The Athenian Trireme

THE ATHENIAN TRIREME
The history and reconstruction ofan

ancient Greek warship
Secondedition
j. S. MORRISON, j. F. CO ATES
and N. B. RANKO V
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
CA MBRIDGE UNI VER SITY PRE SS
Cambridge, New York, Melb ourn e, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo
Cambridge Univ ersity Press

The Edinburgh Build ing, Ca mbridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge Univers ity Press, New York
www.cambridge.o rg
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521564 199
© Cambridge Unive rsity Press 2000
Th is publ icat ion is in cop yr ight. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licen sin g agreem ent s,
no re production of an y part may take place with out the written
permission of Cambridge Unive rsity Press.
First published 1986

Reprinted 1986, 1987 (twice), 1988 (twice), 1992
Seco nd edition 2000
A catalogue reco rd / or this p ublication is available /rom the Brit ish Library
ISBN 978-0 -52 1-564 19-9 hardback

ISBN 978-0-52 1-56456 -4 paperback
Transferred to di gital pr inting 2008

CONTENTS
List ofillustrations VI
List ofmaps xi
Preface to the second edition xut
Preface to thefirst edition xv
List ofabbreviations xvi
Introduction xvii
1 Questions and answers 1

2 Evolution and supersession of the trieres 25
3 The Salamis campaign 50
4 Sybota and the gulf of Corinth 62
5 Cynossema, Cyzicus and Arginusae 80
6 Naval movements 94
7 The men 101
8 The ships I 121
9 The ships II 158
10 The materials 119
11 The reconstruction: fundamentals ofdesign 191
12 The reconstruction: main features 201
13 The Athenian trireme reconstructed: sea trials of Olympias 231
Appendix I: Fast triereis 216

Appendix II: The Lenormant Relief in projection 280
Glossary 284
Bibliography 295
Generalindex 300
Index ofpassages cited 313
ILLUSTRATIONS
page
1. Model made by Sinclair Morrison in 1940 to demonstrate that the
oars in each three-level unit of a trieres could be of the same length.
Photo: Mark Fiennes. XVIll
2. Full-scale mock-up of a trieres' oarsystem made by JFC and David

Moss in 1982/3. In front, the model of the proposed replica made by
Norman Gundry in 1982/3. Photo:Sam Farr. X IX
3. The mock-up demonstrated at the National Maritime Museum,

Greenwich, April 1983. Photo: National Maritime Museum. xx
4. The three-level open trieres on Trajan'sColumn in Rome, earlysecond
century AD. Photo: Museum of ClassicalArchaeology,Cambridge. XXI
5. The Kyrenia merchant ship, fourth century BC Photo by courtesy of

Professor Michael Katzev, xxu
6. The Trial Piece at Coventry Boarbuilders, June 1985, with the
Tzakakos brothers. Photo: JFC xx v
7. The Trial Piece pulled by the Worcester Rowing Club at Coombe
Abbey, June 1985 . Photo: JFC XXVI
8. The Trial Piece at Henley Royal Regatta, July 1985. Photo: London
Pictures Services. Crown Copyright Reserved. XXVll
9. The ship-sheds at Zea. From Dragatzes (1886) . 6

lOa. Admiral Fincati's model of a sixteenth-century Venetian trireme alia
sensile. 12
lOb. The quadrireme a scaloccio Realwhich fought at Lepanto in 1571. 12
11. Drawing made in Rome between 1610 and 1635 for the Cavaliero
dal Pozzo and now in the British Museum . Photo by courtesy of the
Trustees of the British Museum . 13
12. Fragment of a relief originating in Athens and now in the Museo
Nazionale Abruzzo at LAquila . Ser. Archeologica no. 4464. Photo by
courtesy of the Soprintendente. 14
13. The Lenorrnanr Relief in the Acropolis Museum at Athen s (photo of
the cast in the Museum of Classical Archaeology at Cambridge) .
Photo: Museum. 16
VI
Listofillustrations Vtl
14. Fragment of the monument ofwhich fig. 13 is a part. Photoby cour-

tesy of the National Archaeological Museum, Athens. 18
15. Photograph of an engraving showing the Roman trireme built for
Napoleon III by Dupuy de Lome and Auguste Jal in 1860/1. Photo
by permission of the British Library. 19
16. Various three-level oarsystems proposed for the trieres: (a) Graser
(1864), (b) Lemaitre (1883), (c) Haack-Busley (1895, 1918), (d)
Kopecky (1890), (e) Anderson (1962). 21
17. The alia sensileoarsystem proposed for the trieres by A. B. Cook and
Wigham Richardson (1905). 23
18. Cretan larnax in the Heraklion Museum, I 1985 (LM III, c. 1400
BC). Photoby courtesy of the Museum . 26
19. Scene from a Mycenaean pyxis from the Tragana tholos tomb,
Messenia, 1200-1100 Be. Kourouniotes (1914). 26
20a. Pentecontor from an Attic black-figure dinos, c. 550-530 Be.
Louvre F 62. Photo: Giraudon. 27
20b. Triacontor from an Attic black-figure dinos by the Antimenes
painter, c. 520 Be. Madrid 10902 . Photo: Museo Arqueologico
Naciona l, Madrid. 27
21. Two oared warships of different types from a krater made by
Aristonothos. Probably west Greek, 675-650 Be. Palazzo dei
Conservatori Rome. Photo: Vasari. 28
22a. Fragments of an Attic krater showing the forward part of an oared
warship with hooked tholepins, 760-735 Be. Louvre A 527. Photo:
Museum. 29
22b. Fragments of an Attic krater showing the greater part of an oared
warship with hooked tholepins, 760-735 Be. Louvre A 528. Photo:
Museum. 29
23. Attic spouted bowl showing a warship with oars apparently at two
levels, about 735-710 Be. London XCII B 65. Photo by courtesy of
the Trustees of the British Museum. 30
24. Fragment ofAttic pottery showing a longship with oars at two levels,
about 735-710 Be. Acropolis Museum, Athens NM 266 . Photo:
Museum. 32
25a. Fragments of a relief from the palace of Sennacherib showing a two-
level oared warship taking part in the evacuation ofTyre in 701 Be.
Photoby courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum . 33
25b. Another fragment of a relief from the palace ofSennacherib showing
fleet auxiliaries (round ships) taking part in the evacuation ofTyre in
701 Be. Photoby courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum . 33
uiu List ofillustrations
26. Detail of Attic black-figure cup showing one of two warships with
oars at two levels, c. 510 Be. Photo by courtesy of the Trustees of the
British Museum. 34
27. A scene showing the stern of the Argoengraved on a bronze casket in
the Villa Giulia, Rome, end of the fourth century Be. 35
28a. Octadrachrn from Sidon, c. 380-374 Be. Babelon (1901) pl. CXlX
3. Photo by courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum. 37
28b. Stater from Arados, c. 350-332 Be. B.M.e. Phoenicia pI. II 19.
Photo by courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum. 37
28c. Model of a three-level ship from Erment, Egypt, c. 350-300 Be.
Danish National Museum of Copenhagen. Photo: Museum. 37
29. The disposition of the fleets at the battle ofArginusae. 91
30. Attic black-figure cup signed by Nicosthenes showing two oared
warships with helmsman and bow officer, c. 530-510 Be. Louvre
F 123. Photo: Musees Nationaux, Paris. 112
31. Attic black-figure hydria showing an oared warship with helmsman,
boatswain and bow officer, 570-550 Be. Louvre E 735. Photo:
Chuzeville. 113
32. Graffito from Alba Fucentia showing a warship labelled navistetreris
longa ('four long ship'), first century BC to first century AD. 128
33. The Athlit ram before the removal of the timber. Photo by courtesy
of Professor Elisha Linder of the University of Haifa. 129
34. The relief carved beside the stone steps leading up to the Acropolis at
Lindos, c. 200 Be. Photo: A. S. F. Gow. 130
35a. A model of a reconstructed ship-shed housing the model trieres
shown in fig. 2. Photo: ]Fe. 134
35b. Reconstructed scene at the top of a slipway inside a ship-shed.
Drawing by]Fe. 134
36. The proposed interpretation of the Lenormant Relief 139
37. Apulian rhyton in the shape of the bow of a trieres, 400-322 Be.
Paris Petit Palais 411. Photo: Musee du Petit Palais. 142
38. Rhyron in the shape of a trieres' bow, third to second century Be.
Photo by courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum. 143
39. Coin of Cius in Bithynia showing a trieres' bow, 340 Be. Babelon
(1901) pI. CLXXX4. 143
40 . Distribution of oarsmen in the Lenormant Relief trieres. 146
41a. Attic red-figure volute krater by the Talos painter showing the stern
of the Argo portrayed as a trieres, end of the fifth century Be. latta
Collection, Ruvo. Drawing from Furrwangler and Reichold
(1904-32). 147
List ofillustrations IX
41b. Interpretation of fig. 41a. Drawing by] FC 147

42. Distribution of oarsmen in the Talos vase rrieres, 148
43. Fragment of a red-figure cup showing parr of the side of a trieres,
c. 450 BC Vienna University Museum 503.48. Photo by courresy of
the University ofVienna. 149
44. Wall painting in the House of the Priest Amandus at Pompeii
showing the bow of a three-level oared ship, probably a quin-
quereme, with high bulwarks and many armed men on deck, AD
54-68. From Casson (l97l). 155
45. The oarsystem of a trieres, Drawing by]FC 161
46. The bow timbers of a trieres (perspective). Drawing by]FC 166
47. Attic red-figure stamnos showing Odysseus and the Sirens 520-480
BC London E 440. Photo by courresy of the Trustees of the British
Museum. 168
48. The oars of a trieres as originally reconstructed for Olympias.
Drawing by]FC 172
49. Scene from an Attic black-figure volute krarer painted by Cleitias
showing the stern half of a one-level oared warship, c. 570 BC
Florence 4209. Photo: Soprinrendenza aile Antichita, Firenze. 174
50. Attic black-figure fragment in the Acropolis Museum Athens
showing the stern of an oared warship, c. 570 BC Acropolis 605.
Graef and Langlotz (l925-33). 175
51. Roman oared ship on a mosaic from Thernerra , AD 225-250. After
Foucher (1967). 176
52. Attic black-figure cup showing a pentecontor under sail, c. 500 BC
Louvre F 145. Photo: Louvre. 176
53a. Leaden rings used as fairleads for brailing ropes. 177
53b. Detail from anAttic black-figurejugshowingthe fittingsthrough which
the brailing ropes passedover the yardarm, c. 500 BC British Museum
B 508. Photo bycourresyofrhe'Irusteesofthe BritishMuseum. 177
54. Reconstructed ship: mid-section, December 1981. Drawing by]FC 194
55. Reconstructed ship: lines of hull form No.3, December 1981.
Drawing by]FC 194
56. Reconstructed ship: mid-section, October 1983. Drawing by]FC 198
57. Comparison of the reconstructed ship with the Lenormant Relief.
Drawing by]FC 199
58. Reconstructed ship: final lines of hull. Drawing by]FC 202
59. Reconstructed ship: second test of tenons. Photo: ]FC - 203
60. Model of the ram structure proposed for the reconstructed ship.
Photo:]FC 205
x List ofillustrations
61. General arrangement of the reconstructed ship. Drawing by]FC 208

62. Reconstructed ship: traitdeJupiterscarf. Drawing by]FC 209
63. Reconstructed ship: hull structure (isometric). Drawing by]FC 210
64. Olympias: thranite and zygian rowers. Photo: ]FC 213
65. Olympias: zygian and thalamian rowers. Photo:] FC 214
66. Olympias: the quarterdeck. Photo: ]FC 219
67. Olympias: ram with bronze sheath. Photo: ]FC 221
68. Reconstructed ship: sail and rigging plan. Drawing by]FC 223
69. Olympias under sail: view from the stern. Photo: ]FC 225
70 . Reconstructed ship: conversion to a cavalry transport. Drawing by
]FC 228
7 1. Munychia in the fourth century, a reconstruction. Drawing by]FC 229
72. The reconstructed trieres Olympias at sea. Photo: Alexandra Guest. 232
73. The oars in Olympias, separated in the water by less than 30 em.
Photo: John Illesley. 239
74a: The oars of Olympias as originally constructed with squared tips.
Photo: John Illesley. 241
74b . The oars of Olympias as modified in 1990 into a teardrop shape.
Photo: ]FC 242
75. Oar in Olympias attached to tholepin with a sewn leather oarloop.
Photo: ]FC 243
76. The rope grommet with adjustable knot introduced in 1994 on the
advice of a Poros fisherman. Photo: Nan Shaw. 244
77. Olympias under sail. Photo: ]FC 257
78. Power/speed curves for Olympiasshowing the mean effective propul-
sive power of the oars (in kilowatts) in relation to speed (in knots).
Drawing by]FC 265
79. Position of beams (zyga) relative to thalamians in a ship with an
interscalmium of 0.98 rn. Drawing by]FC 269
80. General arrangement drawings of Olympias and of the proposed
second reconstruction superimposed. Drawing by]FC 270
81. Arrangement of one triad amidships in the proposed second recon-
struction (Mark lIb), showing how oarhandles would pass outboard
of the next rower astern at each level. Drawing by]FC 271
82. The Lenorrnant Relief: with probable thole positions . 281
83. The Lenorrnanr Relief:with oars at more realistic angles. 281
84. The Lenormant Relief: broadside on . 282
85. The Lenorrnanr Relief:seen from 70 off bow.
0
283
MAPS
1. The eastern Mediterranean. 31

2. The Aegean Sea. 52
3. The battle of Salamis. 57
4. The battle of Sybota. 64
5. The entrance to the gulf of Corinth: Phorrnio's first action. 70
6. The entrance to the gulf of Corinth: Phorrnio's second
action. 73
7. The battle ofCynossema. 83
8. The battle ofCyzicus. · 85
9. The battle ofArginusae. 89
10. Piraeus to Mytilene, 96
11. Chios to the Hellespont. 98
12. Corcyra to Rhegium. 100
13. Byzantium to Heraclea. 103
14. Apollodorus' extra duty. 125
15. The battle ofErineus. 164
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
The first edition of this book went to press as the reconstructed trieres was
already under construction, and she was launched as the Hellenic Navy
ship Olympias in June 1987. Between then and the summer of 1994 the
Trireme Trust in conjunction with Trireme Trust USA conducted five
seasons of experimental trials in Olympias under oar and sail. These pro-
vided a great many insights into the problems and practicalities of operat-
ing a ship of this type, some of which have necessarily modified the
authors' views on details of the design. Some modifications have also been
suggested by new archaeological discoveries and by historical, scientific
and physiological research over the last fifteen years.
The authors are therefore most grateful to Cambridge University Press
for agreeing to publish a revised and augmented second edition. This has
enabled us to recast the text to take account of Olympias' existence, and to
make a number of substantive changes throughout in the light of the sea
trials and new research. It has also allowed Boris Rankov to add an entirely
new chapter which describes the trials of Olympias in detail, reports the
performance figures obtained, and outlines the changes which the authors
would wish to incorporate into any second reconstruction. The opportu-
nity has also been taken to add nineteen new illustrations, including
eleven photographs of Olympias at sea demonstrating features of the
design which could only be represented by line drawings in the first
edition.
The construction of Olympias was financed by the Greek Ministry of
Culture and the Hellenic Navy, and our trials of the ship would have been
impossible without the generosity of those two organisations and without
the very considerable logistical support of all kinds provided by the latter.
The authors offer their heartfelt thanks to the countless officers and men
of the Hellenic Navy General Staff, of the Naval Constructors department,
of the Petty Officers Training School (SMYN) at Poros, of the support
xm
XlV Preface to thesecond edition
vessels Kos and Kriti, and of course of the Olympias herself, who have
helped to make the project work. We would also like to acknowledge the
unstinting help and support provided by a succession of British ambassa-
dors and naval attaches to Greece, and by the British Council and the
British School at Athens. Last bur not least, we wish to thank the almost
1,000 volunteer crew and supporters from allover the world who have
either rowed in Olympias or helped with the organisation of her sea trials.
This new edition was produced out of the perspiration and hard work of
all of them.
J.S. Morrison
J.E Coates
N.B. Rankov
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
In the collection of material for this book, and in the scientific and techni-
cal work for the design of the ship which is its raison d'are, the authors
have received generous help from a wide range and a large number ofindi-
viduals and institutions. We have done our best to acknowledge this help
in the Introduction , List of Illustrations and footnotes to the text, but
realise that we cannot here give just recognition to much that has been of
vital importance to us.
More widely we wish to thank those in this country who with us have
founded and who have given support and backing to the Trireme Trust.
Our Greek friends deserve particular mention: Mr George Dracopoulos,
Captain A. I. Tzamtzis of the Hellenic Maritime Museum, Mr H . E. Tzalas
of the Hellenic Institution for the Preservation of Nautical Tradition,
whom we first met at Greenwich in April 1983, Admiral E. Makris, whom
we met subsequently in Piraeus, and last but by no means least
Commodore I. Kolliniatis and Captain S. Platis, with whom we have had
the pleasure of working closely towards the realisation of what is likely to
prove the fastest oared ship afloat. Collectively they have been successful in
secur ing Greek financial backing for building the trireme. We thank them
all for their confidence, collaboration and friendship.
We acknowledge with gratitude the award by the Leverhulme
Foundation of an Emeritus Research Fellowship to John Morrison which
has helped very greatly in the assembly of material, and in travel, con-
nected with the book.
Lastly we wish to thank Cambridge University Press and its skilful and
sympathetic staff whose efficient labours have made it possible for the
book and the ship to be launched together. .
J . S. Morrison
]. F. Coates
xv
ABBREVIATIONS
anc. ancient
AJA American[auralofArchaeology
Arch. Eph Archaiologike Ephemeris (Eph. Arch. before 1860)
C. Cape
CP Classical Philology
CQ Classical Quarterly
CR Classical Review
FGrH Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker: F. Jacoby, 1957-8
GOS Morrison and Williams (1968) : Greek OaredShips
GROW Morrison and Coates (1995): Greek and Roman Oared
Warships
IG Inscriptiones Graecae
IJNA Internationaljournal ofNautical Archaeology
JEA Journal ofEgyptian Archaeology
JHS Journal ofHellenic Studies
LSJ Liddell-Scott-jones: Greek-English Lexicon
LSRS Morrison (1980) LongShipsand Round Ships
MM TheMariner's Mirror
mod. modern
PCG Poetae Comici Graeci: K. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.)
pro promontory
RA RevueArcheologique
SI Systerne International
SIG Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum
Lt. technical term
The initials JSM, JFC and NBR are used to refer to the three authors.
XVI
INTRODUCTION
The idea of building a full-scale reconstruction of a trieres, or Greek

trireme as it is better known in English, the first and most famous of the
standard oared warships of the ancient Mediterranean, first took shape in
1981. Rodd i Williams and I (JSM) were beginning work on a book about
the later oared warships of the Hellenistic and Roman navies, and had
asked John Coates to join us. He had recently retired as Chief Naval
Architect for the Ministry of Defence, and was interested in marine
archaeology. We were aware that the weakness of Greek Oared Ships
900-322 Be (1968) had been its neglect of the architectural and engineer-
ing aspects, and we could see that in the explanation of the nature of the
later (and larger) ships these considerations would have a vital part to play.
At this point, Charles Willink, a classical scholar whom I had known at
Trinity, telephoned to say that he had been having dinner with Frank
Welsh, a banker and writer, and Edwin Wolff, a Liverpool solicitor who
had recently spent a year as a Visiting Senior Member at Wolfson, my most
recent College at Cambridge. The idea had come up of making a recon-
struction of a trireme , and he asked if I was interested. I telephoned John
Coates , warning him that if we did agree to undertake such an enterprise
most of the work would fall on him. It so happened that he and I, as might
have been foreseen, had just reached the conclusion that before we could
approach the design problems of the later ships we should need as a start-
ing-point to develop in more detail the design of the trieres; for it was
beginning to appear that the design of the later ships was likely to have
been based on that of the trieres. Early design work on the trieres had
already been started, so we were in the mood to agree to undertake the
project , and we did so.
The first public step was a press conference in the City of London in
August 1982, at which the project was announced to the world , and a
partial model of the proposed oarsystem was exhibited (fig. 1). Seven years
XVlt
xuut Introduction
1. Model made by Sinclair Morrison in 1940 to demonstrate that the oars in

each three-level unit of a rrieres could be of the same length.
before, there had been a correspondence of record length in The Times (6

September to 4 October 1975) on the subject of the trieres. We were not
therefore surprised at the considerable attention the announcement
aroused in this country as well as in continental Europe and in the USA.
The trieres was clearly not only a matter ofarcane interest to a few classical
scholars, ancient historians and archaeologists. A much greater number of
other people had had their curiosity stimulated, and frustrated, in their
school-days by reading about these famous and quite extraordinary war-
ships , and finding no adequate explanation of how they were pulled by
their huge crews of oarsmen. Rowing men, boatbuilders, scientists and
Mediterranean yachtsmen all joined in, displaying very decided views on
various aspects of the ship and its performance, and adding significantly to
the body of relevant knowledge.
The press conference was followed in April 1983 by an Advisory
Discussion. This was a 'live' version of the Times correspondence and so
designated with the profitable outcome of the latter in mind. It was held at
the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich under the auspices of the
Director, Dr Basil Greenhill, and with the valuable and energetic assis-
Introduction XIX
2. Full-scale mock-up of a trieres' oarsystem made by JFC and David Moss

in 1982/3. In front, the model of the proposed replica made by Norman
Gundry in 1982/3.
ranee of Dr Sean McGrail and his department. During the previous winter
John Coates and another naval architect, David Moss, had built a full-scale
mock-up of the oarsystem which we were proposing for the reconstruction
(fig. 2), while another friend ofJohn Coates, Norman Gundry, made a 1.5
m model of the whole ship (fig. 2, foreground), both to be shown, with
drawings, at Greenwich. All the people who were known to have an inter-
est in the subject were invited to attend the discussion, and a good
number, including a strong contingent from Greece and one or rwo from
other continental European countries and from America, were able to
come. We wanted to receive as many comments and suggestions as pos-
sible before, rather than after, the designs were finalised, and to have time
to consider them.
The model and the working drawings were exhibited and explained, and
the ancient evidence discussed. The mock-up of the oarsystern, with a pool
alongside, was set up outside the Museum , and manned by a crew of
oarsmen from Emmanuel College, Cambridge, who after some preliminary
xx Introduction
3. The mock-up demonstrated at the Nat ional Maritime Museum .

Greenwich, April 1983.
splashing settled down to a steady, if cautious rhythm (fig. 3). A naval

onlooker! suggested that the uppermost oarsmen might more comfortably
hold their oars with their inner hand under rather than above the oar (a
position adopted in fact by the uppermost oarsmen of the open Roman
trireme, Trajan's flagship, on Trajan's column (fig. 4)). There was some dis-
cussion of the steepness of the angle made with the water by the uppermost
oars, which we were subsequently able to reduce. In general, both oarcrew
and spectators expressed themselves satisfied with the system, although
some doubts remained about the top oars.
For the structure of the hull we proposed to take as a model the third-
century Phoenician oared ships/ found by M iss Honor Frost off Marsala
(anc. Lilybaeum) and also the fourth-century Kyrenia merchant ship
(fig. 5) .3 It was fortunate that Richard StefIY was able to be present at the
I Admiral Sir Simon Cassels KBE, The Admiral President of the Royal Naval
College. 2 Honor Frost (1973) and (1974b) .
3 H . W Swiny and M . L. Karzev(1973) and (1974).
Introduction XXi
4. The three-level open rrieres on Trajan's Column in Rome, early second

century AD.
discussion. He was a member of the team from the Texas Institute of

Nautical Archaeology which had raised the Kyrenia ship . He gave advice
on the method of construction, and the discussion on this topic was par-
ticularly fruitful.
The Advisory Discussion at Greenwich was recorded and published by
the National Maritime Museum in December 1984. It had attracted a good
deal of attention in the press, and had resulted in an invitation from the
DailyExpress to exhibit the mock-up, the model and the working drawings
at the Earl's Court Boat Show in January 1984. In September 1982 John
Coates and Eric McKee,4 who was advising the Trust as an expert in
methods ofwooden boat construction, visited Greece to study the work that
was being done in a Piraeus boatyard on a replica of the Kyrenia merchant
ship. John Coates was invited to give a lecture on the Trust's project to a
Greek audience. In conversations with the President and Secretary General
of the Hellenic Maritime Museum (Admiral E. Makris and Captain A. I.
Tzamtzis), with the President of the Institute for the Preservation of
Nautical Tradition (Mr Harry Tzalas) and with representatives of the
4 See the Bibliography.

xxtt Introduction
5. The Kyrenia merchant ship, fourth century BC

Introduction xxut
Hellenic Navy, the Trust's representatives became aware that there was a
great deal of active interest and substantial support for the project in various
quarters in Greece, official and unofficial. Sadly, and to the detriment of the
project, Eric McKee died suddenly, shortly after taking part in these promis-
ing discussions.
In Britain the promoters of the project had by now formed the Trireme
Trust, with charitable status. Air Vice-Marshal Peter Turner, Bursar of
Wolfson College, became its Treasurer, and a public appeal for contribu-
tions was made . A number of generous donations resulted, including a
substantial gift from Mr Eddy Kulukundis and research grants from the
Classical Faculty at Cambridge and a number of Cambridge Colleges. The
exhibition of the mock-up and model at the Boat Show, the former with
oars pulled by crews from Trinity, Magdalene and Corpus Christi
Colleges, brought in some further contributions and widened the general
interest in the project. Achievement of the Trust's aim began now to seem
possible.
It was realised at the outset that before the building of the ship could be
put in hand a good deal of preliminary experimentation would be neces-
sary. Small models to test the run of planking at bow and stern would have
to be made, and destruction tests carried out on the mortice-and-tenon
joints by which the planks of the hull were fastened edge to edge. It was also
seen to be necessary to build a piece of the hull to full scale to tryout the
ancient methods of construction, as attested by the discovered remains of
ancient hulls, and to experiment in accurate detail with the seating and
pull ing arrangements for the oarsmen. Problems which drawings might not
reveal could thus be identified and tackled in advance of the actual building
of the ship. A Trial Piece built for these purposes would also serve as a useful
guide for the future boatbuilders, and might ultimately find a place in a
Maritime Museum, since it would be a section, accurate in all respects, of
the built ship. Accordingly, in June 1984 a contract for building a full-scale
Trial Piece, one-seventh as long (5.5 rn) and slightly over half as broad (3.5
m) as the eventual ship , was placed with Coventry Boatbuilders at an initial
cost of £30,000 (which eventually rose to £40,000). In view of the favour-
able prospects which were developing in Greece the Trust thought it essen-
tial to press on with these essential preliminary stages, although funds from
the appeal were not yet sufficient to cover them, Lloyd's Bank and the Co-
operative Bank provided overdraft facilities.
XXIV Introduction
In February 1984 Frank Welsh and I had visited Athens to talk to our
Greek friends. They came forward with a firm proposal that the rwo minis-
tries involved, Defence and Culture, and the National Tourist
Organisation, should put up half the cost of building the ship (which they
estimated at £300,000) if the Trust would put up the other half, in addi-
tion to the research and development costs already incurred and the cost of
the Trial Place. On our return the Trust began to look for some more sub-
stantial sponsorship. In June 1984 Frank Welsh went to Athens for the
Poseidonia shipping exhibition, taking with him the Gundry model for
display on the Hellenic Navy stand. He was then officially informed that
the Hellenic Navy, having received assurances of full financial support
from Greek sources, was prepared to go ahead with the building of the ship
in Greece, the Trust providing the Trial Piece, detailed specifications and
working drawings, and conducting the sea trials of the ship when com-
pleted. John Coates and I went to Athens at the end ofJune shortly after
the public accouncement there of the initiation of the project by the
Hellenic Navy and the Trust in partnership. Mr George Dracopoulos,
chairman of Empros Lines , offered free transport of the Trial Piece from
Felixstowe to Piraeus and back.
By this time, after more than a year's work, John Coates had developed
the design to the point where a specification could be written. As the
Hellenic Navy wished to press ahead and invite tenders to build, he set
about writing it. With substantial help from Dorian Dyrnoke, this ISO-page
document was completed, together with the building drawings, in time to
meet the Hellenic Navy authorities again at the end of}uly. In consultation
with John Coates, they immediately translated the specification into Greek
and sent out invitations to tender for building the trieres in Greece.
During the winter of 1984/5 while the building contract was being nego-
tiated in Greece , the Trial Piece was being constructed in Britain, rather
slowly at first owing to the large amount of work involved in forming and
fitting the keel and th e thick lower makes. Commander Stavros Platis and
Lieutenant Christos Leletzis of the Hellenic Navy visited Coventry to see
the progress and to understand the problems of building an ancient ship . In
May 1985 the building contract was awarded to the boat-building firm of
the brothers Tzakakos ofKiratzini a suburb of Piraeus. The rwo brothers are
seen in fig. 6 in front of the Trial Piece at Coventry a few weeks later.
The Stewards of the Henley Regatta kindly agreed to a reque st from the
Introduction xxv
6. The Trial Piece at Coventry Boatbuilders, June 1985,

with the Tzakakos brothers.
Trust that the Trial Piece should be shown at the Regatta before being
shipped out to Greece at the end of July. Their chairman Mr Peter Coni
QC earned our gratitude for the helpful and efficient way he enabled us to
carry out this rather unusual operation, financed by a generous grant from
the Hellenic Foundation.
To be sure that all would be well at Henley, the Trial Piece was given a
preliminary testing in the moat of Coombe Abbey near Coventry, where
the fifteen oars were pulled with great enthusiasm and precision first by
Warwick University Boat Club and then by Worcester Rowing Club.
Since it was only a small part of the complete ship and asymmetrical along
its length and across its breadth, the achievement by means ofa number of
steel drums of exactly the right position in the water demanded by the
sophisticated oarsystem was a matter of delicate calculation and experi-
ment. Fig. 7 shows how John Coates' sums and the Worcester Rowing
Club's performance came right .
At Henley, publicity for exhibiting the Trial Piece was financed by
grants from Global Asset Management and the Grocers' Company, and
the whole event was organised with the greatest efficiency and enthusiasm
by the Trust's Henley representative Rosie Randolph of Watlington. Our
purpose at Henley was to interest and inform the international rowing
XXVl Introduction
7. The Trial Piece pulled by the Worcester Rowing Club at Coombe Abbey,
June 1985.
community about the trireme and the building of the ship in Greece with a
view to the recruitment of volunteer oarsmen and oarswomen for the sea
trials in the autumn of 1986 or the spring of the following year. A number
of rowing clubs and about 150 individuals put their names on the list,
among them Boris Rankov, an oarsman and ancient historian who later
became one of the rowing masters in the reconstructed trieres. To these the
Trial Piece gave some indication of what pulling a trieres would be like
(fig. 8), and it did not seem to deter them . The exhibition also stimulated a
very lively interest by many members of the public in the whole project.
Some useful contacts were made and suggestions put forward in the area of
fund-raising. These were important because the activities of the Trust were
still being run almost entirely on credit.
After two weeks at Henley the Trial Piece was lifted from the river onto a
truck and driven to Felixstowe, where one of Mr George Dracopoulos'
Empros Line ships was waiting to take it to Greece. The first stage of the
British part of the project had been completed.
Building the trieres herself had already started in Greece and, in the
1ntroduction XXVlZ
8. The Trial Piece at Henley Royal Regatta, July 1985.
event, took two years and two months from signing the contract to com-
pletion of acceptance trials by the Hellenic Navy. Oversight of construc-
tion was by the Hellenic Navy assisted by John Coates. The second stage of
the British part of the project, the conduct of the sea trials to explore the
performance of the ship, began at the end ofJuly 1987 at Poros, off the east
coast of the Peloponnese where the Hellenic Navy generously accommo-
dated free of charge the necessary 200 odd oarcrew, deck crew and trials
staff. At the start of these trials no one knew anything about operating such
a ship; there was all to learn.
Thanks to the continued support of the Hellenic Navy, four more
periods of trials at Poros were possible, in the course of which, with the
help and exertions of internationally recruited oarcrews of men and
women, achieved speeds were raised to nearly nine knots, about half a knot
short of the historically deduced target speed for fast triereis. The perfor-
mance under oar achieved in the sea trials was greatly assisted by the
enthusiastic and dedicated contributions of both oarcrew and trials staff
from the USA, organised by the Trireme Trust, USA.
XXVIlt Introduction
The ship, named Olympias, has, as may have been expected, been
revealed by trials to have some shortcomings, but the trials also demon-
strated beyond reasonable doubt that the design of the ship was correct in
its fundamentals. She has therefore fulfilled the purposes for which she was
built and has fully justified carrying out this large project in experimental
ship archaeology, quite apart from the enjoyment given to the many who
have been aboard her in one capacity or another.
Reports of all the periods of sea trials have either been published or are
currently in press and the knowledge gained from operating this recon-
structed trieres has been applied in proposing more recently some practical
designs for the dozen or so other attested types of warship which were also
instruments of sea power in the Mediterranean during the millennium
from the time ofArchaic Greece to that of the Roman Empire.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The Greeks called the standard warship of the classical period a trieres. The
Romans called it a triremis, and English scholars have traditionally fol-
lowed the Romans and called it a trireme. 1 But since the Greek ship is the
theme of this book we shall use the term 'trieres' (plural 'rriereis') through-
out, except when we are speaking of the Roman vessel.
At the outset a number of questions require to be answered. Why is the
trieres important? Why did a book need to be written on the subject? Why
should the book have been followed up by the design and making ofa full-
scale ship? And, finally, why was the definitive book not written, and a
satisfactory ship built, long ago, since the evidence has been available for a
good many years?
The importance of the trieres

Oared warships, of which the trieres is the most famous, lie at the heart of
the Greek, Hellenistic and Roman story as it unfolds from Homer to
Constantine. In the seventh and sixth centuries BC, oared galleys took
Greek colonists from their mother cities to all parts of the Mediterranean
and the Black Sea. In 480 BC a great Persian armada was defeated by a
much smaller Greek fleet in the narrow waters between Attica and the
island of Salamis. Athens' ensuing maritime supremacy was founded on
the crucial role which she played in that famous victory. The skilled use of
the trieres enabled her to win, and for some decades to keep, the hegemony
over some, at least, of her former Greek allies. In the fourth century larger
oared ships - 'fours', 'fives', and 'sixes' - were built in Sicily at Syracuse to
I Unlike the French (triere) and the Germans (Triere). The word 'trieres' probably
means 'fitted with three' ofsomething. Aeschylus Persians 679 and 1074 uses the
epithet triskalmos of triereis. Lionel Casson calls the ships of higher denomina-
tion 'fours', 'fives' etc.
1
2 The Athenian trireme
meet the growing seapower of Phoenician Carthage, and 'fours' and 'fives'
were employed at the end of the century by Athens and in the Levant.
After the death of Alexander, his successors in the late fourth and third
centuries BC dispured among themselves the command of the Eastern
Mediterranean in fleets of increasingly large denomination. Rome had to
build fleets of 'fives' (quinqueremes) and accustom herself ro their use in a
war with Carthage for the control of Sicily. In 31 BC at the sea battle of
Actiurn, fought in oared ships of a great variety of sizes, the young
Octavian defeated Antony and Cleopatra and gained the mastery of the
Roman world as the emperor Augustus.
To understand the naval confrontations ofancient history, on which the
furure of western civilisation has so often turned, it is essential to know as
much as possible of the nature and potentials of the vessels in which the
two sides fought, as well as ro form an idea of the economic and social
aspects of the organisation of fleets; and knowledge of the trieres is basic to
the understanding of the larger ships. The rrieres was the first type of oared
warship to be pulled by oars at three levels. No representation of an oared
warship exists showing oars at more than three levels. It seems likely, then,
that the types of denomination five to eight were pulled at three levels
employing more than one man ro an oar, in a five at two levels and in the
others at all three levels. The four is likely to have employed two men at
each of two levels and the types larger than eights to have employed gangs
of men at big oars again at two levels. It follows that understanding of the
trieres is important in relation not only to the deployment of that ship
herself bur also to the deployment of the larger ships which also were
pulled by oarsmen at three levels.
To Athens in the fifth and early fourth century BC the importance of
the trieres hardly needs ro be emphasised. The fleet of 200 rriereis built
shortly before the second Persian invasion, when she was involved in a
naval war with Aegina, enabled the Greeks successfully to repel the inva-
sion when it came. The entrance fee to the club of naval powers was high,
and we are told that Athens was only able to afford it by using, at
Thernisrocles' suggestion, the proceeds of a lucky strike in the silver mines
at Laurium. These ships were also, Plutarch tells us (Cimon 12.2) , specially
designed by Thernistocles 'for speed and quick turning', informatio n
which suggests that he had his own ideas of trieres tactics. Only by under-
standing these tactics and the nature of the ships which employed them
Questions and answers 3
can we form an idea of how the Greeks were able to defeat a fleet three
times the size of their own.
After the repulse of the Persian invasion a naval force under Athenian
command proceeded to liberate the Greek cities ofAsia Minor and the off-
shore islands, as well as part of Cyprus, and later invaded Egypt. In the last
third of the fifth century Athens, now at war with her Peloponnesian allies,
ensured her power at sea with a mastery of that special skill in fighting with
triereis which was the despair of her rivals, and which, in the end, led her
to overestimate the value of sea power against a continental league . In 415
an over-confident and ill-planned naval expedition to Sicily ended in dis-
aster, and was a prelude to Athens' ultimate defeat by Sparta and her allies
in 404, after some brave attempts to re-establish her naval command of the
Aegean. Even after her defeat and surrender she managed with inadequate
resources and varying success to cling to some semblance of maritime
supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean for more than three-quarters of a
century, in competition with strong Peloponnesian, Theban and ulti-
mately Macedonian fleets, until her defeat at sea by a Macedonian-led
Phoenician fleet off Amorgus in 322. A fitting epitaph for Athenian sea
power is the proud reply put into the mouth of an Athenian traveller by a
comic poet (Aristophanes, Birds 108) in the year of the Sicilian expedition.
Asked for his country of origin he gives the answenWhere the fine triereis
come from.' It was, it seems, the superior quality of her ships of which she
boasted. This, very briefly, is the story of the Age of the Trieres.i and of the
trieres as the weapon by which Athens achieved and maintained, and in
which in the end she lost, her power and prosperity. The trieres was not
only a battle weapon but also the means by which Athens deployed her
military power quickly and for the most part effectively.
The need for a theoretical reconstruction

The trieres is important, firstly because her design is basic to the designs of
some of the subsequent ancient oared warships, and secondly because she
2 Lionel Casson entitles chapter 4 of his Ships and Seamanship in theAncientWorld

(1971) 'The age of the trireme', Cf. Tarn (1930) p. 122: 'Down to the final
destruction of Athenian sea-power at the battle of Amorgus in 322 the standard
warship of the Mediterranean had been the trireme.'
4 TheAthenian trireme
played so significant a role in preserving the political and economic condi-

tions in which Athens was able to make her great contribution to ideas of
human society, to art, literature and philosophy. We need to know, and
modern historians of Greece have not yet told us, how the trieres played
that role, or rather how it was that the Athenians exploited more success-
fully than others the potential of the three-level oared ship as a naval
weapon, and what that potential was. We want to know how she was used,
to attempt to recognise the tactical purposes for which she was built, her
strengths, and the limitations on her use which those strengths necessarily
imposed. Fundamental questions need to be answered about the physical
environment provided for her crew, the practice of pulling and sailing, her
performance under oar and sail, the pay and recruitment of her crew, and
the materials with which she was built. All this may be called the theoreti-
cal reconstruction of the trieres, and it needs to be set out as far as the evi-
dence we have will allow.
There are two possible kinds of indisputable evidence for an ancient
object: actual recognisable remains and a detailed description in contem-
porary literature. Neither exists for the trieres.
Recent activities of underwater archaeologists in the Mediterranean
have produced no remains of a trieres to give a whole or partial answer to
questions about the hull-structure or oarsystem, although numerous
remains of ancient merchant ships have been found, some of them deriv-
ing from the fifth and fourth centuries Be and offering a useful analogy for
building a trieres' hull (below, pp. 128-9). Nor do historians writing at the
time when the trieres was the standard warship ofcontemporary fleets give
the kind of detailed descriptions of her such as we have of the monster
double-hulled 'forty' which Ptolemy Philopator built (below, p. 15) or of
the Byzantine dromon (below, p. 10).
The enquirer must satisfy his frustrated curiosity by picking up infor-
mation about the trieres from any contemporary source he can.
First will be the narratives of the historians describing the actions and
voyages of triereis at sea. These will give him a feel of what sort of ship the
trieres was. The picture he gets will be supplemented by passing references
to triereis or things connected with them in the poets - tragic and, in par-
ticular, comic - and even in the philosophers.
After literature, archaeology provides a variety of indirect information.
The excavated remains of the Zea ship-sheds, built for triereis, give the
maximum overall dimensions of the ship (c. 37 metres long, c. 5.9 metres
broad) (fig. 9). The surviving inventories of the Piraeus naval dockyards
inscribed on stone and covering a number of years in the last third of the
fourt h century, provide a wealth of detailed information, in particular the
length and number of the oars in the various categories. Finally there are
the vase-paintings, reliefs and coins which can be claimed to represent the
trieres, though no ship is labelled as such.
The intricate process of piecing together the clues from all these sources
has the fascinating quality of a detective story and has attracted profes-
sional interest not only among classical scholars .
The foundations of the present investigation were laid in Greek Oared
Ships in 1968, but although the general principles of the trieres ' oarsystem
there presented seem now to be generally accepted, a good deal more work
remained to be done. The use of the ship in battle and moving from place
to place has had to be more closely studied, and the nature of the ship and
her characteristics have had to be deduced as ground rules for a theoretical
reconstruction. These ground rules have then had to be embodied in a
detailed design which would satisfy the demands of the naval architect as
well as those of the historian and archaeologist.
The need for a practical reconstruction
The next step was to build a trieres. One reason for doing this was the
truth that the proof of this particular pudding is very much in the eating,
since it had to be borne in mind that a three-level oared ship was an elab-
orate and highly sophisticated phenomenon without parallel elsewhere in
time or place. The picture of the trieres which could be pieced together in a
book is by the nature of the evidence necessarily a fragile construction,
resting on interpretations of difficult texts and puzzling representations.
The joint authors of this book by working together for the first time
brought to bear on 'the trireme problem' three systems of knowledge: the
learn ing of the scholar and traditional archaeologist, the more recent
knowledge ofancient ship construction gleaned by underwater archaeolo-
gists, and the professional skill of the modern warship designer. In the light
of that pooled expertise there appeared to be, apart from details, only one
practicable design for the trieres which conformed to the available evi-
dence. That thesis was strengthened during the development of the design
.::: ::.:-.: : : ~
(
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.::: :-:::.-.: :.-:.:: ~
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---- -- -. . · -·d
·" --" ·' '' . .4.: o
as more features were worked out and found to knit together neatly, with
the need for no more than minor adjustments to the main parameters.
Thus we had on paper a ship which was not only a practical proposition
but was also very likely to be in essentials the only possible solution to the
trieres problem. Such a ship seemed well worth building.
A reconstructed ship ought to accord with the known evidence about
the original in dimensions, materials, construction, appearance and per-
formance. If that is not completely possible, the exceptions should be
defined and explained. Consequences or side effects of exceptions should
be made clear.
The purposes of building a full-scale trieres need to be defined.
Reconstruction of the past, by itself, in most cases hardly justifies the
expense and effort involved. The best reason for making reconstructions of
past artefacts is to improve our understanding of important aspects of
history. As most artefacts are made for use, reconstructions can generally
serve their main purpose only if they too work, and their performance can
be assessed by proper measurements. An historically authentic working
ship reconstruction can give us an insight into the realities of ancient sea-
faring, mercantile or naval, which would otherwise be unattainable.
Another aspect of reconstructions, well expressed by Howard I. Chappelle
(1936), the historian of American sailing ships, '.. . is that of learning to
appreciate the intellect and ability of past generations. It is perfectly
natural for each successive generation to look upon itself as far better
equipped mentally than the ones before. If, however, one may judge by a
comparison of naval architecture of the past with that of today as repre-
sented by modern sailing craft, there is little to support this self-admira-
tion ... men of earlier years had the same abilities and powers of reason
and intellect that can be found in similar stations oflife today.' The design
of the trieres reconstruction has not only fully demonstrated Chappelle's
point, but also borne witness to the very high level of craftsmanship in
wood achieved in ancient times. The reconstructed ship has brought home
to many that techniques of wood construction were as refined as those in
stone and metal with which we have for a long time been familiar through
numerous surviving examples of ancient architecture and sculpture.
The importance ofship reconstructions from the ancient Mediterranean
world is enhanced by three further facts. The first is that stone and metal
played a role in the general constructive and manufacturing effort of those
societies that was relatively minor compared with that of wood, though of
course surviving relics would overwhelmingly and quite erroneously indi -
cate the opposite.
Secondly, ships represent solutions to more complex and testing struc-
tural problems than arise in land-based structures. Thirdly, among ships,
those for war were developed to points nearest to the edge of technical fea-
sibility at the time, regardless, it seems, of safety, expense or effort: they
were, and indeed always have been, in modern terms, the high-technology
products of their time.
The purposes of the reconstructed ship were four: (1) to prove that the
reconstruction designed to the historical requirements and built in accor-
dance with archaeological evidence would have a performance consistent
with historical accounts; (2) to improve understanding of naval operations
in the Mediterranean from the fifth to the third centuries BC; (3) to
broaden appreciation of the technical, economic and naval achievements
of Hellenic society and culture from the fifth to the third centuries BC by
exhibiting the reconstruction to the public in Greece with explanatory
material; (4) to recreate one of the major artefacts of Hellenic civilisation
and a unique ship-type of outstanding interest to naval historians and
architects.
The history of the problem

The last question remains. Why was the problem not solved, and a recon-
structed ship not built to everyone's satisfaction, long ago?3The historian
Zosimus, writing in the fifth century AD, speaks (5.20.3-4) of the 'libur-
nians' which the Gothic chief Fravitta employed in the Aegean at the
beginning of the century: 'These seem to be not less speedy than pente-
contors" though far inferior to ships of the trieres kind, the method ofcon-
struction of the latter having been ftrgotten many years ago.' Zosimus
(2.22.3, 23.3) speaks of the last engagement in which rriereis took part,
the battle between Constantine and Licinius at the Hellespont in AD 323.
3 For rhe history of the problem in great detail from the fifteenth to the twentieth
century AD see L.Th. Lehmann The Polyene Quest1995 Amsterdam .
4 Oared ships with 15 oarsmen a side at one or two levels were called triacontors
(thirty-oared ships) . Those with 25 oarsmen a side at one or two levelswere called
pentecontors (fifry-oared ships).
On that occasion 200 of Licinius' triereis were defeated by 80 of

Constantine's thirty-oared ships, a result which no doubt contributed to
the trieres' final obsolescence.
The liburnian was originally a light warship with oars at two levels,
invented as a pirate craft on the Dalmatian coast and subsequently much
used in Roman Heets.? Vegetius, who was a contemporary of Zosimus,
came to use the word for warships in general ( On Warfare 2.1)
There are several kinds of liburnians, the smallest have one column or file (ordo:
i.e, of oarsmen) a side, the slightly bigger ones have two a side, while those of the
ideal size have three or four a side; sometimes they have five levels (gradus) a side.
This should not seem strange to anyone when in the battle ofActium much larger
vessels are said to have run.
There are two things to be noted in connection with Vegetius' observa-

tions. Firstly there is no evidence for ships being pulled at more than three
levels, nor is such a thing feasible. Secondly, Vegetius was writing at a time
when 'the method of building ships of the trieres kind had long been for-
gotten'. He reveals himself as the first of many writers on the subject to
explain the ancient types of ships, 'threes', 'fours', 'fives', etc. in terms of
the oared ships of their own time. He slips from columns or files (i.e. lines
of oarsmen sitting one behind the other from stern to bow at one or more
levels: figs. 20 and 26) quite unconsciously to speak of levels, as if the
number offiles and the number oflevels ofoarsmen in a ship were necessar-
ilythe same.
He does this without noticing it because in the rwo-level liburnians (as
in the warships in fig. 26) known to him there were in fact two fore-and-aft
files of oarsmen, and one was above the other on each side of the ship.
Quinqueremes, then, were for him, by the same mode of reckoning, ships
with five fore-and-aft files ofoarsmen on each side of the ship sitting atfive
5 Appian (early second century AD), Roman History 10.1.3 : 'The liburnian was
named after a tribe of Illyrian pirates who roved the Ionian sea and islands in
ships both fast and light .. . whence even now the Romans call their light swift
ships with two oar-beats (dikrotous) liburnians.' For the meaning of dikrotous see
Xenophon, HG 2.1.27-9 where of the Athenian triereis at Aegospotami, sur-
prised on the beach by the Spartan admiral Lysander's unexpected attack, some
were caught monokrotoi (i.e. with one file of oarsmen manned) , some dikrotoi
(i.e. with two files manned), and some entirely empty. See below, p. 28 n. 2.
levels. He has interpreted the quinquereme, quite absurdly, in terms of the

ships he knew, although no representations of ships with more than three
levels of oars have been shown to exist.
The warships of the Byzantine navy were called dromons ('runners').
We possess a building brief for them from the hand of the emperor Leo VI
(19. 7), who was writing at the end of the ninth century AD:
Let each of the dromons be long in proportion to her breadth and well propor-
tioned with two oar-levels, the upper and the lower. Let each oar-level have at least
twenty-five thwarts (zyga) on which the oarsmen will sit, so that all the thwarts are
twenty-five above and twenty-five below, making fifty in all. And on each one of
them let two oarsmen sit, one on the starboard side and one on the port side.
Leo's dromon is nearly as big as the Boeotian ships in Homer (Iliad

2.509-10); it is a large two-level ship with 50 oarsmen a side in two files of
25, each man pulling a single oar. There is no deck between the two levels
of Vegetius' liburnians or of Leo's dromons, nor had there been a deck
between the levels in the two-level pentecontor.
The anonymous author of the Itinerarium Peregrinorum, however, who
wrote in the twelfth century about the crusade of King Richard of
England, appears to have known oared warships in which the two levels
were separated by an actual deck. He tells (ch. 34) the story of the sea-fight
between the Christians and Turks in the bay of Acre in the course ofwhich
Turks got possession of the upper deck ofa galea and her oars and pulled in
one direction, while the Christians, still in possession of the oars below,
pulled in the other, and succeeded in winning this unusual kind of boat
race. When the author comes to mention the ships of antiquity, with
echoes ofVegetius, he, like Vegetius, interprets them in terms of the ships
he knows, but the ships of his time are different from Vegetius'. They have
a deck between the two levels of oars. The ships of the ancients, he says,
accordingly 'rose level by level in distinct decks and some smote the waves
with the beat of the longest oar, others with the beat of a shorter oar'.
There is no need to trust the author of the Itinerariums account of how
ancient ships were pulled, any more than Vegerius'. Both are reflections of
the oared ships of their respective times.
In Renaissance Europe the general awakening of interest in the ancient
world led to speculation about the nature of the oared ships which readers
found mentioned in their texts. In 1514 the French humanist Bude,
who was acquainted with the contemporary galleys of the western

Mediterranean and Adriatic, wrote 0514, p. 135):
We read that among the ancient peoples there were not only ships of three files
[i.e. of oarsmen] which are called triremes by our moderns, triereis by the Greeks
(in these ships three oarsmen sit to each bench each pulling his own oar, so that the
man who sits furthest inboard pulls the longest oar) but also quadriremes and
quinqueremes and ships of six files of oarsmen.
The system of oars which Bude describes is the system known as alia
sensile, developed in the Mediterranean from the tenth century onwards
from small vessels to those in which the oars at each bench were not only of
different lengths but also nearly 36 ft 01.83 rn) long. Molmenti 0906:
Vol. 1, p. 131)6 describes this system and the one that followed it:
The (Venetian) galley was propelled by oars, first of all two to a bench, then three
or even four, so that they took the classical names of triremes and quadriremes. It
was not until the middle of the sixteenth century that they adopted the single oar,
forry or fifry feet long, rowed by four, five, six, seven, or even eight men.
The former system can be recognised as the alia sensile system, the latter as
the a sealoeeio (figs. lOa and b). It is clear that Bude, like the others before
him, aided and abetted by the Venetians, who called their alia sensile
galleys by the ancient names, has attributed the known contemporary alia
sensile system, in the usual manner but again quite arbitrarily, to the
ancient ships.
Sir Henry Savile, Queen Elizabeth's tutor in Greek and later Provost of
Eton, saw the fallacy in the approach to the problem adopted by Bude and
others. He writes 0581: p. 49 of the notes):
Now warships (longae) were sorted into their several kindes according to the
number of bankes [i.e. benches] and oares placed one above the other, as I take
6 Cf. Guilmartin (1974) p. 101: 'Starting abourrhe middle of the fifteenth century
there was a shift in the rowing system of the Mediterranean galleys from one
where each oarsman pulled his own individual oar to one in which all the
oarsmen on a bench pulled a single large oar', p. 226: 'Before 1550 the standard
Mediterranean warship was the triremi alia sensile of 24 banks', i.e. benches of
three oarsmen (so 72 a side, 144 all told). For the length of the oars in alla sensile
galleys seeJurien de la Graviere (1885) pp. 190-1. The gearing was 3.8 m (loom):
8 m (outboard).
b Bow
1Oa. Admiral Fincati's model of a sixteenth-century Venetian trireme

allasensile.
1Db. The quadrireme a sealoeeio Realwhich fought at Lepanto in 1571.
it, though peradventure not directly. Some I know have concluded otherwise,
that in triremes, for example, three men with three oares sate upon one banke
[i.e. bench, the alla sensile system], some other that three men pulled at one oare
[i.e. the a scaloccio system], directly against both the authority of ancient writers
produced by themselves and contrary to the ancient ponraytures remaining yet
to be seene: so incredible a thing it seemed to beleeve that which in our galleyes
nowadaye they never saw: whereas in truth Zosimus telleth us that very many
yeares before his time they had discontinued to make any ships of the trireme
type at all.
11. Drawing made in Rome between 1610 and 1635 for the Cavaliero dal
Pozzo and now in the British Museum.
The ancient authority Savile is thinking of is probably Aristophanes, who

spoke (Frogs 1074-5) of one oarsman in a trieres making wind and worse
into the face of another (see below, p. 17); and one of the 'ancient portray-
tures' is probably the three-level ship on Trajan's column in Rome (fig. 4).
Another may have been the relief of which the drawing in Cavaliero dal
Pozzo's collection is all that survives (fig. 11; below, p. 140); a third pos-
sibly the Aquila relief (fig. 12; below, p. 142). It is as well that he did not
take other examples than the trieres for his own explanation, but his main
point is an important one, that people refused, in spite of the evidence, to
believe in an oarsystem which was not actually practised in the galleys of
their time.
Savile did not address himself to a formidable difficulty which had
rightly worried a younger contemporary of Bude, Lazar de Baif.
Appointed ambassador of the French king to the Venetian Republic, he
wrote from Venice asking his friend Dinteville to send him some engrav-
ings, the majority from the relief on Trajan's column. In 1536, on his
return to France, he wrote a monograph on ancient ships in which he
12. Fragment of a relief originating in Athens and now in the Museo

Nationale Abruzzo at LAquila.
included the engravings but adhered to the current theory that the anc ient
trieres was pulled on a one-level system. He accepted the two-level system
in some ships presumably because this was a contemporary practice; but
on the three-level ship on Trajan's column, which he discusses, he merely
comments: 'I do not think that this is the trireme which the ancients
used.'? The opinion is understandable. The ship on the column has no
deck, and triereis were undoubtedly decked in the fifth and fourth centu-
ries Be. The human figures, greatly out of proportion, lend an air of
implausibility.
Nevertheless the ship unmistakably has three levels ofoars. But Lazar de
Baif's main objection is a new and sensible one, which has since his time
played a big part in the discussion. If a trieres has three levels of oars, the
word, containing the prefix tri, i.e. 'three', seems to mean a ship with three
levels of oars; and if that is so, it seems to follow that the numeral in the
7 For a detailed interpretation of the representations of the ships on Trajan's

Column see GROWChapter 5 items 45-9.
series tetreris penteres in Greek, quadriremis, quinqueremis, etc. in Latin
indicates the number of levels of oars in these larger ships. And there is a
very well-attested tesserakonteres built by Ptolemy Philopator.f which must
then have had forty levelsof oars. From this reductio ad absurdum the con-
clusion has been generally drawn that a trieres could not , after all, have had
three levelsofoars.
In this early discussion one other contribution is notable. Barras de la
Penne (1727), the captain of Louis XIV's galleys, and a man therefore of
some considerable experience of oared ships, criticised accounts of the
ancient ships such as Vegetius' by making the significant point that crews
using oars of greatly differing lengths at different levels, such as would
apparently be entailed in a three-level oarsystem, could not possibly syn-
chronise their stroke; and with a large number ofoarsmen synchronisation
of stroke was vital. Admittedly, in alia sensile galleys the three men sitting
on the series of single benches on each side of the ship would have pulled
oars of different lengths; but since the difference would have been small in
proportion to the total length of the oars and the men would have been
sitting side by side, the difficulty of synchronisation would not have been
very great.
This historical account teaches a clear lesson. Men from the fifth to the
sixteenth century AD very naturally explained the ancients ' galleys in
terms of the ships they saw around them .
Discussion of the trieres' oarsystem received a new stimulus in 1859 by
the publication of a marble relief (fig. 13), now known as the Lenorrnant
Relief, discovered on the Acropolis ofAthens. It showed the middle part of
the starboard side of an oared ship, and seemed likely from its date alone,
about 400 Be, if by nothing else, to depict the standard warship of the
time, the trieres (below, p. 138). A further fragment of this relief was sub-
sequently found (fig. 14). In the second half of the last century, accord-
ingly, many scholars and naval architects in Germany and France
addressed themselves to solving the puzzle of how the trieres worked.
In EIllustration of 23 March 1861 (and also in the Illustrated Times and
the Illustrated London News a few weeks later) there is a picture of the
Roman trireme built on the Seine for the emperor Napoleon III on the
8 Callixenus in Athenaeus 5.37 , Plutarch, Demetrius 43 .4. As ]urien de la Graviere

(1878) observed (p. 769): 'La foi la plus robuste ici s'epouvanre.'
13. The Lenormant Relief in the Acropolis Museum at Athens (photo of the
cast in the museum of Classical Archaeology at Cambridge).
advice ofAuguste Jal (eminent author of the Glossaire nautique) and to the
designs of a distinguished naval architect, Dupuy de Lome (fig. 15).
Napoleon III was engaged in writing the life of Julius Caesar and
instructed Jal to collaborate with Dupuy de Lome in the building of a
reconstruction of the sort of trireme that Caesar might have used, for
display in the Exposition of 1867. Jal apparently relied on certain
'medailles' and on the Lenormant Relief. The ship was built at Clichy in
1860-1 and launched in March 1861 in the presence of the emperor and
his Minister of Marine. It appears to have been an embarrassing failure,
and the reason is not hard to see.
According to the Illustrated Times it was 39.25 m long, 5.50 m broad,
with the deck 3 m above the waterline. There are said to have been 130
oars at three levels (42, 44, 44), the upper two levels somehow seated on
the deck and the lowest below it. From the pictures the ship seems to have
been massively built, weighing about 200 tonnes, and fewer than 60 oar-
ports on the port side are in fact visible. In a note on the reconstruction in
his book on La Flotte de Jules Cisar (1861) Jal says that the oars were of
different lengths; the thranire oars (i.e., presumably, the longest) were
7.20 m. 'Nothing,' he says, 'is better established than the inequality in
length of the three banks of oars: the "rnedailles" leave one in no doubt at
all.' These 'rnedailles' have not been identified. It seems clear that
although the length, breadth and height of the ship were about right, it
was nevertheless far too heavily built, and greatly underpowered. The oars
were also far too long, and being of different lengths and pulled at differ-
ent levels would have been impossible for the 'rnatelors de Cherbourg' to
synchronise.
The Roman trireme's absence from the maritime parade at the Paris
Exposition of 1867 was noted with regret by the press, and no mention of
it appears in Napoleon III 's Histoire deJules Cisar published the previous
year. The ship is said to have been used in target practice and eventually
sunk by torpedo."
In spite of the embarrassment produced among scholars at the outcome
of this venture, and the amusement of the general public, speculation con-
tinued. Graser (1864) based a reconstruction (fig. 16a) of the trieres' oar-
system on the lines ofAristophanes mentioned above, taken quite literally,
but found that he had to decrease the space between one oarsman's seat
and the next in each fore-and-aft file to less than the unitary length of
two cubits, the interscalmium of which Vitruvius (1.2.4) speaks (below,
p. 133) . Cartault (1881) insisted on the observance of the two-cubit rule
and modified Graser's arrangement accordingly. Lemaitre (1883; fig. 16b)
protested against Graser's 'living wall' ofoarsmen, and set his units of three
oarsmen en echelon across the ship as well as fore-and-aft. All these systems
were open to the fatal objection made first by Barras de la Perine, that it
would be impossible for oarsmen sitting at different levels to pull in unison
oars of greatly differing lengths.
In examining the Lenormant Relief Carraulr had noticed that the pair
of longitudinal timbers through which the visible oarsmen were pulling
their oars were in higher relief than the wales on the side of the ship below
them, and suggested that the timbers in high relief were pans of an outrig-
ger, like the apostis which in the Venetian galleys carried the rholepins, a
sort of rectangular frame imposed on the gunwales. Assmann (1887) also
9 I am much indebted to Mr]. S. P. Buckland for information on this sad tale. For
the complete story see L. Th. Lehmann (1982).
14. Fragment of the monument ofwhich fig. 13 is a part.

15. Photograph ofan engraving showing the Roman trireme built for Napoleon III by Dupuy de Lome
and August Jal in 1860/1.
suggested an outrigger, and identified it with the parexeiresia mentioned in

Thucydides (4.12 , 7.34).
This suggestion also accounted for certain unexplained features of the
relief as supports for the outrigger. 10 In 1895 Haack, a professional naval
architect, published a reconstructed oarsystem which was later improved
by another naval architect, Busley, in 1918. The result (fig. 16c), like the
earlier design of Kopecky (I 890: fig. 16d) and the more recent one ofR. C.
Anderson (I962; fig. 16e), incorporates the outrigger and accounts very
closely for the various details of the Lenorrnant Relief, but like the earlier
solutions fails in taking no account of Barras de la Perine's point. The oars
in each unit of three oarsmen are consistently of different lengths .
In the meantime in Italy Admiral Fincari (I 883) had reiterated the
theory that the ancient trieres was pulled on the Venetian alia sensile
system (fig. l Oa), and Weber (I896) restated the theory that it was pulled
on the a scaloccio system. The two theories, which had been put forward in
the sixteenth century for reasons which are plainly inadequate and had
been decisively rejected by Savile as inconsistent with the ancient evidence,
were now given an undeserved new lease oflife although the evidence now
available made them even more untenable. In the first place a ship with
170 oarsmen (below, p. Ill) arranged on the alia sensile system would nec-
essarily have been much longer (48 m) than the 37 m allowed by the Zea
ship-sheds (above, p. 4). In the second place, whereas the oars of alia sensile
galleys were in the region of 12 m long (fig. l Oa) to allow the gunwale to be
a safe distance above the waterline, and were of three different lengths, the
oars in a fourth-century trieres are shown by the naval inventories (below,
p. 137) to have been about 4 m long. Again, the a scaloccio system is ruled
out on many grounds, of which perhaps the most cogent is the passage in
Thucydides (2.93.2: below, p. 135) in which each oarsman of a trieres is
said to have 'carried his oar, his cushion and his oar-loop' from one side of
the Isthmus to the other.
At this point W. W. Tarn (I 905) entered the discussion. He severely crit-
icised all the attempts that had hitherto been made to reconstruct a trieres
of three levels of oars on the basis of the Lenormant Relief, which in his
view represented a ship with a single file of oars. Tarn's arguments were
10 Two brackets supporting the outrigger are identified in this reconstruction ,

which was followed in GOS, but the shorter 'bracket' now turns out to be the
base of the deck-stanchion resting on the upper wale.
Qu inquereme
I
Quadr ireme
I
Trireme
I
d e
16. Various three-level oarsystems proposed for the trieres: (a) Graser (1864),
(b) Lemaitre (1883), (c) Haack-Busley (1895, 1918) , (d) Kopecky
(1890) , (e) Anderson (1962)
mainly concerned with the later types of oared warship. He had no diffi-
culty in demonstrating the absurdity of regarding tetrereis, pentereis, etc.
as ships of four, five and more levels of oars, and concluded like Lazar de
Baif that the trieres could not have had three levels either.
Tarn's 'real' objection to the then current interpretation of the
Lenormant Relief, viz. that it represented a trieres with three levelsofoars,
was that such a ship would entail oars ofdifferent lengths. 'Such a ship', he
claimed, 'is impossible: for if one thing be more certain than another, it is
that oars of different lengths, where the difference bears more than a
certain proportion to the length [i.e. the aliasensile oars excepted], cannot
be rowed together, by one man to an oar, so as to be of any real use or turn
out an efficient ship.' In this claim he was, ofcourse, perfectly right. It was
what Barras de la Penne had said many years before.
Following Tarn's arguments, Cook and Richardson published a recon-
struction of the trieres (1905; fig. 17) with oars pulled on the alia sensile
system - a ship which, as we have seen, could not have been accommo-
dated in the Zea ship-sheds. Furthermore the oars were of three different
lengths, 3.05 m, 3.65 rn, and 4.11 m, which would hardly have satisfied
Tarn's ruling and in any case were not in accordance with the lengths given
in the naval invent ories (above, p. 20 and below, p. 137). In Venice, of
course, the oars of the aliasensile galleyswere three times as long (fig. l Oa),
and thus allowed a reasonable height of gunwale above the waterline (free-
board); but Cook, using shorter oars, had to reduce the freeboard to a mere
twelve inches.
Such a ship, with a crew of200, would be unseaworthy even by ancient
standards. Notwithstanding these obvious objections and although the
system employed was, in Savile'swords, 'directly against both the authority
of ancient writers ... and contrary to the ancient portraytures remaining
yet to be seene' it was, until recently, still found attributed to the trieres in
all standard works of reference in English. Liddell-Scott-jones'
Greek-English Lexicon (1939) is of two minds. The alia sensile system is
attributed to the rrieres, but one category of oarsmen, the thranites, are
said to be highest, and another, the thalamians, are described as lowest.
It did however appear that the two practical objections to the three -level
trieres might be met. The first objection, that if a trieres was a ship of three
levels of oars, a tetreris (quadrireme) must have had four and a pentiris
(quinquereme) five and so on, was only valid if the name trieres means a
17. The aliasensile oarsystem proposed for the trieres by A. B. Cook and
Wigham Richardson (190S).
ship with three levels of oars. She might, as seemed to be the case, have
three levels of oars but be called after some other feature of which she had
three. The name could alternatively derive from the fact that the ship
had three files or columns of oarsmen ranging fore-and-aft on each side of
the ship, in contrast to the Homeric pentecontor which had one, and the
later two-level pentecontor which had two. Large numbers of files of
oarsmen on each side ofa ship might be clumsy; but they were not absurd,
provided that there were not more than three levels, and this proviso could
be met if the practice of purring more than one man to an oar had been
adopted by the time these ships were built.
The second practical objection, that the oars of a three-level ship, being
of different lengths at the different levels, would have been impossible to
pull together in time, could also be met if the oars at the three levels could
be arranged in such a way that in anyone unit of three (one at the highest,
one at the middle and one at the lowest level) the oars were all of the same
length. This had manifestly not been the case in the published reconstruc-
tions of three-level triereis hitherto; and different lengths of oars at the
three levels had been Tarn's 'real objection' to a three-level theory. It proved
in fact possible to demonstrate in a working model (fig. 1), based on a pro-
jection of the Lenormant Relief, that all three oars at different levels could
be of the same length in anyone unit. It was true that the fourth-century
naval inventories recorded the spare oars of a trieres in two lengths (9 and
9Yz cubits) , but the difference is explained by Aristotle and Galen. Aristotle
(PA 4.10, 687b 18) says that in the human hand 'the end finger is short
rightly and the middle finger long as is the oaramidships', and Galen (UP
1.24) specifically mentions the trieres in making the same point. The same
thing is true of the oars in a naval whaler.
The removal of these two objections made it possible to look afresh at
the evidence for a three-level trieres, and two vase-paintings (one a small
fragment) were now available (pp. 146-50) to support the interpretation
of the Lenormant Relief as depicting such a ship. These arguments and
conclusions appeared in articles in the Mariner's Mirror in 1941 and in the
Classical Quarterly in 1947, and twenty-one years later Greek OaredShips
attempted to put together all the evidence available for ancient oared war-
ships from the Bronze Age to the death of Alexander. A three-level trieres
seemed now to be generally accepted; and it was, at last, reasonable to
undertake the further work leading to a satisfactory design . The immi-
nence of an actual reconstruction served to concentrate the mind wonder-
fully on evidence throwing light on the more important practical details.
In the next chapter we shall consider briefly how and why the trieres
came to be developed, probably in the late eighth century BC, and how
and why she came to be superseded as the standard warship of
Mediterranean navies towards the end of the fourth century Be. Both pro-
cesses throw light on the nature of the ship and of her employment.
2
EVOLUTION AND SUPERSESSION OF
THE TRIERES
Evolution
The trieres was a sophisticated naval weapon developed from the simple
longship to perform a specific role in warfare at sea. A review of that evolu-
tion will show what that specific role was and what characteristics it
required. The reasons for the trieres' supersession as a front line warship will
show those characteristics from a different angle, as circumstances, and a
change of tactical concept, made naval designers abandon them for others.
The earliest use of the oared warship is described in the Iliad: the trans-
port of armed men and their equipment to a scene of conflict on land. This
was the role of the longships represented by the Naxos lead models of 2500
BC, the oared ships of a little later date on the Syros 'frying pans' , 1 the Late
Minoan III ship of 1400-1200 BC, probably a one-level pentecontor
(above, p. 8 n. 4), on the Cretan larnax (fig. 18), and the Mycenaean ship on
the pyxis from the Pylos Tragana tomb of 1200-1100 BC (fig. 19). All these
are characterised by the projecting forefoot . Much more realistic examples
of ships of the same type, with files of fifteen to twenty-five oarsmen a side,
are to be seen later on sixth-century Attic vases (e.g. figs. 20a and b).
The ships shown on the Attic Dipylon vases of the Late Geometric
period (figs. 22a and b: 760- 735 Be) are still simple longships without
decks and with the sharp pronounced forefoot not yet sheathed with metal
(below, p. 32). Yet at the end of this period open longships with oars at two
levels begin to appear (e.g. fig. 24; cf. also GOS PI. 7e and 8a) and there is
also a suggestion of this system in Book II of the Iliad 509-10. It is
recorded there in the Catalogue of Ships that ' 120 young men went' in
each of the Boeotian ships. The poet does not say that they all pulled oars,
but since Thucydides (1.10.4) goes out of his way to comment that they
I See Plate la and b in LSR5.
25
18. Cretan lamax in (he Heraklion Museum (lM III , c. 1400 BC).
19. Scene from a Mycenaean pyxis from (he Tragana (halos tomb, Messenia,
1200-1100 BC
Evolution and supersession ofthe trieres 27
20a. Penteconror from an Attic black-figure dinos , c. 550-530 BC
20b. Triacontor from an Attic black-figure dinos by [he Antimenes painter,

c. 520 BC
were at the same time fighting men and oarsmen (auteretat), it seems likely
that the poet had such a ship in mind and Thucydides had reason to
believe that such a ship existed. If there were sixty men on each side of the
ship pulling oars, they could only have been in two files, one at a higher
level than the other. There is no suggestion ofoars rowed by more than one
man before the fourth century Be. A ship pulled rather unrealistically by
sixty men a side at two levels is what seems to be illustrated on a late
eighth-century Attic Geometric bowl found in Boeotian Thebes (fig. 23),
which Williams suggested may have been made for a Theban client.
21. Two oared warships ofdifferent types from a krater made by

Aristonothos. Probably west Greek. 675-650 BC
A development which doubled the number of men which could be

accommodated in a ship ofa given length opened two possibilities. Either
the longship could remain at what appears to be the maximum practical
length and the number of men carried be doubled. or the number of men
could remain the same and the length of the rowing area be halved. If the
role of the oared warship was. as in early times , to carry the maximum
number of fighting men to the scene of combat. the former possibility
offered a clear advantage. If. on the other hand, the role of the ship was to
manoeuvre so as to ram an opposing ship most effectively, the advantage
of a doubled oarcrew is more than doubtful. The increase in power would
not compensate for the additional weight of structure and men. To judge
from the surviving pictures of two-level galleys from the sixth century, the
new system seems to have been used to reduce the ship's length while
keeping the same number of oarsmen (fig. 26). The fact that with the
introduction of the two-level system no new names, e.g. hekatontoros
(hundred-oared ship), were invented but the names triacontor and pente-
contor (thirty- and fifty-oared ship) continued to be used;' supports this
impression. So it would seem that the objective of the naval architect was
2 The Greek word dieres, mean ing a ship with oars at two levels. does not occur
until the second century AD in the grammarian Pollux. It is likely to have been
manufactured as Greek for the Latin biremis which occurs in Horace and Livy
(first century Be) . The epithet dikrotos occurs in Euri pides (IT 408) to describe a
ship pulled by oars at two levels. and is employed by Xenophon (HG 2.1.28) to
indicate that a trieres had only two files manned. Arrian (6.5.2) uses it of the two-
level triacontors employed by Alexander on the Hydaspes in Ind ia.
22a. Fragments of an Attic krarer showing the forward parr of an

oared warship with hooked tholepins, 760-735 BC
22b. Fragments of an Attic krater showing the greater parr of an oared warship
with hooked tholepins, 760-735 BC
23. Attic spouted bowl showing a warship with oars apparently at two levels,
about 735-7 10 BC
no longer to transport of maximum number of men e.g. to Troy, but the

power, speed and agility required by the new ramming tactics, and that
the new system came to be employed in the way which would achieve this
best, i.e. by keeping the manpower the same and decreasing the length. In
speed and agility the two-level pentecontor would have been much super-
ior to the one-level pentecontor, whose strength would be suspect unless
the hull was much deeper than was needed merely to accommodate
twenty-five oarsmen a side.
There is no doubt that the two-level system was used extensively, and it
must be concluded that it did not entail different lengths of oar.
Experiment does in fact show that there is no difficulty at all in keeping the
oars ofeach unit of two at different levels to the same length. The oarsmen
and their tholepins in each unit can be regarded as placed on the circum-
ference of concentric circles with the oarblades at the centre. The upper
oarsmen sit on the ship's thwarts (zyga) as the single file of oarsmen did in
the Homeric pentecontor, pulling their oars either over the topwale or
through an upper row of oarports (fig. 27) , while the lower oarsmen , sit in
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Map 1 The easrern Medirerranean.

