691470

research-article2017
MCXXXX10.1177/0097700417691470Modern ChinaFong

Article
Modern China
1­–34
One Country, Two © The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0097700417691470
https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700417691470
Periphery Relations journals.sagepub.com/home/mcx

between Mainland China

and Hong Kong,
1997–2016

Brian C. H. Fong1

Abstract
According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Basic Law, Hong Kong
was to exercise a high degree of autonomy under the framework of “one
country, two systems” after the British handover of its sovereignty to China
in 1997. In the initial post-handover period, Beijing adopted a policy of
nonintervention in Hong Kong, but the outbreak of the July 1, 2003 protest
triggered a subsequent change of policy. Since then, Beijing has embarked
on state-building nationalism, adopting incorporation strategies so as to
subject Hong Kong to greater central control over the political, economic,
and ideological arenas. Ironically, instead of successfully assimilating
Hongkongese into one Chinese nation, Beijing’s incorporation strategies are
leading to a rise of peripheral nationalism in the city-state and waves of
counter-mobilization. This article analyzes mainland–Hong Kong relations
on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the handover and offers insights
from an emerging case study that builds upon the nationalism literature.

Keywords
peripheral nationalism, autonomy, one country two systems, China, Hong
Kong

1The Education University of Hong Kong, New Territories, Hong Kong

Corresponding Author:
Brian C. H. Fong, The Education University of Hong Kong, E-LP2-24, 10 Lo Ping Road, Tai Po,
New Territories, Hong Kong.
Email: chfong@eduhk.hk
2 Modern China 

The literature contends that peripheral nationalism will arise when residents
of an ethnically, linguistically, or culturally distinctive periphery resist incor-
poration by a centralizing state. Thus, peripheral nationalism is by nature a
counter-mobilization of the periphery directed against the incorporation strat-
egies of the center (Seiler, 1989: 199; Hechter, 2001: 17; Hechter, Kuyucu,
and Sacks, 2006: 86). From this perspective, the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR), which has been an autonomous region of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the framework of “one country,
two systems” (OCTS) since 1997, is an emerging case of peripheral national-
ism under a centralizing state. Drawing on the results of a territory-wide tele-
phone survey and other original empirical findings, this article argues that
Beijing’s incorporation strategies toward Hong Kong in recent years have
resulted in waves of counter-mobilization, shaping the dynamics of main-
land–Hong Kong relations into a clash of nationalisms—the clash of the
state-building nationalism of mainland China and the peripheral nationalism
of Hong Kong. It is crystal clear that the OCTS model is nearing a make-or-
break moment.

Theorizing State-Building Nationalism and

Peripheral Nationalism: A Review of the Literature
In the nationalism literature, peripheral nationalism is defined as the assertion
of a distinctive identity by people living within a specific territory of a nation-
state (Williams, 1997: 424). Conceptually, peripheral nationalism is not nec-
essarily concerned with “achievement of an independent state” (Lancaster,
1987: 562); indeed, it is a complex phenomenon covering a very wide variety
of political claims ranging from protecting local culture and emphasizing
regional autonomy to pursuing outright secession (Gourevitch, 1979: 303).
Peripheral nationalist movements in Wales, Brittany, and Friesland, for
example, primarily aim at promoting the languages of the region while in
Galicia peripheral nationalists focus on claiming greater regional autonomy
(Williams, 1997: 424). In other areas, such as Northern Ireland, the Basque
Country, and Corsica, the politics of peripheral nationalism developed into
sustained campaigns of violence in pursuit of territorial secession (Williams,
1997: 424).
But peripheral nationalisms of various territories have one thing in com-
mon: resistance against the incorporation of a centralizing state (Williams,
1997: 426; Hechter, 2001: 16–17). Indeed, peripheral nationalism is the by-
product of another type of nationalism, state-building nationalism, defined as
the conscious efforts of the center to “assimilate or incorporate culturally
distinctive territories in a given state” (Hechter, 2001: 15–16). Scholars of
Fong 3

nationalism usually cite France as the pioneer of state-building nationalism

because of its effective incorporation of various regions into “one and indi-
visible nation” (Zimmer, 1964: 52). However, such a process of incorpora-
tion will more often engender a growing awareness of a distinctive local
identity within peripheries and bring about “moments of resistance” directed
against the center (Williams, 1997: 426). From this perspective, peripheral
nationalism can be seen as a counter-mobilization of the periphery directed
against the incorporation strategies of the center (Seiler, 1989: 199;
Schwarzmantel, 1992; Hechter, 2001: 17; Hechter, Kuyucu, and Sacks, 2006:
86). Center-periphery conflicts in this sense are by nature direct confronta-
tions between two types of nationalisms, namely the assimilationist state-
building nationalism of the center and the reactive peripheral nationalism of
the periphery (Hechter, 2001: 16–17). All in all, the theories of peripheral
nationalism provide a useful conceptual framework for understanding the
dynamics of center-periphery relations (Brass, 1991: 279; Wu, 2016: 690).
The development of peripheral nationalism in both Catalonia and the
Basque Country from the eighteenth to the twentieth century are textbook
examples. Beginning in the eighteenth century, the century-long state-build-
ing process of Spain was characterized by a model of political centralization,
under which the Madrid government attempted to assimilate the local cus-
tomary law, practices, and privileges of the peripheries into a homogeneous
Castilian whole (Motyl, 2001: 506–7). Ironically, over the years the center’s
incorporation strategies only served to increase resistance by the peripheries,
particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country, sowing the seeds of periph-
eral nationalism in these two regions (Motyl, 2001: 42 and 73; Encarnación,
2008: 92). Under the authoritarian Franco regime (1936–1975), Catalans and
Basques consolidated their peripheral nationalism in the process of defending
their languages and cultures against Franco’s incorporationist strategy, which
included the official proscription of all non-Castilian languages (Inder Singh,
2001: 42), and despite the restoration of a Spanish democratic regime and the
devolution of autonomous powers in 1978, the peripheral nationalist move-
ments of both Catalonia and the Basque Country have remained active (Inder
Singh, 2001: 92; May, 2012: 258).

Beijing’s Hong Kong Policy under the OCTS

Model: From Nonintervention to Incorporation
Hong Kong became a British colony by virtue of the so-called unequal treaties
signed between Britain and the Qing Empire during the nineteenth century
(Miners, 1998: 3). Unlike in other British colonies after the end of colonial
rule, in Hong Kong the people were denied both the right to self-determination
4 Modern China 

