Right to Information

1. Chavez vs. Presidential Commission of Good Governance, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated
plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy,
alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered
in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to
(1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between
the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these
assets.
A provision in the compromise agreement provides:
xxx the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and
which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the
PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic
of the Philippines. Xxx
ISSUE:
Whether or not such provision in the compromise agreement exempting the Marcoses
from the taxes due to the government in valid
6. Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 12, 2018
FACTS:
These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary Injunction under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assail the constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ)
Circular No. 41, series of 2010, otherwise known as the Consolidated Rules and
Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders,
Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure Orders, on the ground that it infringes on the
constitutional right to travel.
On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ
Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which govern the issuance
and implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs.
After the expiration of GMA’s term as President of the Republic of the Philippines an her
subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed against
her before the DOJ particularly plunder, malversation and/or illegal use of OWWA funds,
illegal use of public funds, graft and corruption, violation of the OEC, violation of the
Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and qualified theft. In view of
the foregoing criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 against
GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the
inclusion of GMA’s name in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watchlist.
On October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of
the OEC were filed against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo. Following the
filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and
Miguel Arroyo with a validity period of 60 days, unless sooner terminated or otherwise
extended.
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 197930, HDO No. 2011-64 was issued against Genuinos, among
others, after criminal complaints for Malversation and Violation of Sections 3(e), (g), (h)
an (i) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioners therein seek to annul and set aside the following
orders issued by the former Secretary Leila De Lima, pursuant to the said circular.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the DOJ has the authority to issue Circular No. 41; and
2) Whether there is ground to hold the former DOJ Secretary guilty of contempt of
Court.
HELD:
1) The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art. 3 of the 1987
Constitution provides three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel:
national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an
explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment.
[ FEU.LAWREV]
To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of
justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel. To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a
law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of
lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance
apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ
Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987.
It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative
issuance, there must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid.
It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former DOJ Secretary
will disclose that they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular
No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel through the issuance of the WLOs and
HDOs. Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 did not authorize the
DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to travel. There is even no
mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution that will justify the impairment. The
provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of crimes and
prosecute offenders, which are basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not
carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper in performing its
functions without regard to constitutionally-protected rights. The curtailment of fundamental
right, which is what DOJ Circular No. 41 does, cannot be read into mentioned provision of
the law.
As such, it is compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient
in itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On
its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its authority being confined to execution of laws. The
DOJ is confined to filling in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect the law
as enacted. Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra
vires.
To sum, DOJ Circular No. 41 does not have an enabling law where it could have derived its
authority to interfere with the exercise of the right to travel. Thus, the said circular is
unconstitutional.
2) In view of the complexity of the facts and corresponding full discussion that it rightfully
deserves, the Court finds it more fitting to address the same in a separate proceeding. It is in
the interest of fairness that there be a complete and exhaustive discussion on the matter since
it entails the imposition of penalty that bears upon the fitness of the respondent as a member
of the legal profession. The Court, therefore, finds it proper to deliberate and resolve the
charge of contempt against De Lima in a separate proceeding.
FACTS:
Rallies or the right to peaceably assemble to express freedom of expression, to petition
for redress of grievances hounding the government which was co-organized by various
mass based groups, and as Bayan and KMU sometime in September 26 and October 4-6
2005 has been violently preempted and and forcibly dispersed causing injuries by police
and peace keeping authorities under the “no permit, no rally” policy whereby enforcing
the Batasang Pambansa Blg 880, otherwise known as the “Public Assembly Act of 1985”
and the Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) Policy recently in force “in lieu of”
maximum tolerance under the directive of the office of the Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita.
ISSUE:
Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can immediately dissuade
the courts in resolving the case?

RULING:-
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. The Court holds that President
Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary
surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to
Fix Bail. Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter
of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that
the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his
guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking
into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE:

Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?

HELD:

YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is
further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
“The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality
of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both
his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.

1. People vs. Velasco

FACTS:
There was a shooting in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The shooting claimed the life of Alex Vinculado
and seriously injured his twin brother Levi. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot.
Three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide were
initially filed against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, the
alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set was filed
against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez
was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside
his residence.

The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez
of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of
illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was challenged by the Government before this Court
in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Allegedly, in holding in favor of
Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record
which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and
arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a
determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be
nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.

Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy
Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no
retrial is required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy
have been sourced from American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence,
particularly the case of Kepner v. United States and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial
does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be
allowed to take the same directional course.

ISSUES

- Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional
interdict against double jeopardy is permissible
HELD/RATIO

NO. It must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be
had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of
criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments
of dismissals do not involve determination of evidence. It must involve questions of law or
matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not
involve a review of evidence.

United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of
the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the case at bar, the records show that respondent
trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner,
upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual
resolution of the case.

The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court
in a bench trial is a new trial, is applicable in this case.

Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:

(a) a valid complaint or information;

(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed;

(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and,

(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it
occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly
establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our laws
and jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy,
whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before
the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine
that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that
the “criminal trial was a sham” because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in
the criminal case was denied due process. The "remand of the criminal case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

6. Dela Cruz Vs. People

FACTS:

Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several unknown male
persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. Complainants were instructed
to proceed to the Gorordo Police Station. They met “James” at the Police Station, who
demanded from them P100,000.00 which was later lowered to P40,000.00, in exchange for the
release of Ariel.

The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The accused was later
brought to the forensic laboratory where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing.
The test yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. (NO)

HELD:

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful
act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.

The drug test was in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested
for drugs.
7. Bermudez vs. Castillo
FACTS

In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor
General against Castillo, the latter filed six letters which were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36
and 37. He then contended that the said six letters are the complainant’s, but the latter denied it
while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. She admitted, however, that the letters marked as
Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were in her own handwriting.