24. Fragment ofAttic pottery showing a longship

with oars at two levels, about 735-710 BC
what had been the hold (thalamos) of the ship and pull their oars through a
lower row of oarpoftS. The oars throughout will be of a length suitable to a
man of average physique (below, pp. 136-7).
The mood of innovation at the end of the eighth century which produced
the two-level oarsystem did not stop there . Beside the symmetrical round
ships (fig. 25b) in the evacuation fleet ofLuli king ofSidon in 701 Be there
appear also longships. The British Museum fragment of the relief (fig. 25a)
shows the greater part of the starboard side of a warship with eight oarsmen
whose heads and shoulders are visible between stanchions in an open side
course. Below this course eight oars, en echelon, emerge through oarports.
Above the open course there is a puzzling course of alternate rough squares,
four open and five oflatticework, and above them there is the deck bulwark,
waist-high to various passengers and hung with shields in the Phoenician
manner (Ezekiel 27.1-12). The warships differ from the fleet auxiliaries in
two respects; firstly they have a sharp forefoot on the side of which a double
vertical band indicates a fastening for its metal sheath, and secondly they
have the course of alternate open and latticework squares.
The first feature is a natural characteristic of a warship, a metal, prob-
ably bronze ram. Fig. 24 showing part of a similar course of alternate open
and latticework spaces (with oarsmen framed in the open spaces) gives the
clue to the second, and puzzling, feature. It indicates a third, uppermost
level of four oars not on this occasion manned. The representation of the
oarsystem is conscientious but probably symbolical in respect of numbers.
25a. Fragments of a relief from the palace ofSennacherib showing a two-level

oared warship taking part in the evacuation ofTyre in 701 BC
25b. Another fragment of a relieffrom the palace ofSennacherib showing fleet

auxiliaries (round ships) taking part in the evacuation ofTyre in 701 BC
26 . Detail ofAttic black-figure cup showing one of two warships with oars at
two levels, c. 510 Be.
In this prototype three-level ship the new uppermost level may be half as
numerous as the lower two, but the total on each side is unlikely to have
been twenty. It could have been as little as twenty-five (l0/10/5: a pente-
contor) or as much as sixty (24/24/12). Whatever the numbers were, the
warship was an early design ofa rrieres, No satisfactory alternative explana-
tion of this second feature of the Nineveh warships has yet been given. The
unmanned state of the uppermost file is easily accounted for by the nature
of the operation in which the warships were engaged. No naval challenge
was expected since Sennacherib had no fleet. Every oared ship would have
been commissioned and given an oarcrewadequate for the short voyage to
Cyprus, but speed above that achievable by the two-level auxiliaries would
not have been required. Oarsmen would have been in short supply and not
used where they were unnecessary.
This interpretation is supported in a curious way by a number of
fourth-century representations ofships, which will be discussed below, on
Phoenician coins, a Persian seal and a Phoenician ship model.
The earliest literary reference to the trieres and at the same time to the
ram is by Hipponax (fr. 45 DiehP), a native of Ephesus who went in exile
to Clazomenae in 542 Be. He urges the painter Mimnes 'not to go on
27. A scene showing the stern of the Argo engraved on a bronze casket in the
Villa Giulia. Rome , end of the fourth century BC
painting a snake on the many-benched side of a trieres, so that it seems to

be running away from the ram towards the helmsman'. Most of what is
known about the trieres and its employment before the end of the fifth
cent ury derives from the Greek historians Herodotus and Thucydides.
Both worked in the second half of the century. Herodotus was a native of
Halicarnassus (mod. Bodrum) on the south western seaboard of Asia
Minor, a mixed Dorian-Greek and Car ian city ruled at the time of the
second Persian invasion of mainland Greece by a Persian-backed monarch,
a 'tyrant ' in Greek parlance, the queen Artemisia. She commanded five tri-
ereis in Xerxes' invasion fleet, and Herodotus boasts that they had the
highest reputation after the crack Sidonian squadron. He tells of her that
Xerxes compared her with his other commanders at Salamis, saying 'My
men have become women and my women men' (7.99.3 , 8.88 .3).
Herodotus, then , grew up in an environment which was no stranger to
the trieres and its skilled use in battle. Furthermore, in his extensive jour-
neys in the eastern Mediterranean he is likely to have travelled in oared war-
ships as well as in merchant ships. Thucydides, again, was no armchair
historian. He was an Athenian who commanded a force of triereis in the

Peloponnesian War, was exiled for his failure to prevent the capture of
Amphipolis by Brasidas in 424 Be, and thereafter devoted himself to
writing a history of the war. As a man whose family had property in Thrace
and who had served as a naval commander, he fits very well the description
which an anonymous writer at the beginning of the war ([Xen.] Const. of
Athenians 1.19) gives of Athenians and their retainers unconsciously acquir-
ing the skill of pulling an oar by reason of overseas possessions and com-
mands abroad: 'it is inevitable that a man who is often aboard ship should
take an oar himself, and his retainers too, and learn the language of the sea'.
So both historians, who are vital witnesses in our enquiry, speak of the
trieres from personal experience; and although, as is usually the case with
writers (other than epic poets) who deal with commonplace objects of their
environment, what they say is not very detailed or explicit, their evidence on
naval topics is to be treated with close attention and used with confidence.
Thucydides begins his history with an account of the growth of Greek
prosperity and the consequent emergence of sea power during the
period of tranquillity and consolidation which followed the movement of
peoples into and within Greece in the post-Mycenaean age. He notes
(1.12.4-13.2) three features: increases in population, resulting in the main
cities, in particular Athens and the cities of the Peloponnese, sending colo-
nies overseas; increased wealth, which led to the displacement ofaristocra-
cies by popular 'tyrannies'; and most importantly increased exercise of
power at sea. 'The Corinthians are said to have been the first to take up
ships in a way nearest to the modern, and triereis to have been built first at
Corinth in Greece.' The second clause of this statement suggests that
Thucydides was aware that triereis were built in this period elsewhere than
in Greece, but it does not intimate as some have claimed that they were
built elsewhere before they were built in Corinth. The interpretation given
above of the longships shown in the Nineveh Relief is that they were ships
with three files of oarsmen on each side at three levels, although one file,
the uppermost, was in fact and quite reasonably unmanned on the occa-
sion represented. Phoenicians of701 BC were then credited by the sculp-
tor of the Nineveh Relief with at any rate one type of trieres. Clement of
Alexandria's attribution (Stromateis 1.16.76) of the invention of a trieres
(trikrotos naus) to the Sidonians may be regarded as support for this con-
clusion, particularly since it has been suggested that it rests on the
Evolution and supersession o/the trieres 37
a
28a. Ocradrachrn from Sidon, c. 380-374 Be.

28b. Stater from Arados, c. 350-332 Be.
28c. Model of a three-level ship from Errnent, Egypt, c. 350-300 Be.
Inventions of a reputable writer of the third century BC, Philostephanos of

Cyrene. The Egyptian pharaoh Necho (610-595 BC) is said by Herodotus
(2.159.1) to have built triereis on the Nile for service in the
Mediterranean, and in the Red Sea for service in the Indian ocean. This
pharaoh, known as 'the philhellene', had close contacts with Greece, in
particular with Corinth and her eastern ally Samos, and although he cer-
tainly employed Phoenicians in the exploration of Africa there is no good
reason to prefer Phoenicia to Corinth as the source of the design for
Necho's fleets of triereis. Built about the end of the seventh century BC,
they were probably of Corinthian rather than Phoenician design.
The most important point in Thucydides' statement is, however, that

he clearly sees the trieres as introducing a new and modern kind both of
fleet management and of naval warfare. He continues: 'It appears that
Ameinocles, the Corinthian shipwright, built four ships [i.e., in the
context, triereis] for the Sarnians, and it is about three hundred years to
the end of this war [i.e. the war between the Peloponnesians and the
Athenians] when Ameinocles came to the Samians.' The precision of this
dating is affected by the uncertainty ofwhether Thueydides was taking the
Peace ofNicias in 421 or the surrender ofAthens in 404 BC as 'the end of
this war'. If the former, the date is 721 and if the latter, 704. Since the
building of the trieres at Corinth would have occurred a few years earlier
than those years in both cases, it would have been built either earlier or
roughly contemporary with the Sidonian trieres. It has however been
argued" that owing to a faulty generation count, the period of 300 years is
50 years too long and that the date calculated is c. 671 or 654, in each case
later than the building of the Sidon ian trieres. The question of priority is
not of much importance since the designs were certainly different as will
be seen. The important conclusion is that at the end of the eighth century
there was a growing pressure to improve on the two-level warship and that
both at Sidon and at Corinth, the two leading maritime powers of the
time, attempts were made to do so."
Thueydides proceeds to note that 'the earliest sea-fight also was fought
by the Corinthians against their colony Corcyra [mod. Kerkyra, Corfu]
260 years before the end of the war'. This date, for the same reason, can
now be taken to be c. 610. There seems to be a connection in Thueydides'
mind between the first sea-fight and the invention of the rrieres, not
merely that Corinth was involved in both but a causal connection, that the
latter led to the former, the trieres being the ship which symbolised the
modern mode of fighting at sea.
In the west in the second quarter of the seventh century the Arisronothos
vase (675-650 BC: fig. 21) gives the first representation of a conflict at sea.
It shows two ships of markedly different types facing one another bow to
bow. The ship on the left can be recognised as a Greek type which for the
3 See Forrest (1%9), A. B. Lloyd (1972), J. B. Salmon (1984) p. 218 .
4 This chronology for the development of the tricrcs is disputed by H.T. Wallinga
(1993), who argues for an origin probably in Egypt in the second halfof the sixth
century Be, after which it was taken up first by the Persian empire .
first time shows a deck , or at any rate a high median gangway on which
armed men stand and fight. It has a marked forefoot and eye and a single-
level oarsystem. The forefoot is unsheathed, unless the crack in the vase in
the critical position masks the band which, as in the trieres on the Nineveh
Relief, indicates the sheath's fastening. The ship facing it on the right has an
unusual bow with a downward-pointing beak fitted high up to a hull,
which without it is symmetrical. It has, like the other ship , armed men on a
similar deck or median gangway. It is possibly Etruscan or Carthaginian,
Carthage having been founded 'at least as early as the eighth cenrury'.?
Confrontation between ships at sea, first shown on the Aristonothos
vase, is first described by Herodotus (1.164.3) as taking place many years
later in 535 BC between a fleet ofPhocaean pentecontors and a combined
force of Etruscan and Carthaginian ships." The Phocaeans left their mari-
time city when it was threatened by the Persians in 540 BC and embarked
in their pentecontors taking with them their families and possessions.
Phocaea was an Ionian city less than twenty miles across the gulf of Smyrna
from Erythrae (map 1), where the two-level oarsystem was invented. " Since
the two-level system is shown to have been in use for about 200 years in
mainland Greece and only slightly less in Phoenicia, and since its aim must
have been to produce a more powerful and manoeuvrable ship for the use
of the ram in conflict between ships at sea, it seems likely that the Phocaean
pentecontors were two-level ships . Certainly in a migration ships with a
capacious hold were desirable, but for migration to an area where they
might be, and were in fact, challenged efficient warships were necessary.
The development of the two-level system is causally connected with the use
of the ram, and Herodotus comments on the Phocaeans' use of it.
Sailing west to escape the Persian advance, the Phoenicians founded
Alalia (map 1) on the east coast of Corsica, but their presence was chal-
lenged by an alliance of two other, non-Greek, peoples , the Etruscans and
Carthaginians. The Phocaeans with their 60 ships, presumably the most
efficient warships among those in which they had left Phocaea five years
before, defeated the 120 ships of their enemies, but their casualties were
heavy: 40 ships lost and the rest disabled with their rams 'twisted off'
5 See Dunbabin (1948) p. 22.
6 These are of unspecified type, but Herodotus would probably have told us if they
were triereis.
7 Damastes of Sigeum, contemporary of Herodotus (FGrH 5F6).
(Herodotus 1.166.2). It looks as if the tactics of ramming were still in an

experimental stage. It is interesting that thirty-five years later it was a
Phocaean who was chosen to put the Ionian fleet in revolt against Persia
through tactical exercises (below, p. 42). In spite of their losses the
Phocaean tactics were good enough to defeat a fleet twice as numerous.
The Bacchiad aristocracy at Corinth was succeeded by the popular
'tyranny' of Cypselus and his son Periander. The Bacchiadae appear to
have taken refuge at Corcyra, although eventually members of the
Cypselid dynasty ruled in Corcyra and in the other Corinthian colonies of
the region. Since we can now place the invention of the trieres at the outset
of the tyranny, when Corinth and Corcyra were enemies, it seems reason-
able to see the invention as the outcome of naval rivalry between Corinth
and her colony, and the first sea-battle as an engagement in which triereis
were used by Cypselus or Periander in a fleet action which resulted in the
establishment of Cypselid power in Corcyra." It is likely that, forty years
after their invention, Corcyra also employed triereis, and that what
Thucydides has in mind when he speaks of the first sea-battle is the first
engagement between fleets of triereis. The reclame oi such an action would
explain the adoption of the trieres, as the newest example of naval technol-
ogy, by Necho in Egypt shortly afterwards.
The slow spread of the use of the trieres in the eastern Mediterranean
can be linked to the slow growth of prosperity in the Archaic period
(650-500 BC). The trieres was an expensive weapon which only the
wealthiest states could afford. Thucydides makes just this point.
Hipponax probably knew about it in the rich city of Ephesus. What
Herodotus says (3.39-44) about Polycrares, who became tyrant ofSamos
in the latter years of the sixth century.? is illuminating. He initially had a
fleet of 100 pentecontors'" but later when he became more prosperous he
8 See Salmon (1984) pp. 221-2.

9 For the dare ofPolycrares see J. P. Barron ( 1964). Ifas Barron suggesrs and seems
likely there was an earlier, very prosperous, Polycrares (572-40), who was respon-
sible for the grear public works, he would certainly have had a fleer of triereis,
which would have ceased ro exist when he collapsed under Persian pressure. The
Polycrates II of whom Herodotus speaks would then have had to rebuild sea
power from small beginnings.
10 J. A. Davison (1947) uses this account to dare the introduction of the trieres in
Greece, bur see JSM (1979).
Evolution and supersession a/the trieres 41
went over to triereis and could send 40 of them , manned by his dis-
affected subjects, to support Cambyses' invasion of Egypt in 525 . The
trieres in Cambyses' fleet, which Herodotus mentions (3.13 .1-2,
14.4-5), had a crew of200. 11 Such a ship with three times as many crew
as a pentecontor (with 50 oarsmen and 10-20 additional crew men and
soldiers) would have been expensive to keep in commission, apart from
the capital cost.
In 500 BC , in an attempt to extend their power across the Aegean, the
Persians supplied the tyrant of Milerus with 200 triereis with which to
subdue Naxos and the islands of the Cyclades. In his account of the cam-
paign Herodotus tells the story (5.33.2) of the punishment of a trierarch
named Scylax who failed to post a look-out on his trieres when beached.
He was tied up with his head 'th rough the thalamian carport'. It would
seem that the thalamian oarport is specified, as distinct from the oarport in
the higher part of the trieres, because there were at least two kinds of
oarport in the ship and the thalamian sort, as being bigger, was suitable for
this purpose'? (below, p. 147).
A recent writer'-' has made the illuminating suggestion that the supply
of 200 triereis to Miletus is an indication of Persian naval policy. The great
increase in the naval potential of the Phoenician and Ionian states at this
time is surprising, and seems unlikely to have come about if the y had to
rely on their own financial resources; but if Persia planned to create her
own sea power with which to dominate the Aegean she may well have
aimed to do it, as Rome did later in her naval war with Carthage, by
financing construction of the ships wherever timber was available and
paying her maritime allies to man them. There was always the danger of
defection, as the Ionian revoir was soon to show, but it is to be noted that
in the second Persian invasion of Greece , for which she mustered all her
II 2,000 men were puni shed, ten for each of the 200 men in the Myrilenian ship
who had been murdered.
12 The phra se 'the rhalarnian carport' may be taken as evidence that the ship in
question (in 500 BC) was a trieres of the Cor inthian design, since in them there
were zygian and thalarnian oarpons needing to be distingui shed while in the
Phoenician eype there was only one , the thalamian. The thalam ian oarpon of a
trieres is also mentioned in Aristophanes Peace 1232. The word in Acharnians
553 may refer either to the oatport or to the oar of the thalarnian oarsman. See
GOS p. 308 and not e 2. 13 H . T. Wallinga (l984b; 1993) .
naval allies, she took the precaution of placing 30 of her own soldiers on
board each of her allies' triereis.
In 499 BC when the Ionian cities and offshore islands revolted against
Persia they had at their disposal large fleets of triereis, probably supplied by
Persia, and among their early successes was the defeat off Cyprus of the
Phoenician fleet, which remained loyal to Persia. But by 494 a new
Phoenician fleet came north to participate in the siege of Miletus; it was
joined by ships from Cilicia, Egypt and Cyprus. The Ionians mustered 353
ships to meet it, Chios sending 100 ships, Miletus 80, Lesbos 70 and
Samos 60, with 43 from the lesser Greek cities of the Asiatic mainland.
Herodotus (6.8.2) says that all these ships were triereis , and there is no
good reason to doubt his word. It is interesting that Herodotus (5.99.1) ,
speaking of the help which came to the Ionians from mainland Greece,
says that 'the Athenians sent twenty ships bringing five triereis from Eretria
with them'. The words suggest that the Athenian ships were not triereis.
Athens, it appears, was still too poor, or was too much of a landed aristoc-
racy to be willing, to aspire to sea-power. 14
The overall command of the Ionian triereis was given to a certain
Dionysius, who commanded the few ships sent by the expatriate Phocaeans.
Herodotus (6.11.2-15.2) relates that he told his fellow seamen that if they
were prepared to accept hardships now they would have work for the time
being but would succeed in overcoming the enemy and winning freedom.
' But if you go on with your usual slackness and lack of discipline I shall not
be at all surprised if you pay the king [of Persia] the penalty of rebellion.'
There could be no clearer statement than this of the qualities which service
in triereis demanded - hard work and good discipline. Herodotus goes on to
describe the training sessions Dionysius gave the men:
He regularly took the ships to sea in line-ahead formation, so that he trained the
oarsmen in making a breakthrough (diekplous) with the ships through each other's
lines. and he turned out the soldierson deck (epibatat) in full kit. Then for the rest
of the day he kept the ships at their moorings. and gave the Ionians work to do all
day.
14 Corinth is conspicuous by her absence. She had the ships, since a little later
Athens borrowed 20 triereis from her for her war against Aegina, her own 50
ships not being up to fightingthe Aeginetan fleet, which in the eventwas70 ships
strong. Thuc . 1.41.2 , Hdt . 6.89, 92.1.
After a week of this sort of thing the Ionians had had enough. When it
came to the battle with the Phoenician fleet at Lade off Miletus, the
Samian contingent of 60 ships began the action by advancing in line ahead
(against the Phoenician ships in line abreast , with the intention of making
the planned breakthrough), but with 11 exceptions all broke off the
engagement, raising their sails and making for Sames;'? followed by the
Lesbian ships and most of the others. Only the 100 Chian ships, each with
40 picked citizen soldiers on deck (epibatat) , stayed to fight, using the
tactic of the breakthrough. They captured many enemy ships but lost most
of their own , being very greatly outnumbered.
From this account of the training of the Ionian fleet and its ultimate
defeat, a little can be learnt about the tactics of fighting the trieres at this
time. In the first place sailswere not used in battle, only oars. This is true of
fighting at sea throughout antiquity. At a later period there is reference to
sails actually being left behind when ships put out for battle. Here the
ships that raise sail are breaking off the engagement, and the sails they raise
may be the small rather than the main sails (below, p. 97). The break-
through or diekplous is the fleet manoeuvre, by squadrons in line ahead, of
pulling through the enemy's ships drawn up in the usual defensive fashion
in line abreast (below, pp. 59-60). A modern historian 16 speaking of the
sixteenth-century Mediterranean galley emphasises its 'terrible vulnerabil-
ity to attack from the side' which 'made the maintenance of a line abreast
formation a matter of life or death'. The offensive tactic of the faster and
more agile ships , at Lade as later in the century, was to break through the
defensive line, approaching it in line-ahead formation and either outflank-
ing it (the peripious) or punching a hole through which a line of ships
could pass (the diekplous). This tactic depends primarily on the concept of
the trieres as a ramming weapon. Some have seen the diekplous as a
manoeuvre by individual ships , each trying to pass between two of the
enemy ships drawn up in line abreast opposite. Such a manoeuvre by
single ships is self-evidently suicidal, but ships in line ahead had a better
chance ofgetting through, with some losses.
In the battle at Lade the various squadrons advancing on the enemy in
line ahead used the manoeuvre which Dionysius had tried to practise
15 The reason for this defection may have been political and connected with the
absence of their allies the Corinthians. 16 Guilmartin (1974) p. 202.
beforehand. The Samians broke off and sailed home, bur the Chians
employed the manoeuvre successfully. Nevertheless, the 40 picked soldiers
which the Chians carried on deck show that the Chians were not totally
committed to the ramming tactic, bur regarded what Thucydides was to
call 'the old-fashioned way of fighting at sea' (below, p. 65) as equally
important. The two are not really compatible, since 40 fully armed men on
deck would themselves have diminished the ship's speed and agility, and
for reasons of stability required a more heavily built hull and a deck
bulwark as well. To judge from practice in the second Persian invasion fleet
in 480 the Persian fleet at Lade would also have carried 40 soldiers on deck.
By the standards of most later naval warfare in Greek waters, the battle
off Miletus involved a large number of ships. The Ionian Greeks had 353
triereis. Herodotus says that the Persian fleet consisted of 600 ships, some
of which may not have been triereis, since the Persian commanders when
they learnt the size of the opposing fleet were afraid that they might not
succeed in defeating them. Nevertheless, when a few years later Darius dis-
patched the first invasion fleet to mainland Greece it was composed of 600
triereis accompanied by cavalry transports. I?
The naval resources of the Persian empire before the revolt of the Greek
cities ofIonia were considerable, since Persia controlled besides the Ionian
fleets the navies of Egypt, Phoenicia, Cilicia and Cyprus. After the sup-
pression of the revolt, when not only the Asiatic Greeks bur the islands also
came into Persian hands, Persia's power at sea became even more formid -
able. Thucydides, in his account of the growth of navies in Greece, men-
tions only briefly the large eastern area ofsea power (1.16): 'Darius, strong
in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, enslaved the islands also.' First
under Darius and then under his son Xerxes, these resources were now
17 G. L. Cawkwell (1968) pp. 1-5, thinks that this is a 'paper figure'. He putS
weight on Herodotus' statement that at Salamis the two sides were about equal.
This is roughly true in the sense that the allied ships only engaged two of the
Persians' four squadrons (2 squadrons with 250 ships each at full strength) . He
also presses the point that 'after 479 we never hear of a Persian navy anywher e
near as large as 600 ships, and all through the fourth century the largest numbe r
we hear of is 300'. But after 479 Persia lost the large Greek naval contingents
from the coastal cities ofAsia Minor and from the islands, and probably the non-
Greek contingents from that area as well. In the fourth century the large Egyptia n
naval force was also denied her.
mobilised for the invasion of mainland Greece, as the natural follow-up to
the invasion of the islands of the Aegean.
The question of the nature of the Phoenician triereis at this time is a diffi-
cult one (see Basch 1969). From the time of the Nineveh Relief until the last
half of the fifth century BC there are no ship representations on surviving
Phoenician coins. In the last half of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth
century the coins of Sidon and Arados show ships that are almost certainly
triereis although no oars are shown. They have a sharply pointed forefoot
like the Nineveh longships, and like them most probably a bronze ram.
From the early years of the fourth century coins ofSidon, Arados and Byblos
show longships of two types with oars shown symbolically, which are exem-
plified in figs. 28a and 28b. The stepping of the oars in 28a has been seen as
representing a three-level oar-system which in Sidon at this date may be rec-
ognised as belonging to a triereis. The single open side course and the sug-
gestion of a parexeiresia indicate the Corinthian/Athenian trieres type (figs.
11, 12, 13) which Sidon by then appears to have adopted (hence the row of
shields hung over the edge of the deck) from mainland Greece.
The second type , which is exemplified in 28b, shows a system with its
two open side courses which recalls the Nineveh triereis and is strongly cor-
roborated in three dimensions by the late fourth-century Erment model
(fig. 28c). This model shows two open courses through which the two
upper levels of oars are seen emerging (though damaged) ; and a third,
lowest, level is seen emerging through oarports.
Beside the coins, there are to illustrate the ships of the period in Persian
employment two seals from the treasury ofPersepolis (GROWCh. 5 Item
2) each illustrating one of the two three-level types. They are unfortunately
very widely dated from 520-15 to 331 BC but to judge from the coins are
likely to belong to the later rather than the earlier part of the span. In the
period when the second three-level type appears in the Phoenician coins,
the Erment model (fig. 28c) and possibly in one of the Persian seals, the
three-level system shown may belong not to triereis but to fives (quinque-
rernes) for which there is historical evidence at Sidon in 351 Be. If that is
the case, and there is no means of telling whether it is or not, the fivesare of
a design going back to the Nineveh longships (certainly not fives) .
Phoenician triereis of the intermediate period must, under Greek influ-
ence, have adopted the Corinthian oarsystem. For a more detailed argu-
ment leading to these conclusions the reader is referred to GROWCh. 5.
By the beginning of the fifth century the trieres was plainly recognised
as the principal means of asserting political power in a region, the eastern
Mediterranean, where the sea offered the natural method of communica-
tion berween cities and nations. A warship at sea could either be a platform
from which armed men engaged the armed men on a similarly constructed
ship through missiles or hand-to-hand fighting, or she could be herself an
offensive weapon by means of an armoured or armed ram. These rwo con-
cepts of the fighting ship were opposed and certainly made opposite
demands on the naval architect, but for a time, possibly always, existed
together. What may be termed the guided-missile concept required the
designer to maximise speed and agility to the limit, while the fighting-plat-
form concept required no more than that the ship should be brought
under oar into firm and stable contact with the enemy ship. For the former
purpose the armed men on deck would be the minimum necessary to repel
boarders if withdrawal after ramming became accidentally impossible. For
the latter purpose the largest possible number of men was desirable. Large
deck manning implied a more solid upper structure, as well as a hull built
for greater stability, than a small deck party would require, with the overall
result of a slower and less manoeuvrable ship.
We shall be following the development of these concepts in some
selected accounts of naval warfare in the fifth century, and shall attempt to
gauge their implications for the fifth- and fourth-century Athenian trieres
which we have reconstructed. We should not forget that the trieres also
necessarily had to move out from her home port to the expected scene of
conflict either under oar or under sail. This secondary function, as a
warship moving from place ro place, sometimes carrying extra fighting
men for an action on land, also had implications for the design which had
to be considered and given due weight.
Supersession
The desperate, but from time to time quite successful, efforts ofAthens in
the fourth century to maintain her power in the Aegean and the protection
of her grain supply by the deployment of fleets of triereis will be touched
upon in Chapter 6. There was another area of naval activity in the fourth
century - this was Sicily, where Dionysius of Syracuse was at pains to
contain the growing maritime pressure of the great Phoenician colony in
Euolution and supersession ofthe trieres 47
North Africa, Carthage. Carthaginian, like Athenian (and later Roman),

interest in Sicily was prompted by the need for Sicilian grain to feed a large
urban population. Carthage was a sea power, and Dionysius, with enthu-
siasm backed by ample resources, entered into naval competition with her,
which resulted in the evolution of new types of oared warship, the 'four',
tetreres in Greek, the 'five' , penteres in Greek, and the 'six', which has no
Latin and hence no English name, the Romans merely transliterating the
Greek word bexeris.
It appears that Aristotle attributed the invention of the 'four' to the
Carthaginians (Pliny, NH 7.207 = Rose fro 600). Diodorus credits
Dionysius with the invention of the 'five', 18 and it is likely that he rather
han his son Dionysius II built the sixes in the fleet which gave strength to
he latter's subsequent reign (Aelian Poik. Hist. 6.12) . Although there was
naval rivalry, there seem not to have been any large-scale naval engage-
ments between Syracusan and Carthaginian fleets. 'Fours' and 'fives' seem
accordingly not to have been built in large numbers. Dionysius went in a
'five' to a neighbouring city with a proposal of marriage, no doubt to
impress his prospective in-laws, but the ships which he sent on three occa-
sions to assist his allies the Peloponnesians were all rriereis.
'Fives' turn up at Sidon in Phoenicia in 351. When Alexander, after
efeating Darius on land at Issos (333) , moved south to strike at the
Phoen ician cities, the main source of Persian sea power, which still domi-
nated the eastern Mediterranean, the Cypriot kings who came over to his
side had 'fives' as flagships; and there were 'fours' and 'fives' in the fleet of
Tyre which he besieged. 19
The fleet which Alexander built on the Indus and its tributaries con-
sisted of small river boats, but when he returned from India to Babylon he
.ound waiting for him two 'fives', three 'fours ' and twelve triereis, which
had been transported across the desert in pieces from Phoenicia (Arrian
7. 19.3). It is difficult to guess what the role of the fleet was envisaged to be.
T here is a story that Alexander had plans, which his death brought to
noth ing, of building a vast fleet of 'ships larger than triereis' with which to
wage a naval war against Carthage.I?
The news ofAlexander's death in 323 aroused Athens to a burst of naval
I' 14.41.3,42.2,44.7. 19. Diod . 16.44.6; Arrian 2.21.9,22.2.

~ Diod. 18.4.4, cf. Arrian 7.1.2, Currius 10.1.17-18.
and military activity. The Assembly is said to have ordered the building
and fitting out of 40 triereis and 200 'fours' (Diod. 18.10.2)2' but it is
unlikely that the programme was begun, certain that it was not completed.
'Fours' and 'fives' appear in the Athenian naval lists which survive for some
of these years. There are 18 'fours' in addition to 392 triereis in 330-329, 7
'fives' and 50 'fours' in 325-324. 22 The bigger ships were becoming
increasingly popular and Athens' ambitious plan to build 200 'fours' in
323 fits this pattern ofdevelopment. But the final defeat of Athens ' fleet at
Amorgus in 322 put an end for good to her naval ambitions.
The fleets with which Alexander's successors fought for supremacy in
the eastern Mediterranean were dominated by the larger vessels. For
example , the first of these, the fleet of about 240 ships which Antigonus
assembled in 315, was made up of 90 'fours', 10 'fives', 3 'nines', 10 'tens',
and 30 open, i.e. unprotected, warships. The balance of about 97 ships
was, by inference, made up of protected triereis (Diod. 19.62.8).
The trieres continued to be used as a warship , but the tactics and dispo-
sitions of fleets were now based on the larger ships. The reason for the
supersession of the trieres as the ship of the line, and for the evolution first
of the 'four', 'five' and 'six', and then after an interval of the ships of larger
denominations, can only be the subject ofguesswork until we know rather
more precisely the answers to the sort of questions about them that we are
now asking about the trieres. But it is possible to discern some pointers to
the kind of answers which it may be possible to give. For example, the
history and literature of the fourth century make it clear that it was becom-
ing more and more difficult to recruit the skilled oarsmen on which the
trieres relied. Further, it seems clear that the oarsystems of the ships of the
higher denominations can only be explained satisfactorily on the assump-
tion that more than one man sat to an oar, an arrangement which was eco-
nomical of skilled oarsmen since in each oar-gang only one skilled man
was needed, as a modern historian remarked about a similar change in
Renaissance galleys from single-manned to multiple-manned oars. 23
These constraints certainly contributed to, but are unlikely to have been
21 The reading of Diodorus' manuscript, '200 tetrereis and forty rriereis' has been
arbitrarily amended to '200 triereis and forty tetrireis and this is how the text is
now read. 22 IG2 2 1627.24, 1629.801-11.
1J Guilmart in (1974) p. 10 1; 'Henceforth only one skilled oarsman, the man fur-
est inboard who feathered the oar and set the pace, was needed to each bench .'
Evolution and supersession a/the trieres 49
the sole cause of, the change in tactical concepts which accompanied the
supersession of the trieres. These new concepts seem to have arisen from
the development of missiles thrown by ship-borne catapults and from an
increase in the number of the military contingent, men in full armour,
archers and javelin men , on board warships, and the importance placed on
them. These developments called for larger ships which would be more
stable and could carry protection for oarsmen and soldiers, and these
larger ships were heavier and slower and lent themselves to none of the
tactics on which the trieres had relied. The Macedonians and Romans, in
whose interests these new fleets were operated, were content to see naval
actions as opportunities for men in full armour to fight it out on deck. This
was their forte and they saw to it that ships would be built to bring such
fighting about. The new ships and the new tactics present the exact oppo-
site of what the trieres was and what it had been built to do. Only the
Rhodians with their fours and trihemioliai continued to practise regularly
the classical tactics of the peripious and diekplous.
3
THE SALAMIS CAMPAIGN
In tracing the evolution of the trieres and its subsequent supersession we

have isolated certain characteristics and qualities which the trieres pos-
sessed. We shall now turn to the ancient accounts of actions in which tri-
ereis took part. These will reveal how these ships were used in battle in the
fifth century, and give some idea of the sort of ships they were. Two
actions, which took place in the course of the second Persian invasion of
mainland Greece, in 480, will be the subject of rhe present chapter.
Artemisium
The Persian invasion force consisted of a large land army, which crossed
the Hellespont on a bridge of boats and made its way west and then south-
wards, accompanied by a fleet of considerable size. Herodotus
(7.89.1-99.3) gives the number of triereis as 1,207, and says that there
were as well 3,000 smaller ships, triacontors, pentecontors, oared supply
ships (kerkouroz) and horse-transports. He gives the following numbers for
the various contingents of triereis: Phoenicia, including Palestine Syria,
300; Egypt 200; Cyprus 150 ; Cilicia 100; Pamphylia 30; Lycia 50;
Dorian-Creek cities 30; Caria 70; Ionian-Greek cities 100; 'the islands' 17;
Aeolis 60; the Hellespont, excluding Abydus, which had the duty of
guarding the bridge, 100. The crews of nearly half of these could be
described as Greek by origin or influence. The ships of the Phoenicians, he
says, were the fastest and of these the fastest were the Sidonian ships. In a
later passage (7.184.1-2) Herodotus puts the native crews ofall these ships
at 200 men, which is likely to include, as the Athenian crews of 200 did
(below, pp. 107-8), ten soldiers and four archers; and he says that an addi-
tional30 Persians, Medes and Sacae (the last of whom were archers) went
on the deck of each ship (i.e. were epibatai, below, pp. 130-1). The mili-
tary complement ofeach ship would then have numbered 44 and the add i-
50
The Salamiscampaign 51
tiona] troops would have made the Persian ships about 4 ronnes, or 8%
heavier than those of the Athenians, at any rate, among the Greek allies.
He describes (7.184.3) the 3,000 small oared ships, previously described as
triacontors, pentecontors and kerkouroi, here loosely as pentecontors, and
gives their crews as 80 each 'more or less' (i.e. 50 oarsmen and 30 petry offi-
cers, deck hands, and soldiers).
Keeping in close touch with the army on land, the invasion fleet moved
through the newly built canal across the isthmus in the eastern prong of the
Chalcidic trident, and then, after rounding the two western prongs, went
north again to Therma (mod. Saloniki). From there the fleet, joined,
Herodotus says (7.185.1), by a further 120 ships from Greek cities in the
north Aegean, moved south in a long voyage down the harbourless coast of
Magnesia (7.188ff.). On this stretch they met a great summer storm , and
after huge losses, put by Herodotus at 400 ships, reached the harbour of
Aphetae (mod. Platania Bay)opposite Artemisium on the northern tip of the
long island of Euboea, where the ships of the Greek allies now lay (map 2).
The Greek land force sent to hold up the invading army at Tempe in
Thessaly had been withdrawn before the Persians left the Hellespont; and
the first skirmishes between Greeks and Persians took place on land when
Leonidas and his Spartans unsuccessfully tried to hold up the Persians'
advance at Thermopylae, and at sea when the Greeks engaged the Persian
fleet now beached at Aphetae, and reduced by storm losses. These latter
engagements, which were indecisive, have great interest as illustrating the
tactical ideas and presuppositions of both sides.
The original Athenian force, probably dispatched to Artemi sium the
previous autumn (below, p. 114), had numbered 100 ships, but by now this
force had been increased to 127, some of the ships being manned partly by
Plataeans. The Athenians had also provided 20 ships for Chalcis in Euboea,
Athenian manpower not being sufficient to crew the 200 ships now built
(below, p. 115). The rest of the allies sent 124 triereis and 9 pentecontors,
the largest contingent, of 40 ships, coming from Corinth (8.1.1-2) .1
Although Sparta contributed only 10 triereis her military reputation was
I Corinth had emerged as a sea power under Periander, who built a seaport at
Lechaeum on the gulf of Corinth. Cenchreae was her port on the Saronic Gulf.
He also constructed the haulway (diolkos) which enabled him to transfer his naval
forces quickly from one side of the Isthmus to the other. See R. M. Cook (1979) p.
152 and note 11, also J. B. Salmon (1984) pp. 13-7 and notes 11 and 12.
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The Salamis campaign 53
such that the supreme command was given to her admiral (nauarchos)
Eurybiades.
It is clear that between 499 when Athens had no triereis to send to the
elp of the Ionians at Lade and 480 when she had 200, more in fact than
she was able to man at one time, Athens had made a serious attempt to
ecome a maritime power. Herodotus (7.143-4) says that Themistocles
. ersuaded the Athenians to spend a windfall from the silver mines at
urium on building 200 triereis nominally for prosecuting her war with
Aegina, her naval rival across the Saronic gulf, but probably also with the
possibility of a second Persian invasion in mind. This information empha-
sises the great capital cost of a fleet of triereis. Herodotus speaks of
T hemistocles, after the engagements at Artemisium, taking 'the fastest of
he ships' on a special mission (below, p. 95) , and the Athenian ships are
said later (8.42.2) to have been the fastest in the allied fleer. There seems to
ave been a tradition which Plutarch knew (Cimon 12.2) that the
Athenian ships at Salamis were built by Thernistocles 'for speed and agility
in turning'. These qualities were, then, not just the result of the ships
having been newly built but the outcome of deliberate design.
When the Greek allies saw the unexpected size of the Persian naval force
at Aphetae, they were inclined, Herodotus says (8.4), to withdraw south
y the inner channel. The Euboeans implored Eurybiades to stay till they
ould evacuate their households, but were unable to persuade him . By
offering a large bribe, he alleges, they persuaded Thernisrocles, and he in
urn persuaded Eurybiades and the Corinthians. Although greatly super-
ior in numbers the Persian fleet did not at once come out to fight, but sent
a force of200 triereis southwards on a route east ofEuboea to cut the allies'
line of retreat through the inner channel. Their intention was to offer
attie as soon as they heard that it was cut. The Greeks, however (8.9),2
'wishing to make trial of the Persian fleet's capability in fighting and in the
"breakth rough" (diekplous)' came out late in that first day so that the
action should not last long. They knew that in a protracted battle numbers
would eventually tell. In response the Persian crews, or at any rate some of
: This action was, as Herodotus says, an exploratory skirmish, and it is unl ikely
either that the whole allied fleet put to sea or that the whole Persian fleet went out
to meet them. The kyklos manoeuvre implies a small squadron rather than a whole
fleet.
them, embarked expecting an easy victory, 'seeing that the ships of the
Greeks were few, while their own were many times more numerous, and
faster', and encircled the Greek ships. This was the fleet manoeuvre known
as the periiplous, and was carried out by ships in column (below, pp. 82-3).
At the first signal given the Greeks changed formation from line abreast, in
which they could have been outflanked in the open water, and adopting
the defensive tactic of slower ships, they
placed their ships with the bows facing outwards towards the Persian ships (now
pulling round them) with their sterns aligned towards a central point. At the
second signal they went over to the attack, although confined in a smallspaceand
with the enemy uncomfortably close. They captured [i.e. towed away after
ramming"] thirty ships ... and night came on the two sides as they fought an
unequal battle.
The tactical aspects of this interesting and carefully planned exercise are
reasonably clear. The Persian fleet, since the sending of the task force now
about 600-700 strong, was still more than twice as numerous as the Greeks'
271 triereis (8.1.1-2). In spite of the reputation of the Athenian ships for
speed, the Persian ships were also, apparently, in general faster (8.10.1). As
such they accordingly took the initiative and a squadron attempted to get
round the flank of the Greeks who would be drawn up in the normal line-
abreast formation adopted by ships at the outset of an action after putting to
sea in column. The Greek squadron had a tactical reply to this move. They
made a circle with bows outwards and sterns inwards.
This formation was defensive in the sense that it prevented the faster
enemy ships from getting behind their slower ships and attacking them in
the beam or quarter where they were 'terribly vulnerable'." but it also pre-
sented the enemy ships abeam to the Greek rams, so that if they went over
to the offensive they would have the enemy ships open to attack. At the
second signal, then, the circle exploded in all directions with considerable
success, and the fall of night, as planned, prevented the Persians from
securing ultimately the advantage which their greater numbers would have
given them. The action shows not only a formidable grasp by the Greek
commanders of the relevant tactical factors in the use of the trieres as a
ramming weapon, but also, on the part of the crews, great skill and disci-
3 The disparityin numbers of fightingmen on deckwould be irrelevant to the issue

in such circumstances. 4 SeeGuilmartin (1974) p. 202 quoted above.
TheSalamis campaign 55
pline in manoeuvre , and in both commanders and crew the nerve neces-
sary to carry out a difficult movement with precision. Intelligent
command was matched by the result ofdiligent and hard training.
The following night a second summer storm with thunder and heavy
rain drove the task force of200 ships on to the rocks of the eastern coast of
Euboea and totally destroyed them . Next morning news of the destruction
reached the allied fleet, and shortly afterwards further Athenian reinforce-
ments of 53 ships arrived, the last of the 200 built with the money from
Laurium. The allied fleet at Artemisium now numbered 324 triereis and 9
pentecontors, facing a Persian fleet reduced by the casualties of the previ-
ous day. A Greek squadron again came out late in the day against a Cilician
squadron, and had some success (8.12-14).5
Next day the Persian fleet put to sea, adopting a sickle-shaped forma-
tion. At first the Greeks made no move, but as the enemy approached the
beach at Artemisium they came out in full force, and took the initiative in
attack. The Persian ships apparently fell into some confusion, but did not
break their line, and the two fleets separated after some bitter fighting and
heavy casualties on both sides. The general tactical picture shows a larger
fleet in sickle-shaped formation , i.e. in line abreast but with the two wings
threatening to envelop and move round the flanks of a smaller fleet.
The rules required the Greek ships to adopt a line-abreast formation
from the beach, and, as the slower ships, stay in it. Since to abide by the
rules would have been fatal, and the ships, had they not put out, risked
being destroyed or towed away by the enemy, the Greeks decided, in spite
of being the slower fleet, to attack the enemy line, probably by squadrons in
line ahead . The issue of the battle seems to have been indecisive, which is
perhaps the best the Greeks could have hoped for under the circumstances
(8.15- 16). That evening the Greeks heard that the force heroically defend-
ing the pass at Thermopylae had been overrun, and took the decision to
withdraw southwards, abandoning Euboea and Attica to the enemy.
Salamis
T he last stage of the naval campaign was now reached. The Athenians,
after some argument, succeeded in persuading their allies to regroup their
: Again the attack on the Cilician ships is clearly not made in full force.
ships on the landward beaches of the island of Salamis, instead of pulling

them further back south of the wall which the Peloponnesians were build-
ing across the Isthmus. The fleet accordingly moved there from
Artemisium and was reinforced by further ships which had assembled in
the harbour ofTroizen (mod. Poros) across the Saronic gulf southwards
from Piraeus. In spite of losses the number of allied ships had now been
made up to 378 6 (8.48), and Eurybiades remained in command.
The Greek fleet lay on an eastward-facing landward beach of the island
of Salamis in what is now Paloukia bay? (map 3). The Persian land and sea
forces had occupied Attica, the ships drawn up on the beaches in the
various harbours. The Spartan commander was still in favour of complet-
ing the withdrawal to the Isthmus where the army had taken up position.
Before we turn to the battle itself a brief look at the number of ships
involved on each side is necessary. Aeschylus puts the number of Greek
ships at 300, 10 of which were especially fast, and the number of the
Persian ships at 1,000, of which 207 were fast. It is just possible that he
means that the fast ships were in addition to, rather than included in, the
main totals, but scholars do not interpret the Greek text in that way." The
Persian total on this (unlikely) interpretation would be 1,207, which is the
figure Herodotus gives for the Persian fleet at the review at Doriscus, and,
with the reinforcement of 120 Greek ships, on their arrival at Sepias in
Magnesia before the onset of the storms. He says that by the time of their
arrival in Attica reinforcements had made up the storm losses, which he
puts at the incredible figure of 600. It seems likely that the initial failure to
include the 207 fast ships in the total of 1,000 led to an exaggeration by
that amount of the storm losses, and that the corre<:.t figure for the Persian
6 See N . G. L. Hammond (1956) pp. 38ff., also GOSpp. 139-43, 150-3.

7 The main sources of information about the battle are: (1) the Athenian tragic poet
Aeschylus, who wrote a play, the Persians, put on at Athens eight years after the
battle, in which he probably fought himself and in which certainly a good part of
his audience had fought; and (2) the historian Herodotus, who was a boy at the
time of the battle and must have heard about it from participants on the Persian
side, since he was a nat ive of Hal icarnassus (mod. Bodrurn) . He grew up to be a
not uncritical admirer of Athens. (3) and (4): two later writers, Diodorus of the
first century Be and Plutarch, who wrote at least a century and a half later than
Diodorus, also provide some information which has value as representing a tradi -
tion independent of (1) and (2).
8 See Broadhead's commentary on Persians 342-3.
G Station of Grm Allied flu:t'

P 1,2,3 and 4 Sea stations of 1m
~ur squadrons of th~ Ptrslan fleee
pm-
Map 3 The bartle of Salamis.
fleet at Arrernisiurn is about 600-700, and for Salamis about 1,000 (after
further reinforcement). Both are plainly round numbers. This conclusion
is confirmed by Aeschylus' division (Persians 366) of the Persian fleet into
three squadrons and a detached force of 'others '. He speaks of one Persian
as in command of a squadron of 250 ships (Persians 323-4). If the full
strength of a squadron was 250, and the 'others' consisted of the 207 fast
ships, the total is 957, very roughly 1,000 . For the Greek fleet, Herodotus'
final detailed figure of 380 is perhaps to be preferred to Aeschylus' round
figure 0000.
The conclusion is that at Salamis there were between two and three
Persian ships to one Greek. These were the formidable odds which
Thernisrocles, taking advantage of the narrow waters of the straits, set
himself to face. He faced also the more subtle task of bringing his allies,
and his supreme commander, to fight. Later actions show that in fighting
with triereis good tactics are more important than large numbers.
We may now return to the Greek fleet beached at Paloukia bay, opposite
the now hostile Attic coast, but at least partly hidden from it by the island
ofH. Georgios (map 3).
Thernistocles succeeded in solving one of his problems, and went some
way towards solving another, by a simple intelligence operation. He sent
his tutor Sicinnus, posing as a defector, to tell Xerxes that the Greeks were
planning withdrawal to the Isthmus through the Megarian strait. Both
Herodotus and Aeschylus give this story, which there is no reason to disbe-
lieve. Xerxes' own sources of information may have corroborated the
message since, indeed, it was not far from the truth. Xerxes acted on it and
ordered his fleet to sea - according to Aeschylus, after sunset, according to
Herodotus, after midnight - 'so that the Greeks might not be able to get
away'. The Egyptian squadron was ordered to move round the seaward
side of the island and seal the Megarian strait. This squadron, with further
to go, might well have embarked at sunset. Of the other three squadrons,
embarking possibly at midnight, one, probably the 207 fast ships, was
detailed to patrol the seaward coast of Salamis in case the Greeks tried to
abandon their ships and escape in small boats from that side of the island,
while the other two patrolled the narrow straits on each side of the Persian-
held island of Psyttaleia. Aristides, recalled from political exile by an
amnesty, slipped through the patrolling ships and joined the Greek com-
manders at their council ofwar. He told them that, from what he had seen,
they had no option but to stay and fight. Thernistocles' first objective had
been achieved ; and by forcing the Persians to divide their forces he was
approaching a solution to the problem of numbers.
As dawn broke on that late summer morning the two squadrons ofships
sent to watch the eastern narrows moved up to reconnoitre the Greek posi-
tion , probably without much expectation of an engagement, but thinking
to find them gone or at least demoralised. As they nosed their way up the
channels the Greek seamen, fresh after a night's rest, embarked in their 380
ships , and put to sea to face the two squadrons of the Persian fleet, each
about 250 strong, the crews ofwhich had been at the oar at least since mid-
night. Themistocles had thus achieved his third objective, to overcome the
disadvantage of his slower ships (above, p. 54 and below, p. 60) . His
oarsmen were fresh, his opponents' oarsmen had been pulling, desultorily,
for six hours at least. It must also be remembered that, as is likely, and as
Diodorus (11.18.4) says, the Greek line, as it formed, spanned the narrow-
est part of the single channel which is about 1,200 m (1,310 yards) wide as
it led up to the island now called H . Georgios. A trieres with an overall
beam of 5.45 m and oars 4.2 m long would occupy a beam space of a little
less than 12 m (i.e. 5.45 m + (% X 4.2 m X 2 = 6.3 m) = 11.75 m) . Ifwe
allow 3 m between the tips of rhe oars ofeach trieres and 10m between the
end of the line at each end and the shore we find that only 80 triereis in
line-abreast formation could move up the 1,200 m wide channel, and this
is the formation which they must have adopted as soon as an engagement
seemed imminent. It seems, then, that at least at the outset of the action
he Persian superiority in numbers, already reduced by the division of their
forces, was now to a great extent neutralised.
The reason why the Persians allowed this to happen seems to have been
a fatal, if understandable, over-confidence, which led them to underesti-
mate the Greeks' resilience. The Greek fleet was holed up in the Salamis
han nel. The Persians expected them to attempt withdrawal, as they had
expected it at Artemisium. The withdrawal on that occasion had been sue-
essful because the task force sent to prevent it had been overwhelmed by a
storm . The Persians hardly needed Sicinnus to tell them to repeat the
anoeuvre. All that remained, it seemed, was to send the two squadrons at
aybreak up the straits to complete the elimination of the Greek fleet. The
last thing they must have expected was a confident naval confrontation.
T hey had not learnt the lesson of the first skirmish at Artemisium.
There is a discrepancy between our two main authorities in the account
of the battle that ensued. It must be remembered, however, that Aeschylus
. robably took part in the battle himself and was writing for many who had
fought in it, while Herodotus' information must have been second-hand,
and gathered from Persian sources. Herodotus says: 'The Greeks put to sea
-irh all their ships, and as they came out the Persians attacked them.' The
G reek line appeared to falter, but an Athenian ship drew first blood. In
Aeschylus' more circumstantial account (Persians 386ff.) the Persian fleet,
moving northwards up the channel, at first only heard the Greeks 'then
uickly they were all plain to see'. The Greek ships, as they put to sea from
- e beach, were first obscured from the approaching Persian ships by the
island ofH. Georgios, and then came into view from behind it. Aeschylus
nrinues: '... the right wing leading in orderly formation, then the whole
eet followed and after a clash they moved through behind the Persian
ips and surrounded them'. It looks as if the faltering which was noticed
by the Persians (and subsequently reported to Herodotus) as the Greeks

moved up the channel in line abreast , was the well-practised manoeuvre of
swinging from line abreast to column, and that the Greeks with the right
wing leading made a breakthrough on the Persian left and then rolled up
the Persian lines attacking the ships in the beam or quarter. The manoeu-
vre was in fact a classical diekplous achieved by ships which were technically
slower and should therefore have been on the defensive, but were able to
adopt an attacking role because they were fresh and their opponents tired
after a night at the oar.
Nevertheless, a breakthrough of a line six deep was a notable achieve-
ment. The breakthrough at the right end of the Greek line is logical
because the inevitable Greek casualties in the breakthrough would thus
have the advantage of the friendly Salaminian shore, always an important
factor in battles fought with oared ships (p. 63).9The Persian ships were, in
Herodotus' eyes, the attackers because they were moving towards the
Greek line, and for this reason, and also because in the dawn wind their
ships with their deck bulwarks (pp, 154-6) became difficult to manage ,
were unable to adopt any of the classical answers to the breakthrough.
The Persian ships seem to have been thrown into confusion, and
although in the succeeding melee there was some bitter fighting, and losses
were suffered on the Greek side, the Persians never recovered, and their
two squadrons were surrounded and destroyed. Xerxes realised that
without command of the sea he would never conquer Greece, and decided
to return to Asia, leaving his army, which withdrew northwards, to carry
on the fight as best it could. The final and decisive defeat was on land at
Plataea, but it was at Salamis with the skilled use of triereis that the invad-
ers were halted and turned back, and Greek command of the sea estab-
lished.
In the narrow waters off Artemisium and in the straits between Attica
and Salamis the Greek commanders adopted tactical movements, defen-
sive and offensive, aimed at producing situations in which the ram could
be used to advantage. Off Artemisium in the first skirmish and in the last
battle the Persian commanders adopted tactics which were designed to
achieve similar objectives. In the former the sudden Greek move from
defence to attack caught the Persian ships unawares in an unfavourable
9 See A. W. Gemme (1953) p. 16.

position. In the latter again they were denied the success they might have
expected from a periplous on both wings carried out by a more numerous
fleet, when the Greeks attacked and a tactical stalemate ensued, 'with bitter
fi ghting and heavy casualties on both sides'. In all these engagements the
Greek ships exhibited that 'speed and turning ability' for which, Plutarch
says (Cimon 12.2) , Themistocles built the Athenian fleet.
It appears that the choice of offensive or defensive tactics in an engage-
ment depended in the first place on a speed rating of the fleet as a whole. It
appears also that a commander would know at the outset whether or not
his ships were to be rated faster than his opponent's. There is no indication
what the basis of this rating was, but we shall see (p. 152) that it is likely to
have been a matter of maintenance, and that a fleet that had recently been
'dried out' was automatically rated faster than one which had not. This
overall 'maintenance rating' was apparently independent ofanother rating
which a group ofships in a fleet might have had as 'fast' and which is likely
to have been a matter ofsomething different - specially light build or, pos-
sibly, recent construction. Again, it appears that the 'maintenance rating'
and the choice of tactics which followed from it might be overridden on
occasion by other factors. In the case of the last battle at Artemisium it was
overridden by the necessity to escape from a tactically dangerous situation,
the threat to the defensive line-abreast formation of a periplous on both
wings. In the preceding skirmish it was overridden by the sudden presenta-
tion of a favourable opportunity to attack. In the case of the battle of
Salamis the Greek commanders felt able to override the 'maintenance
rating' because of another factor which they had contrived to bring into
operation: the oarsmen of the fleet judged to be faster were tired , whereas
the oarsmen of the fleet judged to be slow were fresh.
4
SYBOTA AND THE GULF OF CORINTH
In the fifty years between 480 and 432 Athens operated fleets in Egypt,
Cyprus, and Asia Minor and achieved that greatness which Thucydides
gives as the chief cause of the war which eventually broke out between her
former allies and herself (1.118.2). The building of these fleets, their main-
tenance and operational procedures, their strategy and tactics, are all, for
this period, a closed book for the modern student since we have no ancient
account of them. The Salamis fleet had been financed by the silver mine s'
unexpected profit. The fleets now had to be built and maintained out of the
tribute paid by the allies. Athens destroyed her naval rival Aegina, 'the stye
in Athens' eye' as Pericles is said to have called her (Aristotle, Rhet.
1411a15-16); and she built the Long Walls from the upper city to her poftS
of Piraeus and Phalerum. Her helmsmen and other auxiliaries employed in
triereis were now unrivalled in numbers and skill. So too was the most
important cadre of all, trained and experienced oarsmen. Her shipwrights
and naval architects had benefited from fifty years of trial and error, and
brought to a degree of technical perfection the ship which had already at the
beginning of Athens' career as a sea power become a sophisticated weapon
built for a recognised tactical purpose. By 433 Athens had developed a for-
midable naval superiority over all other Greek states, in her exploitation of
the offensive potentiality of the trieres and in the skill and seamanship
demanded for its operation. This superiority is well demonstrated in an
engagement in 433 between a Corinthian fleet and a fleet of her island
colony Corcyra (mod. Kerkyra, Corfu), supported by Athenian squadrons.
Thucydides emphasises the way in which Athens' use of the trieres differed
from the 'old-fashioned' tactics of the Corinthians and Corcyraeans .
Sybota
The immediate causes of the outbreak of war between Athens and the
Peloponnese was a dispute between Corinth and Corcyra over the allegiance
62
Sybota and thegulfofCorinth 63
of one of Corcyra's colonies. In the course of the dispute Corcyra, with a
eet of 120 triereis , defeated a Corinthian fleet of 75 ships with 2,000
oplites on board (T huc. 1.29).\ For the next two years the Corinthians
applied themselves to building ships and to recruiting 'oarsmen from the
Peloponnese and from the rest of Greece by offering pay'. They offered pay,
presumably, because the normal service of citizens could not produce
enough oarsmen for the large fleet envisaged (1.31.1). For their part, the
Corcyraeans sought an alliance with Athens, claiming that their navy was
second onl y to the Athenian in size. Athens agreed to a defensive alliance,
and sent ten ships with orders not to fight the Corinthians (with whom they
were at peace) unless the Corinthians launched an attack by sea on Corcyra,
or on one of her territories, and attempted a landing. The campaign which
followed, involving on the one side 110 Corcyraean ships and first 10, then
20 more , Athenian ships, and on the other a fleet of 150 ships of the
Corinthians and their allies, is described in considerable detail by
Thucydides and is worth attention (1.45-54; see map 4}.2
Moving north from their colony Leucas the Corinthian fleet
encamped at Cheimerion (mod. Vemocastro) at a harbour near the
mouth of the Paramythia stream. The Corcyraeans reacted by manning
110 ships and encamping on one of the two Sybota islands which, con -
nected by a reef, make a natural, north-facing, harbour on the mainland
side of the channel between the island of Corcyra and the mainland. In
this position the Corcyraean fleet covered the southern approaches to the
city of Corcyra which lies northwards on the eastern side of the island,
but was separated by the channel from the fleet's forward base on the
island at Leucimme (mod. Lefkimo). 'The ten Athenian ships were
present as well.' Both fleets were supported by land forces. The
Corcyraean land force was at Leucimme, the Corinthian consisted of
non-Greeks on the mainland, the latter providing the reason for the
Corcyraean ships bivouacking on the Sybota island instead of on the
mainland opposite.
When the Corinthians were ready to make their assault on the island
J Like the later Corinthian fleet which fought the battle ofSyboca this was an inva-
sion force. With 42 troop-carriers and 33 fast triereis it would have carried 2,010
hoplites (42 X 40 + 33 X 10).2,000 is a round number.
2 See N. G. L. Hammond (l945), who has elucidated the description from a close
first-h and knowledge of the area.
t
i t Leuclmme.
} (mod.Lefkirno)
'S.eccnd Corcyrae.an
",ca mp
First S boca
Corcrae.an :Swmd Ccrtntltian
110CoccFaean "'., ..;:>.
S rota r·,·.
.
. .10 Atneruan
. '.~hi ps 0 ~
c:::>
slUl's
Y •
12. Megarian ships .'
.
/:,' c::> 0..0 27Arribraclot shlps
/".J--:). .~ 10 Elean ships . ri,:st .
.....' ~. 10leuca.diansN.ps .~Conn.thian .
...., 90 y,rinthtan 1 Anactorlansfup I'a ramyth la
smps S~~
2.0 Athenian ships
(Iare. in the day)
Map 4 The battle of Sybora.
of Corcyra, they put to sea in darkness from Cheimerion, taking victuals

for three days and with the ships cleared for action but apparently, as an
invasion fleet, carrying extra rroops.l They hoped, it seems, to slip past
the Corcyraean fleet and cut it off from its base at Leucimme. However,
as day broke they saw the Corcyraean ships already at sea and moving
towards them. As soon as the two fleets saw each other they formed battle
lines (i.e. line abreast) across the channel, with the Athenian ships in
support of the right wing of the Corcyraeans , who were drawn up in
three squadrons. On the Corinthian side the Megarians (12 ships) and
Arnbraciots (27) formed the right wing (nearest the mainland). In the
centre were the rest of the allies (Eleans 10, Leucadians 10, Anactorians 1)
3 A fleet would normally (below, p. 95) expect to find food and water where they
put ashore, but on this occasion, if they made the intended landing on Corcyra,
they could not expect to get victuals immediately. Ships cleared for action left
their main sails ashore together with any other gear unnecessary for their imme-
diate purpose (below, p. 97).
vhile the Corinthians (90) occupied the left wing with their fastest ships!
-acing the Athenians.
When the signals were run up on either side the two fleets engaged,
rh having man y hopl ires on deck as well as man y archers and javelin men , for
the ships were still m anned rather unsci en tifically in the a id-fashioned manner .. .
T he fighting was hard , not so much in terms of matching skill with skill bur
because it resembled land-fighting more than anything else. For wh en the ships
rammed each other th ey did not easily separate, because of the numbers and the
press of the ships and because success in the battle was seen to depend more on
<he fighting me n on deck [than on ramming]. They fought a pit ched battle with
the shi ps im mo bilised . No r were there any examples of the bre akthrough (diek-
pious), bur the y fou ght rather with courage and ph ysical strength th an with tacti-
al skill." As a result the re was mu ch clamour everywhere, and th e fighting was
onfused . The Athenian sh ips stoo d by the Corcyraeans wherever th ey were hard-
pressed , and overawed th e enemy, but the Athenian generals did not starr com bat,
bearing in mind the orders the Assembly had given th em. The Corinthian right
ving [39 ships] was in the worst trouble, for the C orcyraeans with twenty ships
routed them, scattered them and chased them to the mainland."
But on the left wing , where the Corinthians themselves were, they had
much the best of it, as the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to
begin with,
[could not send their right wing, of which the C orinthians were getting th e better,
any help from the ir left wing o r centre, since the y] had twenty ships [from the left
wing] away in pursuit.
Seeing that the C orcyraeans wer e in difficulties the Athenians now began to
help more openly, at first restraining th emselves from actu ally ramming an enemy
ship; but when the rout became obv iou s and the Corinthians pressed them hard,
hen everyone at th is point to ok a hand in the act ion . There was no longer an y
hold ing back , bur circumstances were such th at th e Corinthian s and Atheni ans
had inevitabl y to attack each other. After the rour th e Cor inthians d id not take in
4 Literally 'with the ships th at moved best in the water (arista pleousar) i.e
those which had hull s in the best con di tion of maintenance and well-trained
oarsmen. It may alterna tively apply to those th at were not troop-carriers (below,
pp.152-3).
T hucyd ides is conc erned to show the superiority of the Athenian ships in the
modern mode of fighting.
6 Prob ably not all th e way back to Ch eimerion but to a nearer beach.
tow the ships they had swamped but pulled in among them and turned their
attention to killing the men? rather than to taking them alive. And by mistake
they killed their own men, not realising that their ships on the right wing had been
worsted . . . This sea-fight was the greatest, in terms of the number of ships
involved, of any that had hitherto been fought by Greeks against Greeks.
Once the Corinthians had pursued the Cor cyraeans to the shore they turned
their attention to the wrecks [i.e. to towing them away] and to their own dead,
and secured most of them and brought them to Sybota, a deserted harbour on the
mainland ofThesprotis to which their land force of non-Greeks had moved up in
support.
This harbour is of course the same as that beside which the Corcyraeans
had bivouacked the night before, not on the mainland but on one of the
two islands sheltering the harbour from the south. Once the Corinthian
supporting land force had moved up to occup y the mainland side of it, the
harbour was available for the Corinthians to use as a forward base.
Harbour and islands seem both to have been named Sybota.
The two fleets with their supporting land forces were now facing each
other across the channel separating the island of Corcyra from the main-
land: the Corinthians at Sybota and the Corcyraeans at Leucimme.
When the Corinthians had completed this operation, they mustered their forces
and moved out against the Corcyraeans. With the ships which [had been
engaged but] were still seaworthy and with the others which had been with the
Athen ian ships [and were accordingly untouched] the Corcyraeans in their turn
moved out to meet them, afraid that the Corinthians would attempt a landing in
their terr itory. It was already late in the day and the paean had been raised for the
attack, when the Corinthians suddenly backed water seeing twenty Athenian
ships approaching. The Athenians had sent them in fear of what did in fact
happen , that the Corcyraeans would be worsted and that their own ships would
be too few to give them effective help. When the Corinthians caught sight of the
approaching squadron they guessed that the ships were from Athens and
thought that there were not only those they could see but more still, and began
to withdraw. The Corcyraeans [who were facing east] did not see them since
their approach [from the south-west] was less easily visible to them, and could
not understand why the Corinthians were backing water, until some of them
caught sight of the ships and shouted out: 'There are ships coming up over
? The crews would have been holding on to their ships which though holed were
still afloat.
there.' Then they too withdrew as it was already getting dark, and the
Corinthians put about and broke off the action. So the rwo sides disengaged,
and the battle ended at nightfall.
As the Corcyraeans were pitching camp at Leukimrne, the twenty ships from
Athens ... after making their way through the corpses and the wrecks pulled in to
camp not long after they were sighted. In the darkness the Corcyraeans at first
were afraid that they might be enemy ships, but then recognised them as Athenian
and helped them to their moorings .
Next day the Athenian and Corcyraean ships came out from Leucimme
against the harbour of Sybora, and the Corinthians put out to meet them,
but there was no engagement as the Corinthians were anxious to return to
their home port.
Thucydides' detailed account of this campaign contains a number of
points of great interest concerning the trieres itself and about its opera-
tional use.
The first point is a general one, and has a bearing on the nature of the
trieres as a fighting ship: the close reliance of the Corinthian invasion fleet
on a series ofland bases, and a supporting land force, in the comparatively
short haul from Leucas to Corcyra (c. 78 sea miles). From the Corinthian
colony of Leucas the fleet moved first to Cheimerion (c. 43~ sea miles)
where a camp was pitched, the ships moored and contact made with their
non-Greek allies on the mainland. In the battle the victorious Corcyraeans
pursued the ships of the Megarians and Ambraciors, who made for 'the
mainland' where the non-Greek allies could protect them, while the victo-
rious Corinthians pursued the Corcyraeans who, again, made for 'the
shore' of Corcyra where they could find protection from a land force.
Seeking the shore is the normal action of defeated, sometimes even of
merely outnumbered, oared ships, and plainly it is important that the land
should be friendly (see below, pp. 75-6).
It seems clear that the Corinthians intended to land on Corcyra. This
intention is confirmed not only by the Athenians' belief and the
Corcyraeans' fears, but by the number of hoplites (armed infantry men),
archers and javelin-men carried, and the victuals for three days. The
Corinthians could not count on finding food immediately, which was
what usually happened. Thucydides is not quite fair, at any rate to the
Corinthians, in talking about their 'old-fashioned' way of fighting a sea-
battle . Although the ships were in other respects cleared for action, the
circumstances of the mission demanded that they should carry as many

troops as possible .
Actions are broken off at nightfall as much by reason of fatigue and
hunger as anything else. On this occasion (and others: e.g. pp. 7 1- 86)
fleets set out in darkness before dawn to achieve surprise. There seems to
have been no problem in navigating by night, provided that the sky was
clear.
The two fleets are likely to have been approaching each other in line
ahead by squadrons (below, p. 90). When they came in sight ofeach other,
they formed line abreast. The Corcyraean ships were divided into three
squadrons, each commanded by one of their three generals, presumably of
about equal numbers, i.e. about 37 ships, while the 10 Athenian ships were
in support of, probably behind, the Coreyraean squadron, on the right
wing. The Corinthians' 90 ships, including their fastest, were placed on
the left wing, with the intention, it appears, of making a breakthrough
(diekplous) on that side and cutting off the Corcyraeans from their base at
Leucimme (and Corcyra city, further north), and the Athenian ships were
stationed opposite them to prevent that happening. The Corinthian
centre was weak, with only 21 ships, while the right wing with 39 presum-
ably matched the Corcyraeans' 37 ships. When Thucydides says that 20
Corcyraean ships routed the Corinthian right wing and pursued the ships
to the mainland, he can hardly mean that the Corcyraean left wing con-
sisted only of the 20 ships. As it turned out, the Corcyraean right wing was
routed as the Corinthians intended; but, thanks to the Athenian ships
standing by, there was no breakthrough and the Corinthians could only
withdraw to Sybora and come out again in the evening, to be thwarted by
the arrival of the second Athenian squadron.
The signals raised from the command ships must have been flags or
pennants flown from the stern. Recognition by the crews was marked by
the singing of the paean as the ships pulled in to the attack as at Salamis
(Persians393).
The 'old-fashioned' style ofsea-fighting, in Thucydides' eyes, was a reli-
ance on soldiers of various kinds on deck either repelling boarders or
themselves boarding another ship. This style is in contrast to the modern
way of fighting, exemplified in the engagements at Artemisium and
Salamis, which consisted in the use of the trieres herself as an offensive
weapon. The Athenians had by now become particularly proficient in this
Sybota and the gu/fofCorinth 69
manoeuvre. There can be no doubt" that the Athenian ships , which only
participated in the fighting when the rout of the Corcyraeans' right wing
had become general and the hand-to-hand fighting was over, are not
included in this description of the 'old-fashioned way'.
The operation of backing water, i.e. reversing the forward pulling
stroke, is a regular manoeuvre under oar in battle and is frequently
described. Backing off after the impact of ramming is essent ial, unless the
'old-fashioned way' of fighting is followed , when ships 'do not easily sep-
arate after ramming'. In ordinary navigat ion it is also the normal proce-
dure when beaching stern first in mooring." In this account it is
distinguished from 'turning away' which is the practice in breaking off an
action.
Thucydides' account of the action at Sybora both in its outcome and in
the terms in which he describes the fighting underlines the superiority
which the new tactics , and the design and training calculated to put them
into effect, gave to even a small squadron. The Corcyraeans presumably
knew nothing better than the 'old-fashioned way', but the Corinthians
had it thrust upon them by circumstance. Even if cleared for action, laden
with stores and extra troops they would have been severely handicapped in
combat with fast Athenian ships cleared for action, but otherwise unen-
cumbered.
Naupactus I
The naval battles fought at the outset of the war in and around the
entrance to the Corinthian gulf underline further the tactical superiority
which Athens had achieved - a superiority revealed at Sybota by the
respect in which her ships were held and, by implication, in the terms used
by Thucydides to describe the tactics her way of fighting superseded.
Phorrnio, in command of a small squadron of ships at Naupactus facing
much larger Peloponnesian fleets, demonstrates that superiority directly,
both in success and adversity.
In the winter of 430 Phormio, sent by the Athenians round the
8 Jordan (1975) p. 187 concludes otherwise, but his conclusion does not follow
from the text ofThucydides.
9 See GOS pp. 56, 311 ; 'the Mediterranean moor '.
Peloponnesian
expci:lition to karrunia
~,
"
•...
f
Map 5 The entrance to the gulf of Corinth: Phorrnio's first action.
Peloponnese with 20 ships, made Naupactus his base for a blockade of