and the opportunity to take part formally in the Sino-British negotiations over
the future of the city-state in the 1980s (Chan, 2000: 502).1 The Sino-British
Joint Declaration signed in 1984 stipulated that Hong Kong was to become a
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China under the
framework of “one country, two systems” starting from 1997 (Ghai, 2013b:
319–23).
According to the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong after 1997 was to enjoy a
“high degree of autonomy” except in foreign affairs and defense, which were
to be the realm of the Central People’s Government (CPG) in Beijing. The
HKSAR was vested with executive, legislative, and judicial power (including
the power of final adjudication) and the HKSAR Government (HKSARG)
was to be composed of local inhabitants, with its chief executive elected
locally and appointed by the CPG (Articles 3[2] and 3[4]). The Joint
Declaration also stated that the detailed terms of the autonomous arrange-
ments as promised by Beijing would be spelled out in a “Basic Law” to be
promulgated by the National People’s Congress (NPC) of the PRC and
remain unchanged for fifty years from 1997 (Article 3[12]). A Basic Law
Drafting Committee was thus set up in 1985 and the Basic Law was formally
promulgated by the NPC on April 4, 1990.2
Unlike in most other of China’s autonomous regions, where ethnic, reli-
gious, and linguistic or cultural distinctiveness is major justification for the
practice of self-government, Hong Kong’s autonomous status was principally
justified by Beijing for the purpose of maintaining the city-state’s liberal
capitalist system and way of life within socialist China (Ghai, 2013a; Henders,
2010: 130). Nevertheless, a closer examination of Hong Kong’s situation will
show that its distinctiveness lies not simply in its liberal values and capitalist
economy. Indeed, Hongkongese are also distinctive from mainland Chinese
in terms of spoken language (the majority of Hongkongese speak Cantonese
while the official spoken language in the mainland is Putonghua), written
language (Hongkongese use traditional Chinese characters while mainland
Chinese use simplified Chinese characters), and transnational culture (about
350,000 residents, or 5% of Hong Kong’s population, are not ethnic Chinese),
making it similar to a “distinct minority community in the PRC context”
(Henders, 2010: 130–32).
Beijing’s promise of autonomy was put to a real test when the OCTS was
formally put into practice on July 1, 1997. In the early years of the HKSAR,
Beijing adopted a position of nonintervention in Hong Kong and in fact
allowed it a high degree of autonomy (So, 2011: 108; Cheung, 2012: 326). In
the eyes of the local population and the international community, Hong Kong
remained a vibrant financial center with a high degree of freedom and rule of
law, and Beijing’s “self-imposed restraint” was seen as the principal factor
Fong 5

contributing to the successful implementation of OCTS in its initial years

(Horlemann, 2003: 102). This policy of nonintervention effectively sidelined
potential center-periphery conflicts between Beijing and Hong Kong , mak-
ing the HKSARG headed by the chief executive the major focus of political
conflicts (Li, 2000: 233).
But after 2003 Beijing has gradually adopted a “new Hong Kong policy”
新对港政策, to quote the term used by Cheng Jie (Cheng, 2009), a legal
scholar at Tsinghua University who served on the Hong Kong and Macau
Basic Law Committee of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) in 2006 to
2007. On July 1, 2003, half a million Hongkongese took part in a mass proces-
sion to express their dissatisfaction with national security legislation intro-
duced by the HKSARG. In the face of mounting public pressure, the HKSARG
finally decided to abandon its legislative plan. The July 1, 2003 protest was a
turning point that put an end to Beijing’s nonintervention policy. The protest
was “unexpected” for Beijing leaders, who viewed Hongkongese as politi-
cally subdued. In the eyes of Beijing leaders, pro-democracy political groups
played an influential role in mobilizing Hongkongese in confronting not only
the HKSARG but also the CPG, with “foreign forces” exercising significant
behind-the-scenes influence (Cheng, 2009). Worried that Hong Kong would
develop into a territory “critical of and in confrontation” with the CPG, Beijing
decided to change its policy toward the HKSAR from nonintervention to
active involvement (Cheng, 2009). Shortly thereafter, a CCP Central
Coordination Group on Hong Kong–Macau Affairs, chaired by State Vice-
chairman Zheng Qinghong and comprising representatives from powerful
organs such as the CCP United Front Department, the Ministry of Public
Security, the Ministry of National Security, and the Hong Kong and Macau
Affairs Office, was set up as the top-level task force in charge of formulating
policies toward the two SARs of Hong Kong and Macao (Yep, 2010: 99).
Cheng Jie described the shift in Beijing’s policy as “a reaction to changes in
Hong Kong’s own political environment since 2004. It is different from the
old ‘well water does not interfere with river water’ policy, in the sense that it
emphasizes more central government engagement and involvement in Hong
Kong’s political development” (Cheng, 2009). Jiang Shigong, another main-
land legal scholar, who had worked in the Central Government Liaison Office
(CGLO) in Hong Kong as a researcher from 2004 to 2008, argued that after
the 1967 riots the British colonial administration had successfully won the
hearts and minds of Hongkongese by cultivating anti-Communist and anti-
China sentiments. Jiang claimed this sowed the seeds for Hongkongese’
refusal to accept Beijing’s authority and he believed that steps should be taken
to facilitate the return of Hongkongese’ hearts and minds to the motherland
(Jiang, 2008: 31–34; Hung, 2014).
6 Modern China 

When we review the actual practice of the so-called new Hong Kong pol-
icy since the July 1, 2003 protest, it is perfectly clear that Beijing has
embarked on an assimilationist state-building nationalism; that is, it has
adopted an incorporation strategy aimed at subjecting Hong Kong to greater
central control on the political, economic, and ideological fronts. In the
nationalism literature, the notion of “incorporation” is commonly used to
describe the various strategies designed by the center for the purpose of
imposing tighter control on peripheries and fostering homogeneity across the
country. Michael Hechter classically defined state-building nationalism as
conscious efforts by the center to “incorporate” culturally distinctive periph-
eries so as to “render the boundaries of the nation and governance unit con-
gruent” and to “assimilate culturally distinctive individuals to the dominant
culture” (Hechter, 2001: 62–63). While the actual practice of incorporation
may vary across different contexts, its ultimate aim is to “erode the base of
peripheral nations” and subject them to greater control by the centralizing
state (Hechter, 2001: 28). From this perspective, “incorporation” can be seen
as an umbrella term for strategies designed by the state-building nationalist
center for exerting greater control over the peripheries. Following this classi-
cal framework of Hechter, in the following paragraphs I trace out how Beijing
has adopted various incorporation strategies since 2003 so as to “emphasize
central government engagement and involvement” in the HKSAR.

Assimilationist State-Building Nationalism:

Beijing’s Incorporation Strategies
Political Incorporation: Bringing Hong Kong under Beijing’s
Political Control
Beijing’s incorporation strategies are most evident in the political realm.
After the adoption of the “new Hong Kong policy” in 2003, Beijing has
striven to bring Hong Kong under more direct political supervision, first by
proactively exercising its supreme constitutional powers to control Hong
Kong’s scope of autonomy and democratic reforms, and second by strength-
ening the role of the CGLO as the “second governing team” in the HKSAR
handling the domestic affairs of Hong Kong on the spot.
First, since 2003 mainland officials have developed a new political narra-
tive that highlights the supreme powers of the Central Authorities under the
Basic Law. This political narrative stresses that all the autonomous powers
enjoyed by the HKSAR are devolved from the CPG through the Basic Law;
therefore, the locality retains no residual power and Beijing has final say over
the scope of autonomy of the HKSAR. In particular, Beijing insists that it has
Fong 7

the supreme power to decide on Hong Kong’s democratic development

through the NPCSC’s power to approve democratic reforms under Annex I
and II of the Basic Law and to interpret the relevant provisions of the Basic
Law (Cheng, 2009; Cheung, 2012). In the words of Beijing’s leaders, such a
new political narrative aims at defending the “powers of the Central
Authorities” 中央权力 under the OCTS framework. Over the past decade,
Beijing has used various means such as speeches and visits by mainland offi-
cials to construct and strengthen this political narrative (Cheng, 2009;
Cheung, 2012). The most comprehensive and controversial statement made
by Beijing is its White Paper, “The Practice of the One Country, Two Systems
Policy in the HKSAR,” issued in June 2014. The White Paper, which was
published by the State Council and is seen as representing the official stance
of Beijing on Hong Kong affairs, claims that the CPG “exercises overall
jurisdiction over the HKSAR” 全面管治权, including various “powers
directly exercised by the CPG in the HKSAR” such as appointing the chief
executive and other principal officials and guiding the HKSARG in the
implementation of the Basic Law (Information Office, 2014). By any mea-
sure, this political narrative is not just empty words, but rather has been
developed for the concrete purpose of defending and justifying the actual
exercise of the CPG’s constitutional powers in critical events of Hong Kong’s
political development including several reinterpretations of the Basic Law
and decisions made by the NPCSC over Hong Kong’s constitutional reforms
(see Figure 1). In short, although Beijing’s leaders in the 1980s–90s main-
tained that they would manage only the defense and foreign affairs of the
HKSAR and would leave it to Hongkongese to administer their own affairs,
including constitutional reforms,3 in recent years the CPG has changed course
and wielded its supreme constitutional powers to limit Hong Kong’s scope of
autonomy and control the pace of democratic development (Cheng, 2009).
The most recent reinterpretation of Article 104 of the Basic Law by the
NPCSC on November 7, 2016, which effectively blocked two pro-indepen-
dence legislators, Sixtus Leung and Yau Wai-ching, from taking office in the
Legislative Council, once again demonstrated Beijing’s determination and
readiness to make full use of its supreme constitutional powers to tighten its
control over Hong Kong (Economist, 2016).
Second, a more straightforward way that Beijing seeks to incorporate
Hong Kong under its direct political control is through strengthening the role
of the CGLO as the “second governing team” 第二支管治队伍 in the
HKSAR, to quote the term coined by the former director of the CGLO
Research Department, Cao Erbao (Cao, 2008). Unlike the British colonial
period when London did not attempt to maintain a strong presence in Hong
Kong and the Colonial Office basically left it to the governor to decide in
8 Modern China 

