Nonviolence K - MichiganClassic 2019 FH

Kappeler 1NC
The affirmative frames the idea of violence as a single type of

physical act of violence through killing abuse. The idea of
violence goes far deeper than just the physical act of violence,
and is rooted in the idea of mental violence which is a “social
policy.”
Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Freelance writer and former associate professor at the School
of Humanities and Social Science, Al Akhawayn University, Page 9) GV
This means engaging also with the discourses which construct violence as a phenomenon
but obliterate the agent's decision to violate. Our unwillingness to recognize the will of
those who act violently as their will to act violently, our readiness to exonerate violent behaviour by
means of spurious explanations, not only betrays our primary identification with the subjects of violence and our lack of solidarity with
the victims. It is itself an act of violence: the exercise of ideological violence, of the power of a discourse
which legitimates violence, stigmatizes the victims, and treats people not as the agents of
their own actions but as material lor ('our') social policy. Ideology, however, is not just made by others; we are all of
us subjects of ideology — as the producers of our own thinking and as the recipients of other people's discourse — unless we resist such
ideological structures of thought and discourse in a continual critique of ideology itself. A decision to violate is not necessarily
synonymous with a decision to be 'bad' or to commit an injustice. Rather, we have at our disposal structures of
thought and argumentation which make such a decision appear rational, justified or even necessary.
These structures of thought are deeply rooted in our everyday thinking: they are part of the dominant
ideology. We use them in our daily decisions for action - actions which are not necessarily acts of bodily injury and
murder, of arson and larceny, and which do not necessarily unleash a major war, but which none the
less are acts of violence: violation of the rights and integrity of other people, violation of their dignity and personhood, suppression of
their freedom of choice and their self- determination, acts of objectification and of exploitation at every conceivable level — in other
words, war, 011 a small scale and against our nearest if not our dearest. What is remarkable is that this everyday
behaviour, in so far as it does not fall within the competence of criminal law, is hardly the subject of a serious theoretical discussion.4 Neither
does it attract explicit legitimation; rather, the violence of everyday behaviour draws its legitimacy from the ubiquity of such behaviour in our
society and the social consensus about its relative 'harmlessness' compared with other, that is, recognized forms of violence. That is to say,
everyday behaviour takes its orientation from the tradition of social practice, reproducing itself through recourse to the status quo. It is so
naturalized, in fact, that it is not violent action which attracts attention, but any resistance to it: leaving a violent relationship or situations of
violence, resisting bullying, pressure and blackmail, refusing to fight back. Even a discourse on ethics which we might expect to address this
issue increasingly addresses problems of a collective social responsibility - leading indeed to enlightened guidelines for social policy, yet
leaving the question of personal responsibility unanswered. For
an analysis of collective social responsibility tends not
to differentiate between the respective responsibility of the members of that collective according to
their diverse situations. Yet the single person has to act, has to decide how to act, even if this does not
cause a war or change the world at one stroke. It is these decisions for action within the range of
competence of persons which are the topic of this book. This does not mean that I deem the obvious
and systematic forms of violence — from the violence of men against women and children, the racist
violence of whites against Black people and people of the Third World, to the violence of the state and
its military forces, or violence against animals and nature (which is hardly even discussed in the context
of violence) — a less urgent problem than individual behaviour. Rather, the obvious importance and magnitude of
'social' problems of violence cannot be the pretext for considering apparently 'lesser' or more 'harmless' forms of 'personal' violence (our own)
a matter for postponement until the major problems have been solved. Violence cannot be measured as larger or smaller, more or less, even if
the consequences of violence differ enormously. The consequences differ, however, neither in their measurable size as 'damage' nor in the size
or measure of the violence which caused them, but in terms of the means used on the one hand, and in their specificity, uniqueness and
incomparability as experience on the other. Violence as the structure of action is neither greater nor lesser: it either is or is not violence.
Moreover, personal behaviour is no alternative to 'political' action; there is no question of either/or. My concern, on the contrary, is the
connection between these recognized forms of violence and the forms of everyday behaviour which we consider 'normal' but which betray our
own will to violence - the connection, in other words, between our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our
political critiques. Precisely
because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to 'political issues'
or to 'personal behaviour', the question of the politics of personal behaviour has (also) to be moved into
the centre of our politics and our critique.
- thus she will need me if she wants to keep it. Through periodic validation I will ratify it
(as the case may be), thus keeping her informed of any fluctuations in the exchange rate.
The aff overlooks and simultaneously perpetuates the notion

that violence is a foreign act. That perception of violence leads to
a lack of accountability as individuals rely on the state for
change rather than themselves.
of Humanities and Social Science, Al Akhawayn University, Page 1) GV
What is striking is that the
violence which is talked about is always the violence
committed by someone else: women talk about the violence of men, adults about the violence of young people;
the left, liberals and the centre about the violence of right extremists; the right, centre and liberals about the violence of leftist
extremists; political activists talk about structural violence, police and politicians about violence in the 'street', and all together
about the violence in our society. Similarly, Westerners talk about violence in the Balkans, Western citizens together with their
generals about the violence of the Serbian army. Violence
is recognized and measured by its visible
effects, the spectacular blood of wounded bodies, the material destruction
of objects, the visible damage left in the world of'objects. In its measurable
damage we see the proof that violence has taken place, the violence being
reduced to this damage. The violation as such, or invisible forms of violence —
the non-physical violence of threat and terror, of insult and humiliation, the
violation of human dignity — are hardly ever the issue except to some extent in
feminist and anti-racist analyses, or under the name of psychological violence.
Here violence is recognized by the victims and defined from their perspective —
an important step away from the catalogue of violent acts and the exclusive
evidence of material traces in the object. Yet even here the focus tends to be on the effects and experience
of violence, either the objective and scientific measure of psychological damage, or the increasingly subjective definition of
violence as experience. Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for politics to get a grip on. But
violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behaviour of people, human action which may be analysed. What is missing is an analysis
of violence as action — not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effects, but as the actions of people in relation to other
people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as Other political critiques, has analysed the preconditions of violence, the
unequal power relations which enable it to take place. However, under the pressure of mainstream science and a sociological
perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking, it is becoming standard to argue as if it were these power relations which
cause the violence. Underlying
is a behaviourist model which prefers to see human action as the
exclusive product of circumstances, ignoring the personal decision of the agent to act,
implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate certain forms of behaviour. Even though
we would probably not underwrite these propositions in their crass form, there is nevertheless
a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behaviour by its
circumstances. (Compare the question, 'Does pornography cause violence?') The circumstances identified may
differ according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation remains the
same. While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful place in a court of law
trying (and defending) an offender, , this does not automatically make it an adequate or
sufficient practice for political analysis. It begs the question, in particular, 'What is considered
to be part of the circumstances (and by whom)?' Thus in the case of sexual offenders, there is a
routine search — on the part of the tabloid press or the professionals of violence — for
experiences of violence in the offender's own past, an understanding which is rapidly
solidifying in the scientific model of a 'cycle of violence'. That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant
past and in other contexts of action, while a crucial factor in the present context is ignored, namely the agent's decision to act as
he did. Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have tried to
explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of
Black men as the result of racist oppression. The
ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw
attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail
to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it. Although such oppression is a very
real part of an agent's life context, these 'explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone
experiencing the same oppression uses violence, that is, that these circumstances do not
'cause' violent behaviour. They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has
decided to violate, even if this decision was made in circumstances of limited
choice To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular interests. In the first instance it
serves to exonerate the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to circumstances and a history for which other
people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps to stigmatize all those living in poverty and oppression;
because they are obvious victims of violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators themselves.1 This slanders
all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others, and libels those experiencing racist
and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence. Far from supporting those oppressed by classist, racist or sexist
oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the interest of exonerating individual members. It is a version of collective victim-
blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the mainstream
division of society into so-called marginal groups — the classic clienteles of social work and care politics (and of police repression)
— and an implied 'centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers and carers themselves belong, and which we are to
assume to be a zone of non-violence. Explaining people's violent behaviour by their circumstances also has the advantage of
implying that the 'solution' lies in a change of circumstances. Thus it has become fashionable among socially minded politicians
and intellectuals in Germany to argue that the rising neo- Nazi violence of young people (men), especially in former East
Germany, needs to be countered by combating poverty and unemployment in these areas. Likewise anti-racist groups like the
Anti- Racist Alliance or the Anti-Nazi League in Britain argue that 'the causes of racism, like poverty and unemployment, should
be tackled' and that it is 'problems like unemployment and bad housing which lead to racism'.2 Besides being no explanation at
all of why (white) poverty and unemployment should lead specifically to racist violence (and what would explain middle- and
upper-class racism), it is more than questionable to combat poverty only (but precisely) when and where violence is exercised. It
not only legitimates the violence (by 'explaining' it), but constitutes an incentive to violence, confirming that social problems will
be taken seriously when and where 'they' attract attention by means of violence - just as the most unruly children in schools
(mostly boys) tend to get more attention from teachers than well-behaved and quiet children (mostly girls). Thus if German neo-
Nazi youths and youth groups, since their murderous assaults on refugees and migrants in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Dresden etc.,
are treated to special youth projects and social care measures (to the tune of DM 20 million per year), including 'educative' trips
to Morocco and Israel,3 this is an unmistakable signal to society that racist violence does indeed 'pay off' . If
we
nevertheless continue to explain violence by its 'circumstances' and attempt to counter it by
changing these circumstances, it is also because in this way we stay in command of the
problem. In particular, we do not complicate the problem by any suggestion that
it might be people who need to change. Instead, we turn the perpetrators of
violence into the victims of circumstances, who as victims by definition cannot
act sensibly (but in changed circumstances will behave differently). 'We', on the
other hand, are the subjects able to take in hand the task of changing the circumstances. Even
if changing the circumstances — combating poverty, unemployment, ! injustice etc. — may not
be easy, it nevertheless remains within 'our' scope, at least theoretically and by means of state
power. Changing people, on the other hand, is neither within our power nor, it seems,
ultimately in our interest: we prefer to keep certain people under control, putting limits on
their violent behaviour, but we apparently have no interest in a politics that presupposes
people's ability to change and aims at changing attitudes and behaviour. For changing (as
opposed to restricting) other people's behaviour is beyond the range and influence of our
own power; only they themselves can change it. It requires their will to change, their will not
to abuse power and not to use violence.
War does not break out in a peaceful society, we must first and foremost
recognize that we are the war, we are the violence.
Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Freelance writer former associate professor at the School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, Page 8-10) AK
Even a discourseon ethics which we might expect to address this issue increasingly addresses problems of a
collective social responsibility - leading indeed to enlightened guidelines for social policy, yet leaving the question
of personal responsibility unanswered. For an analysis of collective social responsibility tends not to
differentiate between the respective responsibility of the members of that collective according
to their diverse situations. Yet the single person has to act, has to decide how to act, even if this
does not cause a war or change the world at one stroke . It is these decisions for action within the range of
competence of persons which are the topic of this book. This does not mean that I deem the obvious and systematic forms of
violence — from the violence of men against women and children, the racist violence of whites against Black people and people of
the Third World, to the violence of the state and its military forces, or violence against animals and nature (which is hardly even
discussed in the context of violence) — a less urgent problem than individual behaviour. Rather, the obvious importance and
magnitude of 'social' problems of violence cannot be the pretext for considering apparently 'lesser' or more 'harmless' forms of
'personal' violence (our own) a matter for postponement until the major problems have been solved. Violence cannot be
measured as larger or smaller, more or less, even if the consequences of violence differ
enormously. The consequences differ, however, neither in their measurable size as 'damage' nor in the size or measure of the
violence which caused them, but in terms of the means used on the one hand, and in their specificity, uniqueness and
incomparability as experience on the other. Violence as the structure of action is neither greater nor lesser: it either is or is not
violence. Moreover, personal
behaviour is no alternative to 'political' action; there is no question of
either/or. My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of
violence and the forms of everyday behaviour which we consider 'normal' but which betray our
own will to violence - the connection, in other words, between our own actions and those acts
of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques . Precisely because there is no choice
between dedicating oneself either to 'political issues' or to 'personal behaviour' , the question of the
politics of personal behaviour has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique. Violence — what we usually
recognize as such - is no exception to the rules, no deviation from the normal and nothing out of the ordinary, in a society in which
exploitation and oppression are the norm, the ordinary and the rule. It is no misbehaviour of a minority amid good behaviour by the
majority, nor the deeds of inhuman monsters amid humane humans, in a society in which there is no equality, in which people
divide others according to race, class, sex and many other factors in order to rule, exploit, use, objectify, enslave, sell, torture and kill
them, in which millions of animals are tortured, genetically manipulated, enslaved and slaughtered daily for 'harmless' consumption
by humans. It is no error of judgement, no moral lapse and no transgression against the customs of a culture which is thoroughly
steeped in the values of profit and desire, of self-realization, expansion and progress. Violence as we usually perceive it is 'simply' a
specific — and to us still visible — form of violence, the consistent and logical application of the principles of our culture and
everyday life. War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the
disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of
a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world
otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to
violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization
which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and
destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her
existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?':
I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20
people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards
you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees| and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our
feelings, relationships, values — in short: us. We
are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone
else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5
'We are the war' — and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation
and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make
them possible and we permit them to happen.
'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an
entire society — which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as , Ulrich Beck says,
upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible
for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent
of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and
differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are
indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command
such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions
without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility . Yet our habit of focusing
on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation
to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility — leading to the
well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-
called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations — have come to feel secure in their
obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia —
since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we
are not responsible for the
decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that
therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus
into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems
to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections
between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck
calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally,
nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our
personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war,
because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why
many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with
Positive Peace 1NC
The aff’s negative state action fundamentally misunderstands the kritik – the
distinction between negative and positive peace is key because negative peace
overlooks continued structural violence that only the alt solves for – their focus
on the absence of war constituting peace creates a self fulfilling prophecy that
necessitates conflict
Rissler and Shields 18 (Grant Rissler, professor at Virginia commonwealth university and Patricia
Shields, Texas State university; “positive peace – a necessary touchstone for public
administration” https://www-tandfonline-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/10841806.2018.1479549?needAccess=true 8/27/18)
EEG
In this article, we argue that public

administration would benefit from rediscovering, and adopting as
part of the core mission of the discipline, the concept of building a positive peace. Doing so
holds potential for the discipline by providing a broad, unifying, normative vision that opens up
discourse about both ends and means, one that has the potential to be cross-cultural without privileging
one culture over another. Moreover, the concept of positive peace provides a conceptual framework that
readily supports key skill sets needed by public administrators facing “wicked” problems in the
globalized, networked, participatory landscape of twenty-first-century public administration . In support of
this argument, we first explain the concept of positive peace in more depth, showing how it is distinct from the more commonly
used negative peace. This helps to highlight how the
use of the concept can shift what we pay attention to as
public administrators. Next, we briefly show how positive peace was once central to the goals of early public administration,
why it fell out of mainstream usage, and where the concept still echoes in the work of several key thinkers. Finally, we explore how
the key qualities outlined above can POSITIVE PEACE & PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 61 help Public Administration productively hold
together acknowledged tensions within the discipline at a conceptual level and how the skills of peacebuilding could help prepare
practitioners. We conclude by recapping the collective benefit we see for PA in rediscovering the concept of positive peace.
EXAMINING HOW THE MORE NUANCED CONCEPT OF PEACE MOVES TOWARD DISCOURSE In this section, we answer the question
“what is positive peace?” from several different vantage points, acknowledging that peace
is one of those terms with
so many potential meanings that it is essentially contested as a concept (to use Gallie’s formulation
[1956]). We don’t argue for one “best” definition of positive peace, in part acknowledging the futility of the attempt, but more so
because the
contested nature of the concept points to the value positive peace holds for opening
up discourse. We first distinguish it from negative peace (i.e., defining a lack of overt organized
violence as peace), a word game that privileges order over change and is often uncritical of the
status quo. Next, we look at concepts of peace in a range of cultures, focusing on the shared centrality of just relationships in
both the Jewish concept of shalom and the African concept of ubuntu. We then briefly review the conceptual movement within the
field of peace studies from a negative definition (conflict management or resolution) toward the positive peace-oriented concepts of
peacebuilding. We conclude our circling of the concept by examining in more detail the four qualities that we believe make positive
peace useful as a touchstone concept for public administrators and associated skill sets developed within the field of peace studies
that could be important for training public administrators. Peace
may seem, at first, to be an odd choice for a
touchstone value in public administration. Generally focused on internal governance of nation states, public
administration often implicitly presupposes the absence of widespread organized violence and
assumes a clear and largely unchallenged mandate for the government. This apparent
disconnect, however, is more due to a narrow meaning of peace within Western parlance, one which
sets peace off as simply the absence of war. Even before Tolstoy titled his now famous novel War and Peace, the
two concepts have been linked conceptually. The costs and moral horrors of war and a society’s gratitude for the ending of such
horrors understandably lead to a basic conceptualization of peace as simply being the absence of war. This “negative” definition of
peace is among the most common (Merriam Webster [2016] lists it as the first definition), and it is useful in such fields as
international relations because of its easily quantifiable nature. But the
negative concept of peace contains
limitations that a positive concept does not , and highlighting those limitations is useful in being
able to see how the framing of positive peace is more useful for public administration. As often used by
international security and peace scholars for coding large databases, the measure of negative peace as a dichotomous variable (0 ¼
peace; 1 ¼ war) is simplistic but 62 RISSLER & SHIELDS useful in statistical efforts to understand factors that make war more likely
(Diehl, 2016a, 2016b; Gleditsch et al., 2014). Ironically, though, anegative framing shifts the focus from peace to
violence (and war). The belief that peace exists automatically when overt violence is not
observed is what some have called a naive peace (Galtung, 1996). The recent president of the International
Studies Association, Paul Diehl (2016a, 2016b), notes that “defining peace in negative terms leads to perverse
outcomes for scholarly analysis and policymaking” (Diehl, 2016a, p. 3). By focusing on shooting wars,
observers may miss other equally important conflicts that the hard work of diplomacy (internationally) and
politics (domestically) resolve, manage, or transform (e.g., the U.S.-Soviet Cold War). Such a narrow definition also risks
conflating war with the concept of conflict generally. This privileges the status quo and can frame even
nonviolent challenges to the current order as disturbing the peace. Doing so would ignore
positive changes that may come from conflicts such as Gandhi’s independence efforts in India
and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States where those disadvantaged by the existing
system advocate for greater justice. Likewise, a negative conception of peace constrains observers to
seeing peace as only an outcome, losing sight of the ways that a just peace is often a result of ongoing processes, such as
participatory democracy, that need to be continually repeated in order to be effective. Finally, it potentially allows
actors to
rationalize the use of overwhelming violence or the threat of violence to “end” the overt conflict
while ignoring the underlying conflict, leaving it unresolved or even worse off (Lederach, 1995). This,
in turn, means the finite resources of a society may be directed toward mitigating the visible
products of a conflict (e.g., imprisoning gang members in the hope of reducing violence) rather than toward
resolving the root causes of a conflict (e.g., widespread underemployment of young men). Positive Peace as an
Essentially Contested Concept In contrast, the notion of positive peace emphasizes deeper concerns such as the
“structures that create and sustain peaceful societies” (IEP, 2015, p. 4), “nonviolent and creative conflict
transformation” (Galtung, 1996, p. 9), prosperity and wholeness (Freedman, 2016), and humanity toward others
(Gade, 2011). While we have explored these concepts in greater detail in several prior publications (Shields, 2016, 2017b; Shields &
Rissler, 2016; Shields & Soeters, 2017) we highlight several crucial distinctions here.
Every instance of “war” that the aff tries to solve will only serve to create crisis-
based politics that ignore and multiply the underlying causes of violence.
Cuomo 96 Chris J. Cuomo is Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and an affiliate
faculty member of the Environmental Ethics Certificate Program, the Institute for African-
American Studies, and the Institute for Native American Studies at the university of Georgia.
(Chris J. Cuomo, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence,” Hypatia, Volume 11, Number 4,
Fall 1996). 31-32 // SN
Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are
woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based
politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative
social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they
distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent
systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives.
Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared
armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives
are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of
militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern
only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises
in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or
when the stability of privilege is directly 31 Hypatia threatened, and at that point it is difficult
not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven
attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and
complicitous in the general presence of global militarism . Seeing war as necessarily embedded
in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored
violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military
institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.
Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also
enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore
can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example,
investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the
relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope
in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of
soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-
sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and
corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently
in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the
relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current
American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death
penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for
philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on
drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.
The alternative is to build positive peace through inversitgating what peace

means in our everyday lives and developing peacebuilding capabilities
Dutta et al 16 (Urmitapa, department of psychology at UMass Lowell, “The Everyday
Peace Project: An Innovative Approach to Peace Pedagogy”
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296681333_The_everyday_peace_project_a
n_innovative_approach_to_peace_pedagogy 3/2016) EEG
Our concept of everyday peace builds upon those of positive peace, human rights, and conflict
transformation. At its inception in the 1950s, peace studies focused primarily on 3 responses to direct violence and warfare,
usually in the form of peace treaties and accords. Although the incidence of major wars has greatly reduced in recent decades,
societies across the globe continue to experience violent conflict. Responding to these
contingencies, peace scholar Johan Galtung introduced the term positive peace in 1964.
Positive peace involves the active creation of harmonious environments that support
cooperation and coexistence (Galtung 1964, 1996; Galtung and Fischer 2013). Thus understood, peace is not
just the absence of war, but the creation of lasting structures that ensure the reduction
of all kinds of violence in a society (de Rivera 2004). Positive peace moves beyond attempts to
end violent conflicts to also focus on critical rights such as social and political equity,
access to quality health care, access to economic opportunities, freedom to express
one’s self without fear, and to develop one’s abilities without obstruction (Barash 2010; Galtung
1985; Ife 2007; Perry 2000). Positive peace is closely connected to the concept of conflict
transformation, which contends that the structural and cultural violence associated with
the overt conflict have to be addressed in order to promote constructive social change
(Dayton and Kriesberg 2009; Lederach 1997, 2003). Conflict transformation approaches therefore allow us to
engage constructively with conflict across different contexts and across multiple levels
to advance rights and promote positive peace. The concept of everyday peace also
builds upon the existing literature on peace education. The goal of peace education is to
provide insights on how to transform cultures of violence into peaceful cultures (Harris
2010). Lasting peace depends on educating future generations on values, attitudes,
behaviours, and capabilities that will enable them to build and enact peace (Johnson & Johnson
2010). The gamut of peace education includes both formal institutional contexts such as
schools and colleges as well as informal community-based peace education. This paper focuses
on peace education in the context of public universities. We draw upon critical approaches to peace education,
which emphasize the empowerment of learners as agents of social transformation (Bajaj
2008). The ‘critical’ component of peace education according to its proponents is the interrogation
of power dynamics and various social hierarchies. Eschewing rigid normative standards
for peace education, these approaches underscore the value of contextualized forms of
peace education (Bajaj and Brantmeier 2011). The ways in which we conceptualize peace must
contend with the expansive problems of peace located at all points along a micro/macro
dimension (Haavelsruda and Stenbergb, 2012). Responding to these exigencies, peace scholars have generated
different sets of principles to guide peace education . For example, Johnson and Johnson (2010) emphasize
the establishment of cooperative learning environments;, development of conflict
management and conflict resolution skills, and inculcation of the value of consensual
peace. Shapiro (2002) laid out a number of principles to guide peace pedagogy, some of which include
connecting violence to social injustice, understanding real differences and learning to
live with them, and developing the capacity for compassionate attentiveness. Collectively,
these principles underscore a variety of ways for students to engage the concept of
peacebuilding in daily lives along and explore their role as everyday peace advocates.
The everyday peace framework coalesces around positive peace, human rights, conflict
transformation, and critical peace education. These approaches foreground the need for
both structural and relationship change in order to advance sustainable peace . The
everyday peace project involves a critical engagement with the production of positive
peace at the local level, while taking into account global and transnational forces
implicated in various conflicts around the world. Thus, everyday peace is negotiated
between micro and macro scales. Given specific historical, political, cultural, and socioeconomic contingencies,
communities and groups may have varying conceptions of what local peace means to
them. In order to ensure sustainable peace in diverse, multicultural societies, the vision must be 5 democratised. Instead of
starting with a pre-defined concept of peace, an everyday project involves collectively
investigating the notion of everyday peace in a specific context and working towards an
integrated the vision of what peace means to different stakeholders within that context.
In other words,
the vision for everyday peace in a particular context has to be investigated,
negotiated, and deliberated upon by group members.
Links
Cuomo
The aff’s framing of war as solely an event or occurrence justifies complicity in
every day actions of state sponsored violence
Fall 1996). pp. 30-31//SN
Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering
into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war
as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly
removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from
everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and
ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event-an occurrence, or collection of
occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal,
institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated
by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-
makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to
feminists-including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of
other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic
political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists;
how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies-cannot be
adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad
intentions and identifiable decisions.
Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot
represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women,
on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the
environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military
practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they
justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack
of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an
extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections
among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social
phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current
ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems.
The aff’s epistemology focuses only on the act of declaring and fighting wars,
while missing the omnipresent horrors that pervade society.
Fall 1996). pp. 32-33 //SN
I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a
crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are
eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply
oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.2 Feminists should be particularly interested in
making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on
women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of
militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific
qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared,
large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most
societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military
institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality . Philosophical discussions that focus only
on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in
which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These
approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the
face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.
Crisis-based politics only serves to justify further “war” in which the

environment is an innocent noncombatant subject to the will of the
belligerents
Fall 1996). 38-39 // SN
I turn now to a discussion of the environmental effects of war, because I believe these effects to
be significant to feminists for two basic reasons. Though women are no more essentially
connected to nature than any other organic beings, cultural constructions associate women
with nature and help justify the mistreatment of both. Many feminists and ecological feminists
have discussed these problematic conceptual connections as created or fueled by the
dichotomous thinking discussed above (Griffin 1989; King 1990; Warren 1990; Cuomo 1992;
Plumwood 1993). Others, including Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies (1993), focus on the
practical, or material connections between environmental degradation and women's
oppression. In any case, if women's oppression is connected to the unjustified destruction of
nature, or if, as Karen Warren argues, feminists must be against oppression in any form,
including the oppression of nature, it is arguable that the ecological effects of war and militarism
are feminist issues. Because military ecological destruction occurs primarily "during peacetime,"
and because it is so directly tied to other forms of ecological and social violence, attention to the
ecological impacts of war further illustrates the limitations of only thinking of war in terms of
events.
In "The Military Commander's Responsibility for the Environment," Merrit Drucker, a major in
the U.S. Army and philosophy instructor at the United States Military Academy at West Point,
utilizes an expanded application of just-war principles to argue that military commanders ought
to protect natural environments during peace and warfare. The commander's peacetime
responsibilities are founded on the commander's professional responsibility as an agent of the
state. Wartime responsibilities stem from the well-established prohibitions against harming
noncombatants and destroying works of art and objects of historical or cultural value. (Drucker
1989, 136) Drucker's analysis rests primarily on a sharp distinction between peace and war, and
a broad interpretation of the just-war principle of noncombatant immunity. This principle
requires military discrimination between combatants and noncombatants and states that it is
justifiable to intentionally kill only the former. In essence, Drucker believes military commanders
ought to protect the environment during war because, like noncombatants and cultural
artifacts, 38 Chris J. Cuomo natural entities are inherently valuable, morally inappropriate
targets of military aggression. Drucker argues from analogy that because "the environment"
(which he represents as a unified, self-evident entity) is free of intention and cannot wage or
fight in war, it is an innocent noncombatant in the realm of human affairs. If a just-war must
be fought without intended or excessive harm to noncombatants, justice requires that wars
also be fought without intended or excessive harm to environments. In fact, he believes
restraint is due not only because of nature's lack of intention, but also because of its functions:
The environment is remarkably like a special group of soldiers who are considered to be
noncombatants.
Just as [medical personnel and religious professionals] protect and foster life, the environment,
if treated properly, makes possible and sustains life in the most basic way imaginable . . . [and]
should be accorded the considerations we grant human nurturers and healers. (Drucker 1989,
147) Despite his characterization of the rule of noncombatant immunity as "an established part
of our moral tradition and international law," Drucker himself admits that it is often violated
(1989, 146).
Generic Links
The misinterpretation of violence as a phenomenon allows for it to be
undermined by politics allowing for it to continue
Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Freelance writer, teacher in England and Germany and associate
professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The Will to Violence Page 2)H.S.
Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for

politics to get a grip on. But violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behaviour
of people, human action which may be analysed. What is missing is an analysis of violence as
action — not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effccts, but as the actions of people in relation to
other people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as Other political critiques, has analysed
the preconditions of violence, the unequal power relations which enable it
to take place. However, under the pressure of mainstream science and a sociological
perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking, it is becoming standard to argue as
if it were these power relations which cause the violence. Underlying is a behaviourist model which
prefers to see human action as the exclusive product of circumstances, ignoring the personal decision of
the agent to act, implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate

certain forms of behaviour. Even though we would probably not underwrite these propositions in their crass
form, there is nevertheless a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behavjour by its circumstances.
circumstances identified may differ