Corinth (map 5). Naupactus, an Athenian outpost just inside the gulf of
Corinth on its northern shore, had been settled by exiled Messenians,
inveterate enemies of Sparta (see note 11 below).
Meanwhile, the Corinthians and their neighbouring allies were plan-
ning to send a sea-borne expedition to Acarnania, an operation which
would entail a naval movement past Phorrnio's squadron out of the gulf
into the open sea. Acarnania was on the mainland, north of the entrance to
the gulf. Realising that the expeditionary force moving past him on the
southern shore of the gulf would at some point have to cross to the north-
ern coast, Phormio did not attack them as they passed, preferring an
engagement in open water, since his ships, though few, were fast while the
Corinthian force consisted, with the exception of five ships, entirely of
troopships. Thucydides now takes up the tale (2.83.3):
Sybota and the gulfofCorinth 11
The Corinthians and their allies were not proceeding with their ships cleared for
action but as an expeditionary force to Acarnania, little expecting that in face of
their own fleet of forty-seven the Athenians would dare to go into action with
rwenty ships. They observed Phorrnio's squadron moving along [the northern
shore] opposite them as they moved along the [southern] shore [to Patrae, mod.
Parras], and when [next morning] they were making the crossing from Patrae in
Achaea to the mainland opposite, they saw the Athenians advancing to attack
and realised that they had not succeeded in putting to sea unnoticed in the dark-
ness, but were forced to fight an action in the middle of the channel ... The
Peloponnesian ships formed as large a circle as they could, thus giving no oppor-
tunity for a breakthrough (diekplous) , with their bows outwards and their sterns
inwards, and the vessels that were accompanying them [smaller oared ships and
merchantmen] were placed inside the circle as well as the five ships that were
fastest, so that if the enemy did attack at any point they would have only a short
distance to go to bring suppon. The Athenians with their ships in single file
moved round the Peloponnesians in a circle and hemmed them into a small
space, constantly encircling them at very close quarters, and making them look
out for an immediate attack. Phormio had given orders to his captains not to
attack until he gave the signal. He was expecting that the Peloponnesians would
not keep formation, as infantry on land would, but that the ships would collide
with each other and the smaller ships would be a cause of confusion; also that if
the wind from the gulf [of Corinth] were to get up (that was what he was
waiting for and what usually happened about sunrise) they would not remain
steady for long . And he realised that the initiative was his to take when he
wished, since his ships were the faster, and that that was the right moment for
him to take it.
As the breeze freshened, the ships which were already in a constricted space
were beginning to fall into confusion from the simultaneous effect of the wind
and of the smaller vessels, and ship was jostling ship and poles were being used
to keep them apart. And as the seamen [i.e. the deck-hands] were shouting and
taking evasive action, and abusing each other, so that they were not listening out
for the words of command or for the boatswains, and as the ill-trained oarsmen,
being unable to recover their oars in the choppy water, made the ships unre-
sponsive to the helm, at that precise moment Phormio gave the signal, and the
Athenians, moving in to ram, first sank one of the flagships, and then went on
with the intention of putting the rest of the ships out of action as they fell in
their path. The result was that in the confusion none of the ships turned to fight,
but they all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The Athenians pursued and cap-
tured twelve ships, having put out of action at least one other in the engage-
ment.
The first point to be made about this action is that in the initial stages it
developed tactically on the same lines as the first skirmish at Artemisium
and for the same reasons. In each case, although on different grounds, one
side was recognised to be faster and the other to be slower, with the result
that the slower side, to avoid the breakthrough, adopted the circular for-
mation, while the faster ships moved round the circle very close in column
with the intention of causing confusion. Off Patrae the Peloponnesians
were slower because they were an expeditionary force on passage, while the
Athenian ships were cleared for action and fast. At Artemisium the reason
for the disparity in speed between the fleets was probably that the one had
recently been 'dried out' and the other had not (below, pp. 151-2). At
Artemisium the slower side was also the smaller in number; the opposite
was the case off Patrae, where Phorrnio's 20 fast ships attacked a slow
Peloponnesian fleet of 47 ships, of which 5 only were fast and they were
kept in reserve by a curious failure to understand the proper use of 'fast'
ships in battle.
By letting the enemy move out through the entrance of the gulf to
Patrae, and then catching them during their early morning dash across to
the mainland coast (a move they had to make if they were to carry out their
mission to Acarnania), Phormio ensured that the battle, when it came,
would be in open water where his own faster ships would have the room to
manoeuvre. The circular formation had been exploited offensively at
Artemisium by the Greeks, and it exploded successfully. On the present
occasion the Peloponnesian commanders certainly read the situation
right. They went by the book in adopting the correct defensive formation
but were prevented from using it offensively by Phorrnio's superior knowl-
edge of local weather conditions and by the inexperience of their own
oarsmen. Like all good commanders Phormio had a firm grasp of the stra-
tegic features of the situation, the enemy's obligation to cross the open sea
and the relative characteristics of his own and the enemy's ships, and was
thus able to choose the tactical situation most favourable to himself. His
knowledge oflocal conditions and his ability to forecast the tactical choice
which the enemy would take enabled him to harass their ships and to make
his attack at the right moment. The gross disparity in numbers was thus
overcome. In the next engagement the circumstances were different.
Phormia's local command of the sea was to be directly challenged.
N Naupacrus ,
t
quit of
Cortntt»
o
b
Map 6 The entrance to the gulf ofCorinth: Phorrnio's second action.
Naupactus II
After its defeat, the Peloponnesian fleet gave up its objective and withdrew
south to Cyllene on the west coast of the Peloponnese, mustering further
ships. The Spartans in response sent three more commanders, including
the talented and daring Brasidas. Phormio asked for reinforcements and
was sent 20 ships, but on their way round the Peloponnese they were
diverted southwards to Crete, and were delayed there. The Peloponnesian
fleet of 77 ships , in due course , moved north to Rhium on the southern
side of the entrance to the Gulf, but this time they came not as an expedi-
tionary force loaded with gear and additional troops and accompanied by
support vessels, but as a fleet cleared for action and intent on destroying
Phorrnio's smaller force. Phormio, still with only 20 ships, could only keep
watch on them from Antirrhium on the northern side of the narrow
entrance (2.86.5; see map 6):
And for six or seven days they lay moored opposite each other, practising and pre-
paring for battle, resolved on the one side [the Athenian] not to move into the
narrows, thinking that the enemy there had the advantage.
Thucydides presents (2.87) Brasidas encouraging his men by claiming that

their lack of skill was compensated by greater daring and numbers; also
that whereas in the previous action the Peloponnesian fleet was not pre-
pared for battle, in the coming action they would be seeking it. Phormia is
shown explaining the tactical situation:
I shall not stage the contest in the CulfifI can help it, nor will I move into it. I see
plainly enough that a confined space is a disadvantage to a few ships, even if they
are used with skill and are faster, against many ships inexpertly used. The fact is
that one cannot properly move against a ship to ram it, if one cannot get the
enemy in one's sights from some way off, and if one cannot retire if need be in a
difficult situation. There are no opportunities for carrying our a breakthrough or a
sharp rum, which are the manoeuvres of a faster moving fleet, bur [in a confined
space] it would be necessary to turn the sea-fight into a land-fight, and in those
circumstances the larger fleet wins.
Phorrnio's orders to his men were:
to stay near the [beached] ships in good order, to act on the words of command
with alacrity, particularly since there is little room between the fleets for embarka-
tion and attack [and so it was important to get off the beach and into a defensive
formation quickly] 10 and in the battle to regard disciplined movement and silence
as the most important things. These are necessities in most warlike operations and
not least in fighting at sea. And you must repel the onslaughts of the enemy in a
manner worthy of your former actions.
Themistocles, in the allied council of war on the eve of Salamis used an

argument that is in one respect the opposite of the argument which
Phormio used here (see p. 151). Themistocles thought it safer to fight an
enemy fleet faster and more than three times more numerous than his own
in the narrow waters between Salamis and Attica rather than in the open
waters of the Saronic Gulf adjacent to the Isthmus. He was afraid that in
10 This is just what the Corcyraean fleet failed to do in 427 (below, p. 78) and the
Athenian fleet failed to do at Noriurn and Aegospotami (above, p. 9 n. 5). It was
essential for a fleet putting to sea from a beach to get into formation very briskly,
since a ship on its own was very vulnerable.
the open water the ships of the Greeks would be surrounded by the faster
and more numerous Persian fleet, which contained the expertly operated
Phoenician and Ionian squadrons. Phorrnio's ships, unlike the Greek ships
in 480, were faster and they were also more expertly operated than their
opponents. They had already shown that in open water they could literally
make rings round the more numerous enemy ships and throw them into
confusion, and hoped to do so again.
In the event, Phorrnio, like the Peloponnesian commanders in the pre-
vious bartle, found that his freedom of action was limited by his respon-
sibilities, since, just as they on the previous occasion were an invasion force
under orders to proceed to Acarnania, he now had to defend Naupactus.
Accordingly, when at dawn the enemy moved, in column of four parallel
files of ships, along the southern shore of the Gulfin an easterly direction,
Phormio had no option but to keep pace with them, moving with his 20
ships in column, single file, along the northern shore. The Peloponnesian
right wing, to which the fastest ships had been assigned, was leading
(2.90-92.3),
so that if Phormio concluded that their objective was Naupactus and moved in
that direction to counter it, the Athenian ships would not succeed in escaping
attack by moving ahead of the Peloponnesian wing (at the head of the column)
but that these ships (being fast) should head them off ... As the Peloponnesians
expected, Phormio, worrying about the undefended position (of Naupactus)
when he saw the Peloponnesians coming out, in response hurriedly and reluc-
tantly ordered embarkation, and moved (eastwards) along the coast, while his sup-
porting land force of Messenians!! made a similar move in turn. The
Peloponnesian commanders saw the Athenians moving along in single file [to the
wing'] and already within the gulf and not far off the land. That was what they had
been waiting for, and at a signal they turned abruptly and swung from column to
line abreast, each ship making for the enemy as fast as possible, and intended to
cut off all the enemy ships. Some eleven of them, however, which were at the head
of the file, slipped past the Peloponnesian [right] wing and its turning sweep, and
succeeded in gett ing through to free water. The rest they caught and drove in flight
towards the land and made useless, killing those Athenians who did not succeed in
making their escape by swimming. Some of those [nine] ships they took in tow
II These Messenians, exiled from their land by Sparta, had been encouraged by
Athens to settle at Naupactus and were now on hand to supply the necessarysup-
porting land force for the Athenian squadron (see Salmon 1984 P: 281).
and were pulling them away empty, except for one which they had already cap-
tured complete with its crew, bur the Messenians, coming up in support, went
into the sea in full armour, boarded some ships and recovered them by climbing
on to the decks and fighting, although they were already under tow. 12
This second action in the gulf gives another detailed, and rather different,
picture of triereis manoeuvring in battle: The usual formation of line
abreast was adopted by neither fleet at the outset; both moved off 'to the
wing', staying in column. The Peloponnesians with 77 ships appear to
have adopted a column offour files (of 20, 19, 19, 19), since in this way
they could cover the Athenian file of 20 ships, bur being four deep would
be that much more formidable. When the Peloponnesian column reached
what they considered a favourable point they took the initiative and each
ship execured a sharp rum to the left so as to present a front of four ships
deep, line abreast. In this formation, which made a breakthrough virtually
impossible, they bore down at full speed on the single Athenian file 'inside
the gulf and not far off the land' with the intention of forcing them ashore
if they could not ram them first. They caught nine of them. The action of
the Messenian land force, in recovering some as they were acrually being
towed away with a prize crew on board, illustrates the role so often played
by supporting land troops in a sea-battle fought close to the shore.
However, the engagement was not yet over. Phormio had had nearly
half his ships pur out of action. The crews that escaped and the hulls that
were recovered could play no further part that day, but the 11 ships
which had succeeded in slipping past the enemy net were making for
Naupacrus with all speed, pursued by 20 fast Peloponnesian ships. All,
with one, possibly deliberate, exception, reached the harbour, and had
time to turn and range themselves 'by the temple of Apollo' in line
abreast with their bows facing seawards, ready for defence if the enemy
moved in against them (2.91.1). When the Peloponnesian ships came up,
the crews were singing the paean for the final arrack. 13 One Leucadian
12 These Athenian ships, cur off by the enemy sweep, did what such ships normally
did and ran for a friendly shore, but some had been rammed before they could get
there since some at least of the crews are said to have escaped by swimming.
Others got near enough to the shore for the Messenians to wade into the sea and
board them, engaging the enemy on deck as they were actually being towed away.
13 For the paean see above, pp. 66 and 68 . Silence is enjoined on other occasions.
'Clamour' is the mark of an ill-disciplined crew.
ship, far ahead of the others, was chasing the laggard Athenian ship. It so
happened that a merchantman was anchored off shore in deep water, as
merchantmen normally were, and the Athenian ship, reaching it first and
swinging round it in a tight circle , rammed the Leucadian ship and holed
14
iL
T his unexpected strike confused the Peloponnesians; success had caused their
formation to become ragged, so, with the intention of waiting for more of their
ships to come up, some of the ships dug in their oars and stopped in their tracks,
putt ing themselves at a disadvantage in view of the short distance between them
and the enemy, who were in a posture to attack. Others through unfamiliarity
vith the place ran their ships aground. When the Athenians saw what was hap-
pening, they regained their confidence, and at a single command went over to
he attack with a shout. IS Because of all the mistakes they had already made, and
heir state of disorder, the Peloponnesians resisted for only a short time, and
hen turned and made for Panorrnus, the place from which they had set out.
T he Athenians in pursuit captured six of the nearest ships and recovered their
own, which the enemy had put out of action near the shore and first taken in
ow.
T his remarkable account, whose truth there is no reason to doubt, under-
lines the qualities which made the Athenians so formidable in the practice
of warfare at sea: refusal at the outset to accept the logic of numbers and of
a tactically unfavourable situation, refusal to accept defeat when nearly
half their ships were out of action, a magnificent and glorious opportun-
ism and an ability to react quickly and decisively to a sudden change of
fortune. Knowing the superior agility and ramming ability of their ships,
he Athenians were really fighting with a different sort of weapon from
heir enemies, who did not know how to use fast ships when they had
hem . Provided that Athenian commanders had the ability to keep or
recover favourable tactical circumstances, superior numbers were of little
avail to a less skilful enemy. It was a brilliant, if rather brittle, form of
warfare brought by the Athenians to a pitch where tactical professionalism
had become decisive.
Thucydides does not tell us the name of the ship 's captain whose tight
urn was so effective, but he does give the name of the captain of the
14 We are told later that the ship filled with water.

IS See n. 13 above. There was no time for a paean.
Leucadian ship he rammed, Tirnocrares the Spartan, who killed himself as

his ship began to fill with water.
Corcyra
The tactical use of the trieres is again illustrated by another engagement in
western waters two years later. On this occasion Thucydides does not give
the Athenian commander's name. In 427 the Athenians sent a small force
of twelve ships to give support once again to a Corcyraean fleet against the
Peloponnesians (Thuc. 3.77-8). The 60 Corcyraean ships outnumbered
the 57 sent against them, but by going into action off the beach in a care-
less way they got into difficulty. The Athenians, afraid of being enveloped
by the large numbers of the enemy drawn up in line abreast, launched an
attack on the enemy's wing and put a ship out ofaction. The enemy, them-
selves now afraid of a breakthrough, formed a circle in the approved
manner, and the Athenian ships moved round them and tried to throw
them into disorder, as they had done off Patrae. But the Peloponnesians,
apprehensive of a repetition of that battle, threw against the Athenians
the ships that had been successfully fighting the Corcyraeans, causing
the Athenians to make a gradual withdrawal, backing water, towards the
harbour of the city, 'so that while they were doing so, the Corcyraean ships
should as far as possible escape first, since they were retiring slowly and the
enemy was facing them. The battle on these lines went on until sunset .'
The tactical movements in this engagement, so far as concerns the 12
Athenian ships and the part of the Peloponnesian fleet not in action with
the Corcyraean ships, followed normal lines. A small force of fast ships
facing a larger force of slower ships in line abreast formed line ahead and
attacked a wing to make a breakthrough. The breakthrough succeeded and
the larger force formed a circle to prevent attack from the rear; the faster
ships then moved round them trying to put them into disorder. So far, this
was according to the book, but on this occasion there was a second squad-
ron ofships which had been successfully engaged elsewhere and now inter-
vened, forcing the twelve ships to withdraw, greatly outnumbered. This
they did , backing water and with their bows to the enemy to cover the
Corcyraeans' escape 'as far as possible'. One can only admire the Athenians
as they passed through their tactical movements, from line ahead to close
encirclement, and from that to line abreast , as they backed water slowly
towards the harbour, all the time presenting the Peloponnesian ships with
the threat of attack. This is a cool professionalism that reflects intelligent
command, tight discipline and hard training. Thucydides certainly
intended us to notice and admire these qualities . He had, of course, com-
manded Athenian ships himself.
5
CYNOSSEMA, CYZICUS AND ARGINUSAE
Thucydides gives a detailed account of the dispatch and fortunes of the

great Sicilian expedition which Athens mounted in 415. It contains a good
deal of information about the trieres and its crew which will be introduced
into later chapters, but it has little to offer about the tactical deployment of
the ship and its performance in action . In Sicily Athenian proficiency in
these two fields, by the nature of the operation, was not called upon until
the peak of the fleet's effectiveness, both in manpower and in ships, was
long passed. Furthermore there was no large-scale sea-battle until the mili-
tary requirements of the siege of Syracuse had placed the ships in an
impossible position, and the Syracusans with Corinthian help had devised
modifications to their ships to take advantage of it. Given the diplomatic
and military aims of the adventure, to bring Sicily firmly into the Athenian
sphere of influence, not even a Phormio could have plucked a naval victory
from an operation marked by a series of diplomatic reverses and military
defeats, following the defection of one of her generals, the death ofanother
and the sickness of a third.
The Athenian disaster in Sicily was followed by a war at sea in the north-
eastern Aegean, sometimes called the Ionian war, in which Athens strug-
gled to keep open her remaining supply lines with the Black Sea. We find a
description of this war first in Thueydides and then, when Thucydides'
history comes to an end, in Xenophon, also an Athenian, and Diodorus of
Sicily. Xenophon was born shortly after 450 BC and his career, like
Thucydides', made him familiar with the trieres and its operation. H is
account provides the only detailed record of the movement, at top speed ,
of a fleet of triereis during a long day, and also includes descriptions of
three naval engagements, each of which illustrates some new aspect of the
deployment of triereis. Diodorus wrote in the first century BC but his
account of one of these battles makes more sense than Xenophon's. He is
thought to rely on the fourth-century historian Ephorus. As a whole, the
80
Cynossema, Cyzicus andA rginusae 81
history of this war emphasises the degree to which the security of Athens
came ultimately to depend on her naval control of a distant theatre of
operations, the Hellespont, and the adjoining coasts and islands, as pro-
viding the necessary forward bases.
The disaster in Sicily incited Athens' enemies to prepare a naval force to
cross the Aegean and to challenge her domination of the seaboard of Asia
Minor. For her part Athens devoted her ever resilient energies to the
replacement of the ships she had lost. The Peloponnesian fleet was now
encouraged, and rather intermittently paid, by Tissaphernes, the Persian
governor of the southern coastal region of Asia Minor. It used Miletus as
its main base, while the Athenians used Samos. Both sides manoeuvred,
but neither was willing to risk an engagement which might be decisive
(T huc. 8.78-80). At Aspendus in Pamphylia Tissaphernes retained a
Phoenician fleet of 147 ships , but hesitated to bring them north and
commit them to the Peloponnesian side. Persian policy was to keep the
Greeks fighting among themselves (Thuc. 8.87.4) .
Cynossema
In the summer of 411, on the invitation of Pharnabazus, the governor of
[he northern coastal region, who promised to subsidise the Peloponnesian
fleet if it were brought north into his province, the Spartan commander
Mindams moved from Miletus towards the Hellespont with 73 ships. He
was following up a successful incursion into the Thracian Chersonese
made earlier in the summer by 16 of his ships. They were now back at the
Peloponnesian forward base of Abydus and were being watched by a
similar small force ofAthenian ships lying northwards about 1Yz miles (2.7
km) across the straits at Sestus. I Mindarus' move was a direct challenge to
[he Athenian general Thrasyllus at Samos, who responded by moving
north with 55 ships, intending to get to the Hellespont before him. The
Athenian fleet was joined by more ships and the general Thrasybulus.
I Sestus had been established by the Athenian general Strombichides in 411 as a

fort to control the Hellespont (Thuc. 8.62.3). Aristotle (Rhet. 3.10, 1411a14)
quotes the Athenian Peitholaus' description ofSesrus as 'the meal table of Piraeus'.
As de Sainte-Croix says (1972: p. 48) Sestus was 'the king-pin of their defence of
the whole Hellespont' at this time. The Spartans had their base on the other
(south) side of the strait at Abydus.
Mindarus was delayed by bad weather and moved as far as Chios, wher e
the Athenians planned to keep him. But while they were attempting to put
down a revolt at Eresus, on the western coast of Lesbos, Mindarus put Out
from Chios, telling no one where he was going, and slipped through the
channel between Lesbos and the mainland on a remarkably fast passage to
Rhoeteum just inside the straits (see below, p. 97).
The Athenians at Sestus, learning of Mindarus' arrival and afraid of
being trapped inside the straits, eluded the enemy ships at Abydus, but ran
into Mindarus' fleet coming up the straits from Rhoeteum at dawn. The
Athenians lost 4 ships, but 14 escaped to Imbros. Mindarus now had 86
ships and tried to take Elaeus on the southern tip of the Thracian
Chersonese. He failed and returned to Abydus. By now the Athenians in
Lesbos had news ofMindarus' arrival in the Hellespont. They gave up the
siege of Eresus and in a day's voyage (of 60 sea miles: 110 km) reached
Elaeus , where they beached their ships , and after bringing in the squadron
from Imbros made preparations for an engagement with Mindarus.
The action (Thuc. 8.104) began when the 76 Athenian ships which
were moving north-east from Elaeus in column in the direction of Sestus,
approached Cynossema and the 86 Peloponnesian ships , including a
Syracusan squadron, came out from Abydus, also certainly in column,
along the coast in the opposite direction (south) to meet them (map 7). As
the two columns turned into line abreast to face each other, Mindarus with
his fastest ships was on his own left wing (which had been leading the
column) facing Thrasybulus' squadron on the Athenian right (which had
been bringing up the Athenian rear). The Syracusans were on Mindarus'
right wing facing Thrasyllus' squadron (which had been leading the
Athenian column). Mindarus' plan was, with his fast ships, to move round
the Athenian right wing and prevent Thrasybulus getting out of the straits ,
while driving the Athenian centre onto the land, which was close at that
point. The Athenian tactical response was to extend their line on the right
beyond the promontory ofCynossema. They succeeded in avoiding encirc-
lement, but at the expense of thinning their centre, which was driven
ashore. However, the two wings of the Athenian line each carried out an
encirclement of the opposing wings and routed them, a remarkable
achievement at the end ofa pull of more than 20 kilometres (11 sea miles).
They then turned inwards against the successful but now disorderly centre
of the Peloponnesian fleet, which they succeeded in routing in turn. The
Cynossema, Cyzicus andArginusae 83
86
ships
f
~ /un-
.3 sea miles
Map 7 The battle of Cynossema.
Athenians, with their double periplous, scored a clear tactical victory,

although the enemy ships were able to take refuge on the friendly southern
shore, and only 21 were lost. The Athenians lost 15. The chief gain was to
Athenian morale. After the Sicilian disaster they had been afraid of the
Peloponnesian fleet with its Syracusan allies: 'now they stopped thinking
[hat their enemies were any longer worthy of consideration in naval
matters'.
Alcibiades, the Athenian general who had defected en route to Sicily,was
now reasserting allegiance to Athens and regaining favour with the navy of
Samos. He returned there from the south at the moment of this victory,
and reported that he had prevented Tissaphernes sending the Phoenician
fleet north to help the Peloponnesians. For the time, at any rate , the threat
to Athens' lifeline to the Hellespont seemed to have been averted.
Thucydides' history breaks off after the battle of Cynossema, and the
story of the naval war in the north-eastern Aegean is taken up by
Xenophon and Diodorus. Xenophon's history opens at the beginning 0

winter (411) with the arrival at the Hellespont of the Athenian gener
Thymochares 'with a few ships' . An engagement followed in which the
Peloponnesians had the advantage. Then the Rhodian cornrnand e
Dorieus arrived at daybreak with 14 ships, having used darkness to cove
his approach. His ships were spotted by an Athenian look-out, and 2
ships put out against him. Dorieus promptly beached his ships and fough
from the shore. He was outnumbered and if, as seems likely, he had bee
moving under oar during the night his oarsmen would have been tired . A
that moment Mindarus happened to be 'making a sacrifice to Athena a
Ilium' (Troy) overlooking the sea, and made haste to launch his fleet from
Abydus and bring in Dorieus' ships. The Athenians responded and there
was a day-long battle in which Alcibiades, arriving from Samos with 1
ships, played a decisive role. The Athenians took 30 ships and recapture
some of their own. The fleets then withdrew to their local forward bases a
Abydus and Sestus for the winter. Thrasyllus went back to Athens to repo
and ask for more men and ships, while the rest of the Athenian fleet saile
in various directions to collect money, leaving 40 ships as garrison i
Sestus.
Cyzicus
For the events which followed in the early part of 41 0, leading up to an
including the battle of Cyzicus (map 8), we have two main sources - a
scrappy account in Xenophon (1.1.11-23) so much condensed as not t
make sense at times , and a very detailed account in Diodorus
(13.49.2-51) , which is thought to derive from Ephorus.? Diodorus there-
fore deserves attention. In both historians the Athenian ships at Sesrus
threatened by Mindarus with 60 ships at Abydu s, withdrew outside the
Straits to Cardia on the other side of the Thracian Chersonese. Then, i
Diodorus, Theramenes, Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were summoned, an
when they arrived 'the generals were eager for a decisive battle'. Mindarus
meanwhile had moved to Cyzicus, besieged and stormed it. The Arhenia
generals, determined to recapture Cyzicus, re-entered the Straits, arriving
2 See Andrewes (1982) pp. 15ff., to whom 1SM is indebted for the elucidation 0'
the various accounts of the battle.
'·
e·
/··
·
,
.•..
' ..
oconntSu~ ::
:-.,. -. _ . :('.
A Alcibiadessquadron ('k) ships)

T1-I R. Thrasymachus' squadron
THE. Theramenes ' squadron.
M MUu:larus' flett (80 ships)
o I ! I I ~Oknt...
b I Sed m uu I 30
Map 8 The battle ofCyzicus.

first at Elaeus. Then they made an early start and, passing the Spartan base
of Abydus in the dark so that the size of their now reinforced fleet should
not be detected, reached Proconnesus (mod. Marmora) where they spent
the night (Elaeus-Proconnesus about 138 km = 75 sea miles). Xenophon,
less plausibly, says that the 86 ships of the Athenians mustered at Parium ,
Alcibiades going on ahead and the other generals following, and from
there they moved by night under oar and arrived at Proconnesus (only
about 25 sea miles: 46 km) at about the time of the midday meal. Both
accounts stress the precautions taken to ensure that Mindarus should not
know the strength of the Athenian fleer. Xenophon sees Alcibiades as the
leading spirit, pressing ahead to Parium and giving instructions to the
other ships to follow him 'with their main sails left behind', i.e. cleared for
action, and impounding all shipping on arrival at Proconnesus. In
Diodorus the moves are less dramatic, but, suggesting deliberation and
planning, are more believable. The same is true of the two accounts of the
battle which followed.
Xenophon has the Athenian fleet putting to sea in a rainstorm and
finding, when it cleared, that Mindarus' 60 ships were in sight carrying out
manoeuvres away from the (western) harbour of Cyzicus and already cut
off from it by the Athenian ships. 'But the Peloponnesians, when they saw
that the Athenian rriereis were in far greater numbers than before and were
near the harbour fled to the shore; and mooring their ships together they
fought their enemies as they pulled down upon them. Alcibiades , however,
with twenty ships effected a periplous and landed on the shore.'
Xenophon's account, as has been pointed out, does not make sense. If
Alcibiades was already between Mindarus and the harbour, why does he
have to effect a periplous to get to the shore? Diodorus' account removes
some of the difficulties, while reducing the dramatic role ofAlcibiades.
In the first place, Diodorus makes plain at the outset that the Athenian
operation was an amphibious one aimed at the recapture of Cyzicus . The
generals ' first step was to land troops from the ships under Chaereas on
Cyzicene territory with orders to march on the city. Then they divided the
ships into three squadrons under Theramenes, Thrasybulus and
Alcibiades. 'Now Alcibiades with his own squadron went on far ahead of
the others with the intention of drawing the Spartans out to a battle, while
Theramenes and Thrasybulus devised an ingenious plan to encircle the
enemy and cut them off from retreat to the city when once they had been
Cynossema, Cyzicus and Arginusae 87
seen moving out.' Plutarch, in his Life of Alcibiades (28.6), puts the
number ofAlcibiades' ships at 40; but the numbers in the other squadrons
are not given. Diodorus continues:
Mindarus seeing only Alcibiades' ships approaching and not being aware of the
presence of the others scented an easy victory and boldly came out from the city
with eighty ships. When he drew near Alcibiades' squadron, the Athenians, as
planned, pretended to withdraw, and the Peloponnesians cheerfully pursued them
with all speed, sensing victory. But when Alcibiades had drawn them a good dis-
tance away from the city he raised the signal and at that moment his ships sud-
denly swung round in unison to face their pursuers , and Theramenes and
Thrasybulus moved on the city and cut off the Spartans' retreat.
It has recently been suggesred' that the two squadrons ofTheramenes

and Thrasybulus moving unseen southwards from Proconnesus must have
waited behind a promontory just north of the western harbour ofCyzicus,
which would have concealed them from Mindarus' ships as they emerged
from the western harbour. Hotly pursued by Alcibiades, Mindarus was
forced to do what oared ships usually did under such circumstances, and
run for the land, and to seek the protection of Pharnabazus' land force of
mercenaries. A land-battle then ensued, Thrasybulus putting ashore 'the
rest of the troops on his ships', and urging Theramenes to make contact
with the force marching on the city under Chaereas. It looks as if
Thrasybulus' ships had been troop-carriers which had earlier put ashore
their extra armed men in preparation for the sea-battle, and were now
putting ashore the regular hoplite epibatai. It is possible therefore that
Thrasybulus' ships had put ashore Chaereas' troops earlier and had
remained off the southern shore, eventually moving behind Mindarus'
ships from the south, as Theramenes' ships did so from the north. The
fighting on land was long and obstinate. Mindarus was killed and the city
of Cyzicus retaken. All the Spartan ships, with the exception of the
Syracusan squadron, which was burnt by the crews, were towed away to
Proconnesus. It was a famous victory, and Xenophon records the message
sent back to Sparta and intercepted by the Athenians: 'The ships are gone,
Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We don't know what to do.'
In Xenophon the operation for the recapture of Cyzicus appears to have
been a hasty, unplanned attack in which an impetuous Alcibiades succeeded
3 ByAndrewes (1982) pp. 20-1.

single-handed in destroying Mindarus' fleet, thanks to a fortunate rain-

storm, some quick opportunism, and a mysterious periplous. The land-
battle is played down. In Diodorus the operation is clearly amphibious,
carefully planned and deliberately carried out. The choice of Elaeus rather
than Sestus as the starting-point, the night voyage to Proconnesus past
Abydus, where they might have been observed, are both to be noted. On the
following day there is the landing of troops on the coast west of the city, not
near enough to be observed but within marching distance of the place where
land action was to be expected later in the day. Finally there is the ambush
behind the promontory planned to effect a peripIous, possibly a double peri-
plous, of Mindarus' fleet and cut off its retreat. The whole naval operation
seems to have been worked out to lead up to the land-battle by which a
friendly shore was, temporarily at any rate, converted into hostile territory
and which consequently resulted in the total destruction ofMindarus' fleet
and the recapture of Cyzicus. The importance of command of the shore,
which we have seen at Sybota and in one ofPhormio's actions in the gulf of
Corinth, is here very strongly reinforced. The naval engagement, once
rescued from Xenophon's distortions, provides another example of warfare
with the trieres as practised by the Athenians: the quick 180 0 turn of
Alcibiades' ships , and the periplous carried out by the remainder, are good
illustrations of the tactics they emplo yed.
Arginusae
In the follow ing year (409) Lysander, Sparta's new naval commander in the
eastern Aegean, was able to build up and refit a naval force of 70 ships at
Ephesus , including 25 ships which the Syracusans built at Antandrus in
the gulf of Adramyttium to replace those lost at Cyzicus, while the
Athenian fleet operated from Samos. After an unsuccessful action at
Notium, for which Alcibiades was held responsible by the Athenians
although he was not present, Alcibiades was replaced by Phorrnio's son
Conon. When Lysander's year as nauarch came to an end " he was suc-
ceeded by Callicratidas in command of a fleet now numbering 140.
Conon, with 70 ships, was caught at sea by Callicratidas and forced to
4 Having held the office once in 408/7. Instead he was appointed to the subordinate
officeof epistoleus (secretary) but with the power of nauarchos.
Cynossema, Cyzicus and Arginusae 89
12-filu
of ----+ 14 filts
IOsh ips of
10ships
Map 9 The battle ofArginusae.
fight at the entrance to the harbour of My tilene , losing 30 ships , although

the crews were saved. Callicratidas held the entrance to the harbour and
brought up troops on the land side. Conan got word to Athens, and the
Assembly reacted vigorously to the news of his plight. They voted a relief
force of 110 ships , putting aboard all who were of military age, slaves and
free men alike, and within 30 days all were manned and had put to sea.
The new fleet moved to Samos, where it was joined by 10 Samian ships
and 30 more from other allies as well as any Athenian ships that happened
to be in th e area. The total eventually came to more than 150. Callicratidas
did not hear of the relief force until it was alread y at Samos, and leaving
Ereonicus with 50 ships to contain Canon at Mytilene, put to sea with 120
ships, reaching Cape Malea in time for the midday meal. On the same day
the Athenian crews were eating their midday meal on the Arginusae
islands across the strait from Mytilene (map 9).
Callicratidas spent the night bivouacked on the south-eastern promon-
tory of Lesbos, from where he could see the fires of the Athenian camp 8
sea miles (14.7 km) , or little more th an an hour's pulling, across the water.
He attempted to put to sea at midnight, but a rainstorm prevented him. At

day-break his men embarked and pulled across the channel, 'the ships all
in single file ready for the diekplous and peripious because they were the
faster fleet'. The phrase 'in single file' cannot be taken to mean tha t the
whole fleet was in a single file: 120 ships in single file would have been
strung out over at least three miles of water. Callicratidas' ships , like the
Athenian as we shall see, were probably divided into squadrons of 10-15
ships , and each of these would have advanced across the water in single file,
the normal formation for ships 'ready for a breakthrough or encirclement'.
Callicratidas was on 'the right wing' - that is to say, the squadron which he
led was in the proper place for a fleet commander, on the right wing .
In the early morning light, when Callicratidas' fleet was seen approach-
ing, the Athenian fleet put out to meet him (HG 1.6.29-35).5 'T he
Athenians put out to sea in response with the left wing', i.e. the left wing
put to sea first. Xenophon gives the Athenian battle stations in detail. They
are of some interest as displaying another (tactical) answer to the break-
through and encirclement.
Aristocrates led on the left wing with fifteen ships , then Diomedon with another
fifteen. Pericles was stationed in support of [i.e. behind] Aristocrates , and
Erasinides in support of Diomedon [each presumably also with squadrons of
fifteen ships] . Beside Diomedon were ten Sarnian ships in single file; their com-
mander was a Sarnian called Hippeus. Next were the ten ships of the [Athenian
officials called] raxiarchs, these also in single file. Behind [i.e. in support of] these
were three ships of the [other Athenian officialscalled] nauarchs, and certain other
allied vessels. Protomachus formed the right wing with fifteen ships, and beside
him [i.e. to his left] was Thrasyllus with a further fifteen. Lysiaswas in support of
Protomachus and Aristagoras of Thrasyllus [both again presumably with fifteen
ships]. This was their formation, so that they should not offer an opportunity for
the diekplous since their ships were the slower.
About the tactical situation Xenophon could not be more explicit.

Callicratidas' fleet, advancing with its squadrons in single file, was, as the
faster, 'ready for the breakthrough and encirclement', ready in fact to chal-
lenge the Athenians at their own game. The reason why the Athenian ships
were the slower on this occasion is not given, but the fact seems to have been
recognised by both sides. The Athenians accordingly adopted a defensive
5 For this battle see J5M (1974) .

Cynossema, Cyzicus andArginusae 91
LEFT Callieratidas' fleet: 120 ships (1 in 8 SQUltdrons of 15)

Athenian fleet: 143 ships (and someothersl in 10 main squadrons
RIGHT
Protomachus OS) LysilS US}
Thr.syllus (151 Aristagor .. (151
SOOm
Ships of the Tax"-chs (lO t Nluarchs' ships (3)
13 x 40 - 520m
Cape _
Arginusae Is. -
Male.
Samlen ships (10)
•and someothers'
10 X4O -4()()m
Diomedes lIS) Erasinides(151
1000 m - - - - - - - - - - - ...
1100 Aristocrates 1151 Pericles 1151
1200
1250
1- - 5 X4O - .200m 5x4O-200m
1300 200m LEFT
1400
1__ ~all~ra~ida~' S~iP\
RIGHT
o t
I I
Kiklmetres
29. The disposition of the fleets at the battle ofArginusae.
posture, not on this occasion the circle (possibly because of the size of their
fleet and its closeness to the shore), but instead a formation of squadrons in
depth. The Samian ships (10) and the 'ships of the taxiarchs' (10) which
formed the centre are said to be in single file. They seem in this respect to be
in contrast to the four squadrons on either wing, which were then in more
than one file. Similarly, when Callicraridas' squadrons are described as being
'all in single file' they are in contrast to the Athenian squadrons, of which
only two are in single file. Squadrons of 15 ships may be in three files of five
or five files of three; three filesoffive ships are likely, since the two squadrons
so ordered, one in support of and behind the other, would present a forma-
tion the total depth of which would be 10 ships, matching in depth the two
squadrons of 10 ships each in single file. The diagram (fig. 29) sets out the
formation of the two fleets before the engagement began.
The two fleets fought for a long time, 'their ships first in a mass and then
scattered, but when Callicratidas, as his ship rammed another, fell into the
sea and disappeared', the Athenian right wing got the better of the Spartan
left, and the Peloponnesians fled to Chios and Phocaea while the
Athenians moved back to the Arginusae islands. On the Athenian side the
losses were 25 ships, with their crews as well, except in a few cases, while
the Spartans lost 9 of their own 10 ships and more than 60 ships of their
allies. The Athenian fleet split up: 47 ships under Theramenes and
Thrasybulus, both now serving as trierarchs, were detailed to go to pick up
the crews of the lost ships, who were still clinging to the floating wrecks,
while the rest were to relieve Conon at Mytilene. Bad weather kept both
forces inactive and the crews could not be saved. The dispatch boat gave
the Spartan commander at Mytilene the news of the defeat. He concealed
the truth, but raised the siege and withdrew to Chios. Those of the gener-
als that returned to Athens were charged in the Assembly with failure to
rescue the crews of the lost ships and were put to death, in spite ofSocrates'
protests at the illegality of the trial.
The three engagements in the region of the Hellespont during the later
stages of the Ionian war, which we have looked at in some detail, have con-
siderable tactical interest. They underline the qualities ofships and seamen
which gave success in all three cases to the Athenians.
The sickle-shaped formation adopted by the Persian fleet in the main
engagement off Artemisium suggests an attempt, not in the event success-
ful, to move round both flanks of a shorter enemy line of ships drawn up
abreast. At Cynossema the 76 Athenian ships moving into the straits in
column on the north side were met by Mindarus' larger fleet of 86 ships
moving in column on the south side in the opposite direction. As the two
fleets drew level they turned and faced each other in line abreast. Taking
tactical advantage of his longer line Mindarus sent his fast ships to make a
peripious of the Athenian right wing, which had been in the rear of the
column, while attacking the centre and driving it ashore. In reply the
Athenians, temporarily abandoning their centre, did the unexpected and
brought off a periplous on both wings, routed their opponents and then
came to the rescue of the ir centre. Tactical skill and high performance
brought them success. At Cyzicus the tactical picture was a deliberate set
piece, carefully planned; but again it required high performance from
ships and men.
Cynossema, Cyzicus and A rginusae 93
Arginusae is of great interest because Xenophon for once gives a clear
account of the dispositions and tactics on both sides. Here the Athenians,
unusually, had the larger number ofships, and the Spartan ships were rated
faster. The reason probably was that the Athenians were fielding a scratch
fleet as regards both oarsmen and ships. They are to be seen adopting a
heavily defensive posture, and sticking to it. The faster Spartan ships
attacked by squadrons in single file 'ready for the breakthrough and the
periplous in spite of the enemy's superiority in numbers. As we have seen
many times, superiority in performance was regarded as counterbalancing
inferiority in numbers. For their part the Athenians adopted an interesting
answer to the threat of a breakthrough, which is perhaps foreshadowed by
Brasidas' formation in the second ofPhormio's actions in the Gulf.
We have been able to watch the trieres in a succession of engagements
during the fifth century, and to gain a clear picture of what was demanded
of her designer in construction and of what was demanded of her crew in
action. Good acceleration and good turning capacity were required to
enable her to take the position from which she could hit her opponent
most effectively.Certain conditions of hull and loading, as well as of main-
tenance, qualified the trieres for the rating 'fast', and the fast triereis were
clearly those best able to achieve their tactical objectives in battle: in attack
the breakthrough and periplous, quick turns, ramming and withdrawal; in
defence a quick start from a stationary defensive line or circle to take
advantage of targets suddenly offered. Performance of this high quality in a
ship with a crew of 200 required fitness, training and discipline in the
men, and in the ship the maximum lightness of build and a high standard
of maintenance. These engagements also bring out clearly a rather unex-
pected point: the close reliance of the oared warship on support from the
land and the consequent importance of the friendly shore. This point is
perhaps not so unexpected if we take into account the way in which indi-
vidual triereis, and trieres fleets, normally moved from place to place. This
will be the subject of the next chapter.
NAVAL MOVEMENTS
Performance in battle was the main function of the trieres, but it was not
the only one. She was the means by which Athens exerted her influence
throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Fleets had to move from home
port to overseas base, and from there to the areas of conflict. Sometimes
triereis carried only the minimum of fighting men on board; sometimes a
fleet consisted of a few triereis so manned, with the rest carrying 30 extra
troops each for deployment on land, sometimes all the ships were such
troop-carriers. For example (Thuc. 2.23.2), when the Spartans invaded
Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war in 431, Athens replied by
sending a force of 100 triereis round the Peloponnese 'and on them 1,000
hoplires and 400 archers', i.e. the normal complement of armed men
carried (below, p. 110). This force reached the western seaboard of the
Peloponnese and Cephallenia, where it joined 50 Corcyraean ships in raids
on Spartan territory. Two years later another expedition (Thuc. 2.56.2) of
100 ships was sent against the Peloponnese accompanied by 50 ships from
Lesbos and Chios. On this occasion the Athenian ships carried 4,000
Athenian hoplires, Experience had presumably shown that naval confron-
tation was not be expected, so that the ships employed could all be troop-
ships carrying the extra 30 men on deck. That operations on land were
contemplated is shown by the inclusion in the force of 300 cavalry carried
in special horse-transports. 1
The long voyage from Piraeus round the Peloponnese to Cephallenia
raises certain questions. In a speech at this time , when plague and the
Spartan incursions into Attica were weakening Athenian morale,
1 See below, p. 156. Thirty horses could be carried in each horse-transport which ,
Thucydides says, were first on this occasion triereis suitably modified . It appears
that these tran sports were pulled by 60 oarsmen (IG 22 1628.154£) . They were
prob ably tbranitai.
94
Naval movements 95
Th ucydides (2.62.2) shows Pericles reminding his countrymen of the

• wer which their naval superiority gave them:
. u think that you rule only your allies.? but I say that of the two elements that are
anifestly for our use, land and water, you are the complete masters of one in its
irery, both as you now go abour it, and if in the future you should wish to go
• ut it more widely; and no one, be it the king of Persiaor any other nation in the
W'Orld at present, will interfere with your movement on it with your present naval
rmarnen t.
Th ese are proud words, and Athens' resources at the time in men and ships
ould seem to justify them, but to understand fully what is involved in
is claim, and the sense in which it may be true, we must examine, in as
much detail as is possible, the logistics of the movement of triereis on
. .
"- trve service.
When Herodotus speaks of the Greek fleer's move southward after the
trles of Artemisium he says (8.22) that Themistocles took a number of
- e fastest ships and put in at the beaches between Aphetae and Attica
vhere the Persian ships were likely to go ashore for drinking water. There
e carved messages on the rocks urging the Ionian Greeks serving in the
eet to desert to the Greek allies, or at any rate to fight half-heartedly. The
srory is based on a fact, that triereis did not normally carry supplies of
rinking water, even for the short run from Aphetae to Attica, but could be
ounted on to go ashore for it.
Piraeus to Mytilene
Going ashore for meals and bivouacking for the night was regular practice
with the crews of triereis on long voyages. This is implied by the account in
T hucydides (3.49) of the famous non-stop voyage (of about 184 sea miles,
340 km) under oar from Piraeus to Mytilene in Lesbos (map 10). On the
suppression of the revolt of Lesbos in 427 and the fall of Mytilene the
Athen ian Assembly took the decision to put to death all the men captured,
and sent a trieres to tell Paches, the Athenian commander, to carry out the
sentence; but on the following day they thought better of it, and
2 The members of the Delian League, formed after the repulse of the Persian inva-
sion for the liberation of the Greeks of Asia Minor and the islands, were techni-
callyAthens' 'allies', bur she now openly claimed to rule them.
,
100= milts
Map 10 Piraeus to Mytilene.
sent at once a second trieres as quickly as possible, in case, if the first rrieres gO(
there first, they might find the city destroyed. It had a start of about a day and a
night. The Mytilenian representatives at Athens gave wine and barley bread for
the ship and promised great rewards if it arrived first. The crew [of the second
ship] made such haste that they [did not stop for meals but] pulled and ate at the
same time, barley bread mixed with wine and olive oil, and [they did not bivouac
for the night but] some slept and others pulled, turn and turn about. Bygood luck
they had no contrary winds , and while the other ship did not make haste on such
a disagreeable errand, the other hurried in the way described . The first ship did in
fact arrive first by enough time to allow Paches to read the decree and start taking
steps to carry it out, but the second ship put in after it and was in time to prevent
the actual executions.
The story makes it quite plain that the normal practice was to take meals
and sleep on land, and not to pull in shifts but all together all the time, and
that to take food and drink and to sleep on board, and to pull in shifts, was
a practice only justified by these special circumstances.
Naval movements 97
Chios to the Hellespont

Mindarus' dash from Chios to the Hellespont before the battle of
Cynossema is a voyage described in detail by Thucydides (8.101). Mter
leaving Chios (map 11) ,
they made land first in Phocaean territory at the harbour of Carte rea [39 sea miles:
72 km] and took their midday meal there. Then they moved along the Cymaean
coast and took their evening meal at Arginusae on the mainland opposite
Mytilene [26 sea miles: 48 km. The whole day's voyagewas 65 sea miles: 120 km].
From there [next day] when it was still quite dark they moved along the coast and
arrived at Harmatus on the mainland opposite Methymna [68 sea miles: 126 km],
and when they had hastily taken thei r midday meal they proceeded along the coast
to Lecturn and Larisa and Hamaxitus and the places in that region, and arrived at
Rhoeteum in the Hellespont before midnight [56 sea miles: 103 km. The total
distance covered in this second long day was 124 sea miles or 229 km]. Some of
the ships beached at Sigeum and other places nearby.
As they bivouacked and prepared their evening meal in the darkness, their
camp-fires were seen by Athenian look-outs posted from Sestus.
Piraeus to Corcyra
(1) Ipbicrates' voyage
If such constant reliance on the land was, as it appears to be, a feature of
the voyages of fleets of triereis, as it was of their battles, the question arises
(Thuc. 2.23.2) how an Athenian fleet of 100 ships in the summer of 431
could move round the Peloponnese without any friendly territory to make
them welcome on the many stops they would have made on the way. The
account of Iphicrates' voyage to Corcyra in 372 (Xen. HG 6.2.27-30)
gives a good indication of how such a voyage was conducted. It is described
by Xenophon as an example of good leadership.
He proceeded with his journey and at the same time made all necessary prepara-
tions for action, at the outset leaving his main sails behind as if he was expecting
an engagement. In addition, even if there was a following wind he used his small
[boat] sails little, but progressed by oar [instead, presumably, of using main sails
and boat sails when the wind was favourable]. Thus he both improved the fitness
of his men and achieved a higher speed for his ships. Often, also, when he was on
the point of giving his men the order to get their evening meal, he would take
P \0 50
i I I
o \0 ZO
Map 11 Chios to the Hellespont.

Naval movements 99
them our to sea in line ahead in these regions, and turning them about and
forming line abreast [the rourine manoeuvre] he made them race to the shore for a
prize.When they were taking their midday meal he used to set a guard on land and
purring up masts in the ships he had a look-out set from them. [These would seem
obvious precautions since they were in enemy territory.]
He often put to sea after the evening meal, and, if pulling was necessary, he
rested the men in turn . In passage by day he proceeded, according to the signal
given, sometimes in line ahead, sometimes in line abreast, so that the crewscom-
bined making progress with reaching waters dominated , as they expected, by the
enemy,only after practising and learning everything that related to fighting at sea.
And although they usually took their midday and evening meals in enemy terri-
tory, yet by doing only what was necessary he got to sea before enemy forces
arrived, and made a quick get-away.
It looks as if the coast of the Peloponnese was thinly enough populated for
it to be safe for an enemy fleet to go ashore for water, meals and bivouack-
ing provided that precautions were taken.
What Thucydides and Xenophon do not tell us is how such fleets were
victualled. Since no markets would have been open to them on the voyage
round the Peloponnese, the triereis would have had either to take victuals
on board or to make a rendezvous with supply ships. The former is the
more probable. The Corinthian invasion fleet in 433 had taken victuals for
three days when the ships left Cheimerion (above, p. 64).
(2) The Sicilian expedition

The Athenian need for bases on the Peloponnesian coast is shown by
Dernosrhenes' occupation of Pylos, which Thueydides represents as the
fortunate outcome of an Athenian fleet becoming stormbound there in
418 (4.3-4) , and by his later construction of a fort , abandoned the follow-
ing year, on the Peloponnesian coast opposite Cythera when en route for
Syracuse with the reliefforce in 414 (Thuc. 7.26.2, and 8.4).
At any rate , however the victualling was effected in 431 on what was
soon to become a routine voyage for Athenian fleets, Thucydides gives no
hint about it in relating the first stage of the voyage of the fleet of triereis in
the Sicilian expedition of 415. He says that the supply ships and other rri-
ereis assembled at Corcyra. It seems likely then that the main fleet of tri-
ereis carried their victuals on board for the four or five days the voyage
from Piraeus to Corcyra would have taken. They would of course have
gone ashore for water, for the preparation of meals and for bivouacking at
Map 12 Corcyra ro Rhegium .
night. Where they could do this safely would have been by now well
known to Athenian commanders.
Corcyra to Rhegium
Thucydides interrupts his narrative of the preparations for the Sicilian
expedition (map 12) with an account (6.33-4) of a debate at Syracuse
about the prospects of invasion, in which the Syracusan statesman
Hermocrates is shown putting forward a plan to deter the invading force
before it reached Italy. He suggested the dispatch of a Syracusan naval
force with two months' victuals (necessarily carried in supply ships) to
Tarentum. 'T he open sea', he said,
Naua l movements 101
is wide for them [i.e, the Athen ians] to crossall together. It would be hard for them
to keep formation [i.e. in column ] in the long crossing [of 84 sea miles]; and so
moving slowly and arriving in small groups, they would be easy to attack. If on the
other hand they were to invade with the fast ships in a closer formation cleared for
action, then if they use their oars [for the crossing] we should be making our attack
on them when they are tired after the crossing. Alternatively, if they took the deci-
sion not to cross und er oar but unde r sail, we could withdraw to Tarentum; and
they, after making the crossing with a small amount of victuals as men going into
battle, would be at a loss for food in an uninhabited area. Either they would stop
where they were and be besieged, or, after attempting to move along the coast they
would distance themselves from the rest of the expedition [at Corcyra] and their
morale would be low since they would have no sure knowledge about the position
of the ciries [of the region] whether they would take them in or not.
H errnoc ra tes' conclusion was th at, faced with these alternatives, th e

Athen ian for ce would no t even set out from Corcyra.
The strategic analysis which Thucyd ides puts into Herrnocrares' mouth
is penetrating and throws a clear light on the limitations of th e trieres as an
all-p ur p ose warship. The distance from Corcyr a to the h eel of Ital y is
about 155 km or 84 sea miles, not much m ore than half the di stance wh ich
ould be covered by a tri eres com fort ably under oar ' in a long day' (see n. 4
below) but the oarsmen would be in no sha pe for a battle o n arrival. The
fleet, it must be remembered, consisted of three m ain elem ents, th e fast
ships, the troopships and other oared vessels (smaller than triereis) with
the merchan trnen, which in a cro ssing under oa r the y would h ave taken in
tow. Whether the Heet moved under oa r or under sail, the crossing would
be slow and the sh ips would inevitably split up into sm all groups, an y of
wh ich would be an easy prey for a sq uad ro n of fast triereis operating out of
he nearby base of Tarentum. The alt ernati ve wa s for the 60 fast ships to
ma ke the crossing by themselves, cleared for action, with th e intention of
destroyin g the opposing fast squadron and clearing the way for a safe cro ss-
ing by the rest o f the fleet, But after a da y at the oa r the oarsm en of the fast
triereis would arrive ti red and be faced by Syracusan ships with fresh crews.
If th e Atheni an fast shi ps waited for a favo urable wi nd and crossed under
sail, the Syracusans co uld refuse battle, and the Athenian sh ips, without
sup plies, would have nowhere to go for victuals since th e supply ships
wo uld have been left behind. If they bivouacked the Syracu sans could
besiege th em; if th ey pre ssed on they would bec ome further and furth er
separated from the rest of the Heer (and th eir sup plies), and would h ave no
prospect of receiving hospitality from any city. The logic was good, but the
Syracusans were not so convinced of the urgency as to adopt his plan.
The first thing which it is interesting to observe is that the direct route
of204 sea miles from Corcyra to Croton is clearly beyond the capacity of a
trieres. Even the shorter route to the Iapygian promontory is a 'long cross-
ing' for such a ship.
The analysis is clear evidence that a fast trieres cleared for action carried
only the minimum ofvictuals, i.e, for one day. If not cleared for battle (and
thus not in a posi tion to achieve the highest performance of which it was
capable) it might carry provisions for a longer period, but the normal
source of victualling for triereis on the move was either a supply ship or a
market in a friendly city. The crew had, as we shall see, a victualling allow-
ance for the purchase of food. In this analysis of the capability of a triere s
under oar, the fatigue factor is also emphasised.
The Athenian fleet, after the routine voyage of about 390 sea miles
round the Peloponnese, duly met the rest of the allies and the suppot[
vessels at Corcyra. The fleet was divided into three squadrons sailing separ -
ately 'so that they might not sailing together make difficulties in procuring
water and harbours and provisions' . This is a revealing sentence. Three tri-
ereis were then sent on ahead to find out which cities in southern Italy and
Sicily would make them welcome (6.42-4).
All the ships began together to crossthe Ionian seato Italy;and when they reached
the Iapygian promontory [the heel of Italy] or Tarentum, or where each happened
to make a landfall, they made their way along the Italian coast, the cities refusing
them admittance to market or town, bur allowing them water and beaching facil-
ities, Tarentum and Locri not admitting them even to these, until they came to
Rhegium [the toe of Italy]. And they now mustered their forces there, and since
the Rhegines did not admit them to the town, they constructed a camp in the pre-
cinct ofArtemis, where the Rheginesprovided a market for them, and they hauled
their ships our of water there and rested.
The distance from Corcyra to Rhegium is about 375 sea miles or 680 km.
The speed of triereis

The speed of a trieres on the move from place to place deserves some con-
sideration. When conditions were favourable sails were certainly used
Naval movements 103
.l.$> Heraclea. ..
:::#.······ Ii?!.~.!?!!!rf.( ({t~.'!!l ~i~·.. . ....... \<.f1'). ....
~
.: (r MiiliUy ·········~~.~-~.~..miJ.~.i·\\:,····
meal)
..~ Calchedon.
Byz:~
"li!) ~
~ o
Map 13 Byzantium to Heraclea.
since sails were carried, but passage under oar was regarded as faster.3 The
most specific statement about the speed of a trieres under oar is given by
Xenophon, who states that the passage from Byzantium to Heraclea on the
southern coast of the Black Sea, a distance of about 129 sea miles (236
km), was 'a long day's voyage" for a trieres under oar' (map 13). Since, as
we have seen (above, p. 97), a fleet in a hurry would put out before dawn
and arrive after dark, a 'long day' can be taken as 16 to 18 hours. With a
break for the midday meal ofone to two hours, depending on the degree of
haste, the two periods of pulling may each have been 7 to 8\-2 hours long.
On Xenophon's Byzantium-Heraclea run of 129 sea miles there is no indi-
cation of haste. With a 17-hour 'long day' and a 2-hour break the average
speed works out at 8.6 knots. If the working day was longer or the break
shorter, or both, the speed would have been correspondingly less, perhaps
3 Xenophon (above, p. 97) says that Iphicrates in his voyage round the Peloponnese
achieved a higher speed for his ships by proceeding under oar. In ]FC and
McGrail (1984) one of the 'historical requirements for the reconstruction of the
tricres' is said to be: ' (9) to carry sail well enough for oars to be used on passage
onl y in insufficient or contrary winds'. It seems that we should now add: 'or when
the ship was in a hurry' .
4 Xen. Anab. 6.4.2. It is interesting to note that in one manuscript the reading was 'a
very long day'. The scribe may have been a Byzantine who knew what he was
talking about.
as little as 7 knots. It appears ? that although there is a westward current in

the Bosporus strait there is a current eastwards under normal conditions
along the southern coast of the Black Sea. This factor may therefore be dis-
counted.
Mention has already been made (above, pp. 95-6) of the famous non-
stop voyage from Piraeus to Mytilene in 42 7, preceded by the more lei-
surely voyage of the ship which set out the day before. The precise time
each ship took is not given by Thucydides, and there is therefore no accu-
rate basis for calculating the speed of either ship . The distance between
the two places is about 184 sea miles (340 krn) by the most direct route
(map 10). We may guess that the first ship set out at about midday on the
day the Assembly (which began its meetings in the early morning), no
doubt after some discussion , passed the decree. She arrived at about
midday on the third day, spending 24 hours at sea and two nights and one
midday break on land. On this calculation she made a speed of about 7.7
knots when at sea. The second ship might have taken 24 hours in all, the
oarsmen under pressure pulling their oars in shifts at the same average
speed as the first ship. Compared with the trieres in Xenophon's voyage,
the first ship, under no pressure, was certainly on the slow side, while the
second ship did well to keep up the same speed as the first ship for twenty-
four hours.
Mention has also been made (pp, 81,97) ofMindarus' dash from Chios
to Rhoeteum before the battle of Cynossema. This is the most detailed
account we possess of a naval movement by a fleet of triereis (map 11).
Thucydides gives the details because he had the means of knowing them,
and because it was a remarkably fast passage of about 190 sea miles in twO
days, one of them a very long one. Since the fleet was in a hurry it certainly
moved under oar. The second day's pulling, of about 124 sea miles (229
krn), starting well before dawn, say 5.30 a.m. and ending 'before mid-
night', say 11.30 p.m ., was a 'long day' of 18 hours in which perhaps as
little as one hour can be allowed for a 'hastily taken' midday meal. With
two continuous periods of 9 hours' pulling and an overall distance of 124
sea miles the average speed works out at 6.9 knots. If the midday break was
longer or if the day started later or finished earlier, both of which are
perhaps likely, the average speed would have been higher (e.g. 7.3. in 17
5 This information emerged in the Timescorrespondence mentioned above, p. xviii.

Naval movements 105
hours' and 7.7 in 16 hours' pulling), but it should be remembered that this
is a movement of a whole fleet, where the speed is the pace of the slowest,
and not of a single ship, as the other voyages were. The first stage of the
voyage of the Athenian fleet on the Sicilian expedition (map 2), the 390
sea miles from Piraeus to Corcyra, appears to have been taken by triereis
alone, unaccompanied by supply ships , and is likely to have been made
under oar, since that was faster, and the ships would have needed to keep
together off enemy territory. On the assumption of a speed of seven knots
and a sixteen-hour day, including a midday break of two hours, a day's
passage would have been just under 100 miles and the total time taken
four days. The next stage, on which the triereis were joined by supply
ships , of 376 sea miles from Corcyra to Rhegium (map 12), would have
been taken much more slowly. In the first stage the crews would have been
able to exist on the victuals they took with them; in the second, after the 84
sea mile crossing in the open sea to the heel of Italy when the triereis again
would have taken their own victuals, the rriereis would have had to wait
for the supply ships making their way under sailor oar to victual them for
the rest of the voyage. On this stretch the speed of the expedition would
have been that of the slowest, i.e. about 5 knots. If that is taken as the
average speed for the whole of the second stage to Rhegium , the second
part of the voyage would have taken 5-6 days. Allowing then 3 or 4 days
for the muster of the fleet at Corcyra, the whole voyage from Piraeus to
Rhegium, for each of the three divisions of the fleet sailing at intervals one
after the other, may have been completed in 14 days, given favourable
winds. Unfavourable conditions, of which there is in fact no mention,
could have delayed the fleet at any point, but particularly when it was
accompanied by supply ships on the second stage.
It is interesting to compare, in point ofspeed, the account in Xenophon
(HG 2.1.30) of another fast voyage, probably not by a trieres. After
Aegospotami Lysander sent news of his victory to Sparta by a Milesian
'pirate' . His ship may have been a pentecontor or a hemiolia." He arrived
6 See ]SM (1980a) where it is suggesred that , since the word bimiolios means 1Y2,
the hemiolia was a ship with three files of oarsmen ranging fore and aft through-
out the ship at one level, i.e. 1Y2 files on each side. Half the oars would be pulled
by one oarsman and the orher halfby two. See also Gardiner and ]SM (1995) pp.
139-40 and]SM and]FC (1996) pp. 317-21 for more recently proposed designs
of both the hemiolia and trihemiolia.
'on the third day'. Since he must have started fairly late on the first day, he
appears to have covered the distance, of about 390 sea miles from
Aegospotami to Gytheum, in less than 48 hours at an average speed of just
over eight knots. It must be assumed that the ship was pulled continuously,
since even if only one stop was made the speed would have been impos-
sibly high.
It looks as if seven to eight knots was a possible average speed for an
oared warship in a hurry, although normal speed is likely to have been less.
There is no recorded example of a voyage in which sail and oar were used
together.
THE MEN
In chapters 3-6 we have observed the trieres through the eyes of contempo-
rary writers as she took part in actions and moved from place to place on
passage, and we have formed an idea of the nature of her performance under
these conditions. The next step is to focus more closely on the ship herself,
ro see her, as it were, from the inside. In the present chapter, we shall identify
the different sorts of men who went to sea in her and worked the fleets of tri-
ereis in the fifth and fourth centuries. Then in the following chapter we shall
concentrate on the structure of the ship as it is to be seen in contemporary
literature and deduced from the relevant archaeological material.
Overall number of crew

The number of men who formed the crew ofa trieres is given in several his-
torical passages spanning our period. In Herodotus (3.13.1-2), the
Mytilenian ship with a crew of200 which took part in Cambyses' invasion
of Egypt (525 BC) can hardly be other than a trieres, since no other type of
ship in service at the time could have had a crew of nearly that size. Later
Herodotus gives (7.184.1) the number of men in the native crews of the
1,207 ships of the Persian invasion force in 480 as 241,000 and says that
he calculated on the basis of200 in each ship. The 30 extra Persian troops
were in addition to the native crews. It seems to have been the same on the
Greek side. When Cleinias joined the Greek fleet at Artemisium he was
said (8.17) 1 to have brought his own ship and a crew of 200, and later in
1 H. T. Wallinga (1982) says p. 46 5: ' it would be rash to consider K1einias' crew as

typical' and argue s that triereis were normally undermanned. We do not find his
detailed arguments convincing and in general it seems unlikely that the Greeks
should go to the trouble of devising a complicated oared ship in which the
maximum number of men was packed into the minimum space and then regu-
larly leave it undermanned. Cleinias' ship was not of course one of those which
were the subject of the 'Decree ofThemisrocles'.
107
the fifth century (Thuc. 6.8.1 ,8.29.2) the pay of a ship's company is calc -
lated on the basis of a crew of the same number. In the next century th
victualling allowance of the crew of a fast trieres is worked out b.
Demosthenes (4.28) on a similar basis. It is, incidentally, interesting t
notice that the pay of all members of the crew was the same , in spite of the
difference of status which we shall observe (below, p. 110) between some
members and others. The conclusion is safe that throughout the period 0
which we are speaking a full-strength trieres, not carrying extra troops, ha
a crew of 200 men besides the trierarch.
The 'Decree ofThemistodes'

Ofall the documents of Greek history which have been preserved the mo st
vivid, and the most interesting, by reason of the occasion as well as of the
particularity of the information it gives, is 'the Decree of Themistocles'.
Inverted commas are necessary because the inscription we have is thought
to record not the actual decree but a literary version of it current in the
fourth century. 2It records the measures taken by the Athenian Assembly in
481 to meet the threatened Persian invasion. These measures , which were
put forward by Themistocles, include the mobilisation of the fleet and
contain information which is likely to be reliable about the manning of the
trieres in the fifth century and is certainly a reliable guide to the manning
of the trieres in the fourth century. The document may be used here as a
framework for treating the commander and the various components of a
rrieres' crew.
After provision for the evacuation of Attica, the following instructions
are given to the strategoi, the annually elected officers whom we usually call
'generals' but who commanded the armed forces of the city ofAthens both
by sea and land:
Trierarchs (sea-cap tains) (lines 18-23)
The generals are to appoint as from the following day two hundred suitably
qualified trierarchs, one for each ship, and to assign the ships to them by lot. The
qualifications are the possession of land and a house in Attica, children born in
wedlock, age not over fifty.
2 Meiggs-Lewis: no. 23. We usethe textofN. G. L. Hammond (1982) pp. 84, 85,
86 and 88, which isMeiggs-Lewis' 'but without their restorations'. For it as a lit-
erary version see Hammond's note 33 p. 83.
The men 109
At a later date service as a trierarch was a public duty, lasting a year and
laid on citizens ofa high property rating , although, as we shall see (p. 120),
a patriotic citizen could volunteer for the office. The rrierarch was issued
with a ship, probably, as here, by lor. He could draw the gear, for which he
was personally responsible, from the public store, or he could provide his
own . Pay and an allowance for victuals was in theory provided by the city
through the fleet commander, bur, as we shall see (pp. 120-6), the trier-
arch was responsible for keeping his ship at sea and felt obliged (Q meet
these expenses from his own pocket, if the money was not forthcoming
from the commander (below, p. 123). What the responsibility of the trier-
arch was in 480 is uncertain. Cleinias was able to provide a ship and pay
the crew from his own resources, bur he came from one of the richest fam-
ilies in Athens and the case is mentioned because it was exceptional. The
allocation ofships (Q rrierarchs by lot seems to have continued, since in the
naval inventories of the last half of the fourth century ships are specified as
having been allocated by lot to a trierarch or nor so allocated.
There follows a section dealing with the crew in three divisions. A
similar division of a trieres' crew into three occurs in a fourth-century
speech written for an Athenian audience and concerned with naval matters
([Oem.] 50: below, pp. 120-6). The categories there are (1) hoplites
carried on deck iepibatai), (2) officers and men assisting the rrierarch
(hyperesia), and (3) oarsmen (nautai, pleromaand, once, trierarchimai.
Decksoldiers (epibatai) and archers (roxotai) (lines 23-6)
The generals are to call up the epibatai, ten for each ship, aged between twenty
and thirty, and four archers.
Nothing is said abour their allocation to ships, for the reason that they
are both reckoned for this purpose as part of the hyperesia,3 and as such are
covered by the following sentence dealing with the allocation of the
hyperesia as a whole to their ships by lor. That the epibatai were soldiers,
carried on deck and nowhere else in the ship, is shown elsewhere and in
particular by a story in Herodotus (8.118-19: pp. 130-1), the point of
which is that certain Persian notables, specifically called epibatai, were
being carried on deck. The epibatai, who were, unlike the Persian notables ,
soldiers, had only a secondary function in battle, since the ram was the
main offensive weapon, and would fight at sea only if, after ramming, the
3 SeeJSM (1984a) p. 50. Also Neil Robertson (I 982).

ship was for some reason unable to back off. We hear of them fight ing on
land." It is possible that their principal function was disciplinary (i.e. to
support the authority of the trierarch) since Aristotle (Politics 7.5.7,
1327b) speaks of them as 'controlling the ship'. It is difficult to see th e
extra Persian soldiers on the ships of the Persian invasion fleet having any
other purpose than to enforce discipline and prevent desertion. They were
not like the extra troops on the later troop-carriers, who had to be taken by
sea to the scene of intended action , since the Persian fleet was accompanied
by a large army moving by land.
The ten epibatai had the highest status in the ship after the trierarch.
They are mentioned second in the decree, and this is the position they
occupy in the crew-lists in inscriptions from the beginning of the fourth
century? They join the trierarchs in pouring libations at the ceremonial
departure of the Sicilian expedition (Th uc. 6.32.1) . When in 426 the
general D ernosth enes lost 120 of his 300 epibatai from 30 triereis
em ployed as a land for ce in Aetolia, T hucyd ides comments (3.94-8) : 'so
great a number of men all of th e same age pe rished there, the best men in
truth whom the city ofAthens lost in this war', wh ich suggests that the epi-
bataiwere in physique an elite force.
The four archers are distinct from the ten epibatai, i.e. they were not
carried on deck. Since an inscription of c. 412-411 6 gives them a descriptive
adjective paredroi, 'sitt ing beside', it may be that the y were posted in the stern
beside the trierarch and helmsman and acted as their bodyguard in an action .
The latt er would certainly have been vulnerable and would have needed pro-
tection, being too busy to defend himself. Four seems to have continued to
be the regulation n umber in the fifth century (e.g. Thuc. 2.23.2), although
the crew-lists in the fourth century often give only twO or three. One (fG2 2
1951, 82ff.) records 11 epibatai and 3 toxotai. The 400 non-Cretan archers
listed as part ofthe Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.43) were presumably serving
in the usual details of four on each of the 100 Athenian triereis,
Hyperesiai (lines 26-7)
The generals are to assign by lot also [i.e. as well as the trierarchs] the bypiresiai to
the ships at such time as they allocate the trierarchs by lot (to the ships).
4 E.g. in Dernosthenes' expedition to Aetolia mentioned below.
5 IG221951.79-82 .
6 IG 12 950.137. The readingparedroi is rejected by Lewis. Seehowever Euripides
IT 1377 for archers stationed in the stern giving covering 'fire' in an embarka-
tion: GOS p. 202 .
The men 111
Examination of the use of the word' hyperesia' in naval contexts in the fifth
and fourth centuries? leads to the conclusion that it stands for a group of
men on board a trieres who are regarded as assistants to the trierarch. This
=. oup in the fourth century sometimes includes the epibatai, and always
- eludes the archers. Here the two are mentioned separately; but since
orhing is said about their allocation by lot to the ships, it seems that they
are included for this purpose with the rest of the bypiresia. The hyperesia is
~ ways distinct from the oarsmen (nautat). For example, in the description
f the preparation of the Sicilian expedition Thucydides makes the dis-
tinction twice in succeeding sentences (6.31.3):
Th e fleet was elaborately fitted out at great expense to the trierarchs and to the
.ty. The public treasury gave a drachma a day to each oarsman and provided
empty hulls , sixty fast and forty troop-carriers and the strongest bypiresia for [each
of] these. In addirion th e trierarchs gave bonuses to the tbranitai among the
oarsmen (nautaz) and to the hyperesiai.
We have seen that the regular epibatai on a trieres numbered ten, and
the archers usually four. The total number of oarsmen is nowhere given,
1 ut the naval inventories (below, pp . 135-6) give the number of oars,
apart from spares, as 170. Since there is a passage in Thucydides (2.93.2)
vhich shows conclusively that each oarsman in a trieres pulled his own
oar, the total number of oarsmen must also be 170. It follows that the
number of men in the hyperesia was 200 less 170, i.e. 30: 16 in addition
o the 10 epibatai and 4 archers. Five of these are identified in the work
of an anonymous author writing about 430 BC ([Xen.] Const. of
Athenians 1.2) in Athens. Speaking of the men 'who give the city its
power', in addition to the ordinary citizens, the demos, who pull the oars ,
he mentions by name the helmsman (kybernetes) , the boatswain or
rowing master (keleustes), the purser (pentekontarchos), the bow officer
(prorates) and the shipwright (naupegos). An inscription" adds a sixth,
the piper (auletes).
The helmsman was, naturally, an important person, equivalent to the
master in a modern ship and ranking sometimes with the trierarch and epi-
batai. He was in complete charge of navigation under oar and sail, assisted
principally by the bow officer (fig. 30). In Plato (Ale. I.125C) the art of
helmsmanship is said to be to give orders to the boatswain, whose business
7 SeeJSM (I 984) p. 50. 8 IG2 21951.94-105.