Figure 1.  Number of reports published by leftist newspapers on the “powers of

the Central Authorities” (Zhongyang quanli).
Source. Based on information from the WiseNews electronic platform. The research counted
the number of newspaper reports that mentioned the Chinese keywords “powers of the
Central Authorities” (Zhongyang quanli) from 1998 to 2014. The local leftist newspapers
covered in this research are Hong Kong Commercial Daily, Ta Kung Pao, and Wen Wei Po.
Note: Critical events of Hong Kong’s political development:
6 April 2004: Interpretation by the NPCSC of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex 2
to the Basic Law.
26 April 2004: Decision by the NPCSC on the election methods of the Chief Executive in
2007 and Legislative Council in 2008.
29 December 2007: Decision by the NPCSC on the election methods of the Chief Executive
and Legislative Council in 2012.
31 August 2014: Decision by the NPCSC on a specific model for Chief Executive popular
elections to be implemented in 2017.

detail on how to govern the city-state (Miners, 1987: 38), Beijing maintains a
strong local presence as embodied in the three major “resident organs”: the
CGLO (which officially serves as a liaison office between mainland authori-
ties and the Hong Kong community), the Office of the Commissioner of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which coordinates diplomatic affairs involving
Hong Kong), and the People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison (which
consists of a 4,000-strong military force) (Loh, 2010: 201–6). These resident
organs report to the CCP Central Coordination Group on Hong Kong–Macau
Affairs, with the State Council Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office func-
tioning as its administrative agency (Yep, 2010: 100).
The most powerful resident organ of the CPG in Hong Kong is undoubtedly
the CGLO, which commands an extensive network of “leftist organizations” in
Hong Kong.4 In the initial years of the HKSAR period, the CGLO remained
low-profile and was not that visible in the public sphere. Beijing initially
favored a small local presence and scaled down the establishment of Xinhua
Fong 9

Hong Kong 新华社香港分社 (predecessor of the CGLO) by 60% in 1997

(Loh, 2010: 203). But following the adoption of the “new Hong Kong policy,”
the CGLO has become increasingly active and high-profile. In January 2008,
Cao Erbao wrote a paper in a CCP Central Party School’s publication claiming
that there are two “governing teams” in the HKSAR: the first is the “HKSAR
establishment team” 香港特区建制队伍, which is responsible for exercising
the various autonomous powers of Hong Kong in accordance with the Basic
Law, comprising the chief executive, other principal officials, executive coun-
cilors, civil servants, judges, and judicial officers. The second is “a team of
CCP cadres” 中央、 内地从事香港工作的干部队伍 consisting of mainland
authorities specializing in Hong Kong–related issues and the resident organs of
the CPG in Hong Kong (Cao, 2008). The notion of “two governing teams” was
widely seen as an important public statement reflecting Beijing’s “new Hong
Kong policy” (Cheng, 2009) and signaling the expanded role of the CGLO.5
While it is difficult to see into the black box and trace how the CGLO has
exercised direct influence over the HKSARG, the CGLO’s engagement in and
influence over Hong Kong’s domestic affairs were most notable in the elec-
toral arena, where CGLO officials now actively liaise with pro-Beijing forces
in elections at various levels (Ma, 2015: 52). Through its internal bureaucra-
cies such as the Island Work Department, the Kowloon Work Department, the
New Territories Work Department, and the Society Work Department, the
CGLO reaches out to a wide range of pro-Beijing organizations and co-opts
them into its united front apparatus. Empirical research shows that the public
activities of CGLO officials have almost been tripled over the past decade,
illustrating its more active engagement in united front work (Figure 2), and its
united front apparatus has developed into machinery covering more than 600
organizations (Table 1). It appears that now the CGLO, through its united front
apparatus, closely coordinates with pro-Beijing parties throughout the whole
process of District Council and Legislative Council elections, ranging from
nurturing candidates, planning campaign strategies, lining-up pro-Beijing
businesspeople for donations to support the day-to-day constituency services
of pro-Beijing candidates (e.g., voter registration, distributing spoils like food
and gifts, organizing recreational activities), and mobilizing voters on election
days (Loh, 2010: 209; Cheung, 2012: 329; Chou, 2014). The coordinating role
of the CGLO in Hong Kong’s elections is now an open secret and pro-Beijing
politicians also openly acknowledge the support they receive from the CGLO.6
The CGLO flexed its political muscle in the 2012 chief executive election, and
actively canvassed for Leung Chun-ying as a replacement for scandal-plagued
Henry Tang,7 sparking public worries that Leung, widely suspected to be an
underground CCP member, would be dependent on the CGLO’s support to
maintain his ability to govern (Ma, 2015: 53). Leung’s high-profile visit to the
10 Modern China 

Figure 2.  Number of public activities of Central Government Liaison Office

officials, 2000–2014.
Source. Data based on a content analysis of newspaper reports of the three local leftist
newspapers, Hong Kong Commercial Daily, Ta Kung Pao, and Wen Wei Po. The essence of the
content analysis was to search all the newspaper reports for the keyword “Central Liaison
Office” (Zhonglianban) through the WiseNews electronic platform and to code public
activities that fit the scope of the research.
Note. “Public activities” refers to public events such as social functions, ceremonies, and
community visits which CGLO officials hosted and attended as reported by the three local
leftist newspapers.

Table 1.  Member Organizations of Hong Kong Island Federation, Kowloon

Federation of Associations, and New Territories Association of Societies.

Number of member organizations

(A) Hong Kong Island Federation 142
  Agricultural societies 2
  Business associations 22
  Cultural and recreational organizations 21
  Senior citizen organizations 1
  Labor unions 4
  Neighborhood/district organizations 40
  Townsmen associations 15
  Women’s organizations 9
  Youth organizations 4
 Others 24
(B) Kowloon Federation of Associations 159
  Agricultural societies 0
  Business associations 0
  Cultural and recreational organizations 49
(continued)
Fong 11

Table 1. (continued)
Number of member organizations
  Senior citizen organizations 0
  Labor unions 0
  Neighborhood/district organizations 95
  Townsmen associations 0
  Women’s organizations 1
  Youth organizations 13
 Others 1
(C) New Territories Association of 320
Societies
  Agricultural societies 16
  Business associations 13
  Cultural and recreational organizations 96
  Senior citizen organizations 7
  Labor unions 6
  Neighborhood/district organizations 91
  Townsmen associations 19
  Women’s organizations 20
  Youth organizations 16
 Others 36
Grand total [(A) + (B) + (C)] 621

Source. Lists of member organizations of Hong Kong Island Federation (http://www.hk-if.org/

info/bdname2.pdf), Kowloon Federation of Associations (http://www.klnfas.org.hk/areashow.
aspx?chnid=21&id=123&lan=1), and New Territories Association of Societies (http://www.
ntas.org.hk/a-list/5415-cht) as shown in their official websites as of October 17, 2014.