(Compare the question, 'Does pornography cause violence?') The
according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation

remains the same.
Political analysis shows the disequilibrium between the perpetrator and the
victim
Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Freelance writer, teacher in England and Germany and associate
professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The Will to Violence Page 5) H.S.
A political analysis of violence needs to recognize this will, the personal decision in favour
of violence — not just to describe acts of violence, or the conditions which enable
them to take place, but also to capture the moment of decision which is the
real impetus for violent action. For without this decision there will be no
violent act, not even in circumstances which potentially permit it. It is the decision
to violate, not just the act itself, which makes a person a perpetrator of violence — just as it is the decision not to do so which makes
people not act violently and not abuse their power in a situation which would nevertheless permit it. This moment of decision,
therefore, is also the locus of potential resistance to violence. To understand the structures of thinking and the criteria by which
above all to regard this decision as an act of choice,

such decisions are reached, but
seems to me a necessary precondition for any political struggle against

violence and for a non-violent society. My focus, then, is on the decision to violate - not just in
circumstances where violence is conspicuous by its damage, but in every situation
where the choice to violate presents itself. This means a change from the accustomed perspective
on violence to the context where decisions for actions are being made, as it were 'before' their consequences become apparent, and
which we may not recognize as contexts of violence. Our political analyses of sexual or racist
violence have necessarily concentrated on situations where the power
disequilibrium between perpetrator and victim is extreme, where, in
particular, it is supported by social power structures such as male and/o r
white supremacy, so that not only is the violence unlikely to receive sanctions, but on the contrary, the
perpetrator will find support rather than the victim. Violence, however, is a possibility
wherever there is freedom of action, however limited. Such violence may 'look' different, not least
because the possibilities for resistance may also be greater in situations

where there is relative freedom of action also on the part of the other
agent, that is, the violator's envisaged victim.
Psychologizing violence, and historic acts as separate from ourselves,
externalized violence creates endless cycles of otherization and violence.
of Humanities and Social Science, Al Akhawayn University, Pages 244-245)
Moreover, it appears that such 'treatment of the Others' refers not so much to the personal
behaviour of individual people as to the collective 'behaviour' of the nation they belong
to. Although there is mention of people in the plural, they seem less a multiplicity of
individuals than the single entity of a collective. It is the 'relationship of white society to
the Others' (emphasis in the original),52 and a question of 'white women being bound
into their own racist society'.53 Thus, if it is a question of whether they know their 'boundaries'
(Grenzen), in the test case of their 'treatment of the Others within and outside their country', it seems as
much to concern their country's national borders as any potential personal boundaries. 'Directly or
indirectly, white people have in the course of their relationship to the Others developed a consciousness of
normality which includes as a matter of course' a whole number of 'claims' and 'rights'. 54 White women
are also 'bearers of the problem, belonging to the culture which is and creates the
problem'.55 But they are bearers of this culture and members of this society through no
personal fault or responsibility of their own; they are bearers of it qua their identity,
through an accident of history and birth. So presumably they cannot really be
responsible for being bearers of their consciousness, a consciousness developed by their
'race' over centuries. For they are bound not only into their contemporary society; they
are bearers of a historical identity, heirs to a European legacy left not only by fathers to
their sons but also by mothers to their daughters: 'The racism of the Christian-occidental culture is not
only a question of a 500-year-old history of individual colonialists, but also of a prehistory of European men and
women.'56 In any case, however, it is a question of history. And if this history is 'full of examples of women who actively
supported the hostilities of their men',57 the present seems peopled by no such examples. Racism is thus a
problem principally of historic events going back up to 500 years, passed on as the sins
of the fathers and mothers to the umpteenth generation. Our problem as contemporary
Europeans is simply that we 'cannot sneak out of this history', that 'elements of Western
European identity . . . obviously remain effective into the present time .'58 Just as Katie can
see herself in the past as a little girl who was an active agent, yet in her adult self sees but the passively
suffering bearer of a personal identity in which elements of her personal-psychological history are still
effective, so Europeans in the past used to be active agents, participants in the political events (for example,
racism) of their time, while contemporary Western Europeans simply suffer the effects of a Western
European past, a historical identity. History and the past are thus really a biological
inheritance, on the personal as on the political level. That is to say, we psychologize the
history of 'nations' and continents (not to mention 'races') after the model of the
(biological) theory of the psychology of individuals. The point in the one as in the other
case is to banish action and behaviour into the remote and inaccessible past, rendering
the present a state of pure being, troubled but by the interference of particles from the
past which refuse to pass, following us into the present. Thus in an editorial entitled 'The Past
does not Pass', in the renowned weekly newspaper, Die Zeit, it is said of Germany that the past has 'burdened
our people with a particularly heavy inheritance [Erblast]'
The aff does not hold the people accountable and blame it upon another
country for inciting the conflict. They push off the responsibility as other
countries’ and leaders of countries and fail to think about their own thinking.
Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a
Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at
all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do
have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any
relation[s] between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political
decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls
'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically,
institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences . It also proves
the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the
major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything , say, about a war, because we
deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation ; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why
many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in
the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign
minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the
only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question
of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as
'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a
general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to
stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7
Even a discourse on ethics which we might expect to address this issue increasingly addresses
problems of a collective social responsibility - leading indeed to enlightened guidelines for social
policy, yet leaving the question of personal responsibility unanswered. For an analysis of collective
social responsibility tends not to differentiate between the respective responsibility of the
members of that collective according to their diverse situations. Yet the single person has to act, has to decide how to act, even if
this does not cause a war or change the world at one stroke. It is these decisions for action within the range of competence of
persons which are the topic of this book.
Their interpretation of “just war” maintain structural violence – the MIC proves
Gay 18
(William Gay is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
He has published seven books and over 100 journal articles and book chapters on issues of
violence, war, peace, and justice He has been an active member of Concerned Philosophers for
Peace since 1981 and, has served as its President and as its Executive Director. 21 Feb 2018,
“The Military-Industrial Complex from: The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence
Routledge” https://www-routledgehandbooks-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315638751) JP
Among philosophical treatments of issues of militarism, just war theory often receives the most
attention. However, references to the MIC are generally absent in the analyses of just war
theory. Critical attention to the MIC is more common during times of (relative) peace, since
during war the additional fog of patriotism generally prevents consideration of effects of
weapons use and profits from military spending. Even though between wars the MIC receives
some consideration, just war theory is typically applied only just prior to or during war.
Nevertheless, several aspects of the MIC could be addressed by this moral theory. For example,
application of the criterion of “just cause” can be manipulated by economic interests of the
private defense contractors, as can the principles of “right intent” (in relation to the real
interests behind use of military force) and “proportionality” (in relation to likely “collateral
damage” from use of many weapons). One exception in the literature from the just war
perspective is the essay by Andrew Fiala on “Just War Ethics and the Slippery Slope of
Militarism” in which he presents factors that make more likely our slipping into unjust wars.
Arguing for giving more consideration to “the material conditions of war,” he stresses the
importance of examining “the influence of defense contractors, the pressure of pork-barrel
polities, and the interests of lobbyists, military officers, and politicians who benefit from war”
and concludes “the slope toward unjust war becomes slippery when it is lubricated by the
interests of the military-industrial complex” (Fiala 2012). His call for examining the social and
political preconditions of war brings into focus the role of the MIC in precipitating and justifying
war. In brief, he exposes how economic concerns can displace moral intentions. A large body of
evidence suggests alternatives to military means are possible. Some of the political efforts
include ones associated with nonviolent expressions of anti-globalism and its offshoot of
“alterglobalism” that proposes a humanistic globalization strategy. Within peace studies stress is
often placed on the successes of nonviolent methods, from those associated with Mahatma
Gandhi to civilian resistance and similar strategies. These methods are not only possible but
have been employed and have worked. In every decade of the twentieth century on all
continents (except Antarctica) nonviolent social movements have succeeded (Ackerman and
Duvall 2000). Not only does civilian resistance work, it also makes success of democracy more
likely (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). One advantage—beyond obvious moral ones—of
nonviolent models of national security is that they are not capital intensive. Instead, they are
labor intensive and rely on training large portions of the population in nonviolent resistance.
Since capitalism relies on industry, which is capital intensive, nonviolent models of national
security could undercut much of the cost of the MIC, though they also shift responsibility for
defense from a relatively small professional army and its supports to a very large portion of the
citizenry (Gay 1994). One step toward these goals can be found in efforts to reduce killing. The
Global Center for Nonkilling notes few people ever kill another human being and proceed from
this Downloaded By: University of Michigan At: 19:44 12 Jul 2019; For: 9781315638751,
chapter22, 10.4324/9781315638751-23 The Military-Industrial Complex 265 fact to develop
strategies for seeking societies that no longer engage in war and other forms of killing human
beings. Coupling their work with a shift from traditional approaches of conflict resolution and
conflict management to cutting-edge efforts at conflict transformation offers additional hope.
Within philosophy, further perspective and tactics can be drawn from William James’s “The
Moral Equivalent of War,” John Dewey’s involvement in the “Outlawry of War” movement, and,
more recently, efforts by the professional association “Concerned Philosophers for Peace.” The
future of the MIC revolves around two basic questions concerning whether it is necessary and
whether it is unalterable. Is the MIC necessary? No. Is the MIC unalterable? No. In relation to
the first question, the argument has been around for a long time that national security requires
a strong military. Leaving aside the fact that nation-states are a product of modernity and are
themselves historical, the argument for the need for a strong military has been challenged on its
own terms. A strong military is not the only means (and perhaps neither the most effective nor
most ethical means) for attaining national security. Moreover, even if a strong military is an
effective means for attaining national security, it does not require militarism and the military-
industrial complex. Less provocative and less costly military postures are feasible and could have
comparable, if not greater, effectiveness. In relation to the second question, and perhaps most
importantly for the next several decades, if the premise is accepted at least on pragmatic
grounds that the pursuit of national security will continue to rely on the militaryindustrial
complex, acceptance of the MIC need not allow—and advocates of pacifism and nonviolence
would add “should not allow”—the interest in profit by the private sector to retain the current
levels of influence over military policies and military operations. Even if a comprehensive
critique of capitalism is not undertaken, at the least a critique is needed of the ways in which
economic interests of private contractors have led to serious malpractice in the pursuit of
security. The money spent, the profit gained, the resources consumed, the lives destroyed, and
the environment degraded are each themselves threats to security that need to be exposed and
criticized—and these threats can be reduced, if not eliminated, by changed policies and
practices that break the grip of private, for-profit contractors. Governmental desire to enhance
the military led to reliance on industry and the rise of the MIC. Then, industry desire to increase
profit led to reliance on government and the reversal of the relation between the military and
industry in the MIC. The influence of industry on military policy led to the MIC being
transformed from an arguably efficient means to a clearly self-perpetuating end. Would
reversing this transformation in the MIC be enough to end its dangers? No.The fundamental
dangers of the MIC of which Eisenhower initially warned would remain. The aim of technological
enhancement of the capacity to wage war would remain, and private industry likely would
continue to play a key role. The danger might shift from a profit imperative to a technological
imperative. The toll on societies and the planet would continue, even if wars were to be
increasingly avoided. Would ending governmental reliance on industry in the pursuit of national
security eliminate the dangers? No. Direct (physical) violence would continue whenever war
occurs and, regardless, direct violence (and other forms of violence) would continue elsewhere
on an ongoing, pervasive, and massive scale. War and militarism, along with the many other
purveyors of violence, are even more deeply entrenched in the contemporary world and in
global history than the MIC. In the terminology of Johan Galtung, the structural violence of
militarized and non-military institutions would continue, as would the cultural violence of
warism and all the lesser -isms of cultural violence. Negative peace and social injustice would
remain. The ultimate goals of pacifism and nonviolence are not only beyond the MIC and war;
they are also beyond the structural and cultural violence that spawned the MIC and that sustain
war.
Their belief of the liberal international order is used as justification for

aggression – creates a recipe for perpetual war
Gurzolu 18
(Fuat Gursozlu is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Maryland, where he
teaches social and political philosophy and ethics. He is the author of several articles on
pluralism and violence, nonviolent political protest, and radical democracy Feb 2018, “The
Triumph of the Liberal Democratic Peace and the Dangers of Its Success from: The Routledge
Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence Routledge” https://www-routledgehandbooks-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315638751) JP
Note: LDPT = Liberal Democratic Peace Theory
To be sure, there is a remarkable difference between defending peaceful promotion of

democracy in the world in order to build a durable peace and calling for a crusade for
democracy to expand the zone of peace. Some commentators find the idea of peacefully
promoting democracy objectionable, but what really worries theorists is the aggressive
interventionist approach encouraged by the latter position. LDPT could encourage or could be
used to justify aggressive interventionist foreign policies. The aggressive foreign policy is the
result of a belief in the idea that coerced democratization could bring about a peaceful world. As
Andrew Fiala puts it, the hope for a peaceful world promised by LDPT “has a sort of mythic
power that can seduce us toward” wars of forced democratization (Fiala 2010: 67).3 LDPT could
also be misused to legitimize war and mask the real motivation behind it. When political
administrations talk the language of democratic peace, one cannot ignore this potential and the
dangers it could bring about. The point is not that LDPT defends aggressive interventionism and
forced democratization to achieve the dream of perpetual peace. Many defenders of LDPT argue
against intervention as a way of promoting democracy and they emphasize that it is ineffective
and morally wrong. However, some central ideas of LDPT “pander to impulses” that encourage
aggressive interventionist policies (see Layne 1994; Doyle 1983b; Russett 1993). Thus, it is
misleading to describe LDPT as a victim exploited by policymakers. LDPT may not be the author
of these interventionist policies, but it is not as innocent as it has been suggested.4 Theorists
should recognize the destructive potential of LDPT and provide responses to reclaim the theory
by offering ways to contain LDPT’s destructive potential. Downloaded By: University of Michigan
At: 20:42 12 Jul 2019; For: 9781315638751, chapter18, 10.4324/9781315638751-19 Fuat
Gursozlu 218 In fact, many scholars have pointed out the potential of LDPT to encourage
aggressive policies toward non-democracies (Doyle 1983b; Russett 1993: 136). Recognizing that
LDPT has great influence on policy, Russett emphasizes that a misunderstanding of LDPT“could
encourage warmaking against authoritarian regimes, and efforts to overturn them” (Russett
1993: 135). Doyle suggests that “the very constitutional restraint, international respect for
individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among
liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal
societies” (Doyle 1983b: 324). For Doyle, this is why liberal democracies are prone to war in
their relations with nonliberal states. The norms of liberal peace do not apply outside the zone
of peace since liberal democracies are caught in the anarchical nature of international relations.
According to liberal political philosophy, the legitimacy of a state depends on the consent of its
citizens and whether it respects and effectively represents morally autonomous individuals.
When states coerce their citizens and violate their basic rights, their right to be free from foreign
intervention becomes questionable (Doyle 1983b: 325). Liberal democracies assume that
because non-democracies do not rest on free consent, they are not just and because they are
“perceived to be in a permanent state of aggression against their own people,” they are
necessarily aggressive (Doyle 1983b: 326). This deep lack of trust and disrespect pits societies
against each other and determines the nature of the relations between liberal and nonliberal
societies. As Doyle writes, “When the Soviets refuse to negotiate, they are plotting a world
takeover. When they seek to negotiate they are plotting even more insidiously” (Doyle 1983b:
326). Doyle’s example reveals the way the liberal discourse shapes the way the public perceive
nondemocracies. Doyle observes that “fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity;
nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity” (Doyle 1983b: 337). This logic creates hostility
against powerful nonliberal societies while exacerbating intervention against weak nonliberal
societies. By drawing a distinction between the “zone of peace” and the “zone of war” and
proposing the existence of separate peace, LDPT inevitably creates a “mutual identity” among
liberal democracies in a way that transforms its difference against which it defines itself to the
“other.” A constituent feature of this identity is a commitment to peaceful conflict resolution,
which is a trait non-democracies lack. Liberal states should not just respect fellow liberal
societies’ security, but they also should enhance “each other’s security by means of alliance”
(Doyle 2005b: 465). Thus, “we”—liberal democracies—should protect each other from “them”—
non-democracies. The main reason why the “zone of war” exists is because not all states are
liberal democratic, and non-democratic states are by nature aggressive. “The end of history”
represented by a liberal democratic and therefore a peaceful world is not beyond our reach. It is
“them” who prevent the realization of the dream of perpetual peace. The final step of the
argument is a normative position bound to be inferred from LDPT: if non-democracies are
aggressive “troublemakers,” and democracies are just, trustworthy, and peaceful states except
when they have to deal with the potentially dangerous non-democracies, democracies will be
truly secure and the world will be peaceful when every state becomes liberal democratic (Chan
1997; Xenias 2005). As such, LDPT’s logic encourages an interventionist approach. This way of
thinking suggests a simple solution to a complex problem: “fight them, beat them, and then
make them democratic” for the noble goal of world peace (Russett 1993: 136). This logic is best
expressed in a speech given by the thirty-eighth U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root in 1917: “To
be safe democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can. The world cannot be half
democratic and half autocratic. It must be all democratic or all Prussian. There can be no
compromise” (quoted in Russett 1993: 33). Many critics see this as a “recipe for ‘perpetual war’
rather than ‘perpetual peace’” (Demenchenok 2007: 32). Proposed as a theory about
democratic peace, LDPT has come to serve as a discourse used to justify aggressive foreign
policies and military intervention.
Their belief in “warism” is the key factor of the status quo – it’s a preq to peace
Cady 18
(Duane LCady earned his MA and PhD at Brown University after finishing his BA with honors in
philosophy at Hamline University. He has been teaching at Hamline for forty years and has been
recognized for his teaching with the Grimes Award at Hamline (1999) and was United Methodist
Foundation Educator of the Year (2005) . 21 Feb 2018, “Warism and the Dominant Worldview
from: The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence Routledge” https://www-
routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315638751) JP
In our modern world, warism is a dominant outlook. Warists bear no special burden of
justification for taking war for granted as morally justifiable; in fact, the greater burden of
justification typically rests with those opposed to war. This fact alone qualifies warism as the
sort of unconscious assumption we have been considering. It seems so obvious to most of us
that we don’t realize we’re assuming it. As a result, pacifism rarely gets taken seriously;
everybody “knows” it is naïve and unrealistic. Since we see war as normal and natural, all we can
do is avoid it if possible and win if it can’t be avoided. We even take for granted that it’s morally
right to threaten war in an effort to prevent it, and some accept “preemptive war.” Warism
pervades not only politics but virtually all aspects of culture, including business, education,
popular culture, and even religion. This is not a conspiracy; advertising, television programming,
and school curricula all tend to reflect warism, from popular heroes like G.I. Joe, Rambo, and the
galaxy of superheroes to a variety of role models like professional athletes and entertainers.
Conflicts often become tests of superiority. Politicians express their seriousness on issues by
declaring “war” on drugs, poverty, illiteracy, crime, and so on. Athletes are expected to go
beyond winning; they must dominate, even humiliate their opponents with an “in your face”
arrogance. Big games are battles, championships are wars. Even scholars try to be survivors of
academic jousting, often embattled in verbal attack and rejoinder. The philosopher is a warrior
fighting for truth, defending principle (and honor), exchanging linguistic blows in a struggle to
defeat rivals and win arguments (see Burtt 1969). In all segments of society we see battles for
superiority whenever conflict arises. Downloaded By: University of Michigan At: 20:57 12 Jul
2019; For: 9781315638751, chapter21, 10.4324/9781315638751-22 Warism and the Dominant
Worldview 251 Individual autonomy, personal integrity, rights to privacy, property, and freedom
from governmental interference, fighting for what we believe in against all odds, all are
examples of fundamental values that are for the most part uncritically adopted. Warism is
another, but less noticed and less often acknowledged. In political science and history classes in
the US students learn, for example, about our nation: born in righteous violent revolution,
expanded through wars with Native Americans, unified in civil war, a superpower preeminent
after coming out on top in two world wars. School curricula routinely discuss battles, tactics, and
military leadership, but pacifists, anti-war activists, and models of cooperation rather than
military domination rarely arise in class lessons. This emphasis is no surprise given the warism
taken for granted culturally. Western culture traditionally attempts value-free public education
and thus puts little emphasis on moral or political evaluation of current or past public policy.
Public school teachers are supposed to teach facts or skills while values are left to parents,
family, and religious institutions. Increasing realization that all teaching is laden with hidden
values has made parents—and school boards—more likely to ban controversial topics in order
to avoid introducing values incompatible with the mainstream, thereby reinforcing the status
quo. Warism is not only imbedded in popular culture; studies of academic philosophers’
attitudes on war demonstrate that “the great bulk of philosophers who have spoken on the
question of war have supported and defended it as an instrument of social change” (Steinkraus
1969: 3). Often academic philosophers justify war not in itself but as a means to some important
end, like peace or self-defense. Warren Steinkraus describes philosophy professors’ reactions to
war, saying that “studied aloofness, which invariably means tacit acceptance” is the most
common attitude, followed by “overt defense of a particular national policy.” The next most
common is “reluctant and even hesitant justification” with the least common being “direct
criticism with or without consideration of alternatives” (Steinkrauss 1969: 6). This account could
be extrapolated to describe academics generally. Additional evidence that our common cultural
disposition takes the moral justifiability of war for granted is the fact that pacifists are generally
expected to defend their view whereas those accepting war as a normal and natural activity of
nations rarely get asked to justify theirs. We, as a society, presume that the burden of proof
rests on those morally opposed to war because warism is a cultural given, a general assumption
in our contemporary world. This is not saying that all nations are belligerent; rather, it says that
the war system, the standard practice of sovereign states constantly preparing for, threatening,
and engaging in war, goes almost wholly unquestioned. People in and outside of government
may disagree about whether and how to prosecute a particular war, but war itself is almost
never challenged on moral grounds. The system is not in question. Given this context, it is
understandable that those questioning the war system are met with hostility. Political
candidates have no option but to present themselves as “tougher” than their opponents, and all
candidates must be wary of being characterized as “soft on the enemy,” “weak on defense,” or
hesitant to stand firm against adversaries. All of this reinforces the dominant warist attitude and
belittles its critics. As a result, alternatives to the war system—pacifist views in particular—are
not taken seriously because “everybody knows” how implausible pacifism is. Warism may be
held implicitly or explicitly. In its implicit form, warism takes war to be normal, natural, and
morally justifiable. It never occurs to the holder that war in itself could be morally problematic.
No other way of conceiving large-scale human conflict has ever come to mind. Like racism,
sexism, and homophobia, warism is a prejudicial presumption that distorts judgments and
beliefs with no awareness of bias by the holder. In its explicit form warism is deliberately chosen
and openly articulated without apology. Explicit warists regard war as essential to secure justice
and defend national security. In both forms warism misguides judgments Downloaded By:
University of Michigan At: 20:57 12 Jul 2019; For: 9781315638751, chapter21,
10.4324/9781315638751-22 Duane L. Cady 252 and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and
inevitability of war, thereby precluding alternatives and obstructing all challenges to the
dominant conceptual framework of the culture, namely, taking the war system for granted. In
this way warism is the single greatest obstacle to building a more peaceful world. In Just and
Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to
the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt” (Walzer
1977: 21). But there is a third judgment of war that should be made prior to these two: might
war in itself be morally wrong by its very nature? Walzer considers this question in an appendix,
as an afterthought, and dismisses it as naïve. In a way we should not fault him for the dismissal;
after all, his goal is to describe conventional morality and, as we have seen, it does take warism
for granted. To this extent Walzer is right, and this is exactly the point: warist normative lenses
blind us to the fundamental question, not whether this or that war is warranted or whether this
or that behavior may be allowed in war, but whether war itself can be morally justified Warism
results in a dominant attitude among many people that keeping the peace means preserving the
status quo. Often those with this idea of peace are in privileged positions relative to those
against whom they see violence as warranted. Any threat to the status quo, the way things are,
is seen to require “defense against aggression,” usually without considering the possibility that
their advantaged status may have oppressive implications for others. Whenever some humans
enjoy disproportionate advantage, others are left at disproportionate disadvantage. If the
population of the US is about 4 percent of the population of the world and if the US consumes
about a third of what the world produces, then 96 percent of the people on earth are left with
roughly two-thirds of global production. If North America and Europe together constitute 13
percent of the global population and together consume two-thirds of world production, then 87
percent of the world’s population is left dividing roughly one-third of global production. The
numbers here are not as important as the relative proportions of population and consumption.
While there is a lot of talk about “undeveloped” nations, rarely do we hear talk of
“overdeveloped” nations. Yet when population and distribution of goods and services are so
imbalanced, tensions arise. The point here is that such tensions can result in conflict, and those
in advantaged positions are inclined to “defend” their relative advantage against “aggression.”
The status quo, the way population and consumption are distributed globally in this example,
may be accurate, yet the fact that things are as they are may not necessarily justify that things
are as they should be. By encouraging an understanding of peace as the defense of the status
quo, warism blinds us to possible injustice and obfuscates questions about the morality of war.
The pervasive view that keeping the peace means preserving the status quo leads to suspicion
of those opposed to war. Emotional, intellectual, and moral strength are threatening to those
used to dealing in physical, especially military, strength. So it’s not surprising that those who see
peace as preservation of the way things are tend to regard advocates of nonviolence as
incompatible with “national security,” insufficiently patriotic, or otherwise suspect. All of this
grows out of warism. It is easy to forget that America’s eighteenth-century freedom fighters
were terrorists to King George III. Of course those in the relatively disadvantaged position may
likewise consider peace as defense of the status quo and consequently reject peace since it locks
in place their disadvantage. And those in the middle, between the relatively advantaged and
disadvantaged, may see peace as defense of the status quo as well and side with the
advantaged only to avoid ending up on the disadvantaged side. Change can be threatening
because it promises the unfamiliar; at least the status quo offers relative stability. All of this is to
say that social inertia favors conservatism unless conditions become extreme. Again, warism
prevails. We cannot set aside all of our preconceptions at will, but calling attention to the
possibility that they may be prejudicial can open our minds and encourage us to begin
examining warism. Downloaded By: University of Michigan At: 20:57 12 Jul 2019; For:
9781315638751, chapter21, 10.4324/9781315638751-22 Duane L. Cady 254 Developing minds
sufficiently courageous to question the most fundamental beliefs of our culture itself is difficult
and dangerous. But such is necessary if we are to find our way to a more peaceful world, and
warism may be our most formidable obstacle to that world
Being
The construct of "being" is rooted in the relation between the
individual and the group but the use of "being" in the root of our
society further perpetuates the oppression of different political
identities
Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Freelance writer and former associate
professor at the School of Humanities and Social Science, Al Akhawayn
University, Pages 229-231)
Similarly, the
new trend in identity politics shows a development towards forms of newly
clad racist, sexist and nationalist biologisms: not only a parallel interest in the 'being' of
specific groups or their members in preference to their activities, but also a biological
construction of the relation between the individual and the group . What originally made its
appearance on the political scene as a political consciousness of identity — a consciousness of the specific collective
history of oppression, accompanied by a corresponding self-naming, say as Blacks or Women in the Black and Women's
Liberation Movements — today is turning into a pretext to reconstruct identities of race, nation, ethnicity, sex, and their
subgroups. Since a political consciousness of 'identity' is eminently historical - deriving from an analysis of the historical
past with the aim to intervene politically in the present, thus to create a different future - 'political identity' necessarily
implies its own changeability and eventual supersession. The goal is to make such political 'identity'
redundant - to create a society (a material reality) in which it has no more relevance. But
even in the present, where it is a necessity, consciousness of the history of oppression is
continually growing and changing, most of all through the political activity and
experience in the present, which add to the original consciousness of historical
oppression the current consciousness of resistance and change. Hence 'political
identity' means anything but an unchanging sameness, much less a state of being
marked by past oppression, but, on the contrary, the collective consciousness and self-
confidence of a group in resistance and in the process of historical change. Yet political
practice increasingly shows the phenomenon of an 'infatuation' with one's own oppression (or rather, the identity which
bears its name). Audre Lorde (back in 1981) refers to it specifically in the context of white women's reaction to Black
women's feminism and critique of racism, yet defines it as a general problem of power relations between women: 'What
woman here is so enamoured of her own oppression that she cannot see her heelprint
upon another woman's face? What woman's terms of oppression have become precious
and necessary to her as a ticket into the fold of the righteous, away from the cold winds
of self-scrutiny?'7 Similarly, Cherrie Moraga writes in the preface to the second edition of This Bridge Called My
Back (back in 1983): 1 worry about the tendency in the movement where women of color activists seem to become
enamored with our own oppression . . . I worry about the tendency of racial/cultural separatism amongst us where we dig
in our heels against working with groups outside our own particular race/ethnicity. This is what we have accused white
people of, basically sticking to their own kind - only working politically where they may feel 'safe' and 'at home'. But the
making of a political movement has never been about safety or feeling 'at home'. . . Cultural identity — our right
to it — is a legitimate and basic concern for all women of color . . . But to stop there only
results in the most limiting of identity politics: 'If I suffer it, it's real. If I don't feel it, it
doesn't exist.'8 As Lorde and Moraga both indicate, it is a phenomenon of relative
privilege: the use of an 'identity' in cultural-political situations which precisely exclude
the danger of the particular experience of victimiza- tion that has given the identity its
name, situations in which cultural self-representation moves to the foreground, ready to
become an activity and an end in itself. Thus an infatuation with the victim status
of'women' is particularly manifest among white women in situations with other women,
especially Black women (and also in situations with relatively gentle and critical men) —
rarely in situations with sexually exploitative and violent men. Similarly, Moraga sees a
problematical attachment to oppression status in the tendency to cultural separatism vis-a-vis women experiencing
different oppressions — that is, not in the politically necessary separatism vis-a-vis white people and men as a form of
effective political organizing, but in the voluntary exclusion of women of different ethnic origin. We exclude where we have
the power to exclude. Oppression identity becomes problematical, if we follow Moraga, when it becomes a new home - a
9
'homeland of the mind', as Jenny Bourne calls it: a symbolic country where we 'belong', where we feel safe and at home,
being among our own 'kind'. Our own 'kind' are not those with the same political aims, but women with the same
oppression status. Yet a political movement, Moraga insists, cannot be about safety and feeling at home. Feeling at home
and safe, we may equally insist, is not about building a political movement. In particular, we gain this home and its safety
by fighting against those less powerful than ourselves, those underprivileged in relation to ourselves, however
underprivileged we may be, over w h o m we are exercising power and privilege - it is our heelprint in other women's faces,
it is other women we dig in our heels against. And we feel finally 'at home' where we neither are struggling in a political
struggle against oppression, nor are personally in any danger, but where among our 'likes' we feel 'understood' in our
suffering - our ticket to the fold of the righteous. By insisting that cultural identity is indeed a
legitimate concern, while at the same time criticizing the use of oppression status as new
home country, Moraga highlights the importance of considering power relations:
'cultural identity' in the sense of a political consciousness is appropriate as a means of
resistance in struggle, not as a state of being (far from the struggle). Multicultural
oppression identity as new homeland is a form of exclusion on the basis of criteria of
race, ethnicity, class etc., exercised from a position of power over those excluded. That is,
the identity where we feel 'at home' is constructed on the dominant principles of
inclusion and exclusion on which home countries and nations are formed .
Capital/Productivity Links
The sociological concept and use of value is part of the basic
capitalist labor relation that seeks validation, creating the
infinite loop of being either “good enough” or “not good
enough.” That rhetoric is labeled as being a root of value, yet
ultimately has no value
The reorganization of human living as the production and circulation of commodities not
only displaces reality, it also dissolves any sense of the historicity of (one's) life. For
despite all emphases on 'experiences' one wants to have and events one wishes to
consume 'live', the underlying urge is less to experience reality and to understand what is
happening, than to get the imminent future under control: to shape 'events' after the pattern of
previous events and to perceive in new experiences what is familiar, thus facilitating the search for profit and pleasure
without the cumbersome adjustment to the nuances of the ever new. Time thus loses its reality and significance: if
2
anything, it is a necessary component of labour as a productive activity 'within a given period of time'. That is to say, it
too is carved up into measurable pieces, amounts of time which one invests into products. It is part of basic
capitalist thinking to compare things and to measure them against each
other. Since in historical social reality nothing is like anything else, but on the contrary, everything is historically
specific and thus unique, certain mechanisms are required to enable us to compare what is actually incomparable.
'Value' is the abstract element by means of which comparability is established.
Exchanging commodities creates a relation of value between them - a relative value of
each, expressed by the other as its equivalent. In other words, an equation. We have seen
this construction of 'value' play a vital role in social relations , so also for the client of Robin
Norwood's of whom it is said that 'She interpreted the time he stole from his other life to be with her as the validation of
3
her worth.' That is to say, the client does not seem to have any recognizable worth in her own eyes except for the value
which her lover's stealing time from his other life constitutes for her. As Marx says of ordinary products, we may also
say of these life products, substituting
people for 'men': [People] do not therefore bring
these products of their labour into relation with each other as values
because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of
homogeneous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different
products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different
kinds of labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of it.4 Although the
client indeed thinks that her lover's visits bestow value on her — that she is receiving her worth from him — and
correspondingly will feel devalued if he fails to come, it is in fact her own equation which equates the value of his brief
visits with her entire worth as a person. If women like her, then, suffer from 'low self- esteem', it is less because someone
has taken it away from them than because they set their own value on the basis of self-chosen equations and exchanges:
the other shall prove my value. Even though women (for instance) have the collective and personal experience of being
deemed by men to be of 'lesser value', this is no reason to give up responsibility for our own judgement. The problem of
women's lacking self-esteem (as it is raised in the therapy discourse) is not that men do not value women highly enough;
the problem is granting men in our own minds the authority to put any value on us whatsoever. Even if they valued us
more highly (being able to lower their estimate at any time), this would lead not to more 'self-esteem' but to dependency.
Rather, a sense of oneself derives precisely from taking responsibility for one's own
judgement. In the knowledge of one's own judgement and the responsibility for one's
own thinking, the collective devaluation of w o m e n in patriarchy is a cause for outrage
—a political problem which requires a political response: a feminist critique of sexism
and the patriarchal power structure, and a political liberation struggle aiming to change
it. Without this consciousness, moreover, men's undervaluing of women could not even be perceived as such: we would
merely 'have' the value we have (been given). And if we have also internalized our cultural valuation as a consequence of
our socialization, this does not necessitate a man who temporarily bestows a dubious value on us; it necessitates freeing
ourselves of this internalized male judgement, say, by the practice feminists call consciousness raising (whether it be in CR
groups or otherwise). If
'validation' in some quarters has become the proof of a
positive relationship, and the experience of validation, appreciation or
recognition the commodity for the individual subject to strive for, we should
not only question the principle of validation by others, but equally the
construction of this estimation on the basis of 'value'. Similarly, it should make
us pause for thought when arguments in favour of others' right to life and integrity are
based on the notion of 'equal value'. Not only do well-meaning xenophiles explain to us that other cultures
are 'equally valuable', but many animal rights advocates plead for the animals' right to life by attributing comparable
'value' to their lives. This in turn allows, for instance, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (and a host of enthusiastic followers)
to value the (future) life of disabled children (at the stage of the embryo or shortly after birth), or the future lives of old
people and people with illnesses or lasting injuries, as lives lacking in value and not 'worth living' - and to recommend
eugenic 'solutions'.5 Nor does it help if we call the value an 'intrinsic value': the perception of the object's 'value' remains
as subjective and dependent on the valuer as does its perception as 'beautiful' and 'pleasing'. Value is a
fundamentally relative category, deriving from the economic calculations of the judging
and valuing subject. It is a subjective judgement which, through the process of exchange,
seems to slip into the object as its 'objective' or 'intrinsic' value. The ability to enforce
a valuation as a value (that is, a price) depends on one's power and influence
over the exchange. The objective is to put the 'value' of the other's product as low as
possible, to keep down its price. Moreover, 'validation' itself becomes a
commodity, a gift made by the subject to the other (in exchange). If I 'value'
and 'appreciate' another, it not only betrays the arrogance of my position of power —
evaluating not just a person's 'goods' but die very person - it simultaneously implies die
possibility that 1 may find them of no value. The other 'acquires' her worth thanks to my
generous estimation - thus she will need me if she wants to keep it. Through periodic
validation I will ratify it (as the case may be), thus keeping her informed of any
fluctuations in the exchange rate. These mechanisms of evaluation and equation,
then, are based on a primary restructuring of the real into a judging subject
and a judged object, into I and the 'other'. Only with the (subjective)
category of the 'other' does it become viable (for the pivotal subject) to make
a comparison - to divide into 'same' and 'other', 'like' and 'unlike'. It is a
concept of 'difference' that has nothing to do with the constitutive
uniqueness of everything real (what the subject calls 'variety'), and is
incapable of encompassing it. It is 'otherness' and 'difference' constructed
on the basis of criteria selected by the subject and constituted on its implicit
norm, from which everything 'other' and all the 'others' are first of all
judged the 'same' among themselves, equally 'other than' the norm . We know
this to be the case with the 'otherness' of race, sex, etc. Once everything 'other' is
potentially the same, an object of otherness in the subject's sight, comparison between
these objects becomes possible. As we know, this may even include comparison between
objects and the self (as object). Just as value is a subjective category deriving from the
subject's arrogant power, so experiencing something becomes an experience on the basis
of a subjective selection of criteria. If sex with many different women on different occasions is always the
'same', it is because the women are not a relevant factor. Similarly, one experience is 'like' a previous experience because
the specificity of the situation, the people involved and the historical time, do not play any part. Thus Katie's therapists
explained that the 39-year-old Katie was 'reliving' with her partner the very experience which, aged three or four, she had
with her mother. The feelings she felt were not just like the feelings then felt, they were the old feelings, re-evoked from
where repression had stored them. They were not current feelings about a past event, but the 35-year-old originals.
Similarly, in our self-psychologizing accounts we may claim a tendency to construct the 'same' situations, to form the
'same' relationships time and again, and generally to display the 'same' behaviour. Yet it is not the same but new
behaviour, occurring in a new context and following a new decision to act (even if it is a decision to act 'as' one did on a
past occasion). And it is based on a new assessment of the current situation, which at the very least includes one's
knowledge of the last situation in which one is said to have done the same . To speak of the same behaviour
and the same situation in this context not only degrades the current situation and its
participants, reducing them to mere irrelevancies; it also means regarding one's own
historical existence and development, including one's consciousness as immaterial -
considering oneself instead as the timeless and experience-consuming subject of a
continuous present.
Crisis Based Politics
the affirmative’s focus on war as an isolated event is an instance of crisis-based
politics that fails to assess violence as a whole and the way it effects our
everyday lives, perpetuating a world of constant conflict
A critical task for peace pedagogy is to challenge views of peace as primarily responses
to declared war. Crisis-based politics tend to focus on exceptional situations and fail to
capture the entire spectrum of violence. Premised on the idea that peace cannot be understood in
isolation of larger structural problems, this paper proposes the concept of ‘everyday peace’ as a framework for peace
education. Drawing from a pedagogical initiative, we examine how students engage with the concept of everyday peace and present our findings in
three related domains: (1) Definition of everyday peace, (2) Application of everyday peace principles, and (3) Role of collaboration in everyday peace
approaches. Our analysis underscored two important themes in participants’ definitions of everyday peace: (1) peace as a value-based praxis and (2)
individual level and systemic components of everyday peace. Applying these principles to a violent event in the local community, participant responses
emphasized compassion, cultures of peace, and the need to draw reflexive, meaningful connections between local and global contexts. The participants
also outlined the synergistic role of collaboration in everyday peacebuilding. We discuss our findings in relation to extant research and consider
implications of an everyday peace framework for holistic peace education. Keywords: peace education; everyday peace; social justice; collaboration;
we have witnessed a transformation in conventional
structural violence Introduction In the recent century,
ideas of war. War is no longer confined to ‘high technologies of destruction;’ rather,

there has been a proliferation of ‘low technologies’ of warfare shaped about by
emerging geopolitical concerns in Africa, Middle East, and in Asia (Das 2001, 108). This in turn
has led to a rise in crisis-based politics that focus on situations perceived as volatile,
exceptional, and as a break from normal (Cuomo 1996; Gumz 2009). Such a focus fails to take into
account the complex systems of domination and oppression that function as givens in
people’s everyday lives. Besides, not all acts of violence occur within the confines of
declared war (Das 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2006). Thus it has become imperative for peace scholars to
focus on the everyday in order to understand and address the scope of violence in
people’s lives (Appadurai 2004). Peace education in turn must reflect these altered contingencies. Premised on the idea that peace
cannot be understood or studied in isolation of other social processes, this paper proposes the
concept of everyday peace as a framework for peace education. Violence that is ubiquitous and deeply entrenched
in everyday practices calls for a notion of ‘everyday’ peace