30. Attic black-figure cup signed by Nicosthenes showingtwo oaredwarships

with helmsman and bow officer, c. 530-510 BC.
it was to manage the oarsmen and get the best out of them. A passage in
Xenophon (Oecon. 21.3) illustrates the boatswain's job vividly:
On a rrieres when the ship is at sea and the oarsmen have to make a day's voyage
under oar, some boatswains can say and do the sort of thing that stimulates the
men to work with a good heart, but some are so tactless that it takes them twice
the time to complete the same voyage. In the first casethe boatswain and oarsmen
come ashore sweating and congratulating each other, in the other they come in
cold, hating their rowing master and hated by him.
A sixth-century vase-painting of a 20-oared ship under oar gives a good
picture of the boatswain (as well as the bow officer) looking astern to the
helmsman for orders (fig. 31).
The name pentekontarcbos looks like a traditional one and gives no clue
to his duties. To judge from the duties attributed to him in the speech
AgainstPolycles (below, p. 124) he seems to have been a sort ofcaptain's sec-
retary or purser, ranking next to the helmsman and put in charge of pur-
chases and expenditure. The function of a shipwright in a large wooden
ship on active service needs no elaboration. There is a reference to the
piper in Euripides (Electra 432-7) where the chorus sing of the dolphins
who love the pipe plunging in time with its music. His position in the ship
may be indicated by another passage of Euripides (Hypsipyle61-7) where
The men 113
31. Attic black-figure hydria showing an Dared warship with helmsman,

boatswain and bow officer, 570-550 BC.
Orpheus the musician of the Argonauts plays his lyre at the foot of the
mast. The auletes seems likely to have set the rhythm for the oar-beat on a
long pull , increasing or decreasing the rate of striking as the helmsman
req uired . In Olympias the pipe has proved useful in keeping rowing time
(below, pp. 250-2).
There remain ten members of the hyperesia to be accounted for. Men
would have been needed to work the ship under sail. There were two sails,
the main sail amidships and the 'boat' sail forward (pp. 175-8), and there
seems to be a reference to two parries, one under the orders of the helms-
man and the other under the orders of the bow officer. Xenophon (Anab.
5.8.20) describes how 'in a storm with a high sea running, because of a
mere nod the bow officer gets angry with those in the bows and the helms-
man gets angry with those in the stern'. Since helmsman and bow officer
are on the stern and bow platforms respectively, the parries must also be
based there. The existence of such bow and stern parries is confirmed in a
later source," probably relating to a tetreris in the Rhodian navy. They
num ber five in each case. The sails of a tetreres are not likely to have
required more men to work them than the sails of a trieres, We can then
safely identify the remaining ten men of the hyperesia as belonging to such
gangs. When not needed to work the sails they could be employed as spare
oarsmen , to take the tiller or bail the ship. These were the men on the
Peloponnesian ships in Phorrnio's first action in the gulf of Corinth who
used poles to keep the ships from colliding with each other 'and shouted
and abused each other' (see above, p. 71).
9 See JSM (l984a) p. 56 note 21.

In his speech to the Athenian Assembly in 432 Pericles identifies (Thuc.

1.143.1) an important source ofAthens' strength: 'the helmsmen we have
in the fleet are Athenian citizens, and the hyperesiai also, whom we employ
are in greater number and of better quality than the byperesiai of all the rest
of Greece'. When her navy was destroyed in 404 she exported these skilled
personnel to Phorrnio's son Conon in Asia Minor, and in the fourth
century we find them going as mercenaries to Syracuse and the Bosporan
kingdom. 10
[Oarsmen (nautai)] (lines 27-38)

The generals are to write up on the white boards also [i.e. as well as writing up
there the trierarchs and hyperesiai whom they have allocated by lot to the ships]
the [oarsmen]!' by ship: the Athenians from the deme registers and the foreigners
from the lists of the polemarch. The y are to write them up. distributing the men in
comp anies (taxeis) to the number of two hundred (companies) in divisions of a
hundred in number and to write at the head of each company (taxis) the name of
the trieres and of the trierarch and of [each member of] the hyperesia, so that they
[i.e. the oarsmen whose names are thus posted] may know onto which trieres each
company [of oarsmen] is to embark. When all the companies [of oarsmen] are
made up and assigned to the triereis by lot, the Council and the generals are to
man all the two hundred ships, making sacrifices .. . And when the ships are
manned the generals are to send help to Artemisium in Euboea with one division
of a hundred ships, and with the (other) hundred ships they are to take stations
around Salamis and the rest of Attica, and mount guard.
The orders to the generals in respect of the oarsmen are clear enough. Two
hundred oarcrews (taxeis) 12 are to be formed and are to be allocated by lot
to the two hundred ships like the trierarchs and hyperesiai previously men-
tioned. The number of oarsmen in each taxis is not mentioned since it is
constant (determined by the oar-system of a trieres) and would be a matter
of common knowledge. The sh ips are in two divisions, each 100 strong
and with a separate mission, one to go north to the tip of Euboea to meet
Persian ships coming down from the north and the other to mount guard
10 Plato Letters VII 350a 2- 3 refers to mercenary Athenians in Syracuse as ton

bypiresiiin in 353 BC. C( JG2 2 212: 346 BC.
11 There is a gap in the inscription here which can nearlyaccommodate tous nautas
(the oarsmen, ace.). In this context the supplement isvirtually certain, as is taxei
(dat.) in the gap of five letters five linesbelow.
12 Cf. Aeschylus Persians 380 taxisde toxin parekaleineos makras.
The men 115
in home waters against any Persian squadron coming, as the first Persian
invasion had come , across the Aegean.
The oarsmen fall into two categories, Athenian citizens and foreigners.
It must be assumed that the Plataeans and Chalcidians who helped to man
the 200 Athenian ships (Hdt. 8.1 .1-2) fell into the latter category. Athens'
decision to develop a large fleet of triereis in the few years before 481 must
have involved a deliberate and irreversible switch of her manpower to the
navy, and even then she was unable to man all the ships herself. It must also
have involved a considerable training programme in oarsmanship. It seems
clear that the oarsmen in the trieres fleets of the fifth and fourth centuries
were very much a specialist cadre. Only in exceptional circumstances was
an oarsman used as a fighting man on land . In 428 Athenian naval
resources were fully stretched, with 200 triereis at sea in home waters,
another force raiding the Peloponnese and some ships also probably in
northern waters, as well as 40 ships sent to Lesbos to avert a threatened
revolt. It is therefore no wonder that when reinforcements had to be sent
to Lesbos they included 1,000 hoplites who also served as oarsmen.
Thucydides here (3.18.4) uses the word auteretai, which he had used
before only of the Greeks at Troy. In Homeric conditions such a thing was
normal, but it was highly abnormal in the fifth century. 13 Again, later in
the same year, in the final assault on the Spartans trapped on the island of
Sphacteria the Athenians used some of their oarsmen as light-armed
troops (all except the thalamioii'" (4.32.2), and in 409 the Athenian
general Thrasyllus setting out from Athens for the Ionian war equipped
5,000 of his 8,500 oarsmen with light weapons. These are the exceptions
which prove the rule, that oarsmen were specialists, too valuable to be
risked in battle.
The skill of pulling an oar in a trieres was a matter of hard training and
constant practice. Before the outbreak of the war with Athens Thueydides
(1.80.4) makes the Spartan king Archidamus admit to his countrymen
that they were inferior to the Athenians at sea, and that 'if we train and
make preparations to meet the Athenians at sea, that will take time', while
Pericles is represented (1.142.6-9) as making this comment to the
Athenians:
13 At 6.91.4 Alcibiades suggests to the Spartans that they should adopt the same
emergency practice in sending help to Syracuse. 14 See Chapter 8 note 9.
As for the Peloponnesians gaining knowledge of seamanship, that will not come
easily to them. If you, who have practised since the Persian wars, have still not
brought your skill to perfection, how can men achieve anything who are
farmers ... ?The fact is that sea power is a matter of skill, like everything else,and
it is not possible to get practice in the odd moment when the chance occurs, but it
is a full-time occupation, leavingno moment for other things.
What happened with unskilled oarsmen is shown in Phorrnio's first

engagement in the gulf of Corinth. When the water got rough they were
unable to recover their oars after the stroke (2.84.3) . The historians often
remind us that the oarsman's skill was only maintained by constant prac-
tice . For example, in the winter of 426 when the Athenians for once had
only a few ships in commission - a small force in Sicily and 20 ships
moving round the Peloponnese on their way to Naupactus - they manned
40 ships to send to Sicily, 'partly', Thucydides says, 'because they would
thus, they thought, bring the war in Sicily to an end more quickly, and
partly because they needed to exercise their naval forces' (3.115.4). When
Mindarus was preparing his fleet for battle with the Athenians in the
Hellespont in 411, Diodorus 03.39.3) says that he spent five days 'carry-
ing out manoeuvres and training his men' . And Xenophon's account (HG
6.2.27-30) of Iphicrates' voyage from Piraeus to Corcyra in 374 empha-
sises its aspect as a tra ining exercise. It was probably the lack of skilled
oarsmen in the second and third quarters of the fourth century which led
to the adoption by the aspirants to sea power of ships with a less demand-
ing oarsystem, carrying out tactics which also demanded less of the
oarsmen whom they had managed to recruit.
Pericles' assertion of Athenian skill in seamanship at the oar and at the
helm is confirmed by the anonymous author 0.19) already quoted (above,
p.36):
The Athenians, because of their overseas possessions and the public offices they
hold abroad, learn to use the oar as second nature, both themselves and their
attendants. In fact when a man is often at sea he must of necessity take an oar
himself and likewise his slave, and learn the language of the sea.The majority are
able to pull an oar when first they set foot aboard a warship, having had the pre-
liminary training man and boy up to that moment.
This passage gives a glimpse of the background to Athenian naval exper-

tise. The picture is 50 years later than Thernistocles' mobilisation decree,
The men 117
and even now, Pericles reminds his hearers, Athenian skill has not yet been
brought to perfection. In 481 she was at the beginning of her naval pro-
gramme, but had already taken decisive steps.
So much, then, for the citizens whom the generals were instructed to
call up for naval service. Who were the foreigners who were also to be
called up - those 'on the lists of the polemarch'?The polemarchs were state
officials who are known later to have had some legal functions in connec-
tion with the resident aliens. In the speech from which quotation has been
made above Pericles in 432 claimed that were the foreign oarsmen in the
Athenian fleet to be lured away to the fleets of her enemies by higher pay
the Athenians themselves and their resident aliens could fill their places on
the oar-benches. It seems, therefore, that the foreigners on the lists of the
polemarch are probably resident aliens for the most part, but also the
Plaraeans and Chalcidians who were manning Athenian ships. The
foreigners whom the Spartans might lure away with higher pay in 432 are a
different category, which did not exist in 481. Pericles continued: 'when it
came to the point none of the foreigners whom we employ would accept
exile from his country and on top of that service on the side [i.e. the
Spartan] with a smaller prospect of winning the battle, all for the sake of a
few days' higher pay'. From such words it is plain that these foreigners in
the fleet are men from the cities of the Athenian empire on whom she
could enforce the penalty ofexile if they defected.
An interesting insight into the composition of Athenian oarcrews is
given by a passage in the letter of Nicias reporting from the Athenian camp
before Syracuse to the Athenian Assembly in 414 (Thuc. 7.13). He gives
the reasons why his oarcrews are not now up to strength: enemy cavalry
raids on foragers, desertion of retainers, repatriation of pressed mercenar-
ies, defection or desertion of volunteer mercenar ies (who had been
attracted to Athenian service by the high rates of pay), and lastly the fact
that some oarsmen had persuaded the trierarchs to accept as substitutes for
themselves slaves captured at Hyccara (earlier in the year on the north coast
of Sicily) and had thus impaired the fleet's efficiency. We have already seen
an indication that attendants had an opportunity to learn to pull an oar like
their masters when travelling abroad, and were sometimes called upon to
do so. The retainers who are here said to have deserted were probably such
servants, and in both cases they seem likely to have been slaves. It is not
their lack of skill but their desertion which Nicias notes as damaging. The
Hyccaran slaveson the other hand lacked the necessary skill, and it appears
that their being accepted as substitutes for their masters rested on the deci-
sion of the trierarch. Slave oarsmen were unusual in Athenian ships at this
time , but they are sometimes to be found and they were not always lacking
in skill. When the Athenians were hard pressed to relieve Conon at
Mytilene in 406 , they promised freedom to the slaves who served in the
ships they sent. IS Such an incident clearly indicates that their service in the
fleet was unusual. Isocrates exaggerates for the sake of an epigram when he
writes in 355 (8.48.2): 'T hen [when we had an empire], if we manned tri-
ereis, we sent foreigners and slaves aboard to serve as oarsmen but citizens
to serve under arms [i.e. as epibatai, of superior status]. Now we use
foreigners as hoplites [i.e, epibataz] and compel our citizens to pull an oar.'
Slave oarsmen were, however, used in large numbers by the Corcyraeans at
Sybota, since out of 1,050 prisoners taken by the Corinthians in the battle
800 were slaves (Thuc. 1.55.1), and we hear later of slave oarsmen on
Chian ships (Thuc. 8.15.2). There were certainly no slaves among the
oarsmen called up under the Decree ofThemistocles.
Pay
The decree makes no mention of the pay for naval service and nothing is
known about it at this date. It is probable that the crews served without
payment, as part of the duty required of citizens and resident aliens of
Athens, but crews serving away from home are likely to have received vict-
ualling. Later there was both pay and a victualling allowance. At the begin-
ning of the Peloponnesian War, as we have seen, Athens' enemies could
talk of luring away her oarsmen by promise of high rates of pay. And the
Egestaeans in Sicily encouraged Athens' intervention in the island by
sending a month's pay for the ships, which can be worked out as one
drachma a day for each of the 200 men on each ship, the same for the
whole ship's company irrespective of status. This appears to have been a
high rate, since in the account of the expedition Thucydides says (6.31.3)
that 'i t was equipped at great expense by the trierarchs and by the city, the
treasury paying a drachma a day for each oarsman ... as well as supplying
byperesiai of the very best, while the trierarchs for their part gave an addi-
IS IG2 21951.117,Xen.HG1.6.24.
Themen 119
rional bonus to the thranitai among the oarsmen in addition to the pay
irom the treasury'.
How the city 'supplied hyperesiai of the very best' is obscure, bur there is
evidence later'? that the city had some sort of control over skilled naval
. ersonnel, since byperesiai recruited for service abroad by the Bosporan
.cings in 346 are 'grant ed' to them by decree of the Athenian Council. In
-iew ofwhat is said immediately afterwards about bonuses given by the tri-
rarchs to the tbranitai, Thucydides would certainly have mentioned it if
'supplying' hyperesiai had involved bonuses. It seems likely, then, that the
iry paid a flat rate of pay to all the ship's company and that if any bonuses
were paid in the interests of the ship's efficiency they came our of the trier-
arch's pocker. Lysias says (21.10) that for the whole period of his trierarchy
(befo re 405) he employed the foremost Greek helmsman Phantias, 'per-
suading him with money'. And we shall see how much 'persuasion with
money' was incumbent upon an Athenian rrierarch in the middle of the
ext century ifhe was to maintain an efficient ship (below, pp. 120-6).
Only half the rate of a drachma a day was actually payable to Athenian
rews while on active service; the rest became due when the ship was paid
off in Piraeus. Thucydides (8.45.2) tells how Alcibiades in exile in 412/11
advised the Persian governor Tissaphernes, who was then the paymaster of
a Spartan fleet operating on the coast of Asia Minor, to 'cur down the pay
of the Spartan seamen so that instead of an Attic drachma a day only 3
obols (!1 dr.) were given', i.e. he advised him to adopt the Athenian system
of giving half-pay to seamen abroad. The reasons Alcibiades gives are likely
-0 be the reasons behind the Athenian system. He told Tissaphernes to tell
he Spartan commanders that
me Athenians, who had had experience of naval matters a longer time than they,
gave only three obols to their men not so much for lack of money as with the
intention of keeping their oarsmen from becoming well-offand above themselves.
[If given full pay] some were likely to become unfit by spending their money on
things which made them sick, others would desert becausethey had no balanceof
pay, as a kind of hostage, to look forward to.
Athenian trierarchs, who had to recruit oarsmen abroad to replace desert-

ers, had, of course, to offer full pay ([Dem.] 50.18). A similar system
16 SeeJSM (l984a) p. 54.

designed to discourage desertion was in force in the British navy from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century.
In addition to pay there was also, as we have mentioned, a victualling
allowance. Crews seem to have been responsible for buying or otherwise
acquiring their own victuals. There was no organised provisioning. In
Nicias' letter (above, pp. 117-18) one of the reasons given for the shortage
of oarsmen was that some had been cut offby the enemy cavalry while for-
aging; and the weakness of the Athenian position at Aegospotami (Xen.
HG2.1.27) lay in its distance from the places where the men could acquire
victuals. They regularly scattered up and down the Chersonese when they
came ashore at midday, and that was their undoing. The amount of the
victualling allowance in the fourth century seems to have been two obols a
day (Dem. 4.28) for seamen and soldiers, and one drachma for cavalry,
who had to feed their horses as well as themselves.
The banker trierarch

Employing the framework of the 'Decree ofThemistocles' of481 we have
been able to identify the various members of the ship's company of an
Athenian trieres in the fifth and fourth centuries, and by the use of later
information largely supplied by contemporary Greek historians have
been able to add some flesh to the bare bones of that identification. This
provided us with the necessary knowledge of how many had to be accom-
modated in Olympias and of where in the ship were the working stations
of the members of the byperesi«. The nature of the oarsystern and the con-
sequent position of the oarsmen will be discussed in the next chapter. We
may conclude this chapter with a look at a second document, which gives
a unique insight into the human side of naval service in the age of the
trieres.
It is a speech written in the middle of the fourth century for (possibly
by) the banker Apollodorus ([Dem.] 50). His family had recently been
granted Athenian citizenship and he had volunteered for the trierarchy
with a touching enthusiasm. His ship was ordered to sea in 362 and was
part of a squadron sent to the NE Aegean to build on the recent successes
there of Conon's son Timotheus commanding a fleet of the Second
Athenian League. The speech gives a revealing glimpse of what it was like
to be a trierarch in a League fleet in those years, and adds a touch of grass-
The men 121
roots realism to contrast with the optimistic claims for Athenian sea power
voiced by Demosthenes and other politicians at this time.
Apollodorus is suing Polycles, the man appointed to succeed him in
command of the ship after his year of service, for the extra expenses he has
incur red because Polycles was not ready to take over the ship until five
months and six days had elapsed after the due date. He describes (4) the
occasion for the dispatch of his ship . 'O n the rwenry-fourth day of
Metageirnion [August/September] in the archonship of Molon when an
Assembly had been held and many great matters had been reported to you ,
you voted that the trierarchs should launch their ships . I was one of the tri-
erarchs. I need not go into details of the emergency which occurred for the
city at that time.' But of course he does: the grain supply from the Black
Sea was under threat. 'You voted that the trierarchs should launch their
ships and bring them round to the mole,' ? that the councillors and the
heads of the demes should make dernesmen's lists and returns of seamen ,
that the ships should be dispatched without delay and aid sent to our allies
in the various theatres ofwar.'
The size of the squadron dispatched is not given, but the task it had to
perform is clear, to expel Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, from the island of
Tenos (a League member) , to seize the opportunity of interfering in the
affairs of the kingdom ofThrace, and to protect the grain ships sailing from
the Black Sea from interception by Byzantium, Calchedon and CyziCUS,18
which though technically still members of the League were on the point of
secession. The aim of the interference in Thrace was the recovery of the
T hracian Chersonese, which was always regarded as a vital Athenian inter-
est in view of its position dominating the Hellespont. Apollodorus' ship
seems to have been part of the force sent to the NE Aegean, but he gives no
clues to what he did in the actual period of his trierarchy, since the burden
of his speech is to recount the duties he had to perform, and the expenses he
had to incur, in the excess period of five months and six days.
We may return to his description (7) of the dispatch of the expedition.
'When the oarsmen listed by the demesmen did not appear, apart from a
17 The chiima in Munychia, an artificial mole or hard from where the officially
appointed apostoleisdispatched expeditions (IG2 2 1629 .178ff.).
18 For Alexander of Pherae see Cargill (1981) pp. 87,169. G. de Sainte-Croix
(1972) App. 8, p. 314 says that states had a tacitly recognised right to take action
of this sort if they were short of grain.
few who were no good, I dismissed them, and by mortgaging my property

and borrowing money I was the first to man my ship, hiring the best
oarsmen I could procure, giving large bonuses and advance payments to all
of them.' The normal method of manning a ship with oarsmen seems to
have broken down, so that recourse was had to the open market. Oarsmen
were normally paid in full only on return to their home port, as we have
just seen. 'Furthermore I furnished the ship with equipment entirely of my
own, taking nothing from the public stores.!" and the gear was the finest
and most magnificent in appearance of all the trierarchs ' gear in the fleet.
As to assistants (hyperesia), I hired the best that could be had' (above,
pp. 110-14). In addition to the trierarchal expenses Apollodorus says that
he also paid the advance taxes which were levied to cover the cost ofa naval
expedition. This advance payment of tax was itself regarded as a duty, like
trierarchal service, to which men of means were liable, and as a serving tri-
erarch he could have claimed exemption from it.
In two other speeches from this period, one, On the Trierarchic Crown,
by Dernosthenes (51 ) and the other, Against Euergos (47) by an anony-
mous author, similar claims are made. It appears from all these speeches
that the trierarch's first duty was the launching of the ship to which he had
been allotted; the second the manning of it with oarsmen; the third the
provision ofgear (oars, masts, sails, ropes, etc.) which he could either draw
from the public store on loan or provide on his own account; the fourth
the enrolment of the hyperesia (helmsman, bow officer, boatswain, etc.):
finally to bring the ship round' to the mole' for inspection by the officials
who were appointed for the dispatch of the expedition (apostoleis) , and
then to give the ship her trials.
In theory the oarsmen of Apollodorus' ship should have been men on
the demesmen's list called up for service, but since the men who came
forward in this way were neither sufficient in number nor up to
Apollodorus' standard, with the enthusiasm and pride of the new
Athenian citizen as well as the resources of a banker, he hired the best crew
he could get. This action turned out a mistake, as he says later (15-16):
19 See GOS pp. 188-9 and the inscription in n. 17 above. The ten annuall y
appointed overseers of the dockyards were responsible for issuing gear from the
public store to those trierarchs who applied for it, and for recovering it after use.
Others like Apollodorus preferred their own.
The men 123
The fact was that in so far as I had manned the ship with good oarsmen in my
keenness for a good reputation, so the rate of desertion in my ship was the
highest in the fleet. In the case of the other rrierarchs the oarsmen who served
from the list stayed with them, looking forward to their safe return home,
whereas mine, full ofconfidence in themselves because they were good at pulling
an oar, went off at the places where they were likely to be re-engaged at the
highest rate of pay.
It appears that the responsibility for providing victualling money for the
oarsmen (and no doubt for the rest of the crew as well), whether men from
the dernesrnen's list or hired by the trierarch, lay with the general in
command, but he did not always, or was not in a position to, provide it,
and in the circumstances it was up to the trierarch to give it 'since if they
didn't eat, they couldn't pull an oar' (53-4). 20Apollodorus also had to hire
the bypiresia for his ship, although in theory they, again, should have been
performing military service. They seem here to include the ten hoplites
(epibatat), although later in the speech the latter are mentioned as distinct
from the rest of the hyperesia (above, pp. 109-10).
In view of all this enthusiastic provision it is not surprising that
Apollodorus' ship was selected by the general as his flagship and was
employed on various special missions because of her speed. Nor is it sur-
prising that his appointed successor was slow in taking over the ship ,
which, while an outstanding performer, was so much more expensive to
keep at sea than the usual run of triereis. All that Apollodorus says about
his trierarchal year is the following (I 1):
It is common knowledge that there are two things which finish a trieres, first if the
trierarch does not see that his men are paid, and second if the ship returns to
Piraeus during commission, because there is a high rate of desertion and the
oarsmen who do not desert refuse to re-embark unless the rrierarch offers them
more money to meet their family expenses. Both these disasters happened to me
. .. I received no pay from the generals for eight months and I sailed home with
ambassadors because my ship was the fastest, and then back again when I was
20 The Athen ian commander of the League fleet of usually Athenian ships had to
draw on contributions (syntaxeis) of the League members in the region where he
was operating on their behalf and for their protection. The contributions were
fixed by the Council of the League. At this period when pressure was being
exerted from outside for many members to defect it is understandable that con-
tributions were not readily forthcoming.
given the task by the people of taking the general Menon to the Hellespont in
placeof Aurocles who had been voted out of office.
He had to hire replacements for the deserters with big bonuses and
advance payments, and to give those who stayed with him 'something to
leave behind for the maintenance of their families'.
Apollodorus is more informative about the duties he had to perform
after the expiry of his trierarchal year (map 14). His ship was part ofa force
under the gen eral Timomachus operating in the Straits. It was here that he
suffered the high rate of desertion of which he complains. He received
orders to go ·to the Crimea and bring back the grain fleet from there in
convoy (17), since word had come that the Byzantines and Calchedonians
who commanded the Bosporus strait 'were again taking the grain ships
into harbour and compelling them to discharge their cargoes' . The general
produced no money for pay, but Apollodorus was able to use his credit as a
banker to raise funds at Sestus from two Athenians, and he sent his purser
(see above, p. 112) , Eucternon, off to Lampsacus with money 'and letters
to the foreign correspondents of my father' telling him to hire the best
oarsmen he could. On Euctemon's return he had orders to put to sea, but
Euctemon fell ill and Apollodorus had to take on another purser. When
Apollodorus returned to Sestus after the convoy duty with the autumn
grain fleet from the Crimea, he hoped to be able to sail home, but (22-3)
'when a delegation came from the people of Maroneia asking for an escort
for their grain ships' Timomachus ordered the trierarchs to take the ships
in tow to Maroneia 'a long voyage [74 to 78 sea miles] in the open sea'.
Maroneia was presumably entitled to ask for this service as a member of
the League. From Maroneia the squadron moved to Thasos. Then,
Timomachus came and with the help of the Thasians convoyed grain and
mercenaries to Stryrne on the Thracian coast 'planning to seize the place
himself'. However,
the people of Maroneia opposed us . . . and the men were exhausted after their
long voyageand towing ships from Thasos to Stryme [43 sea miles] . Besides, the
weather being stormy and the coast without harbours and offering no opportu-
nities to go ashore for the evening meal, since it washostile, with foreign mercen-
ariesand neighbouring non-Greeksencamped round the city walls, we had to ride
at anchor all night at sea, unfed and without sleep, on the alert lest the Maroneian
triereisshould attack us. What was more, it happened that at night in this season
of the year [late autumn] there was rain and thunder, and a great wind got up. You
IH R-ACE
os
samomt:::) /
o
I
50
I
km
b 30 sea m iles
Map 14 Apollodo rus' extra du ty.

can imagine the result, the state of despondency into which the men fell and how
much desertion again took place after this experience. The original oarsmen [i.e.
those recruited at Piraeus] had been through many hardships and had got little for
it, all in fact that I was able to spare for each man, in addition to what they had
already had from me, by borrowing, since the general was not even giving them
what wassufficientfor their daily needs [i.e. the minimum victualling allowance].
The hostility of the people of Maroneia to Timomachus' planned raid is a
striking example of the 'freedom and autonomy' of the members of
Athens' new model League. It is striking too that although Maroneia had
triereis of her own, she made the League fleet tow the grain ships from the
Hellespont for her.
Finally, after using Apollodorus' ship on various errands, Timomachus
decided to send the ships off home, and put a deputy on Apollodorus' ship
as commander of the squadron with instructions to pay the men the vict-
ualling allowance daily. He did not do so, and at Tenedos (a cons istently
loyal League city), after meeting his successor and failing to get him to take
over the ship, Apollodorus had once more to use his banking connections
to borrow money to get the ship home.
Enough perhaps has been told of the woes of Apollodorus, the rich,
newly-made , Athenian citizen whose rather naive enthusiasm both his
commander and his successor seem to have exploited shamefully. His
speech, supplemented by the two other relevant speeches from the same
period, tells us a good deal about the naval life of the time, the procedure
for the dispatch of an expedition, the responsibilities of the trierarch, the
various categories of the ship's company, details of naval pay and victual-
ling, and the vicissitudes of service in a ship of the fleet of the Second
Athenian League. The point of view is unique.
THE SHIPS I
n this chapter and the next we discuss the ancient evidence for the main
structural features of the trieres, and a chapter on materials follows. When
these discussions are completed a naval architect is called on to design a
ship capable of the performance required of the ancient trieres, accommo-
ating the members of the crew in their respective positions and satisfying
the evidence for the structure. The making of the reconstruction from
equivalent materials and by the ancient methods is then outlined.
First two general points must be made . One of the reasons why no
remains of a trieres have been found on the sea-bed, while remains ofcon -
emporary merchantmen do occur (fig. 5), is that the trieres had a positive
uoyancy, and did not sink when flooded. 1 The transitive verb kataduein,
which we find in accounts of sea-battles and which is usually translated
sink', does not mean 'sink' in the accepted sense of the word in modern
onrexts - i.e. 'send to the bottom'. Passages in the Greek historians show
that the word means, rather, 'swam p', since when ships were pue out of
action by ramming in deep water and their crews either swam away or were
drowned or killed by the enemy, the wrecks themselves were towed off or
drifted away. At Artemisium the Greek allies thus 'capture' 30 ships
(above, p. 54). This fact emerges from a number of naval engagements and
particularly clearly from the account of the action at Sybora in 433 (above,
pp. 65-6). Some of the wrecks are said to have been towed away, and when
he second Athenian squadron appeared in the evening just as battle was
about to be joined for the second time that day, the ships had to make their
way 'through corpses and wrecks' which wind or current were taking up
G. Landels (1980) pp. 148-9. The fact is confirmed by ]FC's calculations: he

I [ ,
draws attention to an observation, in connection with the Sybora action , made

by A. F. B. Creuze (1841): 'T he vesselsspoken of as sunk were evidently merely
stove in and waterlogged.' In Xenophon (HG 1.7.32) a general escapes on a ship
which had been 'sunk ' (katadutheises)
32. Graffito from Alba Fucentia showing a warship labelled navis tetreris longa
('four' long ship), first century BC to first century AD.
the Corcyra strait (above, p. 67). The trieres, then, was light enough to float
when holed, and either was not ballasted at all, which is the most likely, or if
ballasted the ballast was not sufficient to overcome her buoyancy. Other
evidence for her lightness comes from the fact that in spite of her size the
trieres could be hauled across the Isthmus of Corinth (above, p. 51 n. 1).
The second general point concerns the nature of the archaeological evi-
dence. In the absence of any actual remains of a trieres we have to make do
with representations - some reliefs, one or two vase-paintings, a vase in the
shape of a ship's bow, and some coins. All of these show Greek oared war-
ships of the age of the trieres, but none of them is labelled as such. The only
labelled picture of an ancient warship is the graffito of a Roman quadri-
reme found at Alba Fucentia in Italy (fig. 32). The single piece of hard
archaeological evidence for the trieres which we possess consists of the
remains of the Zea shipsheds in Piraeus, which are known to have been
built to house triereis (fig. 9), and thus allow us to calculate the maximum
dimensions these ships could have had. We are driven to infer the method
of hull-construction (fairly safely, in fact) from the remains of contempo-
rary merchantmen, e.g. the Kyrenia ship (fig. 5). Merchant ships did sink,
The shipsI 129
33. The Arhlir ram before the removal of the timber.
and their cargoes protected some at least of the hull timbers from decay
and the ship-worm. A large warship's ram has recently been found on the
sea-bed at Arhlit near Haifa, with some hull timbers adhering to it which
show the same method of construction as the Kyrenia ship (see below,
p. 167 and fig. 33) and the remains of oared longships of about 300 BC
excavated from the sea-bed near Marsala by Honor Frost (1973, 1974a,
1974b).
Accommodation of trierarch and hypiresia

In the previous chapter we identified the various members of the crew and
established the general position in the ship of the non-oarsmen. The
helmsman and his protective archers occupied the stern platform at deck
level, and the helmsman's deck party were at any rate based there. The tri-
erarch and the pentecontarch are also likely to have been in the stern. On
deck were the ten epibatai, and in the bows the bow officer and his party on
the bow platform at deck level. The boatswain (keleustes) and the pipeman
(auletes) were certainly below deck with the oarsmen. The ship's carpenter
(naupegos) might have been anywhere, probably below deck where he
would have had a place to keep his tools. There is some evidence for a small
34. The relief carved beside the stone steps leading up to the Acropolis at
Lindos, c. 200 BC.
cabin for the trierarch underneath the stern platform aft of the oarsmen.
The full-scale representation of the stern of an oared warship cur in the
rock beside the steps leading up to the acropolis at Lindos shows a trace of
such a cabin (fig. 34). When Alcibiades returned to Athens after exile in
407 in command of a trieres (Xen. HG 1.4.18) 'he did not immediately
disembark but went up on deck to see if any of his friends were there to
welcome him'. If he 'went up', he must have had accommodation below
the level of the deck. Such accommodation is perhaps implied by the story
in Herodotus (8.118.1-4) ofan incident when Xerxeswas returning home
after Salamis in a Phoenician ship which he had boarded at Eion in Thrace
for the voyage to the Hellespont. The ship could hardly have been other
than a trieres.
And as he was on his way a high Strymonian wind caught him. He was rather
severely tossed about, the ship being overloaded, with the deck packed by a large
number of Persians in his entourage. The king panicked, and shouted to the
helmsman asking what chance they had of making po ft. The man replied:
'Master, no chance at all, unless we get rid of all these men on deck (epibataz) and
The ships I 131
• erxes is said to have declared: 'Men of Persia, it is now up to each one of you to
• ow his care for the king, it seems that my life depends on you.' At that the
rsians made obeisance and jumped into the sea, and the ship, thus lightened,
made its way to Asia in safety . .. This is the story of Xerxes' rerum , but
erodotus adds] I don't believea word of it. For if the helmsman had reallymade
- is reply, the king would quite obviously have ordered the people on deck to go
low, since they were not only Persians but very important Persians at that; and
since the oarsmen were Phoenicians he would have thrown a number of them into
• e sea to make room below for the Persians.
T his story has been told at length not simply to make the point that if
_-erxes shouted to the helmsman he cannot have been sitting beside him in
· e poop but must have been in accommodation below. The reason for the
digressio n is that it contains a number of other points. The first is that it
· roves conclusively that the word epibatis means someone carried on deck,
ere the Persian notables, in the normal crew armed men. The second is
at, while there may have been a small cabin for the trierarch and an
- portant passenger, there was no room elsewhere below decks for anyone
else. The story further shows most dramatically that the weight of many
en on deck dangerously reduced the ship's stability and hence its sail-
carrying capacity and ability to maintain steerage way in a storm. In such
.eather the ship could hardly have been proceeding under oar.
.Accommodation of the oarsmen

he main problem facing a reconstructor of the trieres concerns the
a com m od ation of the 170 oarsmen in a hull of the required length. In the
single-level oared longship as described by Homer the oarsmen sat on
- warts (zyga) and kept their stores under them, and, in the sixth century,
?ent eco nto rs carried large loads in addition to the oarsmen. Some of the
oarsm en in a trieres are called thalamioi, and since thalamos is a word for
e ship's hold it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that when oared
ships began to be pulled by oarsmen at two levels the oarsmen at the lower
level were called tbalamioi because they occupied the space which had pre-
·iously been the hold below the oarsmen who sat on the zyga. The thala-
nioi seem to have pulled their oars, naturally enough in view of their
osition low down in the hull, through oarpons (figs. 24-25a and b),
vhich are mentioned in connection with a trieres by Herodotus
(5.33.2-3: above, p. 41) and by Aristophanes (Peace 1232). Thranites

appear as an important class of oarsmen in Aristophanes (Acharnians
162-3) and Thucydides (6.31.3), but there are no clues in literature to
their position in the ship, and the name itself is not very helpful (see below,
p. 140 for a possible derivation).
There is a passage in Xenophon's treatise on household economy
(Oecon. 8.8) which is generally relevant to the oarsmen's accommodation.
He uses the example of the trieres to drive home the lesson that in the
home speedy movement and good order are important: 'Why is the trieres,
fully manned, such a terror to the enemy and a joy to her friends except by
reason of her speed through the water? And do not those on board avoid
getting in each other's way only if they take their seats in order, swing
forward in order, go aboard and go ashore in order?' In Xenophon's eyes
the trieres' chief virtue was speed. Theophrastus (Enquiry 5.7.4) writing
about timber in the fourth century confirms that lightness was a prime
consideration when he says that silver fir was used in the trieres' construc-
tion for this reason. To Aeschylus (Persians 336, 408-9, 415) in the previ-
ous century the tactical function of the trieres is to ram. These three
aspects together support the historical picture of naval action with triereis
'in the modern manner'. Speedy, agile movements of lightweight craft
were planned to take advantage of 'the galley's terrible vulnerability to
attack from the side', and defensive tactics were devised to avoid these
manoeuvres. The pursuit of speed and agility through lightness of con-
struction resulted in an oar-machine/ packed tightly below deck with
oarsmen and with little room for anything else. Strict discipline had to be
observed to avoid physical clashes, and in handling, we recall, a boatswain
was needed who had the knack ofgetting men to work cheerfully together.
A reconsrructor must expect to create a physical environment which
matches these demands.
So much in general; now for some of the details. The remains of the Zea
ship-sheds have already been mentioned. Enough of the foundations have
been preserved to allow measurement of the slipways" (figs. 9 and 35).
2 Aristotle (Rhet. 1411a24) says that Cephisodotus (possibly the Rhodian sculp-
tor) called triereis 'complicated mills', One fourth-century rrieres is called by the
name Kouphotate('Lightest'), IG2 2 1629.1.
3 See the chapter by D. J. Blackman in GOS pp. 181-92. The Zea ship-sheds were
excavated and published by Dragarzes (1886) pp. 63-8 and pIs. 2-3.
Theships I 133
They have a maximum dry length of37 m (121 ft 5 in.) and a clear width
between the columns (which separated one ship-shed from another) of
5.94 m (19 ft 6 in.). The gradient is 1 in 10.4The ships themselves are likely
to have been about as long and a little narrower than these dimensions.
They were manhandled by not less than [one hundred and] forty men
up the slipway and by not less than [one hundred and] twenty men down. ?
These men would have room to stand beneath any outrigger so that room
would not have to be provided for them on each side of the ship. The
dimensions are very relevant to the oarsystern, inasmuch as the oarsmen
must be accommodated in a ship of this length and breadth. They do in
fact rule out the aliasensile system of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
in the Mediterranean (see p. 20).
As regards the oarsystem, we may consider in the first place whether
any clue is given by the name trieres itself. The word seems to mean
'three-rowing'. Aeschylus uses a revealing alternative, triskalmos, i.e. a
ship with three tholepins. The trieres, then, could be regarded as having
three tholepins iskaimoi), not of course in the whole ship but in some
obvious unit, where other ships had a different number." This obvious
unit is the one given by Vitruvius (1.2.4), a Roman architect who worked
in the principate of Augustus, as the interscalmium, the unit oflength in
an oared ship between one tholepin and the next in a fore-and-aft file of
oarsmen. Although the word interscalmium is itself half Greek, he adds
an illuminating Greek equivalent, a word which has been corrupted in
the manuscripts to dipheciaca but can be recognised as dipechiake(or, as
the scholiast suggested, dipechuia) meaning (in both cases) 'of two
cubits'. " Such a unit oflength in an oared ship would contain one thole-
pin in a simple pentecontor, two in a two-level pentecontor, and in a
trieres could have three. This appears to have been the way in which
Aeschylus regarded the trieres. Alternatively the word 'trieres' could have
described a ship which had three files ofoarsmen ranging fore-and -aft on
each side of the ship in contrast to the simple pentecontor with one such
file and the two-level pentecontor with two. The Romans tended to clas-
4 This is the same grad ient as the Phoenician ship-sheds recently excavated at rIlot
de l'Amiraute (communication to ]FC) .
5 IG 13 153. Lewis'ssupplements in brackets.
6 See]SM. CQ41 (1947) 122ff.;Aeschylus, Persians 678, 1074.
7 See]SM (1991) pp. 298-303.
35a. A model of a reconstructed ship-shed housing the model triercs shown in

fig. 2.
35b. Reconstructed scene at the top of a slipway inside a ship-shed.

Theships I 135
sifY their oared ships in th is way, as having so many files (ordines) on each
side.
If the trieres had three tholepins to each two cubit unit in the same way
as the pentecontor had one or two, it is likely that each of the oarsmen in
the trieres, like those in the pentecontor, pulled his own oar. This likeli-
hood is proved correct by a passage in Thucydides to which brief reference
was made in the last chapter (p, 111). He is describing an incident in the
winter of 429 when the fleet which Phormio had twice defeated in the gulf
of Corinth earlier in the year withdrew to Corinth. There the crews of 40
of the ships were transferred to the other side of the Isthmus to man 40
Megarian ships at the port of Nisaea for a surprise attack on Piraeus. Such
a move was quicker and attracted less attention than if they hauled their
own ships across by the diolkos (above, p. 51 n. 1). Each man was to go on
foot 'taking his oar, his cushion and his oarloop', items of gear apparently
personal to the oarsman. The cushion has an interesting implication.
Assuming that it was tied firmly to the seat, its presence implies that (in the
absence of a sliding seat) the oarsman moved his body backwards (i.e.
towards the bows) during the stroke as he straightened his legs, having pre-
viously bent them as he moved his body forward (i.e. towards the stern) in
preparation for the stroke. This point was made by John Hale (1973) com-
menting on the raised knees of two oarsmen in the Lenormant Relief
(pp. 20-2 and below, pp. 138-40: fig. 13). Such movement is confirmed
by a passage in the Frogs of Aristophanes (236) where the god Dionysus,
made to row across the Sryx by Charon, complains of blisters, presumably
because he had not brought his cushion with him. The purpose of the
oarloop or grommet is more obvious. Made of leather, according to
Homer (Od 4.782) and probably also in the fifth century, it was looped
over the tholepin and held the oar to it during the stroke. The mention of
the cushion and the oarloop is interesting, but the main value of the
Thucydidean passage is to show beyond doubt that in the fifth century the
oars in a trieres were pulled each by one man.
We have already referred briefly to the naval inventories.f Inscribed on
stone slabs found in Piraeus and covering a number of years mostly after
the middle of the fourth century BC , they contain lists ofships and gear in
various categories and provide the most important and authoritative
8 JG2 2 1604-1632: above, p. 5.

source of information about the classical trieres and its equipment, record-
ing as the y do the contents of the dockyards which the overseers of one
year handed over to their successors in the next. In the previous chapter we
were concerned to deduce from the record of 170 oars for each ship that
since 170 oars implied 170 oarsmen and the total number ofeach crew was
200, the bypiresia must have numbered thirty. Here we are concerned with
the detailed classification of the oars in these inscriptions into 62 thranite,
54 zygian and 54 thalamian oars. There are, as we have seen, literary refer-
ences to thranite and thalamian oarsmen, and we have seen reason to infer
that the latter, working oars through oar-ports, sat in the lowest part of the
ship below oarsmen seated on the zyga. The category of zygian, as well as
thranite and thalamian, oars occurring in the inventories justifies the con-
clusion that there were oarsmen called zygioi as well as those called thrani-
tai and thalamioi, although there is no literary reference to them. The
name suggests that these were the oarsmen seated on the zyga, the thwarts
or cross beams in the ship's hull.?
We may now address ourselves to the question of the relative position-
ing of the three categories of oarsmen. The inference that the thalamians
occupied the lowest part of the ship is confirmed by a passage in
Aristophanes (Frogs 1074f.) where a character speaks of one of the crew of
the Paralos, one of the two crack state triereis, as 'making wind in the face
of the thalamaxand getting excrement all over his rnessmate'. Thalamax is
a colloquial equivalent for thalamios (cf. styppax below, p. 185), who must,
therefore, have sat below at least one of the other two classes. The greater
number of thranires (62) than the number (54) of the other two classes,
i.e. four more on each side of the ship, is an indication that the thranites sat
higher in the ship, since thus they would be less affected by the reducing
beam and depth of the hull at bow and stern (below, pp. 216-17).
The general assumption has been, and still often is, that if, as it
9 Modern writers (e.g. Anderson (1962) pp. 6. 7. 12, 14) continue to speak of
zygite oarsmen (the latest example The World ofAthens (1984) p. 265). Zygitls,
like thalamitis, occurs only in the scholiast on Aristophanes, Frogs 1074, no
doubt on the analogy of the correct tbranitis. Zygios, like thalamios, is used of oars
in the naval inventories, as is tbranitis. Tbalamios is used of oarsmen in
Thucydides, and it is reasonable to suppose that zygioswas also so used in the fifth
and fourth centuries. Zygian and thalamian then seem to be the correct anglicisa-
nons.
Theships I 137
appears, the thranites sat highest and the thalamians sat below and
between the zygians (these latter two classes seated like the oarsmen in a
two-level penrecontor), the oars in each unit of one thranite, one zygian
and one thalamian oarsman would have had to be of different lengths,
and that the difference would have created insuperable difficulties, in
harm o n ising the oar-beat (above, p. 22) . It can however be shown that
there was no necessary difference in length between the oars in anyone
such unit. The naval inventories provide the vital piece of information by
recording the number and length of the spare oars carried. IQ There were
thirty of these, of 9 cubits and 9 Y2 cubits, and a reference to this small
difference can be found in Aristotle (PA 687b 18). Speaking of the fingers
of the hand he says: 'the outermost finger is short for good reason and the
middle finger long, like the oar amidships'. Galen (UP 1.24) is a little
more explicit:
Why are all the fingers of unequal length and the middle finger the longest? Is it
for any other reason than because it is better for their ends to extend the same dis-
tance in grasping large round objects? . . . as I think in triereisalso the ends of the
oars extend the same distance and yet they are not all the same length; for in that
case too they make the middle oars longest for the same reason.
And lest we should be led astray by Galen's word 'longest' Michael of
Ephesus, the Greek commentator on Aristotle, is brief and to the point
(22. 118. 15): 'the middle oars of ships are longer than those at each end'.
T his fact is likely to have been true of triaconrors and pentecontors as well
as of triereis, There is not much room for doubt: the spare oars in triereis
are of two different lengths because in the bow and stern, where there was
less room , shorter oars were used, but still in all but a very few units all the
oars would have been of the same length.
It would, again, seem likely that the gearing of the oars (i.e. the propor-
tion between the part of the oar outboard of the thole and the part inboard
of it) would remain the same throughout the ship irrespective of the oar-
length . But the fourth-century work on mechanics attributed to Aristotle
(4.850b 10) is evidence to the contrary. Answering the question 'Why do
the midships oarsmen move the ship most?', the author says: 'Amidships
the largest part of the oar is inboard for the ship is broadest there.' It seems,
10 E.g.1G2 2 1606.43--4, 1607.14.

then, that the half cubit by which the bow and stern oars were shorter
came off the loom, or inboard part of the oar, so that 'the midships
oarsmen move the ship most' because they have greater leverage, and, as
Galen says, all the oars extend to the same distance from the ship's side
although they are not (overall) of the same length.
With the help of the naval inventories and some literary sources it has
been possible to establish the general nature of the oarsystem of the trieres
fairly clearly. There is, however, still no indication of the suspected connec-
tion between the thranire oarsman and the parexeiresia or outrigger. We
may now turn to the representations of oared ships which in the light of
what we now know may be identified as triereis .
There are a few representations of galleys, deriving directly or indirectly
from the fifth and fourth centuries, which are prima facie likely to depict
triereis, but none show the whole ship or the sails and rigging.
(1) The most spectacular of these is the relief probably found by
Lenormant on the Acropolis at Athens and published in 1859 (fig. 13).11 It
is dated in the last decade of the fifth century. Small and delicately cut in
local pink marble, it portrays a midships section of the starboard side of a
galley under oar. The painted colours which would have aided interpreta-
tion are now lacking and its surface is worn (for an interpretation by
shading see fig. 36). The galley can nevertheless be seen to possess the char-
acteristics which we have come to expect in a fifth-century trieres. On the
deck are the lower parts offigures half-lying or sitting. Supporting the deck
are successive curved stanchions (the curvature possibly indicating per-
spective), which descend outside the hull and rest on the middle wale, i.e.
the upper of the two visible wales, and in between them eight figures are
visible pulling oars. Their oars pass through two heavy horizontal timbers,
which are connected by short uprights (tholes and stiles) and seem to be in
higher relief than the two horizontal wales beneath them on the ship's side.
Cartault (above, p. 17) rightly recognised these upper horizontal timbers
as an outrigger and the visible oarsmen as thranites, since he also recog-
nised two lower levels of oars emerging from the ship's side, thus happily
identifYing and connecting to each other the two features which distin-
guish the trieres . Cartault's recognition is the key to the interpretation of
the relief and one of the two remaining unidentified features of the ship's
11 For the literature see Beschi (I 969-70) p. 117 no. 5.

The ships I 139
~ A Deck rail B Middle wale C Lower wale

~ Stanch ions supporting t7J.l 1. Thranite 3 Th I .
~ deck and resting on B ~ 2. Zygian . a amran
}oars
P"1 Brac.kets supporting 0 O~trigger and
b:d outrigger stiles
I Tholepins ~ Oarports
36. The proposed interpretation of the Lenormant Relief
side in the relief is thereby explained. The longer slanting semi-vertical

timber resting on the lower wale is a bracket supporting the horizontal
timbers which stand out from the ship's side as an outrigger through which
the thranite oars are pulled. (The shorter such timber is to be recognised as
[he lower part of the deck-stanchion resting on the middle wale.) From
under this structure of the outrigger emerge the zygian oars, probably
through ports originally picked out in colour. Thalamian oars emerge
above the lower wale, again through ports originally picked out in colour
and fitted , as will be seen, with sleeves (askomata: pp. 168-9) as a precau-
don against water splashing in. Thus the relief illustrates the relative posi-
[ion ofeach of the three oarsmen in the unit: the thranite somewhat higher
and, thanks to the outrigger, further outboard than the other two. The
zygian and thalamian are in the same positions relative to each other as
[hose which they held in the two-level pentecontor. The trieres in fact, at
the time covered by the naval inventories, is a ship with 27 oarsmen a side
at each of two levels on which has been superimposed on each side a third
file of 31 oarsmen, sitt ing virtually on the topwale and pulling oars
through an outrigger supported at two-cubit intervals away from the ship's
side by a bracket resting on a horizontal wale. It is possible that the word
thranos (from which the name thranites comes and which has the general
meaning ora longitudinal beam in, e.g., a roof) in the nautical context
denotes the 'topwale'.
(2) A small fragment of reliefl2 which by reason of the marble of which
it is made, and the style and subject matter of the sculpture, is certainly
part of the monument from which the Lenormant Relief comes , shows
part of the side ofa galley with a thranite oarsman visible and traces of two
figures seated on deck (fig. 14). It was found in 1876 in a spoil heap from
the earlier excavation of the Acropolis at Athens.
There are two further representations in the same general style and
showing galleys on the same scale as the galley on the Lenorrnanr Relief.
One depicts the bow and the other the stern (in both cases the starboard
side , as in 1 and 2) of a ship which can likewise be identified as a trieres ,
(3) One of a folio of drawings made for the Cavaliero dal Pozzo in Rome
between 1610 and 1635 and now in the British Museum (fig. 11) 13 shows
the starboard bow of a galley with five oarsmen pulling oars in the same
position as those in the Lenormant Relief. It is then a reasonable assump-
tion that the ship is a trieres . The scale is also the same, since in both the
oarsmen measure about 4.4 cm from seat to the crown of the head . Again,
as in the relief, the oarsmen are framed fore and aft by the aft-curving deck-
stanchions and above and below by the deck and by the upper outrigger
timber. In the drawing the heads of the oarsmen slightly overlap the deck,
suggesting that the artist thought that they sat outboard of it (pp. 141-2).
A figure wearing a high cap, drawn rather larger than the oarsmen, lies
propped on one elbow at the forward end of the deck , and looks and signals
aft with one hand. He can be recognised as the bow officer (p rorates or
priireui), The deck has a low bulwark which conceals some of the bow
officer's bod y, and would conceal more ifhis size was not exaggerated.
On the ship 's side there are the same horizontal timbers of the outrigger
and wales, and tholes and stiles between the former, as have been seen in
(1). The artist has, however, not recognised that the deck-stanchions are to
12 See Beschi (1969-70) p. 12l.

13 See Vermeule (1964) p. 27. Also Beschi pp. 123ff.
Theships I 141
be seen continuing downwards between the horizontal outrigger timbers
and resting on the middle wale: these continuations are inserted, but
incorrectly aligned. The thalamian and thranite oars are shown correctly,
but the zygian oars although appearing in their correct positions below the
lower wale have not been recognised as continuing upwards across the
lower and middle wales to the point where they disappear inside the ship
under the outrigger, but the artist inserts , again incorrectly aligned , what
in the original were the upper parts of the zygian oars between the wales
and between the middle wale and the outrigger. The early seventeenth-
century artist, ignorant of galleys with oars at three levels, very naturally
has failed to understand what he is copying, but it is not difficult to see the
nature of his mistakes and penetrate to the original with the help of the
Lenorrnant Relief. One thing is clear. The original showed the bow unit as
consisting of a single thranire oarsman while the next units aft were shown
complete, containing thranire, zygian and thalamian oarsmen.
The form of the trieres prow which the dal Pozzo drawing shows, i.e.
with a foredeck continuing forward to the stem, is corroborated by two
vases of a ritual character (rhyta) which are dated respectively in the latter
part of the fourth and the third century BC. The earliest (fig. 37) is
Apulian. !" It shows clearly the ram and above on both sides of it the later-
ally projecting epotides (below, pp. 166-7) or 'ear-timbers'. Above and in
between the handles (which of course have nothing to do with the ship
imitated in the vase's shape) is the hint of a superstructure, a deck such as
that on which the prorates lies in the drawing. This deck superstructure is
more clearly shown in the later rhyton (fig. 38), in which a figure is placed
on it. Still more clearly but in two dimensions the foredeck appears on a
Cian coin of the later fourth century (fig. 39). The screens which box in
the sides of the space below the foredeck are shown in the coin giving
place further aft to a deck-stanchion curving aft in just the same way as
the deck-stanchions do on the Lenormant Relief and its associated frag-
ment, the dal Pozzo drawing and the LAquila Relief- (1), (2) , (3) and (4) .
This screened area underneath the foredeck may have formed a cabin for
the bow officer corresponding to the cabin underneath the quarterdeck in
the stern. The suggestion made by the artist of the dal Pozzo drawing that
the foredeck did not extend laterally over the thranite oarsmen is not
14 See GOS, p.178 .

37. Apulian rhyton in the shape of rhe bow ofa trieres, 400- 322 BC.
elsewhere corroborated for the late fifth century and is unlikely to have
had support in his original.
(4) A piece of a marble relief, now at LAquila in Italy (fig. 12),15 shows
part of the starboard side of the stern of a galley under oar. The style and
aspect of the representation is similar to that of (1), (2) and (3). The stroke
oarsmen and the three others visible have the same posture, and measure-
ment shows them to be on the same scale, as the oarsmen in the other three
representations. The marble is Greek but shows none of the transverse
veining of (1) and (2), and cannot therefore come from the same monu-
15 See Beschi (1969-70) p. 121.

Theships 1 143
38. Rhyton in the shape of a trieres' bow, third to second century BC.
39. Coin ofCius in Birhynia showing a trieres' bow, 340 BC.

ment as those. Compared with them the surface has suffered less weather-
ing and the relief is higher, but severe damage round the edges, particularly
at the bottom, makes interpretation difficult. When first published 16 it was
thought to be a Roman copy of the monument from which (1) and (2)
come. But the provenance of the marble makes this unl ikely. A recent sug-
gestion 17 that it is a contemporary Greek copy of the monument made for
exhibition at a second site in Athens seems unlikely and is ruled out by
certain differences between it and (1) and (2). It may come from a separate
but broadly similar monument, brought to Italy, like the original of (3), by
a Roman visitor to Athens interested in Greek warships.
Part of the up-curving line of the keel is visible in the relief, as well as the
top of the aft-slanting steering oar on the starboard side, and the lower pan
of a figure seated on a deck which has no low bulwark. Of the first (stroke)
oar unit there is recognisable a thranite and zygian oar but no thalamian,
and there is no outrigger bracket. In unit no. 2 a thranite and a zygian oar
are recognisable but again no thalamian, and there is again no outrigger
bracket. Unit no. 3 shows first an outrigger bracket then thranite and
zygian oars. The outrigger bracket appears to have a continuation below
the lower wale, although the state of the stone is such that no conclusion is
certain. If there is a continuation there, the stonemason has made one of
two possible mistakes. Either, as is more likely, he has simply treated the
bracket as ifit were an oar and continued it downwards, or he has merged a
thalamian oar (which stands next to the bracket in (I), (2) and (3)) with the
16 ByA. Rumpf(l935) p. 14.

17 Beschi (1969-70) . Rumpf and Beschi regard the original of which the LAqu ila
Reliefis a copy, the Lenormant Relief and the original ofthe dal Pozzo drawing as
pans of the same monument. Beschi reconstructs the whole as a votive relief to
which he attaches a fragment (Acropolis Museum 2544). He regards this frag-
ment as showing the head ofa figure which appears seated in the upper part of the
dal Pozzo drawing, and identifies it as Paralos, the eponymous hero of the state
trieres of that name depicted at the foot of the relief.The added fragment has fea-
tures which date it, like the Lenormant Relief, to the end of the fifth or the begin-
ning of the fourth century BC. O. Waiter (1932), on the other hand, connects
the Lenormant Relief with the picture of the Paralos trieres in the Pinacotheca of
the Propylaeum at Athens , which Pliny (NB. 35.101) and Cicero (Verr. 4.135 )
speak of as painted by Protogenes of Caunus at the end of the fourth century BC.
It is doubtful, however, whether a relief, even if coloured, could be described as a
painted picture.
Theships / 145
bracket. In unit no . 4 only a thranite oar survives the break in the stone,
but this unit is likely to have contained also a zygian and a thalarnian oar.
Stiles and tholes appear between the upper and lower outrigger timbers,
and so do the lower parts of the deck-stanchions, which are not shown as
continuing downwards to rest on the middle wale. The looms of the thra-
nite oars are noticeably thi cker than the outboard pans (see below, p. 172
n.22).
The most significant difference between the L'Aquila Relief and (1), (2)
and (3) is the absence ofa waterline. In the Lenorrnant Relief the waterline
is plain and no part of the hull or oars below it is shown. The deck stands
13.5 cm above it. There is a most realistically drawn waterline in the dal
Pozzo drawing, the deck standing 14.5 cm above it. The additional height
is at least partly caused by the clearly drawn low bulwark, higher than any
bulwark which may possibly be intended in the Lenorrnant Relief. In the
L'Aquila Relief the clearly marked keel is visible to a point 16 cm below the
deck surface, where a break in the stone cuts it off. Now the practical
requirement s of pulling an oar make it certain that at each of the three
levels the oarsmen in a trieres must have sat throughout the ship at the
same height above the water. The oarsmen in the stern could not have sat
higher, at each level, than those in the rest of the ship in relation to the
waterline: and it must be remembered that measurements of the oarsmen
show that the stern on the L'Aquila Relief is drawn on the same scale as the
midships section and bow in (1), (2) and (3). The waterline in the L'Aquila
Relief should, then , be a horizontal line crossing the keel at the point
where the stroke thranire oar crosses the keel (and in fact is not shown con-
tinuing) about 14 cm below the surface of the deck. It seems clear, there-
fore, that the monument from which the L'Aquila Relief comes depicted a
trieres, but, unlike the Lenorrnant Relief and the original of the dal Pozzo
drawing, did not show a waterline.
The conclusions to be drawn from this examination may be briefly
stated. Material, provenance and detail make it reasonably certain that (1)
and (2) represent a fifth-century trieres. Community ofscale and detail, in
spite of some errors of execution, make it likely that (3) and (4) also repre-
sent such a ship . The original of (3) might well have been a part of the same
monument of which (1) and (2) were parts, but (4), although a broadly
similar picture of a similar ship, shows differences of material and detail
which indicate that it came from a different monument of the same type.
UNITS 1 234 5-28 29 30

Thranite 24 complete units ~ 30
STERN Zygian ~ 29 80W
Thalamian ~ 26
40. Distribution of oarsmen in the Lenorrnant Relief rrieres.
The ship ofwhich we have the bow and stern depicted in (3) and (4) has
one more thranite than zygian oarsmen on each side, and three more
zygian than thalamian oarsmen, a different distribution from that which
the naval inventories attest, where the zygian oarsmen and the thalarnian
oarsmen are the same (27) , and the thranites are four more (31) than the
other two classes. Since the crew of a trieres remains constant at 200
throughout our period, it seems likely that the total number of oarsmen
was 170 in the fifth century, as it was in the fourth. If that is so, the distri-
bution of the 85 oarsmen on each side attested by our four representations
is 30: 29: 26 in contrast with the distribution 31 : 27: 27 attested in the
naval inventories.l'' Such a relatively small change could have been dic-
tated by an alteration in the shape of the hull. The distribution shown in
the four representations deriving from the fifth century is set out diagram-
matically in fig. 40.
(5) The Talos vase in the jatta collection in Ruvo (5. Italy), which is dated
to the end of the fifth century, can also be seen, by comparison with the
Lenormant Relief, to show a trieres (figs. 41 a and b). 19 The painting gives a
very detailed and precise picture of the port side of the stern. The ship is
beached, i.e. slightly on its side, with the stern slanting away from the eye.
There are three human figures, all enormously out of proportion to the ship ,
two sitting on deck and a third descending a ladder which is leaning against
18 IG2 2 16 15- 18. See GOS p. 272 n. 16. Beschi's reconstruction enables the height
of the relief to be estimated at 95 cm. Taking it as a rule that the breadth of such
votive reliefs is twice the height, he reaches 1.90 m for the breadth. In this
breadth a ship with only 25 thranite oarsmen a side can be fitted. He says
(p. 129): 'the maker of the relief was an artist not a geometer, and th e number is
sufficient to give an impression of the real thing to the eye'. 1 find it difficult to
believe that the artist who so meticulously represents each detail in the relief can
have been so careless in something which any Athenian observer would see at
once to be wrong. A simple adjustment of the scale would have enabled the right
number of thranite oarsmen to be shown . 19 See GOS pp. 173-6.
The ships I 147
.I. . .
Oar Unit No. . . . ..
I
o '
"
"
0
I
~In the picture-

5
0
I
4 3
I
2
I I
1
Aft
(a) (b)
41 a. Attic red-figure volute krater by the Talos painter showing the stern of the
Argoportrayed as a trieres, end of the fifth century BC.
4 1b. Interpretation of fig. 41a.
the lower horizonral timber of the outrigger. The deck is supported, as in the
Lenormanr Relief, by stanchions with an exaggerated curvature, the lower
ends of which rest on the middle wale; and the outrigger, again as in the
Lenormanr Relief, is supported by a bracket resting on a lower horizonral
wale. In a beached ship, narurally, the oars have been shipped, but below the
outrigger and above the middle wale there is a row of three oarpoftS and
berween the middle and lower wales a single, larger, thalamian oarport
covered by a sleeve of some kind (see above, p. 41 and p. 139) to which we
shall rerum. Two thranite tholes are visible and one is implied by the corre-
sponding zygian oarport. The figure with his foot on the ladder conceals
part of the stern, so that it is impossible to tell whether the rhranite tholes
and zygian oarport continue aft. The thalamian oarports plainly do nor.
UNITS 1 234 5-28 29 30 31

Thran ite 24 complete units = 31
STERN Zygian = 27 BOW
Thalamian = 27
42 . Distribution of oarsmen in the Talos vase trieres,
If, as is quite possible, two further thranite tholes and two further zygian
oarports are concealed, the arrangement is such as is set out above in fig.
40. If on the other hand only two further thranite tholes (and no zygian
oarports) are concealed, then the arrangement would fit the distribution
between the classes of oarsmen attested by the naval inventories as shown
in fig. 42 (the arrangement has been converted to starboard side for com-
parison). Since the greater part of our detailed knowledge about the trieres
comes from the naval inventories and the oar arrangement they impl y
appears to be the result of a refinement of hull shape, this is the distribu-
tion that we have adopted in the reconstruction. Other arrangements than
that shown in fig. 42 would of course satisfy the distribution 31: 27: 27 ,
but the Talos vase stern, as far as it goes, is consistent with the arrangement
in fig. 42, and provides further reason for our following that pattern.
(6) There remains a small fragment of red-figure pottery to be consid-
ered (fig. 43).20 It antedates (1), (2) and (5) by about fifty years, and repre-
sents part of the side of a rrieres comparable with what is shown in them.
Like (5) it shows no oars, and since the bunched 'foot? ! of a sail is visible
above the deck it is possible that the ship is under sail.
There are minor differences. The absence oftholes and stiles in the outrig-
ger as well as of the bracket supporting it, and the similar size of the zygian
and thalamian oarports, are probably the result of rough drawing, but the
presence of a substantial rail to the deck indicates a difference in practice
which may imply that this ship was a troop-carrier with hoplites on deck.
Instead of the two heavy wales seen in (1), (3) and (4) there are here two pairs
oflight horizontal timbers with the oarports in between each pair. The deck-
stanchions in (1), (3), (4) and (5) curve towards the stern. On this fragment
they curve from left to right. This fact, and the decorative roundeP partly
20 See GOSp. 176. 21 See GOSpp. 299, 312.

22 The only evidence for decoration on the side of a trieres' hull that we know of is
Theships I 149
4 3. Fragment of a red-figure cup showing parr of the side of a triere s,

c. 450 BC.
visible on the ship 's side, suggest that a section towards the port bow of a
rrieres is show n. The vertical lines appare ntly passing th rough a slot in the
deck may be rigging ropes of the 'boat' sail, the 'foot' of which is visible, or
possibly weapons which in earlier ship s were often stacked in the bow.23 If
the break in the sherd on the left-hand side concea ls a second thalamian
the passage in Hipponax (see abo ve, pp. 34-5) which speaks of a snake painted
'on the many-benched side of a rrieres fleeing fro m the ram towards the helms-
man'. Apart from the eye (e.g, GOS PI. 21e) and the boar's head (GOS Pis.
13-20) which are common on th e earlier ships bur forw ard of the oarsystern,
th ere are the rwo do lph ins on the famo us Exekias cup (GOS PI. 13).
The eye wh ich is a regular decoration of the prows of earlier oared ships (see
GOS, General In dex s.v.) in triereis of the fourrh century was app arently a piece
of marble sha ped and painted to resemble an eye. Some have been discove red in
Zea (C h rysoula Saarogl u-Paliadele 1978) and provide an explanation of the enig-
matic entries in one of the naval inventories (JG 2 2 160 4.68 and 7 5: GOS p. 28 8
note 26) that the eyes of a ship 'are broken', and in another (JG2 2 1607 .24: GOS,
ibid.) that in a certain ship 'there is no gear and even the eyes are missing' .
23 E.g. GOS Pis. 2c and d , 6a and 12c.
oarport, then the oar arrangement may be that in fig. 40 with units nos. 2
and 29 (partly) shown and unit no. 30, consisting of a single thranite place,
also invisible by reason of the break on the left-hand side.
The evidence for a slot in the deck is unique. There is a necessity fo
such a narrow opening in the deck above the keel-line to enable the mast (
be raised and lowered, and this feature is necessarily present in Olympias.
There is no other evidence of any kind, for or against it.
There is a final observation to be made about the general form of the
trieres as it appears from the evidence given in this chapter. Although the
oarsmen were protected to a certain degree from weather and in battle
from enemy missiles by a light deck, whether 'overall' or not, the trieres
was open at the sides above the topwale . This weakness was exploited by
the Syracusans in the early battles in the Great Harbour. They employe d
small boats to get close in among the enemy ships and enable missiles to be
thrown in among the oarsmen (Thuc. 7.40.5). There are screens of linen
and hair among the gear of triereis in the naval invenrories. f" The latter
were presumably for protection against such attacks and against javelins
thrown from the decks, while the first were for protection against the
weather. In Xenophon (HG 1.6.19) screens are said to have been used to
conceal the manning of ships planning to make a dash for the open sea.
The introduction of catapults in the Hellenistic navies made necessary the
permanent and solid 'boxing in' of the oarsmen.
Types of trieres
In the accounts of the Salamis campaign distinctions are made between the
performances of different triereis.
In the first place, in giving the numbers of the two fleets Aeschylus says
that the Greek fleet was made up of300 ships ofwhich ten were 'outstand-
ing' (ekkritous) , while the total of the Persian fleet was 1,000 of which 207
were especially fast (Persians338-40). Our other contemporary authority,
Herodotus (7.89, 184) speaks of a total of 1,20 7 for the Persians, probably
having added the 20 7 fast ships to the total of 1,000 instead of including
24 IG2 2 1605.40-3; 1609.85,86,113; 1611.244-9; 1612.73-9 (two pararrymata

each ship); 1627.348. Screens put up before battle (parablemata) Xen. HG
2.1.22.
Theships I 151
them in it as Aeschylus does. He says that the Phoenician ships were the
'best movers in the water ' (arista pleousas) (7.96) and that there were 300 of
them (7.89). In his two accounts of the Greek naval force before
Artemisium (8.1.1-1) and before Salamis (8.43-8) no number or group of
ships is said to be specially fast, but after Salamis (8.22.1) he speaks of
Themistocles taking the 'best moving' Athenian ships on a special mission.
In the second place when Herodorus comes to describe the engage-
ments at Arrernisiurn he characterises the Persian ships as a whole as
moving better in the water than the Greek ships (8.10.1), and when he
comes to the account of the Greek council of war on the night before the
battle of Salamis he gives Themistocles the words (8.60a): 'if you engage
them at the Isthmus you will fight a battle on the open sea, which is least
advantageous to us who have ships heavier and fewer in number [than
they].'
It seems that there are two quite different ratings in these two groups of
passages. In the former group the rating rests on specific inbuilt character-
istics of the hull, i. e. some ships are built to be faster than others, whereas
in the latter group the better performance or the greater heaviness derives
from some other factor which affects all the ships in the fleet whatever their
build. For the clue to this latter factor we must go once more to the letter
Nicias wrote to the Athenian Assembly in 414.
The Athenian ships in Nicias' fleet were the 100 empty hulls, 40 fast
and 60 troop-carriers (Thuc. 6.31.3 cf. 4.3.1) which the city had supplied
for the expedition. The ratings 'fast' and 'troop-carrier' depend, here at
least, not on their function alone - for they were empty hulls - but on
some inbuilt characteristics. A Syracusan speaker (Thuc. 6.34.3), talking
of the expected invasion, mentions a fast squadron of the Athenian fleet
which could keep together on the crossing from Corcyra to Italy. On
arrival at Syracuse the fast ships were moored together under the forts at
the harbour's entrance. But in the letter from Syracuse a year later (Thuc.
7.12.3) Nicias says: 'O ur fleet was originally in first-class condition, the
ships dr y and the crews unimpaired, but now the ships are leaky and the
crews have deteriorated. It is not possible to beach the ships and dry them
out because the enemy fleet ... keeps us constantly on the look-out for an
attack.' The Syracusans on the other hand 'have a greater opportunity of
drying out their ships'. It is clear from these words that the second kind of
rating is here explained. Regular maintenance of these wooden ships was
of the greatest importance if they were to be kept in efficient condition,

and this involved a lengthy procedure of beaching and 'drying out' which
would have included careening and caulking of seams as well as, in all
probability, giving the wetted area of the hull a coat of pitch,
We may compare the Persian and Greek fleets before Salamis in the ligh'
of this crucial maintenance factor. Herodorus tells (7.59.2-3) how rh
Persian fleet, on its voyage from the Hellespont, came to a wide beach a
the mouth of the river Hebrus near Doriscus, where 'they hauled thei
ships up on to the beach and dried them out'. This was in the early summe
of 480. The Greek ships on the other hand appear to have been mobili sed
and at action stations since the previous autumn. They would not hav
been able to risk immobilising their ships for the time taken for the mai n-
tenance operation, because they too, by the time 'drying out' became nec-
essary were, like Nicias, 'constantly on the look-out for an attack' .
The 200 triereis, which the Athenians built just before the battle 0 .
Salamis and which fought there, were, in Thucydides' words (1.14.3) 'no
decked overall', and the 'Decree ofThemistocles' shows that these, like rh
fast triereis in use later, carried only ten epibatai. If on the other hand we
look at the ships in the Persian fleet we find that, according to Herodo rus
(7.96) , they all had, in addition to the native epibatai, 30 Persian, Medi a
and Sacan epibatai on each ship as well. Since the rest of the Persian army
was proceeding to Greece by land the reason for the additional epibatai
being on board was not because this was the only means of getting them to
their destination, but, probably to ensure the loyalty of the ship's company,
and for that reason they may also have been carried in battle. All the ship
therefore, whether technically 'fast' or not, would qualify as troop-carriers
in the sense in which Thucydides uses the term, and thus be, prima jacie,
slower than the ships which carried no extra troops.
Nevertheless, in spite of the extra weight of the additional 30 soldiers on
deck and the probable strucrural modifications entailed, it appears that the
favourable condition of the ships as regards maintenance was a powerful
enough factor to override the disadvantage of the extra men, etc., as far as
speed was concerned if they were in fact taken into battle.
Since it appears that at Salamis, irrespective of the maintenance factor,
which was of great importance, all the Athenian triereis were 'fast' in the
sense that they did not carry extra troOps, and all the Persian ships were in
Thucydidean terms troop-carriers in the sense that they did, in what sense
Theships I 153
were ten of the Greek ships 'outstanding' (ekkritol) and 207 of the Persian
ships 'especially fast' as Aeschylus says? At the beginning of the
Peloponnesian War the Athenians set aside each year 100 triereis in reserve
against emergencies. These ships are called by Thucydides (2.24.2, cf.
Andocides 3.7) exairetoi, and the same word is also used in the fourth
century for a category of triereis, many of them new, in the naval invento-
ries, where other categories of ships are first, second , and third class and
'0Id'.25 It seems then that within the overall Thucydidean categories of
'fast' ships and troop-carriers triereis could also be placed in categories
according to their date of construction, building standard (possibly in
respect of the timber used, see below, p. 180), hull design (see above,
pp. 150-1) or some other factor.26
At this point we must enquire whether there are any clues to the structu-
ral difference between the "T hernisroclean' fast trieres with 10 epibatai,
and with a correspondingly restricted deck, and the triereis in the Persian
fleet with 40 epibatai(and the necessarily larger deck) . A larger deck for at
any rate some of the non-Athenian triereis of the time is implied by
Thucydides' remark that the Athenian triereis 'did not yet have decks
overall' (1.14.3) . There are two relevant passages from Plutarch, who
wrote in the first/second century AD but is likely to have derived his infor-
mation from a reliable source. He says (Cimon 12.2) that the Athenian
general Cimon in command of a fleet of the Delian League operating in
467 in SW Asia Minor 'set out with two hundred ships which had been
originall y very well built by Thernistocles for speed and easy turning and
which he had then made broader and given a (greater) deck span, so that
they might proceed against the enemy with the greater fighting power
exercised by many hoplites'. There is the implication that, so modified,
they were slower and less easy to turn. If these were in fact the triereis built
by Thernisrocles, they would have been getting on for fifteen years old and
would have been ready for conversion to troop-carriers. This is what
2S /G2 2 161 I.
26 Thuc. 8.62: 'the troop-carriers carrying hoplites' and Xen. HG 1.1.36 'troopcar-
riers rather than fast'. In /G 2 2 1623.284 four hulls are specified as 'fast', and of
th ese three are in fact said to be new. In /G2 2 1611.65-128 there is a special class
of exairetoi, 'selected' ships, which are mosrly new. The earliest mention of troop-
carriers is probably /Gt3 499 (435-410 BC) [stratjiiitides. See Appendix I,
below.
Cimon appears to have done and we are told how he did it: 'by making the
hulls broader and giving the decks greater span'. Similarly we hear later of
old triereis being made into horse-transports by what must have been a
. .
major conversion,
The second passage ( Themistocles 14.2) is from Plutarch's account of an
incident in the battle of Salamis which he uses to illustrate Thernistocles'
qualities as a naval commander:
He seems to have been as much aware of the right time as of the right place [to
start an engagement]' and to have been careful not to send his triereis in to attack
rhe enemy's ships until rhe moment arrived which usually broughr a sriff breeze
from rhe sea and a swell through the straits. This did no harm to the Greek ships,
which were nearer water-level and lower, bur did affect and confuse the enemy's
ships with their towering sterns and high decks, and offered rhem broadside to the
Greeks, who were in fact bearing down on rhem and keeping an eye on
Thernistocles as he was warching for the right time to make his attack .
Plurarch describes the moment when the two Persian squadrons were
coming up the straits several ranks deep in line abreast (above, pp. 58-60)
and the Athenians on the Greek right wing were waiting for the right
moment to turn into line ahead and launch their attack aimed at a break-
through. Plutarch preserves a tradition that Thernistocles, like Phormio
later in the gulf of Corinth (pp. 69-72), used his knowledge of local
weather conditions to attack at precisely the right moment, when the fol-
lowing breeze and swell caused enemy ships to broach to and present
themselves broadside to the Athenian rams, thus enabling the break-
through to be effected. Plutarch's story concerns only a brief, if vital,
moment in the action. It emphasises an important characteristic of the
ships of the Persian fleet, all of which were built to carry 40 soldiers on
deck as opposed to the Athenians' 10.
It has already been seen that troop-carriers had to have broader hulls
and wider decks than triereis of the Themistoclean type. The second
passage from Plutarch says that they also had higher sterns and decks,
offering greater wind resistance and making the ships heavier. In what
sense could they have been higher? The oarsystem of the trieres will be seen
to be such that the oarsmen could not be arranged lower or higher in one
rrieres than in another (see fig. 45) without changing the length of the
oars, and no reason is discernible for such a change. On the other hand
Theships J 155
44. Wall painting in the House of the Priest Amandus at Pompeii showing
the bow of a three-level oared ship, probably a quinquercmc, with high
bulwarks and many armed men on deck, AD 54-68.
there is very good reason for troop-carriers to have bulwarks at least 1 m

high if 40 men are to be accommodated on deck. Such bulwarks are visible
on the oared ships taking part in the evacuation of Tyre in 701 and
depicted on the relief from Sennacherib's palace (fig. 25). They are also
seen on the oared war-ships of the first century AD in Pompeian wall
paintings, in particular on the ship in the House of the Priest Amandus the
deck of which is packed with armed merr" (fig. 44). If the few representa-
tions of triereis which we possess show only a minimal bulwark or none at
all (figs. 37 and 38) the reason must be that they are all representations of
fast triereis, There is good reason to think that the Lenormant Relief and
its associated representations come, or are derived from, a monument
showing the Para/os, which was certainly a fast ship .28
27 Her oarsysrern resembles that of a trieres, but as a Roman ship it is perhaps likely
to be a pentiris or 'five', with two of the oar-levels double-manned. T he ship has
high bulwarks to the deck and many epibatai.
28 Since she went on errands for the state . Her crew were punished by being trans-
ferred to a troop-carrier.
Plurarch's statement (Themistocles 14.2) that the Persian ships were

katastriimasin bypsorophous, high-roofed in their decks, must be a loose ref-
erence to their high stance in the water which was the outcome of the high
bulwarks needed, as in the Nineveh longships and in the later Phoenician
and Roman three-level ships, for the safe carriage on deck oflarge numbers
of soldiers and other passengers. Large numbers of deck soldiers were
carried by the Chian ships at the battle of Lade at the beginning of the
century and by all the contingents of Xerxes' fleet. Their bulwarks would
necessarily have been high. Herodotus (7.194.1-3) tells how some ships of
the Persian fleet on the day of its arrival at Aphetae came in late and
mistook the Greek fleet beached at Arternisium for their own , crossed the
strait and were captured. This story is not incompatible with the difference
between the Greek and Persian fleets which Plurarch describes. A waist-
high bulwark on beached ships would not have been so noticeable in the
fading evening light as to warn the Persian ships of their mistake before it
was too late. At sea it would however have caught the wind more than the
lower profile of the Greek ships.
Besides fast triereis (including some that were outstanding) and troop-
carrying triereis there is a third category, the horse-transport (hippagogos
or, for short, hippegos: pp. 227-30). Horse-carrying vessels are mentioned
in Herodotus' accounts of Darius' and Xerxes' invasion fleets (6.48.2,
7.21.2, 7.97); but they seem not to have been modified triereis, since in
speaking of Pericles' expedition against the Peloponnese in 430
Thucydides (2.56.2) mentions 300 cavalry in horse-transports 'which
then for the first time were made out of old triereis'. And Aristophanes in
the Knights (595-610) speaks of horses being regularly transported by sea
in the Peloponnesian War. There was one horse-transport in the Sicilian
expedition (Thuc. 6.43) carrying 30 horses, and an inscripriorr'" shows
that such transports were pulled by 60 oarsmen. It is a natural inference
that the horses occupied the space in the hull vacated by the thalamian and
zygian oarsmen, and that there were 30 thranite oarsmen on each side of
the ship instead of the regular thirry-rwo.v'' These horse-transports are in
fact called triereis in Demosthenes and in an inscription.:'!
29 IG2 2 1628 .154-5, 161-2,470,475,480.