CGLO office on the day following the election only heightened such public
worries (Siu, 2012), making the visit a symbolic moment signaling the role of
the CGLO as the “second governing team” in the HKSAR. Without doubt, the
increasing quasi-supervisory role of the CGLO over the whole pro-Beijing
camp in Hong Kong including the chief executive and legislators is an indica-
tion of the overall trend of Beijing’s tighter political control over Hong Kong,
including its own “local collaborators.” Many political observers therefore
speculated that the director of the CGLO had become a CCP committee secre-
tary directing the work of the HKSARG (Lin, 2013).

Economic Incorporation: Bringing Hong Kong under Beijing’s

Economic Control
Absorbing Hong Kong into its economic sphere of influence has also been
central to Beijing’s incorporation strategies in recent years. Before 1997 and
12 Modern China 
Table 2.  Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Projects, Infrastructure, and
Economic Cooperation Platforms, 2003–2016.
Cross-border economic cooperation pacts
  Date of signing
1 June 29, 2003
2 Sept. 29, 2003
3 Oct. 27, 2004
4 Oct. 18, 2005
5 June 27, 2006
6 June 29, 2007
7 July 29, 2008
8 May 9, 2009
9 May 27, 2010
10 Dec. 13, 2011
11 June 29, 2012
12 Aug. 29, 2013
13 Dec. 18, 2014
14 Nov. 27, 2015
Cross-border infrastructure
  Date of commission
1 July 2007
2 Sept. 29, 2003
3 Under construction
4 Under construction
Name of agreement
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements
(CEPA) Main Text
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements
(CEPA) Six Annexes
Supplement to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement II to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement III to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement IV to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement V to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement VI to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement VII to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement VIII to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement IX to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Supplement X to Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangements (CEPA)
Agreement between the Mainland and Hong Kong
on Achieving Basic Liberalization of Trade in
Services in Guangdong
Agreement on Trade in Services
Name of infrastructural project
Shenzhen Bay Bridge
Sheung Shui to Lok Ma Chau Spur Line
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge
Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–
Hong Kong Express Rail Link
(continued)
Fong 13

Table 2. (continued)

Cross-border economic cooperation platforms

  Date of Establishment Name of platform

1 Mar. 1998 Hong Kong/Guangdong Cooperation Joint
Conference and related issues
2 Oct. 2003 Hong Kong/Shanghai Economic and Trade
Cooperation Conference
3 May 2004 Pan-Pearl River Delta Regional Cooperation and
Development Forum
4 June 2004 Hong Kong/Shenzhen Cooperation Meeting and
related issues
5 Sept. 2004 Hong Kong/Beijing Economic and Trade
Cooperation Conference
6 June 2008 Hong Kong/Macao Cooperation High Level
Meeting and related issues

Source. Cross-border economic cooperation pacts: Industry and Trade Department, HKSAR
Government (https://www.tid.gov.hk/tc_chi/cepa/legaltext/cepa_legaltext.html); Cross-border
infrastructure: Transport and Housing Bureau, HKSAR Government (http://www.thb.gov.
hk/eng/policy/transport/issues/cbt.htm); Cross-border economic cooperation platforms:
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, HKSAR Government (http://www.cmab.gov.hk/
en/issues/regional_cooperation.htm).

in the initial years of the HKSAR period, mainland–Hong Kong integration

only took place at an informal level mostly through self-initiated investment
of Hong Kong’s businesspeople in the mainland’s manufacturing and ser-
vice industries with little planning from the Hong Kong government (So,
2011: 105). In the aftermath of the July 1 protest rally, Beijing adopted an
incorporation approach and took the lead in speeding up cross-border eco-
nomic integration. It did so, first, to alleviate Hongkongese’ hostility toward
Beijing by demonstrating that the motherland was “all for the good of Hong
Kong” (Ma, 2015: 46), and second, to increase Hong Kong’s economic
dependence on the mainland by providing Beijing with leverage to influence
local business and professional sectors (Chou, 2014).
As a consequence, Beijing over the past decade has steered the mainland–
Hong Kong economic integration process, facilitating the flow of people,
goods, and services across the mainland–Hong Kong border through the
signing of various cross-border economic cooperation agreements, promot-
ing the development of cross-border infrastructure, and setting up various
regional cooperation platforms (Table 2) (So, 2011: 110; Cheung, 2012: 339–
40). In 2006, Hong Kong was for the first time in history covered by the State
Council’s Five-Year Plan (the Eleventh Five-Year Plan), thus signaling the
14 Modern China 

Equity funds raised by other companies (HK$billion)

1000
Equity funds raised by Red Chip stocks (HK$billion)
900 Equity funds raised by Mainland enterprises H shares (HK$billion)

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Figure 3.  Equity funds raised on Hong Kong’s stock market (main board).
Source. Annual factbooks published by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (http://
www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/statrpt/factbook).

Figure 4.  Hong Kong’s trade with mainland China vis-à-vis other countries/
territories, 1972–2104.
Source. Adapted from the statistical tables of the Census and Statistics Department (http://
www.censtatd.gov.hk).

official incorporation of Hong Kong into the economic planning system of

Beijing (Chan, 2008: 7). The cumulative effect of a decade of rapid cross-
border economic integration is that Hong Kong’s economy has become
Fong 15

Figure 5.  Number of visitor arrivals to Hong Kong by country/territory of

residence, 1992–2014.
Source. Annual factbooks published by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (http://
www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/statrpt/factbook).

heavily dependent on the mainland (Cheung, 2012: 324). Major sectors of

Hong Kong’s economy now rely on the mainland to survive, with mainland
capital, trade, and visitors occupying the largest share of Hong Kong finan-
cial, trade, and tourism industries (Figures 3 to 5). While in the short run the
cross-border economic integration has boosted Hong Kong’s economic
growth, in the longer run it is significantly expanding the mainland’s eco-
nomic influence, “bond[ing] the HKSAR more tightly to the Mainland eco-
nomic orbit” (Chan, 2008: 7) and “erode[ing] the HKSAR’s bargaining
power and autonomy” (Cheung, 2012: 342). Even though Hong Kong should
enjoy autonomy in developing new industries and trade under Articles 118
and 119 of the Basic Law, the cross-border economic integration since 2003
has effectively brought Hong Kong under Beijing’s economic control.