The aff’s instance of peacekeeping through political means to control countries
they deem “dangerous” is reflective of an ideology that privileges only rich and
powerful states – peace support should be done outside of state control
Pugh 07 (Michael, International journal of peace studies, “Peacekeeping and critical theory”
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1353331042000228445?src=recsys 1/24/07)
EEG
A deconstruction of the
role of peace support operations suggests that they sustain a particular order
of world politics that privileges the rich and powerful states in their efforts to control or
isolate unruly parts of the world. As a management device it has grown in significance as
the strategic imperatives of the post-industrialized, capitalist world have neutered the universal
pretensions of the United Nations. Drawing on the work of Robert Cox and Mark Duffield, this essay adopts a critical theory
perspective to argue that peace support operations serve a narrow, problem-solving purpose –
to doctor the dysfunctions of the global political economy within a framework of liberal
imperialism. Two dynamics in world politics might be exploited to mobilize a counter-hegemonic transformation in global
governance. First, a radical change in the global trade system and its problematic institutions
will create opportunities to emancipate the weak from economic hegemony. Second,
future network wars are likely to require increasingly subtle and flexible teams , similar to
disaster relief experts, to supply preventive action, economic aid and civilian protection. This
might only be achieved by releasing peace support operations from the state-centric
control system, and making them answerable to more transparent, more democratic
and accountable multinational institutions.
The aff’s logic of humanitarian intervention is fundamentally flawed and rooted
in an international order that necessitates the crises they are trying to stop
Pawlowska 05 (Katrina, phd from Stockholm university, “Humanitarian Intervention:
Transforming the Discourse” https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500201886) EEG
The discourse of Humanitarian Intervention (HI) has not been able methodologically to
move beyond its own conventions, which emphasize the decision-making process about
whether or not to intervene. 1 This argument implies two further observations. First, current mainstream
theorizing about HI already recognizes that in practice the use of military force will always be
contradictory in as much as the use of violence – even for supposedly humanitarian purposes – will
always harm innocent people. 2 However, HI is also contradictory because it justifies
military intervention without addressing the underlying causes of so- called ‘supreme
humanitarian emergencies’ in the first place. 3 The contradiction is that while the primary purpose of
HI is to help others, its main agents – Western states – continue to preside over an
unjust and iniquitous world order. 4 This implication reinforces the second observation,
which is that HI discourse is reformist but it is not transformative. Its reformist nature is understood
as disengaging from statism: that is, extending obligations to the rest of humanity or stopping ethnic cleansing. This logic is
deeply problematic because an obligation to the rest of humanity applied in situations
of acute crisis only becomes inconsistent with the principles of common humanity,
which HI aspires to uphold. Transformative change can only be implemented when HI
discourse conceptually acknowledges that circumstances requiring an intervention arise
in a wider context of the international order. 5 It is only when the international order becomes an integral part
of the HI discourse that international society can attempt to implement principles of humanity. 6 In order to substantiate these
claims the article explains why the traditional HI discourse is preoccupied with a decision-making process about whether or not to
intervene. What follows from this observation is that HI discourse involves a problem-solving logic in order to deal with situations
requiring HI. This means International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.4, Winter 2005, pp.487 – 502 ISSN 1353-3312 print = 1743-906X
online DOI:10.1080 = 13533310500201886 # 2005 Taylor & Francis that the discourse attempts to manage supreme humanitarian
emergencies without questioning why these arise in the first place. The main section identifies the international liberal order and
demonstrates that HI discourse reflects liberal assumptions about the separation of politics
and economics. As such, the international order is not included in the HI discourse and
consequently contradicts its purpose of fulfilling the principles of humanity. The ‘liberal
scenario’ is divided into three stages. The first, characterized as economic statism, constitutes a context for
situations requiring an outside intervention, though such relations are not included in the HI discourse. Roger
Tooze’s analysis of political economy is used in order to substantiate this claim, as are the events
preceding the war in former Yugoslavia. The article then explains why the second stage, the intervention
itself, is problem solving and why it is insufficient to promote the principles of humanity. The third stage,
peacebuilding, is addressed by analysing events in post-war Kosovo to show that while reformist change did take place, stopping a
‘supreme humanitarian emergency’, the wider international context has not been transformed. Consequently, there is a significant
risk that further intervention will be required. The second part of the article considers an alternative scenario in which humanitarian
theory posits a fairer international order which would help reduce the need for intervention in the first place. By drawing upon
critical theory and the characteristics of reflexivity I argue that while the HI
discourse justifies action as
stopping supreme humanitarian emergencies, it needs to address why they happen in
the first place. Further, while the proponents of the orthodox HI discourse claim to be
promoting change in the international order they merely reinforce the old one. Finally,
while the practitioners of HI claim objectivity, one needs to be wary of their subjectivity.
Humanitarianism
humanitarian intervention that does not try to address the broader scope and
root cause of the crisis leads to serial policy failure that ensures the
continuation of crises
I argue that intervention with humanitarian intent needs to reach much further than an agreement
on whether or not to intervene. In order to reflect an expression of common humanity, which
interveners claim to stand for, the impulse needs to be committed to preventing situations requiring
outside intervention. In the meantime present HI discourse implies that the duties of common
humanity stop at HI, when states selectively feel obliged to intervene at times of acute crisis. As B. Parekh notes, the
moral argument of having a duty to others needs to apply to ‘normal’ international relations in
order to minimize the need for intervention. 12 A humanitarian argument needs to involve a
wider concern than a state’s own interest. States need to stop playing off one group against another,
manipulating and exploiting economically unprivileged states. 13 Furthermore states need to have a
positive duty of economic and political assistance , practising fair trade and allowing people to achieve their own
dignity. As Parekh suggests, HI needs to encompass the patterns of a fair world. 14 Meantime, while
solidarists claim that legitimating humanitarian intervention in situations of supreme huma-
nitarian emergencies illustrates ‘new solidarism in the society of states’, 15 the HI discourse
continues to be deeply influenced by the liberal assumptions that dominate the contemporary
international order. One characteristic of liberalism is the idealistic separation of the economic sphere
from the political sphere. This explains why the necessity for intervention is not being questioned.
Robert Cox’s idea of problem-solving theory and its property of legitimizing prevailing social and political structures
is relevant to this argument. 16 There are two main reasons why problem-solving theory has a legitimating function. First
because policy-makers take the world as they find it. 489 Hence, second, the existing order is
unquestioned and consequently the general purpose of problem-solving theory is to make the
system work smoothly. In this respect the present discourse on HI lacks transformative properties and
represents a problem-solving approach. Accordingly HI proponents, including counter-restrictionists and
solidarists, have a tendency to legitimize prevailing social, political and economic structures. HI discourse
implies this logic because it takes the world as it finds it, in the sense that decisions about an
intervention always occur after humanitarian crises have already erupted. This means that the debate
focuses on the decision-making process and the context is not questioned (see Figure 1). Indeed in circumstances where
international factors have directly contributed to the need for an intervention these factors are
still not being sufficiently problematized beyond the desire to help others. In the following sections I argue that HI
as currently conceived is non-reflexive in that it ‘privileges the victims of politics over the victims
of economics’. 17 Liberal International Order International order – the expression of economic, political and other normal
relations taking place inseparably – contextualizes events around the world. However, the agencies of liberal
international order conceptually separate economics and politics. 18 This conceptual separation
has immense consequences for thinking about and understanding the purpose of HI (see Figure 2). The dominant
approach to thinking about HI reflects assumptions about an order in which divisions are drawn
between the political and the economic spheres. This in turn, produces a situation where the
context of HI is artificially divided between three stages, whereby stage 1 is not a constitutive part of current
theorizing about HI. This
has two major consequences. First, because the economic FIGURE 1 THE LOGIC OF
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 490 aspects of the international liberal order are neglected, the ways in
which liberal economic remedies can actually increase the likelihood of violent conflict in certain
parts of the world are rarely considered. 19 Second, therefore, HI theory has a very narrow
understanding of why violent conflict occurs and how it can be prevented.
Not evaluating assumptions in humanitarian intervention and liberal politics

leads to an endless cycle of economic decline and instability wherein political
actors always shift responsibility onto something else – the k is key to
eliminating conflict and turns consequential distancing
Also changing the international order is a prerequisite to successful humanitarian intervention
(ig you can read this card 2 different ways?)
Also the aff is statist so maybe a link

The first stage of intervention reflects a variety of political, social and economic relations, corresponding
to normal, everyday domestic and international relations, which may contribute to the outbreak of violence.
This stage can be defined as economic statism because political, social and in particular economic decisions
are still being dictated by the rules of statism. This means that its own citizens are the primary responsibility of the
state, which has primary responsibility for domestic activities rather than the international consequences. Thus, domestic
relations are more morally binding than international relations. 20Even if decisions, especially economic
decisions, of different states have contributed to undesirable international circumstances, illustrated below with
reference to the Yugoslav crisis, they are often unquestioned or ignored in discussions about HI. Such logic
is perfectly acceptable within economic liberalism where wealth is associated with national security: legitimate
economic statism is justified by normal liberal practices. In the context of HI theory, this implies that dying from unjust
economic relations is less alarming than dying from physical violence. Prioritizing one wrong-
doing over an assumed more serious wrong-doing creates an artificial logic which excludes the
early signs of a crisis as being part of preventing supreme humanitarian emergencies. An explanation
of this can be found in the field of International Political Economy (IPE).FIGURE 2THE CONTEXT OF HI DISCOURSEHUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION DISCOURSE491 In the context of economic liberalism, political activity has the task of
ensuring specific conditions necessary for efficient economic activities.21The economic activity itself,
however, is not assumed to be political – because the assumption is that it has a distinct and
superior rationality. This assumption was reflected in the Bretton Woods system, whose international financial institutions
were expected to operate as non-political entities. One reason for the economic/political separation is that
free-market economic behavior is assumed to be highly rational while politics are irrational. Hence
efficiency requires minimum political interference. Another reason is that it is assumed that conflict can be managed
by international economic agencies because it takes place within a system that generates
continual, pacifying economic growth.22However, when the liberal international order fails , as
Roger Tooze has argued, this is explained through orthodox manifestations ‘which have accepted a particular set
of values and assumptions’, for example that economic activity operates according to a superior
rationality compared to politics.23 Without questioning the assumptions on which economic
international order is built, liberal analysis quickly becomes system-supporting analysis .24The
current contradiction within the HI discourse is caused by similar logic. While theorizing about HI claims to encourage
principles of humanity, the current international order, which contextualizes humanitarian interventioIn ns,
discourages them. Unless the international order is changed, HI will encourage and reinforce the
same order that has helped to create the need for an intervention. In other words, HI discourse encourages
a system-supporting analysis of order, which has failed to prevent the need for interventions
Human Rights Links
Oppressed and structural violence victims fail to combat inequality and are held
to become perpetrators themselves
Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Freelance writer, teacher in England and Germany
and associate professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
The Will to Violence Page 3)H.S
Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have tried to explain men's
Black theoreticians have explained the

sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some
violence of Black men as the result of racist oppression. The ostensible aim of
these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural
violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such
inequality, they actively contribute to it. Although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life
context, these 'explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same
oppression uses violence, that is, that these circumstances do not 'cause'
violent behaviour. They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has decided to violate, even if this decision was
made in circumstances of limited choice^ I To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular
interests. In the first instance it serves to exonerate the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to circumstances and a
to stigmatize all
history for which other people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps
those living in poverty and oppression; because they are obvious victims of
violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators
themselves.1 This slanders all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others,
and libels those experiencing racist and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence. Far from supporting those
oppressed by classist, racist or sexist oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the interest of exonerating individual members. It
collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as

is a version of
potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the

mainstream division of society into so-called marginal groups — the classic clienteles of
social work and care politics (and of police repression) — and an implied 'centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers
and carers themselves belong, and which we are to assume to be a zone of non-violence.
Focusing on discussion of rights, and creation of safe spaces absolves us of any

guilt and violence that we have perpetuated.
Even where it seems, at least rhetorically, to be an issue of politics — of racism, sexism or
patriarchy, what in relation to people concerns political behaviour — we tend to biologize
the political, so that we may fight against (or avoid or exclude) people - patriarchs,
sexists, racists etc. — who supposedly personify the politics. That is to say, we opt for war with
particular people, in preference to resistance to the political order and to racist and sexist behaviour,
whosesoever it may be (though on the principle of identity it rarely is one's own). If the ultimate
consequence is not the extermination of sexists and racists, the implication at least is
territorial segregation and the creation of 'pure' communities, on a principle of exclusion
(after the motto of 'fascists out'), or else a retreat into niches of separatist living space. It
is a version of 'ethnic cleansing' and the nationalist claim to an exclusive territory of
one's own, there to realize one's 'national identity'. Lesbian ethicist Sarah Lucia Hoagland writes
of the incipient lesbian revolution: During the emergence of the u.s. women's liberation and gay liberation
movements . . . we turned our backs on the fathers' categories and began to focus on each other . . . hundreds
of lesbian projects began: collectives, newspapers, record companies, bookstores, presses, film companies,
schools, lesbian community centres, libraries and archives, credit unions, magazines, healing centres,
restaurants, radio stations, food co-ops, alcoholism detox centres, rape crisis centres, bands, womyn's land,
music festivals, more bars, and on and on.' 10 In other words, everything you need to live - a lesbian republic
nearly ready to declare its independence. As Hoagland also emphasizes: 'I do not believe oppression is going
to be lifted from us ... If oppression is going to end, we need to move out of it.' 41 Although this must be a
metaphor, the metaphor bespeaks a conceptual framework, for we also 'created conceptual frameworks
outside the values of the fathers' (my emphasis). 42 Oppression thus is no longer what in our
society we need to fight against, or patriarchal values what we oppose where and when
they are realized: they are like an untoward climate we turn our back on and 'move out
of', to an 'outside' we make into our own space, from which in turn we exclude and
include whom and what we see fit. For territory is the basis on which political power
rests — the material range of its jurisdiction. Hence the attempt in the centres of power
to extend its range - say, to unify 'Europe' or ultimately create a 'global village'.
Conversely, however small (and powerless) a minority may be within a larger
community, with a territory of its own it will be the majority, with power and jurisdiction
over its space.
“Other”
Hierarchical power structures serve to create violence against the other.
Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, Page 133-5)
A subject whose relations are characterized precisely by the fact that the subject can call them
off at any moment of its choice — whose cancellability is the very point of a conception of self as subject - now sees
its project of power and domination reach a 'natural' limit , at least on the level of its own discourse: the
split ego cannot think itself as pure and absolute subject, without its object complement . In the
face of such 'superior power', the power of (its) logic and the grammar of being, the powerful subject makes itself into the victim of
that 'power': the victim of a discursively thingified 'existence', an abstracted and autonomous
'Being'.
Hence the elites of the ruling classes of the world - the elites of white, Western, educated men -
concern themselves not with the burning problems of the world — say the problem of domination and the
massive subjection created by it, the exploitation of the majority of humanity and their consequent
poverty and destruction, or the destruction and exploitation of their place of residence , the planet
they concern themselves with themselves and their problem of not really having any problems. Thus they create the most
important and fundamental problem — most important in as much as it concerns themselves — by
philosophically pathologizing their own existence as rulers in near-total supremacy.
What for other people are the real consequences of the actions of the dominant and the ruling —
captivity, chains, servitude, the burden of an existence from which there is no escaping, to which there is no shouting 'stop', a social
contract of power and domination which on the part of the dominated and oppressed cannot be called off or terminated — is
turned, by means of rhetorical reformulation and metaphoric appropriation, into the grandiose problem of
existence in freedom: 'More profound and perhaps more crucial than the wish to be oneself, to find oneself, to purify
oneself from foreign dross, is the dream of being released from one's self. . .'I5
Such a dream, rather than being the profoundest dream of universal 'humanity', is the dream of a subject living in the leisure and
boredom of overabundance and superfluity, a subject which has depopulated the world around it, thus robbing its existence of any
meaning and purpose beyond power. Hence there may indeed be 'ennui of being oneself',16 and satiety always to find but oneself.
Under different conditions of being, the dream of liberating oneself from foreign dross and foreign chains may indeed be more
profound and above all more urgent.
As the colleagues from psychology

have recourse to 'original' needs and experiences of children in
order to justify the claims to power of adults and to legitimate them as 'natural', so it is part of the stock
repertory of Western philosophy to have recourse both to the childhood of the subject and to a
'childhood' of humanity in order to legitimate the boundless, transgressive and exploitative
aspirations of the adult philosophical subject as 'existential', 'universal' and 'ontological':
When the child cannot find sleep, when all the lights are extinguished and he begins to listen to the impalpable murmur of the night,
what he hears and feais is existence in its purity without the existing, the anonymous form of Being . . . there is nothing but Being as
such, the inevitable murmer of there is. There is always, even if there is no particular thing - and this' is precisely what the child
grasps. Terror rises in him, because he feels as if sucked up into this amorphous existence . . ,'7
For 'thechild' is a little existential philosopher, who even in the bed of his infancy is afraid of
thingified abstractions, of the anonymous shape of shapeless Being or the vacant 'event of
Being' — in short, who has a 'Heideggerian experience' .18 Above all, he is a child who in his child's life
has had no social experiences at all which might give him reason to be terrified of the dark - not of
the 'shapes of monsters' and other 'fantastic images',19 but
of the experience of powerlessness and violation,
or in other words the actions and the behaviour of powerful adults . Thus denuded of the social condition of
his very being as a child, he may then serve as the tabula rasa of a human being in a state of' nature', the philosophical subject in
post-natal embryo.
Fear and terror, then, for Levinas are the mark of the subject's encounter with the superior power of 'existence'. What in
Finkielkraut's view distinguishes Levinas from other great Western philosophers such as Hegel, Heidegger and Sartre, is that
his analysis of social relations, of the encounter with the Other, is a matter neither of fear and
terror, nor 'predominantly of struggle'.20 While for Hegel the relationship between two subjects
is determined by the dialectic of Master and Slave, the war between consciousnesses ,21 for
Sartre the mere 'fact of the Other' , that is, the mere existence of another, constitutes a challenge to the
subject which Sartre calls 'violence'.22 For the sheer recognition or consciousness that another exists
suffices to catapult the subject out of the paradise of his singular existence — a perception of the other
which according to Finkielkraut does not yet constitute a 'relation': 'No relation links me to this stranger.'23
The Sartrean subject's ability to reflect leads it to the alarming insight that this 'object', the Other,
is himself a subject who in turn may reduce 'me' to the object of his sight: 'I am being seen, this
is enough to transport me into a different world .'24 To be precise, into the Other's object world.
Looking, eyeing me, observing and appraising me, the Other is making me into his Other, fixing
me in a mode of being, a 'nature', which I cannot reject, imposing on me, as we might say, an
identity which is not of my making: 'the Other is for me at once he who stole my being and he
who effects that there is a being which is my being.'2
While for Hegel the problem was that in order to exist, I need another for whom I exist, the modern existential subject has
progressed so far as not to know any more if it even wants to exist, if it wants to have a 'being', dreaming indeed of detaching itself
from its self and its 'being'. .Hence the encounter with the Other no longer means, as it did for Hegel's subject, the troublesome yet
necessary (and thus nevertheless wanted and 'needed') condition for existence: it becomes the violent
aggression of an
unwanted confirmation of one's existence and 'being'. This 'being', determined not by the self
but by the Other, at the same time means the destruction of the subject's own (object) world, in which it was the sole and
supreme ruling subject.
Discourse of the “other” and politics of difference divests individual

responsibility of problematic acts.
The apparent irony that whites, in response to the political self- naming of Blacks,
Christians in response to the self-naming of Jews or Muslims, nationals in response to
the self-naming of migrants, and men in response to the political self-naming of women,
today define themselves as 'other than.' Black, ergo white, and 'other than' female, ergo male (etc.),
we owe to the same cultural scene in which politics is but radical chic, feminism and the critiques of racism
and anti-Semitism no more than trends on the level of discourse. On the level of a left-liberal
intellectual discourse, the concepts 'Black', 'Jewish', 'migrant', and 'women' etc. are
found simply to be dominant concepts, political values which are in fashion, in relation
to which whites and/or men now 'need' to define their 'identity' — as Black people or
women defined theirs at the time of their emerging resistance movements — in.
'resistance' to the 'dominant' fashion in discourse. Hence masculinity studies are
booming with the justification that 'there is a need for a reassessment of masculinity in
response to the feminist reinterpretation of women's identity' .27 Were it in response to feminist
critique rather than an alleged 'reinterpretation of women's identity', students of men's studies would realize
that feminism already is a reassessment of masculinity. Yet by reducing feminism to a mere reinterpretation
of women's identity, the parallel project of 'reassessing men's identity' acquires a spurious political status, on
a par with the radical project of feminism. Similarly, women try to reassess their 'national' 'white' 'Christian'
'middle-class' identity, thus assessing it as of old. The critiques of racism, of nationalism and
Euro- centrism are reduced to the mere renaming of 'identities', identities created by
structures of oppression, but now subject to the volatile valuation of fashion. That such
reassessments turn out to be like the original 'assessments', in the old and intact
categories of dominance, follows from the application of the double negative, the doubly
deployed dualism of the dominant culture: women are those who are 'other' than men.
Men are those who are 'other' than those who are 'other' than men. Ditto white, Christian,
German, etc. Rather than being due to a political necessity of resistance, however, this 're'-assessment offers
yet another chance for self-representation and self-realization, that is, for occupying oneself with oneself,
maintaining a position of power and self-interest, now clad in the glamour of a 'political' activity. However, it
is no longer just men of discourse who see in feminism no more than a reinterpretation of femininity.
Increasingly, many women also see 'feminism' if not indeed 'post-feminism' as a chance
cosmetically to revamp the cultural image of women and to reclaim biological sex as a
factor of personal and collective identity. What the repressive measures of patriarchy
have for centuries been forcing on women, namely their identification on the basis of
their reproductive capacity, ideological persuasion seems finally to have brought to
completion: namely that women — especially women with education privilege and thus
highly trained in the culture of patriarchy — are now claiming it voluntarily and without direct or physical
coercion. Such enthusiasm at the reappearance of the reactionary and positivist concept of 'identity' can be
explained only by the profit it promises the subject. Identity offers, as we have seen, a refuge of 'being', from
which historicity and action have been banned. If 'Black people' have become, once again, those
who are black, then white people, too, are simply those who are white - and less those
responsible for racist oppression, who are exercising, profiting from and maintaining it.
'Identity' no longer refers to historical and political doing, it is a mere statement about
people's being (which they cannot help). Equally 'men', rather than designating those
responsible for exercising and institutionally maintaining the oppression and
exploitation of women, who are collectively and individually benefiting from it,
increasingly is meant to designate people who are biologically (and culturally and
socially) male and thus different from what women are . Hence we may own not only a white,
Christian, male etc. identity, but own up even to being 'bearers of a racist identity'. 28 'Being racist' thus
becomes something we no more can help than we can help being white or male.
Generally, the politics of difference offers all of us equally — be we oppressors or
oppressed — the democratic opportunity to define ourselves from our own point of view,
and in relation to an 'opposite' of our choice, as 'different' and 'other' — thus to affirm
this 'relationship' as an eternal (ahistorical) actuality. Moreover, this preoccupation with cultural
or 'political' identities pre-empts any serious discussion about political activity. For what determines political
activity is less the political necessities of action than who we want to be doing it with. What the activity is
about is discussed, if at all, after the question with whom we are doing it has been resolved. The highest
priority is the community, that is, the social and political elective home country, with political activity its by-
product. This is how the well-known separatist political groups are formed to which Cherrie Moraga refers,
and it is how coalitions, -once the groups exist, are to be made between them. What white 'anti-racist'
women today know for sure is that white and Black, Christian and Jewish, nationals and migrant women
shall 'come together', the analysis concentrating on why it is 'so difficult'. 29 The 'lack of contact' and
connection between white women and Black or migrant women is now being experienced as a lack, to be
overcome by increased contact.30 The goal is 'togetherness', whose advantages are extolled
while the potential disadvantages muted by other white women are systematically
denied.31 What is clear is the desire for 'coalitions' and 'bondings' — communities we
want, encounters we seek and associations we regard as desirable — and less the political
necessities calling for political solidarity. That is to say, for many white women, working
together with Black women has become a veritable need — and a condition for any anti-
racist commitment on their part.
Impacts
Building a culture of peace is a greater moral responsibility than the aff’s advantage –
the seven issues that threaten humanity are a result of a lack of peaceful values
Setiadi et al 17 (Riswanda, 1 Department of French Language Education, Faculty of Language and
Literature Education, Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, “A peace pedagogy model for the
development of peace culture in an education setting”
https://benthamopen.com/FULLTEXT/TOPSYJ-10-182 10/28/17) EEG
Everyone needs peace, as they need happiness, justice, and prosperity. From time to time, the need for a culture
of peace and peace itself is very urgent . In this case, it is revealed [4] that, “ no time is more appropriate
than now to build a culture of peace. No social responsibility is greater nor task heaver than that
of securing peace on our planet on a sustainable foundation ”. To live together in peace and harmony
is also a challenge, for educators, while students themselves also faced with the challenge in their personal lives. The report of
the International Commission on Education for the twenty-first century, or better known as the Delors Report has
identified seven issues that threaten humanity with direct implication on the values , namely: the
conflict between the global-local, universal-individual, traditional-modern, short-term and the
long term consideration, competition-cooperation, expansion of knowledge expansion-
assimilation skill, and the spiritual-material.
No matter what theory you ascribe to, unipolar hegemony creates continual
conflict and nuclear proliferation
Monteiro 12 (Nuno, Assistant professor in political science at Yale university, “Unrest assured:
why unipolarity is not peaceful”
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064) EEG
This article has laid out a theory of unipolarity that accounts for how a
unipolar structure of the international
system provides significant incentives for conflict. In doing so, my argument corrects an important
problem with extant research on unipolarity—the absence of scholarship questioning William
Wohlforth’s view that a unipolar world is peaceful. In this respect, Wohlforth’s words ring as true of extant
scholarship today as they did in 1999: “When balance-of-power theorists argue that the post–Cold War world is headed toward
conºict, they are not claiming that unipolarity causes conºict. Rather, they are claiming that
unipolarity leads quickly to bi- or multipolarity. It is not unipolarity’s peace but its durability that
is in dispute.”112 Not anymore. International Security 36:3 36 108. Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath, p. 195. 109. Niall
Ferguson, “A World without Power,” Foreign Policy, No. 143 (July/August 2004), p. 34. 110. Lieber, The American Era, p. 53. 111. See
Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Paciªer,” Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 1986); and John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56. 112. Wohlforth, “The
Stability of a Unipolar World,” p. 24. It is not that the core of Wohlforth’s widely shared argument is wrong, however: great
power conºict is impossible in a unipolar world. Rather, his claim
that unipolarity is peaceful has two important
limitations. First, it focuses on great powers. But because unipolarity prevents the aggregation of conºicts involving
major and minor powers into conºict between great powers, scholars must look beyond great power interactions
when analyzing the structural incentives for war . Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole’s
only reasonable strategic option is defensive dominance. But given that unipolarity provides the
unipole with ample room for deªning its foreign policy, offensive dominance and disengagement
are equally plausible strategies. This requires a look at how these two additional strategies facilitate
conºict. After correcting for these two limitations, it becomes clear that unipolarity possesses much potential for
conºict. Contrary to what Wohlforth argued, unipolarity is not a system in which the unipole is spared
from any conºicts and major powers become involved only in peripheral wars. Instead, a unipolar
system is one that provides incentives for recurrent wars between the sole great power and
recalcitrant minor powers, as well as occasional wars among major and minor powers. That is the central prediction of my
theory. To be sure, the unique historical character of the current unipolar era makes the task of building a
general theory of unipolarity difªcult . Particularly, it requires great care in distinguishing between those features of the
post–Cold War world that are intrinsic to a unipolar system and those that stem from speciªc aspects of contemporary international
politics. Two points deserve mention. First, my theory of conºict in unipolarity is robust to changes in military technology. Still, some
such changes would mean the end of unipolarity. At one end of the scale, some scholars argue that the widespread possession of
equalizing technologies such as nuclear weapons would turn all minor powers into major powers and decrease the use of the
unipole’s power-projection capabilities in ways that might invalidate the label of unipolarity.113 At the other end of the scale,
should the unipole develop a splendid ªrst-strike capability against all other states—an unlikely prospect, no doubt—its relative
power would increase, perhaps replacing anarchy with hegemony.114 Both of these developments would mean that my theory no
longer applies. Second, my argument is robust to changes in the geographical conªguration of the distribution of power. Were a
future unipolar era to feature a continent Unrest Assured 37 113. See Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). 114. See Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense
and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40–92. tal, rather than an
offshore, unipole, the paths to conºict described above would still apply. A continental unipole’s inability to
disengage from its neighbors might increase the proportion of conºict in which it will be
involved at the expense of conºicts between others, but the conflict-producing mechanisms would remain the same.115 From
the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the
Goldilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces
signiªcant conºict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against
recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major
powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conºict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the signiªcant level of
conºict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant. From the
narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A
unipolar structure provides no incentives for conºict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s
forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a
downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conºict beyond the unipole’s region and
increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is
between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conºicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows
conºict between others to fester. In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are
selfdefeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities
and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war
in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conºicts or result in an
increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will
be constrained.117 International Security 36:3 38 115. In this sense , the current unipolar world is a hard case for
the components of my theory that deal with strategies of dominance. The United States, as an
offshore unipole, can more easily disengage from most of the world’s regions. Still, despite
enjoying this privileged position, the United States has been involved in signiªcant conºict. See Jack
S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International
Security, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. 7–43. 116. See Richard Rosecrance, “Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conºict: The
‘Goldilocks Problem’ in International Strategy: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 145–163.
117. On how a nuclearized world would constrain the unipole, see Campbell Craig, “American This last point highlights one of the
crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the beneªts of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that
the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that
states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status
quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor
powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited
pacifying effects of U.S. power. What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great
power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm— unipolarity
does not give the unipole greater inºuence over international outcomes .118 If unipolarity
provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the
seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modiªcation.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain
of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend
friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations,
but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower.... In any event, the polarity of the
system may become less important.”120 At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level
of conºict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the
unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or
militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major
powers and the magnitude of the conºicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a
theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conºict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system. Finally, my
argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By Unrest Assured 39 Power Preponderance and the Nuclear
Revolution,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35 (January 2009), pp. 27–44. 118. See Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and
Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 121–154; and
Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” pp. 86–120. 119. Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” p. 213. 120. Ibid., pp. 212–213,
footnote omitted from the original text. 121. At least two other paradoxes stemming from power preponderance have been
highlighted in the literature. First, Joseph S. Nye Jr. ªnds it
is paradoxical that the United States, though a
unipole, putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the
unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being
involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—
restraining it all the same.122 Paradoxically, then, more
relative power does not necessarily lead to greater
inºuence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect,
unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint.
Focusing on Violence as a result of past history and circumstances leads to a

stigmatization of all peoples under the same circumstances leading to racist and
classist oppression. It also allows for violence to continue through a neglect of
personal agency.
Kappeler 1995 (Susanne, Freelance writer former associate professor at the
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, Page 2-3) AK
While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful place in a court of law trying (and'defending) an
offender, , this does not automatically make it an adequate or sufficient practice for political analysis . It
begs the question, in particular, 'What is considered to be part of the circumstances (and by whom)?' Thus thus in the case of
sexual offenders, there is a routine search — on the part of the tabloid press or the professionals of violence — for
experiences of violence in the offender’s own past, an understanding which is rapidly solidifying in the
scientific model of a 'cycle of violence'. That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant past and in other contexts
of action, while a crucial factor in the present context is ignored, namely the agent's decision to act as
he did.
Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have
tried to
explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians
have explained the violence of Black men as the result of racist oppression . The ostensible aim of
these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism
and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it .
Although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these 'explanations'
ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence , that is, that these
circumstances do not 'cause' violent behaviour . They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator
has decided to violate, even if this decision was made in circumstances of limited choice.
To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular interests. In the first
instance it serves to exonerate[s] the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to
circumstances and a history for which other people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps to
stigmatize[s] all those living in poverty and oppression ; because they are obvious victims of
violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators themselves .1 This slanders
all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others,
and libels those experiencing racist and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence.
Far from supporting those oppressed by classist, racist or sexist oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the
interest of exonerating individual members. It is a version of collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing
entire social strata as potential hotbeds of violence , which rests on and perpetuates the mainstream division of
society into so-called marginal groups — the classic clienteles of social work and care politics (and of police repression) — and an
implied 'centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers and carers themselves belong, and which we are to assume to be a
zone of non-violence.
Peace pedagogy focuses on developing mindsets and progress to instill value to