30 As]FC has discovered, in his drawing of a possible reconstruction (fig. 70).
31 Dem. 4.16, IG2 21627 .241.
The ships I 157
The naval inventories record the numbers of triereis in the dockyards at
Piraeus in 357/6 as 283. 32 In 353/2 the triereis in the dockyards and on
commission numbered 349, 33 and in 330/29 there were even greater
numbers: 392 triereis in the dockyards and 7 at sea including horse-trans-
ports, and 8 'fours' in the dockyard and 10 at sea.34The inventory 0026/5
records 360 triereis and a number (erased) of 'fours'; and it also gives the
number of ship-sheds, 372 all told, 82 in Munychia, 196 in Zea and 94 in
Cantharos. P In the following year there are the same number of rriereis
and in addition 43 'fours' and seven 'fives'.36
In this chapter all the evidence from various sources has been assembled
relative to the more general features of the rrieres, the hull, the accommo-
dation of the trierarch, the byperesia and the oarsmen, and the various
types of rriereis which were built. In the following chapter important par-
ticular features of the ship will be considered - her deck, outrigger and ram
- and then certain articles of gear which are relevant to the reconstruction.
32 IG2 21611.1-9. 33 IG2 21613.284-302 . 34 IG221627.268-9 .

35 IG2 2 1628.481 ,553. Fig. 71 (p. 229) gives a reconstructed view ofMunychia.
36 IG2 21629.801 -11.
THE SHIPS 11
The deck (in Greek leatastriima; or plural leatastriimata)

The oared ships depicted in the earlier vase-paintings have platforms at
bow and stern (ikria) and probably, in some, a connecting gangway
between th ese platforms (fig. 21). These are twenty-, thirty- or fifty-oared
ships, in the case of the latter two sometimes with oars at two levels. None
has a deck. Speaking of Homer's ships in the Iliad, Thueydides (1.10.4)
remarks that they were unlikely to have taken on board many men , apart
from the leaders, in addition to the oarsmen (who were, as he has said, also
the fighting men) , since the ships were not kataphrakta. This word is here
taken to mean 'decked' since, as we have seen, it would have been on deck
that the additional men were accommodated.
A picture of the stern of the Argo (starboard side) engraved on the
bronze Ficoroni casket in the Villa Giulia in Rome (325- 300 BC: fig. 27:
GROWCh . 5 vii) shows two levels of oars and a deck supported by curved
stanchions continuing forw ard from the stern platform at the same level.
The Argo was traditionally a pentecontor. The Talos vase-paint ing
described above (pp. 146-8: fig. 4 1) gives a very similar picture of th e
Argo's stern, thi s time port side , but the presence of the outrigger indicates
that the ship represented (anach ro nistically) is a trieres , Here again a deck ,
supported by curved stanchions, continues forward at the same level as the
stern platform. The outward edge of the deck , which has no bulwark or
rail, appears to be vertically above the horizontal outer planks of the out-
rigger. The Vienna fragment (pp . 148-50: fig. 43) shows a deck with a
deck rail, the deck having a slot in it on the middle fore-and-aft line of the
ship through which lines are drawn repr esenting rigging rope s, javelins, or
poles . The Lenormant Relief with its associated fragment (pp. 138-40:
figs. 13 and 14), giving the midships section of the starboard side of a
trieres, shows a deck on which men are lying, and which, like the deck
158
Theships II 159
f the Talos vase ship, has no bulwark or deck rail. The L'Aquila Relief
(pp. 142-6: fig. 12) shows the starboard side of a trieres stern with the deck
ont inuing forward at the same level and men seated on it, as in the
enorm ant Relief. The dal Pozzo drawing (pp. 140-2: fig. 11), probably
aken from the same monument as that from which the Lenorrnant Relief
erives, shows the bow of a ship, starboard side , in which the deck contin-
es into the bow where it joins the bow platform at an identical level. On
his bow platform a man, probably the bow officer, reclines and signals aft
(to the helmsman). We may draw the following conclusions from this evi-
dence: (l) in the fifth century triereis had a deck connecting bow and stern
platfo rms; (2) this deck extended laterally to the same width as the outrig-
ger; (3) the deck was supported by outward-curving (or outward-leaning,
if the curve is an attempt at perspective) stanchions; (4) the deck in some
cases had a rail and in some cases had not; and (5) the deck had a slot in it
running fore and aft on the ship's median line.
Such, then, was the deck of the trieres in the later fifth century. It can be
seen at once that the slot would have been necessary for managing the main
mast and, further forward, the 'boat' mast (p. 175) . It is likely that both
were stepped into tabernacles built around the keel, possibly between para-
statai, 'm ast-part ners', which occur in the naval inventories, ' like a modern
flagpole . How does this account fit what Thucydides says about
Themistocles ' triereis at Salami s (1.14.3) , that 'they were not decked
overall'? The phrase 'overall' (dia pases) is not at all explicit. It could mean
'thro ugho ut the length' or 'thro ughout the breadth' or both.? It seems so
unlikely as to be virtually impossible that the trieres could have had no deck
at all, not even a narrow one, connecting the bow and stern platforms. The
presence of the epibatai and the necessity of managing the masts and sails,
with the hull packed with oarsmen, make a deck imperative. On the other
hand, if, as the history of the trieres makes clear, the prime consideration of
the sh ipbuilder was lightness, it is reasonable to suppose that Thernistocles'
triereis at any rate had as narrow a deck as possible in contrast to the ships of
1 As LSJ s.v, and Torr (1894) p. 83. In (he naval inventories they appear regularly as
important items of the wooden gear of a trieres. In GOS p. 293 JSM called them
shores , but since mast-partners are clearly needed and parastatai is a very suitable
word for them, we are now inclined to follow Torr. In 1G2 2 1611.38-41 there are
two parastatai for each ship.
2 Torr (1894) p. 50 n, 118. See also Casson (1971) ch . 5 p. 52.
the Persian fleet, all of which were, in Thueydides' parlance, carriers 0:

troops and would have needed not only a wide deck and bulwarks but also a
more heavily built hull. And that is the contrast which Thueydides is
making. His remark fits well with Plutarch's statement (above, pp. 153-4)
that Cimon converted Themistocles' triereis 'built for speed and easiness O C
turning' into troop-carriers with wider hulls and broader decks. It looks as
if, by the end of the century, Athenian fast triereis, as well as the troo p-
carriers, had adopted the wider deck, but only the troop-carriers had the
wider and heavier hull and a deck rail, a lighter version of the deck bulwark
which we have inferred for the Persian ships at Salamis (above, pp. 154-5).
It is an interesting fact that on the Lenorrnanr and the L'Aquila Reliefs
(figs. 13 and 12 ), the associated Acropolis fragment (fig. 14) and the dal
Pozzo drawing (fig. 11), representing the fast trieres Para/os under oar, the
men on deck are all seated or reclining. In this connection we may recall
the speech of the Spartan general Gylippus before the final battle in the
Great Harbour at Syracuse (7.67.2). He is addressing the Syracusan and
Corinthian seamen and soldiers who are about to join battle: 'When the
Athenians . . . have many hoplires on their decks contrary to their estab-
lished practice and many javelin men, landsmen so to speak, Acarnanians
and others, on board, who will not have learnt the knack of throwing jave-
lins in a sitting position, this factor will surely put their ships at risk and
everything will be in confusion from the unaccustomed movement.'
The reason for the Athenian practice of taking only a few hoplires on
deck is here shown clearly. Their prime consideration was pulling effi-
ciency, and this was jeopardised if there were many men moving about on
deck and inevitably causing the ship to rolL Anyone contemplating the
oarsystem of a trieres (fig. 45) with this possibility in mind can see at once
that even a small rolling motion of the hull would 'put everything in con-
fusion' as far as the oarsmen were concerned. The effect of javelin-men
standing up and moving from side to side of the ship to hurl their missiles
would be even more disturbing and dangerous. Gylippus' words are evi-
dence that naval javelinmen, not landlubbers like the Acarnanians, would
be taught to throw their missiles sitting down. Indeed it is pretty clear that
everyone allowed on deck during a battle, the hoplites included, must have
been ordered to sit or lie down while the ship was moving under oar. When
the ship had come to a stop locked into an enemy ship and expecting
boarders, the hoplites would of course have done no harm by standing up
The shipsII 161
45. The oarsysrem of a rrieres.
and moving. We must assume that any movement on deck, entailing a

rolling movement of the ship, was 'unaccustomed' for Athenian oarsmen,
and would spoil the stroke.
The other reason for carrying few men on deck is revealed by the
Athenian general Nicias in his speech before the same battle (Thuc.
7.62.2). He says: 'M any archers and javelin-men will be on deck and a
mass of hoplites, which we would not employ if we were fighting a battle in
he open sea, because they would hinder us through the weight of the ships
in exercising our skill.' Weight, particularly on deck, prevented them
bringing off the breakthrough, the circling movement and the engagement
of the ram amidships, all of them manoeuvres in which speed and agility
were essential.
The outrigger (parexeiresia)

The Greek word parexeiresia suggests some part of the ship concerned with
pulling the oars (eiresia) outboard (ex-) and alongside (par-). Tarn wrote
(1930 p. 65): 'The meaning of the word was Assmann's discovery
('Seewesen', in Baurneister's Denkmaler) and is the most illuminating
thing discovered in modern times about these warships.' Two passages in
Thucydides throw some further light. The first is part of the account of the
Spartan attempt to dislodge the Athenian general Demosthenes from his

foothold on Spartan soil at Pylos. Early in 425 an Athenian fleet, sent
partly as a training exercise round the Peloponnese to Corcyra and from
there to Sicily, was driven by bad weather into the large bay on the west
coast of the Peloponnese now known as Navarino Bay, sheltered on the
west side by the island ofSphacreria. Demosrhenes was not one of the gen-
erals in command of the fleet but had accompanied it and at his own
request had received permission from the Assembly to use the 40 ships at
his discretion in their journey round the Peloponnese (Thuc. 4.2.4) . He
saw to it that, during the fleet's enforced stay, a small promontory (Pylos)
at the northern end of the bay was fortified; and when the rest of the fleet
continued on its way, he stayed there with four ships. In the course of
Spartan attempts to dislodge the small Athenian force, Brasidas, who on
this occasion was serving as a trierarch on one of the Peloponnesian ships
sent to the scene, was among those detailed to try to effect a landing on the
side of the fort facing the sea, where the defence was weakest. Thucydides
(4.11.4-12.1) describes the attack:
Being a tricrarch himself and noticing that the trierarchs and helmsmen, because
the shore was rocky wherever a landing was possible, hung back and were afraid of
damaging their ships, Brasidas shouted out to them to run the ships aground
[bow first] and make a landing in any way they could And he ... compelled his
own helmsman to run his ship aground, and went to the landing ladder. As he
attempted to get ashore he was beaten back by the Athenians and was wounded in
many places. He lost consciousness and as he fell into the outrigger his shield
slipped offhis arm into the sea.
This picture ofa trieres in action is unique even if the action itselfis untyp-
ical. The ship is driven ashore bow first. 3 A 'brow' (apobathra) , i.e. a
gangway on which a man could get down from the deck of a ship facing
the shore ," was run out and the trierarch began to advance down it, but he
was beaten back and fell unconscious into the outrigger. As he fell his body
was caught in it, but his shield slipped through and rolled into the sea. The
passage shows that the outrigger projected from the side of the ship at a
lower level than the deck and was so constructed that a man going down
from the deck could fall into it and be prevented from falling further, while
3 See GOS p. 211. Okellein has the meaning ofgrounding a ship bow first.
4 Apobathraiwere used similarly in the opposed landing at Mycale (Hdt, 9.98 .2).
The ships JI 163
a shield could fall through it. These are important hints for a reconstruc-
tor.
Before proceeding to the second of the two relevant passages in
Thucydides, it is worth while looking at two devices attributed to the
fourth-century Athenian naval commander Chabrias by the historian
Polyaenus, writing in the middle of the second century AD . The first
(3.11.14) was a device to assist steering a trieres in bad weather.
For voyages in the open sea and rough weather he fined to each ship two pairs of
steering oars and employed the normal single pair? in calm weather, but if there
was a swell he ran out the second pair through the outrigger beside the rhranite
oars with the upper end s [of the oars] and the tillers above the deck [instead of
above the stern platform as would be the case with normal steering oars], so that
when th e stern came our of the water [as it would in a swell, with the result that
the normal steering oars would be ineffective], the ship was steered by the second
set.
The other device (3.11.13) consists of sidescreens to protect the oarsmen

in bad weather. The text is very uncertain, but it is clear that the side-
screens were in some way hung from the deck to the outrigger.
These passages give reliable information about the trieres. In them the
outrigger appears to extend along the side of the ship from the bow, where
Thucydides shows it to have been, to the stern , where auxiliary steering
oars could be run out through it. The further important point made is that
the auxiliary steering oars run out through the outrigger were beside the
thranite oars, which must then also have been worked through the outrig-
ger. The normal function of the outrigger becomes plain . The proposition
may now be put forward that the structure of the outrigger made possible
the addition of the third class of oarsmen to the two-level pentecontor to
form the trieres.
The second passage in Thucydides illuminates the relation of the out-
rigger to the bow-structure and at the same time gives interesting informa-
tion about the efforts made by Athens' enemies to overcome the advantage
which the speed and lightness of her ships gave her in the normal course of
fighting at sea.
In the spring and early summer of 413, when Dernosrhenes' fleet of 50
ships was on its way to reinforce Nicias, ten of the fastest were detached to
5 fG2 2161 1.23-7.

LOeR.IS
~~-:
~' .
.• ......
....
- ~-' --' -
, " 1'anormus ~---------- £.r~ . .... 30 Ath eruan
A C H A. E.. A. H~~~~r ' .... .. sn ips In lin e
30 Cor in tfu an * abrus[ I lO m)
t (4 )
srups In \me 1~ ~
5 k.m ab reast ( 4 18 m) ~, ~
9,
o
=====-~
.3 sea miles
I
0'
"c
Map 15 The battle ofErineus.
join Canon, Phorrnio's son, who was then in command at Naupactus,

and had asked for reinforcement. W hen next we hear of the Naupactus
squadron it had increased to 30 ships under Diphilus, and rhe
Corinthians had raised their opposing force on the other side of the gulf
of Corinth to nearly the same number. The ensuing engagement (T huc.
7 .34) had a considerable bearing on th e fate of th e Atheni an fleet at
Syracuse.
The Corinthian ships put to sea and formed line abreast in a crescent-
shaped bay on the southern shore of the gulf at Erineus in Achaea (map
15). Their land forces occupied the horns of the crescent, the projecting
headlands on each flank. The Athenians pulled out to meet them from
Naupactus on the other side of the gulf and to th e west. The Corinthians
remained where they were, to draw the Athenians out and to avoid expos-
ing their wings to encirclement if they came out beyond the protecting
headlands on each side. Then, when they judged the moment to be right,
they raised the sign al and attacked the Athenian ships.
The ships II 165
For a long time neither side gave ground. Three Corimhian ships were put out of
action, and of the Athenian ships none was completely swamped, but some seven
became unmanageable , having been rammed bow-to-bow and having their out-
riggers smashed by the Corinthian ships' bow-timbers which had been specially
strengthened for just this purpose. There was an indec isive battle, in which both
sides claimed victory, but the Athenians got possession of the wrecks because the
wind drove them out to sea and the Corimhians refused to come out after them.
Then the two sides separated, and there was no pursuit nor were any men cap-
tured on either side. The Corinrhians and Peloponnesians easily escaped since
they were fighting near the shore, and none of the Athenian ships was swamped .
Two features of this battle have already been noticed on other occasions:
the planned role of land forces and the fact that triereis holed and conse-
quently abandoned by their crews nevertheless continued to float and were
cowed away by one side or the other. The interest of the battle lies here in
the evidence it provides of a serious attempt by the Corinthians to devise
an answer to the tactic of breakthrough and encirclement. The answer was
for their opponents to seek a combat situation in which head-on, bow-to-
bow, collisions would inevitably occur, and previously, without regard to
weight, to reinforce the bow-timbers of their ships so that when bow-to-
bow ramming did occur the bows of their opponents' ships, being more
lightly built, would be smashed and the oarsystem disrupted. More pre-
cisely, what would happen would be this: the ram of a strengthened ship
would, after a bow-to-bow collision, slide along the ram of an opponent;
and her bow timbers (one end of which projected on each side of the ship
(fig. 46) at a higher level than the ram and covered the outrigger (above,
pp. 140-1)) would smash into and, having been strengthened, break the
bow-timber of the more lightly built opposing ship. These bow-timbers
themselves were not particularly vital, but if one of them was broken the
outrigger through which the thranite oars were pulled would be dislo-
cated. The Corinthians' carefully planned tactical situation (in which
bow-to-bow collision was inevitable), together with the structural modifi-
cation of their ships , constitutes an intelligent response to the Athenian
use of lightly built ships. This Corinthian innovation, tried out here for
the first time, is significant not for its immediate results, which were negli-
gible, but because it was adopted by the Syracusans in the Great Harbour,
where the Corinthians were acting as advisers to them in the build-up of
their naval force.
46. T he bow timbers of a trieres (perspective). The anchor platform, here

removed for rebuilding, would normally obscure the epotis beam and its
brace.
While the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Eurymedon were on

their way to Syracuse with 50 ships, the Athenians already there lost pos-
session of the three forts covering the approach to the Great Harbour, and
were experiencing still greater difficulty in victualling their force by sea.
The Syracusans were anxious to attack the Athenian positions by sea and
land before their reinforcements arrived. Thucydides describes (7.36.2)
how they, in preparation for a sea-battle, 'shortened the bows of their ships
and made them stronger and placed stout timbers across the bows, taking
brackets from them to the ships' sides to a distance ofsix cubits both inside
and outside, in just the same way as the Corinthians had modified their
ships in the bow-to-bow fight against the [Athenian] ships at Naupactus'.
The word used for bow-timbers both here and in the earlier passage is
epotides, literally 'ear-timbers'. The bow of an oared galley was often deco-
rated to look like the head of an animal with the ram as its snout (e.g,
Theships II 167
ng. 26), so that timbers projecting on each side of this simulated head
ould be described as 'ear-timbers'. The strengthening of these in the way
escribed would be effective in head-on collisions if ram slid alongside
am. The strengthening of the ram itself by making the bow shorter seems
<0 imply ram actually hitting ram, an occurrence which was not envisaged
in the earlier passage bur seems now to be a possibility which had to be

guarded against. The Athenian rams were designed for a much lighter - if
more deadl y - task: to penetrate the hull timbers ofa trieres from the side.
The ram (embolos)
Hipponax (above, pp . 34-5), the mid-sixth-century poet who first men-

ions the trieres, is also first to mention the ram . Its first use in battle of
vhich we have any account (above, pp. 39-40) is at the battle ofAlalia in
535, when the rams of the Pho caean pentecontors are said to have been
visted off. Aeschylus (e.g. Persians 415) speaks of the use of bronze rams
at the battle of Salamis, and they appear in the lists of gear of the naval
dockyards as returnable when a ship is broken up." There is plain (if
anachronistic) representation of a bronze ram in a late sixth-century vase-
paint ing showing Odysseus' ship (fig. 47). Reference has been made
above (p. 129) to the large bronze ram with some of the structural timbers
attached (fig. 33) which has recently been found in the sea off Arhlit in
Palestine. It cannot be the ram of a trieres since it is far too heavy, about
400 kg compared with the 200 kg which is an appropriate weight for a
rrieres.? It probably belonged to one of the large new types of oared
warship which are known to have been built in Cyprus at the end of the
fourt h cenrury. '' Nevertheless, the discovery provides useful information
about the mounting of a ram which is of indirect relevance to the trieres .
The shape of the ram is also likely to be common to the earlier triereis and
seems to have been designed to cause maximum waterline damage
without penetrating the hull too far and making it difficult for the attack-
ing vessel to back off.
This chapter may be concluded with a brief consideration of certain
items of gear9 which are relevant to the making and working of Ofympias.
6 fG2 21623 .11-13,1628.498. 7 MM68.1.3-7,6 9.3.229-50.

8 See f]NA 13.2. 9 For the gear of the rrieres in general see GOSpp. 289-307.
47. Attic red-figure stamnos showing Odysseus and the Sirens, 520-480 BC.
The oarport sleeves (askomata)

In the earliest naval inventory, of 37 7/6 BC, 10 it is noted against each of
the ships listed what the position is with regard to her askomata. They are
either already fitted , or someone named has them , or the dockyard holds
the money for them (43 dr. 2 obols), or they are missing. Plainly they are
important fittings . There is reason to believe!' that they are leather sleeves
through which the thalamian oars were worked as a precaution against
water coming in through the lower, and larger,12 row of airports when the
sea was choppy or the ship was under sail. There is some indication of
them on the Lenormant Relief but the clearest representation is in the
stern on the Talos vase (fig. 41). It is possibly more than a coincidence that
the number of thalamian oars inferred for the oar-arrangement in fig. 40
(abo ve, p. 146) is 52 (2 X 26) and that the money held for the askiimata in
10 IG 22 1604 e.g. 33 ('the dockyard has them' ), 38 ('fitted to the ship') , 42, 91 (rhe
trierarch has them') . 11 See GOSpp. 283-4.
12 They appear larger in the Talos vase stern, which is our most accurate piece ofevi-
dence. See pp . 146-8. The reason for their being larger appeared during the
making of the mock-up (below, p. 171) .
The ships11 169
the inscription 0077/6 is easily divisible by 52. Askomata work out at five
obols each . The triereis 0077/6 seem to have retained the earlier distribu-
tion of oarsmen between the classes.
The hypozomata
In the Piraeus naval inventories the first named and hence the most impor-
tant of the ' hanging gear ', Le. ropes, of the trieres are the hypozomata. A
decree lays down the minimum number of men to be employed in fitting a
hypozoma to a ship (but unfortunately the number is no t preserved though
thought from the space it occupied to be fifry};13 and ships fitted with
them are regarded as being in commission.l f Four were the regulation
number carried, a further two being added for a squadron sent in 325/4 to
suppress piracy in the Adriatic, 15 which suggests tha t two were rigged at a
time. ' Pieces' of them are listed. !" Bya happy chance the weight of four is
given in an inscription 17 and from that weight the length of one may be
roughly calculated, viz. 280-340 ft (85-108 m) , according to the type of
rope chosen - twice the length of a trieres, with a good deal to spare.
In Plato's Republic (616B-C) the narrator uses hypozomata to explain 'a
straight light' which Er, a soul , a temporary visitor to the region of the
dead, sees first in company with a party of souls of the dead 'from above
(anothen) stretched (tetamenon) across the whole heaven and [the flat cir-
cular] earth'. The straight light is said to be 'like a pillar but resembling
most of all a rainbow' which seen from above would look straight. The
party of souls then mo ves down to a position apparently under the light:
'Arrived at this light after a day's journey they saw there in the middle [i.e. a
point equidistant from each end] of this light, stretched (tetamena) from
heaven the ends of the bonds (desmoz) of it' (i.e, of the straight light). The
function of the str aight light is then explained: 'for th is light is the syndes-
mos of heaven like the hypozOmata of trierei s in that wayholding together the
whole circumfirence (hoion ta hypozomata ton trieriin, houtopasan synechon
ten periphoran) ; and from the ends [of the bonds of the straight light] is
hung the spindle of necessi ty'.
13 f G1 31 53: c.440-425 BC. 14 fG 221 627.29. 15 fG 221 629.11f.
16 f G 221610.26.
17 fG 2 2 1479 B 49 and 58. Since the date of the inscription is after 314/13 the
hypozoma t« could have been parr of the gear ofa 'four' or 'five'.
The reason why the comparison of hypoziimata is used to explain what

the party of souls is described as seeing will become clearer when an expla-
nation of the function of the hypozoma is considered, given by the poet
Apollonius of Rhodes in the Argonautika. He is describing the launching
of the Argo (1.367-9). 'The first thing they' [the Argonauts] 'did was to fit
the girdle to the ship with might and main, using a well-twisted rope
within to put a tension on each extremity, so that with the dowels the
planks should fit well together and withstand the opposing force of the
sea's surge.'
Apollonius came from a city and island famous for its maritime skills
and his succinct explanation is to be trusted. The purpose of the girdle or
loop was to pull bow and stern together and thus to prevent hogging as a
result of the loosening of the plank fastenings of the hull in a rough sea.
The girdle or loop must then have been passed round strong points at each
end of the ship and been pulled tight to hold the hull together in rough
water. The first fitting required 'might and main' and then the girdle was
tightened further by 'a well-twisted rope within'.
Apollonius does not go into details, with which his readers would be
familiar. But they are shown in Plato's picture of the 'straight light' in its
two stages. Firstly, seen from above the straight light stretches across the
heaven and earth as bypozomata stretch from end to end of triereis. From
the second position the ends of the bonds or bindings (desmor) of the
straight light/ bypozoma are seen stretched; and that is because this straight
light/ hypozoma is what holds together (is the syndesmos of) the circumfer-
ence/trieres hull. The reason given for the comparison of the straight light
with the bypozoma is that both are under tension to hold together in the
case of the light the circumference of the universe and in the case of
the hypozoma the hull timbers of the trieres. This tension in the case of the
ship, as Apollonius says, is produced at first in the fitting and then 'by a
well-twisted rope within' . This latter means is given in detail in Plato's
picture. The straight light/ bypozoma has bindings at a point equidistant
from either end. From the ends of the ropes binding the straight
light/ hypozoma is attached under tension (tetamenon) the spindle of neces-
sity. Plato 's description need be taken no further. The function of a spindle
is to twist the threads, usually ofwool, attached to the hook surmounting a
spinning whorl. In the rest of the picture it represents the revolving uni-
verse and the bypozoma comparison is abandoned. Taken with Apollonius'
Theships JI 171
'well-twisted rope' the spindle may be taken to represent a device which at

a point equidistant from each end of the girdle or loop increases, by twist-
ing additional binding ropes or braces, the fore and aft tension which the
fitters have been able to achieve; and which maintains it at the right level.18
Plato (Laws 945C) and the naval inventories;'? both in the fourth
century BC speak of braces (tonoi: entonoz) of bypozomata, and Plato
speaks of them as adding to the ship's seaworthiness, confirming Plato's
and Apollonius' explanation of the purpose of the girdle and of the use of
additional ropes to achieve it. Tonoi, entonoi are the most suitable technical
equivalents for the tensioned desmoi of Plato's picture in the Republic.
The name bypozoma 'undergirdle' suggests that the loops were fitted low
down in the ship as distinct from the Egyptian hogging truss mounted on
crutches over the deck.
Oars (kopai)20
A full-scale mock-up (figs. 2, 3) of part of the three-level oarsystem based

on the Lenormant Relief and the Talos vase was built by John Coates and
David Moss in the winter of 1982/3, successfully demonstrated at the
National Maritime Museum in April 1983, and subsequently improved by
some adjustments. The oars used were 4.2 m in length at all levels. The
mock-up was designed to combine a suitable hull shape and beam on the
waterline with the need for the tholes of each level of oars to be well out-
board of those in the level below. To achieve this it was necessary to set the
thalarnian tholes in carlings mounted on the inboard facings of hull
frames. This was made possible because the larger oarports used at the tha-
lamian level allowed the proper movements of the oar as it passed through
the hull shell. The existence of larger oarpons demands a compelling
reason for what would otherwise be an unnecessarily hazardous feature.
Such a compelling reason is provided by the need to set the thalamian
tholes a few inches inside the hull shell.
The oars used in the mock-up were of the naval pattern with blades
150 cm X 15 cm (pierced for pulling in a static structure alongside a pool),
18 See JSM (1955) for an early attempt to solve this baffiing problem.
19 IG2 21610.23, 1613.280-2, 1673.12.
20 The substance of this and the following sections appeared in JSM (1984b).
Loom
Thranite C3:=:========================:::=
Z ygian ( ==
Thalamian (
Metr es 0
=::::======================:::=
1 2 3 4
I , I
I
I
I
I , I
I
I
i
I
I I "
Cubit s 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
48. The oars of a trieres as originally reconstructed for Olympias.
and it appeared that the varied angles at which they were pulled required a
different-shaped blade in each category (fig. 48): i.e. where the angle was
largest a short broad blade, and where the angle was least a narrow long
one (similar to the oar actually being used in the mock-up) . It happens that
there is an inscription in the naval invenrories-' which records that 'the
inspector declares that of these thranite oars four are zygian'. As we have
seen, the difference between the thranite and zygian oars was not in length.
It could be either in the shape of the blade or in the nat ure of the loom.
Experience at Greenwich and at the Boat Show at Earl's Court in January
1984 where the mock-up was demonstrated again, suggested that the
former was likely.22
There are several representations of ships being pulled by oars at two
levels (figs. 25 and 26) which show no difference between the oars. These
pictures are not , however, carefully drawn. The earliest oars shown, in the
ships illustrated on late Geometric vases of the Dipylon group (760-735
BC),23 have triangular blades, a shape repeated in later pictures.r? Others
from the same century are spade-shaped-? or paddle-shaped. P' From the
sixth century there are a large number of Attic black-figure vases showing
warships with one or two levels of oars. These oars are depicted by an
incised line for the shaft and a broader brush-stroke for the blade. The only
carefully drawn manned oars appear at the end of the sixth and the begin-
ning of the fifth century on the well-known red-figure vase in the British
21 JG2 2 1604.56. See )SM 's note (1978) in reply to a query by M. Lucien Basch.
22 It is also possible that rhranite oars were different as having looms which were
heavier than the looms of the zygian and thalami an oars, since the need to
balance them would have been greater because they were pulled at a steeper
angle. 23 GOS pis. 3 and 4. 24 GOS pis. 8b and 22a.
25 GO S pIs. 7b and c. . 26 GOS pI. 7d.

Theships 11 173
Museum (fig. 47) depicting Odysseus and the Sirens. These oars have
short, broad spade-shaped blades , with round shoulders, apparently
spliced to the oar-shaft which tapers towards the outboard end. The
engraving on the Ficoroni bronze casket (end of the fourth century BC:
fig. 27) shows one of the Argonauts seated on the ground with an oar
across his thighs. The stock has a ball-shaped butt and appears to taper
rowards the blade which is long and thin and spliced to the stock. As far as
is known there are no further rep resentations of oar blades until the
Roman period, when the ships depicted are certainly pulled by oars
manned by more than one oarsman, e.g. the Palestrina relief in the Vatican
rnuseu m .V These oars are massive affairs shaped from a single timber and
growing gradually broader towards the outboard end, which is pointed. It
was thought that a composite oar made up of a tapering shaft and a short
broad blade spliced to it might conveniently have a blade of a different
shape according to the angle at which it was pulled, long and narrow for
the thalamian position, shorter and broader in differing degrees for the
zygian and rhranire. The blades for Olympias were initially formed in this
way (figs. 48 and 74a) but were subsequently modified in the light of expe-
rience to a more uniform teardrop shape (fig. 74b and see below, pp.
240- 1). The question of whether the three types of oar were indeed differ-
entiated by blade shape thus remains open.
Steering oars or rudders (pedalia)

There is a question as to whether triereis were steered by steering oars
which were moved from side to side or by rudders which turned on their
axes.28 It was suggested in GOS (pp. 291-2) that the tiller (oiax) was a con-
necting bar between the tops of the two steering oars or rudders which
were thus ganged for lateral movement, and a phrase in Plato, 'moving the
tiller in or out' was cited (Ale. I 117C-D) in support. This phrase could,
however, equally well be used of the movement of the handle of a tiller set
at right angles to each rudder in an arc either outward or inward. The func-
[ion of a tiller is to enable the helmsman to operate a rudder with greater
cont rol. A tiller attached to [he single steering oar or rudder with a pin is
17 First century BC: see J5M (1980b) pl, 27.

18 L. Th. Lehmann (1978) pp. 94-104.
49. Scene from an Attic black-figure volute krater painted by Cleitias

showing the stern half of a one-level oared warship, c. 570 BC.
shown in one of the earliest pictures of a Greek oared galley, the

Mycenaean ship, probably of 50 oars, since it has 25 thwarts, on the
Pylos-Tragana pyxis (fig. 19). This tiller could as well have been used to
turn the steering oar or rudder as to move it laterally. There are two very
carefully drawn pictures showing the stern of smaller oared vessels, one of
Theseus' ship on an Attic black-figure vase by Cleitias (fig. 49) and the
other on a fragment of a similar vase of the same date (fig. 50). The first
probably belongs to a triacontor and the second is closely similar. In both
cases the helmsman sits in a narrow stern seat with the ends of the steering
oars or rudders rising conveniently on either side. On the Cleitias vase the
'6ns'29 on their after edges suggest that they were rudders designed for
turning rather than for lateral movement. On the fragment, the tops of
these rudders are given ball-shaped 'caps'. John Coates has suggested that
these are more likely to be the ends of tillers than caps, the ends being
enlarged and rounded to embrace the shaft of the rudder. Pindar,
Aeschylus and Euripides, all of whom wrote in the heyday of trieres use,
speak consistently abour 'tu rn ing the steering oar or rudder', and it seems
very unlikely that they would have used that phrase if in the most com-
monly used ship of their time they knew that it was a steering oar moved
laterally. The conclusion is that what has commonly been called the steer-
ing oar was a rudder, turned on its axis, and controlled by a tiller. The sea
trials of Olympias have shown that sharp turns (anastrophaz) which are said
to be the mark of a well-trained ship (Thuc. 2.89.8) are possible with the
use of the rudders alone (below, p. 261).
29 The word for this 'fin' is pteryx, 'wing', which is recorded sometimes as 'broken' in
the naval invent ories (JG2 2 1607.74 cf. 1608.14-15).
The ships II 175
50. Attic black-figure fragment in the Acropolis Museum Athens showing the
stern of an oared warship, c. 570 BC.
Masts, sails and rigging

There are no extant representations of the trieres under sail, or even of one
with masts up. There are two masts for each ship recorded in the naval
inven tories-? - the main mast and the 'boat' mast. The position of both
must be guessed, but pictures of some later ships (e.g, fig. 51) can give some
clues. The main mast is probably stepped about amidships, and the boat
mast is probably raked and stepped forward. The height of neither is known.
There are similarly two sails, the main sail and the 'boat' sail. The main sail
was regularly left ashore before battle. P' There is no evidence for the size or
shape of these sails. It is reasonable to assume that they were rectangular, like
the sails of pentecontors and other ships depicted on sixth-century vases
30 1G2 2 1604 .23, cr. 48,50,60,66.

31 E.g. Xen , HG 2.1 .29: Lysander left his main sails on the promontory of
Lampsacus before the battle ofAegospotami, and Conon carried them off after it.
51. Roman oared ship on a mosaic from T hernetra, AD 225-250.
52. Attic black-figure cup show ing a penre conr or under sail, c. 500 BC.
(e.g. fig. 52). Two sorts of sails occur in the naval inventories, light and
heavy, and it seems th at the light ones were more expensive, possibly
reserved for specially fast ships. There was a yard, called in Gr eek keraia. It
was hauled up by halliards , wo rking through a tru ck probably of met al at the
top of the mast , clearly visible in vase-paintings ofsmaller ships (e.g. fig. 47 ).
Sails were brailed up to the yard when the ship was moving under oar but the
sails were kept ready for use (see again fig. 47) . Brailing ropes are also shown
(fig. 47 ) coming over the top of th e yard and led aft where they are belayed
near the helmsman. There are also braces attached to the outward end s of
the yard , and brought back aft . H erodorus (2.36.4) says th at while other
Theships 11 177
53a. Leaden rings used as fairleads for brailing ropes.
53b. Detail from an Attic black-figure jug showing the fittings through which
the brailing ropes passed over the yardarm, c. 500 BC.
peoples attach rings and kaloi to the far (i.e. forward) side of the sail, the
Egyptians attach them on the near (i.e. after) side. Kaloi must then be the
Greek word for the brailing ropes, and they must be carried over the yard
and down the forward side of the sail and attached at regular intervals to the
bottom edge of it. Some of these rings have been found with wrecks on the
sea-bed (fig. 53a). A vase-painting shows brailing ropes passing over the yard
through special fittings which look as if they were made of metal (fig. 53b).
It appears that these brailing ropes were not only used for shortening sail in
the normal way, but could be used to alter the size and shape of the sail in a
variety of ways. The height of the yard was also varied to suit the needs of
navigation.
Such is the information which can be extracted from the sources about
the means of navigation with triereis under sail. About the practice ofsuch
navigation virtually nothing is known.V Unfortunately, the crews of
Olympias have to date been able to carry out only very limited sailing trials
(below, pp. 256-9, 261-2).
32 See GOSpp. 312-13 .

10
THE M A T E R IA L S }
Wood for the planks of the hull

n Aristophanes' comedy the Knights, acted in Athens in 424 BC the
horus (1300- 10) tells a story. 'T he triereis came together for a meeting,
and one of them, rather older th an the others, got up and spoke':
'Maidens, are you nor aware of what is talked of in the city?2There is a man asking
ror a hundred of us for Carthage, a wicked, sour-temp ered man , H yperbolu s.' The
est of them thought it shocking and into lerable, and one, who had never been
near a man, exclaimed : 'Lord save us, he will never be my master. If it comes to
hat, I'd rather becom e an old ma id here and be eaten by ship- worm .' 'And he
von't be master of N ausiphanre, daughter ofNauson, either', said another, 'no, in
God's name, so long as I, like you , am built of pine (peuke) and joinery (xyla).'3
The 'pine and joinery' of which these two Athenian trierei s of the last
quarter of the fifth century are built are given a littl e more definition in the
literatu re of the next century. Plato, who depl ored the effects of a maritime
economy on a city's life, make s the Athenian stra nger in the Laws (705 C)
ask a que stion natural to an Ath enian: 'H ow is the environment of our
olon ial city off for ship-tim ber?', and gets the answer: 'T here is no fir
(elate) to speak of, nor pine (pe ukt) , and not much cypress; nor is much
larch (pitys) or plan e to be found , which shipwrights normally have to use
or th e inner parts of ships.' Theophrasrus, a younger contemporary of
Plato and a pupil ofAristotle, wrote an Enquiry into Plants in wh ich he says
a good deal about the timber used for building ships - trierei s in particular.
In one passage (5.7. 1- 5) he gives three principal sh ip-timbers - meaning,
like Plato , timbers for building th e hull. They are fir (elatt) , pin e (pe uk!)
I In this chapter JSM is constantl y indebted to Meiggs (1983), in particular

chapter 5. 2 This line is a quotation from Euripides.
3 The Bude transla tor rightly here gives 'bois charp ent e' for xyla.
179
and cedar (kedros). The last had now become more readily available fro-
Syria as a result ofAlexander's conquests. Theophrastus had earlier (5.1 .5
compared the fir an d the pine: ' T he latter is fleshier and has few fibr
while the former has many fibres and is not fleshy. That is why the pine '
heavy and the fir light.' The later passage continues: "Triereis and longshi
[i.e. oared ships] are made of fir for the sake of lightness, whereas rou -
ships [i. e. ships in which, not being oared, weight was not important] •
made of pine because it resists decay.' Elsewhere (5.4.4) he says that pi •
(peukt) is more liable to ship-worm (teredon) than fir, but presumably wh z
he means in the passage quoted is that, apart from fir, which no one wo u
think of using for round ships, peukeis more resistant to decay than oth -
woods.
Theophrasrus continues:
Some make triereis also of peuke [like the two in Aristophanes] because rh
cannot get fir (elate). In Syria and Phoenicia triereis are made of cedar becau
pine (peuke) also is in short supply. In Cyprus they use coastal pine (pitys) sine
this is indigenous and it has the reputation of being superior to their pine (peuke).
The rest of the hull [i.e. other than the keel, the planking] is made of these woo
bur the keel is made in the case of the trieres of oak to stand up to hauling ashore,
and in the case of merchantmen (hoLkades) [i. e. round ships which when no
under sail are towed rather than pulled and ride at anchor in port], of pine. If the
larter have to be hauled ashore a false keel of oak is fined. For smaller craft beec -
wood is used for the keel and in general the breastwork [of the bows] is made t
beech.
It may be noted here that the wood found in the Kyrenia ship (abo ve.
p. xx) was mostly pine, beech and oak. 4 An interesting point arises fro
these remarks ofTheophrastus. Peukewes, he says, second best timber fo
triereis because it was heavier. Yet two of Aristophanes' triereis hulls we r
made of peuke. It seems then possible that the timber used, elate or peuki;
may have had some bearing on the rating of triereis. For example, 'fast' rri-
ereis ma y have been made of elate.
The mention of oak prompts Theophrastus here to digress with an obse r-
vation. 'Oak-wood does not join well in a stopped joint to pine (peuke) or fi
(elate); for the one is of close and the other of open grain, the one has a con -
sistent texture, the other not. Things which are to be made into one piece
4 H . W Swiny in Colston Papers no. 23 p. 356.

The materials 181
should be of similar and not opposite character like wood and stone.' The
implication of this passage is that some stopping was used, as well as other
means, to join planks together edge to edge in the hull-structure but that
this stopping material was not found satisfactory in fixing the garboard
make of pine or fir to the rabbet of the keel which was made of oak. The
reason for the failure of the joint would probably be the differing movement
of timbers with changing moisture content. The method of joining the
planks will be considered later in this chapter (below, p. 182).
Wood for internal structure
From the timbers used in the hull Theophrastus passes to the' joinery'.
The word he appears to use for this is torneia, which is probably a textual
corru ption of enteroneia.' signifYing the 'woodwork', which Plato opposes
to the planking with the phrase 'the inner (entos) parts of ships' and
Theophrastus elsewhere calls the enkoilia of a ship, when he speaks of the
Egyptians using acantha (acacia) wood for this part in shipbuilding
(4.2.8):
In merchant ships the internal woodwork is made of mulberry or ash or elm or
plane since it must be cheap and tough. Plane wood is the worst, because it rots
quickly. Sometimes the internal parrs of triereis are made of coastal pine (pitys) as
well, because of its light weight. Bur the stempost, which adjoins the breastwork,
and the bow timbers are made ofash and mulberry and elm, since these parts have
ro be rough. This is about all there is to say about ship-timber.
Which is a pity because, as every builder ofwooden boats knows, there is a

great deal more to say. However, the emphasis on light weight for the
timber both for the hull and for the rest of a trieres is to be noted.
5 In Aristophanes, Knights 1183-5, Demus, a character representing the Athenian

people, is offered tripe (entera) . 'What shall I do with this tripe?' he asks; and the
reply comes 'The goddess (Arhena) sends it you as enteroneia for your rriereis',
i.e., as the lexicographers say, internal woodwork. Of torneia the word in fact pre-
served in the text ofTheophrasms A. F. Hort said: 'The word is perhaps corrupt:
one would expect the name of some part of the vessel', and, one might add, of
some part of the vessel opposed to the hull planking, which has just been
described. Enteroneia, as alternative to enkoilia, is just such a name, i.e. for the
frames, beams and the rest of the furniture (not ribs as GOS p. 279); cf. Latin
interamenta, Livy 28.45 .15.
Joints
Theophrastus then turns to woods used in house-building, but shortly
afterwards returns to ship-timber.
For carpentry rhe oldest wood is best, provided it is not rotten; for old wood is
suitable for craftsmen of all sorts. But for shipbuilding, because of the need for
bending, it is necessary to use sappier wood (though when it is a case of stopped
joints the drier the wood the better). The fact is that (hull) planking shows gaps
[between the planks] " when it is new, but when the ship is launched the planks
absorb? water, close up and are watertight, except in the case of timber which has
been completely dried out. In that condition planks do not make a closejoint, or
not as well as they would if the wood was not completely dried out.
The text of the foregoing passage is uncertain in places , but the general
meaning is clear. A number of interesting practices are attested: in the first
place, the bending of planks (instead of carving them) where possible to
bring them to the required curve; in the second place there seem to be two
ways in which watertight joints between the planks of the hull are
achieved: (1) by stopping of some kind and (2) by the selection of timber
which is dry enough to swell and make a completely watertight joint, but
not so dry that it will not take up water when immersed.
Vegetius also speaks about the use of green wood in shipbuilding, but
makes rather a different point (4.36). 'When ships which have been bu ilt
with green timber sweat out their moisture [i.e. in hot weather] they con-
tract and develop cracks. There is nothing more dangerous for sailors. '
Theophrastus was saying that when completely seasoned wood is used it
does not swell at all or not enough to close up the inevitable gaps between
hull planks in a new ship, so that it is better to use wood with a little mois -
ture left in it. Vegetius' point is that if completely green wood is used and
the wood is allowed to dry out (e.g. in the sun) the resulting cracks and
open seams could endanger the ship .
Method of construction
Study of the remains of ancient merchant-ships found on the sea-bed of
the Mediterranean, and of the timbers adhering to the ram discovered at
6 The reading of the manuscripts histatai, 'stands', makes no sense. Dihistatai,

'showsgaps', iswhat is required.
? The text translated is that of the Aldine edition.
The materials 183
Arhlit (p. 167), leaves no doubt that in those waters in antiquity ship-
wrighrs built their hulls from the keel up with planks joined to each other
edge to edge to form a shell. This method seems to be indicated by the verb
pegnunai (to fix together) , the root of which is embodied in the noun
naupigos, a shipwright." There is no detailed description of the process in
literature of the classical period, but the building of Odysseus' makeshift
boat as described by the eighth-century poet of the Odyssey (5.243-61) can
be recognised as true shipbuilding now that underwater archaeology has
shown us how ancient ships were built.
Calypso , having provided Odysseus with an axe and an adze, first told
him 'where tall trees grow, alder, poplar and lofty fit (elate), dry long ago,
well seasoned, which would float lightly in the water'. She left him to it,
and he quickly got on with the task ofcutting the planks .
He felled twenty [dead] trees in all, and adzed them with the bronze tool. He clev-
erly planed them and made them straight to the line. Then Calypso brought drills
and he dr illed them all and fitted them one to the other (harmozein). He ham-
mered the ship (together) with dowels (gomphoi)9 and mortice-and-tenon joints
(harmoniai ).IOAs broad a bottom (edaphos) as a man skilled in carpentry will
round out (tornousthai) for a wide merchantman, so broad a bottom did
Odysseus fashion for his wide boat.
The structural importance of the harmoniai is revealed later, when a

storm hits Odysseus' improvised ship, and he declares (5.361-2) 'as long
as the planks are held fast in the harmoniai so long will I stay aboard and
suffer the worst that comes'. These harmoniai are mortice-and-tenon
joints regularly found in excavated hulls in Greek waters from the
8 The root meaning of sticking something into something else is most appropriate
for the mortice-and-tenon method. The word is used of shipbuilding in, e.g.
Iliad2 .664 and Herodotus 5.83.
9 Aristotle gives the ways by which things can be joined together in his usual com-
prehensive manner (Physics 5.3, 227a): 'by gomphos or glue or contact or organic
union' and (Metaphysics 10.1, 1052a) : a thing is a whole either naturally or 'by
glue or gomphos or by tying together'. The words gomphos (noun) and gomphoun
(verb) are used in connection with shipbuilding and general carpentry, where
gomphos is a wooden dowel or tenon (in particular Hdr. 2.96). The Attic word for
it may have been tylos, since in the description of the naval preparations in the
dockyard in Arisrophanes, Acharnians552-3 there issaid to be 'a din of oarblades
fitting, tyloi hammering, etc.' .
10 In Aristophanes, Knights 532 harmonia appears to be a joint in a 'wooden' lyre
which gapes apart when the lyre is old and in disrepair.
bronze age onwards. The mortices were probably made by drilling, fin-
ished by chisel, and the tenons hammered home. The next plank was
then carefully marked and morticed correspondingly, to fit over the pro -
truding tenons, and driven home to make a close seam. Finally, each
.tenon was locked firmly in place by a pair of pegs. Holes were drilled for
rhe pegs through the plank and tenons, and the pegs hammered into
place from the inside of the plank. The poet of the Odyssey has named
the tools, axe, adze and drill, and described in general terms the process,
involving tenons (gomphoz), mortice-and-tenon joints (harmoniai) ,
hammering and fitting together, which we can now recognise as the
means and method which produced the hulls whose remains have been
found .
Stopping and caulking

There is no direct evidence about the stopping or caulking ofships' plank-
ing in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, and it is possible that shipwrights
relied on the slight swelling of planks on immersion to effect a tight joint.
There is nevertheless a certain amount of indirect evidence. Speaking of
Egyptian shipbuilding Herodotus says (2.96.2) that the Egyptians caulk
the joints between their short planks with papyrus from the inside. Since
he tends to make the point that the Egyptians do everything in just the
opposite way to the Greek practice, we may possibly infer that the Greeks
caulked their ships from the outside (as one might expect) and used flax as
opposed to papyrus which was the Egyptian alternative to the flax of the
Greeks and Phoenicians (see below, pp. 189-90). Pliny (NH 16.158)
speaks of the reed used by the Belgae for caulking their ships and says that
it is more adhesive than tar (gluten) and more reliable than pitch for filling
the seams between the planks (or possibly, cracks in the planks). Pliny
writes in rhe first century AD and provides no strong evidence for practice
in earlier Greek warships, but although the ships of the Belgae were built
to the north European pattern, he is contrasting them with the ships he
knew in the Mediterranean. If seams there were stopped with pitch some
fibre would have had to be soaked in pitch for it to be held in the seam
effectively. Only fibre soaked in pitch is analogous to the adhesive reed the
Belgae used.
There is a good deal of evidence for the existence of such a fibre in the
The materials 185
fi fth and fourth centuries BC, and it plays an important part in naval con-
texts. We should call it tow or oakum. In the Knights (129) 11 a seller of
sryppeion is mentioned, and in a fragment (696) ofAristophanes a contern-
orary, Eucrates, is given the nickname styppax. 12 In a speech of the next
entury ([Dem.] 47 .20) we read: 'It happened that there was a dispatch of
riereis and an emergency expedition speedily mobilised. There was not
enough gear in the dockyard ... What was more there was not available for
purchase in Piraeus a supply of sailcloth and styppeion and ropes, all of
which are needed for getting a trieres ready for sea.' In the fourth-century
navalinven roriesl'' styppeion again appears with cords in between askoi
(= askiimata: pp. 168-9) and timber for oars (kopeis). In another list
payment is made to a styppeioplokos (row-splicer') for splicing a rope
which had parted. Styppeion would then seem to be raw flax as opposed to
linon, an article made of flax. It appears in Herodorus and frequently later
(8.52, Xen. Cyr. 7.5.23, Aen . 33,35, Diod. 14.51.2) as an incendiary
material used in sieges for defence and attack, often in association with
pitch. Styppeion could also describe old rope material. 14
To be classed with sailcloth and ropes styppeion was clearly an important
naval commodity. After the earthquake at Rhodes in 224 BC Prolerny
promised (Polybius 5.89) the Rhodians, among other things, timber for
the construction of ten 'fives' and ten triereis, 40,000 cubits of squared
pine planking, 3,000 talents of coined bronze, 3,000 talents of styppeion,
and 3,000 pieces of sailcloth (e.g. 130 pieces for each trieres, 170 for each
penteres).
The seams of newly built warships and of older ships undergoing main-
tenance may have been caulked with flax soaked in pitch. There is also a
possibility that a substance was inserted between the planks during the
process of construction - resin (pine tar) or, again, pitch. However, the
planks of warships were thin and there was very little depth of seam
outside tenons into which to drive caulking. The apparent absence of any
caulking in the wrecks yet found may well be true evidence of its actual
absence. Of stopping and bedding compositions made of tar, pitch, lime ,
11 ef.1G 2 1570.24 and 1572.8.

12 The termination -axis colloquial, like thalamaxfor thalamios{p. 136).
u 1G2 1629.1151- 2; 1631.336.
14 As its occurrence with cords in the inventories shows.
hair and no doubt much else there is much evidence in the seams ofwrecks
as well as under hull timbers. There is no doubt that the outside of the hull
of oared ships was coated with pitch, as we shall see below.
Theophrastus (9.2) speaks of the methods used to obtain pitch an
resin from trees: elate, terebinrh, pitys, Phoenician cedar and peuke. These
substances appear to have been imported into Greece from Macedonia,
Asia Minor, and Syria. Bitumen (asphalton) is known to Herodotus
(1.179.2) as used with bricks in building Babylon; the fifth-century author
of Airs, ~ters, Places speaks (7.50) of it as being collected from springs
and Herodotus (6.119) mentions a well near Sardis which produce
bitumen, salt and oil. It is sometimes said 15 that the Greeks and Romans
like the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, 16 used bitumen on the hulls of thei r
ship s, but there appears to be no evidence for this practice in Greece of the
fifth and fourth centuries.
The principal enemy of wooden-hulled ships in Mediterranean waters
was ship-worm. Merchant-ships were as a rule lead-sheathed, but the
weight of the lead in vessels constructed for maximum lightness and the
practice of hauling ashore made lead sheathing highly undesirable for
oared warships. The maiden trieres in Aristophanes resigned herself to a
worm-eaten old age. Theophrastus remarks (5.4.4) that peukewas more
liable to the teredim than elate, and that the harm done to a ship's planks by
the skolex and thrips is easy to cure , for when the ship has been smeare d
with pitch and immersed it is watertight, but that the damage done by the
teredon is impossible to repair. That may have been true, but caulking of
worm-holes during the regular process of maintenance, and a coating of
pitch, would have gone some way to remed ying the effects of terMon on
the hull provided that the planking was not too much weakened. Items of
wooden gear in the inventories are frequently labelled 'worm-eaten'.
Coating with pitch, etc.

The most common epithet for ships in Homer after 'swift' is 'black'. It is rea-
sonable to assume that the blackness is the result of the application of pitch.
15 E.g. by R. J. Forbes (1936) p. 87.

16 E.g. the Gilgamesh epic 117 where Utnapishtim coats his ship inside and Out
with bitumen.
The materials 187
It was certainly also used on Athenian triereis III the fifth century. In
Aristophanes' play the Acharnians ( 190) an envoy comes back from Sparta
with a five-year truce , but the hero Dicaeopolis, who is keen to end the war,
does not like it because 'it smells of pitch and naval preparations'. It seems
that ships preparing for an expedition were given a coat of pitch. Pitch was
on the contraband list and export of it was forbidden in the war
(Aristophanes, Frogs 364). In the next century an inscription of 330 BC l 7
lists four items in a miscellaneous inventory of naval stores: 'hypaloiphe [i.e.
substance for application to a ship's bottom] in a cask, black; another kind,
in an amphora, black; another kind, white, in a cask; in two amphoras,
white'. The black substance is likely to be pitch of two varieties. The white is
likely to be resin, probably mixed with lime. When Theophrastus speaks
about the extraction of resin from trees (9.2), he says that some is 'most
pitch-like' and another kind of pitch is 'whiter'. Indeed the names resin and
pitch seem to be coterminous, with the blacker sort being called pitch and
the 'whiter' called resin. Plutarch (Mor. 676A) confirms this, and shows that
both were used on ships' hulls to make them watertight: 'The pitys and
kindred trees, peukai and strobiloi, produce the wood most suitable for ship-
building, and the pitch and resin paint (aloiphe) without which shipwright's
work is useless in salt water.' The words rendered 'shipwright's work' (ta
sumpagenta) suggest the edge-to-edge method of hull-building with pegged
mortice-and-tenon joints, and Plutarch's words do not rule out the possib-
ility that resin was used between the planks as a kind of stopping. If that
were to be so the white bottom paint (hypaloiphe) of the inscription could
be wax, for which there is some evidence in this connection. Hipponax
(fr. 46 DiehJ3), in the middle of the seventh century, speaks of a trieres' keel
being waxed. The purpose of this treatment could be to make watertight the
seam between the keel and the garboard strake, often a main source of
leakage. Applied to the underside of the keel, particularly, it could have been
a lubricant to facilitate slipping and hauling up in a ship-shed. There is
however some further evidence for wax on a ship's bottom, where applied
over the wetted surface of the hull it would reduce skin-friction and thereby
17 JG2 l 1627.313. Cf also 1622.740 where it occurs in a list of gear for a ship, the
Amphitrite ihypozomata, anchors , oars, ladders, poles), with the suggestion that it
was carried on board for use when the ship was hauled up for regular mainte-
nance when in commission.
the chief element in the ship's resistance as she moved through the wate .
Pliny (NH 16.56) speaks of pitch being produced from various trees an
extracted by heat from a pitch pine (taeda) for the protection of warships;
and then he adds: 'We must not omit the fact that among the Greeks there is
a stuff, pitch mixed with wax,18 scraped off seagoing vessels, which is called
zopissa (since experience of life teaches us everything) and is much mor e
effective for all the purposes for which pitches and resins are useful, presum-
ably because the hardness of salt has been added.' This curious piece 0
information suggests that pitch and wax were customarily applied, either
successively or as a mixture, to the wetted surface of a ship's hull.
Materials for gear

We may now rum to what may be said about the material for the two kinds
ofship's gear: 'wooden' and 'hanging'. Theophrastus (4.1.2) has something
to say about the wood used for the sailyard, mast and oars.
Masts andyards
At a place in Arcadia the elataiand peukai are superior in height and girth, bur the
wood is nor similarly dense or fine, rather the reverse, like pines that grow in shady
places. These are not accordingly used for expensive work, such as doors, bur
rather for shipbuilding and house-construction. They provide the best roof beams
and timbers, and sailyards, and again particularly tall, bur nor equally strong,
masts. And sunny situations produce masts which, while being shorter, are of
denser wood and stronger.
Elsewhere (5.1.7) he says that the best sailyards and masts come from the
elate, 'which is both the tallest and the straightest growing of trees', while
Pliny (NH 16.195) says that the fir is preferred for these items of gear
because of its lightweight.
Oars
Oars were a vital parr of a trieres' gear. Each oar-shaft was made from a
young fir-tree, very carefully prepared. Theophrastus (5.1.6-7) says: 'The
fir has many skins like the onion. Underneath the visible skin there is
18 This stuff is used in medicine. See Hippocrates, OnJoints 62.20, and 63.20 wax
treated with resin, also Dioscorides 1.72.
The materials 189
always another, and the wood is composed of these skins. For that reason
oar-makers (lit. 'shavers'!") do their best to remove the skins one by one
evenly. By so doing they make the shaft strong, but if they deviate and take
them off unevenly the shaft is weak.' As Meiggs points out, the naval
inventories at Athens show how carefully the oars were inspected for faults,
and those which were sub-standard were rejected. The procurement of
suitable oar-timber was important to Athens. Thrace, in which she had a
continuing interest throughout the period of her naval ascendancy, is
noted by Herodotus (5.23.2) as 'having much ship-timber and many oar-
shafts and silver mines'; and Perdiccas, the king of Macedon, signed a
treaty with Athens, probably during the Peloponnesian War, engaging
himself to export Macedonian oar-timber to Athens alone. i" A little later
Andocides (2.11) curried favour with the Athenian democrats in the fleet
at Samos by using his friendship with the king of Macedon to secure oar-
timber for them. The oar-shafts, prepared from rough young trees, had to
be equipped with a blade, perhaps, as we have seen (pp. 171-3), ofa differ-
ent shape for each of the classes of oarsmen. The process of fitting the
blades seems to be mentioned in a passage of Aristophanes (Acharnians
552-3: n. 9 above) which describes how when a fleet was preparing to put
to sea the dockyard was full of a great variety of noises. Among these was
the noise of oar-shafts being given blades (kopeon platoumenont, either by
carving the ends or by splicing on a separate blade (see above, p. 173).
Ropes and sails

The main 'hanging gear' consists of a great variety of ropes" and the sails.
Information about the material used for ropes in the fifth century comes
from Herodotus' account (7.25, 34, 36.3) ofXerxes' famous bridge across
the Hellespont for the invading army in 480. 'He prepared ropes for two
bridges, of papyrus and white flax, giving the task (of making them) to the
Phoenicians and Egyptians. The former made the bridge of white flax and
the latter the one of papyrus.' These first bridges were carried away in a
storm. The second pair of bridges was reinforced with boats and the kinds
of rope were mixed. Each bridge had two ropes of white flax and four of
papyrus hauled taut by wooden 'donkeys'. The two kinds of rope were
19 An inscription relating to Cos (SIC 1000.18) speaks of 'oar-shavers '.

20 IC 13 89.31 (440-415 BC). 21 For these in detail see COS pp . 299-301 .
equally thick and handsome in appearance, bur those of white flax were
heavier in proportion, each weighing one talent for a cubit. The fact that
there were twice as many ropes made of papyrus as made of flax may be an
indication of their relative reliability. There is some evidence from
Euripides/? that ropes were made offlax in Athens in the later fifth century.
The same two materials, flax and papyrus, were alternatives for sails as
well as for ropes. Theophrastus says (4.8.4) that sails were made of papyrus
in Egypt , and in the previous century a comic poet (Hermippus fr. 63
DiehP) speaks of sails and papyrus coming from Egypt, although
Euripides (Hecuba 1081-2) calls a sail a 'cloth of yellow flax'. It is to be
inferred from what Herodotus says about the relative weight of flaxen and
papyrus ropes that sails made of papyrus were also lighter. The naval
inventories'v show that a trieres had two suits of sails, one of which was
light. It seems reasonable to think that these were made of papyrus. Flaxen
articles, i.e. ropes and sails, were on the contraband list at the end of the
fifth century, like leather oar-sleeves and pitch (Aristophanes, Frogs 364) .
In the third century BC material for the ropes made for a ship built for
Hiero of Syracuse consisted of leukaia, a variety of esparto grass, from
Spain, and hemp (kannabis) and pitch from the Rhone (Athenaeus
5.40.206). These fibres were presumably more readily available in
Syracuse than the flax and papyrus which were the alternative materials for
ropes, as they were for sails in the eastern Mediterranean.
22 Euripides , Trojan WOmen 537-8 'with swifters of woven flax', IT 1043 where
mooring ropes are called 'bridles of flax'.
23 IG2 2 1627 .65, 1629 .371, 1631.415-17. There is a suggestion thatlight sails are
more valuable.
11
THE RECONSTRUCTION
FUNDAMENTALS OF DESIGN
A reconstruction of an original whose design and whose techniques for

building, operation and maintenance have been lost has to be redesigned.
That is a process of deduction, calculation and spatial organisation utterly
different from the slow step-by-step process by which the original was
developed over a time-span running to decades, even centuries. Our better
knowledge today of the laws of physics, of mathematics and of the proper-
ties of materials enables us to design a ship, for example, with a degree of
discrimination and choice as to what we create which was almost totally
denied to the ancients. However, our ability to design at will devices of
practical use in wide variety does little, of itself, to help us to work back to
deduce the 'design' of ancient artefacts. 'Design' is here given inverted
commas because most ancient artefacts were not and could not have been
'designed' in the sense in which we use the word today. 'Design' here means
only the description or definition of the thing. What our present knowl-
edge enables us to do is to explore the physical consequences of surviving
evidence in the sure knowledge that the natural laws have not changed.
In many cases this exploration may not succeed in discriminating
between the physical feasibility of different 'designs', and so may fail in
identifying the most likely actual design of an object in the past. Failure is
more probable in the case of objects whose manufacture and use were
comfortably within the limits of possibility, allowing scope for custom,
fashion or irrational preference in the design. However, in the case of arte-
facts near the edge of practicability physical constraints bore heavily upon
their design and there is less room for choice.
It has become evident in the course of the book that the trieres was an
ancient artefact pushed to the limit of what was technically possible at the
time. Exploring the physical consequences of the evidence about the ships
revealed their design to be as intricate and interlocking in quality, though
not of course in scope, as that of modern warships.
Fundamentals of ship design

The first step towards retrieving th e design must be to marshal the ancien
evidence, and thi s task has been done in the previous chapters. This evi-
dence is the equivalent of the requirements for a ship which a naval arch i-
tect sets out to satisfy, The next step is to co nsider particularly those p ieces
of evid en ce affecting the fundam entals of the vessel which are m uch the
same in an y sh ip, viz.
1. Accommodation of what must go in or on the hull.

2. Propulsion, power and speed.
3. W'eightand waterline.
4. Centre o/ gravity and stability.
5. Strength.
6. Feasibility of building.
None of these is independent of the others: indeed it will be seen that the y
interact strongly in the trieres. However, some pieces of evidence may be
regarded as primary determinants of one or more of the above fundamen-
tals, as follows:
Fundamental requirement Determined by

1. Accommodation Spacing of oarsmen, number of
fore-and-aft files and of men in each.
Length of oars , number of men to
each oar. Representations. Ship-
sheds. Outrigger. Position of
thalarnians.
2. Propulsion Ship-sheds. Outrigger. Build of
ancient ships. Sustainable speeds.
3. W'eightand waterline Ship-sheds. Outrigger. Build of
ancient ships. Number of crew.
Floating when holed. Number of
men required to haul ship up slip .
4. Centre 0/gravity and stability Ship-sheds. Outrigger. Size of
thalarnian pons. Floating when
holed. Build of ancient ships.
Askomata. Masts and sails .
The reconstruction:fundamentals ofdesign 193
5. Strength Build ofancient ships. Length .
Representations. Hypozdmata. Long
timbers.
6. Feasibiliryofbuilding Build ofancient ships. Athlit ram.
Because the size of the trieres is for us virtually determined by the
number and arrangement of oarsmen, and by the size of the ship-sheds
(though ofcourse in evolution the reverse was the case), it was the arrange-
ment of oarsmen that had to be settled first, sufficiently at least for their
arrangement to be a basis for designing the ship as a whole. In doing this,
interactions between design fundamentals immediately arose: attested
speeds demanded an arrangement with a high oar-gearing of about three
(see Glossary) as in most fast-pulling sea-boats like gigs: likely available
power required that the wetted area of the bottom be small and so there
must be minimum beam on the waterline and minimum displacement.
From that it followed that the height of the centre ofgravity would be crit-
ical in achieving adequate stability without ballast. The high oar-gearing
with oars of given length led to short looms , which did much towards
enabling oarsmen to be closely arranged vertically and thus to lowering the
cent re of gravity of the ship. The normal method of ship-building in the
ancient Mediterranean, as demonstrated by recent underwater archaeo-
logical work, required a ship of the fourth century BC to have a wineglass-
shaped midsection. After much calculation and drawing, it turned out that
a hull ofoverall beam fitting the ship-sheds and of that shape (fig. 54) with
convex flaring sides and outriggers would
(a) house transversely without waste ofspace three files ofoarsmen on
each side tightly but workably packed by placing each man out-
board of, and in height overlapping, the one below, provided that
thalamian tholes were set inboard and their ports enlarged (as
indeed they appear to have been) to allow oar movement;
(b) house longitudinally the required numbers of oarsmen in each file
in a fine enough hull of overall length close to the dry length of the
slips, provided that the hull had a parallel middle body (fig. 55)
and a large prismatic coefficient (see Glossary);
(c) provide sufficient displacement volume to float the total weight of
the ship at the right waterline;
(d) have sufficient beam on the waterline to provide on that displace-
I
I
Gangway
~
Metacentre
!
I
~I I
~I li
i\o.~ I Working room I~
&I r- ~r~~I~s_a~~t~:d-W~~S-- - - -- ; 11 Cfl
Athenian measure-cubits and feet Slipway Metres :
o '2 3 4 :5 6 I 0
~ __ "
~ _ _
I
----'--_ _--..J 3,
023
54. Reconstructed ship: mid-section, December 1981.
Cross-sections of hull and

plan of waterline and gunwale
21 20 19 18 17 16 15 7 6 5 4 3 2
Length contracted 5 times
55 . Reconstructed ship: lines of hull form No. 3, December 1981.