Ideological Incorporation: Promoting a Homogeneous Chinese

National Identity
The promotion of a Chinese national identity as part of China’s official ideol-
ogy has been another crucial element of Beijing’s incorporation strategies
vis-à-vis Hong Kong after 2003. This ideological incorporation was not, ini-
tially, carried out by a massive and immediate change to the school curricu-
lum (Morris, 2009: 97), but has been conducted mainly through various
implicit measures inside and outside the schools via different government
16 Modern China 

agencies (e.g., Education Bureau, Home Affairs Bureau) and advisory com-
mittees (e.g., Curriculum Development Council, Committee for the Promotion
of Civic Education) (Tse, 2007: 239).
National education 国民教育 has been implemented “inside schools” via
curriculum reforms. In 2001 a reform of the curriculum in the HKSARG first
specified nurturing a “national identity” 国民身份认同 as one of the seven
learning goals for Hong Kong’s nine-year compulsory education. “National
identity” has been taught as one of the five priority values and attitudes under
the rubric of “Moral and Civic Education.” Since then, various national edu-
cation elements have been introduced into the formal curriculum by way of
adding national identity and China topics to various subjects such as general
studies and Chinese language in primary schools and civic education and
liberal studies in secondary schools, with official teaching kits with video
tapes, wall charts, web-based materials, and the like provided to teachers
(Tse, 2007: 239). Under the curriculum, “soft content” such as Chinese cul-
tural and ethnic heritage has been emphasized so as to “provide pupils with a
soft portrayal of Chineseness” (Morris, 2009: 97). Concurrently “economic
reform and opening-up” since 1978 have been set as the focus of modern
China topics, but controversial issues like the 1989 Tiananmen incident are
excluded from the curriculum (Jones, 2015: 235). The cumulative effect of
curriculum reforms over the past decade has brought “both the structure and
ideological content of local schooling far more closely into line with main-
land practice” (Vickers, 2011: 100). Following the withdrawal of “Moral and
National Education” as an independent school subject amid the anti-national-
education movement that broke out in 2012, the HKSARG has most recently
initiated curriculum reforms in the subject of Chinese history for secondary
schools aiming at “[increasing] students’ sense of belonging towards China”
(Leung, 2016).
National education has also been implemented “outside schools” through
funding students to join mainland exchange activities (Kennedy and Kuang,
2014: 108). Over the past decade, a cumulative total of 334,737 post-second-
ary, secondary, and primary school students have received government subsi-
dies to join mainland exchange programs and over HK$430 million has been
spent for this purpose (see Table 3). In 2008, a national education activity plat-
form known as “Passing on the Torch,” which comprised government officials,
pro-Beijing figures, and CGLO officials, was established by the Education
Bureau to coordinate national education initiatives in the wider society. Apart
from official programs, a number of pro-Beijing youth organizations such as
the Future Star Federation of Students, the Hong Kong Volunteers Association,
and the Hong Kong Youth Exchange Promotion United Association have been
established in recent years to strengthen the united front work among youth by
 Table 3.  Number of Students Receiving Government Subsidies for Mainland Exchange Programs and Relevant Government
Expenditures, 2007–2008 to 2015–2016.

Number of students Expenditures (HK$ millions)

Secondary Primary Secondary Primary

Financial Post-secondary school school Post-secondary school school
year school students students students Total school students students students Total
2007–2008 0 7,937 7,937 0 4 4.0
2008–2009 0 10,300 10,300 0 12 12.0
2009–2010 0 34,800 34,800 0 44 44.0
2010–2011 0 22,000 16,500 38,500  0.0 36.0 12.4 48.4
2011–2012 1,200 19,700 19,900 40,800  3.7 33.1 13.6 50.4
2012–2013 5,900 12,800 7,400 26,100 17.8 27.8 4.5 50.1
2013–2014 7,100 26,200 16,700 50,000 21.4 30.6 10.6 62.6
2014–2015 4,500 29,100 17,300 50,900 13.8 34.9 11.7 60.4
2015–2016a 5,000 46,300 24,100 75,400 15.2 66.1 17.6 98.9
Cumulative total (Number of students) 334,737 Cumulative total (Expenditures) 430
aEstimated figures for 2015–2016 budget.

Source. Administration’s replies to members’ initial written questions in the Special Finance Committee of the Legislative Council, various years
(http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/fc/fc1216.htm).

17
18 Modern China 

organizing mainland study tours and internships (Cheung, 2012: 337). These
new youth organizations, together with similar organizations with a longer his-
tory, namely the Hong Kong New Generation Cultural Association and the
Hong Kong United Youth Association, often have CGLO officials who act as
patrons or officiate at their activities (Cheung, 2012: 338). It is not uncommon
for teachers and students in mainland exchange activities to meet party and
government officials and to listen to talks on the party’s doctrines and achieve-
ments, giving rise to public concerns in Hong Kong that these exchange activi-
ties are just aimed at “brainwashing” (Mingpao, 2012a).
Theorists of nationalism consider education central to state-building
nationalism since it fosters loyalty to the center and patriotic socialization
(Hechter, 2001: 66), both of which contribute to cultural homogeneity across
the country. From this perspective, the above-mentioned national education
measures implemented inside and outside schools clearly represent Beijing’s
conscious efforts to achieve ideological incorporation through promoting a
homogeneous Chinese national identity in Hong Kong.

Reactive Peripheral Nationalism: Counter-

mobilization against Incorporation Strategies
As theorists like Paul R. Brass (1992) and Michael Hechter (2001) would
predict, the “new Hong Kong policy” adopted by Beijing in 2003, which is
by nature an assimilationist state-building nationalism designed to incorpo-
rate and subject Hongkongese to tighter central control, has threatened the
preexisting distinctiveness of Hong Kong and resulted in a rise of peripheral
nationalism. In recent years “Hongkongese” as a distinctive identity has been
mobilized by people with strong peripheral nationalist identification to strug-
gle against Beijing’s incorporation strategies.8 The rise of peripheral nation-
alism in Hong Kong can be observed in two aspects as theorized by Ernest
Gellner (1983: 1): nationalist sentiment (i.e., a feeling of anger or satisfac-
tion) and nationalist movements (i.e., political actions).9
The first indicator is the growing trend of peripheral nationalist senti-
ment. It should be noted, however, that a distinctive Hongkongese identity
is not a new phenomenon, having existed long before the handover.10 The
birth of a Hongkongese identity can be traced back to the 1950s, when the
imposition of mainland–Hong Kong border control put an end to the previ-
ous frequent in-flows and out-flows of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong
and turned them “into a settled [community]” (Tsang, 2003: 223). In the
1970s Hong Kong’s rapid transformation into a metropolitan city gave rise
to a new identity—Hongkongese—among local residents and created a
growing distance from the sense of “belonging to the Chinese nation”
Fong 19

(Mathews, Ma, and Lui, 2008: 38). In the 1980s and 1990s political con-
troversies surrounding the impending transfer of sovereignty (e.g., Sino-
British negotiations and the 1989 Tiananmen incident) further consolidated
a distinct Hongkongese identity based on Hong Kong’s liberal institutions
and values such as the rule of law, freedom of speech, and human rights
(Bhattacharya, 2005: 54). Without doubt, Hong Kong’s status as a separate
political entity as well as its different path of political and socioeconomic
development vis-à-vis China are critical factors behind the development of
a Hongkongese identity before 1997. Moreover, this distinct identity has
been prolonged by the OCTS and the Basic Law (Lau, 1997: 26). To a
great extent, a distinct Hongkongese identity has gradually evolved into “a
unique form of nationalism,” emphasizing Hong Kong’s distinctiveness
from mainland China (Zheng, 2008: 40). To be sure, in the initial years of
the HKSAR, the “absence of open intervention” from Beijing had led
Hongkongese to trust in the CPG, softening the sense of Hongkongese as
a distinctive identity and increasing a sense of identity as Chinese (Lee and
Chan, 2005: 12–13). Even in the first few years after the July 1 protest
rally when Beijing gradually stepped up its incorporation strategies, the
trend of Chinese identification continued to grow and peaked in 2008
because of patriotic sentiment surrounding the Beijing Olympic Games
(Kwong and Yu, 2013: 127; Jones, 2015: 20). But the trend has changed
since 2009 when a Hongkongese identity began to revive (see Figure 6) as a
consequence of people’s growing awareness of Beijing’s interventions and
the social disruption attending mainland–Hong Kong socioeconomic inte-
gration, such as the influx of mainland tourists and pregnant women who
wish to give birth in Hong Kong in order to evade the mainland population
policy as well as secure Hong Kong residency for their child (Yew and
Kwong, 2014).
It must be emphasized that unlike the decades of the 1970s to the 2000s,
when a Hongkongese identity was to a large extent built upon Hongkongese’
sense of socioeconomic superiority over mainlanders (Kwong and Yu, 2013:
118, 130), since 2009 that identity has been revived against a new backdrop
of “us” (Hongkongese) resisting the “invaders” (mainlanders). To apply the
notion of peripheral nationalism to Hong Kong, the revival of a Hongkongese
identity in recent years is clearly a counter-mobilization that aims at defend-
ing Hong Kong’s autonomy, core values, lifestyle, and language (Cantonese
and traditional Chinese characters) against Beijing’s incorporation strategies.
The rise of peripheral nationalist sentiment is most evident in the develop-
ment of a public discourse that centers on mobilizing Hongkongese to
“defend Hong Kong.” In recent years, this discourse, as expressed by politi-
cal rhetoric such as “defending our own city,” “defending our core values,”
20
Figure 6.  Sense of identity in Hong Kong, 1997–2016.
Source. Public Opinion Programme, University of Hong Kong (https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/ethnic/index.html).
Note. The figure excludes respondents who answered “Others,” “Don’t know,” “Hard to say,” or “Refuse to answer.
Fong 21