life
Peace is the ideal state in international relations , inter-group relations between ethnic groups ,interpersonal
relationships (family and work) and intrapersonal peace for psychological and spiritual purposes. Peace in the whole
relationships is important for human health and welfar e. The review of several studies conclude that the
welfare and psychological health would be realized if the relational aspect in various levels are
integrated harmoniously [18]. Harmonious interpersonal relationships are related to health and happiness [19]. The
attitude of people in large groups affect each other whether the state encourages war or promotes peace. Peace is defined as a
condition of the individual, family, community or country that has low and high levels of violence in harmony of mutual and
beneficial relationship [20]. The context of the peace according to Anderson is within the individual (intrapersonal
peace), individuals (interpersonal peace), between social groups (social peace), in the community (civil peace), in the
state (national peace), inter-state (international peace) and with nature (natural peace), and with the ultimate reality
or God (existential peace). In the context of the theory about the level of peace developed [4], four characteristics that represent
Sundanese personality can be categorized as personal peace that is characterized by the values of self-respect, inner resources, love,
and hope. The school has a strategic position as an agent of peace and cultural development , and
teachers are a central figure, but the school principal’s support is still limited. Therefore special efforts are required [ 21]. Teacher-
centered approaches and subjects are not effective for peace education. Unlike the subjects, peace education depends on teachers'
personality. Students learn the peaceful behavior of how the teacher speaks, responds to the challenge and look at certain issues
than what the teacher taught. Teachers who are not peaceful cannot teach peace as their behavior is contrary to what they teach
[17] so it is not excessive if the pedagogy of peace is an “honorable” potential for respect for human rights [21]. Teenagers are the
main capital in building a culture of peace. Therefore, teenagers are more likely to avoid violence and may be involved in instilling a
culture of peace if given an opportunity to mutually bound and strengthening in instilling a culture of peace in a common life [ 22].
Peace pedagogy to develop a culture of peace focuses on the development of mindset instead
of micro competence. It departs from the statement “since war begins in the minds of men, it is
in the minds of men that defenses of peace must be constructed” [17]. The values of peace as local
wisdom certainly do not appear immediately, but proceed so long that eventually proved to contain
a favor for life. In this case, local knowledge in a tradition and culture is strongly attached to people's lives. That is, to a certain
extent there are perennial values that are deeply rooted in every aspect of cultural locality. T he peace spectra targeted by
this model is holistic because it has vertical (transcendent) and horizontal (instrapersonal and
interpersonal) dimensions. This is in fact the essence of education itself as a learning process that is based
on the formulation of philosophical values that every individual is able to understand the values
of truth and universal truth. Through education, each person must not only be good for itself, but should benefit the wider
society and be able to establish a good relationship with God the Creator. In this context, learning outcomes are evaluated to brush
up knowledge and behavior that is not fully in accordance with the nature of the values of truth and goodness of life which are
universally recognized [23].
Countries with less positive peace face a staggering disparity in conflict –

environmental disaster, war, death, and political turnoil – turns the aff
*could be a neg impact/reason why the alt has to come first or an aff perm that the government
should do it (except it would probably be instrinsic)
IEP 17 (Institute for Economics and Peace; “Positive peace: the lens to achieve the sustaining
peace agenda” http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/05/IPI-Positive-Peace-
Report.pdf) EEG
Conflict prevention remains caught in ambiguity, arguably as a result of competing approaches over the type of action or set of
policies that fall under its conceptual remit. Actions toward Positive Peace can however be measured, tracked and
conceptualised as an ongoing process. IEP’s analysis demonstrates that resilience is built by building
high levels of Positive Peace. It is also an effective way to reduce the potential for future
violence. Globally, Positive Peace has been improving since 2005, with 118 of the 162 countries ranked in the PPI, or 73 per cent,
having improved over this period. This largely outweighs the 44 whose PPI score deteriorated. Countries with high Positive
Peace are more likely to maintain their stability and adapt and recover from both internal and
external shocks. Low Positive Peace systems are more likely to generate internal shocks, with 84
per cent of major political shocks occurring in these countries. Similarly, there are 13 times more
lives lost from natural disasters in nations with low Positive Peace as opposed to those with high Positive
Peace, a disproportionally high number when compared to the distribution of incidents. POSITIVE PEACE | THE LENS TO
ACHIEVE THE SUSTAINING PEACE AGENDA 4 5 Violence and conflict continue to thwart efforts to meet
humanitarian goals and tackle major challenges such as climate change or poverty reduction. In
2015, the economic impact of containing or dealing with the consequences of violence was 13.3 per cent of
global GDP. Yet, in comparison, far less is devoted to supporting the underlying conditions that lead to
peace. Peacebuilding activities, for example, are a critical way in which donors and governments can
tackle the sources of violence and address the weak institutional and state capacities that
contribute to internal conflict and violence. But peacebuilding is a relatively overlooked aspect of
official development assistance (ODA). Conflict-affected countries do not represent the main beneficiaries of ODA. In 2013, they
received only slightly more than 24 percent of total ODA, or US$41 billion. These countries received US$6.8 billion for peacebuilding
activities, which represents 16 percent of their total gross ODA allocation. With
the global cost of violence reaching a
staggering $13.6 trillion in 2015, just $15 billion was spent on peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities.
This means that efforts to consolidate peace constituted a mere 0.12 per cent of the total cost
of violence. IEP has constructed a global model of peacebuilding cost-effectiveness that shows increased funding for
peacebuilding would be hugely beneficial; not only to peacebuilding outcomes but in terms of the potential economic returns to the
global economy. Using
20 years of peacebuilding expenditure in Rwanda as a guide for establishing a unit cost, IEP
estimates the cost-effectiveness ratio of peacebuilding at 1:16. This means that if countries currently in
conflict increased or received higher levels of peacebuilding funding to appropriate levels estimated by this model, then for every
dollar invested now, the cost of conflict would be reduced by 16 dollars over the long run. The total peace dividend the international
community would reap if it increased peacebuilding commitments over the next ten years (from 2016) is US$2.94 trillion. Based on
the assumptions of this model, the estimated level of peacebuilding assistance required to achieve this outcome would be more
than double what is currently directed toward peacebuilding for the 31 most fragile and conflict affected nations of the world.
Without an understanding of the systemic nature of peace and the factors that support it, it is
impossible to determine what policies actually work and what programmes need to be implemented to support
them. International actors need new paradigms to shift the deadlock in their approaches to avert conflicts
before they break out. The combination of Positive Peace and systems thinking therefore provides a factual framework that
fosters our common understanding of the interdependent nature of peace and the sort of action required to sustain it. Source:
EMDAT, INSCR, Reinhart and Rogo, UCDP, IEP 164 253 349 358 61 38 70 20 18 17 6 5 4 2 2 0 1 2 0 0 Infrastructure Accident
(2005−2015) Economic Shock Onset (2005−2010) Political Shock Onset (2005−2014) Violent Conflict Onset (2005−2014) Genocide
Onset (2005−2014) Very high High Medium Low POSITIVE PEACE 0% 20% 40% 60% Percentage of total incidents DISTRIBUTION OF
ENDOGENOUS SHOCKS, 2005-2015 Lower Positive Peace countries experience more industrial and
political shocks while higher Positive Peace countries suer more economic shocks. TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM
NATURAL DISASTERS, 2005-2015 More people are killed by natural disasters in low Positive Peace
countries than high Positive Peace countries. POSITIVE PEACE LEVELS 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 Very
high High Medium Low NUMBER OF FATALITIES FROM NATURAL DISASTERS 2005-2015 Source: EMDAT, IEP POSITIVE PEACE | THE
LENS TO ACHIEVE THE SUSTAINING PEACE AGENDA 6 BOX 1 POSITIVE PEACE AND THE SDGs Beyond Goal 16, there are other aspects
of the SDGs that are related to the drivers of peace. The SDGs are integrated, interlinked and universal, working together to bring
about development outcomes. Goal 16 cannot be separated from the other goals, and, like Positive Peace, it does not apply only to
conflict-affected countries. The bar graph below shows the relationship between the SDGs and Positive Peace. It demonstrates that
there is an unequal distribution of Positive Peace factors among the SDGs. Eighty-five per cent of the SDGs have relevance to at least
two Positive Peace factors. The single factor lacking in significant coverage for the SDGs is corruption. All of the SDGs will be more
achievable with lower levels of corruption. COVERAGE OF POSITIVE PEACE FACTORS IN SDG TARGETS Source: IEP Of the 169 targets
in the SDGs, 85% are relevant to at least two Positive Peace factors. Low levels of corruption is only relevant to three targets. 95 86
71 62 59 56 25 3 Well-functioning government High levels of human capital Acceptance of the rights of others Equitable distribution
of resources Sound business environment Good relations with neighbours Free flow of information Low levels of corruption Number
of targets relevant; Positive Peace is key to preventing conflict and reinforcing development through Goal
16, the SDGs recognise the long reaching consequences of violent conflict for development outcomes. Not
only is violence a
severe hindrance for development, it can reverse many years of development gains as well as
reducing foreign direct investment, education, life expectancy and poverty. Conflict has prevented many
countries from reaching their development goals. Losses from conflict in 2015 were estimated to be nearly
US$742 billion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. As conflict impacts the economy in the immediate term, potentially
destroying entire industries, the impact of conflict is also long term , reducing future development opportunities.
These fragile and conflict-affected countries achieved significantly less progress than other developing countries in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). On average, only 16 per cent of these countries met or made progress on their MDGs targets.
When we demarcate ourselves as different than the other violence is

inevitable.
It is often argued in the context of democratic relationships that a person who is coerced neither
physically nor through a structural inequality is therefore free to consent. This misses the crucial
point, namely the question of the political behaviour of the subject (ourselves), to whose
implicit or explicit proposals the other is invited to consent. If we are concerned about relations
of equality, the question of our own behaviour cannot depend on how the other respon[se]ds —
whether the other objects to it or lets it pass. The question is whether I am willing to exercise
violence, including the violence of arrogant perception, thus to manipulate the other's situation
and hence the other person. Violence does not just become violence if the other puts up
resistance, nor does it cease to be violence if the other fails to object. The demand prevalent in
social usage today that the other must stand up for her rights, that the other must 'draw her
boundaries', that is, put limits on my behaviour, is an attempt to devolve the responsibility for
my behaviour upon the potential victim of my behaviour, and to use the other's lack of
resistance as a legitimation of my violence.
As the critics of slavery and colonialism have shown, and Kathleen Barry has analysed in relation
to the sexual enslavement of women, the ultimate goal in the establishment of a relation of
violence and slavery is to be able to exercise mastery without needing to employ direct force -
to break the will and resistance of the oppressed to such an extent that they obey 'voluntarily'.
As Marilyn Frye explicates,
A system which relies heavily on physical restriction both presupposes and generates resistance
and attempts to escape. These in turn exacerbate the need for bondage and containment . . .
Efficient exploitation of 'human resources' requires that the structures that refer the other's
actions to the exploiter's ends must extend beneath the victim's skin."2
Where the interest in the profit of exploitation exceeds the interest in violence as such, cost-
effectiveness and saving expenses become the rationale. What the violent systems of slavery
and colonialism eventually employed in addition to direct military and physical force, namely the
ideological subjugation and inculcation of the subjected through the culture of the subjectors,
becomes the primary means in political systems — including democratic relationships - which
are obliged to renounce physical force. In either case, the aim is to weaken and ultimately
dissolve the resistance of the subjected, so that 'the exploited are oriented ... to the exploiter's
ends rather than, as they would otherwise be, to ends of their own.'23 Breaking their will —
disengaging it 'from the projects of resistance and escape' and effecting an 'attachment to the
interests of the exploiters' — means to transform a relation of conflicting interests into a system
with but one — the dominant - interest. One might hesitate in this context to call it a 'shared'
interest, for as Frye sums up, 'This radical solution can properly be called enslavement.'24 We
are familiar with this solution in the context of marriage, where ideologizing interpretations do
not see two parties with interests of their own, but unification into a party of one.
While the democratic relationship, of course, fundamentally differs from systems of slavery,
colonialism or sexual enslavement - physical force in particular having (theoretically) no part in it
- we might none the less say that it (and democracy in general) constitutes a historically new
and almost inverse situation: while slavery, conquest and occupation begin with violent physical
subjection, followed by ideological subjugation, "Western society today presents a situation
where slavery, serfdom and colonialism are theoretically abolished and direct physical violence
is officially outlawed, yet where the ideological subjugation of people, their inculcation with the
values of dominance and mastery, seems well-nigh complete. Individuals of'equal rights'
encounter one another with interests and values corresponding to those of slaveholders,
conquistadores, colonialists and husbands, without even first needing to reorient their potential
victims to these values. The values of mastery and the interest in domination are not in
question, only who will manage to assert these more successfully or how they may be evenly
shared. For the culture that constitutes the ideological framework of our 'private' interpersonal
relationships is a culture which celebrates mastery as 'democracy', and the individual's claims to
power as universal 'freedom' and 'human rights'.
Accordingly, violence in the democratic relationship shifts to a power struggle of perception: the
struggle to assert one's own perception as the 'common' perception, one's own interests as the
'shared' interests of the relationship. It begins with the mutual perception of each other as
exploitable and usable for one's own needs, that is, as candidate for a 'relationship': supplier of
satisfaction, minister of care, and generally as material for realizing my relationship and my
interests. There is violence in the intention to commit the other to a frame of guaranteed
mutual trade and to design interactions as debit and credit, considering neither one's own nor
the other's actions as actions, but as sequences in a trade exchange. It is the violence of the
arrogant perceiver not to see the other on principle as independent and 'indifferent', but as
'interested' in common trade and mutual exploitation, that is, mutual prostitution.
Violence solves nothing and perpetuates a cycle of suffering – empirics prove

Jackson 17
(Richard Jackson is Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NCPACS). He is
the founding editor and current editor-in-chief of the journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism.
“Pacifism and the ethical imagination in IR” Dec 12 2017
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-017-0137-6 ) JP
The pacifist critique of violence
As a starting point for developing an alternative ethical approach, pacifism offers a more
realistic, critical understanding of the nature, consequences, and limits of violence as an
instrument of politics or protection. Here, as Howes (2013, p. 433) notes, the pacifist argument
that violence rarely works to achieve its strategic and normative aims is supported by the
‘gathering evidence for the ineffectiveness of violence in a variety of empirical literatures’,
including the studies which show that states with greater material capabilities are no more likely
to win wars than those with weaker capabilities (Biddle 2004), and the studies which question
the effectiveness of torture (Rejali 2009) and drone killings (Calhoun 2015) to reduce terrorism.
To Howes’ list, we can add: the studies which show how infrequently armed insurgencies
achieve their goals (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011); the empirical studies which show how
ineffective both terrorism (Abrahms 2006) and violent forms of counterterrorism (Argomaniz
and Vidal-Diez 2015) are; the studies which show that violent state repression (Anisin 2016) of
popular protest is ineffective; the studies which show the failure of employing violence as a
means of protecting civilians by armed groups in situations of war or repression (Wallace 2016);
and the studies which show how previous political violence is a predictor of future bouts of
political violence (Anderton and Ryan 2016; Walter 2004)—among others.
Certainly, we only have to contemplate the recent historical record of military violence—in
Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, among many
others—to see how rarely it works, how unpredictable are its consequences, and how the
application of increasing force and the achievement of political success bears no direct relation.
Even in those rare cases where a clear-cut military victory was achieved, it has rarely translated
into a strategic victory (Wallace 2016; English 2013). That is, even when actors won decisively on
the battlefield, they most often failed to achieve the broader political (and certainly normative)
aims for which the war was waged in the first place. In the end, Howes (2013, p. 438) suggests
that in believing that violence can be an effective policy tool, ‘[t]he weight of extensive empirical
evidence demonstrates that the practitioners of violence are more often the tragic idealists than
are pacifists’.
Pacifist (and other) theorists explain the failure of violence by noting, among others, how
proponents of violence often misunderstand and confuse the relationship between violence,
force, and power, particularly the relationship between brute force and coercion (see
Holmes 2013, p. 185; May 2015, pp. 49–52)—and how the effectiveness of violence to deter or
compel depends entirely on how people respond to the violence, not the violence itself. That is,
the capacity to destroy bears no direct relation to the ability to coerce (Wallace 2016); the
application of violence can provoke either deterrence or retaliation, intimidation or rage,
submission or resistance, and the desired response can never be assured. This explains why
proponents of violence often mistake the reliability of violence as a political tool, even when it is
employed for a normative good such as civilian protection. As Howes (2013, p. 436) puts it,
Arendt’s theory of action demonstrates that violence is not as reliable as is often assumed.
Killing people does not have predictable political results because it operates in the ‘somewhat
intangible’ ‘“web” of human relations’ which makes it difficult to know what meanings people
will assign to it or what actions they will take in response to it.
An important implication of this is that while violence can always achieve immediate things like
dead bodies, screams, pain, suffering, and material destruction and will sometimes achieve
certain short-term goals like the destruction of an enemy’s means to fight, its longer-term
effects are by virtue of its constitutive and world-shattering nature, unpredictable
(Wallace 2016) and virtually always ends-destroying. Thus, it is more likely that in employing
violence to protect a group of innocent people in the present, for example, the long-term effects
will be to reinforce the discourses and psychological mechanisms that encourage future resorts
to violence and the entrenchment of an ongoing cycle of violence, thus perpetuating rather than
relieving the suffering of the innocent. This follows Arendt’s observation that ‘[t]he practice of
violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent
world’ (Arendt 1970, p. 80).
Somewhat related to this, and directly following Arendt, Vinthagen explains how power and
violence are analytically distinct, given that violence is unilateral action, whereas power is by
definition relational and operates through the approval of the subordinate.5 He goes on to
suggest that as a consequence, ‘the most extreme result of violence—the killing of a human
being—is something that ensures that there will never again be subordination within that
relationship. Killing results in an absolute absence of power. In fact, violence is a… failure of
power’ (2015, pp. 193–194).
More generally, pacifist theory points to the often misunderstood performative, message-
sending aspect of violence—how it requires a broader discourse to make it both possible in the
first place (Jackson and Dexter 2014) and meaningful to its perpetrators and its audience. In
part, this is because physical violence is a brutal, incomprehensible, traumatic, world-shattering
experience which is devoid of meaning in its material experience (see Wallace 2016;
Scarry 1985). And because ‘violence without meaning is unbearable’ (Wallace 2016), it requires
tremendous discursive effort to legitimise, obscure, or aestheticise its sheer brutality and
highlight instead its positive, redemptive, or least legitimate dimensions. Pacifist and other
theorists (including Clausewitz) also highlight the psychological dimensions of violence in terms
of its inherent escalatory and mimetic processes—which is, in part, the result of the emotional
reaction which arises in the victims and witnesses of violence who perceive its brute material
horror.
Most importantly, in keeping with basic social theory, pacifist theorists point out that violence is
never purely instrumental, but rather is constitutive of identities, ethics, and social and political
practices. As Frazer and Hutchings (2008, p. 104) put it, the idea that violence can be employed
instrumentally as a tool ‘misses the link between violence as doing and violence as being’,
especially ‘when we take into account that our bodies themselves are prime instruments of
violence’. They conclude that ‘violence is not actually very much like a tool at all’. Apart from its
embodied character, at the very least, political violence constitutes society through the
institutionalisation of the war system, and the normalisation of the resort to violence as an
essential part of politics. More prosaically, the use of violence, particularly in its justificatory
dimension, is constitutive of identities of friend and enemy, victim and perpetrator, and
grievable and ungrievable lives (see Butler 2004).
Violence leads to cascading risks – turns any of their impacts

Woods 18
(Mark Woods is a professor of philosophy at the University of San Diego. He is the author of the
book Rethinking Wilderness (Broadview, 2017) as well as numerous articles in the field of
environmental philosophy and the field of the ethics of war and peace. 21 Feb 2018, “Ecology
and Pacifism from: The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence Routledge”
https://www-routledgehandbooks-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.4324/9781315638751) JP
Perhaps the clearest link between ecology and nonviolence is what Randall Amster (2015) has
called peace ecology or what Martin Ceadel (1987) identifies as ecological pacifism. Ecological
pacifism is a moral opposition to wars and armed conflicts grounded in ecological
considerations. Michael Fox (2014: 122–125) develops an anti-war argument along these lines.
He argues that because the fates of Homo sapiens and other species are interrelated, we have
moral obligations to nonhumans. War makes it difficult to fulfill these obligations, and we thus
have a moral obligation to oppose war. This should make us ecological pacifists. It is not difficult
to see why one might be an ecological pacifist. There are many negative environmental impacts
of conventional military forces at war and at peace (Cahill 1995; Biswas 2000; Fidler 2000;
Leaning 2000; McNeely 2000; Woods 2007a; Machlis and Hanson 2008). Consider the following:
(1) defoliation, deforestation, degradation, and destruction of natural areas, (2) killing (direct
and collateral) of animals and plants and habitat loss, (3) surface water and groundwater
contamination, (4) crater formation and the compaction, contamination, and erosion of soils by
bombs, missiles, and military vehicles and their hazardous and toxic residues, (5) various forms
of land pollution such as garbage dumps, latrines, land mines, and unexploded ordnance, (6) air
pollution and atmospheric emissions of CO2 and NOX, (7) use of highintensity sonar that can
lead to erratic behavior, internal tissue damage, and death of cetaceans, and (8) noise of 140
decibels or more from low-flying aircraft and weapons that can lead to long-term hearing
impairment in people and animals. Following armed conflicts, there can be further
environmental harms for people, such as (1) damage and destruction of croplands, marine
fisheries, and pasturage and the resulting loss of agricultural products and other foodstuffs, (2)
damage and destruction of water storage and distribution systems, waste and wastewater
treatment facilities, and sewer systems, and (3) damage and destruction of human structures
such as buildings and power grid systems. These kinds of environmental harms in turn can lead
to wider impacts such as the following: (1) disruption or destruction of economic and social
infrastructures, (2) dislocation of human populations, and (3) creation of new opportunities for
the spread of infectious diseases. Following the end of armed conflicts, there can be further
Downloaded By: University of Michigan At: 19:43 12 Jul 2019; For: 9781315638751, chapter28,
10.4324/9781315638751-29 Mark Woods 332 negative impacts as people expand from
damaged and destroyed areas into undamaged natural areas and waterscapes (Hart and Hart
2003). As pacifists such as Duane Cady and Robert Holmes point out, wars do not operate in
isolation: wars necessitate and are preceded by extensive war systems that have numerous
impacts (Cady 1989; Holmes 1989). Asit Biswas estimates that worldwide military use accounts
for about 6% of global petroleum consumption, 8% of global lead use, 9% of global iron
consumption, and 11% of global copper consumption. He notes that the total energy use by
militaries in wartime can increase by factors of five to twenty times over peacetime levels of use
(Biswas 2000). Gary Machlis and Thor Hanson estimate that war preparations during peacetime
utilize up to fifteen million square kilometers and that militaries at peace produce as much as 10
percent of all global CO2 emissions (Machlis and Hanson 2008). It is estimated that US military
consumption of oil for combat operations in Iraq in 2008 alone was the equivalent of
approximately 1,210,000 cars on the road in the US of that year (Watson Institute 2015). As Joni
Seager provocatively claims, military forces are “privileged vandals” (Seager 1999: 163).
Examples of the environmental impacts of non-conventional military weapons include the
nuclear winter effects of a thermonuclear war during the Cold War between the US and the
Soviet Union (Harwell 1984; Dotto 1986), defoliant use of Agent Orange by the US in the Second
Indochina War (Westing 1984; Hay 2000), oil fires and oil pollution of the 1991 Persian Gulf War
(El-Baz and Makharita 1994; Omar et al. 2000), and use of depleted uranium during the 1991
Persian Gulf War (Rostker 2002; Giannardi and Dominici 2003) and in subsequent conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, this list will probably grow. How might an ecological
pacifist champion protecting the environment from the ravages of military activities and armed
conflicts? One possible way might be to build environmental constraints into military thinking
itself via the just war tradition. While ecological pacifism certainly stands in contrast to just war
thinking, an ecological pacifist might consider turning just war thinking against itself in order to
protect the environment. How might this be done? A number of just war philosophers have
attempted to build environmental considerations directly into just war thinking. Merrit Drucker
uses the jus in bello (justice in war) principle of distinction—noncombatant immunity—to
protect the environment. The environment is a noncombatant because, like other
noncombatants, it poses no direct threat to combatants, and, unlike combatants, it has no
choice to be involved with fighting. Drucker also claims that the environment is similar to
noncombatants such as chaplains and medical personnel who do not fight and instead nurture
and heal people. He argues that the environment has inherent worth because species have
inherent worth (Drucker 1989). Gregory Reichberg and Henrik Syse combine the jus in bello
principles of proportionality and discrimination to champion protection of the environment. In
relation to projected military gains, environmental destruction can destabilize ecosystems and
have severe, negative, and long-term environmental consequences and thus violate
proportionality—especially given that many environmental impacts will likely outlast military
campaigns—and be indiscriminate because environmental destruction often destroys natural
resources upon which civilians depend. As the environment for Reichberg and Syse consists of
natural resources for human use, ecosystems, and natural objects, their environmental ethic is
neither exclusively anthropocentric (human-centered) nor nonanthropocentric (non-human-
centered); they argue that the ethic stems from the claim that people have duties toward nature
as per the stewardship tradition of St.Thomas Aquinas (Reichberg and Syse 2000).
Alternative
Positive Peace
Focusing on discussions of positive peace rather than the aff’s focus of negative
peace is key to conflict transformation, which encourages all levels of society to
alleviate the structures that breed violence
EEG
In his article “The Evolution of Conflict Resolution,” Louis Kriesberg (2009) points out that throughthe 1980s, the conflict
resolution field was largely characterized by the general dominance of a negative peace framing
(a focus on ending wars, overt violence). In the late 1980s and 1990s, a gradual transition took
place that oriented the field toward a positive peace approach. John Paul Lederach was one of the most
consistent voices for a reconceptualization toward positive peace (Lederach, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2005). This
reconceptualization, in turn, led to a shift in terms from conflict resolution to conflict transformation
and eventually to peacebuilding. This shift has even impacted key public organizations such as
the United Nations, which in 2005, first institutionalized a peacebuilding structure alongside its
more traditional structures for peacekeeping (Jenkins, 2013). It also can be seen in very recent attempts to
develop an index of positive peace that measures elements such as a well functioning government,
equitable distribution of resources and acceptance of the rights of others (IEP, 2015). Lederach (1995)
identified conflict resolution as a dominant term that, perhaps unintentionally, “carries the connotation
of a bias toward ‘ending’ a given crisis or at least its outward expression, without being sufficiently
concerned with the deeper structural, cultural, and long-term relational aspects of conflict ”
(Lederach, 1995, p. 201). The conflict resolution field often emphasized the role of neutral third-parties in helping conflict
participants to listen to each other, to identify interests rather than simply positions as a way of finding win-win solutions (Fisher et
al., 2011), and on reaching agreements between key leaders (Kriesberg, 2009). Conflict
transformation emerged as an
alternative term, one that according to Botes (2003) is distinguished by a need to identify and mitigate
root causes, to engage multiple levels of society (not just elites), to work in social, political, and even
spiritual contexts and to track the important role of unequal power in conflicts, sometimes requiring
peacebuilders to set parties on equal footing before negotiating a resolution to the conflict. Subsequent theorists, including
Lederach in later writings, argued that these commitments require a further shift to developing models of
strategic peacebuilding with the goal of building a just peace—one where people within a
society are able to participate in shaping systems that meet their needs (Schirch, 2004). These efforts
require a core of cultivated skill sets that are shared with traditional conflict resolution efforts: active listening, problem-solving,
dialogue, negotiation, and mediation skills. Additionally, peacebuilding emphasizes a wider range of mind and skill sets—trauma
awareness; appreciative inquiry skills that seek to identify strengths and successes even within highly conflictual settings; and self-
reflection and cultural competency skills that allow practitioners to understand their own biases and
cultural frames and account for these as they work with others (Schirch, 2004).
Positive peace is net better than negative peace – discussions of it are reflexive
and have an impact on anyone that listens, it is cross-cultural, and turning to
positive peace is a prerequisite to government engagement
EEG
In summary, then, four qualities of positive peace stand out (see Table 1). First, positivepeace is more nuanced and
addresses more dimensions of a society at peace than the more familiar and frequently used
dichotomous negative peace. Second, in that the added POSITIVE PEACE & PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 65 dimensions can
exist in tension with each other (maintenance of order/status quo vs. increased justice/need for change ), positive peace is
an essentially contested concept and the ideal balance between dimensions is contextual. Third,
positive peace is inherently relational and reflexive meaning that no observer is completely
uninvolved personally. Any person asking what a peaceful outcome is in a specific context can only
answer the question in light of the perspective of a range of stakeholders and the person
seeking a peaceful outcome, in listening to others, is necessarily to be impacted and implicated personally.
Finally, though conceptions of it are influenced by culture, because peace is a concept long sought in diverse
societies, no one culture holds the patent on positive peace. This means that discussions of the
essentially contested concept of peace require surfacing the culture-specific elements of the concept.
With these qualities of positive peace firmly in mind, we can now examine the role that peace could play as a
unifying high-level normative goal in public administration. But as we turn in this direction, we first want to
highlight the connection of positive peace to early pioneers in public administration and note specific instances of resonance within
current Public Administration thought. We owe much of our current awareness of the historical importance of peace to public
administration in the progressive era to Camilla Stivers. In Bureau Men and Settlement Women, Stivers (2000) began to recover the
contributions of settlement women and municipal housekeeping as an important component of PA history. The connection between
the peace movement and leaders of the settlement movement is more direct. Jane Addams was a prominent leader in both spheres.
In addition, settlement leaders such as Florence Kelley, Julia Lathrop, Sophonisba Breckinridge, and Lillian Wald actively engaged in
the peace movement (Marchand, 1972). TABLE 1 Limitations of Negative Peace Limitations of negative peace Qualities of positive/
just peace Key concept from peace studies Resonance within PA Binary (no war ¼ peace) Multidimensional (multisector; multilevel;
root causes as well as symptoms) Conflict transformation/ peacebuilding as ongoing processes Social equity, peaceweaving Short run
perspective (peace at all costs) Essentially contested; justice vs. order Just peace Value pluralism Ignores relationships (between
individuals and communities) Celebrates human connection— inherently relational and interdependent ubuntu/shalom Ethic of
relationship, municipal housekeeping Assumed universality privileges dominant culture Found in all cultures so essential
contestedness requires discourse Peace as shared but uniquely culturally informed concept Efforts to globalize discipline 66 RISSLER
& SHIELDS Municipal Housekeeping called for a new conceptualization of the city , one modeled after the
home. A city should care for citizens, attending to basic needs like cleanliness, activities for children, and safety.
Clean water, effective sewers, playgrounds, and meat free of contaminants were all policies
advocated by the municipal household movement. Women were responsible for these functions
in the home and recognized their importance in cities because it was their job to care for the family. The
women of the peace movement took this logic and claimed war was harmful to women and
children yet the voices of women and children were missing from decisions to go to war and
peace negotiations (Shields, 2017a). As a result, women and children suffered, much like they did in
the dirty, corrupt cities of the period. Jane Addams in Newer Ideals of Peace (1907/2007) made the link between
municipal government and peace explicit. Other evidence exists of the strong linkages between the peace movement and public
administration of that period. Public administration scholars have long noted the importance of the New York Bureau of Municipal
Research to the field. Andrew Carnegie, who initially funded the Bureau, and early Bureau board members such as Albert Shaw,
Henry Pritchett, and Frank Vanderlip were active in the peace movement (Stivers, 2000; Marchand, 1972). Roland Marchand (1972)
one of the leading historians of the Progressive Era’s (1898–1918) peace movement, characterized its origin as “genteel
mugwumpery” (p. ix). The Mugwumps refers to an early group of reformers whose actions brought civil service reform to the federal
government through the 1883 Pendleton Act. Much like the reformers of public administration, peace advocates were upper-class
citizens concerned with the application of science and efficiency. These leaders of business and industry argued that war was bad for
business—it was inefficient. In addition, the benefits of science should be applied to the study of peace (Marchand, 1972). However,
the link between early public administration and the peace movement would soon be severed. The onset of the First World War and
the Sedition Act of 1918 buried the active peace movement by painting peace activists as enemy sympathizers (Stone, 2004). The
success of organization and management principles in the war effort of the Second World War further cemented public
administration as a function of supporting the political course of an elected government rather than a mission of building peace
domestically and internationally (Hitch & McKean, 1960). Some degree of resonance between the two areas reemerged in the
movement to consider equity in public administration (Frederickson, 2005; Wooldridge & Gooden, 2009). The focus along socially
relevant demarcation lines like gender, race, and class echoes the evolution of peace theory to include a broader and more diverse
range of stakeholders in defining problems and seeking solutions. More recently, Spicer’s (2010) call
for a value pluralist
perspective and an accompanying appreciation for politics as a process for surfacing and
transforming conflicts over competing values aligns with the necessity of recognizing positive
peace as essentially contested as a concept, but also an opportunity for surfacing competing
values and creating contextualized priorities among them. Similar to the central importance of relationships
found in concepts like ubuntu and Addams’s peaceweaving, Harmon and McSwite argue that an “ethic of relationship”
requires participants to recognize “that people are not whole when they are existing as
individuals.” (Harmon & McSwite, 2011, 234). Likewise, Farmer calls for “authentic hesitation” in making justice POSITIVE PEACE
& PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 67 claims, a position that allows simultaneous recognition and respect of other’s claims (2005, p. 104).
This call, alongside others for public administration to adapt to an increasingly multicultural and globalized context (Hou, 2010;
Klinger, 2015), also echoes the nature of positive peace as a key goal in every culture. These points of
resonance inform the ensuing discussion of how positive peace may be more concretely helpful for public administration theory and
practice.
Positive peacebuilding can help fill the gap in social equity to work towards a
better society
EEG
Similar to peace, social equity has been called “an ideal judged frequently by its absence or
shortcomings, rather than its presence or achievements” (Wooldridge & Gooden, 2009, p. 222). And like the
expansion of scope and depth described above in the conceptual move from conflict resolution to peacebuilding, the argument
for social equity, as Gooden writes, recognizes “the historical, political, social and economic
influences that structurally influence the prospects of access, opportunity, and outcomes ”
(Gooden, 2015, p. 213). In short, social equity recognizes the challenge for society of recovering from relationships that are broken
and unjust not just at a personal level, but at a structural and societal level and in ways that pay attention to inequalities of power.
Confronting this challenge is not easy or something that can be solved with a standard procedure.
Where standard procedure may be inadequate, peacebuilding skillsets can fill the gap in regards to social
equity work and engaging a range of stakeholders . Gooden (2014) illuminates how historical and present
racial inequality makes governments nervous at the individual and organizational level about engaging in
conversations about the topic and efforts to reduce inequality. Too often, these conversations do not occur
because there is an overarching context of discomfort, apprehension, and fear—all attributes of nervousness … if race is not
discussed by individual public administrators within an agency, analyzing and improving racial equity in the delivery of public services
is unlikely to occur. (Gooden, 2014, p. 55) Such “nervousness” around an emotional and historically freighted idea is not unexpected:
conflict avoidance is a frequent human tendency even when the highly charged issue of race is not the focus of discussion.
Peacebuilding studies focus significant time on training students to facilitate often difficult or
uncomfortable conversations. In doing so, programs often emphasize two broad areas of
competence. First, students practice developing a nonanxious presence in the midst of facilitating
conflict. Second, they learn a number of techniques and strategies for structuring conversations for
productive learning rather than polarization . This can include techniques like a fishbowl exercise (e.g., Kraybill &
Wright, 2006) where part of the group (sometimes a group with less structural power or a minority identity) is explicitly invited to
share within an inner circle, and the rest of the group is seated in an outer circle and explicitly charged with listening (not
responding). Often the groups then switch places so that all have a chance to speak, but the structure of the conversation increases
the safety of the space for the group sharing (in that they do not need to worry about immediate critiques from the outer group.)
Both of these skill sets (nonanxious presence and design techniques for productive conversations) could help public
administration practitioners reduce the nervousness around race conversations in government, making it more
likely that agencies can productively work toward greater social equity.
A nuanced understanding of peace through discussions of discource in