The reconstruction.fundamentalsofdesign 195
rnent adequate stability for sailing across a wind ofabout 15 knots,
i.e. a rnetacentric height (see Glossary) of 0.5 to 0.7 metres.
Thus all the evidence about the trieres could be satisfied by a design of
hull and an arrangement of oarsmen in which physical considerations of
hydrostatics, fluid mechanics, physiology and properties of materials,
acting together, fix the beam on the waterline very closely, and the height
of the centre of gravity, the weight, and the hull form within fairly tight
limits. It follows that any physically satisfactory reconstruction of a trieres
conforming to the same evidence would have much the same values for
these leading features . All are interlocked so that any other fundamentally
different solution is difficult to imagine.
Speeds attested in antiquity seem only just attainable, so that any increase
in weight or wetted area is out of the question. The centre of gravity could
not be any lower without reducing the height of thalamian tholes above the
water and thus rendering performance too sensitive to waves, heel or rolling.
If the centre of gravity were higher the beam would have had to be increased
to restore stability and that would have demanded either thalamian pons
too large to fit between the necessary top timbers of the hull , or greater beam
overall, too large for the sheds. If the prismatic coefficient were reduced to
lessen wave resistance, without increasing the length, the foremost and aft-
ermost thalamian oarsmen, despite short oars, could not have fitted inside
the hull. If that coefficient were increased , wave resistance at high speeds
would have risen to make it unlikely that the reconstructed ship could attain
the attested speeds. Length could have been increased by a metre or two
with possible gain at high speed but at a penalty at more usual speeds (below,
p. 269). The ram would then have overhung the water unless the ship-sheds'
dry length was longer than presently thought.
The complete design

It was at this point in the exploration of the design of the trieres that it
seemed worth developing the design of the whole ship. If all essential fea-
tures could be determined, the puzzle of the trieres might be solved. But
before designing individual features , we had to investigate the remaining
more intangible fundamentals of structural strength and feasibility of
building.
It had become obvious that the trieres hull was very shallow for its
length and that longitudinal bending strength might be critical, particu-
larly as the hull was not decked in the normal sense. Although triereis
operated in coastal waters and normally had no need to ride out rough
weather, they would nevertheless have been subjected to some bending by
waves. With a depth of hull, keel to topwale, ofonly 2.1 m (at that stage of
the design), the length on the waterline (LWL) of 34 m was sixteen times
the depth. That figure is more than one-and-a-half times the largest value
admitted by the rules of Lloyds Register for wooden ship construction in
the last century, even though those ships would have been strapped with
iron. But Lloyd's were concerned with ocean-going ships which, like all
flush-planked ships since about AD 1000, were frame-built and without
the benefit of having their shell planks tenoned together edge-to-edge to
form a true shell in the engineering sense.
Calculations of the shear forces and bending moments generated when
the hull was balanced on the crest of a wave oflength equal to the LWL and
whose height from trough to crest was ~o of its length, indicated a
maximum bending moment in hogging of about 1300 kN m. Such waves
could well be met in the Aegean Sea, and they would demand that the keel
and topwales carry stresses about 50% greater than acceptable. Actually a
trieres would probably be swamped by such waves and a sea with waves a
little more than half as high, 0.85 m from trough to crest, would be about
as much as a trieres could be expected to survive without being overcome.
The hull should therefore be strong enough to withstand such waves with
certainty. That would require the hull to carry shear forces up to 90 kN
and bending moments amidships of about 900 kN m. However, bending
stresses would still be too high, and here the necessity for hypoziimata
(above, pp. 169-71) becomes apparent.
The position and rigging of hypozomata have been a particular mystery in
triereis, but it is virtually certain that their purpose was to reduce bending
stresses which would otherwise damage the hull. These would be the tensile
stresses tending to open butt joints in the hull rather than the compressive
actions which would keep them closed. To protect the hull structure against
breaking its back by hogging, the hypozomata should be stretched between
points forward and aft high in the hull section where they would act like a
hogging truss. Conversely, to protect against bending in the opposite direc-
tion, sagging, they should be low in the hull. Curiously, it was the develop-
The reconstructions fundamentals ofdesign 197
rnen t of the underwarer profile of the srern that decided where the
bypoz omata w et« to be rigged in the reconstructed ship.
Until that stage of rhe design the stern of the Phoenician ship found off
Marsala (above, p. xx) had been adopred for the reconstructed ship. In that
srern the straight keel ends well afr and the srern rhen rises ar quire a sreep
angle. When launched from a slip such a ship would hinge, when the bow
lifred to the buoyancy, about a point necessarily quire far afr, causing a
large sagging bending moment made worse by such a sreep declivity as I in
ID. In the reconstrucred ship that moment would have been as big as the
hogging moment on a 0.85 m wave, but more to be avoided because it
would open joints below warer. Wirh such a srern the besr place for the
byp oz omata would, on balance, be low in the hull. However, one of the
resulrs of the Advisory Discussion (see above, pp. xviii-xxi) was to casr
doubr on the validity of the Marsala srern for the trieres. Apart from the
heavy sagging at launch, the warerlines of that srern were really too full for
[he fasr trieres.' It was also scarcely the right shape for backing on to
beaches, and the long straight keel would have grearly impeded the quick
urning so important in a vessel whose principal weapon was [he ram.
We rherefore changed the srern to one with a longer and more genrly
sloping afrer-keel. The hinge point on the slip was moved forward by rhis
change of srern shape far enough to reduce the sagging at launch to insig-
nificance. Hogging rhen became the most severe bending condirion (as ir
usually is in ships), and the proper place for the bypozomata became high
in the hull section. In that position they were much easier to rig and
tighten by twisting. Simple and safe anchorages forward and aft to carry
the tension in the hypoziimata, which could be equal to more than half the
weight of the ship, could also be more easily arranged.
The keel was made deeper' and , following the structure of the Kyrenia
ship (see above, p. xx and fig. 5), the lower three strakes were made heavier
to accord berrer wirh the pracrice of the time. Thar had the advantage of
sriffen ing the hull section as a whole and making the keel into a more sub-
stantial girder on the middle line to distribute local loads from slips and
beaches and increase the Hexural stability of the whole bottom in hogging.
I Frost (1973) p. 40. In writing of the remains of the stern, Honor Frost observes
that 'the lines of the ship widened abruptly after [sic] this extremity'.
z ]FC and McGrail (I984) p. 35. On the advice of Richard Steffy.
M.L.
I
,
~M
I
I
-@)
Hypozomata
I
I
Waterline
Metres ~_-'--_-'-_~_--'2,
56. Reconstructed ship: mid-section , October 1983.
The midship arrangement had by the end of 1983 assumed its final form
as shown in fig. 56. It is compared with the Lenormant Reliefin fig. 57 (see
also Appendix 11).
On evidence' of the use oflong timber in building warships, butt joints
in longitudinal timbers were avoided amidships near keel and topwales,
where bending stresses would be high when the reconstruction was in
waves. This measure contributed greatly to the stiffness and longevity of
the reconstruction. The hypoziimata were, after resolving the shape of the
stern , to be placed about 0.5 m above the neutral axis of bending of the
hull section. If they were to carry a total fore-and-aft tension of 300 kN ,
hogging bending stresses would be, as maxima, about half the largest
allowable working stress (5.5 Nzrnrrr') for pine structures in tension and
near to the corresponding compressive stress in the garboard strake.
Without the hypozomata the topwale stress would be one-third greater,
while those in the keel would fall by about one-fifth.
3 Mainly from Meiggs (1983) .

The reconstruction.fundamentals ofdesign 199
Lenormant Reconstruction
t=(])
~ --t-
I I
! I
=======---
Llg
o ht
waterl ine
--
~
oI Metres 2
, I , , I I
57. Comparison of the reconstructed ship with the Lenormam Relief.
An important additional advantage of hypozomata and similar devices in

wooden ships and boats built with mechanical joints between their shell
planks arises from preventing stress reversals, from tensile to compressive
and vice versa, except in fairly extreme conditions which occur relatively
rarely, thus reduc ing working at joints and therefore leakage.
Building feasibility
This design fundamental is ofa different nature from the others. It has two
aspects: the feasibility of building such an intricate and sophisticated ship
in fifth- and fourth-century BC Greece, and the feasibility of building it
today.
Greek building of all kinds at that time shows a high degree of sophisti-
cation and craftsmanship, and the wrecks that have been examined show
that shipbuilding was no exception. The fact that triereis, wooden ships
lightly built and roughly used, lasted as long as twenty years" indicates the
highest standards of care and accuracy in building and maintenance.
The feasibility of building a trieres today raised some doubts and had to
be proved at some expense. Besides much calculation and design, tests and
trials of several kinds were needed. Together they amounted to a research
and development programme costing over 10% of the cost of building the
ship herself.
The mock-up
The arrangement of the oarsmen, originally demonstrated by Sinclair
Morrison about forty years ago with a small working model, had to be
modified and proved at full scale with live oarsmen. That required a mock-
up (fig. 2), already described, which not only served that purpose but also
enabled the experience of working the oars to suggest an important
improvement in placing the thranites, canted at an angle to the middle line
of the ship, and more nearly alongside (though higher than) the zygians.5
Model of the ship

While the mock-up was being built, a model of the whole ship was made
in a simple style to 1/25 scale by Norman Gundry (fig. 2) to give a general
idea of the proposed reconstruction and to stimulate discussion of its main
features and proportions. That model played an essential part in demon-
strating the unsuitability of the Marsala stern, and it was later given the
new stern.
4 Casson (1971) p. 90.

S The heels of the thranites were thus able [Q occupy the spaces berween the enve-
lopes swept our by the looms of the zygian oars. By that means the thranites could
be lowered by 0.2 m and the angle of their oars [Q the water reduced by nearly 5°,
greatly easing their inboard wrists at the finish of the stroke. The centre of gravity
of the ship was also lowered by about 0.05 m. The arrangement of the oarsmen
that was finally adopted would certainly not have been achieved without the
working mock-up and its exposure [Q criticism at the Advisory Discussion. At a
cost of £500 for materials and of about rwo man-months oflabour, the mock-up
was of great value to the project.
The reconstructiontjundamentals ofdesign 201
Stern planking
In the early stages of the project the run of planking at the stern below the
lower wale as well as at the bow was a puzzle. Eric McKee, an expert on
shell building in the northern tradition, whom we had asked to advise on
planking, made a 1120 scale model before the Advisory Discussion . After
his sudden death, that work was continued with models of the stern to
ensure that planking the final shape was practicable. These models, by
lames Paffett, also helped the builder to reproduce on a full scale the
upswept stern unfamiliar to shipwrights for centuries.
Tank test of hull form

In collaboration with the Hellenic Navy, a model of the finally adopted
underwater hull form was made in Greece and towed in the ship-model
tank of the Technical University ofAthens to find its wave resistance. This
step was advisable because the form combined slimness with high pris-
matic coefficient to such a degree as to put it outside the range of forms for
which data are available. These experiments ensured that the proposed
hull would not be too bluffat the ends to achieve attested speeds, a princi-
pal aim of the project. The final lines are shown in fig. 58.
Material of tenons
The appreciable bending stresses expected in the reconstructed ship will be
accompanied by high shearing forces in the shell and therefore in the
tenons joining the planks together. In the round Kyrenia ship, 14 m long,
tenons were only 6 mm thick, pitched at intervals ofabout 150 mm. In the
Marsala longship they were 9 mm thick , pitched 100 mm, reflecting
heavier stresses in the longer and more slender hull. In the trieres, tenons
pitched 90 mm would in some pans of the shell be subjected to shearing
loads acting on their sides ofabout 2.5 kN . Would tenons of the same size
as those in the Marsala ship be sufficient in a trieres?
This question could not be answered without experiments. Norman
Gundry stepped in again to make a test piece in which the tenons were of
boxwood and , following the Marsala ship, 9 mm thick. Under load they
began to crush appreciably at about 1 kN per tenon, less than half the
'9
Cross-sections
17 of hull and
1-_ _ ''''1' contracted prof ile
13
21
Longitudinal
Scales Transverse ve~rrt;jC~a~I.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
: ~
and 0
58. Reconstructed ship: final lines ofhull.
maximum expected load on tenons in the trieres. When dismantled, the

tenons looked as though someone had tried to cut them in half with a
gigantic pair of blunt shears. It was remarkable that the end-grain at the
mouths of the mortices in the Douglas Fir planks had scarcely crushed at
all. This test seemed to reveal the likelihood of leakage in long and slender
ships of the ancient Mediterranean. Here also, however, was a dilemma
about authenticity.
We had tested tenons as thick, relative to shell planking, as any yet
found by archaeologists - in the only discovered wreck of a longship.
Those tested were made of the most resistant wood to crushing across the
grain available in the Mediterranean area and known to have been used for
such tenons. We may have exposed the reason for the structural limits to
which longships were developed.
The reconstruction :fundamentals ofdesign 203
59. Reconstructed ship: second test of tenons. The four tenons of the test
piece are loaded in shear by pulling in the directions of the two arrows.
The test piece is shown here after being subjected to loads rising to 4.3
kN, at which load the tenons had crushed to allow a slip between the
planks of about 1 mm. The upper plank has here been separated to reveal
two greenheart tenons with holes to receive oak pegs.
It was decided that for the sake of the longevity of the reconstruction
and to promote confidence in her operation at sea, we would depart from
the evidence in the dimensions and the material of such tenons as have
been found in wrecks excavated to date. There is no direct evidence about
the dimensions of tenons in trieres. We decided to increase their thickness
to one-third of the plank thickness and to employ woods hard enough
across the grain at least to match the end-grain strength of the plank. We
chose to use either Greenheart (Ocotea rodiaeii, or, even better, American
Live Oak ( Quercus virginiana) which would be harder as well as more akin
to the Mediterranean Turkey Oak (Quercus cerris), which was used by the
ancients for making tenons for ships. In making this decision we took into
account present-day unfamiliarity with the old leaky wooden ships and the
servitude ofsailors to bail and pump.
In a second test, of Greenheart tenons 12 mm thick (fig. 59), crush set in
at a load per tenon of about 2 kN, a much more adequate figure, and it
appeared that the end-grain strength of the plank had been matched. This
test also showed that the oak pegs locking the tenons in place should be
stronger, so they were increased in diameter from 8 mm to 12 mm. Leon
Neel of Georgia, USA, very kindly supplied Live Oak for tenons, so that
the shell seams of the ship should be as stiff under shear loading as the plank
timber allowed with the tenon type of joint. provided that the builder suc-
ceeded in achieving a tight and even fit of tenons in their mortices.
The trial piece

The largest feasibiliry question ofall was whether people today could build
a trieres hull to the necessary specification, and it called for the project's
most costly preparatory step. A trial piece of hull was built (figs. 7 and 8),
5.5 m long and just over half the hull in breadth, to the specification of the
ship herself. To elicit as many building problems as possible, a difficult pan
of the hull was chosen, including the scarf berween the straight and the
rising stern keel, the ends of the garboard and second strakes and an area of
shell where all planks are curved. The aim was to find, and then be better
able to avoid, snags that would hold up the construction and add to the
cost of building the ship . A long and light wooden ship would be liable to
warp out ofshape ifleft for long in an incomplete and unbraced state.
Ram
The timber structure of the ram, shown by the remains found at Arhlit" to
have been intricate and well made, was designed on the evidence of those
remains to join on to the hull proper. Authenticity had to be combined
with practicality and strength. To prove the design of that part of the
reconstruction, Norman Gundry made a Y5 scale model including the
forward end of the hull shell (fig. 60). That model, besides demonstrating
the design generally, was intended to give the builder of the vessel guidance
in cutting and fitting complicated timbers.
Hypoziimata tension
The behaviour of these ropes was investigated to find out how torque,
tension and angle of twist are related when the ropes are rwisted together
6 5teffy (I 983) pp. 229--46.

The reconstruction:fundamentals ofdesign 205
60 . Model of the ram structure proposed for the reconstructed ship. The ram
upper planking, to be fitted above the ram wale piece, is shown in one
piece lying beside the model. The ram lower planking may be seen in
place below the ram wale piece: the upper of these two planks is dark-
coloured, the lower light-coloured. The metal sheath fitting over the
forward part of the ram structure has been omitted.
to be tightened as in a Spanish Windlass. It may be assumed that these 40

mm diameter ropes in a trieres would have been tightened according to
experience to the maximum that they could safely bear. In the absence of
such data we undertook 1/8 scale experiments to discover whether
bypoziimata could be of polyester (a stronger, safer, more readily available,
but also more elastic material) or whether we should have to stick to hemp
to keep the torque to be applied within practical limits. The choice would
make no difference to the structural effect of the bypozomata on the hull,
which is determined only by the total tension and the position in which it
is rigged.
Timber
Choice of timber and detail s of fastenings had to be carefully considered
in view of the highl y stressed nature of the trieres. The materials of the
originals have already been described, but timber of the required structu-
ral quality and sizes is now scarcer in the regions and in the species from
which it could be obtained in ancient times. The Trust decided with the
agreement of the Hellenic Navy and after consulting the Building
Research Establishment in Britain to specify Douglas Fir (Pseudotsuga
menziesiz) otherwise known as Oregon Pine and Columbian Pine, instead
of the botanically authentic species such as silver fir, larch or several of the
many pines which grow around the Mediterranean and Black Seas. All
true firs, though advantageous in being light for their strength, were
rejected because they are prone to decay. Triereis often had oak keels
(above, p. 180) but seasoned straight-grained oak in the section and
length required is now virtually impossible to obtain. The keel could have
been laminated from oak but lroko (Chlorophera excelsa) is structurally
satisfactory, cheaper and available in a stable state: it is also very resistant
to decay. We chose it in preference to oak.
As another exception from authenticity, we decided to allow long
timbers to be formed by gluing shorter ones together.
Watertightness of seams
On the rather humdrum but important matter of caulking or stopping the
seams to make them watertight, literary and archaeological evidence is too
vague for any particular processes to be identified as authentic. It was there-
fore decided with the agreement of the Hellenic Navy to build on the firm-
ness it was hoped to achieve in shell seams and to make the ship as
watertight as possible by stopping the seams below the lower wale with a
modern two-part curing polysulphide sealant . No aspect of the perfor-
mance of the trieres or of its investigation with the reconstructed ship was
lost as a result of this step: loss of 'fast' qualities by prolonged immersion
could not have been properly reproduced with any confidence no matter
how carefully the 'most authentic' stopping had been selected or applied. All
effects of increasing roughness and fouling with length of immersion have
been experienced with the reconstructed ship in the course of trials and
operation.
12
THE RECONSTRUCTION
MAIN FEATURES
Having discussed the fundamentals underlying the design, we can prop-

erly turn to the main physical features of the vessel, starting with the main
hull and then progressively building up the complete ship in much the
same order as she was actually built.
The builder of a trieres in ancient times would almost invariably have
been adding to an existing and uniform fleet. He would have worked to a set
of traditional scantlings , rules and key measurements ofwhich only the two-
cubit interscalmium (p. 133) has survived. He would therefore have been
perfectly clear about what he was to produce. His concepts and methods,
handed down and guarded by generations of master shipwrights before him ,
are almost certainly lost for ever and probably impossible to reconstruct. As
a modern but very incomplete substitute we can do no better than to offer a
drawing of the general arrangement of the reconstructed ship (fig. 61).
Building started by cutting and setting in place a long timber, 17 m in
length, to which were scarfed the forward and after keels rising gently to
stem and stern. The three pieces were joined end-to-end by traitdeJupiter
scarfs (fig. 62) which, in a number ofvariations, seem to have been univer-
sally used in ship keels in the ancient Mediterranean. This scarf is an
ingenious and intricate piece of carpentry in itself, being self-locking and,
if well fitted, strong in end compression though less good in tension.
To the keel were fitted the first, or garboard, strakes of the shell. Being
heavy strakes, wide and thick, to reinforce the keel as the central girder of
the hull, these had to be carved to shape at each end to bend into the rising
keels fore and aft. In shorter, round, ships that curve would extend over the
whole length of the strakes and to simplify their shape the keel would be
rockered - that is, curved upwards like the sheer of a boat. In longships
rocker is needed only at each end of the length. The garboard strakes were
fastened to the keels by tenons, already discussed, about 10 to every metre
ofseam.
207
.~
...:
The reconstruction: main ftatures 209
[7~----
1-::# ~-- ~
:J
y
P
62 . Reconstructed ship: traitdeJupiterscarf.
The shell was thus formed, strake by strake, following our final design
for the shape of hull to be generated (above, pp . 192-9). The builder
worked by adjusting the bevel angle of the plank edge and so of the mor-
tices which were cut perpendicularly into it to receive the tenons. Seams
were close, carefully fitted before being finally tenoned in place. As the shell
grew, transverse stiffening timbers two or three metres long were then pro-
gressively fitted to the inside of the shell in overlapping tiers to reach the
ropwale (fig. 63). These timbers were fastened to the planks by wood
dowels driven through bored holes and then locked by copper spikes driven
up the dowels and clenched over, the points being driven back into the face
of the timber to form a square hook out of the inboard ends of the spikes.
The ancient Greek terms for the stiffening timbers have been lost, so
more recent English equivalents are adopted here . Those in the bottom
and lying across the keel are called floors: those laid on each side, ends
overlapping the floors to reach the lower wale, are called futrocks, and the
shell stiffening is completed up to the topwale by top timbers whose lower
ends overlap the tops of the futto cks. In a trieres, top timbers had to be
carefully placed in the spaces which there would be between the oarports,
later to be cut in the ship sides in a zigzag pattern, one port in each space
between top timbers.
The top edge of the hull shell was capped by the ropwales, upper and
lower, heavy members forming two layers of timbers in the reconstructed
ship to give strength to the long, shallow hull. Stiffening was completed by
internal longitudinal stringers in the bottom, riding over the transverse
timbers, three on each side of the keel, and by beams across the hull, one to
Topwale
Middle--fl
wale
Top timber---.----±-'.
Lower wale ----'~ /
Futtock - - - - - - " \ : - r - \ .
Floor --C""'.....,/
Garboard strake ---------~
Keel--- - - - - - - - - - - -
63. Reconstructed ship: hull structure (isometric).
every other top timber at the level of the middle wale, to hold the sides of
the hull at their proper distance.
The result was a shell, in the main little thicker in relation to its curva-
ture than a plastic bucket, lightly stiffened over its general extent but with
substantial members at the keel and, like the bucket, round its rim . The
weight of this basic shell was only about 15 tonnes. The addition ofoutrig-
gers, seats etc. for oarsmen, decks, stanchions and braces to complete the
hull added another 10 tonnes or so to make a weight of 25 tonnes, a little
more than half of the total weight of the fully manned and equipped
trieres.
In antiquity, when the basic hull had been finished by the shipwrights
the greater part of building a trieres was done, though they would probably
also have fitted the more important features closely connected with the
hull structure, namely the outriggers and the threnys and epiitis beams
The reconstruction: main features 211
forming the ends of the outriggers. Building would then in all probability
have been handed over to other trades: carpenters for furniture and decks,
ram-fitters for the ram, spar-makers for oars, masts and yards, and other
items would have been made by cordwainers, sailmakers, ropemakers,
riggers, smiths and metal-founders. We can now consider these features as
they were reconstructed in Olympias.
Outriggers
Each outrigger consists of a heavy main rail, very slightly above the
topwale and one-third of a metre outboard of it, supported on curved
brackets (see fig. 56), one to every oarsman, secured to the hull and
extending down to be lodged into the top edge of the lower wale. The rail
is braced between brackets to the topwale to prevent fore-and-aft move-
ment and into it are set vertical stiles supporting the lighter upper rail of
the outrigger. The two rails together hold the thranite tholepins in place.
Thrinys and epiitis beams

The afrerrnost of these two special beams, which for convenience may be
called by its Homeric name, thrinys, and whose ends pass out through the
shell under the upper topwale, performs three functions besides that of a
hull beam: it forms the after end of each out-rigger as already stated, it
carries the main rudder bearings, and it forms part of the after anchorage
of the hypozomata. The epiitis beam in the bows, laid across the lower
ropwale, extends 0.8 m outboard on either side. It is heavily braced aft to
the topwale, as may be seen in fig. 46, to withstand nearly head-on colli-
sions with opposing ships and so protect the outrigger from being sheared
off. The epotis also provides support for platforms beside the fo'c's'le from
which anchors are let go and hove up clear of the ram. The side bulwarks of
these platforms are ear-shaped, while their forward bulwarks incorporate
fairleads for the anchor cables mounted directly over the epiitis beam.
Oarsystem
The furniture for the oarsmen - seats, foot stretchers, tholepins and oar-
ports - have to be set correctly in relation to each other to give each
oarsman the proper posture and room for pulling his oar. Some furthe r
explanation of the arrangement (see fig. 45 above) and design of these
items in the reconstructed ship is appropriate. To any oarsman wishing to
apply appreciable pow er to his oar the position of his foot-stretcher is vital.
In the trieres with beams spaced , in accordance with evidence, every two
cubits (0.888 m in Ofympias; see below, p. 245) and the need for the small-
est possible vertical separation of files, the feet of thranites and zygians
could onl y have been immediately under the seats of the adjacent oarsman
aft. That is also a suitable position for hard pulling. For hard backin g down
(going astern) foot straps are essential.
Foot stretchers
The foot stretchers ' are a crucial element affecting th e whole design
because the heights of files of oarsmen above each other and hence the
height, stability and beam of the ship, hinge up on the vertic al space
needed by the stretchers to give a reasonable clearance from the oar loom s
below th em, allowing for some vert ical movement oflooms caused by roll
of the ship and by waves.
It has been suggested that oarsmen in triereis could have sat on broad,
rounded fore- and-aft stringers and slid upon them on greased cushions.
Their feet could have been supported by stretchers built on either side
of the stringers.2 However such a scheme would have been practicable onl y
if the line of the stringers could have run continuously from one oarsman
to the next, but the mock-up show ed (see below) that that could not be the
case with thranites or thalamians, and that a mixed system was improb-
able .
Canting of oarsmen
The mock-up also demonstrated that the th alarnian s' heads moved through
nearl y the whole space between beams when oar stro ke was long . Their
tholes were fairly closely restricted in position between the adjacent top
I For advice on foot stretchers we are indebted to Tim Watson , an experienced

oarsman who has studied the design of oar rigs.
2 H amilron-Smith and Corlett (1989).
64. Olympias: thranite and zygian rowers.
timbers if their oars were to have their required movement within the oar-
ports, which were already as large as could be conveniently accommodated
between the same top timbers. To reconcile thole position, head movement
and the necessary hull structure, it became necessary to cant the thalarnian
oarsmen in plan by 3°, to face slightly towards the middle line of the ship.
That angle, though small, threw the thalamian blades about 0.15 m aft,
which was enough to put them nearly evenly between the oar blades of the
zygians sitting at beam positions and facing directly aft. Even spacing of the
blades of these two files accords with the historical evolution of the trieres
from two-level pentecontors by the addition of thranites and their outrig-
gers. Canting of oarsmen, applied to thranites, enabled their height in the
ship to be minimised, as already explained. By canting the thranires 9°,
their blades were thrown into the best gap between the blades of the two
lower files, considering all parts of the stroke . The arrangement ofoarsmen
in Olympias is shown in figs. 64 and 65.
Tholes
Thalamian and zygian tholes are set into carlings, respectively mounted on
and set between top timbers as shown in fig. 56, while thranite tholes are
65. Olympias: zygian and thalamian towers.

The reconstruction: mainfeatures 215
dropped through holes in the top rail of the outrigger and seated in the
main rail to enable them to be set in place after rigging the thranite oar-
loops. Owing to the width of thranite blades and the presence of the upper
rail these loops cannot be rigged while the thranite tholes are in place.
Tholes can be either forward of or abaft oars. Early pictorial evidence of
hooked tholes , with the hooks on the aft side of the thole (fig. 22a), makes
it virtually certain that they were aft of the oars in early Greek oared ships.
In that position the oar hung from the thole during the pulling part of the
stroke and the loop took the whole force on the thole. Wear would be con-
centrated on the loop, and for oars worked over an open topwale that
arrangement has the advantage that the oar will trail alongside when not
manned, as is demonstrated in fishing boats all over the Mediterranean
today. However, when worked through ports from which they cannot
trail, oars may be better bearing on their tholes during the pulling part of
the stroke: failure ofJoops in battle would be less serious and oar-ports can
be a shade smaller. On the other hand, oars and tholes would probably
wear more quickly. In Olympias, tholes are aft of oars, but the design is not
much affected in either case (see pp. 241-3) .
Oars
The oars conform to evidence as to length (above, p. 137), that is 9 and 9!tl
cubits or 3.99 m and 4.2 m respectively in Olympias. The cramped space in
the hull towards bow and stern has made it necessary to resort to oars with
shortened looms at the ends of some files of oarsmen. The author of the
Mechanics has recorded the employment of that expedient in triereis, pro-
viding supporting evidence for the hull shape in those places. The three
aftermost and foremost pairs of thalamians and the three foremost pairs of
zygians pull short oars, a total of 18 short oars or 10% of the total number
in the ship.
The mock-up suggested that the blades of the oars in the three files
needed to be of different shapes: shorter and therefore wider for the thra -
nites and long and narrow for the thalarnians. The reason was to equalise
the angles by which they had to be raised and lowered to leave and enter
the water on account of the differing heights from which they are worked.
This accorded with written evidence that thranire and zygian oars could be
differentiated, but by implication could also be confused (above, p. 172).
We believed that the difference lay in the shapes of their blades and the
similarity (apart from length) lay in both types having built-up blades -
while thalamian oars were carved from one pole (pp. 172-3). As already
indicated, however, experience with Olympias has called this conclusion
into question (see below, pp. 240-1).
The oars were given thick looms to help to reduce the handle force
needed to lift the blade from the water (see p. 193 above). This was a
common feature of high-geared oars in fast sea-going boats of the past:
sometimes looms were even weighted with lead.
Askomata
A particular feature of the trieres was a leather sleeve, asleoma, fitted to
every thalamian oarport to prevent water from slopping through them
(pp. 168-9). These sleeves must have been essential to the seaworthiness of
the vessel. They show that there was a clear necessity to place the lowest
tholes as near to the water as they were, since only a compelling necessity
could force acceptance in that position in any craft of the large fragile
covers and the openings calling for them. In Olympias, askiimata are fitted
inside the hull to enable their replacement or repair at sea.
Oarsmen's seats
All oarsmen's seats in Olympias are flat rectangles (400 mm X 300 mm)
with edge bolsters to prevent their occupants from sliding sideways on a
roll, and to help them to keep their seats when the ship is under sail in a
gusty beam wind. All files of oarsmen extend towards bow and stern as far
as hull space allows. The resulting arrangement of end oarsmen happens to
be the only one which appears to accord with fourth-century evidence
(above, p. 148). The forwardmost thalamians on each side meet shoulder
to shoulder. The foot-stretchers of the aftermost thalamians nearly touch
the bottom timbers of the hull , as these rise towards the stern. The zygian
files have to end in the bow two places short of the others because the
zygians are squeezed our between the top and bottom files as the hull
narrows. In the stern zygians extend as far as the increasing slope of the
ship's side allows. Thranites extend from the rudders to a point near the
bow where there is just room between them for a gangway 0.6 m wide to
give access to the fo' c's'le, That all six ends of files should be determined by
sound spatial reasons in relative positions which accord with evidence
lends support to the correctness of the hull dimensions and form of the
reconstructed ship.
Access
Easy movement of men is important in a ship as densely manned and

whose crew embark and disembark as frequently as they did in the trieres.
Clear fore-and-aft access is essential, and is provided by a gangway at beam
level on the middle line. It is 1.2 m wide to enable two men to walk nearly
abreast or to pass with reasonable ease by the standards of a crowded ship.
However, the forward ends of the thalamian files have to converge with the
hull, making a gangway at that level impossible near the fore-end. There is
therefore a step up to a higher level to allow the fore-ends of the thalamian
files to converge below it. The step in the gangway also allows it to broaden
into a lower foredeck as wide as necessary elbow room for zygians and thra-
nites permits.
In this chapter, decks and the like are described according to nautical
practice. A gangway is predominantly a passage to give access. In the trieres
there is one gangway. A deck is an area serving several purposes to do with
working, defending or fighting the ship, or as accommodation. A platform
is a small area for one or two special purposes. A canopy is of lighter con-
struction than a deck or a gangway, sufficient to protect what is under-
neath it, often from sun and rain only. Canopies in ships commonly take
the form ofcanvas awnings.
Canopy
The oarsmen on either side of the gangway and lower foredeck are pro-
tected by a light wooden canopy, whose main purpose would have been to
stop javelins and arrows from plunging into the oarsmen as well as to carry
sitting or reclining epibataiand to provide some shelter. It is strong enough
to support a few seamen handing ropes while sailing, but not any dense
mass of men, for whom it would be unsafe even if strengthened to take the
weight unless fitted with guardrails, at least at the ship's sides. It must be
remembered that Olympiaswas designed as a 'fast' trieres.
The canopy is built in six sections on each side of the ship to allow them
to move longitudinally relative to each other as the ship flexes. No such
light deck carried on stanchions could contribute to the longitudinal
bending strength of the main hull, so it must be prevented from carrying
hull-bending stresses.
Other decks and platforms

Proceeding forward along the lower foredeck to the end of the canopy on
either side, one steps up to the level of the epiitis platforms; and immedi-
ately forward again is the fo'c's'le deck continuous with and at the same
level as the canopy. There is room for a small cabin under the fo'c's'le deck.'
Going aft from the step between lower foredeck and gangway, one walks
between canopies at shoulder or chin height. Abreast the aftermost thala-
mian the gangway broadens into the afterdeck at the same level. A pair of
ladders lead up to the quarterdeck, which is at canopy level. Under the
quarterdeck to port and starboard are sinall accommodation spaces on the
afrerdeck, 2 m long and about 0.6 m wide, enough for a few seats or a
narrow cot. The afterdeck ends at the tbrinys.
The quarterdeck (see fig. 66), whose main purpose is to support the
upper bearings of the rudder stocks, also provides the command point for
the trierarch and helmsman, as well as access for embarking the crew by
ladders over each quarter up from the beach. The quarterdeck is constructed
and braced to carry rudder forces and the tramp of a rapidly embarking
crew, whose static weight on it can be as much as 5 tonnes . At the after end
of the quarterdeck is the trierarch's chair, with the helmsman's position just
forward of him and below his sightline so that both can see ahead. Mt of the
quarterdeck and 0.9 m below it is a small platform for stern mooring to
beaches and for archers to provide covering fire over the beach from a posi-
tion shielded by the stern of the ship rising up to the stern ornament (aph/as-
ton). At the command of the trierarch signals may be hoisted from the
platform to the head of the staff (sty/is), held aloft by the aphlaston.
Rudders ('Steering oars')

The two rudders, 5 m long with their stocks, are each carried in two bear-
ings in which they are turned by tillers lying athwarrships. The ends of the
66. Olympias: the quarterdeck.
tillers are close together so that each can be conveniently grasped by the
helmsman standing on a small platform in the middle-line slot in the quar-
terdeck (fig. 66) . The platform's height allows him also to brace himself on
the end of the slot as on a misericord. To turn the ship to starboard the
helmsman pulls the tiller in his right hand towards him and the other the
same distance away from him. The rudder blades are balanced so that both
tillers can be handled by one man in normal conditions. The rudders can
be operated one at a time or together, if necessary by one man to each.
Each rudder has a lower bearing mounted on the threnys and an upper
bearing in the rudder slots in each side of the quarterdeck. These slots and
both bearings are designed, by Dorian Dymoke, to allow the rudders to
hinge on their lower, main, bearings to bring the blades out of the water
for beaching. There are also two intermediate positions for rudders, one in
which they can be operated in shoal waters with their lower ends no deeper
than the keel, and the other in which the blades are just clear of the water
and ready for use. In their fully housed position the rudders are turned so
that the tillers are vertical and the blades in a nearly horizontal plane as
shown in fig. 35b .
Hypoziimata
The hypozomata (above, pp. 169-71 and 196-9) should be composed of
two lengths of heavy (40 mm diameter) ropes, each rather more than twice
the length of the ship. They should be rigged as two loops, each stretched
between strong anchorages in the hull structure, one near the stem and
between the middle wales, and the other right aft in the form of a post
lodged at its base in the rising keel and whose head is shored to the tbrenys
and thence to the topwale of the hull. The hypozomata thus run nearly the
full length of the ship on the middle line and just below the beams.
Tensioning such hypozdmata (the need for which is explained on p. 170)
by twisting them to form a large Spanish Windlass (as proposed on
pp. 204-5) and for which Dorian Dymoke had very carefully designed
heavy twisting gear with great concern for safety in view of the large forces
involved, in the event proved impossible in the full-scale ship in spite of
the 1/8 scale model experiments carried out in flax3 and polyester. Since
time was short and the ship was nearing completion with a programme of
trials already arranged, we had, therefore , to fall back on using instead a
steel wire hawser, which was tensioned by a chain hoist and fitted with a
tensometer to perform the same function. Owing to the great stiffness of
the steel hawser under tension compared with natural fibre ropes, even if
much bigger in diameter, the tension in the steel varied very noticeably as
the ship flexed at sea, whereas natural fibres would have maintained an
almost constant tension as the hull flexed.
We now think it most likely that each ofthe two hypozomatawould have
been tensioned separately (and progressively tightened as they stretched
under sustained tension) by a three-part purchase rove through greased
dead-eyes and tightened by tackle." That way of tightening standing
rigging was certainly in use a few centuries later than the fifth century BC
3 ]FC (1987). 4 ]FC and]. T. Shaw in Shaw (1993) pp. 82-6.

The reconstruction: main fiatures 221
67. Olympias: ram with bronze sheath .
and was probably known well before that time and therefore could have
been used in the triereis of which Ofympias is a reconstruction. Dead-eyes
continued in use for tightening the standing rigging of ships until the
arrival of iron standing rigging and masts in the nineteenth century AD.
Ram
The principal weapon of the trieres, the ram, is a strong timber structure
built on to the bow of the hull proper (see figs. 46, 60 and 67) and coming
to a point on the waterline about two metres in front of the stem. The
forward part is sheathed with a tightly fitting bronze casting, thin but
armed with three horizontal cutting blades at the fore-end. A bronze
sheath is visible in the ship shown in fig. 46 and in Ofympias in fig. 67. The
structure of the ram consists essentially of a massive horizontal central
member with two pairs of buttressing or bracing timbers, one pair, the
wale pieces, bracing the ram sideways while the other, in the vertical plane,
is composed of the brace sloping upwards to the stem of the ship and the
ram keel piece buttressing it from below. The spaces in between are filled,
or sheathed with planking and the casting covers the joints of the main
members to each other. The design of the bronze sheath, which in
Olympiasweighs about 200 kg, and of the timbers within it closely follows
that of the remains found at Athlit (above, p. 129) the upper planks of
which indicate that the ram was built on to the hull rather than formed
from the stem structure itself. The lines of the Athlit timbers, extended aft,
mate with the principal forward members of the hull remarkably well to
transmit ramming forces to the ship as a whole.
The order of magnitude of ramming forces may be estimated roughl y. A
ramming ship of mass 50 tonnes if brought to rest from 10 knots in a dis-
tance of one metre by a constant force would suffer a retardation of 13
m/sec .2 and the force would be
1000
50 X - - X 13 kN = 66 tonnes force
1000
that is, one-third more than the mass of the ship. The rammed victim,
especially ifhit near one end, would herself move sideways from the blow,
so two or three metres would be a more likely travel before coming to rest.
However, the force with which the progressively breaking structure would
resist the ram would not be uniform, so the 66-tonnes estimate can be
expected to be of the order of the maximum force experienced. To speak of
vast shocks upon ramming a light hull is mistaken.
Transverse forces could have been more destructive to rams and were
probably the main cause of their loss in battle. Such a force could be quite
large if the victim had an appreciable velocity across the path of the
attacker at the moment of impact. The ram, on penetration, would
immediately have to acquire the sideways velocity of the victim , but the
consequent side force on the ram would be limited to that required to tear
the point sideways through the victim's shell structure. That force could
well be about 40 tonnes, quite sufficient to pull the ram off sideways,
indeed about twice what may be estimated to be necessary. Ramming a
target moving at more than a few knots must therefore have been danger-
ous, and trierarchs may have reduced the risk to their own rams by initiat-
ing a sharp turn in the direction of their victim's motion just before
impact.
In Olympias, if the ram were to be torn off, there is a fair chance that the
hull would remain watertight or leak at no more than a controllable rate.
Most lost rams would have been easily salvaged because battles were
usually fought near the shore and the buoyancy ofa ram's structure is suffi-
68 . Reconstructed ship: sail and rigging plan. Forward rigging (not shown) is
similar to the main.
cient to keep the bronze casting afloat pointing downwards, if the struc-
ture came away fairly complete . The after ends of those that did sink
would point upwards and often be quite near the surface, so it is not sur-
prising that there seem to be so few left to be recovered today.
Sails and rigging

The sail and rigging plan is shown in fig. 68. Owing to lack of evidence,
the rig is necessarily somewhat conjectural, though possible positions,
shapes and areas ofsails are restricted by the design and sail-carrying capac-
ity of the ship. The rig was designed by Owain Roberts, who has made a
study of past European single square-sail rigs.?
The sail plan follows the pictorial evidence from both earlier and later
centuries. In accordance with the naval inventories (above, p. 175), it
includes a 'boat' mast and sail. Later pictures of Roman ships under sail
suggest that this was a foremast and sail, the mast being raked forward
(see above, fig. 51). The area of the main sail, 95 square metres, and its
height accord with nineteenth-century AD criteria of square sail carry-
ing capacity when applied to a vessel with the characteristics of the
trieres. Under main sail alone the ship heels to about r in a steady beam
wind of 14 knots: setting the foresail adds another degree or so to the
heel. These angles are about one-third of the heel needed to immerse the
zygian oarports (21°) and so swamp the ship. They are however suffi-
cient to put the sills of the thalamian oarports very near the water, so that
5 O . T. P. Roberrs (I 987) and in Shaw (I 993) pp. 29-38.

in all but very sheltered waters the askiimata are called into action. Sail is
usually shortened in winds stronger than about 14 knots (see also below,
pp. 261-2).
As in all ancient Mediterranean rigs, sail can be reduced quickly in
Olympias by means of 10 brailing ropes controlled from near the helms-
man. These pass over the yard at equally spaced points and down the front
(i.e. lee side) of the sail, through rings (figs. 53a and b) sewn to every hori -
zontal seam of the sail, to the foot. The main braces and sheets are also led
to the helmsman's position so that he has immediate control of the main
sail, probably through the stern deck party (see p. 113).
The foresail, or 'boat' sail, in Olympias is about one-quarter of the area
of the main sail and is similarly controlled but from the fo'c's'le deck, a pos-
sible station for the bow deck party under the prorates (see p. 113) when
the ship is under sail. The purpose of the foresail has long been a subject of
discussion. Sailing Olympias (fig. 69) has shown how it should be worked,
its value in balancing the rig fore-and-aft and how it can be used to adjust
the weather helm needed in various directions and strengths of wind
(below, pp. 257-8).
Both masts are stepped in tabernacles with their heels at beam level.
When lowered aft, they rest on portable bars placedbetween the canopies.
The tabernacles in Olympias consist of two main uprights, the mast-
partners, secured to a deck beam and extending down to twin mast-steps
each spanning several floor timbers, but for the mainmast this has proved
to be insufficiently strong. The masts were initially stayed fore-and-aft but
not athwartships, and when raised they were lashed into their tabernacles.
In order to secure the mainmast, however, four (anachronistic) shrouds
were added for safety.
The main yard is made up of two spars fished together. It is held to the
mast by a parrel and hoisted by twin halliards passing through eyes on each
side of a bronze fitting or truck at the masthead (see fig. 47). In contrast
with the mainmast tabernacle, it has proved to be unnecessarily strong and
heavy. Fairleads for braces, sheets and tacks are provided by wooden thim-
bles stropped with double rope tails for securing them to the ship where
needed. All sails, yards and rigging can be carried ashore, as they normally
were in clearing triereis for action before battle.
In beam winds the brails are used to furl the after part (leech) of the
main sail, shifting the wind force on the sail forwards. In following winds
69. Olympiasunder sail: view from the stern.

the middle of the main sail (bunt) is brailed up more than the corners
(clews). That is necessary owing to the proportions and rigging of the sail,
and it also allows the smaller and lower foresail to draw in such winds and,
by moving the centre of effort of the sails forward, to steady the ship
against yawing in waves (below, pp. 257-8) .
Hull paint
In antiquity the hull would be black below the waterline and up to the
lower wale because triereis, not being sheathed with lead like merchant
ships were frequently coated with pine tar or pine pitch or both. The upper
parrs of triereis were decorated with painted patches and devices.f In
Olympias the hull was coated with a black anti-fouling paint system up to
the lower wale and there was no decoration apart from on the lower wale,
which was painted white, and two painted 'eyes' in the bows. All her
timbers were treated with wood preservative as she was built, and she was
subsequently painted with linseed oil.
Triereis as troop-carriers?
From the earliest times oared ships carried soldiers, and triereis were no
exceptions. There is room on the afterdeck of the reconstruction to trans-
port about 30 soldiers additional to the 10 normally on board, without
interfering with the handling of ropes when under sail. They would,
however, be very crowded on the afterdeck so it is not surprising that in
representations men appear on the canopy, but always sitting or lying
down.
The ability ofa trieres to carry extra men is not limited so much by their
weight and a consequent rise in the ship's centre of gravity, as by the avail-
able space and, above all, the necessity to limit their movement athwart-
ships at all times while the ship is under oars (pp. 160-1). The working of
oars in any boat is much hampered by rolling . To reduce as far as possible
their sensitivity to rolling, the oars in pulling sea-going boats in the past
were arranged to give looms as much room as practicable to rise and, more
especially, to fall, to enable oarsmen to cope with waves and the motion of
6 Casson(l97l)p.212. 7 See]FC in Shaw (I 993) pp. 78-81.

The reconstruction: main fe atures 22 7
the boar. 8 That called for looms ro be at abour shoulder height when the
blades were immersed in still water : even so, among waves a 10° roll rela-
tive to the wave surface was generally near the limit for effective pulling. In
a trieres that limit would probably have been about 4°, an angle to which
Olympias would heel if 30 soldiers on board were ro move 0.7 m athwart-
ships simulraneously, a thing unlikely to happen so long as they were
sirring down. The rowers in Orympiascould detect the movement athwart-
ships of a single person on the canopy, and such movement was generally
discouraged.
Triereis as cavalry transports
In ant iquity, some older vessels were convened to carry 30 horses, cavalry-
men and grooms . The feasibility of convening Olympias in this way has
been investigated ro seek suppon for the likely correctness of the design.
Fig. 70 shows how such a conversion could be carried our fairly easily. The
furniture for zygians is removed , the canopies each side are cur back ro
cover the thranites only, the widened space so created is planked and the
mast tabernacles removed. There is then room, as shown in fig. 70 , for 30
horses forward of the quarter-deck, standing athwartships. With the ir
rumps against board s on the stanchions at the inbo ard edge of the remain-
ing canopy and their chests restr ained by rails set up for that purpose, the
horses would be in the best positi on to steady themselves against rolling
motions of the magnitude likely to be experienced . To balance the ship,
about half the horses would face one way and half the other, with a slight
imbalance to offset the weight of the ramp which must be on one side of
the ship. The ramp would necessarily displace two thranites, reducing the
total number of oarsmen to the att ested number of 60 (above, P: 156).
So conven ed and loaded , the horse-carrier would be abour eight tonnes
heavier than the fast trieres with her full complement of oarsmen. The
cent re of gravity of the cavalry transport would be 0.16 m higher than that
of the trieres proper bur owing ro the flare of the hull at the waterline, the
metacentre would rise too and stabil ity would be satisfacto ry in spite of the
weight of the horses added high in the ship . The deeper loading would put
8 Row ing and pulling oars in sea-goin g boats is discussed more fully by Eric McKee
(1983).
r- '1
I I
I
I - ,
I
\ _'
,
c-,
.c->: Plan at A
-~
" Part section
\ at ramp
~- \J)
- ----1- --
- ?\J=::----- -
70. Reconstructed ship : con version to a cavalry tran sport.

c
o
.;:
u
:l
t:
'"
c
o
u
~
'";;.
\ ....
:l
C
u
u
...c
t:::
:l
..E
u
-5
.S
.~
1c
I :l
I _~~~_ _-
~
the thalamian pOrts close to the water , too close probably to rely on
askiimaia with safety, so those pOrtS would almost certainly have been
boarded over as part of the conversion .
Conclusion
In thi s chapter features of the recon structed ship have been explained and
described in their broad aspects onl y. Reader s wishing to see more infor-
mation about the vessel are referred to the reports of her sea trials."
Fig. 7 1 is an imagined reconstruction of the Athenian harbour of
Munychia in the fourth century BC. One trieres is seen leaving the
harbour. From left to right round the shore are: derelict triereis , a tricr es
being rigged , a fire barrier wall at the side of a block of sheds, and, inside
the mole, triereis used for routine training afloat.
9 ]SM and ]FC (1989); ]FC, Platis and Shaw (1990); Shaw (1993); NBR (forth-
coming).
13
THE ATHENIAN TRIREME
RECONSTRUCTED: SEA TRIALS OF
OLYMPIAS
The Hellenic Navy ship Olympias was launched with due ceremony on 27
June 1987 (fig. 72). The Navy had already agreed to make the ship avail-
able to the Trireme Trust for trials at sea, and our whole project now
entered a new and exciting phase, in which the viability of all the research
and design up to that point could at last be subjected to practical experi-
ment and as yet undetected implications of the ancient evidence could be
made clear. It became, in effect, an exercise in experimental ship archaeol-
ogy and as such immediately entered even into the realms of controversy.
There have been many earlier projects involving ship replicas or recon-
structions which have attracted criticism for being speculative in design,
for lack of rigorous testing, for poor publication, or even simply for yield-
ing an insufficient increase in knowledge to justify the effort. We noted a
particularly disastrous example in our first chapter, that of Napoleon Ill's
Roman trirerne (pp. 15-17), but practical reconstructions continue to be
treated with suspicion today, especially by those researchers who feel that
the time and money could have been more profitably expended in other
ways.
Even the terminology employed for such vessels has been a matter of
heated debate: is a ship like Olympias a replica, a recreation, a reconstruc-
tion, or something else? Some scholars have proposed detailed definitions
ofa variety of terms to be applied to ships which have been based on differ-
ing levels and types of evidence. Unfortunately, there will always be diffi-
culties in locating any particular ship precisely within any such term , not
least since different parts of the ship may be based upon widely differing
types of evidence; for instance, one might have an example of a particular
hull type preserved as a wreck, but know about the associated superstruc-
ture only from iconographic or literary evidence. We have taken the view
that this is a semantic debate of relatively little value, preferring to leave
researchers to document all their evidence (and its strength or weakness)
231
72. The reconstructed trieres Olympias at sea.
for each part of any particular ship and then provide such label for their
ship as they feel is most appropriate. This we have attempted to do for the
Athenian trieres in the preceding chapters; we have chosen to label both
the design which has been presented and the Olympias, which was built to
that design, as a reconstruction. 1
Regardless of the label chosen, it was essential that the huge effort and
expense of the reconstruction - some 750,000 pounds sterling and well
over a million US dollars at 1987 prices - should be justified by carefully
planned and conducted sea trials. These had to be treated as parts ofa large
experiment aimed at acquiring the maximum amount of useful informa-
tion in a variety ofareas, and the information acquired had to be published
as fully as possible. Olympias was to be, in the words of Scan McGrail, a
'floating hypothesis? whereby the arguments put forward for the recon-
struction should be put to the test and reassessed in the light of practical
experience and as part of a continuing process of research. Nor was she
ever intended to be the final word on the subject: her construction and
trials were meant to clarify thinking, highlight weaknesses, narrow param-
eters, and raise new questions for further research and experimentation.
1 See]FCetal.(1995). 2 McGrail (1992).

Sea trials of Olympias 233
This she has done (below, pp. 273-5). There were, moreover, limits, both
theoretical and practical, to what could be achieved with Ofympias.
Replicas, recreations, reconstructions, can be built with many different
aims in mind, but it is not necessary, or even possible, for them to cover all
conceivable aims.
The limitations of the experiment
It was decided by the Trireme Trust, in agreement with the Greek govern-
ment, that the investigation of design and operation should take priority
over that of construction methods and materials. Other researchers might,
of course, have decided on a different order of precedence. While one
might have wished, in an ideal world, to explore all areas of interest, any
attempt to replicate ancient woodworking methods would have added sig-
nificantly to the cost of the project and considerably slowed down con-
struction, since finances would allow the employment of relatively few
craftsmen for a limited length of time . In these circumstances (and with so
large a ship), it would furthermore have been impracticable to deny the
builders the use of power tools to supplement their hand tools . Nor is it
known how ancient shipwrights formed the shape of their hulls or held
them in place by the shell-first method of construction, and since the form
was crucial to the success and safety of the vessel, moulds had to be
employed to ensure accuracy.
As for the investigation of the behaviour and durability of the original
materials employed, these were well known and predictable. It was felt that
there was relatively little to be gained here from adopting an archaeologi-
cally pure approach, especially if it might compromise the longevity or,
indeed, the safety of the ship. As was stated in an early defence of the
project, it was no part of the experiment to see how fast an ancient ship
rotted .or how nastily an Athenian crew may have drowned when the
rotting was complete.f Consequently, although Ofympiaswas built so as to
perform at sea as authentically as possible, some modern materials were
incorporated and some modern gear employed.
Departures from authenticity in choice of timber for the hull have already
been discussed (pp . 201-4 and 205-6). Very long timbers, now unavailable,
3 ]FCand]SM (1987).
had to be simulated by gluing and by the use of scarf joints of ancient type
(p. 207 and fig. 62), and the arrangement of non-structural floor timbers
was (unintentionally) slightly different from the ancient norm. All wood
was treated with preservative, the planking was sealed with synthetic caulk-
ing (instead of with unrecorded concoctions of pitch, tar, lime, tow, flax or
hair) and the hull was protected with modern underwater paints (instead of
tar or pitch) and applications oflinseed oil (pp. 184-8,206). For safety,and
because of initial difficulties in devising secure anchorages for the attach-
ment of hempen or synthetic bypozomata, a steel cable was used instead
(pp. 189-90,220-1). Again for safety, halliards were of polyester, and for
economy and durability, lanyards were of polypropylene. Sails made use of
long bolts of canvas with artificial seams rather than in the ancient manne r
of short pieces of canvas made on hand looms and sewn together. The ship
also carried modern safety and navigation equipment and modern-type
anchors and mooring ropes. All the substitute materials were chosen
because they provided advantages in terms of cost, availability, durability or
safety whilst possessing general properties similar or identical to the origi-
nals. The intention was that none of them should make any difference to the
performance or operation of the ship. Only the use of Douglas Fir for the
oars, in place of the lighter silver fir (both because of availability and for
robustness), can be identified as having had any effect in these areas.
Similarly, there had to be compromise in the investigation of design and
operation of the trieres at sea. Once again, one might have wished, in an
ideal world, to test Olympias full-time over several years with a specialist
crew ofoarsmen, all of them corresponding to the physical type and size of
the average ancient Athenian male (about 168 cm in height). The ship
would have been tested in all weather and sea conditions, under sail and
under oar, and to destruction. A second, improved reconstruction, would
then have been built in which the whole process could be repeated. Reality
has up to now necessarily fallen short ofsuch an utopian ideal.
The major limiting factor was the need to safeguard the ship and the
crew. The ownership of Olympias by the Hellenic Navy brought enormous
advantages for the conduct of trials by the Trireme Trusts UK and USA.
Not only had the Greek government paid for the original construction,
but its Navy provided housing for the ship in the naval dockyards, appro-
priately enough at Salamis, continuous maintenance (particularly impor-
tant for a wooden ship), crew accommodation and escort vesselsfor all sea
Sea trials ofOlympias 235
trials (including its own trials which are not reported here) , and a perma-
nent captain and deck-crew. Five successive series of trials have been
jointly carried out to date by the two Trireme Trusts operating under the
Navy's aegis, in 1987, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994. 4 Our researchers have
been allowed as free a hand as possible, but inevitably there have been
limits on the extent to which the Navy could allow the ship and, more
importantly, its own and the Trusts' volunteer crews to be put at risk (as
there would have been, ofcourse, even if the ship had been in private own-
ership). This overriding consideration for safety has, for instance, pre-
cluded the investigation of what takes place within the ship during
ramming. Similarly, rowing in very rough conditions has had to be
avoided, as has sailing in more than a fresh breeze (in part because of
understandable caution over the strength of the mast housing (p. 224) and
the watertightness of the leather oarsleeves (askomata) over the thalamian
portholes as the ship heels) (pp. 248, 256-9, 261).
The nature of the oarcrew also limited what was possible. Not even the
Hellenic Navy, which conducted its own sea trials and regularly crewed the
ship for displays throughout the Aegean, could afford to assign 170 rowers
to the ship on a regular basis. Trireme Trust trials had to be conducted with
volunteers recruited from both sides of the Atlantic and beyond, who paid
their own way to Greece, and who could spare only three weeks at a time.
Although a core of these attended two or more of the trials, the majority of
the rowers always were new to the ship. Crews had to be trained largely
from scratch in each year, and a significant amount of time had to be
devoted to the basic task of teaching them how to propel the ship at all.
The maintenance of crew morale was also a necessity, just as it was in
antiquity, and the rowers could, for instance, be worked to exhaustion only
on a limited number of occasions. There was, indeed, a great deal to be
learnt about the man-management aspects of rowing a trieres in antiquity.
Nevertheless, the demands of morale made it impracticable to design
experiments (for example, on the effects of undermanning on speed and
manoeuvrability) in which a large proportion of the crew had to be left
ashore. A similar consideration has been one of the factors (alongside the
demands of safety) which has restricted operation of the ship under sail.
The oarcrew have, on the whole, insisted that they should spend their time
4 See p. 230 n. 9.
on board rowing, the activity for which they volunteered, although they
have also often been glad of the periodic respite afforded by a favourable
breeze. The interests of researchers in Olympias have, therefore, always had
to be tempered by the need to maintain the good will and co-operation of
the oarcrew, Despite this, it proved possible to ask a great deal of the
rowers, and to conduct the majority of the experiments desired.
The sea trials: rowing

The first task of every outing with the ship was to get the crew aboard. It
was realised from the outset that this had to be done in an organised
manner, and the necessity for this became even greater once the allocation
of seating on board had become established. It is clear that, in antiquity,
oarsmen were at the very least allocated to particular levels of the ship ,
since we know that rhranites might be paid at a higher rate than the rest
(see p. 119). It is quite likely, moreover, that they occupied regular posi-
tions within the ship, since this would have allowed them to perfect their
timing by training with the same people in the same positions around
them. This approach certainly worked best in Olympias, the key unit of
operation being a fixed vertical group of three rowers which became
known as a 'triad', with each triad learning to move together with the triad
immediately forward and astern. Embarkation therefore had to be carried
out in an orderly manner, for which the central gangway running down
the whole length of the ship proved to be essential.
The rowers were first arranged as they would eventually be seated, on a
grid chalked on the quayside. They were then embarked over a single gang-
plank at the stern and along the gangway, either filling up the ship one
section at a time (centre, bows, stern, so as to minimise the strain on the
hull), or in levels (thalamians, zygians, thranites, not necessarily in that
order). Either way, the ship could be filled or emptied without haste in 10
to 15 minutes. This time could, of course, have been halved by employing
two gangplanks or boarding ladders, attested for antiquity both on vase
paintings and from epigraphic ship-inventories. Using two gangplanks
and operating at the double, the Hellenic Navy was able in 1988 to board a
full crew and run out the oars in 1 minute 30 seconds, and to retract oars
and disembark in the same amount of time. They also achieved a total
emergency evacuation over the side in a mere 24 seconds. It is clear that in
antiquity an establ ished, disciplined crew (who would, of course, have had
no need of a chalked grid in order to form up) could have 'scrambled'
aboard very quickly indeed to meet any seaborne threat or to escape from a
mooring in hostile territory.
Once the crew were aboard, it was necessary to get the ship moving
under oar. This was, in fact, a primary requirement of the whole project,
since if Olympias could not be rowed satisfactorily, it would be a clear and
irrefutable indictment of the basic design . Indeed, the strongest objection
to the three-level theory has always been its supposed impracticality. The
initial achievement of this requirement was, however, a far from simple
task. Very little information on the practicalities of rowing a trieres has sur-
vived from antiquity, and what has survived was even more obscure to us
in 1987 than it is now. All progress had to be made by trial and error, and
the ship's performance in the first series of sea trials left many participants
feeling that the reconstruction must be fundamentally flawed.
To be sure, Olympiaswas, at first glance, an awkward ship to row. Lines
of vision were variously restricted according to each rower's position
within the ship. The thranite rowers on top had clear lines of sight, both
outboard, so that they could see what their own and the other oars were
doing, and inboard along the ship, so that they could see the movement of
the crew. The zygian rowers in the middle, on the other hand, could not
see their oarblades at all, even through the oarports, but could see along
the ship. Meanwhile, the vision of the thalamians at the bottom was
blocked both by the leather oarsleeves fixed over their oarports to keep out
the swell, and by the main beams (zyga) fixed astern of each rowing posi-
tion at eye level. They could see neither their oarblades nor the general
movement of the crew, and were thus the most handicapped of the three
tiers of rowers. It would certainly have helped them if the zyga could have
been placed elsewhere, out of their line of sight. The inability of the
zygians and thalamians to see their oarblades is, however, an inevitability
in any ship rowed at three levels, since it would be impractical (and would
weaken the hull) to make the oarports large enough to give any useful view
outboard. It may be that the thranites too had their vision restricted in
battle by the lowering of protective sidescreens (pararrymata), although it
would have been relatively easy to rig these so as to leave the oarblades in
sight whilst still providing cover against missiles from above. At any rate,
even when there was no threat, two thirds of the oarcrew in antiquity, as in
Olympias, must always have been rowing 'blind'. This certainly made the
stroke more difficult for the Trusts' crews, who were accustomed in
modern craft to being able to see the movement of the oarblades astern of
their own. Ancient crews may not, of course, have perceived this as quite
such a problem, being quite used to timing by sound and feel alone.
Neither could Olympias be described as particularly comfortable for the
modern rower. Wooden seats were hard, even covered with sheepskins or,
later, space-age synthetic foam pads. The problem here was, however,
partly to do with the crew's inexperience of rowing for extended periods,
up to two hours in one stint, or of remaining seated for perhaps six or seven
hours on one of the long voyages. More wearing were the heat and the lack
of ventilation in the bowels of the ship. This was accentuated by the need
to hold trials in July and August because of the availability of crews and
accommodation only at that time of year. Without the canopy, the rowers
would have suffered severely from the effects of the sun. Even so, dehydra-
tion was a real danger, and each of Olympias' crew was asked to take aboard
and drink one litre of water for each hour of rowing. To put this into per-
spective, at this rate of consumption, the oarcrew alone would require 1.7
tonnes ofwater in a ten-hour rowing day.
Almost all the water consumed was sweated off, with the rowers feeling
relatively little need to urinate. Much of this sweat dripped onto the thala-
mians, making life particularly unpleasant for them, and also into the
bottom of the ship. The smell in the hold of Olympias became so unpleas-
ant that it had to be washed out with sea water at least once every four days
(but ancient Athenians may have been more tolerant than their modern
counterparts). More significant, however, was the amount of sweat which
could be evaporated off. Evaporation is the body's cooling mechanism and
without such cooling it cannot continue to work; the thermal efficiency of
the human body regarded as a heat-engine is only about 20%. For this
reason , ventilation is an absolute necessity for rowers, and in Olympias it is
ample for the rhranires, sufficient for the zygians, but barely adequate for
the thalamians. This may be one of the factors limiting the ship's perfor-
mance.
It is clear that the ancients used a co-ordinated stroke, just as rowers do
today. Aeschylus speaks of the 'simultaneous entry of the oar' (kopes ...
xynembolei in the Greek fleet at Salamis (Persae 3%), and in Olympias
precise timing was a necessity, both for efficient propulsion and because of
Sea trials ofOlympia s 239
73. The oars in Olympias, separated in the water by less th an 30 cm.
the limitations of space within the ship. The level of precision required
may be gauged from the fact that the 'room' available for each of the rowers
(i.e. the distance between the thole s) is onl y 0.888 m in Olympias (below,
p. 245 ), whilst across the ship, bodi es are separated by a few centimetres
(figs. 64 and 65). Because th e rowers are seated on three levels, there are in
effect three oars to each 'room' on each side of the ship, and the separation
of their blades in the water is less than 0.3 m (fig. 73).
T he number of oars has some other drawbacks. One of the facto rs
reducing the effectiveness of Olympias as a rowing machine is the turbu-
lence in the water created by the massed oars. In rowing , the water essen-
tially provides th e fulcrum for a second-order lever, which is the oar, as it
acts upon its load , which is the resistance of the hull acting through th e
thole-pin. The efficiency of an oar depends in parr upon th e amount of
slippage of the oarblade in the water (Le against the fulcrum) , and th e
blade will slip significantly mor e in disturbed than in und isturbed water.
An oarblade is thus most efficient if it is worked against clean, undisturbed
water. At a speed of 5 knots (9.26 kilometres per hour) and a rating of 30
strokes per minute, Olympias runs just over 5 metres between strokes. The
arrangement of her oars means th at at th at speed and ratin g, only 24 of the
170 are wo rking in clean water. Even at th e highe st speed yet recorded by
the ship under oat, 8.9 knots (16.48 kilometres pet hour), achieved at 46
strokes per minute, she was running 6 metres per stroke with a mere 30
oars in the clean.
In anticipation of the likelihood of considerable clashing, at least in th e
early stages of trials, the ship's oars were built to be excessively sturdy, and
were therefore extremely heavy (originally about 12 kg). This, however,
caused its own difficulties. It transpired in the first season of trials that the
rowers had to expend almost as much energy in extracting the oars from
the water as in actually driving them. The thranites, in fact, found them-
selves having to lean on the top of the oarshaft at the end of the stroke in
order to accomplish extraction at all. Consequently, in 1988, lead counter-
weights were let into the inboard section of the oarlooms, br inging the
overall weight of the oars to 14 kg for the thalamians and 17 kg for the
other two levels, but reducing the weight 'in hand' to 4 kg and 6.2 kg
respectively. Whilst this solved the extraction problem, rowers were now
wasting energy in reversing the momentum built up by the lead by the end
of the stroke. In 1990, therefore, the lead weights were knocked out and
the shafts were shaved down outboard to produce balanced but much
lighter oars, now weighing between 7 and 10 kg overall. These were much
handier, but, unsurprisingly, broke far more frequently. This was due
mostly to simple failures of the shafts rather than through collision with
other oars. The evident need for a compromise between lightness and
strength gives a good explanation as to why Athenian triereis found it nec-
essary to carry 30 spare oars (see p. 137).
Clashing had largely been eliminated by the third period of trials, in
part by changing the blade shape throughout from one with squared tip s
to a teardrop (figs. 74a and b), which allowed oars in contact to slide easily
over each other. Another problem, however, was the narrowness of the tha-
lamian oarblades as constructed for Olympias, since it resulted in a smaller
area of blade being immersed than for the upper two levels, and this could
not be rectified merely by changing the shape. The thalamians were further
handicapped by having to row with slightly more of the oarloom inboard
(i.e. with a slightly lighter gearing) because the carlings on which the oars
were worked had been insufficiently chamfered inboard of the tholepin,
The result was that at speeds of greater than about 6 knots the thalamian
rowers were virtually ineffective, which is certainly one of the reasons why
the performance of Olympias has fallen short of what was expected (below,
74a. The oars of Olympiasas originally constructed with squared tips.
pp. 262-7). Accordingly, a purpose-built set of nine oars in spruce (4.1 to

5.5 kg overall) with teardrop blades all of the same size and shape was con-
structed for experimentation during the 1990 trials. They have continued
to work extremely well at all three levels, albeit with one breakage to date.
It thus appears that, in practice , there is no reason why the size and shape
of the oarblades should not be uniform throughout, despite the evidence
suggesting that there was a visible difference between the three levels
(above, p. 172). The exact interpretation of this evidence for differentia-
tion thus remains a mystery.
Another, more minor, equipment problem concerned the oarloops
which held the oars in place forward of the wooden tholepins (see p. 215).
These consisted of leather straps sewn into loops incorporating a left or a
right hand twist to fit over the tholepins, depending on which side of the
74b. The oars of Olympias as modified in 1990 into a teardrop shape.
ship they were used. Rowing was done against these loops (fig. 75) rather
than against the tholes as in northern European rowing, which caused con-
siderable scepticism amongst many of the oarcrew. The loops were disliked
because they tended to stretch, reducing the efficiency of the stroke, and
the stitching holding them together tended to break with use. Both these
problems were partially remedied by replacing the stitching with leather
laces which could be tightened from time to time. Nevertheless, this was
not an ideal solution, and loops of various other materials were tested .
Rawhide, the use ofwhich is also attested is antiquity, was found to be too
stiff, and the best results were obtained with specially tied rope grommets.
By 1990, these had been universally adopted in the ship, and in 1994 they
were made even more efficient by the use of a knot, long employed in the
Mediterranean, which had been demonstrated to a member of the crew by
a Poros fisherman (fig. 76). This knot was easy to adjust and keep tight,
and since it also allowed the use of thinner rope than before, it might even
be possible to make use of it with a more authentic plaited-leather thong
Seatrials of Olympias 243
75. Oar in Oryrnpiasattached to rholep in with a sewn leather oarloop (the

bows of the ship are to the right) . The leather has stretched and the oar is
no longer being held tight against the pin as it should be.
instead. Both leather and rope oarloops had to be lubricated from time to
time with a lanolin substitute.
Alongside broken oars and stretched oarloops, running repairs were fre-
quently required for loose tholepins, weakened foot stretchers and broken
seats. Breakages were particularly frequent in the first season of trials as
weaknesses in the design ofthe ship's furniture became apparent, but became
fewer as minor modifications were gradually introduced. Nevertheless. even
in subsequent years, it was not unusual for the ship's repair team to deal with
one or two breakages per hour, often whilst the crew as a whole continued
rowing. The rowers were trained to check and tighten their oarloops, foot-
stretcher bindings and askiimata at every break in the rowing. Askomata also
had to be kept well greased, though less frequently than the oarloops , and
76. The rope grommet with adjustable knot introduced in 1994 on the
advice ofa Poros fisherman. T his knot allows the grommet to be tight-
ened with ease and as required . The stopper knot at one end of the
grommet has been pulled clear for clarity.
large tubs of lanolin substitute were kept available for the purpose. Every
outing was followed by a repair session on land in which those breakages
wh ich had not been dealt with immediately were made good . This need for
constant maintenance was not unexpected, given the materials which had to
be employed and the extremely large number of oar positions within the
ship. It was, however, very obvious why a ship's carpenter (naupegos) was a
regular part of the complement ofevery trieres (see p. 111).
A more serious problem was the effect oflimited space on the rowers. On
the two upper levels, rowers more than 1.78 m tall with arm-lengths normal
for their height tended to find that their reach was restricted by the back of
the man in front. This required tall rowers to take the stroke with their arms
bent, an extremely inefficient method of rowing, demanding muscular

effort to be wasted in bracing the arms, which should act for most of the
stroke only as connecting rods to harness the power of the back and legs.
For the rhalarnians , however, there was a still greater difficulty whatever
their height. It was impossible for them to take a full-length stroke because
of the positioning of the ship's main beams (zyga) forward and aft of them
at the level of their heads. The beams had been positioned as low in the
ship as possible both to keep her centre of gravity low (a crucial factor for
the stability of any ship) and to allow the thranire rowers to sit as close to
the water as possible so as to keep their oar-angle manageable. This posi-
tioning, however, meant that the thalamians were unable to swing their
heads, and therefore their bodies, beyond the beams, a restriction of the
greatest possible significance for the performance of Olympias under oar.
The length of the thalarnian stroke effectively dictated stroke length for
the whole ship because the two upper levels could not row longer than the
thalamians without destroying cohesion. And since speed in oared vessels
is a direct function of stroke length, power and rating, this limitation of
the thalamian stroke length also limited the maximum speed attainable.
In the light of these problems, it was felt that the ship could have been
worked much more efficiently if each rower had been allowed more room
and the beams were positioned to allow the thalamians to swing beneath
them. The maximum allowable room in a trieres is restricted by the struc-
tural requirements of the ship, which mean that the overall length of the
hull cannot be extended beyond about 40 metres without making it exces-
sively weak and flexible. The determining factor in Olympias was the
ancient evidence for the oarsman's room as equivalent to two cubits (see
p. 133) . There was no clear indication when she was designed as to which
of the many different cubits known from the Greek world should be
employed. It was therefore decided to employ the classical cubit of 0.444
metre, known to have been in use in fifth- and fourth-century Athens. In
1990, however, a new fifth-century metrological relief was published
which had been found on the island of Salamis five years before.? This
depicts an older, 'archaic' cubit of 0.49 metre, which thus appears to have
continued to be in use in the Attic region in the classical period alongside
the better-attested, shorter version. Moreover, excavations at Philon's naval
5 Dekoulakis-Sideris (1990).
storehouse in the Piraeus in 1989 revealed that this building of the mid-
fourth century had been constructed using a foot of 0.327 m in length and
therefore a cubit (= 1~ feet) of 0.49 m." This discovery suggested that the
longer cubit could have been used contemporaneously in other naval con-
texts, such as ship construction. If so, then the two-cubit room of an
Athenian trieres could have been as much as 0.98 metre, an invaluable 9
centimetres longer than that of the Olympias.' A further benefit of the
longer cubit would have been that the oars too would have been longer,
since their length is defined as 9 and 9 ~ cubits in the naval inventories
(pp. 137-8 and 215), which would have allowed the beams to be placed
higher whilst leaving the thranite oars at the same angle.
It has been suggested by Hale (1973; 1996) and by Harnilron-Smirh
and Corlett (1989) that ancient crews made use of a sliding technique,
moving their bodies fore and aft along the seat. This would both allow an
increase in leg drive and lengthen the stroke without requiring an exten-
sion of the room for each oarsman. Any sliding would be over a much
shorter distance than in a modern racing craft, about 15 cm as opposed to
40-50 cm actual movement on the sliding seats with wheels which are
used in today's boats. The evidence put forward for the use ofsuch a tech-
nique in antiquity includes the recorded use of a cushion by rowers (see
p. 135). A leather cushion could have been used in the manner of nine-
teenth-century competition oarsmen, who attempted to slide on polished
wooden seats by reinforcing their breeches with greased, soft leather. If it
were made of sheepskin with the fleece outside, the natural lanolin would
have produced the same effect. In addition, we have a sixth-century
Corinthian vase (GOS Arch. 50, p. 90 and PI. 12f) and the Lenormant
Relief (fig. 13), both of which show rowers with knees bent, and a line
from a comic play in which a trainee oarsman is told to 'extend your leg'
(peGS Eupolis fr. 268 (Taxiarchs) 53-5).
All this evidence is, however, equally compatible with fixed-seat rowing.
Cushions could have been used simply for comfort and to adjust the
oarsman's height relative to that of his oar. The nineteenth-century racers,
moreover, found that sliding would become more difficult as a race pro-
gressed and the grease on their pants wore away. In fact, simple sheepskins
(not made into cushions) were employed on board Olympias in the first
6 Steinhauer (1989). 7 Morrison (1991) .