Figure 7.  Development of a public discourse of “defending Hong Kong,”

1998–2015.
Source. Data from the WiseNews electronic platform, covering 12 Hong Kong Chinese
printed newspapers (Apple Daily, Hong Kong Commercial Daily, Hong Kong Daily News,
Hong Kong Economic Journal, Hong Kong Economic Times, Mingpao Daily News, Oriental
Daily News, Sing Pao, Sing Tao Daily, Ta Kung Pao, The Sun, Wen Wei Po). In conducting
the content analysis, a set of Chinese synonyms has been used to represent and locate the
keywords “Defending Hong Kong,” including “shouhu Xianggang,” “shouwei Xianggang,”
“baohu Xianggang,” “baowei Xianggang,” “hanwei Xianggang,” and “shouzhu Xianggang.”

and “defending our autonomy,” has become commonly used by opposition

politicians and widely reported in the local media (see Figure 7).
The second indicator is the growing trend of peripheral nationalist move-
ments (i.e., political actions). In recent years, a strong sense of Hongkongese
identity has developed into waves of localist mobilizations resisting both
Beijing and the HKSARG. In the electoral arena, “defending Hong Kong”
was adopted by the entire pan-democratic camp as the major election theme
in the most recent 2015 District Council election, with the democrats mobi-
lizing support among voters by asking them to “Defend the District Council,
defend the community and defend Hong Kong” against the “red tide” (Tang,
2015). In the social movement arena, tidal waves of “localist protests” aimed
at resisting Beijing’s incorporation strategies have also become common
(Table 4).
Most recently, there are signs that the peripheral nationalist movement in
Hong Kong is extending from localist mobilizations aimed at defending
against Beijing’s intervention into more organized campaigns in pursuit of
self-determination and territorial secession. Joshua Wong, the student activist
who led the anti-national-education movement in 2012 and the Umbrella
movement in 2014, recently set up a new political party, Demosistō, with
“self-determination” as its principal political demand (Cheng, 2016).
22 Modern China 

Table 4.  Major Localist Protests, 2012–2015.

Date Nature of the protest

Counter-mobilization against Beijing’s political intervention in Hong Kong’s affairs
Mar. 24, Media widely reported that CGLO officials had canvassed
2012 for Leung Chun-ying in the 2012 chief executive election.
Democrats staged a demonstration to protest the CGLO’s
intervention.
Sept. to Dec. Student organizations launched class boycotts and organized
2014 rallies outside Government Headquarters in September to
protest the decision of the NPCSC on August 31, 2014, on
the implementation of universal suffrage for the chief executive
election. The class boycotts and rallies subsequently resulted in
shots of tear gas by the police on September 28 and a 79-day
occupation by protestors of major roads in Admiralty, Mong
Kok, and Causeway Bay.
Counter-mobilization against social disruption of mainland–Hong Kong economic
integration
Feb. 2012 Under the Framework Agreement on Hong Kong / Guangdong
Cooperation, the governments of Guangdong and Hong Kong
were to launch the first phase of a trial scheme for cross-
boundary private cars in March 2012 under which qualified
owners of Hong Kong private cars were to be allowed to
enter Guangdong. During the second phase, private cars
from Guangdong were to be allowed to enter Hong Kong. In
February 2012, there was growing public concern that after the
implementation of the first phase of the trial scheme in March,
the second phase would also be carried out, bringing about
chaotic traffic in Hong Kong. The Civic Party and the Democratic
Party organized signature campaigns to protest the trial scheme
on February 6 and 11, respectively, and on February 12 several
hundred people spontaneously joined a protest rally hosted by
a Facebook group. The HKSAR government in the end put the
second phase of the trial on hold.
Jan. and April An influx of mainland tourists under the Individual Visitor
2012 Scheme (IVS) made streets, shopping malls, and public
transport overly congested and sparked anxiety among
Hongkongese over the erosion of Hong Kong’s culture and
lifestyle. In 2012, a number of social actions were organized
to protest the influx of mainland tourists, such as a protest in
January against the Dolce & Gabbana (D&G) store for alleged
discrimination against Hongkongese but not mainlanders, and
a protest in April against the Agnes B. Cafe for using simplified
Chinese characters on its menus instead of traditional Chinese
characters.
(continued)
Fong 23

Table 4. (continued)
Date Nature of the protest
Sept. 2012 Parallel traders from Shenzhen made use of the “multiple-entry”
and Feb. to arrangements under the Individual Visitor Scheme (IVS) to buy
Mar. 2015 goods such as powdered milk and medicine in Hong Kong and
then take them to mainland China for sale. Parallel traders
were active in the New Territories North and railway stations,
which had become major distribution centers for parallel
trading, pushing up commodity prices and disturbing traffic in
nearby areas. On September 15, 2012, a group of protesters
organized themselves via Facebook and launched a protest
called “Recover Sheung Shui,” confronting parallel traders
outside the Sheung Shui station. Another round of anti-parallel-
trading protests broke out in February and March 2015,
when protesters organized a series of campaigns—“Recover
Tuen Mun,” “Recover Shatin,” and “Recover Yuen Long”—to
confront parallel traders outside Tuen Mun V City Shopping
Mall, Shatin Station, and Yuen Long Station. In April 2015,
the CPG announced the replacement of the “multiple-entry”
arrangements for Shenzhen residents with “one trip per week.”
Counter-mobilization against expansion of national education
Aug. 30 to The HKSAR government planned to introduce “Moral and
Sept. 9, National Education” as an independent subject for primary
2012 and secondary schools in September 2012 and September
2013, respectively. There were public concerns that the
curriculum guidelines amounted to “brainwashing” and a group
of secondary school students formed an organization called
“Scholarism” to protest the implementation of the plan. From
August 30 to September 9, 2012, Scholarism staged an “occupy
action,” repeatedly holding rallies in the public plaza of the
Tamar Government Headquarters; over 100,000 people joined
the daily rallies. The HKSAR government finally backed down
and agreed to shelve the curriculum guidelines.