academic spaces like debate acknowledges our own biases and creates cultural
understanding that solves the root cause of conflict
EEG
Peace as a Global Touchstone Fourth, a

more nuanced understanding of peace is a goal found throughout
humanity’s many cultures, each with long-held wisdom on how to build and maintain it. Research has long
pointed to the way that bureaucratic cultures within the developing world are inherently
intertwined with the colonial periods of European rule and the injustices of those systems (e.g.,
Hanson, 1974; Islam, 1989). For many cultures, broad aspirations such as democracy or good governance may
be understandably suspect as broad touchstone values, in that the concepts evolved in usage with the
same colonialist structures and values (including for much of the modern period, elements of White supremacy
and patriarchy) that are now recognized as morally repugnant. Positive peace, as evidenced by efforts of researchers to
situate its insights within their own cultures (Lumeya, 2015; Murithi, 2009) and apply concepts like ubuntu to public policy (Muxe
Nkondo, 2007), may allow a conceptual discourse that is less likely to privilege Western cultural
frames of reference and male-centered conceptions of governance or require rejection by those
seeking to move beyond colonialist structures. This can be important at the level of academic or
professional discourse (does good governance mean the same thing in a small village in the Sahel as it does in Savannah,
Georgia), but also within the American context as immigration continues to diversify the variety of cultures present among residents
that local governments need to serve with professionalism. 74 RISSLER & SHIELDS Specific peacebuilding skillsets can
support productive and respectful cross-cultural discourse . Developing cross-cultural understanding is, almost
by definition, culture specific. Just as most people only master a few languages in their life-time, truly understanding a different
culture is a lengthy investment. But peacebuilders
are often trained to hold onto an acknowledgment of
what they don’t know—that a different cultural understanding may be skewing communication
and increasing the likelihood of conflict. One experiential lesson used in some peacebuilding programs is an activity
called Alphaville. Half of the students are designated as consultants and charged with interviewing residents of Alphaville (the other
half) to discover the best place to locate a new government office. The consultants are warned that Alphaville’s culture is very
specific: no one will answer an outsider’s question unless it can be answered with either yes or no. Consultants are then sent off in
pairs to strategize their questions, while the residents of Alphaville are given a further instruction about their culture: whether they
answer yes or no depends completely on whether the speaker smiles when speaking. Any question asked with a smile receives yes;
otherwise, the response is no. Invariably, the consultants return from their interviews with wildly conflicting advice on the best
location, but students are left with a clear reminder that culture can skew what seems like the simplest of responses. With
such
an authentic hesitation about whether they are understanding a communication completely,
public administrators may be better prepared to look for culture-based misunderstandings and
more inspired to invest the time needed to learn about the diverse cultures present within their
community or within the globalized discipline of public administration.
Positive conceptions of peace are key to recognizing the underlying causes of

violence and working towards social equity – the aff’s negative conception of
peace only leads to violence
EEG
We began our exploration noting that a positive conception of peace could prove crucial in recognizing
underlying causes that could stop the overt violence that we often think of as rupturing the peace in
our communities. We argued that positive peace can provide a contested concept helpful for
discussing the broad normative values within public administration that can remain unsurfaced by a focus
on intermediate values such as efficiency or professionalism. In exploring positive peace, we noted that the concept of peace
is often defined and measured in negative terms, but that this has led, ironically, to a focus on
violence, conflict, and its cessation rather than the patterns and actions that lead to a positive peace of
right relationships and justly shared prosperity (social justice and equity ). Through Lederach’s writings, we reviewed
a recent shift from negative to positive peace in the field of peacebuilding. We then highlighted places where positive peace
concepts resonate with historical and more recent voices in public administration, from Jane Addams’s peaceweaving to calls for an
ethic of relationship in public administration. We concluded by articulating several
benefits that could flow from the
greater use of positive peace within public administration, both at the conceptual and practical skillset levels.
Alt – critical engagement with positive peace at the local level to ensure
sustainable peace internationally
Dutta 16 Urmitapa Dutta is Associate Professor at the College of Fine Arts, Humanities and
Social Sciences at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. (Urmitapa Dutta, “The everyday peace
project: an innovative approach to peace pedagogy,” Journal of Peace Education”) //SN
The everyday peace framework coalesces around positive peace, human rights, conflict
transformation and critical peace education. These approaches foreground the need for both
structural and relationship change in order to advance sustainable peace. The Everyday Peace
project involves a critical engagement with the production of positive peace at the local level,
while taking into account global and transnational forces implicated in various conflicts
around the world. Thus, everyday peace is negotiated between micro- and macro-scales. Given
specific historical, political, cultural and socio-economic contingencies, communities and groups
may have varying conceptions of what local peace means to them. In order to ensure
sustainable peace in diverse, multicultural societies, the vision must be democratized. Instead
of starting with a predefined concept of peace, the Everyday Peace project involves collectively
investigating the notion of peace in a specific context and working towards an integrated vision
of what peace means to different stakeholders within that context. In other words, the vision
for everyday peace in a particular context has to be investigated, negotiated and deliberated
upon by group members.
Alt – focusing on the presence of war

Fall 1996). 42-43// SN
Emphasizing the ways in which war is a presence, a constant undertone, white noise in the
background of social existence, moving sometimes closer to the foreground of collective
consciousness in the form of direct combat yet remaining mostly as an unconsidered given,
allows for several promising analyses. To conclude, I will summarize four distinct benefits of
feminist philosophical attention to the constancy of military presence in most everyday
contemporary life. 42 Chris J. Cuomo
1) By considering the presence of war and militarism, philosophers and activists are able to
engage in a more effective, local, textured, multiplicitous discussion of specific examples and
issues of militarism, especially during "peacetime" (when most military activities occur). These
include environmental effects, such as the recent French decision to engage in nuclear testing;
and effects on conceptions of gender and on the lives of women, such as the twelve-year-old
Japanese girl who was recently raped by American soldiers stationed in Okinawa.
2) Expanding the field of vision when considering the ethical issues of war allows us to better
perceive and reflect upon the connections among various effects and causes of militarism, and
between aspects of everyday militarism and military activities that generally occur between
declarations of war and the signing of peace treaties.
3) As Robin Schott emphasizes, focusing on the presence of war is particularly necessary given
current realities of war, in an age in which military technology makes war less temporally,
conceptually, and physically bounded, and in which civil conflict, guerilla wars, ethnic wars, and
urban violence in response to worsening social conditions are the most common forms of
largescale violence.
4) Finally, to return to a point which I raised earlier, it is my hope that a more presence-based
analysis of war can be a tool for noticing and understanding other political and ethical issues
as presences, and not just events. In a recent article in The New Yorker, Henry Louis Gates
relays the following:
The alt is a pre-requisite to challenging broader structures of violence as a
whole
Grewal 03 Bajit Singh Grewal. School of Social Science, Aukland University of Technology. (“Johan Galtung:
Positive and Negative Peace”)//SN
Galtung in most of his work has sought to project positive peace as a higher ideal peace. This is
because according to Galtung, peace research shouldn’t merely deal with the narrow vision of
ending or reducing violence at a direct or structural level but seek to understand conditions for
preventing violence. For this to happen, peace and violence need to be looked at in totality at all
levels of human organization. So, inter-gender violence is no less important than inter-state
violence and positive peace promotion has to address issues of violence at all levels. This
requires an understanding of the civilisations, development, peace and conflict studied
eclectically.
Galtung (1996) suggests a typology in answer to the question, what is the cause of peace? What
is the effect of peace? The typology includes six spaces: Nature, Person, Social, World, Culture
and Time. This gives five violences: nature violence, actor or direct violence, structural or
indirect, cultural and time violence. Negative peace then is defined as the absence of violence of
all the above kinds. Positive peace includes nature peace, direct positive peace, structural
positive peace and cultural positive. Based on these Galtung comes to the conclusions that
violence and peace breed themselves and that positive peace is the best protection against
violence.
The answer to the above question can be framed thus, that positive peace is feasible according
to Galtung’s theory and that though negative peace is useful for the short term, the longer-term
remedies are only achievable with the positive peace approach. After all, prevention is the best
cure.
Pacifism acts as a critique of violence

Fall 1996). 35-36// SN
Pacifist writers as diverse as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Barbara Deming have
emphasized the fact that pacifism entails a critique of pervasive, systematic human violence.
Despite its reductionist tendencies, there is much to learn from the ways in which pacifists
conceive of war as a presence, as well as the pacifist refusal to let go of the ideal of peace.
Characterizing pacifism as motivated by the desire to avoid specific events disregards the extent
to which pacifism aims to criticize the preconditions underlying events of war. 35 Hypatia 3)
Following several influential moves in feminist philosophy, Peach rejects just-war theory's
reliance on abstraction-of the realities, or "horrors," of war; of enemies as one-dimensional evil,
killable Others; and of the ethical responses needed to address the morality of war, such as a
privileging of justice and rights over love and caring. Following Elshtain, she believes that
feminist just-war principles should be more particularized, contextualized, and individualized.
But the abstraction of the particularities of war depends on an abstraction of war itself. The
distance of such abstraction is created in part by willingness to think of war without considering
the presence of war in "peaceful" times. Wars becomes conceptual entities-objects for
consideration-rather than diverse, historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in
which they occur. In order to notice the particular and individual realities of war, attention must
be given to the particular, individual, and contextualized causes and effects of pervasive
militarism, as well as the patterns and connections among them. 4) Like other feminists, Peach
criticizes the dualisms and dichotomies that underlie war and the other evils of patriarchy,
including dichotomies between male and female, combatant and noncombatant, soldier and
citizen, ally and enemy and state and individual which have dominated just-war thinking. Rather
than relying on traditional dichotomies, a feminist application of just-war criteria should
emphasize the effects of going to war on the lives of particular individuals who would be
involved, whether soldier or civilian, enemy or ally, male or female. (Peach 1994, 166)
As should now be obvious, though Peach rejects several relevant dualistic hierarchies, a stark
ontological distinction between war and peace remains basically intact.3 Thus Peach's rejection
of dualisms is undermined by her own failure to question a stark ontological distinction between
war and peace. In considering the ways in which violence shapes women's realities, feminists
might be better served by analyses of war as part of enmeshed continua or spectra of state-
sponsored and other systemic patriarchal and racist violence.
Non-Violence
Nonviolence is key to preserving future sustainability
Colucci-Gray, Camino, Barniero and Gray 06
(Laura Colucci‐Gray University of Edinburgh Bachelor of Science; PhD, Elena
Camino Interdepartmental Research Institute on Sustainability (IRIS), Giuseppe
Barbiero Interdepartmental Research Institute on Sustainability (IRIS), Donald Gray Professor at
University of Edinburgh previously Director of Research and Interdisciplinarity in the School of
Education. From scientific literacy to sustainability literacy: An ecological framework for
education 01 Feb 2006 https://onlinelibrary-wiley-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1002/sce.20109) JP
Ecology and Equity: A Nonviolent Perspective on Sustainability Our research and our
educational activities, addressed to both teachers and students,stemmed from the
fundamentals of the natural sciences, which recognize the finiteness of our planet, and refer to
a system of values which has emerged in recent years as a result of anew sensitivity toward the
earth. This particular ethical framework emphasizes the value of the natural ecosystems as
being the necessary support system on which human beings (seen as one of the “guests”)
depend for all their needs. From this, it follows that human beings hold the responsibility of
finding peaceful ways of living in coexistence with other living things and in managing common
goods, in order to guarantee a sustainable future for allthe inhabitants of the planet. This
includes the variety of human cultures and the variety of living things that populate the different
ecosystems. In this paradigm it becomes important to develop nondestructive approaches to
dealing with conflict. Nonviolence represents one of the most articulated steps in this direction
because it proposes a method for containing the destructive potential which may be present in
every conflict situation. Moreover, it offers us some hints for assuming a rational attitude in
conditions of ignorance, with the view that our actions will still be reversible in case the choices
we made proved wrong. In the light of our previous considerations about the globalization
process and the interconnections between populations and ecosystems of the whole planet, the
view of nonviolence can support the design and implementation of our educational action in
accordance with an “ecological lit-eracy” and an “ethics of the planet.” This further
conceptualization opens new opportunities for scientific research and practices, such as studies
which recognize the monetary value of ecosystems’ services and the dimension of equity, to
those which emphasizes the spiritual dimension in the production of goods and set the basis for
a nonviolent spirit in economics:“self-interest and self-preservation demand complete
nonviolence, cooperation and sub-mission to the ways of nature if we are to maintain
permanency by non-interference with and by not short-circuiting the cycle of life” (Kumarappa,
1929, as found in Padmanabhan,1993). In the realm of cultural change, the ethics of the planet
implies a recognition of the relational context between humankind and nature, in the evolution
of language, thinking,spirituality, and ethics. Complexity and Nonviolence as Educational
Values In line with findings from the cognitive sciences, our experimental data suggest that in
order to internalize the idea of complexity it can be useful to integrate the more traditional ways
of teaching science (i.e. the linear relationships of cause and effect in knowledge, sep-aration
between holders and receivers of knowledge, partition of knowledge in disciplines etc.) with
direct experience of complexity, as for example:– the study of complex issues (i.e.
controversial issues);– the use of complex teaching methods (simulations, group discussions,
debates);– the involvement of different levels of personal development (the cognitive aspects
as well as the feelings, values, opinions, dreams, aspirations and so on). Complexity can be
introduced within the school context at different levels: the object of the study, the processes as
well as the aims and purposes of the learning process. This can be of great usefulness for
reducing the gap, which both teachers, students, and educators perceive as problematic,
between the world of the school, which is presented as “neutral,”“simple” and foreign to the
reality of things, and the life outside, which is full of stimulation but where we often find
ourselves lost and without the necessary tools for understanding and acting. The classroom is
in itself a good example of a complex system consisting of people with interests, abilities,
and values, all very different from each other. Many traditional teaching practices tend to
simplify this system, in an artificial way, and so miss the opportunity to realize its full potential:
the top – down lecture is carried out at the expenses of the interaction amongst peers, the
close-ended questioning prevents the expression of new and creative ideas, disciplinary
teaching is an obstacle to the creation of transversallinks, the emphasis on memorizing facts and
information interferes with possibilities formeta-reflection.In conclusion while there may be
different and valuable teaching and learning approaches for handling a socioscientific issue
which focus on specific learning outcomes, we believeit is important to acquire awareness of the
complexity of the teaching and learning process in its interrelated learning dimensions.
Specifically considering the ecological thinking framework, we can now ask ourselves: “What
does this say about ourselves?” How can we develop awareness of the ways in which we
perceive and interpret the world, and take part in the interaction which constitute our life?” To
this respect, the reflections presented in this article could inform further research on the
development of a rationale for assessing new competences that today’s citizens are required to
develop. In the realm of education, our reflections on the teaching and understanding of
complex and controversial issues led to a formulation of an approach to learning which
enhances our own personal enquiry about ourselves and the world. As Morin (2000) had
expressed it:we are contemporarily within and outside nature. We are at the same time cosmic,
physical,biological, cerebral and spiritual beings. We are children of the cosmos, but because of
our own humanity, of our own culture, our own mind and consciousness, we have become
foreign to this cosmos, from which we were born but which at the same time remains for us
secretly intimate.” (pp. 34 – 35)7In order to progress along this path, our further investigations
will concern the exploration of our sustainability, or how to be sustainable with and within
ourselves. For example, our research started to provide some evidence of a process of self-
reflection in the participants,as they prepared themselves to deal with conflict. However, our
experimentations weres everely constrained in their scope and impact, and further
research may be addressed to build upon the dialogical and interdisciplinary aspects of this
personal and collective investigation
Only through concrete action can nonviolence solve

Bourgeois and Wooding 16
(Janelle Bourgeois University of Massachusetts & John Wooding Emeritus Professor, Senior
Research Fellow, Acting Director 2016-17 (2016) Peace Profile: Richard Gregg,Peace Review,
28:2, 238-245, May 18 2016 https://www-tandfonline-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/10402659.2016.1166794?needAccess=true) JP
Gregg’s work made two main contributions to pacifist political thought. First, the book
established nonviolent protest as a media spectacle where Gregg argued that onlookers see the
violent assailants as “excessive and undignified—even a little ineffective.” In this way,
nonviolent protest “wins for its users the support of public opinion.” Second, and most
importantly, Gregg did not characterize nonviolence as passive resistance. Echoing Gandhi,
Gregg argued that nonviolent protest required intense training, both physical and spiritual.
Gregg repeatedly invoked martial metaphors, and indeed, argued that nonviolent protest
represented a war of its own. 242 PEACE PROFILE The book had a significant role in pacifist
politics abroad. One of his most important and telling speaking engagements occurred during
the founding of the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) in Britain. The PPU was formed in May 1936 by
Dick Sheppard, a World War I (WWI) army chaplain, committed pacifist, and charismatic leader,
who built on the vibrant pacifist movement that emerged in the United Kingdom after the
horrors of WWI. Membership of the PPU quickly reached 135,000. Early in the organization’s
history the PPU embraced the strategies and tactics described by Gregg in The Power of
Nonviolence. Gregg’s notion of “moral jiu-jitsu” found popularity among PPU members and was
often referred to as “Greggism.” In addition to the Power of Nonviolence, Gregg’s 40-page 1936
pamphlet Training for Peace, A Program for Peace Workers, published by the PPU, addressed
the need to combine the philosophy of pacifism with a strong platform of action and training. In
his pamphlet Gregg encouraged pacifists to form discussion and reading groups, committed to
developing self-respect, unity, and morale. To cultivate these sentiments Gregg suggested
“three marks of later pacifist culture: singing, folk dancing, and meditation.” Development of
sentiments should then be combined with concrete action. For Gregg, members needed to
engage in social service, nonviolent resistance or, favored by Gregg, manual labor. Aldous
Huxley, a founding member and significant thinker of the PPU, strongly supported programs
similar to those advocated by Gregg. When Huxley encountered Gregg’s work he “responded
enthusiastically to its selfdiscipline, asceticism and exclusivity.” Huxley viewed Gregg’s ideas as
part of the necessary “training of an intellectual aristocracy.” Indeed, many distinct similarities
can be noted between Gregg’s work on pacifist training and Huxley’s work. In 1936 Huxley
authored What Are You Going to Do About It?, the first publication of the PPU. Later he wrote
An Encyclopedia of Pacifism, published in 1937, also by the PPU. In both of these works Huxley
relied heavily on Gregg’s writing and Bart de Ligt’s Conquest of Violence. Huxley urged pacifists
to “create a movement as disciplined as those of their Fascist and Communist rivals and as
dedicated as the Satyagraha movement.” While Huxley prominently supported Gregg’s training
methods, Gregg’s ideas did not sit quite so well with other members of the PPU. Indeed, Dick
Sheppard harbored significant reservations about Gregg’s philosophies. In his 1936 work, We
Say No, Sheppard had much praise for Gregg, but this was quickly replaced by doubts about the
methods and Sheppard allowed the publication of Training for Peace under the auspices of the
PPU only because of his deep respect for Huxley and Huxley’s support for Gregg’s ideas. The
British pacifists found that Gregg’s focus on meditation, folk dancing, communal singing,
spinning, and knitting made the whole training program look “too Eastern.” Back in the States,
Gregg continued his interest and commitment to organic farming and simple living and took up
the position, in late 1936, as PEACE PROFILE 243 acting director of Pendle Hill, a Quaker study
center founded in 1930. At Pendle Hill he made writing a pamphlet about the value of simple
living one of his priorities. In The Value of Voluntary Simplicity, published by Pendle Hill in 1936,
Gregg outlined his reasons for adopting a simple life. He made arguments based on the debates
he often had with himself in his notebooks and other published works. He noted, “(c)apitalism is
no mere exterior organization of bankers and industrialists. It consists of a spirit and attitude . . .
If I wish actively to participate in this transformation [of the capitalist order], I myself must begin
to alter my own life in the desired direction.” While The Value of Voluntary Simplicity
represented the culmination of Gregg’s thinking since he lost his job with the railway union, the
text did not receive much attention. Today, of course, these ideas have found fertile ground and
Gregg was the first to coin the term “voluntary simplicity” as a framework for what we have
come to know as alternative lifestyles, simple living, and living in harmony with nature.
Our framework is one of building nonviolent relationships through education

while rejecting their approach to difference
Wang 18
(Hongyu Wang is a professor in Curriculum Studies at Oklahoma State University-Tulsa. Her
teaching and research areas include curriculum theory, nonviolence education, East/West
inquiry, psychoanalysis and education, and college curriculum and teaching. “Nonviolence as
teacher education: a qualitative study in challenges and possibilities” 01 Apr 18 https://www-
tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/17400201.2018.1458294) JP
The theoretical framework of this study, compatible with the orientation of curriculum and
pedagogical design in these classes, is based mainly upon nonviolence studies, but it also blends
with principles of psychoanalysis and post-structural theory. Several key threads in the
conceptions of nonviolence informed by Gandhi and Buddhism (Kaneda 2008Kaneda, T. 2008.
“Shanti, Peacefulness of Mind.” In Cross-cultural Studies in Curriculum , edited
by C. Eppert and H.Wang , 171–192. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar];
Nagler 2004Nagler, M. N. 2004. The Search for a Nonviolent Future . Makawao, HI: Inner Ocean
Publishing. [Google Scholar]) are used in this study. First, organic relationality that transcends
dualism lies at the heart of nonviolence, and nonduality heals the divide between the body and
the mind and the separation of the self and the other
(Wang 2014aWang, H. 2014a. Nonviolence and education . New York: Routledge.
[Crossref], , [Google Scholar]). Second, nonviolent relationships with others are interdependent
with the integration of the self. Meditation and mindfulness practices enable inner peace and
compassionate relationships. Third, means and end are united through the principles of
nonviolence.
Under the relational orientation of nonviolence studies, psychoanalytic work with its emphasis
on the psychic working through of difficult memories and difficult emotions, adds depth to the
inner work of nonviolent engagement with the self. One can learn to integrate the shadow of
the self and refuse to project it onto the other so that the enriched and fuller self does not make
an enemy out of the other (Mayes 2005Mayes, C. 2005. Jung and Education . Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education. [Google Scholar]; Pinar 2012Pinar, W. F. 2012. What is
Curriculum Theory? 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.[Crossref], , [Google Scholar];
Shim 2014Shim, J. M. 2014. “Multicultural Education as an Emotional Situation.” Journal of
Curriculum Studies 46 (1): 116–137.10.1080/00220272.2013.834076[Taylor & Francis
Online], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar]). Here the psychosocial dynamics of the
individual are necessarily tied to contextualized relational interactions with others.
Drawing upon poststructuralism, which values the alterity of the other, this framework also
involves building nonviolent relationships with difference. Often commonality is viewed as the
basis for building relationships, and conflicts and difference are perceived as needing to be
smoothed out or erased by compromise. However, leading scholars in poststructural theory –
Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Julia Kristeva – argue that erasing difference into
commonality is itself a form of violence. Assimilating the other into the self runs the risk of
imposing one’s own positions and perspectives. From a Buddhist point of view, Hershock
(2012Hershock, P. 2012. Valuing Diversity . Albany: SUNY Press. [Google Scholar]) argues for the
necessity of diversity for a mutually enhanced community. Both poststructural insights and
Buddhist wisdom inform this approach to difference as a positive site for nonviolent
engagement.
In drawing upon these different theories, the individual and the relational aspects become the
double foci of nonviolence education that unite purpose, curriculum, and teaching in a daily
practice of transforming negative energies and forming positive relationships. Curriculum should
highlight the contributions of nonviolence but, unfortunately, studies of history textbooks have
shown that ‘students are learning very little about the history of peace, though they learn a
great deal about wars and other forms of violence’ (Gemstone Peace Education
Team 2008Gemstone Peace Education Team . 2008. “Peace Education Aimed at Children
Everywhere in the World.” InTransforming Education for Peace , edited by J. Lin , E.
J. Brantmeier , and C. Bruhn , 93–111. Charlotte, NC : Information Age Publishing. [Google
Scholar], 94). Stoskopt and Bermudez (2017Stoskopt, A. , and A. Bermudez . 2017. “The Sounds
of Silence.” Journal of Peace Education 14 (1): 92–113.10.1080/17400201.2016.1230543[Taylor
& Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar]) also argue that representations of non-
violent resistance have been silenced in four American history textbooks, which leaves students
little access to non-violent social change. In my classes, nonviolence was explicit curriculum, but
a pedagogy of nonviolence in which the interactions between teacher and students and among
students led to students’ embrace of nonviolence was also enacted to match the content. When
the content and means were united, the purpose of education for nonviolence could be served.
My course design, including the choices of textbooks, the nature of the assignments,
pedagogical relationships, and the fostering of relational dynamics are discussed in more detail
later.
As a teacher researcher ‘living the question’ (Shagoury and Power 2012Shagoury, R. ,

and B. Power . 2012. Living the Questions: A Guide for Teacher-
researchers . Portland, ME : Stenhouse. [Google Scholar]) of how to meet challenges and open
possibilities for teaching nonviolence, I intertwine theory, practice, and research intimately in
this study. Since nonviolence suggests a unity between thought and action, teacher research as
a research methodology that integrates theory and practice matches the topic of this study.
The alt is to teach nonviolence in a way that encompasses its relationships and
it’s need as a ongoing process
Wang 18
inquiry, psychoanalysis and education, and college curriculum and teaching. “Nonviolence as
teacher education: a qualitative study in challenges and possibilities” 01 Apr 18 https://www-
tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/17400201.2018.1458294) JP
My experience of teaching nonviolence in teacher education demonstrates both the challenges

and possibilities in approaching nonviolence as an educational project. The challenges lie in
unpacking the stereotypes of nonviolence and restore its proactive and relational force and thus
fundamentally question socially and culturally constructed orientation of individualism and
dualism between the self and the other. It is a radical shift that takes time and experience to
sink into students’ views, but it opens up new possibilities for integrating both the individual and
the community and has important implications for teacher education. Foregrounding the role of
both relational dynamics and individual integration through students’ learning experiences, this
study shows possibilities of teaching and learning nonviolence in teacher education as an
ongoing process of counteracting aggression and cultivating compassion in daily educational
practice. Creating pedagogical conditions for students to learn requires shifting relational
dynamics in the classroom including relationship with the self and relationship with the other,
guided by nonviolent pedagogical relationships. In framing nonviolence as teacher education,
educational purpose, means, process, content, and context are integrated for, about, and
through nonviolence. Here, I highlight several key aspects of what this study means for teacher
education and teacher educators and also briefly indicate directions for future research.
First, the individual and the relational aspects of nonviolence need to be in dynamic interplay in
order to transform teacher education. The design of the texts and learning activities in these
classes combined the structural analysis and the autobiographical analysis with the intention to
encourage students to critically re-examine emotions, languages, and actions at the intersection
of the personal and the social. Through various contemplative and self-education practices
(Gunnlaugson, Sarath, and Bai 2014Gunnlaugson, E. W. , C. S. Sarath , and H.Bai ,
eds. 2014. Contemplative Learning and Inquiry across Disciplines . New York: SUNY
Press. [Google Scholar]; Miller 2014Miller, J. P. 2014. The Contemplative Practitioner:
Meditation in Education and the Workplace . 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press. [Google Scholar]; Pinar 1994Pinar, W. F. 1994. Autobiography, Politics and Sexuality . New
York: Peter Lang. [Google Scholar]), students learned to make the connections between the self
and the communal as mutually influencing each other. The future research is needed for
negotiating a meaningful connection between nonviolence as a way of life and teaching
particular school subjects as well as for facilitating the mutual support of the individual and the
social. Here, drawing upon critical peace education can be beneficial. In these classes, although I
asked students to do experience-based individual projects, further efforts can be made to
combine social action projects in pairs or small groups with nonviolence education so that
students directly experience introducing orientations of nonviolence into community and
society.
Second, engaging nonviolent relationships with difference in teacher education is an important
task for crafting pre-service and in-service teachers’ experiences in a culturally and ecologically
diverse society. While difference should not be erased, students’ stories, and experiences
demonstrate the importance of making connections through difference. A balanced approach of
neither removing nor radicalizing difference is the key here, as the companionship project shows
that difference with nature can teach us important lessons about humanity while allowing
nature to be nature. Human relationships influenced by history and culture are complicated as
social diversity is laden with memories, emotions, and collective unconsciousness. In a
nonviolent approach, social difference must be recognized and social injustice must be
challenged. At the same time, such differences should not reinforce separation and
fragmentation, or lead to the radical unknown that eludes connections; students can be invited
to experience them as enrichment for an interconnected life in which everybody and everything
are participants (Author; Hershock 2012Hershock, P. 2012. Valuing Diversity . Albany: SUNY
Press. [Google Scholar]).
Related to the role of social difference, the gendered experiences of participants and the
gendered differences of doing emotional work suggested in this study indicates the need for
further research on gender and nonviolence education. Nonviolence can be considered a
feminist project as historically and contemporarily women have played a key role in peace
movements (Wang 2014bWang, H. 2014b. “A nonviolent perspective on internationalizing
curriculum studies.” In The international handbook of curriculum research . 2nd ed, edited
by W. F. Pinar , 69–76. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar]; Harris 2008Harris, I. 2008.
“History of Peace of Education.” In Encyclopedia of Peace Education , edited by M. Bajaj , 15–
24. Charlotte, NC : Information Age Publishing. [Google Scholar]) and have engaged daily caring
relationships. Since all participants were female, a future study on the social and individual
construction of femininity and masculinity and its role in engaging nonviolence work in teacher
education will be informative.
Third, Brantmeier (2009Brantmeier, E. J. 2009. “A Peace Education Primer.” Journal of Conflict

Management and Development 3 (3): 36–50. [Google Scholar]) discusses peace as text, peace as
subtext, and peace as context in doing peace work in schools and communities, which is
applicable to teacher education. Nonviolence as teacher education infuses nonviolence into
text, subtext, and context to transform content, process, method, and purpose of education.
Nonviolence as text highlights the importance of curriculum in constructing versions of reality
that opens up more spaces for peaceful co-living: ‘The inclusion of more peaceful voices of the
past is one very tangible way to acknowledge and to legitimize peaceful ways of living in the
present and for the future’ (Brantmeier 2009Brantmeier, E. J. 2009. “A Peace Education
Primer.” Journal of Conflict Management and Development 3 (3): 36–50. [Google Scholar], 44).
Even in teaching historical wrongdoings, we cannot forget those who went against the grain to
challenge injustice. For instance, in teaching the Tulsa Race Riots of 1921, the voices of those
who risked their own lives to protect Black Tulsans should not be forgotten. By questioning the
dominant storylines of hegemony from multiple angles, nonviolence and peace are
foregrounded to demonstrate what is possible for students.
Nonviolence as subtext refers to the hidden curriculum that subtly sends students messages
that are not spoken yet equally powerful. If imposition is the main mode of education even with
the good intention, if the class climate demands agreement rather than allowing different
perspectives, intellectual and relational violence rather than nonviolence become the subtext.
To make nonviolence a subtext is more difficult than making it an explicit curriculum because it
needs pedagogical craft to infuse the energy of interconnectness throughout the educational
process that touches students and move them out of their comfort zones.
While Brantmeier (2009Brantmeier, E. J. 2009. “A Peace Education Primer.” Journal of Conflict