two seasons of trials, but offered only a limited improvement in comfort
over the bare wood and soon became dirty and smelly. One highly experi-
enced oarsman did attempt a sliding stroke on his sheepskin, fleece down,
during the 1988 trials but he did not manage to slide more than a few
inches more than his fixed-seat colleagues and found it tiring and difficult
to sustain for any period on the seat with its side bolsters designed to keep
the bottom in place. In Olympias, the sheepskins were eventually replaced
by synthetic pads which made sliding entirely impossible but did make the
rowing much more comfortable. The argument from the iconographical
and literary evidence for bent knees appears, at first glance, to be more per-
suasive, but this, too, is inconclusive. The rising and falling of the knees to
the extent depicted in the Lenorrnant Relief is a feature of fixed-seat as well
as of sliding-seat rowing, and the legs, in fact, provide a very important
component of the drive. This can be observed today in Thames skiffs and
Cornish gigs alike, and was very obvious in Olympiaswhose crew were fre-
quently exhorted to make more use of their legs. Overall, the difference
between the fixed-seat stroke which was actually employed in Olympias
and the short sliding stroke which has been postulated may be relatively
small and of little real significance.
As part of the rowing trials, experiments were carried out in backing the
ship, a manoeuvre which would obviously have been essential in antiquity
in the aftermath ofany ramming attack. When initially attempted in 1987,
ordinary backing, with the rowers pushing on the oars from their regular
positions, appeared to be impracticable, and little sternway was made.
Repeat attempts in subsequent years demonstrated that this was the result
of crew inexperience and the ship was backed successfully at speeds in
excess of three knots. An alternative method was for the rowers to turn
round on their seats and row forward with the oar of the rower behind. This
manoeuvre could be carried out in less than 20 seconds, and allowed the
ship to be moved sternwards at speeds of up to five knots, which was little
short of its forward speed in similar conditions. Olympias could easily have
been backed away from a rammed victim by either method. Early worries
about the control of the dual rudders when moving astern at speed proved
to be unfounded. In 1992, an experienced helmsman had little difficulty in
manoeuvring the ship as he wished by moving the tillers in the usual way.
Attempts to move the ship sideways, however, have met with lesssuccess.
Such a manoeuvre might be thought to be a necessary requirement for ships
halted in line abreast or in the defensive bows-outward formation (p, 54) to

enable them to keep station relative to one other without drifting together.
Various figure-of-eight or 'sculling' strokes have been tried in each of the
sea trials without measurable effect. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given the
resistance presented by the length of hull and keel which we were trying to
move. It is possible that the secret remains to be discovered, but the
problem could have been overcome by rowing the ship backwards and for-
wards so that drift could be corrected by steering. In that case, keeping still
would have required a crew to keep on rowing more or less continuously
and would not have allowed them to rest (see the Persian ships stationed in
the straits the night before the battle of Salamis, p. 58).
On the whole it was possible to keep the entire crew rowing in all condi-
tions in which it was safe to keep the ship at sea, even in waves as high as
0.75 m, although in rough water the rowing master (keleustes) had to work
hard at maintaining crew cohesion. The thalamians, naturally enough,
had the hardest time in such conditions, and often found themselves
rowing with the whole oarshaft buried. Zygians and thranites had few
problems beyond the maintenance of timing. All three levels, however, did
find it almost impossible not to shorten the stroke in rough water. Rowing
into the wind was exhausting, and on one occasion, with windspeed
gusting to over 20 knots, forward speed dropped to 0.5 knots. In such con-
ditions, the best strategy for an ancient crew would have been to run for
shelter, whereas Olympias had the option of being taken in tow by her
Hellenic Navy escort vessel. It was very clear that, with the whole crew
rowing into a strong wind, there was a limited amount of time before
exhaustion would set in and the ship would be in danger, especially off a
lee shore. The conservation of the human engine of oared warships is a
factor of ancient seafaring almost entirely ignored by present-day histo-
rians, although it was obvious enough to Herodotus when he wrote about
the state of the Persian fleet at Salamis.
The sea trials: command, control and communication under oar
A major difficulty imposed by the design of the ship was that of command,
control and communication. Ancient crews undoubtedly worked to a
well-developed and practised system. There are a few clues in the ancient
evidence, both literary and visual, as to how such a system might have
Sea trials ojOlympias 249
operated, although these were insufficient to allow the rowing masters in
Olympias to attempt an immediate recreation.
It is certain that audible signals were employed to help the rowers keep
time. The ancient texts make it clear that this was normally the respon-
sibility of the keleustis (literally, the 'exhorter'). In Aristophanes' Frogs, as
the central character, the god Dionysos, settles down to row across the
River Styx in order to bring the poet Euripides back from the underworld,
he tells the infern al ferryman, Charon, to 'start exhorting' (katakeleue)
(207), and the latter takes up the call Oopop, 0 opop to set the cadence of
the stroke (208; cf. 180; Birds 1395). A similar call, ryppapai is recorded
later in the same play (1073), and the fact that elsewhere Aristophanes can
refer to a ship's crew as 'the ryppapai' (Wasps 909) may reflect its use as a
refrain sung by the rowers. The rhythm of these calls, incidentally, corre-
sponds very well to that experienced in Olympias as the stroke was driven
through and then the oar held in its oarloop bounced against the thole-pin
on extraction. The Roman poet Ovid also speaks of the rowing cadence as
being set verbally (Metamorphoses 3.618-19). That keleustai performed
this task in triereis is confirmed by a passage ofXenophon, who tells how
the chinking ofstones was used to replace the voices of the rowing-masters
on board a squadron of triereis attempting to pursue another unnoticed at
night (HG 5.1.8). Furthermore, a number ofAttic black-figure vasesshow
vesselsunder oar with a man, who can only be the keleustis, standing amid -
ships and either thrusting forward or raising his arms, apparently alter-
nately and sometimes accompanied by the helmsman (see fig. 31) . The
most obvious explanation is that he is gesturing in time with the rowing to
add a visual signal to the verbal.
We know that it was also the task of the keleustis to give instructions to
the crew, for instance to start and stop rowing (e.g. Euripides Helen
1575-6, 1590, 1595-6; Aristophanes Frogs 269). Thueydides twice men-
tions the difficulty of hearing keleustai over the din of battle and the prob-
lems this caused for critical manoeuvring (2.84.3; 7.70.6). Whilst
passage-making, on the other hand, the most important function of these
officers was to maintain morale and keep the men going. Xenophon makes
this quite explicit in a passage already cited (Oecon. 21.3; see p. 112).
Good communication between the keleusti» and the oarcrew was thus a
prerequisite for the operation of any trieres. Putting the clues from the
ancient evidence into practice was not, however, as straightforward as it
might appear. Calling time would be unproblematical in Charon's rowing

boat, and even perhaps in the relatively small one- or two-level ships of the
black-figure vases. In Ofympias, however, the length of the hull and its
complement of wooden furniture and 170 sound-absorbing human
bodies meant that the human voice could not be made to carry through-
out. Calls at maximum volume reached, at most , one third of the way
down the ship, thus leaving the majority of the crew out of earshot wher-
ever the rowing master was situated. Anybody standing in the central
gangway also absorbed sound and reduced the range still further.
In the first season of trials, the rowing masters attempted to overcome
the immediate problem by the use of hand-held electronic megaphones,
but even these proved to be inadequate. Consequently, a system ofsix elec-
tronic loudspeakers was installed along the ship for 1988 , and the rowing
masters directed operations through a microphone and amplifier situated
at the stern. At stroke rates of up to the low thirties, it was necessary to call
time continuously. The system worked well enough, although it was diffi-
cult for the rowing master to do much more than mark each stroke at these
lower ratings. Whilst this enabled the sea trials to get under way, it did not,
of course, further investigation of historical methods of communication.
Moreover, safety requirements meant that any experimentation without
the speakers which might lead to loss ofcontrol of the oarcrew was discou-
raged by the Hellenic Navy. It was therefore, in a way, fortunate that the
loudspeaker technology was not always entirely reliable. Breakdowns
caused by flat batteries or loose connections, on one occasion during a crit-
ical docking manoeuvre, forced the rowing masters to develop effective
alternative methods of communicating with the crew in emergencies, and
these have at least suggested how things could have been done in antiquity.
The first method adopted was to instal a piper (auletes) to assist the
keleustes in setting time. The ancient evidence makes it quite clear that tri-
ereis normally carried pipers (above, p. 111), although there is no direct
indication as to their purpose.
Not all the pipes tried were effective. Replicas of an ancient double-
reeded aulos proved difficult to play for sustained periods and produced a
type of squawk which failed to carry through the ship. This may,
however, have been the result of ignorance of the appropriate playing
technique. Others, including the drone from a Bulgarian bagpipe,
proved to be similarly ineffectual. In the end, the most practicable instru-
Sea trials ojOlympias 251
rnent was found to be a cheap, bamboo or tin whistle, which required rel-
atively little breath to play loud and whose high-pitched sound (rather
like that of the latter-day bo'sun's 'call') just carried half the length of the
ship when played in the gangway (although it could easily be heard as
much as a kilometre away across the sea). In Olympias, the piper was situ-
ated amidships in the gangway just astern of the mainmast, at a point
equidistant from the rowers at each end of the ship. As we have already
noted (pp. 112-13), this is the position assigned by Euripides in the
HypsipyLe (61-7) to Orpheus, who, however, plays his traditional instru-
ment the lyre to keep the Argonauts in time.
The pipe was adopted initially in 1988 as a back-up when the loud-
speakers failed. It was also found to be of value when they were operating
normally, in relieving both the rowing master from the task of constantly
setting the cadence and the crew from suffering boredom on long rows. It
was even possible to develop a set of simple calls signifying commands
such as 'get ready', 'row', 'easy oars' (i.e. 'stop rowing'), and so on. Its use
was not, however, entirely without problems. Simply blowing time was
(literally) monotonous and extremely tedious for the crew, but relatively
few modern tunes provided the right rhythm. The Skye Boat Song worked
well (appropriately enough), but the real 'hit' was Pachelbel's Canon in D.
The pipe was, nevertheless, unpopular with those seated in the immediate
vicinity, who found it extremely loud and piercing and objected whenever
it was played. Most took to inserting wax earplugs to protect themselves-
a move reminiscent of Homer's Odysseus, who waxed the ears of his sailors
to protect them from the blandishments of the Sirens ( Odyssey 12.173-7).
More seriously, playing in time with the crew was far from easy, and
musical ability was less important than rowing skill. Most modern rowers
time the stroke from seeing and feeling the entry of the oarblade into the
water, but this entry was invisible to the piper who therefore had to judge
it from the movement of the rowers' shoulders. Moreover, if the piper fol-
lowed either the stern or the midships rowers exactly, the sound tended to
arrive in the bows and the stern about !1o of a second late, enough to
appear out of time to the stern and to make the bows row late. This in turn
made the stern feel that they were taking the weight of the ship by them-
selves and tired them very quickly. A good compromise was for the piper to
follow the stern rowers but anticipate the catch by the appropriate fraction
of a second (although unskilled players could be made to perform through
the speakers to obviate the problem). Even better was to have the whole
crew hum one of the appropriate tunes, either in time with the pipe or
unaccompanied. Such humming produced quite superb timing, on one
occasion allowing the crew to row together in total darkness.
Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence that the ancient Greeks ever
hummed in our sense, either at sea or ashore (but see Aeschylus
Agamemnon 16).
At long-distance cruising rates, in the lower thirties or below, some sort
of continuous audible signal was more or less essential. At higher rates and
speeds , this was no longer necessary and the pipe was not normally used .
The crew relied instead on the rhythmical feel and sound of the rowing
and the motion of the hull which was now strong enough to follow. It was
then sufficient for the rowing master to say something to the crew in time
with the rhythm every ten strokes or so. In Olympias, however, the role of
the rowing master went well beyond the setting of the rhythm, with or
without the aid of the piper, and the simple giving of instructions. One of
the more pressing duties was to watch for breaks in the cohesion of the
rowing and to correct them.
This did not involve the coaching of individuals for timing or tech-
nique, which would have been quite impracticable. From the central
gangway, where Olympias' rowing masters normally stood or roved up and
down, only the crew's bodies and the inboard portion of the oarlooms were
visible. Individual coaching would have required a view of the oarblades,
which were out ofsight. In order to see the latter, it was necessary to climb
onto the canopy, from where one could see one side of oars at a time
(although it was easy enough to step across the slot for the gangway to the
other side), but not simultaneously with the rowers' bodies. Without the
canopy as a vantage point, as apparently in the Greek triereis of the early
fifth century and before, it would have been even more awkward for the
keleustes to obtain a good view of the blades. From the canopy, however, it
was difficult to address the rowers either as a group or individually. It was
possible to speak to individual thranites by lying on the canopy and
poking one's head over the side, but one could only instruct the zygians
and thalamians below through the thranites, Even then, it was not always
easy to determine which of the 85 oarblades visible on each side was being
worked by which rower; to assist in this, numbered labels were stuck to the
upward side of Olympias' oarshafts,
Individual coaching in the ship was thus a cumbersome and difficult
affair. The task was initially accomplished by dividing the crew into six or
eight sections, each coached by a team leader who clambered between
gangway and canopy observing and instructing. After the second set of
trials, crew cohesion would normally develop rapidly enough for the
number of team leaders to be reduced to two or three within a few days,
and they then became concerned mostly with safety, going to the assis-
tance of individual rowers who had got into trouble or 'caught a crab'.
There is no evidence for such team leaders in antiquity. One would expect
most trieres crews, at least in Athens, to have been made up of men who
had already gained experience in smaller ships and boats. This is implied in
a passage already cited from the pseudo-Xenophontic Constitution ofthe
Athenians (1.19; see pp. 36, 116), which suggests that rowing would have
been familiar to virtually every Athenian of whatever class who had ever
gone to sea. This would have reduced considerably the need for individual
coaching in ordinary circumstances. When it was necessary, it is most
likely to have been done by an unskilled man's neighbours in the ship, as
their own rowing would have been adversely affected to a much greater
extent than in any modern craft.
Certainly, in Olympias a good deal of the coaching was done by the
rowers themselves. From the beginning of the first set of trials in 1987, the
rowers were organised into natural groups of three, the triads already men-
tioned (p. 236), arranged vertically and each consisting of a thranite, the
zygian sitting below and alongside, and the thalamian sitting below and
immediately sternwards. The thranite in each triad, who was in the unique
position of being able to see both the oarblades and inside the ship, was
best placed to coach his companions, instructing them verbally on how to
move their oarhandles in order to keep the blades in time and avoid clash-
ing. Such triads very quickly became close-knit little groups who moved
together as one. Since both the thranite and the zygian in each triad could
see the movement of the crew along the ship, they were responsible for
transmitting the rowing rhythm downwards. The thalamian in each triad,
being unable to see the bodies of his own triad, would follow the move-
ment of the zygian in the triad immediately sternward ofhis own, which in
itselfhelped to mesh adjacent triads together. The system proved to be very
noisy at first, with individual thranites, team leaders and the rowing
master all passing instructions at the same time, but within a few days, as
triads came together and the number of team leaders was reduced, the level
of hubbub gradually subsided. Eventually, the thranites would only have
to provide guidance from time to time, usually when a wave had hit the
triad or the rhythm had been disrupted in some other way, and similarly,
team leaders would no longer have to coach continuously. Indeed,
although there was always a temptation for the rowers to chat amongst
themselves , at least until they became tired, the ship would operate best
when crew silence was maintained.
Almost all the talking would then be done by the rowing master, giving
instructions, reinforcing the timing, or just giving encouragement. It was
his job to relay the commands of the captain, for greater effort in order to
clear a headland, say, or to paddle light during docking, or to co-ordinate
changeovers when rowing in shifts. He would also have to watch for a
breakdown of cohesion or loss of timing, either within a particular section
of the crew which had been disrupted by a 'crab' or some other mishap, or
when the timing of the bow or centre section had got ahead of or behind
that of the stern through loss of concentration. This could happen and
affect the rowing quite badly within a few seconds, so that the rowing
master had to keep on constant alert . From 1988, it was a standing order in
Olympias that only the captain and the rowing master's immediate assist-
ants should speak to or distract him while the ship was under oar.
Timing discrepancies would be corrected by asking the crew to count
ten strokes aloud and check timing visually across the ship. This simple
device would normally bring the crew back into time within three or four
strokes, and it proved possible with one of the trial crews to train the
rowers to set up a count spontaneously whenever they felt a problem: those
most affected would begin and the rest of the crew would join in.
Continuous counting by the whole crew would undoubtedly have
required too much breath and is unlikely to have been sustainable, unlike
the humming which was successfully employed from time to time in
Olympias. On the other hand, it might have been possible for them to join
in a verbal chorus led by the rowing master (as in a sea chanty), perhaps
using the ryppapai of the Wasps, but this has not been tested .
The most important task of the rowing master proved to be the mainte-
nance ofcrew morale, just as described by Xenophon. This was done in part
by keeping the crew informed about such matters as wind-strength, rates of
striking, speed and progress made (about which it proved best to be as
honest as possible). On long pulls the greatest enemy was boredom: it was
important to provide constant encouragement and reassurance about the
quality of the rowing, and, after a sustained period of rowing and when the
crew had tired oflistening to the pipe, reading almost anything to the crew
produced an immediate increase of up to a knot in speed. Rowing in shifts
of two levels at a time, forty minutes on and twenty minutes off, also
helped. By rotating the crew by levels so that the top two tiers of oars were
always manned, it was possible to allow the level who were off-duty to rest
in the bilges. After a few rotations, most of those resting would fall instantly
asleep, to awaken spontaneously just before the changeover. In this way, the
crew could be kept under oars for six or more hours at a time, without
building up excessive fatigue. We know from Thucydides (3.49) that
rowing in shifts was not unknown in antiquity (though probably without
moving the crew around), since it was done on the famous dash from
Piraeus to Mytilene to prevent the massacre of the leading citizens after the
suppression of a revolt in 427 BC. The fact that the historian draws atten-
tion to it, however, suggests that this may have been an exceptional measure
resulting from the emergency and the distance to be covered. It is more
likely that ancient Athenian crews were sufficiently hardened to row stints
of, say, fiveor six hours all together and continuously (above, pp. 95-6).
The rowing master in Olympiaswould normally stand in the gangway at
the stern, from where he could get the best view of the whole crew, and
speak into a microphone through the loudspeaker system. Whenever the
speaker system was not working, it was necessary for him to roam up and
down the gangway to talk to the crew. At these times, a special system of
address had to be devised for any instructions which required instant and
simultaneous reaction by the whole crew. It was discovered that if the
rowing master stood near the stern facing forward, and an assistant stood
in the bows facing him, they could co-ordinate verbal orders by gesturing
and reading each other's lips, and their joint voices would carry through-
out the crew. This proved to be surprisingly effective, especially during the
1993 trials on the River Thames when the mainmast had been left ashore
because of the low bridges. It was, ofcourse, necessary to keep the gangway
clear of other personnel, both to preserve lines of sight and to prevent the
absorption ofsound.
We know that a bow-officer (priirates) formed a regular part of the crew
of a trieres (pp. 111-13), and such relaying of commands may have
formed an important part of his duties. In this context, one may note that
whilst at least one Attic black-figure vase shows the proratis facing forwards
as look -out on a ship under sail (fig. 30), most vases and the dal Pozzo
drawing showing ships under oar depict him as looking sternwards (figs.
11 and 31). Moreover, both the bow-officer and the helmsman (kubernetes)
are sometimes depicted as gesturing simultaneously with the keleustis,
which is evidence, perhaps, that these three officers directed the oarcrew in
concert. Another officer, the pentekontarchos ('commander of fifty'), who
appears to have been junior to the keleustes ([Xen.] Const. ofAthenians 1.2),
might also have assisted.
Other approaches to the problem are possible. For instance, one could
extend the device of having a section of the crew lead the counting for the
correction of timing mistakes to the transmission of commands: orders
could be repeated by the rowers nearest the rowing master and then by the
whole crew before execution either on the next stroke or on a visual signal
from the rowing master. In Olympias, even when the electronic speakers
were in use, it was found to be necessary to have the whole crew count
down strokes to easy oars (i.e. to ceasing rowing), in order to ensure simul-
taneous execution by so large a number of people. Whatever happened in
antiquity (and systems probably varied), experience in Olympias has dem-
onstrated that there is no great difficulty in maintaining effective verbal
communication within a ship with the dimensions of a trieres, so long as
there is a pre-arranged system in place and general silence is maintained
(on this, see Thucydides 2.89.9). On the other hand, it is easy to see why a
system such as this could have broken down on occasion amid the din of
battle.
The sea trials: sailing

Trials of the ship under sail were restricted by the factors already discussed
(pp . 234-6). Safety under sail was a particular worry for the Hellenic Navy
because offears that the mainmast tabernacle in Olympiaswas not attached
sufficiently firmly to the beams and floors of the ship. Because of this, the
first captain had ordered the fining of four shrouds, although the vase evi-
dence suggests strongly that the mast would have been unstayed in antiq-
uity (above, p. 224). The spars of the ship, however, have evidently been
made unnecessarily sturdy and heavy. Ancient vases in fact show yards so
Seatrials ofOlympias 257
77 . Olympias under sail.
flimsy that they flex under their own weight (figs. 26, 47). In the event, the
stayed mast and stiff yards of Olympias appear to be capable of enduring
conditions far worse than the hull could hope to survive.
Despite the anxieties, the ship was sailed at least for short periods in
each season of trials, and in 1992 conditions made it desirable to sail for a
full day, before the wind , from Salamis, east of Aegina, to Poros (figs. 69
and 77) . Even this limited experience has been sufficient to demonstrate
that Olympias sails very well indeed and is well balanced between her two
masts, hull and double rudders. Handling of the ropes to control the area
and shape of the sails was straightforward , in the normal manner ofsquare
rigs. The ancient system for reducing sail by brailing lines was shown to
work easily and expeditiously. Nevertheless, it required a certain amount
of co-ordination and understanding amongst the deck crew. It would
appear from the ancient evidence that triereis carried ten men (the
hyperesia), divided between the mainsail and the foresail, who could be
used for this purpose (see above, p. 113). This number was entirely ade-
qu ate for Olympias.
The ship was easy to control, even at high speed, and it was found that
her tendency towards weather helm (i.e. to turning into the wind) could be
corrected without difficulty by brailing up a portion of the mainsail on the

lee side. It was also observed that pulling the clews (the lower corners of the
sails) too far aft and so setting the sails into a hemispherical, baggy shape,
would lead to a significant loss of drive. On one occasion in particular in
1992 , when the ship was sailing into the wind and close-hauled to port on a
starboard tack, the foresail filled and drew normally but the mainsail was
backwinding (i.e. collapsing in the middle). This was cured by attaching a
bowline from a clew ring on the windward side of the mainsail to the fore-
mast, and then drawing it tight. Whilst the sails were rigged in this way, a
gust of up to 20 knots produced the most dramatic surge yet experienced in
Olympias, driving her rapidly up to 4.6 knots and heeling her over to 6° or
T", This was the greatest heel recorded for the ship at sea and was initially
alarming to the crew, not least because water began to seep in through dry
hull seams which had hitherto been above the waterline. Consequently, the
sails were immediately hauled up. Nevertheless, it was clear that the ship
was in fact entirely stable in these conditions, was still accelerating, and
could have gone on to attain much higher speed had she been allowed,
whilst seepage of water would probably have been cut off quickly by swell-
ing of the wood. At no time did the thalamian oarports appear to have been
submerged, and certainly no water came through the askdmata. By con-
trast, on the long sail in 1992, when the wind stayed between 10 and 20
knots and within two points of dead astern for over six hours, there was a
tendency for the foresail to collapse. This was cured by raising the bunt of
the mainsail beyond halfway, so that the wind could pass under it and refill
the foresail. It was not clear, however, that this helped the speed overall
because the advantage given by having the foresail drawing was cancelled
out by the loss of a significant proportion of the mainsail; it may neverthe-
less have helped to keep the ship more steadily on course. The wind-friction
of Olympias' hull is considerable, much of it caused by the drag on the
canopy. The large stern, probably intended to provide protection from mis-
siles for the kubernetes in battle or to provide cover for defenders when the
ship was attacked from shore when moored stern to, also caused problems ,
acting as a large air-scoop and brake. It would have created particular diffi-
culties in bad weather, which again emphasises the extent to which the
trieres was designed for fair-weather rowing and sailing.
It was possible to row and sail simultaneously (power-sail), but only
within a relatively narrow range of conditions, and there is no ancient evi-
dence for this practice. There was certainly no advantage in power-sailing
when wind speed was less than rowing speed. On the other hand, in a fol-
lowing breeze driving the ship at up to about 4 knots under sail alone,
bringing in the oars could add one or two knots with relatively little effort
from the rowers. The main obstacle was heel under sail, which , when it
reached about 4° to one side, began seriously to impede the thalamians on
that side (see also pp. 160-1). Power-sailing was particularly difficult when
the ship was close-hauled, both because of the heel and because the sharp,
fast stroke with minimal recovery time, necessary in order to maintain
momentum into the wind between strokes, was very tiring to the rowers.
Close-hauled power-sailing was thus impracticable at hull speeds greater
than about 4 knots . With a tailwind, when heeling was less of a problem
and it was possible for the rowers to take a measured recovery and allow the
ship to run between strokes, it was practicable to power-sail up to about 5
or 6 knots. If the sails were still drawing at any speed greater than this, the
sea was normally beginning to be too rough for comfortable rowing, and
calculations suggest that at sailing speeds of above circa 7.5 knots in
Aegean waters one could expect there always to be some thalamian oars
along the hull which were locked under a wave. The practicality of power-
sailing is thus very much dependent upon the severity and direction of the
weather.
Performance under oar and sail

The performance and manoeuvrability of the ship were investigated under
oar and sail and in a variety of conditions over the first four seasons of the
Trireme Trust's trials, in 1987, 1988, 1990 and 1992. No significant per-
formance figures were obtained in 1993 , when the ship was taking part in
displays celebrating the 2,500th anniversary of Greek democracy on the
River Thames in London, or in 1994 at Poros, when there were only 120
oarcrew and experimentation focused on communications and measure-
ments of stroke length.
In 1987 speeds had to be measured fairly crudely, by means of a
'Dutchman's log', that is by throwing a piece of wood out from a fixed
point at the bows so that it floated alongside the ship and measuring the
time taken for it to be passed by a fixed point in the stern. In addition, a
number of sprint runs was carried out parallel to the coastline at Poros. In
order to achieve more accurate speed measurements for these runs, a 2,000
metre course was laid out, with distance markers placed at 500 metre inter-
vals on the shore in positions determined from a nautical chart. A shorter,
500-foot (l52.4-metre) course was laid Out with markers on the quayside
at the ship's base to record acceleration runs. Timing was carried out by
sighting the markers off the ship with the aid of a hand-held bearing
compass. Comparison with the Dutchman's log readings suggested that
the latter were generally accurate to within 5%.
By 1988, a mechanical impeller-log had been fitted to the keel of the
ship near the stern, providing direct readings on a display panel in front of
the helmsman. Like all such logs, it had to be calibrated, and this was done
with the aid of a Geodimeter, an infrared measuring device which took
continuous readings from the shore. This worked by bouncing an infrared
signal off a circle of 16 reflecting prisms set up on a 2.5 m high tripod
placed on the deck of the ship. The Geodimeter automatically tracked the
ship once its signal had been locked on to the prisms and as long as the line
of sight was not interrupted for more than four seconds. It was able to
record the ship's position up to 4 km away to an accuracy of a few centime-
tres, and produced a continuous computer readour of the ship 's position
against time elapsed. This allowed calculation of both the ship 's speed and
its precise movement through the water. Simultaneously, the distance and
speed readings of the ship's log and her heading according to the onboard
fluxgate magnetometer compass were recorded by video camera. The
internal clock of the Geodimeter's computer and that of the onboard video
camera were synchronised before each outing, so that at the end of each
day it was possible to enter data from the two in parallel onto a single
record sheet. In this way, it was possible to establish from calibration runs
that the ship's log was consistently producing readings for distance covered
within 4% of those produced by the Geodimeter. The log's speed readings,
however, which it produced every second, fluctuated wildly, and were
apparently affected by water turbulence along the hull, so only those
derived from the Geodimeter are given here.
The Geodimeter was unavailable in 1990, and the log was calibrated for
this season of trials against a nautical mile measured from charts and read
on board by compass bearing from landmarks on the coastline of Poros.
The calibration showed that at about 5.5 knots the log's speed reading now
had to be multiplied by a factor of 0.89 to obtain a corrected true speed.
The readings continued to fluctuate erratically, however, and the figures

presented here have been averaged out from a series of log readings and
then corrected.
By 1992, a hand-held navigation aid known as a Global Positioning
System (GPS) had become commercially available. This device takes bear-
ings from NASA satellites overhead with sufficient frequency and preci-
sion to produce speed readings accurate to + or - 0.1 knot. It was
employed for all performance readings during the 1992 sea trials.
The manoeuvrability of Olympias under oar was undoubtedly impres-
sive. The most precise data were obtained in 1988 because of the availabil-
ity of the Geodimeter. The tightest turn was effected with one side rowing
whilst the oars on the inside of the turn were held clear. Entering the turn
at 6.1 knots and 32 strokes per minute, the ship went through a 360° turn
in a diameter ofonly 62 m (1.9 ship lengths), but with a loss of 50% of the
speed . In another trial, with all oars rowing on at 34 strokes per minute
and entering at 7.0 knots, the ship was turned in a larger circle of 110 m
(3.4 ship lengths) in diameter, but with a loss of only 28% of speed
(turning figures which are, incidentally, comparable with modern war-
ships). Which of these options a kubernetes would have chosen in battle
would no doubt have depended upon circumstances. In both cases the
turn took about 2 minutes (a rate of 3° per second). Rudder effectiveness
was tested with a repeated zig-zag manoeuvre (known as the Kempf
manoeuvre) with the helm being put over to 22~0 first one way and then
the other. In this test Olympiaswas found to check her yaw and respond to
her helm very quickly. Finally, a crash stop manoeuvre was also carried out,
although this required care as the oars were lowered in order to 'hold water'
to prevent individuals from 'catching a crab'. It was found that Olympias
could be reduced easily and safely from 5.7 knots to 1.1 knots in 0.9 ship
lengths."
A few performance figures for Olympias under sail have been obtained
in the course of various sea trials, and these, too, have been excellent. The
ship has been shown to be safe and stable in winds of up to 25 knots. In
1987, with a 22-knot wind just abaft the beam she rolled and heeled just
enough to allow water to to come in by the thalarnian askiimata, that is
about 10° to 12° from upright. She has also sailed (in 1988) to within 65°
8 Lowry and Squire (1988 ).

of the apparent wind, with only 50 to r of leeway, and she appears to be

capable of sailing as close as 60 0 into the apparent wind. The ratio of ship
speed ro rrue wind speed has been measured ar between 0.7 and 0.4 in a 4-
knot wind (i.e a ship speed of between 2.8 and 1.6 knots), reducing to 0.2
in a 25-knot wind (i.e. a ship speed of 5 knots). The fall in the ratio is of
course due to the shortening of sail as wind speed increases. Winds
between following and quartering of about 15 knots apparent have
allowed Olympias to sail comfortably under full sail at 7 knots or more." In
1992, a following gust of about 20 knots drove her momentarily up to
10.8 knots, her fastest recorded speed to date .
Peformance figures under oar have been more disappointing. In general,
speed and endurance under oar have increased significantly over the five
seasons of trials, as rowing and coaching techniques have become estab-
lished and the oarcrew have been better selected. The greatest advances
naturally came in the first and second years. In 1987, by far the longest
continuous piece of rowing achieved over the three weeks of trials was of
about 25 minutes duration at light pressure. 5.67 knots was maintained at
33 strokes per minute and 14 pressure over a measured 2,000 metres . The
highest sustained speed was 6.65 knots at 38-39 strokes per minute over
500 metres, and the highest absolute speed 6.95 knots in a 15-stroke burst
at 38, measured by Dutchman's Log. In acceleration trials along a marked
course, it took 30 seconds to attain a speed of 6 knots from a standing
start.
These results can be compared with those obtained in 1988 (measured
by the Geodimeter), when a much more powerful and effective crew
achieved an average of 6.65 knots at 38 strokes per minute over 2,000
metres, and peak speeds in short bursts of 7.7 knots with both rudders
down, and 8.0 knots with one rudder fully raised and one rudder half-
raised. In acceleration trials a speed of7 knots was attained in 32 seconds.
The 1990 crew was stronger still and better trained, and the emphasis of
the trials shifted towards experimenting with passage-making. In particu-
lar, a voyage was undertaken over three days from Poros to Nafplion and
back. In the course of the outward journey, a stretch of 14 nautical miles
was covered at an average speed of 5 knots with a variable following wind.
9 See O . T. P. Roberts in JSM and JFC (1989) pp. 54-6; JFC, Platis and Shaw
(1990) pp. 32-7; and Shaw (1993) pp. 29-38.
In a 20-knot tailwind, a sustainable 5.4 knots was recorded with the whole
crew rowing at 30 strokes per minute, 5.6 knots sailing only, and 6.6 knots
simultaneously under sail and oar with only the top two levels rowing. On
the return journey into a strengthening headwind with sometimes the
whole crew and sometimes only the top two levels rowing (in shifts), 31
nautical miles were covered in 7.4 hours (including changeover time) at an
average speed of 4.2 knots (6.8 hours actual rowing time, averaging 4.6
knots). Maximum speed trials were carried out towards the end of this
season, after the crew had been toughened up by the voyage. In a Rat-out
sprint with the fuIJ crew rowing at 37 !12 to 39 strokes per minute and with
both rudders down, one nautical mile was covered in 8 minutes and 31
seconds , which is an average speed of7.0 knots. Then with both rudders
clear of the water and from a running start, an average of 8.3 knots (cor-
rected) was maintained over the last 45 seconds ofa 90-second run at 44 to
47 strokes per minute, with a (corrected) peak reading of 8.9 knots being
recorded at 46 strokes per minute. This last figure, however, represents
only a momentary Huctuation of the ship's log.
The quality of the 1992 oarcrew was the highest to date, although it was
very slightly under strength in numbers. After a short period of initial
training, the ship was taken under oar north from Poros through the
Saronic Gulf, and was then towed through the Corinth Canal and docked
for the night in Corinth. She set out on the return journey the next
morning, becoming the first vessel to be rowed through the Canal, and
continued on to Salamis in a single day (although, in the face ofan extreme
headwind, she had to be towed into Salamis Bay). After a rest day, she was
then rowed and sailed southwards, past Aigina, back to Poros.
Maximum speed trials were again carried out towards the end of the
trials in Poros Bay. In a sustained one-hour piece, with 154 people rowing
at ratings of 34 to 36 strokes per minute, and with the port rudder raised,
she covered 2.97 nautical miles in the first half-hour and 5.77 nautical
miles in total. Unfortunately,several of the crew had to return home before
the short sprints could be completed, and the Rat-out trials were carried
out with 49 absentees and .only 5 of the thalamian seats filled.
Nevertheless, the remaining crew were able to achieve a momentary peak
speed with both rudders raised of 8.2 knots (recorded by the GPS) at 48
strokes per minute. This in fact represents the highest effective power
output per rower yet recorded on the ship, 147 W per rower, compared
with 118 W per rower for the 8.9 knot peak recorded by a full crew in
1990.
In summary, therefore, in long-distance trials, Olympias achieved
maxim urn voyaging speeds under oar of 5.4 knots in 1990 and 5.77 knots
in 1992. Between 1987 and 1990, her speed in sustained pieces of more
than 8 minutes {such as might be required in battle conditions} was
increased from 5.67 to 7 knots. Over the same period, her momentary
peak speed (which would be required only immediately before ramming
an opponent) was raised from 6.95 knotS to 8.9 knots, and the full 1992
crew should, on the performance with depleted numbers, have been able
momentarily to exceed 9 knots.
These improvements are put into perspective by the effective-
power/speed curves for Olympias (fig. 78). This was deduced by calcula-
tion and from tank tests ofan accurate model of her hull carried out for the
Hellenic Navy. Some crude resistance measurements of Olympias herself
were taken during towing trials in 1988 and were generally in line with the
tank trials. The figures on which the graph was based are subject to error
but can nevertheless be taken as reasonably accurate overall, and they form
the basis for all the effective power figures given here. The tank trials
showed that resistance is derived mainly from skin friction on the hull up
to about 6 knots, above which wave-making resistance at the bows
becomes a more significant factor, being equal to about a quarter of skin
friction at about 9 knots and progressively greater above that speed. In
practical terms, an increase in speed from 8 to 10 knots requires roughly a
doubling of effective power from the oars.
The speeds so far attained by Olympias are sufficiently respectable to
confirm the essential viability of the three-level design, but they do fall
short of those implied by the surviving data from antiquity. In chapter 6,
we noted that the most specific direct evidence was Xenophon's remark
that the passage from Byzantium to Heraclea in the Black Sea was 'a long
day's voyage for a trieres under oar' (pp. 103-4). We suggested that this
might thus indicate an all-day cruising speed as high as 8.6 knots, though
it was most likely somewhat less, perhaps between 7 and 8 knots depend-
ing on the actual length of the rowing day and the midday break taken.
The slightly lower figures we believe to be in line with estimates from other
recorded voyages, although they still represent a severe interpretation of a
trieres' capabilities under oar. Most alternative estimates of a trieres' speed
, I
,; I I
35
Rudders fully immersed !
, ,
~ . ,--! -,. --+ I -+t-
~-:.it- " I"rlT
H -!
One rudder out of the water I
i-' 'and one half immersed ':
~~
10 tlW
g~:~~19i~i~~~~ij$ill~
5
o
o 2 4 6 8 10
SPEED - KNOTS
78. Power/speed cur ves for Oryrnpiasshowing the mean effective propulsive
power of the oars (in kilowatts) in relation to speed (in knots) . The two
curves represent the figures when both rudders are fully immersed (for
maximum manoeuvrability) and when one is completely out of the water
and th e other only half-immersed (for when only minimal steerage is
requir ed).
have been lower, at about 5 knots, or have taken voyages as having been
carried out under both oar and sail.
Olympias' best voyaging performance to date is to have covered 5.77
nautical miles in an hour with a crew of 154 rowers. It is reasonable to
posit that 6 knots could have have been attained had the oars been fully
manned, but even this falls between 1 and 2 knots short of what appears to
be the desired figure and implies a shortfall in effective power of about
30%. Moreover, whether even 6 knots could be maintained over several
hours or not depends upon the actual power output which could be sus-
tained.
It has been estimated by physiologists Harry Rossiter and Brian Whipp,
in an as-yet unpublished paper, that rowers of 168 cm in height and 67 kg
in weight, typical of the average build of the ancient Greeks as judged from
skeletal material, should have been able to apply 90 to 115W of actual
power to the oar handle over an extended period. Olympias, fully manned
and travelling at 6 knots requires about 33W of e./fictive power from each
rower. It is very difficult to measure how much actual power was being
applied in the one-hour test to produce this effective power, but the gap
between the two figures is a reflection of how much is being wasted in her
oarsystem, for reasons which we discuss below. The fact that this effective
power was sustained for an hour indicates that the rowers were working
well within their anaerobic threshold, and therefore that the actual power
cannot have been too much greater than the parameters indicated by
Rossiter and Whipp. How much longer than an hour this actual power
could be sustained, however, depends on another factor, the rate of glyco-
gen depletion in the rowers. This is very difficult to quantily, and is depen-
dent in part on just how far below their anaerobic threshold the rowers are
working. Moreover, depletion can be more or less precluded altogether by
training the body to use up fats for energy rather than sugars. Further
investigation and experiment are required here.
Certainly, ancient Athenian crews, trained to row long distances over
months and years, may have been able to demonstrate much greater endu-
rance than their modern counterparts, who are mostly trained for sprint-
ing, although they are unlikely to have produced any greater raw, physical
power. Ancient Athenians are also likely to have been better acclimatised
to rowing in the heat than the Trireme Trusts' crews, who came mainly
from Northern Europe and the United States . It is possible for the human
body to improve its rate of sweating over time, which, of course, increases
cooling through evaporation and therefore allows gross power to be sus-
tained for longer.
Olympia/ crews also had room for improvement over short distances
and sprints. There is no doubt that even the best of them, good as they
were, were uneven in terms of their rowing ability and could have pro-
duced better performances with more practice . And as has already been
noted (p. 240) some of the shortfall in effective power is attributable to the
virtual ineffectiveness of most of the srnall-bladed thalamian oars at speeds
of 6 knots and above.
Nevertheless , even taking all these factors into account, a significant
proportion of the gap between actual and effective power must be assumed
to derive from shortcomings in Olympias' design. Fortunately, the sea trials
have exposed likely problem areas, to which we have already drawn atten-
tion. As a result, it is now possible to suggest how the design of the ship
might be modified to make up the shortfall in effective power whilst
remaining within the parameters of the ancient evidence.
The lessons of the sea trials: proposed modifications to the

design of Olympias.
A basic criterion for an ancient trieres, and therefore for our reconstruc-
tion, is that it should be as agile as possible in wielding its ram; an agile
ship would also be swift. Although constant technological development is
not a characteristic feature of the ancient world, it is more pronounced in
military contexts than in any other field. Moreover, such development can
easily be recognised in the field of naval warfare in particular, in the emer-
gence of the two-level pentecontor (pp. 25-32) , then of the trieres itself (a
topic ofsufficient interest in Athens to attract the attention ofan historian
like Thucydides, pp. 36-8), and finally of the Hellenistic and later poly-
remes. Specific modifications to ship types are also well documented, such
as Cirnon's adaptation of the Salamis triereis (pp. 153-4) and the strength-
ening by the Syracusans of the outrigger frames of their triereis for the
battle in the Great Harbour (pp. 166-7). There is a strong presumption,
therefore, that Athenian triereis would have undergone constant improve-
ment to allow the development of the greatest possible agility and swift-
ness. This should have been especially true under the stimulus and in the
aftermath of conflicts such as the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. We

have already suggested that there was a modification ofhull-shape between
the fifth and the fourth centuries BC (pp. 146-8), which may have been
intended to improve performance, and we should expect that by the early
fourth century - the period represented by the Olympias reconstruction -
the development of the oar-rig to provide the required agility and swiftness
would also have reached an advanced if not an optimal stage.
It is clear from the trials of Olympias, however, that there is still consid-
erable room for improvement in her performance and in her oar-rig. Ifone
interprets the ancient texts as indicating that these ships could cruise all
day under oar at 7 to 8 knots , then Olympiaswas certainl y too slow in voy-
aging. It was also obvious that, whilst more effective (and longer) training
of the oarcrew would go some way towards closing this gap, it was even
more important to make it possible for them to take a longer stroke.
In rowing, power, speed and especially rate of acceleration are directly
related to stroke length. From this point of view, the most serious short-
coming in the design of Olympias has been the restriction to the maximum
stroke length of the thalarnians, whose heads are obstructed by the main
beams. This limits their swing and prevents them from attaining even the
length theoretically possible within the 0.888m interscalmium. And this,
in turn, limits the stroke length of the whole crew who have, of necessity,
to keep time with the thalamians.
If one rejects as impracticable the use of a sliding stroke of any signifi-
cant length, one of the two remaining ways to lengthen the stroke is to
increase the interscalmium distance, and with it the distance between the
main beams (zyga). We have already seen that archaeological evidence has
emerged since the launch of Olympiaswhich would be consistent with the
use of a cubit longer than that used in her design (pp. 245-6). An increase
of the two-cubit interscalmium from 0.888 m to 0.98 m, in line with this
evidence, would allow the maximum stroke to be 92 mm longer through-
out the ship. More importantly, if the beams were that much further apart
and raised only slightly, thalamians 1.75 m (5 ft 9 in) tall could pass
beneath them at both ends of the stroke (fig. 79). Even taller thalamians
could be accommodated if their seats were lowered by a couple ofcentime-
tres, which would be possible in most, though not all, positions in the
ship. This would enable them, and therefore the whole crew, to row a sig-
nificantly longer stroke.
79. Position of beams (zyga) relative to rhalarnians in a ship with an

interscalmium of 0.98 m.
The adoption of a longer cubit as a basic unit of measurement would, of .

course, increase the overall length both of the oars and of the ship. Since the
length of the oars is defined at 9 cubits and 9 1/ 2 cubits by the naval invento-
ries (pp. 137-8,215) , they would increase from 3.99 m and 4.2 m (based
on the 0.444 m cubit) to 4.41 m and 4.66 m (based on the 0.49 m cubit).
More significantly, with the lengthening of the two-cubit interscalmia, the
ship 's hull would be extended from 36.8 m to 39.6 m (fig. 80), which is
close to its practical limit and slightly longer than the dry length of the Zea
ship-sheds (see p. 195). The overall displacement would go up from about
42 tonnes fully laden to 44 tonnes. Wetted area and low-speed resistance
would be increased by about 7%, but resistance at higher speeds - over
6 knots - would only be increased by about 5% because the greater length
of the ship would reduce wavemaking. The net effect in a design modified
in this way, which we shall call Mark Ha, would be to increase effective
power output by just over 10%. A crew driving Olympiasat 6.0 knots could
therefore be expect ed to drive the longer hull at about 6.2 knots.
Trleres
GeneraLArrangement
_ I I I I i I I I I le ? 2
10
2
15
3,0 3r
~ ;r.f.e.-c:
.~ --ft-()1F.Co4TEs Jqq2
80. General arrangement drawings of Olympias and of the proposed second reconstruction superimposed.
Scale I I , I I I 1 1 1 I I
Metre 0 I
81. Arrangement ofone rriad amidships in the proposed second

reconstruction (Mark lIb), showing how oarhandles would pass
outboard of the next rower astern at each level.
That improvement in cruising speed might not, however, be felt to be

sufficient to match what is implied by the ancient evidence. A more radi-
cally modified design would then be required, which we shall call Mark
lIb. The only way to increase stroke length within a 0.98 m interscalmium
without sliding is to cant all three levelsofseats outboard, ideally by 18.4°,
the angle whose tangent is Y.3. This is in the opposite direction to the
canting employed for the thranite seats on Olympias in order to achieve
even spacing of the oarblades in the water (pp. 212-13). Canting ourwards
would enable the handle of each oar to pass outboard of the back of the
next rower astern (see fig. 81) and so allow the maximum length of stroke
to be restricted only by the physique of the individual rower. This would in

practice allow a maximum stroke length of about 1.1 m, a gain of about
25% over Olympias, and would allow a crew producing 6 knots in
Olympiasto produce 6.5 knots in the longer hull.
Moreover, in both Mark IIa and Mark IIb effective power could be
enhanced further by separating out the tracks of the thranite oarblades
from those of the zygians and thalamians, thus reducing the disturbance of
the water for all the rowers and allowing their oarblades a better grip of the
water with less slippage (see above, pp. 239-40) . The separation could be
achieved by increasing the breadth of the ship at the outriggers from
Olympias' 5.45 m to 5.62 m whilst maintaining the same breadth as
Olympias on the waterline. This would still leave 16 cm clearance either
side between the outriggers and the pillars of the Zea ship-sheds in the
Piraeus .
Given that there is still some actual power to be gained over Olympias
from proper gearing of the thalamian oars and from further training and, if
it could be achieved, acclimatisation of the crew, and assuming that the
speed so far produced in Olympias was sustainable over several hours, the
projected performance of perhaps Mark IIa and certainly Mark IIb would,
at last, begin to satisfy our severe interpretation of the ancient evidence for
cruising speed. Mark IIb would, however, have a very significant advan-
tage over IIa in terms of acceleration and therefore agility. Both the mod-
ified designs would accommodate, to an extent which Olympias could not,
the comfortable stroke which modern experience of long-distance rowing
suggests would have been adopted for voyaging. Only Mark IIb, however,
would allow the unrestricted reach and maximum practicable stroke
length which are essential for maximum acceleration and agility, the qual -
ities most necessary for a warship armed with a ram as its principal
weapon.
None of the proposed design modifications, we believe, transgresses the
boundaries of the ancient evidence. Neither the lengthening in Mark IIa
nor the increase in overall breadth is in any way incompatible wirh the
archaeological remains of the ship-sheds of the Piraeus. The choice of an
alternative cubit, although prompted by our experience aboard Olympias,
also reflects new evidence which has come out of the ground. The pro-
posed outward canting of the rig for Mark IIb is perhaps more controver-
sial, in part because it is counter-intuitive for those familiar with the
fore-and-aft rig of modern river craft (though not so for students of
Renaissance galleys or those who race gigs upon the sea today). It may also
be seen as contrary to what is shown on the Lenormant Relief, though, if
anything, that monument accords more closely with a canred rig than with
a fore-and-aft arrangement (see Appendix II). Nevertheless, the case for it
appears to us to be strong.
To sum up, should a second reconstruction ever be built, we would
advocate that it be based on the 0.49 m cubit and should employ an oar-rig
sufficiently canted to allow the oars to pass outboard of the rowers' bodies,
in order to maximise stroke-length. We believe that by the early fourth
century BC the Athenians are likely to have optimised their triereis for
speed, acceleration and agility, and that the suggested design would recog-
nise this whilst remaining consistent with our evidence. A ship built to an
optimised design would also be the best option experimentally, since those
with less radical views than ours, for instance on canting, could reasonably
extrapolate between her performance and that of Olympias.
Conclusions
It is now beyond doubt that three-level oared ships are entirely viable.
Olympias has shown that single-manned oars of the same length can be
positioned at all three levels so as to reach the water and without the angle
of the top level being too steep to be rowable. This confirmation of the
practicability of the basic design is perhaps the most important outcome of
the sea trials, since it removes one ofthe longest-standing objections to this
explanation of how triereis were arranged (pp. 15-17, 23-4) . A great deal
more has been learnt about what is required ofsuch an oarsystem if it is to
be capable ofachieving the performances ascribed to triereis in the ancient
literature. Oars need to be light, despite the risk of fragility, and highly
geared, and to be held firmly in place against the thole. The stroke needs to
be as long as possible, which makes it desirable to employ the long 0.49
metre cubit now atte sted for Attica in the reconstruction of the two-cubit
interscalmium. This length of interscalmium would also allow the hull
beams (zyga) to be positioned so that the thalamians could pass beneath
them at each end of the stroke, thus avoiding one of the major restrictions
on stroke-length in Olympias. For maximum length , however, and there-
fore for maximum agility, which is highly desirable for successful
ramming, each rower would have to be canted so that his oarhandle would
pass outboard of the man immediately astern.
Performance under oar could, we believe, be brought up to the required
level by means of the modifications proposed. Performance under sail is
already impressive in Olympias, in particular her ability to sail close to the
wind with minimal leeway. Handling under sail and manoeuvrability
under oar have left little to be desired, even though the drag on the rudders
has frequently made it desirable to operate the ship with one rudder up
and the other only half-lowered. The hull has survived in waves of up to
0.75 m in height and the askiimata have proved entirely adequate to keep
water out of the ship, despite the proximity of the rhalarnian oarports to
the water. These aspects of performance would be unaffected by modifica-
tions to the oarsystem.
Much has also been discovered about the management of the oarcrew.
The rowers must be kept as comfortable as possible to endure long periods
at the oar. The importance for comfort of cushions on the seats is now
evident, as is the need for some sort of covering to protect rowers from the
sun, be it a rigged awning or a wooden canopy as in Olympias. Even more
important is good ventilation, to allow the rowers to work efficiently, and
an adequate supply of water - about 1 litre per rower per hour. The latter
should be regarded as an absolute requirement and has implications for the
logistics oflong voyages and fleet movements. Xenophon's observations on
the importance of crew morale and the role of the keleusta in maintaining
it ( Oecon. 21.3; above, p. 112) have also been borne out by practical expe-
rience on board Olympias. Similarly, both the improvement over time of
Olympias' crews and the remaining inadequacies of even the best of them
accord well with the words which Thucydides (1.142.9; above, p. 116)
puts into the mouth ofPericles, that 'sea power is a matter ofskill ... and it
is not possible to get practice in the odd moment when the chance occurs,
but it is a full-time occupation, leaving no moment for other things '. One
lesson which was relearned the hard way is that, while a human engine like
an oarcrew can row directly into a head wind, say to reach shelter or claw
round a headland or keep clear of a lee shore, it cannot do so indefinitely
without becoming exhausted. These many factors affecting the men who
rowed the triereis will have been the foremost considerations in the minds
of admirals, trierarchs, helmsmen and keleustai alike, whether they were
embarking on a long voyage or going into battle, but they have largely
been forgotten today. Herein lies one of the principal justifications for the
building and testing of a reconstruction.
It will be clear from this and the preceding chapters that the reconstruc-
tion , operation and analysis of Olympias have required a multiplicity of
skills and talents. Since its inception nearly twenty years ago, the Athenian
Trireme project has benefited from the input of historians and archaeolo-
gists, naval architects and shipbuilders, rowers, sailors and seamen, physi-
cists and physiologists, and man y others. Their co-operation has
necessitated a considerable willingness on the part of individuals schooled
in widely differing disciplines to understand each other's modes of think-
ing. By the same token, this multi-disciplinary approach has often made it
difficult to convince specialists outside the project of the validity of some
of the evidence and arguments. Historians have found it hard to under-
stand just how narrowly definitive are the laws of ph ysics upon the design
of an extreme ship-type such as the trieres (something which has been
amply demonstrated in this chapter). Archaeologists have been reluctant
to accept a design which is based on historical, archaeological and icono-
graphical evidence but not on actual ship remains. Naval architects and
physicists have found it difficult to deal with data which are subject to
shifting historical interpretations. Modern sport rowers have viewed with
scepticism a fixed-seat stroke with the oar rigged forward of the pin.
This book is intended to make the evidence and arguments and many
different modes of thinking as accessible as possible . Through the process
of collecting together the indications from antiquity, bringing to bear on
them the craft of the naval architect which is bound by the laws of physics,
and creating a reconstructed ship, Olympias, which has been tested at sea
under oar and sail, we hope and believe that we have learned a great deal
about the Athenian Trireme. We know that not all questions have been
answered and that there is still much more to learn. But our fascination
with the most famous warship of the ancient world remains.
APPENDIX I
Fasttriereis
The interpretation of Greek texts referring to triereis as 'fast' may be helped by

some discussion of
1. The relations between the resistance to the motion of a ship through the water
and changes in displacement and roughness of the ship 's bottom.
2. Likely variation, between different crews, of propulsive thrust, of turning
forces and of ability to perform efficiently in the various modes to manoeuvre
on command. The last two would affect times taken to manoeuvre rather than
attainable speed.
'Fast' could refer to excellence in any combination of the following:
Speed on a stra ight course attainable for a given period of time.

Acceleration from rest to reach a target in the shortest time, or retardation from
stated speeds to rest.
Rate of turning with oars.
In a ramming action agility in manoeuvres over relatively short distances would

have been more important than speed attainable over long periods, though triereis
capable of high sustained speeds would generally have accelerated well and in
many cases also turned quickly with oars, but that would have needed training
and practice on its own account.
The resistance of a ship in water is broadly the result of two factors. The first is
skin friction and the second arises from the continuous formation ofsurface waves
as the ship proceeds. Since it is a long vessel, the resistance of a trieres is mainly due
to skin friction, particularly at lower speeds. At 10 knots frictional resistance is
only about half the total, while at 5 knots and less nearly all resistance is frictional.
Wave-making resistance is unlikely to vary much from one trieres to another at
any given speed because the elements ofform upon which that resistance depends
could not vary greatly, being constrained by limits of length and breadth on one
hand and by the necessity of accommodating the given number of oarsmen on
the other. Frictional resistance (RI) ' however, depends upon the roughness of the
wetted surface of the hull, its length, the area (A) of the wetted surface and the
276
Appendix I: Fasttriereis 277
speed (V). The first two determine the size of the frictional coefficient (j) and ,
following Froude.
R =
f
fA V", where n = 1.825.
Now if the bottom becomes rough or fouled with marine growths Jcan readily
increase above its value for a well-smoothed and painted or pitched surface by
50%. Over long per iods of immersion without cleaning the value ofJcan double
or treble. It could commonly have increased by 50%, however, between beachings
of triereis to dr y them out. In such a case and for the lower speeds (for which resis-
tance is nearly all frictional), if oarsmen pull the ship with the same force as when
the hull is smooth and freshly pitched, they will achieve only
I
1 J:825
=0.8
1.5
of the speed, a reduction of 20 %. At high speeds where friction accounts for only
half of the total resistance , the corresponding reduction in speed will only be
about 10% . say 1 knot. The general effect will be the loss of about 1 knot over a
wide range of speed.
The effects of roughness would have been very obvious in a fleet of nearly iden-
tical ships, so the application of mixtures containing wax to their bottoms to
J
reduce would have been quite natural.
Triereis undoubtedly tended to leak - not surprisingly in view of their slender-
ness and length - and their timbers would have soaked up water, especially those
made of fir or beech, which are permeable woods . There is mention of ship s
becoming slow because they were heavy in the water from not having been dried
out for some time. The likely increase in weight in those circumstances may be
estimated by assuming as a worst case that all timbers in the hull below water were
to be waterlogged and, owing to heavy leakage, bilge water were to rise to the top
of the floors. It can be calculated that 1 tonne ofwater would soak into the timbers
and that the bilge water would amount to about 6 tonnes, a total increase in dis-
placement of about 7 tonnes, or 15% of the ship 's dry displacement. That would
cause the waterline to rise by about 70 mm, and increase the wetted area of the
hull by 4.8 square metres, or 4%, reducing the speeds considered above by 4% and
2%, 1/5 of the effects due to roughness and fouling. These are likely to have been
the maximum effects on speed at the ends of normal periods between drying out
triereis .
It seems therefore that the need for drying out, as regards speed at least, was not
so much to reduce weight and leakage as to make the hulls smooth again. But the
required repitching could not have been done unless the timber had been dried.
218 Appendix 1: Fast triereis
'Heaviness' and roughness would go together, making it hard to discriminate

between their separate effects on speed until the mechanics of fluid flow and fric-
tion had become understood.
Heaviness and hull roughness would have affected a ship's acceleration rather
differently. This should be discussed because it was probably more important in a
ramming battle than sustained high speed. Assuming for simpl icity that while
accelerating their ship, oarsmen exert a constant propulsive force, and noting that
fluid friction is negligible at low speeds, increasing with about the square of the
speed, we can deduce that acceleration from rest will be in inverse proportion to
mass, and at higher speeds it will be reduced progressively as resistance rises at a
faster rate owing to greater roughness. As the ship reaches its reduced maximum
speed acceleration will sink to zero. Again taking as likely maxima the increases in
the coefficient of friction and in weight given above, we would expect acceleration
to be reduced when starting from rest by up to 15% until a speed is reached at
which resistance becomes significant, say 5 knots, after which as speed rises accel-
eration diminishes . The time taken to ram an enemy ship from rest would be
lengthened by more than 15%. The swiftness of that manoeuvre was probably
most important to a trierarch and may well have been the most readily felt penalty
of 'heaviness'. Unlike speed , its cause lay more in extra weight than in hull rough-
ness. Poor acceleration could therefore have been what was mainly meant by being
'heavy in the water', and for which drying out and repitching was indeed the cure,
albeit a temporary one.
Retardation would of course have been actually improved by greater roughness
and frictional resistance, but reduced by extra weight.
Turning, as vital in battle as acceleration, would also be affected more by extra
weight than by roughness because while water velocities round the hull when
turning would generally be low, extra weight would increase draft by about 6%,
and the resistance of the underwater profile to turning and the mass moment of
inertia of the ship by about 10%. It may be estimated that a heavy ship would take
about 8% longer to make a turn.
Irrespective of heaviness, the strength and skill of her oarsmen could clearly
determine whether a trieres was fast or not. A tired crew might pull with only 70%
or even 50% of the force of a fresh one. This was always a potent factor in galley
warfare, and such reductions would diminish attainable speed by 18% or 32%
respectively, while the more important accelerat ion would be reduced more catas-
trophically, in proportion to the propulsive force. Lack of training or skill could
have an equally bad effect.
Wind and waves plainly affected triereis, as reported at Salamis. Ships which,
whether by leakage or inaccurate building, had less freeboard than was desirable
would have been the more sensitive to weather because oar blades would tend to
AppendixI: Fast triereis 279
dig in and catch the waves coming forward. Power would be lost, particularly if
the crowded blades fouled each other.
The military effectiveness of triereis would, by these arguments, be more sensi-
tive to the weather and the quality or tiredness of crews than to leakage or to
roughness of bottom, though extra weight would have made them more sensitive
to weather.
The admiral of a fleet of triereis could judge whether an opposing fleet was
'faster' than his own by the following means:
1. Intelligence, possibly before reaching the scene of battle, about
(a) the time elapsed since the opposing fleet had been dried out
(b) the quality and training of the opposing crews
(c) whether the opposing crews were likely to be fresh or tired.
2. Directly observing
(a) the enemy's oarsmanship during preliminary manoeuvres
(b) the waterline of enemy ships particularly by noting tell-tale features like
rams and rudders.
There are references to ships within a fleet being 'fast' compared with others in
the same fleet, which was presumably composed mainly if not entirely of ships of
the line. These ships could either have been manned with picked crews to
perform, for example, crucial roles in battle tactics, or they may have been built as
'fast' ships, which would in all probability also have been specially manned in
order fully to exploit the high qualities built into them. From the foregoing dis-
cussion it may be inferred that such ships would have been extreme examples of
the trieres, of exceptional lightness and workmanship. If, for instance, hulls had
been built of fir throughout instead of pine and oak they would have been up to
15% lighter, though less durable. It would be reasonable also to suppose that their
bottoms would have been smoothed with extra care. Such ships while new could
well have had a 20-30% advantage in agility.
APPENDIX II
The Lenormant Reliefinprojection
The accuracy of the vertical proportions of the Lenormant Reliefis open to doubt
for the following reasons:
1. The ratio berween the projected lengths of thranite looms and the projected
lengths of shafts from tholes to the water is only about 1.7. Thranite oar
gearing as sculpted is therefore at most about 2, whereas in actuality it must
have been near to 3 at least. (See discussion of oar-gearing in chapter 12.)
2. The lower wale is surprisingly far from the water, and the space berween it and
the middle wale insufficient to accommodate circular ports of the diameter
both required geometrically and indicated in the Talos vase.
The angle of the oars in the relief to the vertical and the relative fore-and-aft posi-
tions of the tholes, shown or implied, in the relief (fig. 13) also raise questions of
interpretation. Following the general opinion that the relief is a broadside profile,
it would appear that the oars are at about Y4 of the stroke past the catch. They all lie
at nearly the same angle. If, however, one considers that oar length, stroke length
and gearing are the same in all three levels of oars, one will appreciate that in any
horizontal aspect of the vessel, and neglecting cant of oarsmen, oars at different
heights, but keeping time together, can appear parallel in the course of a stroke
only at the instant when they are pointing towards the viewer and therefore appear
vertical. At all other times, oars whose tholes are close to the water will appear
inclined more to the vertical than those higher up.
In the diagrams (figs. 82 and 83) are shown the oar angles in the relief and what
they are more likely to have been at the moment in the stroke when the sculpted
position of the thranite oars is correct. It is most noticeable how much tidier the
relief is and how it gives a strong impression ofthe whole array working 'to a single
beat'. The sculptor may also have wished to portray thranites as fully as possible
and to convey the height of triereis. He may therefore have dropped the outrigger
by say 0.2 m to reveal the lower torsos and the thighs of those oarsmen, while
reducing the figures a little in scale relative to the vessel.That change would have
upset the nearly equal spacing, vertically, of outrigger, middle wale and lower
wale, which could have been restored either by lowering the middle wale or by
280
Appendix 11: TheLenormantReliefinprojection 28 1
82. The Lenormanr Relief: with probable th ole positions.
83. The Lenormanr Relief: with oars at more realistic angles.

282 Appendix 11: The Lenormant Reliefin projection
84. The Lenormant Relief: broadside on.
raising the lower wale. He appears to have chosen the latter alternative, which cer-
tainlyadds to the impression of height.
The fore-and-aft positions of tholes as well as the curve of the stanchions sup-
porting the canopy strongly suggest that in the relief the vessel is viewed from a
direction 70-750 off the bow. The second pair of diagrams (figs. 84 and 85) show
the recon struction broadside on and from 70 off the bow, with oars soon after the
0
catch, the most natural part of the stroke to portray. It will be seen that in fig. 85
the tholes at the three levels are in nearly the same relative fore-and-aft positions as
they are in the relief, but that in the broadside view in fig. 84 they are not. In fig.
85 the angles of the oars also accord better with the relief.
The viewpoint suggested here is supported by the decreasing height between
katastroma and lower wale towards the stern . The decrease is 8% in 7 thole pitche s
or 6.2 m in the ship, from which one may infer a viewpoint 25-30 m from the
middle of the ship which would subtend an angle of about 70 appropriate for a
0
,
close-up view of the whole ship.