Concurrently, another group of young people set up the Hong Kong National
Party with the goal of “turn[ing] Hong Kong into an independent republic”
(Ng and Fung, 2016). In March 2016, a group of students from the University
of Hong Kong called for Hong Kong’s independence in 2047 at the end of the
fifty-year grace period of the OCTS in a “young people manifesto” published
by the student magazine Undergrad (Wong, 2016). In April 2016, a group of
young politicians from the pro-democracy camp issued “Resolution for Hong
Kong’s Future,” which calls for “internal self-determination” and “perma-
nent self-government” for Hong Kong (Cheung, 2016). To echo the insights
24
Table 5.  Territory-Wide Telephone Survey (Peripheral Nationalist Sentiment of *Hongkongese), 2015.
Question 1: Would you identify
yourself as a:*

  Hongkongese Mixed Chinese Total

Question 2: [Interviewer read out: “The Basic Law stipulated that HKSAR shall enjoy a high degree 8.23 8.17 7.72 8.13
of autonomy and shall be vested with executive power, legislative power and independent judicial
power, including that of final adjudication.”]
Please rate the degree of importance of high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong in terms of 0 to 10,
with 10 indicating very important, 0 indicating not important at all, and 5 indicating half-half.
Total (Percentage of respondents) 37.3% 47.4% 15.3% 100%

Question 3: How much do you agree or disagree Quite agree / Very much agree 80.7% 52.6% 37.1% 60.7%
that “the high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong Half-half 5.4% 12.2% 5.3% 8.6%
is now under threat”? Not quite agree / Very much disagree 9.5% 29.6% 50.3% 25.3%
Don’t know / Hard to say / Refuse to answer 4.4% 5.6% 7.3% 5.4%
Total (Percentage of respondents) 100% 100% 100% 100%

Question 4: Which of the following do you think Beijing Central Government 65.3% 61.4% 45.6% 61.8%
is the greatest threat to the high degree of Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government 9.4% 6.9% 5.3% 8.0%
autonomy in Hong Kong? [Only respondents Chinese business groups 0.7% 3.7% 1.8% 2.0%
who chose “Quite agree” or “Very much New immigrants from mainland China 6.1% 3.3% 5.3% 4.8%
agree” in Question 3 were asked to answer Chinese tourists 3.0% 2.4% 3.5% 2.8%
this question] The HKSAR Government 12.1% 8.9% 8.8% 10.5%
Local business groups 2.4% 6.9% 8.8% 4.8%
None of the above / Others / Don’t know / Hard 1.0% 6.5% 21.1% 5.2%
to say / Refuse to answer
Total (Percentage of respondents) 100% 100% 100% 100%

(continued)
 Table 5. (continued)
Question 1: Would you identify
yourself as a:*

  Hongkongese Mixed Chinese Total

Question 5: Since you think the high degree Yes 60.8% 43.3% 27.3% 50.5%
of autonomy in Hong Kong is now under No 32.8% 49.8% 70.9% 43.3%
threat, would you consider participating Don’t know / Hard to say / Refuse to answer 6.4% 6.9% 1.8% 6.2%
in social actions in order to express your
dissatisfaction? [Only respondents who
chose “Quite agree” or “Very much agree”
in Question 3 were asked to answer this
question]
Total (Percentage of respondents) 100% 100% 100% 100%

*The figures for identification are mean scores. They exclude respondents who answered “Others,” “Don’t know,” “Hard to say,” or “Refuse to answer.” “Mixed”
refers to respondents who identified themselves as “Chinese in Hong Kong” or “Hongkongese in China.”
Survey method. This survey was commissioned to the Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong on January 12 to 15, 2015. The questionnaire
comprised 18 main questions and 8 demographic questions. The sampling size was 1,011 and respondents were randomly generated by a computer. The target
population were Cantonese speakers in Hong Kong of age 18 or above and the survey was conducted in Cantonese. The response rate of the survey was 69.0%, and
the standard error was less than 1.6% (at 95% confidence level, the sampling error of all percentages is less than ±3.1%). Figures had been rim-weighted according to
provisional data obtained from the Census and Statistics Department on the gender-age distribution of the Hong Kong population in 2014 year-end and the educational
attainment (highest level attended) distribution collected in the 2011 census. Figures in the report were predominantly based on the “weighted” sample.

25
26 Modern China 

of Peter Alexis Gourevitch about the diversity of political claims of periph-

eral nationalism (1979: 303), peripheral nationalist movements in Hong
Kong are already developing into a very wide variety of political movements
ranging from protecting local autonomy and core values to pursuing self-
determination and outright secession.
Peripheral nationalism is fundamentally about the resistance of the periph-
ery in the face of the threats of assimilation and incorporation into the center
(Brass, 1991; Brown, 2000: 14). An original territory-wide telephone survey,
commissioned to the University of Hong Kong Public Opinion Programme in
2015, best illustrates the dynamics of peripheral nationalist sentiment in
Hong Kong. The telephone survey showed that overall the mean score on the
importance of a high degree of autonomy is 8.13 (out of 10) and 60.7% of the
respondents quite agreed and very much agreed that “the high degree of
autonomy in Hong Kong is now under threat.” Of these respondents who
believed that Hong Kong’s autonomy was under threat, 61.8% said that the
CPG was “the greatest threat to the high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong”
and 50.5% said that they would “consider participating in social actions” in
order to express their dissatisfaction. It is particularly noteworthy that the
respondents who identified themselves as Hongkongese, when compared
with respondents who reported a mixed identity or a Chinese identity, dem-
onstrated relatively higher consciousness about the erosion of Hong Kong’s
autonomy (80.7% / 52.6% / 37.1%) and a stronger willingness to participate
in social movements to protest against possible threats (60.8% / 43.3% /
27.3%) (Table 5). Without doubt, these survey findings provide strong empir-
ical evidence of the rise of peripheral nationalism in Hong Kong, showing
that people with greater consciousness of the erosion of Hong Kong’s auton-
omy are more likely to have a stronger sense of Hongkongese identity and a
greater willingness to take part in localist mobilizations.

Conclusion: Reexamining Hong Kong Politics in the

Context of Center-Periphery Relations
Since the July 1, 2003 protest, Beijing has gradually abandoned the noninter-
ventionist approach of the initial post-handover era and adopted state-build-
ing nationalism to incorporate and subject Hong Kong to greater central
control on the political, socioeconomic, and ideological fronts. Nevertheless,
this article shows that instead of incorporating Hongkongese into a single
Chinese nation as intended by Beijing’s leaders, the incorporation strategies
are leading to a rise of peripheral nationalism in Hong Kong. The NPCSC’s
repeated use of its supreme power over Hong Kong’s political development,
the strengthening of the role of the CGLO as the second governing team, the
Fong 27

deepening of cross-border economic activities, the influx of mainlanders, and

the expansion of national education have only served to exacerbate
Hongkongese’ anxiety about the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy, and the
accumulation of such anxiety has paradoxically consolidated Hongkongese
as a distinctive peripheral identity and triggered waves of localist mobiliza-
tions against Beijing’s incorporation strategies.
This article contributes to the literature on both nationalism and local poli-
tics. As far as the literature on nationalism is concerned, it provides a case
study that substantiates the theoretical predictions of the peripheral national-
ism literature in an East Asian context. The case of Hong Kong shows an
overall agreement with the peripheral nationalism literature that the incorpo-
ration strategies of a centralizing state will engender a growing awareness of
a distinctive local identity within peripheries and trigger “moments of resis-
tance” by the periphery against the center. Evidence from Hong Kong vali-
dates the fundamental contradiction between assimilationist state-building
nationalism of the center and reactive peripheral nationalism of the periphery.
With regard to local political studies, this article also reexamines the nature
and characteristics of Hong Kong politics within the established theoretical
context of center-periphery relations. It paves the way for future comparative
studies of Hong Kong and other autonomies with similar dynamics of center-
periphery relations such as Catalonia, Galicia, Corsica, and elsewhere.
This article also provides an updated and comprehensive analysis of main-
land–Hong Kong relations on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the hando-
ver. It illustrates how Beijing’s changing policy on Hong Kong has shaped the
dynamics of mainland–Hong Kong relations under the OCTS model. Since 2003
Beijing has replaced its original position of nonintervention with incorporation
strategies aimed at moving Hong Kong into the political-economic orbit of the
centralizing Chinese state. But after about fifteen years of actual practice and
implementation, Beijing’s incorporation strategies have proven to be counterpro-
ductive as they have intensified center-periphery conflicts, engendering a grow-
ing awareness of a distinctive peripheral nationalist identification in Hong Kong,
and triggering localist mobilizations against Beijing (with calls for self-determi-
nation and territorial secession also on the rise). From this perspective, this article
reveals the fundamental contradiction under the existing OCTS model, that is,
one country, two nationalisms. From the very beginning, Beijing and Hong Kong
have had a contrasting understanding of the OCTS model: Beijing’s leaders,
adopting an assimilationist state-building nationalism as part of their strategy for
governing the whole of China,11 see the OCTS model as a transitional arrange-
ment and aspire to incorporate Hongkongese into a single, unified Chinese nation
in the long run. Hongkongese, on the contrary, emphasize their distinctive periph-
eral identity and view the OCTS model as a permanent arrangement for
28 Modern China 