Management and Development 3 (3): 36–50. [Google Scholar]) highlights peace as context
through pedagogical relationships between the teacher and students, I broaden it to class
dynamics that includes interactions between and among teacher, student, text, and local
communities to create a class context of nonviolence. Pedagogical relationship plays a central
role but must also be mediated through students’ peer relationships and their relationships with
difficult knowledge in a community of learners. The different class dynamics of the diversity
class and the nonviolence class demonstrate this point well. Nonviolence as context means
mobilizing all relationships toward a process of curbing violence and promoting compassion and
social justice.
Fourth, this study also indicates the importance of not setting up violence and nonviolence as
binary but to make it an ongoing process in which violence gives way to nonviolence through
daily efforts. While the metaphor of a continuum as mentioned above helps to mobilize
nonviolence, it seems to imply a linear movement. Centering the importance of both integrative
individuality and organic relationality, nonviolence can be envisioned as an open and evolving
web in which complex relationships are built to spread out compassion and constantly weave
the divisions or fragmentations that violence breaks apart back to the interconnectedness.
Individuals are the knots of the web, stretching out to connect with others. As a whole, the web
promotes both individuals’ inner peace and their connections to others – human or non-human
– with healing and creative power. In teacher education, building such a web in the classroom in
connection with social contexts is a big challenge.
In addition, the teacher educator’s own journey of cultivating her inner peace through dwelling
in creative tensionality of teaching nonviolence is an intriguing topic that calls for further
research. In embodying the principles of nonviolence, the teacher educator has an opportunity
for students to witness what it means to become a nonviolence educator in the midst of
tensions and challenges. Dealing with controversial issues such as in social justice education or
critical peace education, the teacher educator can learn peacebuilding capacities throughout the
process of teaching rather than before teaching. While not necessarily always successful, her
ongoing crafting of pedagogical capacities for holding on to tensions and creating a community
embodies the spirit of nonviolence education. Understanding teacher educators’ critical self-
education will contribute to nonviolence as teacher education.
Nonviolence is key to real world human relations – the purely intellectual

approach must be abandoned
Wang 19
inquiry, psychoanalysis and education, and college curriculum and teaching. “An Integrative
Psychic Life, Nonviolent Relations, and Curriculum Dynamics in Teacher Education” Mar 15 2019
https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1007%2Fs11217-019-09661-4) JP
Multiple Modes of Psychic and Nonviolent Integration Analytical psychology originated in the

treatment of people who were experiencing diffculty in their lives; thus, many of its underlying
principles are about how to remove obstacles for psychic integration, although it also reveals
principles of the psyche that are generally applicable. In contrast, nonviolence originates in a
strong sense of organic relationality and doing no harm to others in one’s daily life. Here
confronting difculty and spreading positive energy go hand in hand: analytic psychology deals
with negative psychic energy while afrming a transformative attitude; nonviolence relies on
positive life energy while converting dualistic approaches so as to dissolve violence. Moreover,
psychic integration and social integration interrelate: psychic wholeness promotes
compassionate relationships with others and nonviolent social relations are enabled by the
individual’s mindful experiencing of body/mind/spirit interconnectedness. At the site of
confronting the unconscious and cultivating nonviolent relations, what modes of integration can
be used to mutually enhance the eforts to seek the wholeness of the psyche and create a
community of nonviolence? What means can be used to bring into the light repressed or
excluded memories, thoughts, or emotions? What can we rely on to achieve nonviolent
conversion of pain, grief, fear, anger, anxiety as they emerge from our psychic and social lives?
Understanding multiple modes of psychic and nonviolent integration can help teacher educators
engage curriculum dynamics in such a way that defensive and aggressive mechanisms can be
dissolved and nonviolent engagements can be inspired. The archetypal image of wholeness is
based upon integrating opposites to achieve dynamic balance. Free association, dream analysis,
and active imagination are commonly used in psychotherapy to remove obstacles for recovering
balance. While these methods can seldom be used directly in the classroom, Jung’s emphasis on
the role of imagination, art, myth, experiential understanding, and embodied engagement for
psychic wholeness has important implications for education. Psychic integration and the inner
work of nonviolence are intimately linked. Nonviolence is also a guiding principle for social
movements, with a variety of nonviolent strategies that can inform educators of how to
efectively use social action and service learning projects in education. In this section, I focus on
multiple pathways of psychic and social integration that are particularly informative to teacher
education. Beyond the Intellect: Synthetic Method and the Integrative Power of Nonviolence
Moving beyond the intellect is called for by both analytical psychology and nonviolence studies.
Jung (1966) discusses the change in attitude that is necessary for the transformation of the
personality: An attitude that seeks to do justice to the unconscious as well as to one’s fellow
human beings cannot possibly rest on knowledge alone…. If books and the knowledge they
impart are given exclusive value, man’s emotional and afective life is bound to sufer. That is why
the purely intellectual attitude must be abandoned. (p. 278–279) During Jung’s long period of
confrontation with the unconscious, from 1913 to 1930, he drew many images that came from
his own dreams, highlighting the role of translating emotions and fantasies through image-
drawing and symbol-making (Jung 2009; 388 H. Wang 1 3 Wehr 1987). That period was also
emotionally intense, and his imaginative expressions of what was beyond the intellect led to his
creative formulation of the collective unconscious. Jung terms this method of integrating
archetypal images through mandala drawings as a constructive or ‘synthetic’ treatment of the
unconscious, in contrast to the analytical, causal-reductive interpretation. Jung (1960) believes
that ‘integrative unity’ and ‘inner division’ form a pair of opposites that seek balance through a
dynamic process (p. 51). How this process unfolds is unique to each individual, with each one’s
diferent talents, but in general it requires the combination of and interplay between creative
formulations and experiential understanding of the meaning. The integrative power of
nonviolence also goes beyond the intellect. Without heartfelt experiences of engaging
nonviolent relationships with the self and the other, transcending dualism is difcult. Both the
inner work and the outer work of nonviolence involve the experiencing of organic relationality.
The inner work of nonviolence involves meditation practices and the conversion of negative
energy. Here, experiencing difcult emotions such as anger, fear, or anxiety is a necessary step
before approaching their conversion because holding down negative feelings can be a form of
violence to the self, as Doll’s story tells us. In meditation that heals the divide between body,
mind, and spirit, accepting emotions as they emerge and then letting them go allows an
individual to experience, rather than ignoring or suppressing, a wide range of feelings.
Experiencing emotions without identifying with them cultivates a critical attitude that can hold
anger and fear without acting upon them and eventually transforms them in constructive
directions. Importantly, the unity of life underlies the possibility of the nonviolent conversion of
hostile thoughts, negative emotions, and aggressive action. Such conversion also involves
mindful interactions with others to construct mutually benefcial relationships—the outer work
of nonviolence. Finding alternative ways out of the usual ‘fight or fght’ reactions to conficts and
forming creative nonviolent responses to antagonism call for practicing agape love, which invites
humane interactions among people while addressing individual and social wrongdoings. In
pursuing restorative social justice, we need to make an efort to recover the broken relationships
in a community through curbing psychic and social aggression, evoking humane responses from
all parties, and seeking heart unity among members, especially those who contest one another.
Notably, the shared constructive work everyone in a community pursues together has a
profound efect on evoking the integrative power of nonviolence, and this positive energy has
both healing and creative power for human relations. In today’s competitive world, education is
often deeply embedded in an intellectual attitude at the expense of emotional, social, and
spiritual growth. When American schools are under pressure to perform and raise test scores,
only those intellectual functions that can be measured get highlighted (Taubman 2009; Pinar
2012). By extension, teacher education emphasizes discipline-based intellectual capacities and
focuses on discipline-based teaching methods. However, intellectual development without
personal growth has dis-integrative efects on the individual because the dissociation between
intellect and emotions splits the human psyche and upholds the mechanism of rational control.
The synthetic method and the nonviolent experiences that are essential to psychic and social
integration remind us that teacher education must not neglect the role of the embodied, the
aesthetic, the symbolic, and the contemplative as well as social engagement in students’
development, not only in curriculum content but also in teacher education pedagogy.
Interdisciplinary understanding and lived experience are essential for creating conditions to
enable students’ subjective integration and the relational dynamics of nonviolence. An
Integrative Psychic Life, Nonviolent Relations, and… 389 1 3 The use of an integrative approach
is demonstrated well in currere, which I have adopted in teacher education for more than a
decade (see Wang 2010 for details of specifc methods). In William F. Pinar’s (1975, 2012)
formulation, oriented by Jungian analytical psychology, existentialism, and Buddhism, the
practice of currere, with its focus on ‘the subjectivity of the socially engaged individuals’ (2012,
p. 43), helps students in teacher education make connections between academic knowledge and
life history. It includes four steps: the memory work of understanding one’s own educational
experiences, the vision work of imagining what the future may unfold, the analysis of the past
and the future in the context of the present situation, and the synthesis of repositioning oneself
as a (prospective or in-service) teacher. Specifc methods involve free association, meditative
breathing exercises, creative visualization, and imaginative photographing of the past, the
present, and the future. When introducing currere as a semester-long writing project, I
encourage students to use diverse synthetic forms of expression such as poetry, photography,
narratives, and creative juxtaposition in their fnal papers. While I provide guidance and
nonjudgmental feedback during the process, students are in charge of their own learning and go
as far as they are willing. I also invite students’ voluntary sharing in partners and in class for
intersubjective interactions. As some students acknowledge (Jenkins 2017), currere as a project
of emptying oneself of psychic violence and forming more authentic relationships with the self is
a form of engaging nonviolence. Such an engagement is an ongoing process and does not lead
to any easy closure. Particularly when it involves experiencing difcult emotions, it is a complex
process as one goes through ‘the pain of digging out all those miseries and struggles… and
experiencing them for a second time’ (Yang 2009, p. 26). Not getting stuck in the past is not only
about one’s individual past but also the collective past. “Productive remembering” (Strong-
Wilson 2013, 26) on the site of historical trauma is open-ended; it not only requires the person
who is undertaking it to bear responsibility but also invites others to make sense of the past and
care for the future. Nonviolent engagement with personal and collective pain is circular, not
linear, but for those who are willing to do so, it opens up possibilities for psychic and social
integration
Nonviolence is the catalyst toward a better future

Lamb 17
(Shena Lamb has a BA in Media and Communication and an MA in Conflict Management and has
been a facilitator for the Alternatives to Violence Project since 2005. “A Nonviolent Pedagogical
Approach for Life Orientation Teacher Development: The Alternatives to Violence Project” Sep
2017 https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1989832325?pq-
origsite=summon) JP
The Nonviolent Pedagogical Approach of the AVP Process
As detailed above, key to a nonviolent pedagogical approach are the affirmation of personal
agency, collaboration for change of oppressive behaviour (one's own and others'), and
recognition of the value of diversity as well as the unlearning of unconscious prejudice. In AVP,
these principles are reflected in its central values: respect for self, caring for others, think before
reacting, ask for a nonviolent solution, and expect the best. Overarching these principles is the
central AVP notion of a transformative power that we can all access to apply these principles,
especially to prevent conflicts from becoming violent.
As mentioned, studies on LO classrooms emphasise the success of teaching strategies such as
discussions, cooperative learning, collaborative problem solving, as well as conversations where
learners feel their opinions are valued by the teacher and their peers (Magano, 2011). Modelling
such teaching strategies and creating a safe, caring, and values-based environment is the central
strength of the AVP process; for many participants, it is their first experience of nonviolent,
empathetic communication. Research on empathy shows that giving and receiving empathy are
the most fulfilling and gratifying experiences that we can have, and emphasises the relationship
of empathy to motivation, values development, and achievement (Cooper, 2013; Goleman,
2009; Morrell, 2010; Rifkin, 2009; Rogers, 1980; Rosenberg, 2015).
The importance of learning through games and play has long been recognised (Axline, 1947;
Rousseau, 2003), as has the transformative power of experiential learning (Kolb, 1984; Marsick
& Sauquet, 2014), especially when the activities challenge learners in unconventional ways
(Snodgrass & Blunt, 2009). AVP's practical exercises, games, and role-plays highlight the
criticality of perspective taking (SlocumBradley, 2008), and how conflict can be perceived as a
destructive or potentially constructive process. Personal agency is emphasised by the power of
these perceptual choices, and participants are shown that they are active co-creators of the
situations they interpret as conflictual, and how there are always opportunities for transforming
conflict in positive directions. The multiple perspectives shared by the group enrich participants'
understanding of past conflict events as well as potential future situations (Halfman & Couzij,
2009). Thus, by participating in these AVP processes, LO teachers can increase their "conflict
fluency" (LeBaron & Pillay, 2006, p. 12) and gain practical skills for managing conflict in their
classrooms.
The AVP process is nondirective in that it is not premised on moralistic perspectives of 'right' or
'wrong'. Workshops allow participants to reflect on their personal histories and reconsider their
values by providing the conditions for unlearning and changes in perspective taking (Hackland,
2007). This participant-centred focus is a sharing process where knowledge is actively co-
constructed, and participants are encouraged to introspect and develop creative ways of
resolving conflicts. Such communal involvement in co-constructed knowledge acquisition is an
essential feature of Afrocentric learning, which negates the existence of absolute knowledge
and highlights communal knowledge construction (Ntseane, 2011). Also known in conflict
management as the "elicitive approach" (Lederach, 1995, p. 62), co-construction builds on the
knowledge available in a diverse workshop setting rather than depending on the trainer as
expert (as is usually done in the Eurocentric/colonial approach), thus recognising the knowledge
of the participants as fundamental to the learning process.
In opening up the space for participants to express their feelings, any habitual language of
criticism or moralistic judgments is highlighted and participants are shown how to understand
the link between accessing their feelings and needs and communicating nonviolently. Although
this is essentially an emotional process, AVP is not therapy and these inner re-storying processes
occur spontaneously in the shared group experience. The games bring the healing of shared
laughter, which is important to the re-storying process:
Reconciliation . . . the effort to repair the brokenness of relationships and life . . . appears as a
very serious business. Ironically the pathway to healing may not lie with becoming more serious
[and].. . may explain [why] people of so many geographies of violence have developed such an
extraordinary sense of humour and playfulness. (Lederach, 2005, p. 160)
Healing laughter is also generated in the role-plays where participants enact conflict situations
and, as a group, consider the options available in dealing with conflict. As in life, these role-plays
are spontaneous and each group decides on a conflict scenario, constructs the plot, and
whatever emerges as an outcome becomes the basis for a lesson in managing conflict. In this
way, responding to the participants' expressed needs, the AVP facilitators (two or three, for
increased diversity) collaborate to create a deep learning environment.
Studies on the effectiveness of AVP-including those by John (2013, 2015), Novek (2011), and
Shuford (2009, 2013), as well as a number of other reports from countries around the world and
archived on the AVP-USA website (https://avpusa.org/resources-pub/avp-research-4/)-reveal
encouraging, mostly positive findings that attest to the power of this communal knowledge
construction. In South Africa, AVP groups in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal as well as the Eastern and
Western Cape regularly conduct AVP workshops in schools, prisons, and communities and
studies exploring their effectiveness (de Villiers Graaff, 2005; Hackland, 2007; John, 2013, 2015;
Lamb-du Plessis 2012; Roper, 2005) have yielded similarly positive results. Several of these
studies explain how workshop participants frequently adopt a new perspective to previously
unquestioned worldviews. For example, Sloane (2002, p. 21) showed how the shift from
antisocial to pro-social behaviours does not develop linearly, but reaches a 'tipping point' when
a certain level of affective trust and social coherence is reached in the group. He saw this trust
as the basis upon which other pro-social skills are developed, including self-esteem and
empathy, and attributed this development to the effective creation of conditions in which
changes of perception can occur, especially with regard to conflict. These conditions appear
related to how AVP addresses the important psychological need for connection with others and
that when participants experience this sense of connection, they view themselves and others
differently. Studies have shown that this change is not temporary but-to a significant degree-is
sustained (Lamb-du Plessis, 2012; Miller & Shuford, 2005; Novek, 2011; Shuford, 2013).
The AVP Workshop: Structure, Content, and Outcomes
The AVP process is based on four central themes: affirmation, communication, cooperation, and
community building, which align with the LO topics of social and environmental responsibility,
democracy and human rights, and especially, the development of self-in-society with its aim of
"the promotion of individual growth and well-being in a rapidly transforming society" (DoE,
2002, p. 3). The workshops are graded into three levels: the basic workshop, the advanced, and
the facilitator workshop, and the LO teacher is encouraged to participate in all three. The
duration of each workshop is two days (which can be adjusted into 1- or 2-hour, weekly
sessions), participation is limited to 25 participants and, as mentioned, each workshop has two
to three facilitators.
Table 1 details the format of a standard AVP basic workshop showing the activities, issues
explored, and outcomes.
The core of the workshop is divided into four main sessions, each session focussing on a theme.
All the activities are aligned to the theme and follow each other sequentially in increasing
complexity. The process begins by positively affirming the participants and creating a space
where they can reveal vulnerabilities, and then facilitates communication, cooperation, and
creative conflict transformation exercises in pairs and small groups. Social workers or
psychologists are included in the facilitator team to ensure support if revealing vulnerabilities
cause discomfort.
The advanced workshop has an increased focus on community building and, in particular, on
participants' individual goals. Once they have clarified personal goals, participants work to
integrate their goals with the group goals by choosing two or three topics as the focus for the
second section of the workshop. This goal integration is done through a process of consensus
and the experience of making a collective decision, which values individual viewpoints, is key to
increasing participants' awareness of inclusivity and teamwork. Participants are taken through
specific exercises aimed at deepening their understanding of the topic and clarifying problem
areas. AVP training is thus presented in differing levels of complexity from basic to advanced.
Once both the basic and advanced workshops have been successfully completed, the facilitator
workshop affords the opportunity to be trained as an AVP facilitator. Although it would be ideal
for LO teachers to become fully-fledged AVP facilitators, participating in even one basic
workshop could be a valuable and useful experience for them.
To summarise, an AVP workshop can provide a safe space where participants are able to
examine their unconscious, often destructive, assumptions and are given tools for resolving
conflicts through consensus and compromise as well as communication skills that can de-
escalate potentially violent and dangerous confrontations (Novek, 2011). These skills are critical
for LO teachers as is AVP's philosophy of nonviolent pedagogy, which collapses the traditional
teacher-learner power relationships and could make the classroom a more democratic and
empowering space. Importantly, the personally relevant processes of an AVP workshop are
quite different from the largely generic, content-burdened workshops currently offered to LO
teachers, which often leave them confused and frustrated (Diale et al., 2014; Mosia, 2011). In
contrast to current LO teaching methodologies which mostly employ transmission teaching, with
minimal use of group and experiential methods (Prinsloo, 2007), AVP's participatory processes
model a nonviolent, democratic pedagogy through learner-centred experiential learning that LO
teachers could replicate in their classrooms.
Conclusion
The LO teacher has the potential to be an important catalyst for critical social change that begins
in the nonviolent classroom. A nonviolent pedagogy can help undo the legacy of racial, gender,
class, and other historical social violence (Wang, 2010) and build robust identities, self-
knowledge, and agency that can assist teachers and their learners to contribute to South Africa's
decolonisation project.
AVP processes that embody such an approach can comprehensively support LO teachers by
providing them with opportunities to reflect on their socialisation and offers strategies for the
development of life skills, assertiveness, and conflict transformation in their learners, which take
into account learners' actual behaviour as well as historical, social, and environmental
determinants. However, even more important, is that LO teachers can learn how to create
democratic and humanising spaces that validate learners' experiences and viewpoints. LO
teachers participating in AVP workshops with a view to replicating its strategies could be
supported in this process by local South African AVP groups, and encouraged to participate in
AVP's national and global network.
Only a culture of peace solves

Amamio 4
(Amamio, May Christine is a UNESCO representative of Maylaysia (2004). “The Role of Peace
Education in Preventing Conflict”, UNESCO First Committee, Session VI. United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiztion. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.10.4495&rep=rep1&type=pdf) JP
UNESCO has established the education for a Culture of Peace to create and encourage peace ‘in
the minds of men and women’, based on the universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice,
solidarity, tolerance, human rights and equality between men and women9 . UNESCO’s effort to
create a Culture of Peace was advanced by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of
Cold War tensions. Towards the creation of a nonviolent 21st century, the decade of 2001-2010
has been declared as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the
Children of the World. The United Nations and UNESCO have ratified strong resolutions defining
a culture of peace. These have been widely accepted by the international community, including
Resolution A/53/243, the Declaration and Program of Action on a Culture of Peace, which
outlines eight critical action areas 10 and calls out for actors of peace to act at national, regional
and international levels to eliminate the roots of conflict: 1) Fostering a culture of peace through
education, 2) Promoting sustainable economic and social development 3) Promoting respect for
all human rights 4) Ensuring equality between women and men 5) Fostering democratic
participation 6) Advancing understanding, tolerance and solidarity 7) Supporting participatory
communication and the free flow of information and knowledge 8) Promoting international
peace and security The values of peace and tolerance are an essential part of quality basic
education. Basic education not only provides the skills of literacy and numeracy, but also
provides the values and attitudes needed for self-development, improving the quality of life, and
for active participation in society. Most importantly, basic education provides the ability for
continuous learning, giving people the power to think, to form opinions and to work towards the
promotion of peace, tolerance and universal respect for human rights. Although basic access to
education is essential for attaining a culture of peace, it is not enough. Educational and training
programs must be available to people at all levels, both formally and non-formally. In such
programs, the dimensions of peace education must include tolerance, respect for human rights
and democracy, international and intercultural understanding, cultural and linguistic diversity. 9
UNESCO: Mainstreaming The Culture of Peace 10 UNESCO: Education for a culture of peace 13 A
culture of peace will be achieved when citizens of the world understand global problems, have
the skills to resolve conflicts and struggle for justice non-violently, live by international
standards of human rights and equity, appreciate cultural diversity, and respect the Earth and
each other. Such learning can only be achieved with systematic education for peace.11 Building
a systematic culture of peace requires committed efforts by educators, researchers and other
members of society. Through education, people are taught tolerance and others’ right to
existence, and how to incorporate these teachings into their everyday lives. It requires a change
in attitude, a difficult process that will not happen overnight. But this is where the role of
knowledge will come into place. Education can provide people with information, but most
essential is the appropriate application of this information. This information must be
transformed into knowledge. Only then will people begin to adapt a change in mindset, attitude
and behavior characterized by long-term goals. Only then will they be able to engage properly in
the eight action areas and be able to contribute to the promotion of a culture of peace. A
complete change of mindset, pure intentions and sustained effort are important to achieving a
culture of peace. Society must take preventive action rather than reacting only after an event.
Only through prevention can future generations succeed. How do we make people aware of the
difference between knowledge and information? How can we support them in making the right
choices to promote a culture of peace? This is where governments can answer that question: by
ensuring that the principles of peace, nonviolence, and human rights - as laid down in the
relevant legal frameworks - are integrated into the educational curricula and the pedagogical
methods of the educational system.
We advocate a culture of peace – it’s key to stop irreversible damage to the

environment
Lum 13
(Professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa Phd, “Peace education: past, present, and
future” Dec 09 2013 https://www-tandfonline-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/17400201.2013.863824) JP
It is important for peace educators to understand how the redefinition of peace and shift in
paradigms catapults their work into a new generation of peace education research. In the
previous issue, Harris and Howett showed us how the term ‘peace education’ in the early
establishment of peace studies programs generally applied to the teachings of scholars and
researchers from the social science disciplines – political science, international relations,
sociology, future studies, and law. The reigning broad definitions of peace delimiting the field
were based on Johan Galtung’s concepts: negative peace – the absence of war, and positive
peace – the elimination of structural forms of institutionalized violence, later to extend to
cultural forms of violence. Peace education in these earlier years was not of shared interest with
scholars, researchers, or students in teacher preparation programs in Colleges of Education nor
was it seen as a vital part of the core curriculum at either the post-secondary or in the K-12
(Kindergarten through high school) school system. Public perception, religion, politics, lack of
interest, and legitimation struggles ruled out this possibility and teachers did not necessarily see
its relevance. In the 1980’s, peace education courses and workshops started to become
available for teachers in afterschool extracurricular programs for students, mainly in conflict
resolution. If any other associated topic of peace was taught, it was often a hidden curriculum
under a different name.
Today, we are in the midst of transition with the shift of paradigms and conceptual frameworks
for defining peace from its political roots and legalistic orientations to a transdisciplinary field of
study. The term ‘peace education’ now more popularly applies to education at the K-12 levels
(kindergarten/primary-elementary-middle-high school as known in the US) of schooling and the
education and training of teachers apart from peace studies education. The popularized myth in
the US that peace advocates and peace topics are ‘undemocratic’ because of its past wartime
associations and stands taken against the status quo must be turned on its head. In fact, those
who support the peace movement are truer to the values of functioning democracies than those
whom they confront. Infusing peace education into core curriculums in schooling is injecting
democratic ideals into both subject matter content and pedagogical practice.
We have seen from Wintersteiner how the Hague Appeal for Peace Global Campaign for Peace
Education was a defining, yet, culminating moment in clarifying the direction of the field for
peace educators to place peace education at the forefront of the twenty-first century agenda
with the specific aim of integrating peace education into core curricular in school systems on a
global scale. The HAP Agenda can be contextualized within the broader constitutive changes
that had been occurring at the UN during the previous decade.
When the Cold War ended, the UN seriously underwent a process of reinventing its own
organization and identity. Its members saw the need and opportunity for changes in the UN’s
modus operandi that required adopting new lenses for diagnosing world problems and more
effective ways of managing its internal workings and worldwide programs. In 1994, UNESCO
launched the Culture of Peace Programme (CPP) beginning a new global social movement that
declared the right of all people to live peaceful lives and to respect all forms of life on the
planet. The concept of a culture of peace was first raised at the International Congress on Peace
in the Minds of Men in Yamoussoukro Cote d’lvoire, July 1989.77. The Earth
Charter (2000), http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/content/pages/Read-the-Charter.html.The
Culture of Peace Manifesto (2000),http://www3.unesco.org/manifesto2000/.UNESCO Culture of
Peace Program Monograph (1997), http://upo.unesco.org/bookdetails.asp?
id=1534.Mainstreaming the Culture of
Peace (2000), unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001263/126398e.pdf.O’Sullivan, Edmund, The
Environmental Education for Sustainable Societies and Global
Responsibility (1999 Transformative Learning, University of Toronto
Press).Transdisciplinarity: Stimulating Synergies, Integrating
Knowledge (1998), unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001146/114694eo.pdf.View all notes The
Congress urged UNESCO to promote education and research to ‘construct a new vision of peace
by developing a peace culture based on the universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice,
solidarity, tolerance, human rights and equality between women and men’ (Culture of Peace
Monograph 1997, 13). The goal of the culture of peace movement is to transform the existing
ways of living in the world that reflect values of the dominant cultures of war to a global culture
of peace (Adams). Transformation requires a change of ‘hearts and minds,’ of daily habits of
living, of perceptions and fundamental cultural assumptions where violence and war are not an
option. One example of this was the change in the defense mission and orientation of the UN
forces from peacekeepers to peacemakers who would no longer ‘occupy’ but instead ‘co-
participate’ in the rebuilding of post-conflict societies. Furthermore, this meant recreating
cultures and not restoring them to how they were before for fear of reproducing the same
cultural elements that brought about violent conflicts in the first place. This entailed
empowering local citizens to engage in dialogue and help them build their own new habits of
associated meaningful living in light of their collective reflections about their traditional cultural
assumptions thereby enabling them to act upon new hopes and visions based upon their
dreams of a peaceful world.
The UN’s definition for a culture of peace is ‘a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of
behavior, and ways of life’ based on: (a) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and
practice of non-violence through education, dialogue, and cooperation; (b) Full respect for the
principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of States and non-
intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law; (c) Full respect for and
promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; (d) Commitment to peaceful
settlement of conflicts; (e) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of
present and future generations; (f ) Respect for and promotion of the right to development; (g)
Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men; (h) Respect
for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information;
(i) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity,
cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue, and understanding at all levels of society and
among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive
to peace (UN General Assembly A/RES/53/243 1999).
This shift placed peace education squarely within the rubric of the UN’s culture of peace social
movement and positively gave license to all persons involved or wishing to be involved in
educating for global peace, to maximize their potential as peace educators within the
subscribed universal values of UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Programme Agenda. These universal
principles are articulated and translated into educational values, principles, and practices in
the the Earth Charter, the Culture of Peace Manifesto, UNESCO Culture of Peace Program
Monograph, Mainstreaming the Culture of Peace, The Environmental Education (EE) for
Sustainable Societies and Global Responsibility, Transdisciplinarity: Stimulating Synergies,
Integrating Knowledgeand other documents created by committees comprised of concerned
public citizens, professionals, educators, government officials, NGO and INGO members, Nobel
Laureates, and academic scholars from multiple disciplines who participated in conferences held
by UNESCO. We need to recognize that these universal principles are context culturally
dependent and do not imply sameness or a post-modern form of neo-colonialism. Adams
describes how the dominant powers at the UN objected, but were overruled unanimously by UN
Member States in adopting the language and analysis of the culture of war. Peace scholars and
researchers from all disciplines may find their place within the CPP Agenda by relating their
work and the problems they investigate in fulfilling the goal of moving from a culture(s) of war
to a culture(s) of peace. It is the interpretation of these concepts, principles and values, and how
they are played out in practice and everyday activities and situations that peace researchers can
investigate to reveal how truth/reality is represented and meanings are constructed in ways that
enhance or undermine these intended culture of peace values.
Brantmeier reminds us of the ‘new ethic’ towards sustainability that was established in the
Earth Charter Initiative expressing the commitment of people, governments, businesses,
organizations, youth groups, NGOs, and academic institutions. He describes how peace
education research should not be anthropocentric, as the tradition of critical theory, but with
the current global environmental crises we must be awakened to include as a subject matter of
investigation, concern, and care for all natural forms of life that suffer abuse or disabled in living
to their fullest potential, lives that are self-sustaining and contribute to planetary sustainability.
The material existential conditions of the earth are changing and we see now how human beings
are knowingly and unknowingly responsible for these changes. In 1992, the Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS), 1700 of the world’s most notable researchers and scholars, including a majority
of Nobel laureates, issued a statement of ‘Warning to Humanity’ recognizing an emerging crisis
in conditions of the global atmosphere, depleting water resources, overfishing in our oceans,
contamination of inland rivers, degraded productivity of soil, disappearance of forests,
extinction of living species, and continued increase in human population.
Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and
often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of
our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant
and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the
manner that we know. Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our
recent course will bring about. (1)
We advocate an entirely new standard – Reform now is key

Lum 13
The UCS identified the most challenging change needed:
A new ethic is required – a new attitude towards discharging our responsibility for caring for
ourselves and for the earth. We must recognize the earth’s limited capacity to provide for us.
We must recognize its fragility. We must no longer allow it to be ravaged. This ethic must
motivate a great movement, convincing reluctant leaders and reluctant governments and
reluctant peoples themselves to effect the needed changes. (UCS 1992)
The UCS pointed out the need for the development of a new humane ecological sensibility – a
new ethic, a different moral understanding about how we see the nature of being human and
experience ourselves in relation to the earth, the planet, and cosmos. However, moral certitude
is not enough if daily actions do not correspond in the way we live our lives and educate in
schools and the public.
The Earth Charter is ‘formally recognized as a global consensus statement on the meaning of
sustainability, the challenge and vision of sustainable development, and the principles by which
sustainable development is to be achieved … (It is) used as a basis for peace negotiations, as a
reference document in the development of global standards and codes of ethics, as a resource
for governance and legislative processes, as a community development tool, as an educational
framework for sustainable development, and in many other contexts.’ It is the culmination of a
decade long process from its original inception in 1987 to its declaration at the Peace Palace, the
Hague in 2000 based on the following outlined principles:
Respect and Care for the Community of Life
Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.
Care for the community of life with understanding, compassion, and love.
Build democratic societies that are just, participatory, sustainable, and peaceful.
Secure earth’s bounty and beauty for present and future generations.
Ecological Integrity
Protect and restore the integrity of Earth’s ecological systems, with special concern for biological
diversity and the natural processes that sustain life.
Prevent harm as the best method of environmental protection and, when knowledge is limited,
apply a precautionary approach.
Adopt patterns of production, consumption, and reproduction that safeguard Earth’s

regenerative capacities, human rights, and community well-being.
Advance the study of ecological sustainability and promote the open exchange and wide
application of the knowledge acquired.
Social and Economic Justice
Eradicate poverty as an ethical, social, and environmental imperative.
Ensure that economic activities and institutions at all levels promote human development in an
equitable and sustainable manner.
Affirm gender equality and equity as prerequisites to sustainable development and ensure
universal access to education, health care, and economic opportunity.
Uphold the right of all, without discrimination, to a natural and social environment supportive of
human dignity, bodily health, and spiritual well-being, with special attention to the rights of
indigenous peoples and minorities.
Democracy, Nonviolence, and Peace
Strengthen democratic institutions at all levels, and provide transparency and accountability in
governance, inclusive participation in decision-making, and access to justice.
Integrate into formal education and life-long learning the knowledge, values, and skills needed
for a sustainable way of life.
Treat all living beings with respect and consideration.
Promote a culture of tolerance, nonviolence, and peace.

Scientific and human research proceeds in discovering untold levels of complexity about the
interdependence within and among elements of diverse ecosystems whereby the destruction of
one has a reverberating effect on the survival of all others. Creating the optimum conditions for
thriving, not just surviving, is dependent on the health of the planet and our natural resources.
The culture of peace rubric encompasses positive perspectives in conceptualizing
the creative process in educating for peace that requires looking at the ways the term peace is
used and its associated family of meanings, such as happiness, compassion, love, belonging,
respect, tolerance, acceptance, justice, spiritual well-being, accountability, etc. The shift in
perspective from seeing the preconditions of peace education in contexts of violence to its
preconditions in contexts of love opens a whole new sphere of research that has begins by such
areas as happiness in the new discipline of positive psychology. Transforming mindsets begin by
looking at the assumptions that have shaped the culture of academia and the understandings
about the nature of being human that drive our academic disciplines. The Charter principles
begin with action verbs. Is ‘peace’ and the conditions for peace a result of taking these actions?
Peace Leadership is key to our scholarship

Lum 13
The state of peace education scholarship and research
The current trend for academics is to move toward transdisciplinarity in research and

scholarship by collaborating across disciplines, forming partnerships with government, business,
and community organizations outside of the institution and maintaining an ethical and moral
perspective in determining their projects’ aims, procedures. Taking responsibility for the impact
that research has on sustaining human lives and the environment is becoming increasingly more
prevalent (Jenkins). This signifies an epistemological and ontological shift in philosophy and
needs to be integral to any formulations of peace philosophy and theories of peace education.
As we discover more about both obvious and invisible ways in which all forms of life are
interconnected materially and spiritually, the many lenses needed in understanding human
consciousness and knowledge formation make peace educators jobs unceasingly challenging as
lifelong learners. Adopting transdisciplinarity in perspectives and methods is inclusive of mono-
disciplinary, multi-disciplinary, interdisciplinary perspectives and the breadth of quantitative,
qualitative, interpretive, and mixed-method approaches. Further research with detailed case
studies that provide vivid illustrations about the existence of culture of war perspectives, values,
practices, policies, management styles, language, in every day life and educational practices in
schooling, lifestyle habits, etc. how these are normalized, and how these are changed or can be
altered or transformed into demonstrating culture of peace values, practices, lifestyle habits,
etc. are needed because these terms appear so ambiguous and subject to interpretation. Adams
research provided a set of eight characteristics that appear globally across cultural civilizations
but there is much more work to be done also in deconstructing positive culture and the
embedded rationality in beliefs and practices that are taken-for-granted in everyday living.
Kelly and Kelly’s proposal of a knowledge framework for ‘appropriate knowledge’ in peace
education coincide with the thrust of UNESCO’s culture of peace agenda, that is:
By focusing on our children, we implicitly pledge ourselves to education for all, a concept that
combines formal and non-formal education and seeks to promote quality basic education that is
grounded upon the universal values – and practice – of a culture of peace and non-violence.
Such a task must engage every one of our fellow citizens in all dimensions of life: in schools,
workplaces, the home; at the national and at the community levels; in the public, private and
voluntary sectors. Above all, children themselves must be empowered to become actors, not
mere spectators, in shaping their own visions and futures … (Koichiro Matsuura, Mainstreaming
2002)
As Kelly and Kelly conclude, their framework ‘appropriate knowledge – homecoming’ is relevant
beyond the contexts of war-torn communities and applicable in developed countries. Their
model is already visible in peace work ‘on the ground’ and in school systems that have
established courses and field-based programs in EE, sustainability, and garden-based learning
(GBL) in urban communities across the USA (state and federally supported), the UK (Learning
Through Landscapes), Sierra Leone (80% schools), and Bolivia (Schoolyard). However, Kelly and
Kelly are proposing more than the enhancement of the current EE and GBL movement. Their
proposal is not a romanticization of the times or a return to the past, rather, they are saying
first, that we need to do some reality testing at the way traditional knowledge paradigms
dominate the research about schools and assumptions about the practices of schooling.
Secondly, they offer a different set of value criteria for a kind of adaptive knowledge and
knowing that accommodates place and yet useful in sight of a future of diminishing returns.
Their lessons are derived from communities in conflict where they have observed
transformative changes in individuals and communities learning and living by permaculture
principles and practices. Their line of research echoes current discourses among socio-biologists,
agriculturalist, ecologists and peace environmentalists, and disaster relief agencies engaged in
building resilience in human communities through postwar reconstruction. Peace educators can
use this knowledge framework for directing and assessing their school and community programs
with an aim to create adaptable individuals who value and have the skills to build and create
community bonds with local limited resources. Teaching appropriate knowledge is enabling the
development of intellectual, emotional, and social capacity in living and creating peace and
being at ‘home’ with others wherever you are.
Their research also highlights the fact that much of the work of peace educators is conducted in
informal settings, especially NGOs in poverty stricken and conflict communities where schools
may not even exist. One thing many members have spoken about in the International Peace and
Research Association is the need to link academic scholars and researchers with peace
educators and advocates on the ground. Creating teams of researchers enables learning from
both sides of experience in the field and creation of new knowledge. The IPRA Foundation also
provides scholarships for these types of endeavors.
It is worth revisiting the 16 principles of EE supported by UNESCO that were developed by

members from five continents at the International Forum in 1992 that resulted in the Treaty on
EE for Sustainable Societies and Global Responsibility to get a sense of values and range of
topics that can serve as guidelines and disciplinary links for exploration in areas often not
considered peace education. The universal platform for human-environmental
sustainabilityincludes the following:
In the USA, the federal government has invested millions of dollars to increase opportunities for
EE has invested millions of dollars. Across academic disciplines, agricultural reformists,
environmentalists, and educators partner with local non-profit educational organizations,
government, and businesses to bring gardening and EE into schools. Some states have embraced
the concept with a thematic focus on healthy foods, nutrition, environmental preservation, and
sustainable living. Teachers have tapped into federal funding programs encouraging students
into science, technology, English, and mathematics (STEM) through EE and GBL education.
Though not fully implemented, in 1995, California’s State School Superintendent, Delaine Eastin
mandated ‘a garden in every school.’ The First Lady, Michelle Obama’s initiatives to fight child
obesity and improve nutrition in schools with Let’s Move, as well as the White House Kitchen
Garden, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, and the most recent 20 November 2012
signing of the Childhood Nutrition Bill, have not only impacted schools but also private sector
businesses and their menu offerings for adults as well as children. School garden initiatives in
public and private schools today cross all boundaries of race, culture, social, economic interests.
Some examples in which peace educators can infuse a critical integrated approach to EE and
GBL curriculum is by providing perspectives about the history of the movements and the use
and abuses of minority migrant laborers, the emergence of tracking in schools, the social class
stereotypes associated with agricultural farming, both positive and negative that hinder success
in creating stewards of the earth in education today, the use of GMO practices, the unsanitary
conditions, and cruelty in raising animals for food production, animal rights, environmental
ethics, etc. As long as careful attention is given to the implementation of Kelly and Kelly’s
proposals that do not reproduce the mistakes of the past, the lessons of peace education in
transforming the culture of schools and communities with adaptable learning based on
appropriate knowledge in homecoming are valuable for reconceiving schooling in a variety of
ways now and in the future.
Documenting processes of change and the transformation of individuals, mindsets,

consciousness, psychological or mental states is much more challenging than the mere tracking
of behaviors. Hagar and Mizali’s transdisciplinary approach and technique of autoethnographic
mapping is a unique attempt to document the transformative process in revealing how space
and place are existential experiences that may be interpreted and consciously rendered through
dialogue and reflexive learning. Their research illustrates many of the desiderata that Zembylas
and Bekerman propose are needed in reclaiming and sustaining ‘criticality’ in critical peace
education. In particular, their technique of ‘autoethnographic mapping’ allows for reinstating
the materiality of things and practices and the re-ontologizing experience of self and world. The
methodology is transferable to a range of applications that should spark interest in those who
come to peace education from other disciplinary backgrounds outside of education, in
particular, interests in representations of space and place afforded in geography, territorial
boundaries, cityscapes, neighborhoods, gentrification, etc.
The nature of peace leadership

Goulah and Urbain spur an interest in discussions about peace leadership and philosophies of
peace education and their intersection with traditional western ways in which educational
leadership and philosophies of education have been conceptualized. Is a global philosophy of
peace education possible? How do we define peace leaders or redefine ‘peacemakers’ in the
twenty-first century? Do peace leaders necessarily have to identify themselves or belong to a
peace community or organization bearing the term ‘peace’? The Cultures of Peace Agenda
identifies peace education ‘for all and by all’ and places individuals on an equal footing in their
value for creating cultures of peace. How might this affect the orientation of peace scholars and
researchers in their work in the field of peace education?
Daisaku Ikeda is often praised alongside Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi as a peace
leader; yet, he is designated as the ‘titular’ President of Soka Gakkai International, an effective
modern faith-based grassroots international peace organization with a membership of over 12
million people in 192 countries worldwide. His empowering value-creating philosophy of peace
education teaches self-directed transformation within the lives of each individual in modeling a
life guided by peace values regardless of one’s faith. Ikeda represents both Renaissance man
and Everyman who has emerged as a significant figure addressing the human, environmental,
and global crises of the twenty-first century in his talks. With new scientific discoveries come
new definitions of what it means to be human and with every culture comes the struggle to find
a new ethic of being in the world. As a well-respected and prominent philosopher, scholar, poet,
and educator, his insights of Nichiren Buddhism into the dialogues he has had with numerous
scholars, world leaders, cultural artists, Nobel laureates, and persons from all walks of life is
relevant to the current global conversations across disciplines (physics, philosophy religion,
psychology, etc.) about the ‘meeting of religion, philosophy, and science’ that is making waves
through academic and grassroots communities. How unique is Ikeda as a peace leader in the
twenty-first century?
A plethora of questions arise, but some basic questions we should always ask in our work as
peace educators are: What would the flourishing of humanity and civilization look like in a
culture(s) of peace? What kind of person do peace educators aim to create in their work? What
kind of peace curriculum and teaching methods are appropriate for teaching peace? What
values, beliefs, and assumptions about peace underlie the actions we take on a daily basis? Do
our actions contribute to a more peaceful world?
The authors in this special edition have presented their thoughts on peace education as an
emerging, established, and continuing field of research, scholarship, activism, and
communication in the global effort to achieve peace in the world. It is compiled with the
intention and hope of sparking more thoughts along these lines of inquiry and other topics for
which there is so much work to be done. This invites a revisioning, reculturing, retooling, and
reorienting of values in the field of peace education for building cultures of peace in order to
make possible the intentional transformations needed to achieve global peace and realize a
fundamental sensibility about the interconnectedness of all life systems of the earth and
cosmos.
Kappeler
The alt is a negative ballot- the affirmative assumes violence as
the root cause without actually looking into the reasons that
cause it. We must first analyze the ways we measure violence
before we attempt to search for ways to end it.
A political analysis of violence needs to recognize this will, the personal decision in favour of violence —
not just to describe acts of violence, or the conditions which enable them to take place, but also to
capture the moment of decision which is the real impetus for violent action . For without this decision there will be
no violent act, not even in circumstances which potentially permit it. It is the decision to violate, not just the act itself, which makes a person a
perpetrator of violence — just as it is the decision not to do so which makes people not act violently and not abuse their power in a situation
To
which would nevertheless permit it. This moment of decision, therefore, is also the locus of potential resistance to violence.
understand the structures of thinking and the criteria by which such decisions are
reached, but above all to regard this decision as an act of choice, seems to me a necessary
precondition for any political struggle against violence and for a non-violent society. My
focus, then, is on the decision to violate - not just in circumstances where violence is conspicuous by its
damage, but in every situation where the choice to violate presents itself. This means a change from the
accustomed perspective on violence to the context where decisions for actions are being made, as it
were 'before' their consequences become apparent, and which we may not recognize as contexts of
violence. Our political analyses of sexual or racist violence have necessarily concentrated on situations where the power disequilibrium
between perpetrator and victim is extreme, where, in particular, it is supported by social power structures such as male and/or white
supremacy, so that not only is the violence unlikely to receive sanctions, but on the contrary, the perpetrator will find support rather than the
victim. Violence,
however, is a possibility wherever there is freedom of action, however limited. Such
violence may 'look' different, not least because the possibilities for resistance may also be greater in
situations where there is relative freedom of action also on the part of the other agent, that is, the
violator's envisaged victim. The feminist critique of sexism, together with our early recognition of the necessity of raising our own
consciousness, constitutes an understanding that ideology itself is a site of power and the abuse of power — that is, that our own thinking and,
by extension, our own behaviour are already a primary area for a liberatory politics. More- over, a
politics aiming at social equality
and relations between equals should make it its central concern to reflect upon the structure of such
relations — what it means to relate to others as equals. We have analyzed and made a critique of abusive behaviour, where
men choose to treat women as unequals, or whites to treat Black people as unequals, being able to do so with sanctioned impunity. This would
imply an analysis also of action and behaviour which by contrast is based on choosing equality — in particular, choosing to grant equality to
others, choosing not to violate others in situations which-permit that choice, all the more so as it is our conviction that it is not people who are
(by virtue of their 'identity') unequal, whom we then necessarily relate to as 'unequals', but that inequality is a matter of treating and being
treated unequally. Conversely, we cannot assume that if there are two 'equals', their relations will, necessarily be (or remain) equal. Rather, we
should investigate how relationships of potential equality may, through the action of one or the other or both agents involved, be restructured
into relations of dominance and submission. Action
— and/especially the will to power and violence — is a vital
factor in the continually changing 'structure' of a relationship, combining with those factors we
normally consider to constitute the structural context of the relation. This means engaging also with
the discourses which construct violence as a phenomenon but obliterate the agent's decision to violate.
Our unwillingness to recognize the will of those who act violently as their will to act violently, our
readiness to exonerate violent behaviour by means of spurious explanations, not only betrays our
primary identification with the subjects of violence and our lack of solidarity with the victims. It is itself
an act of violence: the exercise of ideological violence, of the power of a discourse which legitimates
violence, stigmatizes the victims, and treats people not as the agents of their own actions but as
material lor ('our') social policy. Ideology, however, is not just made by others; we are all of us subjects
of ideology — as the producers of our own thinking and as the recipients of other people's discourse —
unless we resist such ideological structures of thought and discourse in a continual critique of
ideology itself.
The alternative is to analyze violence through the lens of equality and
inequality.
My focus, then, is on the decision to violate - not just in circumstances where violence is
conspicuous by its damage, but in every situation where the choice to violate presents itself. This
means a change from the accustomed perspective on violence to the context where decisions for actions are
being made, as it were 'before' their consequences become apparent , and which we may not recognize as
contexts of violence. Our political analyses of sexual or racist violence have necessarily concentrated on situations
where the power disequilibrium between perpetrator and victim is extreme , where, in particular, it is
supported by social power structures such as male and/or white supremacy, so that not only is the violence unlikely to receive
sanctions, but on the contrary, the perpetrator will find support rather than the victim. Violence, however, is a possibility wherever
there is freedom of action, however limited. Such violence may 'look' different, not least because the possibilities for resistance may
also be greater in situations where there is relative freedom of action also on the part of the other agent, that is, the violator's
envisaged victim.
The feminist critique of sexism, together with our early

recognition of the necessity of raising our own
consciousness, constitutes an understanding that ideology itself is a site of power and'the abuse
of power — that is, that our own thinking and, by extension, our own behaviour are already a primary
area for a liberatory politics. Moreover, a politics aiming at social equality and relations between equals should make it its
central concern to reflect upon the structure of such relations — what it means to relate to others as equals. We have analysed and
made a critique of abusive behaviour, where men choose to treat women as unequals, or whites to treat Black people as unequals,
being able to do so with sanctioned impunity. This would imply an analysis also of action and behaviour which by contrast is based
on choosing equality — in particular, choosing to grant equality to others, choosing not to violate others in
situations which-permit that choice, all the more so as it is our conviction that it is not people who are (by virtue of their 'identity')
unequal, whom we then necessarily relate to as 'unequals', but that inequality is a matter of treating and being
treated unequally. Conversely, we cannot assume that if there are two 'equals', their relations will, necessarily be (or remain)
equal. Rather, we should investigate how relationships of potential equality may , through the action of one
or the other or both agents involved, be restructured into relations of dominance and submission. Action —
and/especially the will to power and violence — is a vital factor in the continually changing 'structure' of a relationship, combining
with those factors we normally consider to constitute the structural context of the relation
The alt allows us to interact with everyday violence and thus has the potential
to solve. We have the potential to change the political landscape without
becoming people in power, just our everyday selves.
Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, Page 26) AK
So I
begin from the assumption that all of us, regardless of our relative positions within the social
power structure, do permanently have to decide how we are going to act in a given situation . We
have described in some considerable detail the many limitations on our freedom of action — it is the first thing (and often the only
one) that occurs to us in justifying our actions. But
each situation, save that of the absolute and ultimate
violence of our destruction, leaves scope for action, however minimal, which permits the decision to
consent to violence or to resist. The question remains how we use the opportunities for action
we have, and how we deal with the relative advantages which offer themselves. Here we face the decision to (ab)use
our power in our own interests and to our own advantage, or not to; here we face the choice to do violence to
others, or not to. It is a most political question, and a most political decision.
The way we talk here in this debate round is key to changing our subjectivity
and analyzing the potential courses of action, either as a solution or as a
collapse.
Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University, Page 17) AK
In the possibility of representing reality, in the access to the role of the speaking or thinking subject, lies the
power of representation — on the level of big politics as much as on the level of one's own
thinking and communication. This power implies a responsibility: the question how we are going
to use it. Are we going to abuse it in our own interest, enlarging and consolidating our power, and are we willing to do
violence to reality, including the reality of other people? Or are we going to use it in the interests of community
and communication, that is, in the common interest of understanding and action? Do we try to analyse and
understand reality, or to represent it in such a way that it turns out most advantageous to
ourselves, enabling decisions which seem justifiable and normal, yet which we would regard
differently if starting from a different representation of reality? It is a position of power which
everyone has access to — at least as the subjects of our own thinking and where we have the chance to speak. And it is a
position of power for which, in determining our actions, we are answerable, in terms of our responsibility for the consequences of
our thinking and our actions. It is a sphere of action, moreover, in relation to which an increasing number of women in the West also
inhabit positions of structural power and privilege, participating in the production of knowledge and public opinion.
AT Perms
Perm – Hybrids of liberal peacebuilding enable self-determination and respect
for rights – It’s already emerging
Richmond 10
(Oliver P. Richmond is a professor in the School of IR, University of St Andrews, UK, and Director
of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace May 10, 2010
https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/0305829810365017) JP
Marketisation removes protectionism making competition and so livelihoods very difficult for
new post-conflict entrants in the market system. Democratisation focuses politics on the party
system and its general and often nationalist agendas. Human rights supplant human needs. The
rule of law endorses all of this and protects private property and may even entrench socio-
economic inequality and a class system. International support, loans, grants, 113. Foucault,
‘What Is an Author?’. 114. Dreyfus, op. cit., 19. 115. This has certainly been very apparent in
many of the field sites I have worked in myself over the years. Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 38 (3) 688 advice, companies, peacekeepers, agencies and NGOs are
supposed to compensate for this removal of agency in these areas, and to focus on empowering
civil society, citizens and the state to operate within their confines. This sleight of hand is what
makes the everyday so important, and is what leads to the paradox of civil society and localised
forms of peacebuilding becoming platforms for deep, local-local resistance, however marginal,
and for the development of an agonism between the liberal and the local. On a positive note
this may form the basis of a new social contract. At the very least, considering the everyday in
both IR and in peacebuilding praxis requires that rather than being policy driven, elite driven,
externally driven and donor driven, that both are ‘context driven’. Here, the repoliticisation and
enabling of relatively autonomous agency necessary for democracy, rights, needs, justice and
culture and identity may occur. Contextually driven approaches require an empathetic response
between ‘liberals’ and ‘locals’ over their mutual and separate everyday norms, interests and
lives. It requires a detailed and ethnographic, not just securitised, or institutional, or statistical or
trend-based, understanding of each other’s positions and contexts. It opens up the world of the
local to IR, and to peacebuilding approaches, also perhaps re-enervating an emancipatory notion
of human security. It requires at the very most a thin version of the Habermasian approach to
discourse theory on the part of those engaged in what they see as a liberal, cosmopolitan
project,116 but preferably an engagement with the less easily essentialisable offerings of
Connolly on deterritorialisation, on the avoidance of othering and narcissistic difference, or on
the reconstruction and pluralisation of exclusive communities as we learn from Anderson.117 IR
should ‘stop operating on the assumption that observable diversity is but a veil over
fundamentally similar processes’,118 where the state, peace and agency might be easily
uncovered. The site of the everyday is probably not a place to reconstruct a single cosmopolitan
everyday or to aspire to communitarian boundaries, but instead represents pluralities which
meet, interact, integrate, react, resist, mediate and negotiate. This means in fact that there are
alternatives and significant modifications to the liberal agenda which are already intellectually
available and empirically observable. Hybrid forms of liberalism have emerged in theory and
practice, which are modified by their contact with the very local context that they claim does
not exist, is mistaken or insignificant. This indicates a local–liberal or liberal–local hybrid is
already emerging, 116. Linklater, ‘Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process’, 154: Connolly,
Identity/Difference, 218. 117. Anderson, op. cit. 118. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz,
Culture Troubles (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006), 327. Richmond: Resistance and the
Post-liberal Peace 689 constituting a shift towards a ‘post-liberal peace’. Some of these might be
seen to be relatively benevolent in terms of the ways in which they enable individual political
agency, respect for rights and provide for needs. Others are much darker and driven by minority
interests. This raises the question of whether the local and the liberal tend to repulse each
other, meaning that the hybrid is inevitably based on internal contradictions, or whether they
are attracted to each other, in which case hybridity is based on the production of new political
cultures and institutional paradigms. Both can occur, and, indeed, have occurred from Cambodia
to Afghanistan in recent peacebuilding operations.
Hidden Resistance is necessary and has a capacity for peace and reform
Chandler 13
(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster.
Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity: rethinking ‘hidden’ agency and ‘resistance’18 Feb
2013 https://www-tandfonline-
The assertions at play in current understandings of politics operating below the surface and
through ‘hidden’ agencies of resistance are quite astounding. Resistances may be hidden, as
Scott's research shows, they may be ‘mobile and transitory’ as Foucault suggests and may even
become ‘strategically codified’ to ‘make a revolution possible’, as he further
indicates6060 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction(London:
Penguin, 1981), 96.View all notes but, as suggested above, resistance can never become the
ontological limit to liberal universal ideals without the rejection of any understanding of the
importance of structures of economic and social relations.6161 This logic will be drawn out
further towards the end of this section.View all notes It seems that Foucault's much quoted
statement on the imbrication of power and resistance has been turned into a reification of
resistance as marking the limit to liberal aspirations and linear understandings. In fact, the
actual articulation in his sentence is this: ‘Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or
rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to
power.’6262 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1, 95. Power cannot be
conceptualised without resistance, without a strategic problematic enabling power to project
itself and to ‘secure’ itself through its operation. This is why, for Foucault, power needed and
produced ‘resistance’ (see further, Foucault, Security, Territory, Population). In this reading, it
could be argued that the boom in ‘resistance’ studies (and their funding by the European Union
and other bodies) highlights that there is a ‘resistance’ problem, a discursive field through which
new techniques of peacebuilding intervention are emerging.View all notes
It seems that (in an entirely opposite reading to that of Foucault) it is a ‘relationship of

exteriority’ that drives the search for ‘hidden agency’ in the sphere of the ‘local’. This approach
is probably best exemplified in the work of Oliver Richmond who argues that International
Relations, as a discipline, ‘needs a theory of resistance’6363 Richmond, ‘Critical Agency,
Resistance and a Post-Colonial Civil Society’, 421.View all notes and that, along the lines of Scott,
the discipline's lack of attention to ‘hidden capacity and resistant agency’ means that the real
workings of politics are ignored. That, in fact, ‘hidden resistance’ is entirely exterior to liberal
power: akin to the dark matter of physics, upon which the world itself depends; forming ‘a
massive percentage of the scale of all capacity for reform, development, justice, institutions,
civil society, rights, needs, peace and emancipation’.6464 Ibid., 424.View all notes It is thereby
hidden resistance which explains the limits to external projects of intervention, operating as ‘a
conglomeration or aggregation of fragmented and hidden everyday forms of resistance’, which
‘cannot be seen or easily resisted by power’ or co-opted by it, yet is capable of agency and
‘holds power to account and illustrates the limits of its sovereignty’.6565 Ibid., 433.View all
notes
The need for theory to understand ‘resistance’ is thereby of prime importance; Richmond sets
out the new research agenda thus:
It has now become axiomatic in several other disciplines that the sum of disaggregated,
uncoordinated and fragmented, hidden, disguised and marginal agencies represents a significant
totality. It is not homogenous, unidirectional or unilevel, but still it is almost impossible to
predict or to countermand. It represents decentralized, bottom–up and grass-roots forms of
identity, culture and legitimacy, and a capacity that disrupts hegemony.6666 Ibid., 434.View all
notes
Non-linear approaches, bringing a variety of self-reproducing frameworks of explanation to bear

on the reproduction of cultural and ideational barriers to peacebuilding success, have
increasingly come to dominate the academic and policy agendas in the 2000s. Non-linear and
hybrid approaches reflect well the sense of limits in today's world. However, they tend to reify
or to naturalise these limits as somehow inherent in the world and beyond the reach of liberal
reason.6767 See, for example, Popolo, A New Science of International Relations, 128.View all
notes The limits of peacebuilding can therefore be understood as a product of the hubristic
linear thinking of Western modernity rather than as economic and social structural problems
eliciting the possibility of social transformation. Resistance articulated as the limits of liberal
aspirations for democracy and peace thereby no longer needs the transformative political
agency of subjects. It is for this reason that Oliver Richmond can suggest that resistant agency is
a vital determining factor, much as the dark matter of space. This agency is resistant objectively,
in its mode of life or being, regardless of subjective political actions or demands.
Once we understand resistance or the limits of liberal peacebuilding aspirations as objective

aspects of the world, then it is easy to understand how the academic boom in ‘resistance
studies’ articulates these assumptions.6868 See, for example, Hollander and Einwohner,
‘Conceptualizing Resistance’; Catherine Eschler and Bice Maiguashca, eds., Critical Theories,
International Relations and ‘the Anti-Globalisation Movement’: The Politics of Global
Resistance(London: Routledge, 2005); Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal
Peace’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38, no. 3 (2010): 665–92; Oliver P.
Richmond and Stephanie Kappler, ‘Peacebuilding and Culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Resistance or Emancipation?’, Security Dialogue 42, no. 3 (2011): 261–78.View all
notes Resistance as an objective characteristic of the world beyond the focus of the linear
epistemes of liberal modernity needs no politics.6969 For example, Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri give ontological priority to resistance rather than to power, enabling the ‘Multitude’ to
resist ‘Empire’ through the nature of their biopolitical being rather than traditional political
forms of organisation, which remain trapped in territorial understandings; see Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire(London: Penguin,
2005), 315.View all notes It is for this reason that complexity and new materialist approaches
can further dilute our understandings of agency and resistance to suggest that non-human
actors can also be seen to ‘resist’ and ‘undermine’ the linear causal assumptions at the base of
international policy making.7070 See, for example, Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political
Ecology of Things(London: Duke University Press, 2010); William Connolly, A World of
Becoming(London: Duke University Press, 2011); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An
Introduction to Actor-Network Theory(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).View all
notesWhereas the old ‘historical materialism’ understood that the structuring of inequalities
was amenable to conscious human transformation, the world of agency of the ‘new’ materialism
lacks the possibilities for structural change. The actor-network framework of Bruno Latour is a
good example of this approach, where social explanation needs the ‘missing masses’ – both
human and non-human – whose ‘hidden’ influence is seen in the uncertainties and
contingencies of the world.7171 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 241–6.View all notes
In this way, non-linear approaches explain the limits of liberal linear reason as a product of the
objective complexity of assemblages or associations of human and non-human actors, in a flat
world of ‘quasi-objects and quasi-subjects’. Latour's ontology is the same as that of Richmond's
in his insistence that the ‘dark matter’ or ‘plasma’ of the world, untouched by the social sciences
of liberal modernity, is the key to overcoming our ‘astronomical ignorance’ and the hubristic
fantasies created by this. Latour differs merely in his understanding that this ‘vast hinterland’ is
limited and bordered by the lack of inclusion of both human and non-human actors or agents
and also in his more radical challenge to liberal linearity, in his assertion that these excluded
agencies are ‘not hidden, simply unknown’ (emphasis in original).7272 Ibid., 244. However,
neither Richmond nor Latour renounce the possibility of knowing or tracing these hidden agents
through the use of more anthropologically grounded approaches.View all notes In this ontology,
it is the ‘recalcitrance’ of being itself that resists liberal linear framings rather than conscious or
intentional political activity on behalf of the subject.7373 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How
to Bring the Sciences into Democracy(London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 81.View all notes
No perm – Hybrids of liberal peace exploits the “local” and fail

MacGinty and Richmond 13
(Roger Mac Ginty is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Humanitarian and Conflict
Response Institute, and in the Department of Politics, University of Manchester Oliver P
Richmond is a Research Professor in ir, Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of
Manchester. He is also International Professor, College of International Studies The Local Turn in
Peace Building: a critical agenda for peace 24 Jun 2013 https://www-tandfonline-
Obstacles to the local turn in peace building
Many of the obstacles to the local turn have already been touched upon, so this section will
provide a brief summary. Most of the obstacles are structural and are embedded in the fabric of
the liberal peace and the political economies that underpin it. Four obstacles are worth
mentioning. First, there is a trend towards the standardisation of peace building interventions.
This isomorphism can be seen through the spread of technocracy, the professionalisation of
staff, the promotion of ‘best practice’ and the spread of common conflict analysis
frameworks.53 53 R Mac Ginty, ‘Routine peace: technocracy and peacebuilding’, Cooperation
and Conflict, 47(3), 2012, pp 287–308.View all notesMuch of this is influenced by neoliberal
management frameworks as opposed to a humanitarian ethic, solidarity or empathy with the
subject. There is also a tension between these and more liberal-institutionalist approaches to
world order (see the tension between the World Bank and the UN, for example: the latter is
wary of neoliberalism). The practice and discourse of peace building have yet to agree on an
equivalent to the Sphere standards that seek to standardise humanitarian practice, 54 54
Sphere Project, The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Disaster Response, London: Sphere Project, 2011.View all notesthough they do profess to ‘local
ownership’ and to ‘do no harm’. 55 55 MB Anderson, Do No Harm, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1999.View all notesThere are, however, strong trends towards standardisation which risk
crowding out local approaches and seeing local variation as deviating from the norm. It might be
said that what was once criticised as a form of distant and unaccountable governance of post-
conflict zones for a negative peace, which appeared to represent governmentality to its subject,
has now, since the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, developed into a far more aggressive and
insensitive form of structural power from the local perspective. We are sure that this is
unintended on the part of the liberal peace architecture, but strategic interests and
securitisation after the start of the ‘war on terror’ have also seeped carelessly into peace
building and development. As Chabal notes, this seepage of power has been a mark of Western
liberal visions of world order—from imperialism to the liberal peace. 56 56 Chabal, The End of
Conceit.View all notesOne of the main implications of this requires policy makers,
administrators and field-officers to put their subjects first (ie to engage with them at least as
partners) and to find ways of preventing strategic, political, ideological or normative interests
and preferences, driven by state elites, key donors or hegemonic states, from undermining the
subjects’ needs and rights in any peace process.
A second obstacle, and one already mentioned, is that the local turn contradicts the
universalism that lies at the heart of liberal optimism and notions of universal rights. By
awarding legitimacy to local norms and practices, some of which might significantly deviate from
liberal norms, the legitimacy of universal projects may be undermined. This requires that the
West see its own universalism and rationalities associated with peace as local to itself, and any
attempt to negotiate with a broader array of actors than has hitherto occurred should accept
that a thin universalism containing acute (and often agonistic) difference is both realistic and
ethical if all subjects are to recognised and represented (the supposed aim of the liberal peace).
A third obstacle comes in the form of the epistemologies and research antennae used by key
actors in the liberal peace to see local situations. Quite simply, many proponents of the liberal
peace find it difficult to see the local. Reporting mechanisms used by international organisations
and Ingos, for instance, often use standardised formats that are unable to fully capture local
nuances. Often local dynamics are too diffuse and complicated to be conveyed in tick-box or
other formats that seek to standardise information. Finally, a major threat to the local turn is
that it is co-opted and neutralised by orthodox, internationally designed, funded and promoted
approaches to peace building. Orthodox approaches to peace building are often able to wield
significant material power (access to power, resources and legitimacy). This is tempting for
many local civil society actors, although to access these resources they often have to conform to
practices, norms and language dictated by donors. Agencies such as the United Nations
Development Programme (undp) have long been aware of this but have found it difficult to
respond fully. The humanitarian and peace building worlds see a constant trade-off whereby
local actors negotiate with international standards, often in the context of a lack of security and
material resources. The results are often hybrid forms of peace and politics, in which the local
and the international interact to form fusion practices. Often the international is unsatisfied with
these because compromise with the local appears to undermine Western liberal norms or
neoliberal frameworks. In this relationship the material power held by liberal peace actors may
be enough to ‘discipline’ or ‘tame’ local actors, although there is plenty of evidence of local
actors subverting, exploiting delaying and negotiating with the international. A recognition of
the realities of the hybrid forms of peace that are emerging from Timor-Leste to Afghanistan is
not an apology for the failings of liberal peace building or neoliberal state building or a
celebration of their continued disciplining of their subjects. Neither should it hide the fact that
many scientifically accepted causal factors of conflict are generally ignored by liberal peace’s
supporters, such as material local and global inequality, the weakness of markets in regions of
instability, or the global arms trade.
We discern from local agency and its relationship with hybrid forms of peace an attempt to
redefine what peace and legitimacy mean in different contexts, to maintain everyday life, to
gain autonomy, aspirations for social forms of justice, to express identity, and to engage with
certain aspects of the liberal peace. We also discern a failing or refusal on the part of
international actors—in their public transcripts at least—involved in peace building and state
building to acknowledge their accountability to local subjects or to refrain from naturalising
international and local hierarchies (at the professional as well as political level). Similarly they
often use unaccountable executive power in ways that compromise the ethics of peace building
(ie no experimentation on human subjects, placing the last first, doing no harm, and seeing their
role as one of public service that enables locally acceptable forms of peace). 5757
Chambers, Rural Development.View all notes
This is problematic also from the international’s own rights and democracy-based perspective. It
effectively denies political agency, as with Paris’s ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’
strategy (which could be said to draw its heritage from the late period of liberal imperialism, as
well as from the likes of Huntington’s concerns about the dangers of rapid
democratisation). 5858 SP Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, Norman, OK: 1991; and Paris, At War’s End.View all notesGiven that many conflicts
relate to material, structural or identity inequalities, these are obscured by the unwillingness to
take seriously the local. In addition many conflicts also have a self-determination element
(which may be secessionist), and although this is seen to be legitimate in a national sense by
internationals, it is denied where it is partitionist in a local sense. This represents a key form of
the denial of the local, as in Cyprus, or Sudan (until recently). Thus, the evidence is mounting
that denying the local and its rights or historical identity, as well as preventing justice across the
international, as well as history and society, is designed to naturalise the current international
order, to de-emphasise historical injustice, inequality and social justice, and to maintain
executive decision-making power in the hands of a global elite which is Northern and
transnational. Yet such public transcripts are often not supported in the private transcripts of
the international civil service of professional and bureaucratic actors, donors, UN agencies, and
Ingos involved in attempting to build peace and the state in the world’s conflict zones, who also
couch their roles in terms of local emancipation and empathy.
AT Not Real World
Positive peace education is an empirically effective method of ethical subject
formation – engagement in activities like debate is crucial to access spill up
claims
In conclusion, our study demonstrated the pedagogical potential of an everyday peace framework . In examining how
students define everyday peace and apply the concept to their immediate environments, we found
that the student participants began to challenge normative assumptions about violence, nation
state, and peace. Remarkably, student participants began to anticipate ways in which the lessons
learned in the classroom might be generalized to their future professional and community
settings. They demonstrated an emerging understanding of the ways in which macro-level
policies translate into micro-level practices and experiences. Peace then is no longer a lofty end
goal to be strived for elsewhere in the world; rather it is viewed as an ongoing process
embedded in everyday practices. Our study thus 32 points to the potential of an everyday peace
framework to inform the ways in which students come to interpret their world in more informed,
critical, and empathic ways. Although this study is exploratory and involves a small number of participants, it opens up the
space for an ecologically informed notion of peace that focuses on the interplay between the
local and global. The everyday peace framework may be used at various stages of peace
education curricula, whether to introduce and orient students to core principles of peace education or to
apply the principles to proximal and distal contexts . To that end, we hope that this work will generate greater
interest in and support for the study of more contextualized and collaborative approaches to peace education. In future work, we
hope to expand the everyday peace approach to curricula in related fields such as community
psychology, education, and social work, while also exploring it as a vehicle for community and
civic engagement.
Positive peace building can function in the real world through Participatory
action research (PAR) in order to teach students the practical applications of
critical framework
Our concept of everyday peace includes both process ( e.g., democratic engagement and community building
processes) and outcome (e.g., shared vision of peace grounded in local contexts) components in an iterative
relationship. Participatory action research (PAR) approaches provide a critical framework
to engage both these elements of everyday peace. PAR approaches combine ‘theory,
action, and participation committed to further the interests of exploited groups and
classes’ (Fals-Borda 1987, 329). Although PAR approaches have developed in a diversity of fields, there are some basic tenets
that characterize PAR approaches. These include the grounding of research within disenfranchised
communities, collective investigation of community problems, the desire to take
individual and collective action to address the structural roots of particular problems,
and effect positive social change (Brydon-Miller 1997; Fals-Borda and Rahman 1991; McIntyre 2008). In PAR,
traditional research subjects are repositioned as critical inquirers so that these individuals
or groups actively craft the research agenda from framing research questions to analysis and dissemination of
findings (Brydon-Miller 1997; Cammarota and Fine 2008; McTaggart and Kemmis 1988). Central to PAR’s notion of knowledge
generation, lies the development of critical consciousness through repeated cycles of action and reflection (Brydon-Miller 1997).
The goal of PAR is to arrive at emancipatory, locally relevant, and collectively produced
and owned knowledge by combining transformative education, inquiry, and action
(BrydonMiller 1997; Fals-Borda 1987; Torre and Fine 2011). From its roots in critical pedagogy to its emphasis on democratic inquiry,
PAR has crucial parallels with the everyday peace 6 framework. Specifically, PAR approaches
employ a rights-based approach to research that recognizes the vital role of the capacity to make strategic
inquiries and gain strategic knowledge in order to exercise democratic citizenship (Appadurai 2006; Fine and Torre 2006); something
that is consistent with the agenda of an everyday peace project. Many empirical
studies attest to the
empowering potential of PAR. Documented positive impact of PAR include enhanced critical
consciousness, health promotion, challenging social exclusion, prevention of
community-level violence, building critical youth capacities, as well as creating new
theoretical possibilities (Cahill and Hart 2007; FosterFishman et al. 2005; Torre and Fine, 2006; Wang 1999; Zimmerman
et al., 2011). PAR approaches have been used extensively by M. Brinton Lykes (1994, 1997, 2013) in
her peacebuilding work in Latin America, especially in collaborative community-based
work that focuses on capacities and rights of individuals and groups who resist
structural oppression. Another example of the effectiveness of PAR in peacebuilding may be found in
transforming mediation practices in Nepal (Lederach and Thapa 2012). Participatory action research strategies
may then be employed to collectively investigate and build a concept of everyday peace that is context specific and meaningful to
the groups involved. When applied to peace pedagogy, this means restructuring the classroom
according to principles of PAR, engaging students as key stakeholders in a collective
process of conceptualizing what everyday peace means to them. The multiple perspectives that
individual students bring in would deepen the resultant understanding of peace. PAR approaches thus represent a
systematic approach for engaging students in everyday peace praxis, engendering
educational experiences that are not only rigorous but also relevant and meaningful to
their lives.
many conflicts manifest in academic spaces like debate, and it is in these spaces
we should begin a comprehensive practice of peace education and individual
peace pedagogy – prioritize it
In today’s global situation, the issue of living together in peace and harmony is increasingly
crucial and has become a challenge for all, including the education sector. Many approaches, methods and models have been put
in place to encourage learners develop the necessary knowledge and skills required to prevent and solve conflicts as responsible
citizens. Because studies have revealed that anger and juvenile violence are among the common
issues faced by teachers and school psychologists [1]. Education institutions are now being
considered as places that can improve or worsen a community’s peace situation because a
school is the most appropriate channel or vechile that can foster the development of a peaceful and
or harmonious society. It is believed that through peace pedagogy violent acts can diminish from our
communities which have been known for quit a long time to be emerging from local communities ( i.e., conflicts) [2]. Hence, it
has not been difficult to find fights, bullying, and conflicts among adolescents [ 3] within the local communities and also now in our
schools and course classrooms. Jacques Delors the Chief of International Commisions on Education for the Twenty-first Century
presents a similar idea in a UNESCO report of 2006 of “ learning to live together, learning to live with others. This type of learning is
probably one of the major issues in education today because education institutions receive people from the different backgrounds,
who are then entrusted to teachers as custodian, being forced to deal with the varying and direct effects of anger and aggression
such as violent threats and conflicts among learners, but also indirect effects such as learning difficulties and personal adjustment
[1]. The long-term strategic plan of Indonesia is to encourage long-term “peace education ” and “global
education”, namely, peace education that is expected to help solve global problems. The most significant
strategy to promote a culture of peace is through peace education [4]. Peace education (education for
peace) aims to develop learning that support social cohesion, justice, and the preservation of the
environment according to Salomon and Nevo, 2002, and Wenden, 2004, in [5]. Education in general and schooling in
particular play an important role in creating “structural violence”, namely, the unbalanced and
oppressive socialeconomic and political relations according to Galtung in [6]. In practice, peace education
has five characteristics: transformative, process-centered, participatory, relational and
sustainable. In the Indonesian education system, from kindergarten to university level, there is no program or educational
services that explicitly develops values of peace. In the context of conflict it is suggested, that “ there is no doubt of the
real need for a comprehensive conflict resolution programs in the school”. A more assertive statement
can be found [9] that “a comprehensive conflict resolution program promotes a safe school
environment that permits optimal personal growth and learning” . It has been recommended [10] that
schools should plan, implement and evaluate peace curriculum. Learners are given knowledge about personal development, social
skills, as well as feeling peace with themselves in the school environment, family and community. Based on these considerations, the
existence of educational models that can foster a culture of peace in schools is a necessity. Up to now, the development of
peace pedagogy does not yet have a solid platform and basis as it is still in the pilot stage despite the everday
practice of those values in education. The local wisdom values should be re-examined and developed as social capital within the
framework of creating a peaceful life that is characterized by the presence of harmony with ourselves, with others and the
environment. The
results of the first year research have formulated a model of peace pedagogy to build
a culture of peace in formal education. This model was built through the integration of
theoretical studies about the peace education program models that have been implemented in
developed countries in Europe and Asia, with the focus on empirical studies related to the
culture of peace in the school and community. The research problem is whether the model of pedagogy of peace
has a high feasibility to be implemented to develop peace culture in formal education. In general, this study aims to construct a
model of peace pedagogy in order to foster a culture of peace at formal education level. It is intended to assess the feasibility of the
model and introduce it to the educational stakeholders at school level in order to develop a support system for its holistic model
implementation.
AT State Good
State bad for achieving positive peace
Anderson 18 Gordon L. Anderson is an American philosopher publishing executive and the author
of Philosophy of the United State and Secretary General of Professors World Peace Academy. (Anderson,
Gordon L.International Journal on World Peace; New York Vol. 35, Iss. 2, (Jun 2018): 3-5.)//SN
The solution is to reengage the discussion of transcendent values that are inherently related to
positive peace. Transcendent values include human ideals and goals that transcend current
reality. If scholarship related to current reality is fixated on power relations, then the field of
peace research cannot make substantial progress towards any economic or social goals.
Gelot explains Judeo-Christian transcendent values underlie the values of positive peace
highlighted by the social sciences and humanities. This includes the values and virtues that
derive from the practice of love. Peace research needs to adopt an ontology that includes
transcendence in order to go beyond the shackles that stop us from conceiving peace as more
than not war.
The Millennial Development Goals relate to values associated with "positive peace." Our third
article, by Dizdza et al., focuses on the role of education in reducing poverty, with Ghana as a
case study. Poverty reduction is UN Millennial Development Goal 1 and Achieving Universal
Primary Education is Goal 2. Education breaks the cycle of poverty, halts the spread of
inequality, and leads to sustainable development. However, education is expensive, creating
insurmountable barriers in impoverished countries in Africa.
At a higher level of education, the chances of a person being non-poor increase, and being a
public servant provides an advantage in retaining a position above the poverty line compared to
the people employed in agriculture. This research validates the need for Ghana to emphasize
access to both primary and secondary education by providing infrastructure, free education, and
training for teachers at the various level of education.
The authors compared the income in the service sector, which requires a higher level of
education, to subsistence agriculture where poverty is the highest. Developing economies have
a difficult time competing with already industrialized economies, so the major growth areas are
construction, transportation, tourism, and other services. Education for skills in these areas is
important.
Other UN Millennial Development goals include promoting gender equality, reducing child
mortality, improving maternal health, combatting disease, environmental sustainability, and
global partnerships for development. Many other items can be added to this list to better
understand and track progress towards "positive peace."
If the global peace index of economies drives home any single point, it is that "positive peace"
cannot be developed unless "negative peace" already exists. Negative peace-physical security
and human rights-is achieved through law and government force. Positive peace cannot be
achieved by force, yet many people naively ask the government to provide it, and think
passing a law will force other people to be more productive or serving. However, the cultural
and economic spheres, not the government, are responsible for the elements of positive peace.
Aff Answers
Perm/link turn: the aff is an example of negative peace, which is net beneficial
and can function with peace education in a world of positive peace
Grewal 03 (Baljit, affiliated with the school of science, Auckland university of technology, evaluating
writing of Johan Galtung, the first person to use the term “positive peace” and a leader in the peace
theory research field, “Johan Galtung: Positive and Negative Peace,”
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/4264714/positive_negative_peace.pdf?response-
content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DJohan_Galtung_Positive_and_Negative_Peac.pdf&X-Amz-
Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20190712%2Fus-east-
1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20190712T194318Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-
SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-
Signature=04fe6e8b737281fc5c598b6f9ecafe2569bd8a0532529cd5487a537c4be80e9a 8/30/2003) EEG
In this essay, I will describe the differences between two
aspects of peace, derived from peace theory and
relevant to social and political philosophy, known as positive and negative peace. These terms
were first introduced by one of the founders and main figure in peace research, Johan Galtung
(1964), in the Editorial to the founding edition of the Journal of Peace Research in 1964. The editorial piece was aimed at clarifying
the philosophy of peace research, according to the Peace Research Institute, Oslo who published the journal. The
history of
the divide between positive and negative peace stems from 1950’s when peace research was
too heavily focused on direct violence, such as assault and warfare and was dominated by the North
Americans. The Oslo Peace Research Institute and the journal JPR were a source of fresh insights in peace theory. In the 1960’s,
Galtung expanded the concepts of peace and violence to include indirect or structural violence,
and this was a direct challenge to the prevalent notions about the nature of peace. The expanded definition of violence
led to an expanded definition of peace. According to Galtung, peace research is a research into the
conditions for moving closer to peace or at least not drifting closer to violence Thus, negative
peace “is the absence of violence, absence of war”, and positive peace “is the integration of
human society” (1964, p.2). It must be noted that in 1964 Galtung did not specifically mention the word structural violence but
human integration. Further, these two types of peace are to be conceived as two separate dimensions,
where one is possible without the other. Negative peace is what we see in a world dominated
by one nation or a United Nations who are equipped with coercive power and readiness to
use it, which maybe used to bring about integration (positive peace). Galtung believes that
this method is not going to work without general and complete disarmament. Examples of
peace policies and proposals in this tradition are multilateralism, arms control, international
conventions (Geneva Conventions), balance of power strategies, and so on. Examples of positive peace
policies and proposals include improved human understanding through communication, peace education, international cooperation,
dispute resolution, arbitration, conflict management, and so on.
Thus, we can see that peace research , from Galtung’s
(original 1964 position) perspective, is peace “search” and it values theoretical consistency of norms and
values more than empirical validation. In addition, whereas negative peace is shown to be pessimistic, positive peace
is optimistic. According to Galtung (1985) the inspiration behind the original positive peace idea was the health sciences, where
heath can be seen as a mere absence of disease as well as something more positive: making the body capable of resisting disease.
Likewise, two types of remedies obtaining from health analogy are useful for peace research: curative
aimed at negative peace and preventative aimed at positive peace . Similarly, the role of peace
studies is to study both negative as well as positive aspects of peace, both the conditions for
absence of violence and conditions for peace. In the next sections we will look at what peace theory has to say
about peace, conflict, and violence and their relation to positive and negative peace.
Alt fails – nonviolence will never reach enough people to be a successful
revolutionary practice and violent principles are too entrenched in places like
educational institutions
Gan and Holmes 12 (Barry Gan, professor at st. Bonaventure university and Robert Holmes,
Professor at Emeritus, University of Rochester; “Nonviolence in theory and practice” third
edition) EEG
In Plato’s dialogue Crito, Socrates says: “this opinion [that we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to
anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him] has never been held, and never will be held by any
considerable number of persons.” Indeed, and unfortunately, Socrates may be correct. The opening paragraphs
of this preface to the first edition of this anthology bear further witness to his claims because they are as accurate today
as when originally written twenty-two years ago: nonviolence has yet to emerge fully into the light of
recognition in institutions of higher learning. One can learn about violence in its various forms: courses
abound on the history of this or that war or revolution or, in colleges or universities with ROTC units, about military
history, tactics, and strategy. In most major universities, one can even receive military training and
instruction, for credit, given by military personnel holding professorships. But relatively few such institutions
have courses in which students can learn about the alternative that nonviolence presents to the
whole set of assumptions, attitudes, and values that are taken for granted in our history and culture.
the aff is one of many reforms that must be made within the state before we do
the kritik and can create a new world order
Temple 93 (Joseph, Associate Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Anthropology/Sociology
Department and Peace and Justice Studies Program at Tufts University. “Peace Politics” it’s a book) EEG
the war system in the United States is linked to alarming trends in the
Currently,
developing world including the destruction of rain forests, poverty, and the debt
crisis. Among the results are violence, threats to democracy, global warming, and the drug
trade. In building a new world order premised on common security, Washington should
instead pursue human rights, environmental protection, stronger mechanisms of
conflict resolution, and a form of international development that will strengthen our
own economy while providing greater global justice. Achieving national security
in concert with the rest of the world will require dramatic reductions in global
militarization. Cutting arms expenditures and limiting the influence of military
factors in global politics does not, in itself constitute peace. But these measures form the threshold
that must be crossed before the full range of world and domestic reforms can be
effectively pursued. A new world order cannot be built around continued global
military expenditures of $1 trillion a year. Nor can it be built around military
expenditures in the U.S. of $250 billion to $300 billion a year.
Peace pedagogy fails as an educational praxis – multiple studies
Based on observations during the implementation of the model and the results of interviews with teachers, a temporary
conclusion can be drawn that the integrated implementation of the peace pedagogy model in
these subjects and guidance and counseling has not worked as planned. For example, in the biology class discussing about “the
circulatory system” fully explains the substance of the subject, despite the fact that there is little room to incorporate issues of peace
when discussing the impact of unbalanced blood cells of the body. The atmosphere during the hectic learning even tends to fuss, so
many times the teacher had to say, 'listen to this first' in an attempt to create a conducive atmosphere. The cozy atmosphere did not
students return to divided attention, chatting with friends, dozing, even doing things
last long as
that are not related to the subject . Noisy classroom was always uncontrolable, respectful behavior only
materialized when the teacher complements a student after a student posed an idea. Ironical
phrases such as “you’re noisy” during the learning activity were used and quite often taken as a joke by the students. The
implementation of the model in the counseling and guidance services was done by discussing the topic of 'cooperation and
tolerance' and 'problem solving'. Experiential efforts were made by the teacher through games like 'Matches Tower'. After going
through the preliminary stages of group formation, the students formed a 'tower of matches' within 10 minutes. Once the game was
over, there was no elaboration or counsel on the moral and values of the game, especially those associated with building a safe and
peaceful class. On the topic of 'finishing', at one stage the teacher was to provide students with worksheets that contain conflict
In groups, the students were encouraged to find alternative solutions to
situations faced by students.
conflict situations. At the end of each session, group representatives present the results of their
analysis. Just like the previous session, the supervising teacher was not able to explain the essence of the
conflict faced by students and how best to look for alternative solutions. The apparent weaknesses can be
seen in the teacher ’s effort to generalize and infer group activities in relation to peace issues in the context of the students’
daily life. The model in the Indonesian language class was implemented by discussion in the topic of 'writing rhymes'. Typical of the
Indonesian class, the teacher began by greeting, checking the student attendance and saying, 'be quiet, ok”. The lesson began with
playing a video about the poem, during the activity, the atmosphere was noisy, students talked to each other, students occupied
with a flurry of their own, some even commented about video. There was also a female student who touched the arm and head of a
boy and pushed it saying 'why'. After students finished writing rhymes in groups, each group performed in front of the class by
reading their rhyme. During the presentation, the other students were noisy, engaged in other activities while occasionally laughing
and commenting, 'it’s funny...'. The teacher responded to the students' comments by saying 'be quiet, listen!'. The lesson closed
with a question by the teacher whether the poem was written by a fine and virtuous friend. Just like in other subjects, the teacher
does not draw inferences of the subject to building a safe and peaceful classroom climate. In the Arts and Culture class, the model
was not implemented in accordance with the existing guidelines. However, there were a few things noted about the learning
activities in this class. First, the class was managed in a form of cooperative learning where students work in groups to complete the
tasks assigned by the teacher. Second, students showed enthusiasm to accomplish their tasks even though the task completion was
there
spontaneous. Third, occasionally teachers helped students complete their assignments in the form of song creation. Fourth,
was no action or activity that specifically led to the cultivation of attitudes or values of peace, but
there were only a few keywords related to attitudes and values, like appreciation and respect. Both of these keywords are already
important components in the process of learning art and culture. The History class was managed in a classical process. At the time of
observation, the lesson being taught was about the period of the establishment of independence fighting organizations. Teachers
simply asked students to work together to find information about when and where those organizations and movements were
established. Cooperation became an important feature in this class but there was no process or activity that showed how the values
Overall, this class was not able to implement a model of peace
of peace were applied in the classroom.
with good pedagogy. In this case, the teacher was not ready to apply the model. In general, the
results of the model show that the safe and peaceful classroom climate as an ultimate goal was
not created. There are many perspectives to explain these finding s, among others, from the substance of
the model, the readiness of the teacher and student to participate . From the technical side of research, the
implementation of 14 classroom sessions is not a guarantee for changes in the climate. In terms of teachers, their understanding of
the model, classroom management skills, and role model in pedagogy of peace are among the obstacles. The next discussion focuses
more on the substance of the peace pedagogy and normative role of teachers in the context of peace pedagogy.
Hierarchies, and production of violence is inevitable in the international arena.
Stavrianakis 11 (Anna, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex, Journal
of International Relations and Development Volume 15, Number 2, Page 224) AK
Discussions of NGOs’ efforts are marked by a distinctively liberal understanding of civil society as an
increasingly global sphere separate from the state and market, promoting progressive and non-
violent social relations. However, there are significant conceptual and empirical problems with
these claims, which I illustrate using examples from contemporary NGO activism on the international production of and trade in
conventional weaponry. First, liberal accounts underplay the mutual dependence between the state,
market and civil society. NGO agency is both constrained and enabled by its historical, structural
grounding. Second, I argue for a more ambivalent understanding of NGOs’ progressive political value. While some NGOs
may play a role in counterhegemonic struggle, overall they are more likely to contribute to
hegemonic social formations. Third, liberal accounts of a global civil society inadequately capture
the reproduction of hierarchy in international relations, downplaying ongoing, systematic
patterns of North-South asymmetry. Fourth, the emphasis on the nonviolent nature of global civil
society sidelines the violence of capitalism and the state system , and serves as a means of disciplining
dissent and activism.
Assumptions of non-violent actions are false, they fail to identify the notions of
capital structures inherent in international relations.
of International Relations and Development Volume 15, Number 2, Page 225-6) AK
This literature is marked by a distinctively liberal orientation towards the role of agency and the
possibilities of an emancipatory future. Four particular dominant claims can be identified : that
civil society is a non-state, non-market sphere; that it is driven by progressive or emancipatory
values; that civil society is increasingly global; and that it is non-violent . However, there are significant
conceptual and empirical problems with these claims, which I illustrate using examples from contemporary NGO activism on the
arms trade. First, understanding
global civil society as separate from the state and market obscures
the role of the market in civil society and the mutual dependence among the three that is belied by
their formal separation. Privileging the agency of actors such as NGOs without grounding this in a historical, structural context that
both constrains and enables their prospects of success, hampers our understanding of NGO activism and misinterprets its
significance. Second, NGOs claim to be, and are understood in the liberal literature to be, driven by progressive or emancipatory
values. However, I argue for a more ambivalent understanding of NGOs’ progressive political value. While some individual NGOs may
play a role in counterhegemonic struggle, as a sector NGOs are more likely to contribute to hegemonic social
formations because of the capitalist character of civil society . Third, liberal accounts of a global
civil society inadequately capture the reproduction of hierarchy in international relations . Despite
disagreement as to whether civil society is global(ising) or transnational(ising), these arguments downplay ongoing,
systematic patterns of North-South asymmetry and have no means of overcoming them . Fourth,
the emphasis on the non-violent nature of global civil society in liberal accounts sidelines the
violence of capitalism and the state system, and serves as a means of disciplining dissent and
activism. Despite these limitations, the concept of global civil society remains powerful in scholarly and policymaking circles. A
key effect of the global civil society literature, and NGO practice itself, is to reproduce[s]
relations of hierarchy between the North and South. Both forms of practice facilitate
intervention in the South by a network of state and non-state actors predominantly from the
North while leaving the North under-scrutinised.
Non-violent alternatives fail.
The aim of this article is to understand the operation of the ‘remarkably fertile call-to-arms’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: vii) of the
concept, its discursive power and the practices that it facilitates. It does so via an analysis of the work of reformist, insider NGOs
based in the United Kingdom (U.K.) working on the international arms trade — in particular Amnesty International, Oxfam and
Saferworld — that dominate the political space available to NGOs and form a central pivot of wider international activism on the
arms trade.1 The argument that follows illustrates the
conceptual and empirical limitations to a liberal
approach that are, in my view, best remedied by a Marxist approach, drawing in particular on
the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony, and postcolonial critiques of
Eurocentrism. As demonstrated in more detail below, such an approach is superior historically, in that it
accounts for the social relations of the emergence of civil society, its strength in advanced liberal
capitalist societies and its apparent weakness in the South . It is more comprehensive empirically, in that it
requires us to pay[s] attention to additional facts beyond those included in liberal accounts, such
as the enmeshment of arms capital with the state and continuities in patterns of world military
spending. And more significantly, it gives a more robust explanation. NGOs have had some notable successes, as
documented below and emphasised by liberal scholars. However, difficult as these
achievements have been, their significance is overestimated and misinterpreted when viewed
through a liberal prism. Without analysis of record levels of world military spending under the War on Terror, and United
States (U.S.) predominance in this; of ongoing dominance of the international arms export market by the U.S., Russia, Western
European states and the persistence of North-South patterns of trade despite the end of the Cold War; of the role of small arms
proliferation in processes of war, state formation and capitalist development in the South; of continued North-South power
asymmetries in the NGO world; and without
an account of the way NGOs contribute to the reproduction
of these systemic patterns, liberal approaches fail to ask a series of pertinent questions, or
answer them only weakly. In short, a postcolonial Marxist approach helps us to understand why NGOs have not been able
to generate more significant and meaningful change in the arms trade since the end of the Cold War.
Non-state actors are inadequate to change violent acts, you must work within
the state.
In the case of the arms trade, understanding

the separation of civil society from the state to be formal
rather than substantive requires us to investigate empirically the relations between the state,
arms capital and NGOs. Existing accounts focus predominantly on the increasing influence that NGOs exercise in the post-
Cold War era, at the expense of analysis of the relationship between the state and arms capital (e.g. Brem and Rutherford 2001;
Krause 2002; Anders 2005; Garcia 2006). While a liberal
account could in principle also examine the influence
of arms companies on government policy, a pluralist approach to power that analyses the
relations between three spheres — the state, represented by government; the market,
personified by arms companies; and civil society, embodied by NGOs — and seeks to assess the
extent of the influence of non-state actors upon the state would be unable to give an adequate
explanation of the relative power of arms capital compared to NGOs, due to the different depth
and character of their relationship to the state. Instead, it is more fruitful to think of two networks of actors, one
comprising elements of the state and arms capital, the other consisting of weaker elements of the state allied to NGOs.
The first network stems from the integration of arms capital into the structures of the U.K. state
through a ‘revolving door’ between the state (in particular the Ministry of Defence (MoD) , both the
civilian bureaucracy and the military itself) and
military industry, and through high levels of arms company
representation on military advisory bodies. For example, former Defence Secretaries Michael Portillo, George
Robertson and Geoff Hoon, and former Defence Procurement Ministers Geoffrey Pattie and Jonathan Aitken, as well as a number of
other MoD staff and senior military personnel, have moved to senior positions in major arms companies such as BAE Systems,
Smiths and AgustaWestland after their time in public office (CAAT 2005). Numerous
other senior figures from the
civil service, political parties and the military have also gone on to work for arms-producing
companies and associated firms such as public relations companies. Examples include General Sir Mike
Jackson (former Chief of the General Staff, now chair of PA Consulting’s Defence Advisory Board), Sir Kevin Tebbit (former MoD
Permanent Secretary, now non-executive director of Smiths Group and Chairman of Finmeccanica) and Lord Levene (former Chief of
Defence Procurement, who went on to become Chairman of General Dynamics and President of the Defence Manufacturers’
Association). The movement from the MoD to arms companies amounts to ‘traffic’ between them, according to the Advisory
Committee on Business Appointments (quoted in CAAT n.d.).
Liberalism fails and contributes to violence because of their misunderstanding

of global community
Despite these four fallacies, global

civil society scholarship and activism remain marked by a dominant
liberal orientation. Dominant approaches to the study and practice of activism on the arms trade
accept incremental gains that further sediment inequality and injustice rather than contribute to
their transformation. Yet, in the post-Cold War era, the ‘nuclear-pacifist and antiimperialist paradigms’ of
past peace movements no longer resonate sufficiently to mobilise mass responses (Shaw 1994: 664). They have
been displaced by the depoliticised campaigning of the human rights and development
movements to which Amnesty International and Oxfam are central. There thus remains a significant challenge in terms of the
mobilisation of socially grounded, transformist responses to organised violence. More widely, understood primarily in terms of its
prophetic function, global civil society ‘seems to have been studied into existence by scholars who
self-consciously have blended analytical and normative concerns in order to justify their
particular vision of a global community’ (Bartelson 2006: 374, emphasis in original). This is suggestive of the
constitutive function of theoretical work. Mainstream accounts of global civil society play a significant role
in the reproduction of a world order that ignores the reliance of liberal forms of political
community and action on capitalist social relations, which have historically been accompanied
by massive levels of violence. NGOs such as Amnesty, Oxfam and Saferworld are explicitly named by Keane as engaging in
‘civil initiatives against incivility’ (Keane 2003: 154); and Kaldor claims that civil society is ‘an answer to war’ (Kaldor 2003). Against
this understanding, given the silences, partial understandings and interventions they reproduce, NGOs may well be
complicit in war and organised violence, rather than an answer to them.
state key for positive peace research
Rogers and Ramsbotham 99 Rogers is Emeritus Professor of Peace Studies at

the University of Bradford. And Ramsbotham is a Consultant on Oxford Research Group's
(ORG) Strategic Peacebuilding Programme Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 750-752//SN
The second area is the longer-term processes involved in conflict resolution and conflict
transformation. This is a wide agenda, but now quite well understood and reasonably clearly
focused, involving the contextual, structural, relational and cultural elements mentioned earlier
with reference to analyses of protracted social conflict. Peck describes the building-blocks of
sustainable peace and security as ‘well-functioning local, state, regional and international
systems of governance, which are responsive to human needs’.
The third area concerns fundamental responses at global level. If the analysis offered above of a
polarized, constrained and increasingly unstable world is correct, then the issue of rich-poor
confrontation is likely to acquire a far greater saliency in future. This will demand a
comprehensive rethinking of concepts of security, incorporating unprecedented co-operation
for sustainable international economic development and environmental management. This
needs to be paralleled by progressive demilitarization linked to the establishment and
enhancement of regional and global conflict prevention processes mentioned above. For peace
researchers there is now an even greater imperative for them to deepen their understanding of
the interconnected problems of international economic relations, the possibilities of sustainable
development, and their relationship to security.
(b) The second characteristic feature of peace research feature of peace research is its
interdisciplinary nature. This has long been a strength, but also opens peace researchers to the
charge of eclecticism and the absence of a distinctive peace research methodology and
theoretical base. They have been accused of being insufficiently aware of historical perspectives,
wedded to simplistic campaigning which ignores difficult choices, given to woolly concepts such
as a positive peace or structural violence which could be applied to almost all structures of
society, and all too ready to see arms races and militarization as sufficient causes of war. Just
thouh these charges may have been in individual instances, the field as a whole is more
substantial than that. We have seen how at least three broad approaches have been combined:
a practical problem-solving and needs- based approach; a rational quantititative and
comparative-empirical approach; and a theoretical-structuralist approach. It is unrealistic to
expect a single peace research methodology or grand theory. What can be expected, however,
is continuing high standards of research methodology in these areas, and much greater efforts
to increase mutual dialogue with related fields, such as international relations and development
studies. It is notable how sparse such dialogue has been in the past, and peace researchers must
share a good measure of blame for this.
c. A third feature is the focus on non-violent processes of political and social change. Here
mainstream peace research has been criticized, on the one hand by realists for whom power
and coercion is the only international currency, and on the other by neo-Marxist and radical
thinkers for whom it is misconceived to attempt to reconcile interests that should not be
reconciled. These are large issues and subject to continuing debate within the peace research
field. In our view peace research must keep its main focus on ‘the peaceful settlement of
disputes’, but also has a significant contribution to make on ways in which military forces, for
example in peace support operations, can best play their part within overall peace processes.
The neo-Marxist critique is misconceived to the extent that it ignores the strong tradition within
peace research which espouses vigorous struggle for social justice, albeit by non-violent means.
Pedagogy Alt fails
Harris 02 Ian M Harris Is the author of books such as Messages Men Hear. Department of Educational Policy and
Community Studies University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Educational Research Association (83rd, New Orleans, LA, April 1-5, 2002). “Peace Education Theory” pp. 2-3 //SN
Teachers who feel pressured to account for their instruction by having their students score well
on standardized tests may not wish to promote something as "frivolous" as teaching values or
preparing their students to confront the many sources of violence that exist in their lives. School
systems are committed to a curriculum jammed so full with mathematics and science that
young people have few opportunities during their schooling to dream about what kind of
society they want to live in and what they should do to get there . Rather than being trained in
sophisticated peace theory and practices that would enable them to build what Martin Luther
King, Jr. called the "beloved community," youth in Western schools are prepared to compete in
a capitalist marketplace and to consume goods created in that marketplace.

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Kappeler 1NC

The affirmative frames the idea of violence as a single type of

The aff overlooks and simultaneously perpetuates the notion

In this article, we argue that public

The alternative is to build positive peace through inversitgating what peace

Crisis-based politics only serves to justify further “war” in which the

Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for

the agent to act, implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate

circumstances identified may differ

according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation

above all to regard this decision as an act of choice,

seems to me a necessary precondition for any political struggle against

because the possibilities for resistance may also be greater in situations

Their belief of the liberal international order is used as justification for

Note: LDPT = Liberal Democratic Peace Theory

To be sure, there is a remarkable difference between defending peaceful promotion of

ideas of war. War is no longer confined to ‘high technologies of destruction;’ rather,

in everyday practices calls for a notion of ‘everyday’ peace

Not evaluating assumptions in humanitarian intervention and liberal politics

Also the aff is statist so maybe a link

Pawlowska 05 (Katrina, phd from Stockholm university, “Humanitarian Intervention:

Black theoreticians have explained the

collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as

potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the

Focusing on discussion of rights, and creation of safe spaces absolves us of any

As the colleagues from psychology

Discourse of the “other” and politics of difference divests individual

Focusing on Violence as a result of past history and circumstances leads to a

Peace pedagogy focuses on developing mindsets and progress to instill value to

Countries with less positive peace face a staggering disparity in conflict –

When we demarcate ourselves as different than the other violence is

Violence solves nothing and perpetuates a cycle of suffering – empirics prove

The pacifist critique of violence

Violence leads to cascading risks – turns any of their impacts

A nuanced understanding of peace through discussions of discource in

Peace as a Global Touchstone Fourth, a

Positive conceptions of peace are key to recognizing the underlying causes of

Alt – focusing on the presence of war

Pacifism acts as a critique of violence

Only through concrete action can nonviolence solve

Our framework is one of building nonviolent relationships through education

As a teacher researcher ‘living the question’ (Shagoury and Power 2012Shagoury, R. ,

My experience of teaching nonviolence in teacher education demonstrates both the challenges

Third, Brantmeier (2009Brantmeier, E. J. 2009. “A Peace Education Primer.” Journal of Conflict

While Brantmeier (2009Brantmeier, E. J. 2009. “A Peace Education Primer.” Journal of Conflict

Nonviolence is key to real world human relations – the purely intellectual

Multiple Modes of Psychic and Nonviolent Integration Analytical psychology originated in the

Nonviolence is the catalyst toward a better future

The Nonviolent Pedagogical Approach of the AVP Process

The AVP Workshop: Structure, Content, and Outcomes

Only a culture of peace solves

We advocate a culture of peace – it’s key to stop irreversible damage to the

We advocate an entirely new standard – Reform now is key

The UCS identified the most challenging change needed:

Respect and Care for the Community of Life

Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.

Adopt patterns of production, consumption, and reproduction that safeguard Earth’s

Social and Economic Justice

Eradicate poverty as an ethical, social, and environmental imperative.

Democracy, Nonviolence, and Peace

Treat all living beings with respect and consideration.

Promote a culture of tolerance, nonviolence, and peace.

Peace Leadership is key to our scholarship