Appendix J1: TheLenormant Reliefinprojection 283
0
85. The Lenormant Relief: seen from 70 offbow.
If the oarcrew shown were rowing on a canted rig, such as that discussed in
chapter 13 as a possibility for any second reconstruction (pp. 271-3), this would
increase the slope of the oars, as seen in fig. 85, from the vertical and hence nearer
to the slope shown in the Lenormant Relief.
GLOSSARY
I English
(a) Nautical
adze: a shipwright's tool, like an axe but with the cutting edge set at right angles to
the haft.
beam: a term for the breadth of a ship. Also, a strong piece of timber stretching
across the ship from side to side to keep the sides at their proper dis-
tance.
bending moment: the sum of the moments about the neutral axis of the cross-
section in question of all the forces acting on the beam, on one side of
the section. It is measured in newton-metres.
bevel: the angle by which one face of a plank or timber departs from the perpen-
dicular with another face, or usually with parallel and opposing faces on
either side of the one in question.
bireme: see biremis in If.
bitts : two strong timbers fixed vertically in the fore part of a ship, to which anchor
cables are secured when the ship rides at anchor.
block coefficient: a measure of the slimness ofa hull form. The block coefficient is
the ratio of the volume of displacement to that of a rectangular block of
sides equal to the waterline length, the waterline beam and the draft of
the ship.
boatswain: a petty officer who summons members of the crew to their duty; see
keleustis in If.
bolt: a metal pin employed to connect timbers, particularly where liable to
tension between them. Many bolts therefore have their ends clenched
over broad rings.
bracket: an angular support.
brailing rope, brail: a rope to haul up the bottom of rhe sail to adjust, shorten or
furl it.
brow: a gangway or ladder on which a man can face the shore while descending
from aship.
bulwark: a solid protecting screen at each outboard edge of the deck.
284
Glossary 285
bunt: middle part or cavity of a square sail, extending over the two middle quar-
ters of its breadth.
butt: a joint between the ends of timber forming a longer member.
cant : angle at which a timber or other item lies relative to its more usual direction.
careening: the process of cleaning a ship's bottom by heeling her over.
carling: a short piece of timber ranging fore and aft from one beam or timber to
another.
catch: in the stroke of an oar, the instant at which an oarsman starts to pull.
caulking: the process of driving material into the seams ofa ship's planking as well
as the material being so driven.
centroid: ofa plane shape , the centre ofgravity of a thin uniform sheet of material
cut to that shape; the point at wh ich if suspended the shape will balance
in any position.
clew (or clue): lower corner of a square sail.
curwater: the leading part of a ship's bow.
displacement: imm ersed volume of a body. The buoyancy force acting on such a
body is equal to its displacement multiplied by the weight density of the
fluid in which it is immersed.
dowel: a peg to make a fast joint between one timber and another.
draft: a depth of underside of keel below the waterline.
fairlead: an eye or ring to enable a rope to pass freely.
fished: two spars are fished when they are lashed together, one overlapping the
other.
'five': an oared warship with five files ofoarsmen ranging fore and aft on each side
of the ship .
floor, floor timber: a timber placed across the keel and secured to the bottom
planking.
fo'c's'le: the foredeck.
'foot ': seepous in If.
foot: %cubit.
forefoot : the forward projection of the ship's keel.
'forty': a monstrous and unwieldy oared warship with twenty files of oarsmen
ranging fore and aft on each side of the ship's two hulls.
'four ': a ship with four files of oarsmen ranging fore and aft on each side of the
ship .
frame: in a ship a frame is usually made up of several timbers, e.g. floors, furtocks
and top timbers fitted at right angles to the keel.
freeboard: the height by which the topwale stands above the warerline.
futtock: transverse hull timber stiffening the shell planking outboard of the floors
and round the curve of the hull to its side (see frame).
286 Glossary
galley: an oared vessel.

garboard: the first plank on either side of a ship's keel.
gearing: (of oars) the ratio a: b, where
a = distance from the thole to the centre of pressure of the blade in the
water, projected on to a horizontal plane, and
b = horizontal distance of the thole from the plane of symmetry of the
oarsman.
grommet: a loop of rope or leather.
halliard: rope for raising and lowering a spar (i.e. 'haul-yard').
heel: transverse angle from the upright at which a ship may float, also the bottom
end of an upright timber, e.g. of the mast.
hog: bending or shearing of a ship's hull in the vertical plane, causing it to arch
upwards in the middle and the ends to drop.
hoplite: see hoplites in If.
inch: 1/16 Athenian foot.
joule: SI unit of energy or work; symbol J. 1J = 1 newton-metre.
leech: vertical edge of a square sail.
loom : (of an oar) the part inboard of the thole.
mast-partners: a pair ofsupporting timbers between which the mast stands .
mast-step: substantial timber into which the bottom of the mast or tabernacle
post is fastened. It is laid on the floors, or onto the bottom, to spread the
mast forces into the hull structure.
metacentre: the point in the middle plane of the ship through which the buoy-
ancy force passeswhen the ship is inclined by a small angle.
rneracentric height: the height ofthe rnetacentre above the centre ofgravity ofthe
ship; it is a measure of the ship's stability.
metic: see metoikos in If.
mock-up: a model, often full size, to find or demonstrate spatial relationships
between parts.
moment (of a force) about a given point: the product of the force and the perpen-
dicular distance of its line of action from that point. It is measured in
newton-metres.
mortice : the slot cut in a plank or timber to take a tenon joining planks or timbers.
neutral axis of bending: the line passing through the centroid ofa cross-section of
a beam perpendicular to the plane ofbending.
newton: the SI unit of force. It is the force required to accelerate a mass of 1 kg by
1 tnlsec",
oakum: strands made from old rope and used for caulking.
oar-loop: the loop of rope or leather holding the oar to the rholepin,
Glossary 287
oarport: the aperture in the hull of an oared warship through which an oar is
pulled.
obol: the sixth part of a drachma.
outrigger: seeparexeiresia in If.
parrel : rope holding a spar to a mast.
pentccontor: a fifty-oared ship.
pitch: angular motion (in waves) of a ship in the fore-and-aft vertical plane.
prismatic coefficient: a measure of the fullness of the ends of a hull form. The
prismatic coefficient is the ratio of the displacement volume to that of a
prism of length equal to the waterline and of section identical with the
immersed mid-section of the ship.
quadrireme: (Lat. quadriremis) see 'four'.
quarter: of a ship, that part of a ship's side which lies towards the stern .
quinquereme: (Lac, quinqueremis) see 'five' .
rabbet: a groove cut in a timber to receive the edge of a plank or the ends of a
number of planks, to be fastened therein.
raked: a raked mast is one stepped to incline aft or forward.
rocker: vertical curve of a keel analogous to that of the upper edge of a hull.
roll: transverse angle from the upright to which a ship may oscillate.
room: (Lat , interscalmium) the space occupied by an oarsman or a group of
oarsmen, seen as the distance between one tholepin and the next in a
fore-and-aft file of oarsmen.
sag: longitudinal bending of a ship as ifloaded amidships and supported at each
end.
scantling: breadth and depth of a piece of timber in shipbuilding.
scarf: joint between timbers end to end in which they are shaped to overlap and
fit into each other to give a uniform section when joined. For 'trait de
Jupiter' scar/see fig. 62.
seam: a longitudinal joint between adjacent planks in the hull of a ship.
sea mile: 1.84 km, 1.15 miles (60 sea miles = 1 degree of larirude) .
shear: state of force or stress in which successive planes in a material or structure
tend to slide relative to each other.
sheer : curve seen in profile of the upper edge of a ship 's hull.
shell construction: any method by which the hull of a wooden ship is built up on
each side by successive planks joined edge to edge or by overlapping their
edges, frames being inserted subsequently.
ship-sheds: the sheds in which oared ships were normally kept when not at sea.
shore: a prop to support a ship when slipped or beached.
'six': an oared warship with six files of oarsmen ranging fore and aft on each side
of the ship.
288 Glossary
Spanish Windlass: parallel ropes or chains rwisred and so tightened by turning a

lever placed berween them at their mid-length.
spike: a pointed metal nail, with a head , for connecting timbers.
stability: measure of the tendency of a ship to rerum to the upright position.
stanchion: a vertical support or pillar.
stile: a vertical member in a wooden framework .
stopping, or bedding: the process of, or the material for, filling joints berween
planks as they are laid together or trowelled in subsequently.
. . I)_ loaded length - unloaded length
strain: (m materia - I d dI h .
un oa e engt
It is a non-dimensional quantity.
strake: a continuous row of planks, joined end to end, typically extending from
stem to stern.
force exerted on a given area
stress: (in material) = h . It is measured in newtons per
t e same area
square mm .
stringer: an internal longitudinal timber riding over and fastened to floors, fur-
rocks or top timbers.
stroke: one cycle of movement made in working an oar.
strop: rope passing round rwo items to hold them together, e.g. round the body
of a block to enable the block to be secured where needed for use.
swifter: a constricting girdle of rope.
tabernacle: casing that encloses and supports the lower part of the mast, the after
part being open to allow the mast to be raised and lowered.
tail: rope secured to a block, thimble or buoy with a free end by which it may be
hitched to anything as required.
'ten': an oared warship with ten files of oarsmen ranging fore and aft on each side
of the ship.
tenon: a tongue ofwood fitting into a mortice, in ancient ships particularly a rec-
tangular tongue of wood fitting into an opposing mortice in timbers to
be joined in the shell method of construction. In this form ir is also
called a draw-tongue and (USA) a loose tenon.
thalamian: see tbalamios in II.
thimble: ring ofwood or metal, having a groove round its outer circumference to
house a rope eye or cringle to protect it from wear.
thole, tholepin : the pin of wood forming, with the oar-loop, one fulcrum of an oar.
thranite: see thranitisin 11.
'three': an oared warship with three files of oarsmen ranging fore and aft on each
side of the ship.
Glossary 289
thwart: a seat or bench of a boat on which oarsmen sit to manage their oars.
tiller: the lever on the head of the rudder by which it is turned.
top timber: (see 'frame') transverse, and generally vertical hull timber stiffening
the planking from the topwale to the futtocks,
topwale: the name given in the case of ancient ships to the top longitudinal
timber where gunwale is anachronistic, the uppermost edge of a ship's
side, or the wale in that position.
tow: coarse hemp or flax.
treenail: long wooden pin employed to connect ships' planks and timbers, espe-
cially where the joint is mainly subject to shear.
triacontor: a thirty-cared ship.
trierarch: the commander of a trieres.
trieres: see'three'.
trireme: see'three'.
truck: fitting at the top ofa mast through which the halliards are worked.
undergirdle: see bypozoma in If.
wale: an assemblage of thick and broad planks forming a reinforcing make along
the outside of a ship's hull.
watt: SI unit of power (symbol W) . I W = I joule/sec.
whaler: a naval oared boat .
yard: a horizontal spar on which a sail is extended .
yawing: swinging of a ship from her proper course or heading, particularly in fol-
lowing seas but also when riding at anchor: otherwise known as sheering.
zygian: see zygios in If.
(b) General
Archaic: a term applied to Greek painted pottery of the period 700-480 BC.
black-figure: a style of painted pottery with figures in black on an unglazed or
slightly glazed red background.
cubit: an ancient measure of length: 1 archaic cubit = 0.490 m.
'frying pan': the name given to the flat, fan-like terracottas with double-handles
found in Syros.
Geometric: the term applied to Greek painted pottery with geometrical decora-
tion of the period c. 900-c. 700 BC.
graffito: a rough drawing scratched on a wall or other suitable surface.
paean: a song ofvictory or praise.
red-figure: a style of painted pottery with figures left in the red of the pottery
against a painted black ground.
scholiast: an ancient commentator on a Greek or Latin text, in most casesbelong-
ing to the Byzantine period.
290 Glossary
11 Greek (unless otherwise stated) and Latin

acantha: an Egyptian tree in two varieties, white and black (Lat. acacia arabica).
Not apparently related to the acant hus.
acropolis: a citadel e.g. ofAthens or Lindos .
aloipbe: substance applied to a ship's hull.
amphora: a high two-handled pot, the standard container for transporting oil and
Wine.
aphlaston: the ornament of a ship's poop in which the up-curving timbers of the
hull terminate.
apobathra: seebrow in I(a).
apostoleis: commissioners appointed by the Athenian Assembly to oversee the dis-
patch of a naval expedition.
arista (or ameinon) pleousai: a phrase describing ships as 'moving best (or better)
in the water' .
askiima: a leather sleeve fitted to the lower oarports in a trieres to prevent water
splashing into the ship.
asphalton: bitumen.
auletis: a member of the hyperesia in a trieres who gave the rate of striking to the
oarsmen by playing a pipe ; also called trieraules.
auteretis: a fighting man serving as an oarsman in an oared ship.
biremis (Lat.): occurs in Horace and Livy (first century BC); seedieres.
cbiima: the mole or hard in the dockyard at Piraeus to which triereis were brought
round by their trierarchs, after manning and fitting out, for inspection
by the apostoleis, followed by sea trials.
corvus (Lar.): 'raven' , a kind of boarding bridge used by the Romans .
desmos: a bond or tie.
dia pases(neos): throughout the whole (ship), overall.
diekplous: as t.t., the battle manoeuvre by wh ich ships pulled through a gap made
in the line-abreast formation ofan enemy fleet, more generally the gap in
a line of ships (e.g. in the bridge of ships at the Hellespont in 480)
through which it is possible for other ships to pass.
dieres: the term seems to have been invented as the Greek equ ivalent of biremis;
an oared ship with two files of oarsmen ranged fore and aft on each side
of the ship. The word is not recorded before Pollux in the second century
AD.
dikrotos: adjective describing a ship (in one case a trieres) in which two files of
oars were manned on each side.
din os: round goblet.
Glossary 291
diolkos: the tramway across the Isthmus of Corinth by which ships were trans-
ferred from one side to the other.
dipichiaki or dipichuia: the unitary length of 2 cubits (picheis), which Vitruvius
calls the interscalmium, between one tholepin and the next in a file of
oarsmen ranging fore and aft in an oared ship.
Dipylon: name for a group of vases (Late Geometric I: 760-735 BC), so called
from the Dipylon cemetery at Athens in which they were found .
drachma (pl. drachmae): the standard Athenian coin. There were six obols to a
drachma, and 6,000 drachmae to a talent. The drachma was also a
measure ofweight (4.36 g), as was the talent .
dromon: a two-level oared warship of the Byzantine navy.
elate: silver fir.
enkoilia, entera, enteroneia: the internal woodwork of an oared ship.
entonoi: tackles for tightening the bypozomata.
epibates, pI. epibatai: as r.t., a fighting man in full armour carried on the deck of
an oared warship; or, generally, a passenger carried on deck.
epistoleus: (secretary) the title for the Spartan second-in-command of a
Peloponnesian fleet.
epiitis: the 'ear timber' in the bows of a trieres projecting on each side of, and
hence protecting, the outrigger.
galea (Lat.): galley.
gradus (Lat.): level, e.g. of oarsmen.
gomphoi: the tenons joining planks edge-to-edge; see tyloi.
harmonia (pl. harmoniaz) : the whole mortice-and-tenon joint.
bexeres: see 'six'.
hippagogos (or, in an abbreviated form, hippigos): cavalry transport ship.
histion: sail.
histos: mast.
holkas (pl. holkades) : (a towed ship) merchant ship, towed when not proceeding
under sail.
boplitis (pl, hoplitaz): fighting man in full armour.
hypaloiphe: substance applied to the under (i.e. wetted) surface of triereis.
hypiresia: (auxiliary group) a collective noun used for the 30 men carried on a fast
trieres in addition to the 170 oarsmen and the trierarch (i.e. 4 archers, 10
hoplites , 6 petty officers and two groups of 5 deck hands, all
regarded as assisting the trierarch in various ways).
bypozdma (pl, hypozamata): a rope forming the undergirdle of a trieres. Two were
regularly rigged.
ikria (pl.): poop and fo'c's'le.
292 Glossary
interscalmium (Lat.) : the two-cubit space between one thole and the next in an
oared ship.
kaloi (pl.): brailing ropes which would pass over the yard and down the front of
the sail through fairleads to the bottom edge.
kannabis: hemp.
kata stroma (pl. katastriimatai: the deck or canopy over the heads of the oarsmen.
kedros: cedar.
keleustes: the member of the hyperesia in charge of the oarsmen.
keraia: th e yard.
kerkouros: an oared supply ship .
kommata (pl.): pieces (of rope).
kiipeus: a spar suitable for shaping as an oar.
krater: a big, deep bowl for mixing wine .
krater, column: a kraterwith column-like handles.
lerater, volute: a kraterwith scroll-like handles.
kybernetes: helmsman, the member of the byperesia equivalent to the master in a
later sailing ship.
kyparissos: cypress.
larnax: a terracotta sarcophagus.
leukaia: esparto grass.
liburna (Lat.): light warship with oars at two levels employed in Roman fleets.
metoikos: a resident alien at Athens.
nauarchos: title of the Spartan commander of a Peloponnesian fleet.
naupegos: shipwright, a member of the hyperesia in a trieres.
nautes(pl. nautai ): in general a seaman, in particular often an oarsman.
okellein: to drive (a ship) ashore bow first.
ordo (Lat.): a column or file of oars or oarsmen ranging fore and aft in an oared
ship, sometimes used to denote all the oars on one side of a ship .
papyrus: plant grown in Egypt providing material for ropes and sails.
Paralos: the name for one of the two state triereis at Athens.
pararrymata: sidescreens.
parastatai: probably mast-partners.
paredroi: epithet for the archers carried on a rrieres, possibly indicating that they
sat beside the helmsman to protect him in battle.
parexeiresia: a structure built our from the side of the trieres to accommodate the
tholes of the uppermost file of oarsmen, an outrigger.
pedalia (pl.): the two rudders fitted on an oared ship.
pentekontarcbos: (commander of fifry) a member of the hyperesia in a trieres. His
duties indicate 'purser' as the most appropriate English equivalent.
pentikontoros: a sh ip of fifry oarsmen, 25 a side at one or two levels. Pentekonteros
Glossary 293
is the spelling in the MSS of Herodotus, but in the MSS ofAttic authors
triakonto ros and pen tekonto ros are preferred.
penteres: see' five'.
periplous: the battle manoeuvre of outflanking the defensive line-abreast forma-
tion of an enemy fleet.
pettke: the mountain pine (see Meiggs (1983) p. 113).
p inakotheke: picture gallery.
pitys: the coastal pine (see Meiggs (1983 ) p. 113).
pliroma: oarcrew.
polemarchos: an Athenian official.
pous: clew
Propylaea: the building marking the entrance to the acropolis at Athens.
priirates: the member of the hypereria in a trieres whose post was in the bows.
pyxis: casket.
rhyton: a type of two-handled cup with a hole in the bottom through which the
wine was drunk, sometimes called a stirrup cup.
skolex: a species ofship-worm.
stamnos: jar.
stratigos: an Athenian public official elected to command military or naval forces.
strobilos: a species of pine .
stylis: a staff in the ship's stern for display of flags and pennants.
styppax: a colloquial form of styppeioplokos.
styppeion: raw flax.
styppeioplokos: rope-maker.
syndesmos: a swifter.
syntaxis: a common contribution.
taeda: pitch pine.
talenton: seedrachma.
taxiarcbos: commander of a company.
taxis: as t.r ., an oarcrew.
teredon: the most harmful kind of ship-worm.
tesseraleonteris: see'forty' .
tetreres: see'four'.
tbalamax: colloquial form of tbalamios.
thalame = thalamos.
thalamios: as noun, an oarsman in the lowest file of oarsmen in a trieres; as adjec-
tive, denoting something connected with such an oarsman, e.g. an oar or
oarporr.
thalamitis: late Greek synonym for the noun thalamios.
tbalamos: the hold of a ship .
294 Glossary
thranites (pl. thranitain a member of the file of oarsmen in a trieres who worked
their oars through the outrigger (parexeiresia).
thranos: a longitudinal timber.
thrinys: the seven-foot beam in the stern, on to which in the Iliad (15.728-9)
Ajax steps back when driven from the poop (ikria) of a beached ship. A
convenient name for the otherwise nameless stern cross-beam of a
trieres. In the Homeric ship it is likely to have served as a foot-rest for the
helmsman.
thrips: a ship-worm.
tonoi: tackles for tightening the bypozoma.
toxotai: archers.
triakontoros: a 30-oared ship.
trierarchos: the commander of a trieres.
trieraules: see auletes.
trieres: see 'three'.
triskalmos: epithet describing a trieres as having three tholepins, presumably to
each interscalmium or unit of two cubits.
tyloi: Attic synonym for gomphoi.
zopissa: mixture of wax and pitch.
zyga (pl.): thwarts, beams.
zygios: noun, the oarsman who sat on or near a beam in a trieres; adj., e.g. describ-
ing the oar belonging to such an oarsman.
zygites: late Greek synonym for zygios.
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GENERAL INDEX
Note the numbers refer to pages. Those in italics indicate the location of relevant maps.
a scaloccio 11, 12, 20 Antirrhium 52, 73,73

Abydus 52,85,81-2,84,88 Antony 2
acacia arabica (the Latin name for the Aphetae 52,51,53 ,95,156
Egyptian tree acantha) 181 aphlaston 218
Acarnania 52, 70 , 75; Acarnanians 160 apobatbra, see landing ladder
acceleration 262, 268, 272, 278 Apollo, temple of, at Naupactus 76
access 2 17 Apollodorus 120-6
Achaea 52, 164, 71 , 164 apostoleis 121 n.7, 122
Acre,bayof31,10 Arados 31, 45
Actiurn, battle of2 Arcadia (E. Peloponnese) 188
Adramytrium 98, 88 archers (toxotai) 50, 67, 109-10, 218;
Adriatic, piracy in 9 and n.S, 169 position of 110, 129
Advisory Discussion xviii-xxi, 197,200 Archidamus 115
n.5,201 Arginusae Is. 89,98,97; battle of88-93
Aegina 52, 2, 42 n.14, 62, 257, 263 Argo 158, 170; Argonauts 113, 170, 173,
Aegospotami 85,9 n.S, 74 n.lO, 105-6, 251
120, 175 n.31 Aristagoras 90
Aeolis 31 ,50 Aristides 58
Aetolia 52, 110 Aristocrates 90-1
Alalia 31,39, 167 Aristonothos vase 28, 38-9
Alcibiades 83, 86-8,115 n.13, 119, 130 arrangement, general 207-8; of proposed
alder 183 second reconstruction 270
Alexander (I) of Pherae 121; (2) the Great Artemisia, Queen 35
2,47-8,180; his fleet at Babylon 47, on Artemisium 52, 50-1, 53, 55, 60 , 114,
the Indus 47 156; battles of50-5, 57, 59-61,72,95,
aliasensile 11-12,20,22,133 151
Ambracia 52, ships of 64 ash 181
Ameinocles 38 Asia Minor 31, 52, 62, 81, 114; pitch/resin
Amorgus 52, 3, 48 imported from 186
Amphipolis 52, 36 askomata, see oarport sleeves, thalamian
anchor 212, 234 Aspendus 31, 81
anchor cables 212 Athena 84
Anrandrus 98, 88 Athenian League, Second 120, 126
Antigonus 48 Athlit ram 129, 167, 193,204,222
300
General index 301
Ani ca 52,I,55,60, 74,94-5, 108, 114, Brirish School at Athens xiv

245 ,249 ,273 bronze, ~ shipbuilding material 185
Augusrus Caesar (Octavian) 2, 133 Buckland, J. S. P. 17 n.9
Autocles 124 Building Research Establishment 206
bulwarks, seedeck rail
Babylon 47,186 bun joints 196
Bacchiadae 40 Byblos31, 45
backing water, backing down 66 , 69, 78 , Byzantium 52, 103, 103, 121; Byzantine
212 ; in Olympias247 scribe 103 n.4; Byzantines 124;
ballast 128 Byzantium-Heraclea run 103, 101,
beam 193-6,212 103-4,264
beech 180
Belgae 184 Calchedon 52, 103, 121; Calchedonians
bending of planks 182 124
bending, moment 196-7; strength 196, Callicratidas 88-92
218 Calypso 183
bevel 209 Cambridge: Classical Faculty xxiii;
biremis 28 n.2 Colleges, contributions from xxiii;
bitumen (asphalton) 186 and n.16 ; use of oarsmen from, at Greenwich xix-xx, at
by Greeks and Romans 186 the Boat Show xxiii
Black Sea 31 ,52, 103, 103-4,264; currents Cambyses 41 , 107
in 104; grain supply from 80, 121 cannabis (hemp) 190
Boat Show at Earl's Court (1984) xxi, xxiii, canopy, sudeck
172 Cantharos 157
boatswain , rowing master (Keleustis) Cardia 52, 85, 84
111-12,129,132,249,256,274; in Caria 52, 50; Carian 35
Olympias 248,250,252-6,274 Carterea 98, 97
Boeoria 31; Boeorian ships 25; and see Carthage 31 ,2,39,41 ,47, 179;
Thebes Carthaginian ships 39; Carthaginians 39
Bosporu s, strait 125, 104, 124; Bosporan Cassels, Vice Admiral Sir Simon , KBE xx
kingdom 114 and n.1
bottom, ship's (edaphos) 183 Casson, Lionel 1 n.l , 3 n.2
bow: officer iprorates, proreus) 111-13, cataphract (kataphrakta, Le. protected)
129,140-1 ,159,224,255-6; timber ships 48 , 158
(epotis, epotides) 141, 165-7, 181,21 \, catapults , ship-borne 49, 150
218 caulking 184-6, 206 , 234
boxwood 201 cavalry 227-8
boxing in 151 cedar (kedros) 180; Phoenician 186
braces itonoi; entonoi), seehYPozOmata Cephallenia 52, 94
brailing ropes, brails (kaloi) 176-8,223-6, Chabrias 163
257-8 Chaereas 86-7
Br~idas36, 73-4, 93, 162 Chalcidice 52, 51
breakthrough (diekplous) 42-3, 49, 53, 60, Chalcis 52, 51, Chalcidians 115, 117
65,68 , 71, 74, 78 ,90,93,154,165 Charon 135,249
British Council xiv Cheimerion 64, 63-4, 99
British Embassy at Athens xiv Chersonese, suThracian Cher sonese
302 General index
Ch ios 52, 82, 92 , 94; C hian ships 42-4 , Darius (I) 44, 156; (Ill ) 47
94 , 156, slaves in 118, extra rroops on deck or can op y (katastroma) 25, 32, 39 ,
43-4; C hian s 44; C hios-Hellesponr run 42-6,49, 129-3 1, 138-4 1, 144- 50 ,
98,97,104-5 152-63, 2 17- 18, 226-7,274; deck,
Cil icia 3 1, 42 , 44, 50 ; Cili cian ships 55 after 2 18; fo redeck or fo'c's'le 141 - 2,
Cimon 153, 160,267 21 8, 224; deck part ies 113- 14,224;
Clazomenae 52, 34 deck passengers 130-1 ; deck, quarter
Cle inias 107 and n .l , 109 218 ; deck rail or bulwa rk 44, 60 , 145,
Cleopatra 2 148 ,155-6,159-60,211 ; deck slot
Coni, Peter, QC xxv 149-50,1 59; deck soldiers (epibatai)
Conon 88- 9, 92 , 114, 118, 164, 17 5 n.1 42-4, 46, 49-51,65, 87,109-10,123,
Constantine I, 8-9 129- 31 , 152-3, 160-1, 21 7, 226; deck-
Co rcyra 52,64,38, 62-4,66-7, 78, 97, stanchion s 138-41 , 158-9, on Ci an
99- 102, 162; city 68, st ra it 128; coin 14 1, in pemecomor 158
C orcyra-Rhegium run 100-2, speed of Delian League 9 5 n.2, 153
105; Corcyraean flee t 63-9, 78, land Demosrhenes (I ) fifrh-ce ntury general 99,
force 63, ships 63-8, 78, 94 , slaves in 110, 163 , 166; (2) fourth-century
118 ; Corcyraeans 62 - 9 politici an 121
Corinth 52, 36, 50 and n.I, 62, 135; designofreconsrrucrion 191-9,208 ,237,
blockade of70; Canal 263; Corimhian 248 ,264 ,267-8; proposed
design of trieres 37, 41 n.12, 45; modifications 267-74
Corimhian Heet 63-9, 99, expedition to diekplous, seebreakrhrough
Acarnania 70- 2, help to Syracu se 80 , dieres28 n.2
166, innovation 16 5; Co rim hian gulf 50 dikrotos9 n.S, 28 n.2
n.l , 69, 7 1, 135 , 154 , 164; Corimhians diolkos, seehaulway
36 ,62- 71 ,164-5, 246 D iomedon 90
Corsica 39 Dionysius, (I) of Phocaea 42 ; (2) I of
cost of Olympias 200 , 23 1-2 Syracuse, invented the 'five' 46-7; (3) Il
Coventry Boatbuilders xxiii ofSyracuse, invented the 'six'(i) 47
C rete 31, 73 Dionysus 135 ,249
Crimea 31,125,124 Diphilus 164
Croton 52, 100, 102 Dipylon vases 25, 172
cushions 135; in Olympias (sheepskins, d isplacement volume 193
foam pads) 238, 24 6-7, 275 'donkeys' 189
Cyllene 52, 73 Dorian-Greek cities of the Persian empire
Cy me 98; Cymaean coast 97 35, 50
Cy nossema pr. 83, 82; battle of 81-4, 92 , Dorieus of Rhode s 84
97, 104 D ou glas Fir (O regon Pine, Columbian
cypre ss (kyparissos) 180 Pine) 20 2, 206 , 234
Cy pr us31, 3, 34 ,42, 44, 50, 62, 167, 180 ; dowel s or pegs (gomphoi) 170, 183-4,
Cypriot kings 47 20 3-4, 20 9
Cyp selus 40 Dra cop oul os, Mr George xv, xxiv, xxvi
Cythera 52, 99 drinking water, crews go ashore for 95,
Cyzicus 52,85,84-8 , 121; battle of 102 ; hourly requirement in Olympias
84-8 238 ,274
General index 303
dromon, Byzantine 4, 10 feasibility of building 192-3, 199-200,
Dutchman's log 259 204
Dyme 52, 7 1 Ficorini bronze casket 30, 35, 158, 173
Dyrnoke, Dorian xxiv, 219-20 fir (elate) 179-80, 183, 186,206,234,
279; for masts and yards 188
Egestaeans 118 'fives' (pentereis) 1-2,21-2,47; Alexander 's
Egypt 31, 37, 40-2, 50 ,62,107; Egypt ian at Babylon 47; Antigonus' 48; at Athens
hogging truss 171, sails and rope 190 , 48, in Cyprus 47, at Rhodes 185, at
ship-building 184, squadron at Salamis Sidon 47 , at Syracuse 47, at Tyre 47;
50, 58; Egyptians 37, 181, 184, 189 invented by Dionysius I ofSyracuse 47
'eights' 2 flags, seesignals
Eion 52,130 flagship 123, (more than one in fleet) 71
Elaeus 83, 85, 82, 86 , 88 flax: raw for caulking (styppeion) 185,234;
elate, seefir white for ropes 189-90; yellow for sails
Elis 52; Elean ships 64 190; flaxen articles (fina)185;
elm 181 contraband 190
encirclement (periplous) 43 , 54-5, 60 , 'floating hypothesis' 232
82-3,86,88,90,92-3, 165; double 55 , floors 209,256
61, 82-3, 88 , 92 foot (pow) or clew 149,226
Ephesus 52, 34 , 40 , 88 foot stretchers 212, 243
Ephorus 80, 84 forefoot 25
epibates, plural epibatai, meaning 131, see 'forty' 4, 15 and n.8
deck soldiers fouling 206
epotis, plural epotiMs, see bow timbers 'fours' (tetrireis) 1-2,9,21 -2,47-9;
Erl61 Alexander's at Babylon 47 ; Antigonus'
Erasinides 90 48 ; at Athens 48, 157, at Rhodes 49 ,
Eresus 98, 82 113, at Syracuse 47, at Tyre 47
Erment model 37, 45 Fravitta 8
Eretr ia 52, 42 Frost, Honor xx, 129
Erineus 164, 164 futrocks 209
Erythrae 31, 39
esparto grass (kukaia) 190 gangway 39 , 158,217-18,236,250,252,
Eteonicus 89 255
Etruscan ships 39; Etruscans 39 garboard make 181, 198, 204, 206, 210
Euboea 52,51-3,55,114; Euboeans 53 generals, Athenian 108, 114
Eucrates 185 Geodimerer 260
Eucrernon 124 gigs, Cornish 247, 273
Eurybiades 53, 56 Gilgamesh 186 n.16
Eurymedon 166 Global Asset Management xxv
experimental ship archaeology 231 Global Positioning System (GPS) 261, 263
'eye' 149 n.22 gravity, centre of 192-5,226-7
green wood, use of 182
fairleads 211 Greenheart 203
fatigue factor 58, 68, 84 ,101-2; in Greenhill, Dr Basil xviii
Olympias248,274 Grocers' Company xxv
304 GeneraL index
Gundry, Norman xix, 200-1 , 204 hyperesia 109-1 4,118-19,122-3,235,

Gylippus 160 257 ; export of 114; working stations
Gytheurn 52, 106 113,120
bypozomata 169-71,196--9,204-5,211 ,
Hagios Georgios , island of 57, 58-9 220-1, 234; braces of 171 , 220-1 ;
Hale , Or John 135,246 tension of204-5
Hal icarnassos 52, 35, 56 n.7
halliards 176,224,234 Iapygian pr. 100, 102
Harnaxitus 98, 97 ikria (bow and stern platforms) 158
'hanging gear' 169, 188-9; material for Ilium 83, 84
189-90 Imbros 98, 82
Harrnatus 98, 97 Indian ocean 37
harmoniai, see mortice-and-tenon joints Indus 47
haulway (diolkos) 51 n.I, 128, 135 interscalmium (an oarsman's 'room') 17,
heaviness 277-9 133,207,239,245-6,268-9,271,273;
Hebrus 152 in Olympias239, 245-6, 268-9
heel 195,223,235 ,258,261 Ionian cities 41-4,50; revolt 41-4; war 80,
Hellenic Foundation, The xxv 115
Hellenic Navy xiii-xiv, xxiii-xxiv, xxvii, Iphicrares 97-9, 116
201,206,231,234-6,248,250,256, Iroko, used for keel instead of oak 206
264 'islands, the' 50
Hellespont 82, 8, 50-1 , 81-4, 92,116, Issos 31,47
124, 130 Isthmus (of Corinth) 51 n.l, 58, 74,128,
helmsman (kybernetis) 110-13, 129-31, 151
162,173-4,218,249,256,258,261 , Italy 52; heel of 101-2; southern 102
274 ; Phantias, foremost Greek
helmsman 119 javelin men 65, 160-1
hemiolia 105 and n.6 joinery, ships' (xyfa) 179-81; imteroneia,
Heraclea31, 103, 103,264; enkoilia) 181
Byzantium-Heraclea run 103, 10 1, joints, watertight: use ofstopping in 182,
103-4,264 206; made by swelling of planks 182
Hermocrates 100-1 Julius Caesar 16
Hiero ofSyracuse 190
Hippeus ofSamos 90 kataphrakta (se. ploia), ships, decked 158,
hogging 196--8 protected 48
hold (thafamos) 32, 131 katastriima, plural katastromata, see deck
horse-transports (hippagogoi; hippegoi) 50, keleustes (rowing master), see boatswain
94 and n.L , 156,227-30 keel 180-2, 196--8,210,220,248,260;
hull Ill , 161, 179-84, 186--8,201, keelscarf204, 207, 209, 234, Trait de
233-4,245,248,250,252,257-60, Jupiter207,209
264 ,268-9,272,274, weight of Kempf manoeuvre 261
210 , paint (aloiphi, hypaloiphe) 187, Kolliniaris, Commodore 1. x:v
226 kyklos (defensive circle) 53 n.Z, 71-2,
Hyccara 52, 117-8 78
Hyperbolus 179 Kulukundis, Mr Eddy xxiii
General index 305
Kyren ia ship xx-xxi i, 128-9, 180, 197, Macedon, Macedonia 3 1, 52; source of
20 1 pitch/resin 186; source of timb er for
oars 189; Macedo nian Beets 3;
ladders, to qu art erdeck 2 18 Macedon ians 49
Lade, battle of 52, 43-4, 53, 156 Magnesia 52, 51 , 56
Lampsacus 52, 125, 124, 175 n.3 1 Makris, Admiral xv, xxi
land troops, use of in support ofships 60 , Malea, Cape 89, 89
63 ,67,75- 6 and n.12 , 87- 8, 93, 165 marble 138, 140, 144 , 149 n.22
landi ng ladder, gangpl ank, or 'brow ' Mark IIa and IIb, see Olympias
(apobathra) 162 , 236 Maro neia 52, 125, 124
L'Aquila Relief 14, 142-6, 159-60 Marsala ship xx, 129, 197, 200- 1
larch, coastal pine (pitys) 179-81 , 186; masts, main and 'boat' 159, 175, 192 ,224 ,
source of pitch 187 255- 7; wood for 188
Larisa 98, 97 mast-partners (parastatai) 159 and n.1
Laurium 52, 2, 53 meals normally eaten ashore 96, 99 ;
leakage 277 Tirnomach us' men prevented 124
Lecturn 98, 97 Med iterranean galleys of sixteenth centu ry
Leletzis, Lieut. Chrisros xxiv 11-1 2 and n.6 , 43 , 273
Lenor mant ReliefI 5-18, 20, 22 , 135, Med iterranean moor 69 and n.9
138-48 ,1 55, 158-60,1 71 ,1 98-9, Megarian strait 57, 58; ships 64,1 35
246-7, 273, 280-3; furth er fragment Meno n 124 .
18, 140-5; proje ction of 24, 280-3 merchant ships (holkades) 77 , 101 , 128-9,
Leoni das 51 181 , lead-sheathed 186, 226
Lesbos 52, 98, 42 , 82, 89, 94-5, 115; Mesopota mia 186
Lesbian ships 43 Messenia 52; Messenian s 70
Leucas 52, 63 ; Leucadian ships 64, 76-8 rneracentric he ight 195
Leucimme pr. 64, 63-4 , 66-8 Merhyrnna 98, 97
Liburnians 8-9 mid-section 193-4, 198
Licinius 8-9 Miletus 52, 4 1-2; Milesian pirate 105
Lindos 52; relief 130 Mim nes34
lines of hull 193-4, 201-2 Min darus 81-2, 84- 8, 92, 97 , 104, 116
Live O ak 203-4,206 Min istry of C ulture, Greek xiii, 233-4
Lloyds Register 196 mock-up xix--xxi, xxiii, 172 , 20 0
Locri 100, 102 models xix, 200- 1, 204-5
Lame, Du puy de 16, 19 mod ifications to design , proposed (Mark
Londo n 259 Ha and IIb), see Olympias
Long Walls 62 mole (choma) 121 and n.17
lon gitudinal bend ing strength 196 Molon 121
Luli, king of Sidon 32 morale of oarcrew 112, 235, 249
Lycia 3 1,50 Morrison, Sinclair xviii, 200
Lysande r 88, 105 mortice-and- tenon joint s (harmoniai)
Lysias 90 182-4,1 87, 209, tests 20 1-4
Moss, D avid 171
McGra il, D r. Scan xix, 232 mulberry 18 1
McKee, Eric xxi, xxiii, 20 1 Munychia 57, 12 1 n.17, 157, 229-30
306 General index
Mytilene 52,89,96, 89, 92, 95-7,118 , 240-1,252,271-2; classification of

255; Mytilenian ship 41 n.Ll , 107; 136; gearing of 137-8, 193,273,280;
Piraeus-Mytilene run 96, 95-6, 255 in Olympia: 236,240-1,245; length of
24, 137-8,215,246,269; length the
Nafplion 262 same in each unit 23-4,136-8; looms of
Napoleon III 16, 19,231 145,172 no22, 193,212,215-16,
National Maritime Museum , Greenwich 226-7, 240, 252; number of 111, 136;
xviii, xxi, 171-2 passageunder oar faster than under sail
nauarchs (admirals) 274, 279; Athenian 103; pulled each by one man 27, 111,
90; Spartan 88 136; pulled in shifts abnormally 96,99,
Naupactus 70, 73, 164,69-70,75-6,116, 254; spare 24,137,240; stroke 212,
164 239,242,245-6,249,259,268,271-3,
Nausiphante 178 275,280; thalamian 30-2, 136-50,
naval warfare: old-fashioned method of, 172-3 and n.22, 237, 240, 267, 272;
44,62,65,67; 'guided missileconcept' thranite 136-50, 163, 165, 172-3 and
of 46; 'fighting platform concept' of 46 n.22, 237, 246-8, 255, 259, 272, pulled
Naxos 52, 41; lead models from 25 through outrigger 162-3, 165; timber
Necho 37, 40 for (kopeis) 185, 188-9; zygian 30,
Neel, Leon 204 136-50, 172-3 and no22,237, 255, 272
Nicias 117, 120, 151-2, 161, 163; Peace oarsmanship 71-2, 116,278; in Olympias
of,38 237-56,268-75; training programme
nights spent ashore 95-6; Timomachus' in 115-16
men unable to go ashore 124 oarsmen (nautai) 114-18,278;
Nile 37 arrangement of 131-50, 193,200,212;
'nines' in Antigonus' fleet 48 Athenian empire, from 117; canting of
Nineveh relief 32-4,39,45, 155-6 in proposed modified design (Mark Ilb)
Nisaea 57,135 271-3; citizen and foreign 115-17;
Notium 52, 74 n.l 0, 88 companies (taxeis) of 114 and nn.ll and
12; constant pracrice by 115-16; deme
oak 181,203,279; LiveOak 203-4, 206 registersof 114, 121-3; desertion by
oarcrews,Athenian, composition of 116-8 123-6; distribution of, between classes
oared longships smaller than triereis, role 136, variation in 146-8; fighting men as
of28-30, 101 25-7; files of9-10, 23, 27,193,
oarloops 135; in Olympias241-4, 249 216-17; in Roman ships (ordines)
oarport sleeves, thalamian (askomata) 139, 133-5, hoplites serving as 115; number
147,168-9,185 (askoi), 192,216,230; of 111; polemarch's listsof foreign 114,
contraband 190; in Olympias216,224, 117; 'rooms' of, see interscalmium; seats
235,237,243,258,261,274 of 216-17; skilled, lack of in fourth
oarports 41, 209; thalamian 41 and n.12, century BC 48,116; slavesas 118;
136,139,147,149-50,192,213,216, specialists 115; thalamax = thalamios
223,235,258,274; zygian 41 n.12, 136; thalamian (thalamioi) 115, 131,
139,147,237 136-50 and n.9, 156, 192-3,195,
oars (kopai) 171-3,215-6,226-7,236, 212-13,215-16,236,238,240,248,
240-1,245,247-9,252,261,268,271, 252-3,258,268-9,273; thranite
274,280; blades of 171-3, 189,215-6, (thranitai) 119, 136-50 and no9, 157,
General index 307
200,2 12- 13,2 16-17,227, 236-8, 240, 264; sea trials, rowing 236-56, backing
244-5 , 248, 252-4 ,262,271; thranite water 247, in shifts 254-5, proposed
and thal am ian, canting of in Olympias sliding stroke 246-7, 268; sea trials,
200 ,21 2-13; used as light -armed troops sailing 256-9, power-sailing 258-9;
115; training of 115-16; two levels of ventilation 238 , 274
25-32; un skilled 116 ; zygian (zygioi) Orpheus 113, 251
136-50 and n.9, 157 ,200,216-1 7, outrigger(parexeimia) 17-20,45, 138-41 ,
227 ,236-8, 244-5, 24 8,252- 3,262 144-5,1 47,161-7,192, 210 -11 ,215,
oarsystern 165, 171, 211-12, 268-73 267,272, 280 ; brackets for 139-40,
oar-unit ofone thr anire , one zygian and 144-5, 147 ,211; covered by bow timber
one thalamian oar 137,139,1 41 165; mean ing ofword 161; thranite oars
Odysseus 167-8 , 173 , 183,251 ; his worked through 162-3, 165
makesh ift boat 183-4
Olympiasxiii-xiv, xxviii, 113 , 120, 167, Pachelbel's Canon in 0 251
173-4,178,211-27,231-75 ; Paches 95-6
com mand , control and communication paean 66, 68, 76
248- 56, 259, humming 252,254, piper Paffetr, James 201
(aulitis) 113,250-2, rowing master Palestrina mosaic 173
(keleustis) 248 , 250 ,252-6,274, Paloukia Bay 57, 56, 58
section s 252, silence 254, 256 , team Pamphyl ia 31,50,81
leaders 252 , 'tr iads' 236, 253-4, 271 ; Panormus 73, 77
crew management 235; departures from papyrus: for ropes 189; for sails 190
authenticity 233-4; fatigue factor 248 , Paralos 136,155
274 ; interscalmi um, ' room' 239, 245-6, Paramyrhia Stream 64, 63
268-9 ; manoeuvrability 235 , 259 , 265 , parexelresia; see outrigger
274, moving sideways 247- 8, yawing Parium 85, 86
261 ; modifications to design , proposed parrel224
(Ma rk lIa and lIb ) 26 7-74; carport Patrae 52, 70,71- 2
sleeves (askoma ta) 235 , 237 , 243, 258 , pay, naval 2, 63,108-9,118-20,122-6,
261 ,274; oars 23 6,240-1, 245, blade 236 ; method of payment 119
shape 240-1, thalamian 237 , 240 , 267, Peitholaus 81 n.1
thalarnian, ineffectivene ss of240-1 , Peloponnese 52, 36, 70, 73, 94, 97-9,102,
267, 272 ; oarloops 241-4, adjustable 115-16, 156, 162; Peloponnesian base
knot 242-4; oarsmanship 237-56, 81 , coast 99 , fleets 3, 69 , 72- 3, 78,
268-75; performance under oar 235, 81-3, ships 7 1, 76 , 82,11 3,162, War
240-1,245,248,254-5 , 25 9-68, 27 1, 36 , 153, 156, 268 ; Peloponnesians 38 ,
274 ; performance under sail 235 , 56, 71-2,76-8,83,116,165
256-9,261-2,274; piper (aulitis) 113, pentecontarch, see purser
250-2; rowers 234-6, 238-40, 242 , pentecontor 8 nA, 23 , 25 , 28-30, 40-1 ,
244-6,248-9,251-2,254,256,267 , 50-1,131,133,1 35 ,137,159, 250 ,
27 1-2; rowing master (k eleustis) 248 , 267; crew of 51; Phocaean 39, 167;
250 ,252-6,274 ; rudders 247,257, Polycrates' 40; sails of 175; two-level 23 ,
26 1, 263, 265, 274; running repairs 30 ,133,139,1 58,163,250,267;
243-4; sea tri als xiii-xiv, xxvii-xxviii, decked 158
231-2,235-48,250,254-5,257,262, Perdiccas of Macedon 189
308 General index
Periander 40 pitys, coastal pin e, seelarch

Pericles (I) 62 , 95,11 4-1 7,156, 274; (2) plan e 179, 181
general at Arginusae 90- 1 plan ks for hull 179-86 . 201 - 5
periplous, see en circlemenr Plaraea, battl e of 60 ; Plat aeans 5 1, 115,
Persepolis 45 117
Persia, king of 42, 9 5; Persian co in series p lat form 2 17- 18
34 ,45 . invasions 3 , 4 1, 44- 5, 50 , Platis, C ap t. Stav ros (H ellenic Navy) xv,
107-8. 115-1 6 . 156,268 , n av~ XXIV
resources 44, sh ips 4 1.95, 152--4, 156 , Plato's 'str aight light ' 169- 70
159-60, 248 (at Salam is) 152--4, 248, polemarch (polemarchos) , lists of 114, 117
squadrons 155 , tro op s on board 4 1.44, poles (k omoi) use of Zl , 113
50-1 ,107.109-10,15 2-6,160; Polycles 121
Persian s 39 ,50 ,130- 1 Polycrates ofSa mo s 40- 1; dat e of 40 n.9
peuke, seepine polyester 20 5, 234
Phalerum 57, 62 polysulphide 206
Phantias 119 Pompeian wall pa inr ings 155
Pharnabazus 8 1, 87 popl ar 183
Philon's nav al storehouse 245-6 Poro s xiii, xxvii, 56, 242, 24 4, 257 ,
Philostcphanos ofCyrene, author of 25 9-60 ,262-3
In ventions 37 power-sailing, seeOlympias
Phocaea 52, 98, 92 ; Phocaean Pozzo, Cavaliero dal, drawing 140-6,
penreconrors 3 9, 167 , territory 97; 159-60,256
Phocaeans 39--40 press co nference xvii-xviii
Phoenicia 31. 37 , 39. 44 , 47, 50.180; prismat ic coefficient of hull 193. 195,201
Phoen ician cedar 180 , 186, cities 41, 47 . Proconnesus 52, 85, 86-8
colon y 46-7 , fleet 3, 42--4 , 81. 83 , shi ps p ropulsion 192 , 276
34,43,45 , 50. 130 . 151 ,1 56 ,ship- Prot oma chus 90
sheds 133 n .4 , squad ron 7 5, rriereis Psyrtaleia 5 7, 58
36-7, 41 n.1 2, 4 5. 180 ; Phoen icians Ptolern y III Euergetes (246-22 1 BC) 18 5
36-7 , 39 ,131 Pt olem y IV Philoparor (22 1- 204 BC) 4,
Phormio 6 9-76 , 79 , 88, 93, 113- 14 . 13 5, 15 and n.8
154 purser. penreconrarch (pem ekontarchos)
pine (peuke) 17 9-81 , 186 , 188 , 279 ; 111 ,1 24,1 29 . 256
source of pitch 188 ; for masts and yard s Pylos 52, 99 , 162; Pylos Tragana pyxis 2 5
188 ; for coastal, seelarch (pirys)
pipeman (auletis) 111-13, 129 , 250; in qu ad rirem e ('fo ur'), Rom an 11, 22, 128
Olympias 113 , 250-2 Quercus cerris, seeTurkey O ak ; Q.
Piraeus 52, 5 7. 96,62, 81 n.1 ,95 ,97. 99, uirginiana, seeLive O ak
119 , 135,246 ,25 5; Piraeus-Mirylene q uinq uereme ('five'), Rom an 2, 9- 1 1, 22,
run 9 6, 95-6 , 255 , 272 ; 155 n. 27
Piraeus-Corcyra run 97-100
pitch, pine tar, resin 184-8,234; for rabbet o f keel 181
caulking and sto p ping 184-6, 23 4; ram (embolos) 32, 35, 39,141 ,1 57 ,1 67,
conrraband 187 ; imported from 20 4-5 ,221-3,267,272; bronze 3 2,
Macedonia, Asia Minor and Syria 186 167, scale model of 204-5, str uctu re of
General index 309
22 1- 3, 'twisted off 39, 167; ramming Samo s 52, 37, 40 , 42-3, 81; Athenian fleet
165- 7,222,235 ,247, 264 ,274 , at 81,88-9 , 189; Samian ships 42- 3,
amidships 167 , bow-to-bow 165-7; 89-91; Sam ians 38 , 44
ram ming forces 222 ; ramming tactics Sardis 186
29-30, 39-40,42-4, 46 ,53-5,59-61 , Saronic gulf 52,53,56,74 , 263
65 ,68-9, 70-2, 75-9,82-3, 86-8 , scantlings 20 7
90-3, 132 Scylax4 1
Rand olph, Mrs Rosie xxv sea-fight, the first 38-9, 167
Red Sea 3 1, 37 seamanship, Athenian 115-1 7
research and development programme 200 seams, caulking and stopping 184-6, 206,
resident aliens at Athens 117 234
resin, pine tar, pitch 184-8 sea-power, emergence of 36
resistance of hull 20 1, 276-9 sea trials, see Olympias
Rheg ium 3 1, 52,100,100,102 'secretary' (epistoleus) , Spart an vice-ad mi ral
Rhium 52, 70, 73,73 88 n.4
Rhodes 52, earthquake in 185 ; Rhodian Sennacherib 33-4, 155; relieffrom palace
'four' 49, 113; tribimiolia49 of, seeNineveh relief
Rhoeteum 83 , 98, 82, 97 Sepias 52, 56
rigging 17 5-8,220-1,223-6 Sesrus 52, 83, 85, 125, 81-2 and n.l , 84 ,
rings as fairleads for brailing ropes 177 88 ,97,124
Roberr s, Owain 223 sharp turns (anastrophai) 74 , 88, 174
rocker, keel 207 shear forces 196, 201, 203-4
rolling 226,261 sheets 224
Rome 3 1, 4 1, 158; Roman visitor to shell 196 , 204, 209- 10
Ath ens 144; Romans 47, 49, 133; ship-sheds 4- 5, 128, 132-4 and n.4, 157,
Roman ship 155 n. 27, trir eme xx, 192-5,272 ; atZea4-5 , 128, 132-3,
15-1 7,19 272 ; reconstructed 134
ropes 169, 189-90,204-5 ,220 ,234,257; ship-worm, skolex 186, terMon129,
seehypozomata 179-80, 186, tbrips 186
Rossiter, Harry 266 shipwright, ship's carpenter (naupegos) Ill,
roundel, decorative 148-9 129,1 79 , 244
rudders, seesteering Shrouds, anachronistic 22 4,256
Sicily 3 1, 2- 3, 80-1,116-18,162; Sicilian
sagging 196-7 expedition 3, 80-1 , 83 , 99- 100, 105,
sails and rigging 97, 175-8, 192, 223-6, 110-11 ,156
257-9; main sails left ashore before Sicinnus 58-9
battle 86 , 97, 175 and n. 3 1; men to sickle-shaped form ation 55
work 113; sails, light and heavy 176 , Sidon 3 1, 32 , 38 , 4 5; Sidonian ships 35,
190 ; sailing 217, 256-9 38 , 47,50
Salamis: battl e of 57, 35, 53,5 5-6 1,74-5 , Sigeum 98, 97
130 ,152- 6,159,167,248,267,278 , signals 65 , 68 , 7 1, 7 5, 87, 218
sourc es for 56 n. Z; island of 57,1 , silence, im portance of in sea battles 65 , 71,
55-61, 74, 114, 234, 257, 263, channel 74 , 76 n.13 , 254, 256
58-9, 74 , 248 , metrological relieffrom 'six' (hexeres) 47
245 skin friction 276
310 Generalindex
Skye Boar Song 251 87-8; Syracusans 80,82-3,88,100-1,

slidingsrroke, proposed 135,246-7 150-1 ,165-6,267
slip 192-3, 197 Syria 50, 180, 186; pirch and resin from
SMYN (Perry Officers Training School), 186
Poros xiii Syros 'frying pan' 25 and n.I
Smyrna 39
Socrates 92 rabernacle 159,224,227,235,256
Spanish windlass 205, 220 taeda, pitch pine 188
spars, see yard Talosvase 146-8, 158, 168andn.12
Sparra 52, 87; Spartan fleet 119, ships 87; rar 226
Sparrans 51,72, 87, 94, 115, 117 Tarenrum 52,100,101-2
Sphacteria 115, 162 raxiarchs90-1
spikes, copper 209 taxis, see oarsmen
stability 192,195,212,227,245,261 Technical Universiry ofArhens 201
staff (stylis) 68, 218 Tempe 52, 51
steering, rudders (pidalia) 163, 173-4, Tenedos 52, 125, 126
218-20, in Olympias247, 257 , 261, tenons 207, 209; marerial for 201-4;
263 ,265,274; duplicated 163; fins of shearing loads of20 1-2
174 Tenos 52, 121
Steffy, Prof. Richard xx-xxi 'tens' in Antigonus' fleet 48
stemposr 181 terebinrh 186
srern 197,201,207,216,219,236,251, tetriris see 'four'
255,258,260 TexasInsritute of Nautical Archaeology
stiles 138-40, 145, 150 XXI
sropping 180-2,184-7,206,234 tbalamos, see hold
Srraits, i.e. Hellesponr 83, 85, 125, 84, 124 Thames, river 259, skiffs 247
srrakes 197,204,207-9 Thasos 52, 125, 124
strength 193, 195-6,210 Thebes 52, 57; Theban fleet 3
srress 196, 198-9,201 Themisrocles 53, 57-8, 61, 74, 95, 108,
stringers, inrernal 209 151,153-4,159; 'Decree of' 108-18,
Srrombichides 81 n.l 120, 152
structural strength 195 Theramenes 84-7, 92
Srryme 52,125,124; Srrymonian wind Therma 52, 51
130 Thermopylae 51, 55
styppeion 185; styppax 136, 185 and no12 Thesprotis 66
Sryx, river 135,249 tholes, rholepins (skalmoi) 133-5, 138,
supply ships (kerkouroi) 50, 101, 105; see 140,145,147-8,193,213-16,240-3,
merchanr ships (holkades) 249,273-4,280-2; thalami an, ser
Sybora islands and harbour, battle of 64, inboard 171, 193,240; rhranire 147-8,
62-9,88,127 211
Syracuse 31,100,1,80,114 nolO, 115 Thrace 52, 36; kingdom of 121, source of
n.13, 151, 166; Athenian hypiresiai ship timber 189; Thracian Chersonese
serving in 114; debare at 100-2, 151; 83,85,81-2,84,120-1
Grear Harbour 150, 160, 165,267; Thrasybulus 81-2, 84-7, 92
Syracusan squadron in Ionian war 82, Thrasyllus 81-2, 84, 90-1, 115
General index 311
threnys2 10- 11, 2 18-20 148; under sail and oar 106; sidescreens
th wart s, bea ms (zyga) 30 , 13 1,136,224, 150 and n.24, 163; speed, rating 6 1,
23 7,245-6,2 56,268- 9,273 chief virt ue 132; speed of 102-6, 193.
Thymoc ha res 84 195, 201, 264-73 . 276-9; stan dard
tiller (oiax) 163, 173-4, 218-20 , 24 7 warship 3 n.2 ; structu ral diffe rences in
tim ber, cho ice of 17 9-81 , 205-6, 233 153-4, 159-60; supply of 20 0 to
Times corre spondence xviii, 104 n.5 Mil etu s 4 1; "T hernistoclean' 153-4,
Ti mocrates 78 159-60; tow in g of grain ships by 124;
Timom achus 124-6 tro op- carr iers 70, 101 , 152-6 and n. 26 ,
Ti rno the us 120 226-7, earliest mention of 153 n.26;
T issaph erne s 8 1, 83, 119 types of 150-7; unsink able 127-8, 165;
tonoi, entonoi, see bypozomata, braces of weight of 192-5 ,277 ,279, ofshell 2 10,
tOP timbers 209-10 of complete hull 2 10; weigh t factor in
topwale s, seewales 131 , 161; wo rds trieres, triskalmos 1 n.I ,
Traj an's flagship o n Trajan's Co lum n 133
xx-xxi, 13 tribemiolia 49
tr iacontor 8 n.4, 13,28 n.2, 50-1, 137, tr irerne, Roman xx, 15-1 7, 19,231
158 , 174; two-level 28 n.2 Trireme Trust, The xiii, xxiii-xxvi, 206 ,
'tr iads' , see Ofympias 233 -5,237,266
Trial Piece xxiv- xxvii, 204; at C oombe Trireme Tru st USA, The xiii, xxvii, 234 - 5,
Abb ey an d Henley Royal Regatta 266
XX1V- XXVll Tro izen 56
trier arch , captain 4 1, 108-9, 117,1 19-26. Troy 30
129-31 ,235 , 254,256,274 ; truck 176,224
acco mmo da tion of 129-31 ; duties of Tur key Oak 203
122-3 Turner, Air Vice Marshal Peter xxiii
rrieres passim and: ballast 128; coate d with rwen ry-oared sh ips 158
pitch! resin 186-8; deck of, see deck; tyranny, tyrants 35- 6, 40- 1, 12 1
d imensi ons of 4- 5, 132-3; dr ying out Tyre31, 33, 47, 155
6 1,72, 151-2, 277 ; Ererrian 42 ; fast 56, Tzakakos, th e brothers xxiv-xxv
69- 70, 101 , 150-3 and n.26; first Tzalas, Mr H arry xv, xxi
mention of3 4-5 ; hauling ashore 102, Tzamrzi s, Captain A. I. xv, xxi
152, 156 ,278-9; horse or cavalry
transporrs (hippagogoi; hippegoi) 50, 94 underwater hu ll form 20 1
and n.1 , 156 , 22 7-30; invention of Utnapishrirn 186 n.1 6
36-7, date 38; keel of oak 180-1 ; life of
199- 200 and n.4; lightweight wood victu alling 95 , 99, 102 ; allowance 102,
used in 180-1; lim itati ons of 100-2; 109,11 8,1 20,1 23,1 26
maintenance of 152,234 ; manning of, Vienna fragment 148-50
see deck sold iers, hyperesia, oa rsmen;
name o f 114 ; Kouphotate 132 n.2 ; wales: topwales 140, 150, 196 , 198,
numbers of in dockyards 157 ; oar- 209-1 1,2 15.220; middl e 138-9,
machine 132; Phoenician 36-7, 4 1 140-1 ,1 45 ,1 47-8,210, 220, 280 ;
n.l2, 45, 180 ; quali ties demand ed by lower 139-41 ,1 47- 8, 20 9-11 , 280-1
service in triere is 42 ; under sail 102- 3, Warwick Un iversity Boat Cl ub xxv
312 Generalindex
waterline 145. 192-4. 226. 272. 277. Worcester Rowing Club xxv-xxvi
279 wrecks towed away 66, 75-6. 87.127.165
Watson . Tim 212 n.1
wax applied to bottom of trieres 187-8. Xerxes 35. 44.58.60.130-1; his bridge
277 over the Hellespont 50. ropes for
weather. effect on performance 278-9 189-90; his invasion fleet 35. 156
weather helm 224. 257-8
Welsh. Frank xvii yard. (keraia) 176. 188.224.256-7. wood
wetted area of hull 195. 276-7 for 188
Whipp. Prof. Brian 266 yawing 226; in Olympias 261
Williams. Roddi xvii
Willink. Sir Charles xvii Zea 4. 128, 132 and n.3. 157; see ship-
'wing. to the' i.e. in column 75 sheds
wooden gear 188 zopissa, mixture of pitch and wax 188
Wolff. Edwin xvii zyga. see thwarts. beams
INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED
I From Greek, Latin and Hebrew APPIAN OF ALEXANDRIA

authors (Greek historian of Rome, 2nd century
AD)
AELIA N OF PRA E N E ST E RomanHistory 10.1.3 9 n.5
(Greek writer, 2nd-3rd centur y AD)
Poikile Historia 6.12 47 ARIS TOBULUS
(historian of Alexander,whom he
AENE A S O F S T YM P H AL US IN AR CADI A accompanied on his campaigns; wrote
(military command er, 4th century BC) after 285 BC)
On Siegecrafi 33 185 ap. Arrian Anabasis 7.19.3 47
35 185
AR1STOPHANES OF ATHENS
AESCHYL US O F ATH EN S
(writer of Old Comedy: hrst play 427, last
(writer of tragedies, 525/ 4-456/5 BC) 388 BC)
Agamemnon 16 252 Acharnians 162-3 132
Persians323-4 57 190 187
336 132 552-3 41 n.12, 183 n .9, 189
338-40 150 Birds108 3
342-3 56 n.8 1395 249
366 57 Frogs 180 249
380 114n.12 207 249
386ff 59 208 249
393 68 236 135
396 238 269 249
408-9 132 364 187, 190
4 15 132, 167 1073 249
679 1 n.l , 133 n.6 1074-5 13,1 7,136
1074 1 n.l , 133 n.6 Knights 129 185
ANDO CID E S O F ATHE N S 532 183 n.lO
(orator, born before 440 BC) 595-610 156
2.11 189 1183-5 181 n.5
3.7 153 1300-10 179
Peace 1232-3 41 n.12, 132
APOL LO NI US O F RHODE S Wasps 909 249,254
(A1exandrian epic poet, c. 295-215 BC) fr. 696 185
1.367-9 170 Scholiast on Frogs 1074 136 n.9
313
314 Index o/passages cited
ARISTO TLE OF S T AG I RA CU RTI US

(philosophe r, pupil of Plato, tutor of (lived at Rome in the principate of
Alexander, founder of the Lyceum: Claudius , AD 4 1-54; wrote a history
384-322 BC) of Alexander in Latin)
Metaphysics 10.1, 1052a 183 n.9 10.1.17-1 9 47 n.20
On theParts ofAnimals687b18 24, 137
DAM A S T E S OF SI GEU M
Physics5.3, 227a 183 n.9
Politics 7.5.7,1327b 110 (Greek geographer and historian, 5th
Rhetoric3.lO, 1411 a14 81 n. l century BC)
3.10 ,1411aI5-16 62 FGrH5F6 39 n.7
3.10,1411a2 4 132 n.2 DEMO STH E N E S OF AT H ENS
fr. 600 (Rose) in Pliny, (orator and statesman, 384/3-322 BC)
N H7.2 07 47 4.16 156 n.3 1
4.28 108, 120
[A R I S T OT L E]
51 122
Mechanics 4,850b10 137
[DEM O STH E N E S]
ARRIAN OF NICOMEDIA IN BITHY NI A 47 122
(became Roman consul, 2nd century AD ; 47.20 185
wrote an account of Alexander's 50 109, 120-6
campaigns in Greek) 50.4 121
Anabasis 2.21.9 47 n.19 50.7 121
2.22 .2 47 n.19 50.11 123
6.5.2 28 n.2 50.15-1 6 122
7.1.2 47 n.20 50.17 119,124
7.19.3 (Arisrobulus) 47 50.22- 3 124
50.53-4 123
AT H ENA EU S OF N AU C R ATIS
(wrote in Greek the Deipnosophists ot DIODO RU S OF S IC I LY
Professorsat theDinner Table, (wrote in Greek, 60-30 BC , a history of
2nd-3rd century AD) the world down to Caesar's Gallic
5.37.203e-204d (Callixenus) 15 n.8 War)
5.40.206 190 11.18.4 58
13.39.3 116
CALLIXE NU S OF RH OD ES 13.49.2-51 84
(Greek historian in Alexandria, end of3rd 14.4 1.3 47 n.18
century BC) 14.42.2 47 n.18
apAthenaeus 5.37.203e-204d 15 n.8 14.44.7 47 n.18
14.5 1.2 185
CICERO OF ARPIN UM 16.44.6 47 n.19
(Rom an orator and writer, 106--43 BC) 18.4.4 47 n.20
Verrines 4.135 144 n.17 18.10 .2 48 and n.21
19.62 .8 48
CLEMENT OF ALEXAN DRIA
(Christian theologian , AD c. 150- DIOS CORID E S
c. 2 15) (Greek medical writer, l sr cent ury AD)
Stromateis 1.16.76 36 MateriaMedica 1.72 188 n.18
Index ofpassages cited 315
EUPOLlS OF ATHEN S 5.99.1 42

(writer of Old Comedy: first play429 BC, 6.8.2 42
last c.412) 6.11.2-15.2 42
peG5 fr. 268 (Tnxiarchs) 53-5 246 6.48.2 156
6.89 42 n.14
EURIPID ES OF ATHENS
6.92.1 42n.14
(writer of tragedies, c.485/4-c.406-5 BC) 6.119 186
Electra 432-7 112 7.21.2 156
lieunl575-6 249 7.25 189
1590 249 7.34 189
1595-6 249 7.36.3 189
liecuba1081 -2 190 7.59.2-3 152
liypsipyu61-7 (Page(1942) p.86) 112, 7.89 150-1
251 7.89.1- 99.3 50
Iphigenia among the Taurians408 28 n.2 7.96 151-2
1043 190 n.22 7.97 156
1377 110 n.6 7.99.3 35
Trojan 'X0men 537-8 190 n.22 7.143-4 53
EZEKIEL
7.184.1 50, 107
(Hebrew prophet , early 6th century BC) 7.184.3 51, 150
27.1-12 32 7.185.1 51
7. 188ff. 51
GALEN OF PERGAMUM 7.194.1-3 156
(Greek medical writer who practised in 8.1.1-2 51,54,115 ,151
Rome, AD c.129-c.199 ) 8.4 53
On the Useofthe Partsofthe Body 8.9 53
1.24 24,137 8.10.1 54, 151
8.12-14 55
HERMIPPUS 8.15-16 55
(comic poet, 5th century) 8.17 107
fr. 63 190 8.22 95, 151
8.42.2 53
HERODOTUS OF HALI CARNA SSUS
8.43-8 151
(Greek historian, see pp. 36-7; died c. 425
8.48 56
BC)
8.52 185
1.164.3 39
8.60a 151
1.166.2 40
8.88.3 35
1.179.2 186
8.118-1 9 109,130
236.4 176
9.98.2 162 n.4
2.96 183, n.9, 184
2.159.1 37 HIPPOCRATES OF COS
3.13.1- 2 41, 107 (Greek medical writer to whom
3.14.4-5 41 contemporary and later medical
3.39-44 40 writings were ascribed: c.460/59 to
5.23-2 189 between 377 and 359)
5.33.2-3 4 1, 131-2 On Joints 62.20 188 n.18
5.83 183 n.8 63.30 188n.18
316 Index a/passages cited
[HIPPOCRATES] OVID OF SULMO

(5rh century) (Roman elegiacpoet, 43 BC-AD 17)
Airs, waters, Places7.50 186 Metamorphoses 3.618-9 249
HIPPONAX OF EPHESUS PLATO OF ATHENS
(poet, migrated to Clazomenae in 542 BC) (philosopher, 427-348/7 BC)
fr. 45 34,149 n.22 Alcibiades 1. 117C-D 173
&.46 187 125C 111
HOMER
Laws705 C 179
Iliad 945C 171
(composed c.800 BC: epic poem about the Letters VII 350a 2-3 114 n.10
Wrath of Achilles) Republic 616B-C 169
2.509-10 10,25 PLINY OF NOVUM COMUM IN ITALY
2.664 183 n.8 (soldier and writer, born AD 23 or 24;
Odyssey killed in the eruption of Vesuviusin
(composed c.750 BC: epic poem about the 79 while commander of the fleet at
Return ofOdysseus) Misenurn)
4.782 135 Natural History 7.207 47
5.243-61 183 16.56 187
5.361-2 183 16.158 184
12.173-7 251 16.195 188
[SOCRATES OF ATHENS 35.101 144 n.17
(orator and statesman, c.436-5-c.338)
PLUTARCH OF CHAERONEA IN
8.48.2 118
BOEOTIA
ltinerarium Peregrinorum
(historian and philosopher, born
(narrative of the Third Crusade, 12th
c.AD 46; educated at Athens,
century AD)
lived and worked in Rome, died
ed. H.E. Meyer (Schriften der Monumenta
c.AD 120)
Germanica Historica 18, Stuttgart
Alcibiades 28 .6 87
1962) Ch. 34, pp. 321-4 10
Cimon 12.2 2,53,61,153
LEO V[ THE ISAURIAN Demetrius43.4 15 n.8
(Emperor of the East, beginning of Iflrh Moralia676A 187
century AD) Tbemistocles 14.2 154, 156
Tactica 19.7 10
POLYAENUS
LIVY OF PATAVIUM (barrister in Rome under Marcus
(Roman historian, 59 BC-AD 17) Aurelius and Commodus, AD
28.45.15 181 n.5 161-192)
LYSIAS OF ATHENS
Strategemata 3.11.13 163
(orator, born 445 BC) 3.11.14 163
21.10 119 POLYBIUS OF MEGALOPOLIS IN
MICHAEL OF EPHESUS ACHAEA

(Greek commentator on Aristotle, (Greek historian of the rise of Rome,
11th-12th century AD) c.201-c.120 BC)
22.118.15 137 5.89 185
Index a/ passages cited 317
T H EOP HRA S T U S OF E RES O S I N 3.49 95,255
L E SB O S 3.77-8 78
(pupil of Aristotle, who m he 3.94-98 110
succeeded as head of the 3. 115.4 116
Lyceum at Athens) 4.2.4 162
Enquiryinto Plants4.1.2 188 4.3-4 99, 151
4.2.8 181 4. 11.4- 12. 1 162
4.8.4 190 4.12 20
5.1.5 180 4.32.2 115
5. 1.6-7 188 6.8.1 108
5.1.7 188 6.3 1.3 111,11 8,1 32,1 51
5.4.4 180,1 86 6.32. 1 110
5.7 .1- 5 179 6.33-4 100,1 51
5.7.4 132 6.42-4 102
9.2 186- 7 6.43 110,1 56
6.91.4 115 n.13
T H UCYD ID ES O F AT HENS
7.12.3 151
(historian of the Pelopon nesian War, see
7. 13 117
pp. 35- 6; born 460-454 BC, died
7.26.2 99
after 399)
7.34 20,1 64
1.10.4 25, 158
7.36.2 166
1.12.4-1.1 3.2 36, 267
7.40.5 150
1.14.3 152-3, 159
7.62.2 161
1.16 44
7.67.2 160
1.29 63
7.70.6 249
1.3 1.1 63
7. 194.1- 3 156
1.41. 2 42 n.14
8.4 99
1.45-54 63
8.15.2 118
1.55.1 118
8.29.2 108
1.80.4 115
845 .2 119
1.118.2 62
8.62.2 153 n.26
1.142.6-9 115, 274
8.62.3 81 n.1
1.143. 1 114
8.78-80 81
2.23.2 94,97, 110
8.87.4 81
2.24.2 153
8.101 97
2.56 .2 94,1 56
8.104 82
2.62.2 92
2.83.3 70 V EG E TI U S
2.84.3 116, 249 (wrote in Latin a compend ium of Roman
2.86. 5 73 military and naval science, AD
2.87 74 c.383-4 50)
2.89.8 174 On Warftre2.1 9
2.89.9 256 4.36 182
2.90- 2.92 .3 75
2.9 1.1 76 V ITRU V I U S
2.93 .2 20, I II (worked as an engineer and architect at
3. 18.4 115 Rome und er Julius Caesar and
318 Index o/passages cited
VITR UVI U S (cont.) 1570 (c. 330) 24 185 n.11

Augustus, wrote his book on 1572 (c. 330) 8 185n.11
architecture in Latin c.25- 23 BC) The Naval Inventories. IG 2 2
1.2.4 17.133 1604-1632 135 n.8
1604(377/6)23 .48.50.60.
X E N O P HO N O F ATHENS
66 175 n.30
(soldier. historian and writer on many
1604.33.38. 42.91 168 n.lO
topics. c.430- c.354 BC)
1604.56 172 n.72
An abasis 5.8.20 113
1604.68.75 149 n.22
6.4.2 103 n.4. 264
1605 (shortly after 1604).
Cyropaedia 7 .5.23 185
40- 3 150 n.24
H istory o/Greece 1.1.11-23 84
1606 (374/3).43-4 137n.1O
1.1.36 153 n. 26
1607 (373/2)14 137n.10
1.4.18 130
1607.24 149 n.22
1.6.19 150
1607.74 174 n.29
1.6.24 118 n.15
1608 (373/2) 14- 15 174 n.29
1.6.29 175 n.31
1609 (37 3/2) 85-86.1 13 cf.
1.6.29-35 90
1611.244-9 150 n.24
1.7.32 127 n.1
1610 (370)23 171 n.19
2.1.22 150 n.24
1610.26 169 n.16
2.1.27-9 9 n.S, 28 n.Z, 120. 175 n. 31
1611 (357/ 6 ) 153 n.25
2.1.30 105
1611.1-9 157n.32
5.1.8 249
1611.23-7 163n.5
6.2.27-30 97. 116
1611.38-41 159 n.I
Household Man agement
1611.65-128 153n.26
( Oeconomicus) 8.8 132
1611.244-9 150 n.24
2 1.3 112. 249. 254. 274
1612(356/ 5)73-9 150 n.24
[XENOPHON) 1613(353/2)280-2 171 n.19
Constitution o/the Athenians 1.2 111.256 1613.284-302 157 n.33
1.19 36.116.253 1615-18 146n.18
1622(342/1)740 187 n.17
Z OSIM U S
1623(334/3)11-13 167 n.6
(Greek historian of the later Roman
1623.284 153 n.26
Empire to AD 410; 5th century AD)
1627(330/ 29)24 48 n.22
2.22.3 8
1627.29 169 n.14
2.23.3 8
1627.65 190 n.23
5.20.3-4 8
1627.241 156 n.31
1627.268-9 157 n.34
11 The inscriptions
1627.313 187 n.17
IG 12 950(412-401 ?)136-7 110 n.6 1627.348 150 n.24
IGP 89 (440-415) 31 189 n.20 1628(3 26/5 ) 154-5 94 n.I, 156 n.29
153 (440-425) 133 n.S, 169 n. 13 1628.161-2. 470,473,480 156 n.29
499 (435-410) 153 n.26 1628.498 167 n.6
IG 22 212 (346) 114n.l0 1628.481.553 157 n.35
1479 B49. 58 169n.17 1629 (325/ 4) 1 132 n.2
Index o/passages cited 319
1629.1 1f. 169n.15 1951 (beginning of the 4th century)

1629.178ff. 121 n.17 1951.79-82 110 n.5
1629.371 190 n.23 195 I. 82ff. 110
1629.801-11 48 n.22, 157 n.36 1951.94-105 111n.8
1629.1151-2 185 n.13 1951.117 118 n.15
1631(323/2)336 185n.13 SIC 1000.18 189 n.19
163 I. 4 15- 17 190 n.23 'The Decree ofThemistocles'
IC2 21 673(327/6)12 171 n.19 Meiggs-Lewisno.23 108 n.2

The Athenian Trireme - J. S. Morrison Et Al. - 2000

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The Athenian Trireme - J. S. Morrison Et Al. - 2000

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The history and reconstruction ofan

Cambridge Univ ersity Press

© Cambridge Unive rsity Press 2000

Th is publ icat ion is in cop yr ight. Subject to statutory exception

First published 1986

ISBN 978-0 -52 1-564 19-9 hardback

Transferred to di gital pr inting 2008

1 Questions and answers 1

Appendix I: Fast triereis 216

2. Full-scale mock-up of a trieres' oarsystem made by JFC and David

3. The mock-up demonstrated at the National Maritime Museum,

5. The Kyrenia merchant ship, fourth century BC Photo by courtesy of

9. The ship-sheds at Zea. From Dragatzes (1886) . 6

14. Fragment of the monument ofwhich fig. 13 is a part. Photoby cour-

41b. Interpretation of fig. 41a. Drawing by] FC 147

61. General arrangement of the reconstructed ship. Drawing by]FC 208

1. The eastern Mediterranean. 31

The idea of building a full-scale reconstruction of a trieres, or Greek

1. Model made by Sinclair Morrison in 1940 to demonstrate that the oars in

before, there had been a correspondence of record length in The Times (6

2. Full-scale mock-up of a trieres' oarsystem made by JFC and David Moss

3. The mock-up demonstrated at the Nat ional Maritime Museum .

splashing settled down to a steady, if cautious rhythm (fig. 3). A naval

4. The three-level open rrieres on Trajan's Column in Rome, early second

discussion. He was a member of the team from the Texas Institute of

4 See the Bibliography.

5. The Kyrenia merchant ship, fourth century BC

6. The Trial Piece at Coventry Boatbuilders, June 1985,

8. The Trial Piece at Henley Royal Regatta, July 1985.

The importance of the trieres

The need for a theoretical reconstruction

2 Lionel Casson entitles chapter 4 of his Ships and Seamanship in theAncientWorld

played so significant a role in preserving the political and economic condi-

The need for a practical reconstruction

.::: :-:::.-.: :.-:.:: ~

The history of the problem

On that occasion 200 of Licinius' triereis were defeated by 80 of

There are two things to be noted in connection with Vegetius' observa-

levels. He has interpreted the quinquereme, quite absurdly, in terms of the

Leo's dromon is nearly as big as the Boeotian ships in Homer (Iliad

who was acquainted with the contemporary galleys of the western

1Oa. Admiral Fincati's model of a sixteenth-century Venetian trireme

The ancient authority Savile is thinking of is probably Aristophanes, who

12. Fragment of a relief originating in Athens and now in the Museo

7 For a detailed interpretation of the representations of the ships on Trajan's

8 Callixenus in Athenaeus 5.37 , Plutarch, Demetrius 43 .4. As ]urien de la Graviere

14. Fragment of the monument ofwhich fig. 13 is a part.

suggested an outrigger, and identified it with the parexeiresia mentioned in

10 Two brackets supporting the outrigger are identified in this reconstruction ,

I See Plate la and b in LSR5.

20a. Penteconror from an Attic black-figure dinos , c. 550-530 BC

20b. Triacontor from an Attic black-figure dinos by [he Antimenes painter,

21. Two oared warships ofdifferent types from a krater made by

A development which doubled the number of men which could be

22a. Fragments of an Attic krarer showing the forward parr of an

no longer to transport of maximum number of men e.g. to Troy, but the

Ego> • Hy=. D\~TOLlA:~P/wcUa.

Map 1 The easrern Medirerranean.

24. Fragment ofAttic pottery showing a longship

25a. Fragments of a relief from the palace ofSennacherib showing a two-level

25b. Another fragment of a relieffrom the palace ofSennacherib showing fleet

painting a snake on the many-benched side of a trieres, so that it seems to

historian. He was an Athenian who commanded a force of triereis in the

------"tr;.;---- O" Pas o~ccnos