protecting and accommodating Hong Kong’s distinctiveness. If the OCTS model

is to be based on such a contrasting set of nationalisms, it will only create con-
tinuing center-periphery conflicts and become unsustainable in the long term.
Unfortunately, Hong Kong and mainland China have already plunged into such
a vicious cycle. On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the handover, the
OCTS model has definitely come to a make-or-break moment. It can survive
until 2047 and hopefully beyond only if the contrasting set of nationalisms
between Beijing’s leaders and Hongkongese can be reconciled.12

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the Department of Asian and Policy Studies, the
Education University of Hong Kong, for sponsoring a territory-wide telephone survey
leading to the completion of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.

Notes
  1. The United Nations had originally placed Hong Kong on its list of colonial ter-
ritories, which entitled it to the right of self-determination. But in 1972 the PRC,
on its admission to the UN, persuaded the General Assembly to remove Hong
Kong and Macao from the list (Ghai, 2013b: 317).
  2. For a comprehensive analysis of China’s policy toward Hong Kong before 1997,
see Tsang, 1996; for an account of the drafting process of the Basic Law, see
Chan, 1996; and for a discussion of the major provisions of the Basic Law, see
Ghai, 1999.
  3. Before the handover, the Director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Lu Ping
wrote an article in the People’s Daily in March 1993 saying that “How Hong
Kong develops democracy in the future is a matter entirely within the sphere
of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the central government cannot intervene”
(People’s Daily, overseas edition, Mar. 18, 1993) and subsequently the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement asserting that “with regard to election
of all members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR by univer-
sal suffrage after 2007. . . . [i]t is a question to be decided by the Hong Kong
SAR itself and it needs no guarantee by the Chinese government” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1994).
  4. The CGLO was known as the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch before
January 2000, and that was where the Hong Kong and Macau Work Committee
Fong 29

(HKMWC) of the CCP was housed. The CGLO was set up on January 18, 2000,
as Beijing’s official representative organization in Hong Kong. It commands
an extensive network of “leftist organizations” in Hong Kong, including com-
mercial organizations (e.g., banks, enterprises, department stores, and tourist
agencies), educational and cultural organizations (e.g., schools, newspapers, and
bookstores), and mass organizations (e.g., labor unions, district-based organiza-
tions, elderly, youth, and women organizations) (Loh, 2010: 13).
  5. The CGLO has not published information on its personnel establishment and
budget. But an investigation of land registry documents by Reuters in 2015
revealed that since its founding in 1999 the CGLO has purchased at least 490
apartments as staff quarters, most of them in recent years (Lee and Pomfret,
2015).
  6. For example, James Tien of the Liberal Party openly admitted that the party
leaders called the CGLO officials on the day of the 2008 Legislative Council
election to ask for help when they realized that they might lose (Loh, 2010: 229).
In the aftermath of the 2012 Legislative Council election, Paul Tse also openly
admitted that the CGLO helped to canvass votes for him and introduced him to
influential figures (Mingpao, 2012b). After the 2016 Legislative Council, James
Tien further revealed in a media interview that the CGLO, by “controlling” a
substantial number of “votes” at the district level, has the power to decide which
pro-Beijing candidates would be elected (HK01, 2016).
  7. For example, James Tien confirmed in a media interview that CGLO officials
actively lobbied many members of the Chief Executive Election Committee
to vote for Leung Chun-ying (Apple Daily, 2012). Li Gui-kang, CGLO deputy
director, was also seen meeting leaders of major commercial associations lobby-
ing them to support Leung Chun-ying (Oriental Daily, 2012).
  8. This article is not the only research that has applied the concept of peripheral
nationalism to Hong Kong. At the time of finalizing this article, Taiwanese scholar
Rwei-Ren Wu published a paper in Nations and Nationalism applying the theories
of peripheral nationalism to three East Asian peripheries: Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and Okinawa. According to Wu, these three peripheral areas are all increasingly
coming under the “spheres of influences” of centralizing centers (i.e., Hong Kong
and Taiwan under China, and Okinawa under Japan), thus triggering anti-center
peripheral nationalist mobilization in these three areas (Wu, 2016).
  9. In discussing the peripheral nationalism in Hong Kong, apart from sentiment
and political movements, Wu, 2016, also examined the issue of “ideology.” He
summarized the four major books that touch directly on the localist discourses,
namely Discourse on the Hong Kong City-State 香港城邦论, On the Hong Kong
Nation 香港民族论, A National History of Hong Kong 香港民族源流史, and
Discourse on Reforming Hong Kong 香港革新论. For the purposes of this arti-
cle, I follow Gellner’s framework focusing on sentiment and movement aspects
of Hong Kong’s peripheral nationalism.
10. For a detailed account of the evolution of Hong Kong identity, see Tsang, 2003,
and Bhattacharya, 2005.
11. The dynamics of center-periphery relations between mainland China and Hong
Kong should be situated within a broad discussion of Chinese nationalism, that
30 Modern China 

is, the broad character of the contemporary CCP regime, which has adopted
nationalism as its major legitimation tool, emphasizing the building of a strong
and centralized state (Hung, 1993: 62; Joseph, 2014) and integrating different
ethnic groups into a unified Chinese nation (Zheng, 2008: 39).
12. The case of Hong Kong has important lessons on the tripartite relationship
between mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. As pointed out by Wu (2016),
Hong Kong and Taiwan are facing different degrees of incorporation from main-
land China, and such threats have triggered similar anti-center peripheral nation-
alisms in both places. This shows that Hong Kong remains an important factor
in shaping the dynamics of cross-strait relations: although Hong Kong’s OCTS
model provides no attraction to Taiwan (Lo, 2008), any controversies surrounding
the operation of Hong Kong’s OCTS model will ironically bring about negative
demonstration effects. For example, the economic incorporation of Hong Kong
by Beijing and the negative impact on its autonomy have alarmed Taiwanese,
contributing to the 2014 Sunflower movement in protest against closer cross-
strait economic integration. Facing similar threats of incorporation from Beijing,
social activists of Hong Kong and Taiwan have also increasingly engaged with
each other and sought to establish some form of alliance (Wu, 2016). While Wu
(2016) provides a preliminary comparative analysis of the peripheral nationalism
of Hong Kong and Taiwan, we need more in-depth studies comparing the incor-
poration strategies adopted by Beijing vis-à-vis Hong Kong and Taiwan and the
pattern of peripheral nationalist sentiment and mobilization of the two places.

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Author Biography
Brian C. H. Fong is Associate Director of the Academy of Hong Kong Studies at the
Education University of Hong Kong. He has published extensively on Hong Kong
politics in international peer-reviewed journals such as China Quarterly, Asian
Survey, Democratization, and International Review of Administrative Sciences.