Castillo believed that the three letters admitted by the complainant to be hers were insufficient for
purposes of comparison with those questioned in this case. Hence, he required her to copy them
in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. Bermudez, upon advice of her
attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right
not to incriminate herself.

Bermudez also alleged that Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were more than sufficient for what he
proposed to do. The INVESTIGATOR upheld the contention of the complainant. He did not
compel her to submit to the trial required. Hence, Castillo instituted these proceedings praying
that the investigator and the Solicitor General be ordered to require and compel the complainant
to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying Exhibits 32 to 37.

ISSUE
May complainant Bermudez be compelled to copy Exhibits 32 to 37 in her own handwriting?

HELD:
NO. This is a violation of her privilege against self-incrimination.
The constitution provides: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It
should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the six documents
above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator. Under said oath, she asserted
that the documents in question had not been written by her. Were she compelled to write and
were it proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really been written
by her, it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury.
 The purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is to avoid and prohibit the repetition
and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any
other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose,
then the evidence must be sought elsewhere.

If it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and
assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, one
for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition.

8. Beltran v. Samson
Facts:

Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that
such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because
such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have
gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against
himself.
I

ssue:

Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.

Held:

The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely
and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended
in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling
upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection
of innocent persons.

9. Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. PCG

Facts:

Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a private corporation known
as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2,
promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986,
respectively, and (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in
accordance with said executive orders by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
and/or its Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation.

The PCGG was tasked to sequester the BASECO thru Executive Orders 1 and 2 of President Cory
Aquino.

The PCGG was able to take over the BASECO and terminate its executive employees and
requested to have the following documents of the said company. Such as (Stock transfer book,
Legal documents, Minutes of the meetings, Financial statements, and the likes)

Petitioner contends that he cannot produce the said documents due to it is an infringement of
its right against self incrimination.

ISSUE:

WON documents ask in by PCGG would vitiate their right against self incrimination.

RULING:

BASECO also contends that its right against self incrimination and unreasonable searches and
seizures had been transgressed by the Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to produce
corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the Commission if it fails to do
so." The order was issued upon the authority of Section 3 (e) of Executive Order No. 1, treating
of the PCGG's power to "issue subpoenas requiring * * the production of such books, papers,
contracts, records, statements of accounts and other documents as may be material to the
investigation conducted by the Commission, " and paragraph (3), Executive Order No. 2 dealing
with its power to "require all persons in the Philippines holding * * (alleged "ill-gotten") assets or
properties, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or
trustees, to make full disclosure of the same * *." The contention lacks merit.

it is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons.

While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by
an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and
franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse ofsuchprivileges
At any rate, Executive Order No. 14-A, amending Section 4 of Executive Order No. 14 assures
protection to individuals required to produce evidence before the PCGG against any possible
violation of his right against self-incrimination. It gives them immunity from prosecution on the
basis of testimony or information he is compelled to present. As amended, said Section 4 now
provides that —

xxx xxx xxx

The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony, or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.

The constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures finds no application to
the case at bar either. There has been no search undertaken by any agent or representative of
the PCGG, and of course no seizure on the occasion thereof.

1. Philippine Rural Electric Cooperation Assoc. vs. DILG Secretary, G.R. No.
143076, June 10, 2003
Facts:
On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in
behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are
members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA). The other petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte
(ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit
electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and
registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of
all National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including
franchise, fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or
costs involved in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD
269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic
council (now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into
six loan agreements with the government of the United States of America, through the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric
cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan agreements contain similarly worded
provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired
through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax
exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity
of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax
exemption privileges granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except
cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the same
cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
Issue:
(1) Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal
protection clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are
duly registered cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the
Cooperatives Code of the Philippines?
(2) Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into
between the Philippine and the US Governments?
Held:
(1) No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial
classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that
there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the
different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric
cooperatives under RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those
under RA 6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called
electric cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as
source of funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require
cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit
that to qualify as a member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the
payment of a P5.00 membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment
the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from the cooperative or
will transfer to another place outside the area covered by the cooperative. However,
under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for
registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a
sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25%
of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the total
subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be less than
P2,000.00.
 b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government
control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role
of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal
clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development and
operations of these electric cooperatives. Consequently, amendments were primarily
geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric cooperatives o ensure that
loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives
under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations
with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is
germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that “every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the
power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the
LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local
government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically
provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these
exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of
the same class.
(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the
impairment of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing
laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of
the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute
impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to
each other and not with respect to non-parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax
exemption in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof.
The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan
agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by
the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously
enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or
the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted
therein.
Philippine Association of Services Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June
30, 1988
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also
being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art
13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:- I’ll write this, I love you

“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order
to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions.

1. People vs. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997

Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide.
The offense was committed on February 19, 1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being
Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing.
 On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While
on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure
of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman
was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant
then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night
time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard
that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot
when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No
longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was
discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries."
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the
appellant. Appellant's nearby house was searched but he was not there. On February 24,
a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him
and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he
denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him
with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was
merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were likewise brought there by the police. The
following day a physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant
has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.
By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The
mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said
"Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne."
The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives
witness the confession. Since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of
the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for
forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of
ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the
pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession,
appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was
captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified
that on said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He,
his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day.
Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was
coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did
as he was told.
The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found
guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized
accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
W/N the appellant’s confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of
the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.

Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has
"operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response
to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No
police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor
was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or
any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence.
The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide.