosch employees to be stationed at
the premises of the vendor to initially ensure development of the vendor and then to certify that the new capabilities
were being used to meet the requirements of Bosch. Hence, it was quite possible that the management would not get
the support of its officers and staff to go ahead this concept as the threat to their employment was a real possibility.
After considerable discussions with different stakeholders directly involved with the SMG group to build
confidence, discussions with potential vendors to participate as the location for the extended workbench, and
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significant efforts to promote the idea with the country leadership in Bangalore and product division leadership in
Stuttgart, Anil Kumar and Krishna opted for the Extended Workbench. Thankfully the implementation, despite some
hic-ups, flowed smoothly and all involved agreed that the concept had been good for the SMG division.
The Decision
Anil Kumar and Krishna had to think through a protocol or even a check-list that would capture the issues to be
addressed if the extended workbench concept was to be implemented for another business division in India or a
business in another geography and legal jurisdiction. The “Extended Workbench” concept had been in place for
about 2 years and it appeared that SMG and the partner perceived significant synergistic benefits. The partner
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obtained reputational benefits in its other businesses by being associated as a “special” partner of Bosch Ltd. It
gained from the understanding of process and quality orientation of Bosch which helped improvements in its other
operations. Since, after the success of the first product, SMG had transferred more products to the partner, it had
resulted in more business. The partner was happy to exploit its expertise in manufacturing in a valued partnership
without any intention of moving up the value change owing to its size. The partner did not have a desire to deal with
issues of liability by taking ownership of a product. However, there was a concern that the partner, at some later
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stage, may work for the competition. To allay any related risks, the partner was contractually bound not to provide
the same or similar services to SMG’s competitors.
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Bosch also experienced some unanticipated benefits. Some best practices that evolved at the partner facilities were
introduced in the Bosch plant. Some efforts at benchmarking between Bosch plant and partner plant led to
improvements and internal productivity. It allowed its regular staff to appreciate that there may be some other ways,
not necessarily the ways adopted by Bosch, of achieving some of the outcomes – this made change management in
SMG plants a little easier. This arrangement had helped plan market risks better by dividing production at its own
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facilities and partner facilities located in different states and industry clusters. It had also reduced logistics costs as
the partner was located closer to a cluster of customers that was far from Bosch-owned plants. However, the
attention toward planning had to increase as there was a need to coordinate internal and external production to
customers distributed in different cities.
Anil Kumar and Krishna planned to use the same model with another partner in another geographical local for an
entirely different line of products for another set of customers. They were aware that the gains with the new business
model had not come easily. It had required much internal negotiation and context setting and working “extra” hard
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to build trust in the partnership. They looked for advice on the potential threats that had not yet hurt the performance
of the business model or opportunities that had not been exploited. (i) How should a division decide what to retain as
core, to be done internally, and what to source from outside? (ii) What are the implications of loss of capability
when an activity is discontinued? (iii) Should a division develop capabilities available with an external provider to
retain the activity internally? (iv) Finally, how should a division choose between the “Extended Workbench”,
contract manufacturing, and purchase from the market? (iv) What is the implication of choosing an “Extended
Workbench” for the management of organizational change?
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Figure 1
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Evolution of Bosch’s starter motors and generators
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Source: Bosch website
Figure 2 yo
Two major products of SMG Division
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Starter Motor Generator

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Table 1
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Impact of the “Journey of Transformation”
(Improvement upon 2009 as base)
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Domestic market share Baseline 2% 4% 6% 11%
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Exports as a percentage of
Baseline 2% 12% 31% 35%
revenues
Profits as a percentage of Baseline 0.7% 6.4% 6.9% 8.3%

revenues
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Source: Provided by company op
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Table 2A
Advantages/disadvantages of alternative business models
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Option Capital Costs Wage Costs Flexibility Manufacturing Focus on core Economies of
Skills/Expertise strengths Scale
Contract Workers No change Some positive Some increase No gains Limited gains No gains
change
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Contract Significant Positive change Positive increase Limited gains Limited gains Limited gains
Manufacturing benefits
Purchase from Significant Positive change Positive increase No gains Limited gains Some gains
Market benefits possible
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Extended Significant Positive change Positive Increase Significant gains Significant gains Significant gains
Workbench benefits
Table 2B
Advantages/Disadvantages of Alternative Business Models
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Option Loss of Control Quality Concerns Intellectual Future Risks Branding/ Relationship
Property Customer Risks Management
Contract Workers No loss Little/No loss No loss No risks No risks Little extra
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attention
Contract Significant loss of High concerns High loss possible High risks High risks High level of
Manufacturing control attention
Purchase from High loss of Very high No loss Very high risks Very high risks Little extra
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Market control concerns attention
Extended Minimal loss of Minimal concerns Minimal concerns Minimal risks Minimal concerns Very high level of
Workbench control attention
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Exhibit 1
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History of Bosch generators
1913: First Bosch generator launched
Bosch launched the world’s first voltage-regulating generator as part of the “Bosch automotive lighting system.”
This generator initially had just one task: to supply power to the battery, which would in turn ensure the reliable
operation of the first electric headlights. The generator output was 4 amps.
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1933 Starter-generator for small cars and motorcycles
Even back in the 1930s, efforts were being made to reduce the size of automotive components. For example, Bosch
developed the starter generator, which combined the functions of a starter and a generator in a single electrical unit.
As well as starting the engine, it could also generate electric current when the engine was running.
1959 Three-phase current generator for buses: a more compact, lightweight, and powerful solution
The direct-current generators used up to this point could no longer cope with the steady increase in power required
by rising numbers of vehicle electrical consumers. Development of the three-phase current generator therefore
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marked a significant improvement: even when idling, it was capable of generating enough energy for the electrical
consumers and battery. This immediately offered major benefits, particularly for city buses with their high energy
consumption and constant stops.
1989 Compact generators for passenger cars: quiet, lightweight, and powerful
Key characteristics of the Compact series of Bosch generators included higher output with reduced noise and the
ability to adapt to increasing loads on the vehicle’s electrical system. This series also introduced the novel design
principle of internal cooling.
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1995 Liquid-cooled generator for passenger cars
The fully liquid-cooled generator, which entered small-series production in 1995, marked the arrival of a completely
self-contained solution. Bypass type cooling used the vehicle engine’s cooling system. The new generator model
was an extremely low-noise solution capable of supplying up to 150 amps at 14 volts. As there were no slip rings
and carbon brushes, the generator’s service life was particularly long.
2005 LI-L generator for commercial vehicles with extended service life
In 2005, Bosch launched a particularly robust and durable generator for commercial vehicles. With its larger ball
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bearings, reinforced end shields, and improvements to the brush/slip ring system, the LI-L generator has a
maintenance-free service life of up to 800,000 kilometers.
2008 New Baseline generators for passenger cars: power plants for low cost vehicles
Bosch developed the New Baseline (NBL) series of generators for low-cost small cars, which typically consume less
electrical energy. NBL generators represent an economical choice that is both robust and compact. Available in
three different sizes, they cover a range of outputs from 1.0 to 1.8 kilowatts. Their efficiency of up to 66% helps to
reduce consumption and keep CO2 emissions to a minimum.
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2009 HD series for commercial vehicles – customized solutions based on a modular design
In 2009, Bosch launched the HD series of generators, whose modular design addresses the multiple requirements of
commercial vehicles. Covering various different output ratings, the HD series also offers a range of additional
options, such as improved heat resistance and extended service life, that can be combined as required. This enables
commercial vehicle manufacturers to choose the best generator for their specific needs.
2011 Efficiency Line generators for passenger cars – particularly efficient for stop-and-go traffic
The special features of the new Efficiency Line (EL) series really come to the fore in city traffic: the new generation
of generators generates around 10% more power to supply the automotive electrical system even when the vehicle is
idling. As the battery is charged more quickly, the availability of the start-stop system is increased, and so it has
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enough energy to restart the engine the next time it shuts down. By further improving the electrical design and using
new high-efficiency diodes (HEDs) developed in-house at Bosch, engineers have succeeded in achieving
efficiencies of up to 76%.

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BOSCH INDIA’S STARTER MOTOR AND GENERATOR DIVISION:

BOSCH’S STARTER MOTOR AND GENERATOR DIVISION IN INDIA

GEARING FOR THE FUTURE

Process of Product Innovation

Mindset Change and Process (Business) Orientation

attention would have to be paid to managing the relationship.

Starter Motor Generator

Source: Bosch website

Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Domestic market share Baseline 2% 4% 6% 11%

Profits as a percentage of Baseline 0.7% 6.4% 6.9% 8.3%

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