Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gaurang R. Sahay
Based on a study of the Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) and the farmer/
peasant movements in western Uttar Pradesh (UP) during 1987-89,
this paper deals with the relationship between traditional socio-
cultural institutions and cultural practices on the one hand, and
agrarian mobilisation, on the other. It is shown that, during 1987-89,
when the BKU organised various successful agitations and move-
ments against the state by mobilising the farmers/peasants of western
UP on a large scale, its strategies of agrarian mobilisation were
rooted in and modelled on the traditional sociocultural system of the
local agrarian society. The BKU used the primordial institutions of
caste and clan to organise and mobilise the farmers; it used tradi-
tional cultural practices or symbols to generate consciousness, senti-
ments and enthusiasm; and it used the traditional institution of
panchayat for discussions and deliberations, and to address the
farmers. The paper also shows that the BKU began declining when it
entered electoral politics and started mobilising the farmers on
political lines.
I have carried out this work against the background of a number of imp-
ortant empirical studies on the subject of caste and agrarian mobilisation.
SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 53 (3), September-December 2004, Pp. 396-418
Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices … 397
The nature and content of this scholarship is rich and heterogeneous, and
it provides us at least two different and, to an extent, contradictory
theoretical understanding of the subject. On the one hand, a set of studies
(see, for example, Moore Jr. 1967; Singh 1974; Sarkar 1979; Omvedt
1981) strongly puts forward the view that the caste system has always
obstructed the process of agrarian mobilisation for rural transformation
in India.
Barrington Moore Jr. (1967) argues that Indian peasants are deeply
divided into castes, facing different life situations in the rural social
formation. Hence, they cannot unite under the banner of a single leader-
ship for agrarian or rural transformation. This apart, the institution of
caste, through the process of ideological interpellation, makes subor-
dinate or weaker castes docile and passive and generates primordial
loyalties among them towards the dominant castes. That is why, he
reasons, there have not been notable cases of peasant rebellion or move-
ments in Indian history.
Rajendra Singh (1974), in his study of the land-grab movement in
eastern UP, observes that the caste system created many problems for the
movement. The movement failed to realise its objectives mainly because
the participants–peasants and workers–were differentiated into different
groups based on their caste affiliation. During the movement, Singh
writes:
The sharp polarisation of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ could not take place as a
large number of landless exterior castes like Chamars, Goriats and Bhataits
kept intact their primordial loyalties to the bigger landholders on whose
farms they have been working for generations. The traditional relation of
these Goriats and Bhataits with the families of the landholders continued to
exist and in most of the instances they leaked inside information of the
plan and strategies of the movement (Ibid.: 61).
He further writes that the dominant castes in the villages ‘exploited all
along what Alavi calls “primordial loyalties” … of Chamars, Goriats and
Bhataits and of their kin and clan members who were in their opposite
camp. Primordial loyalties and caste loyalties transcended the class situa-
tion. This enabled the big farmers to defeat the grabbers everywhere’
(Ibid.: 68).
Omvedt (1981) also finds the caste system to be an impediment in
the process of agrarian consolidation and mobilisation. She argues that in
Indian rural society it is almost impossible to mobilise people in a move-
ment from across caste lines for social change or transformation. To
quote her:
398 Gaurang R. Sahay
The existing class/caste complex also provides fertile ground for the capi-
talist farmers to use casteism to appeal their kin among the middle peasants
and labourers, to divide the rural semi -proletariat, and to attack its dalit and
adivasi sections (and their women) who are often the most militant. While
‘atrocities against Harijans’ are occurring throughout India, it is precisely
in the more capitalistically developed areas, where the general class-caste
structure described above is most fully present, that they are taking the
most widespread forms with even poor and middle peasant caste Hindus
sometimes participating in attacks on dalits on a mass basis… (Ibid.: A-
157).
The BKU draws its sustenance from certain aspects of Jat culture and
tradition while ignoring others. In addition, the fact that these cultural
aspects came to the forefront was because they were in harmony with, and
Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices … 399
thus encouraged by, actual social practices. The Jat ethos of equality plays
a very important role in understanding the character of the BKU (Ibid.: 2).
The Data
The data for this paper have been accumulated primarily by observing
the functioning of BKU and its agitations and movements. Discussions
with the BKU office-bearers as well as the farmers including its
members, over various issues or themes of this paper also provided
valuable insights. This apart, my erstwhile colleagues and students at the
Janta Vedic (PG) college, most of whom hail from the villages of
Baghpat, Meerut and Muzaffarnagar districts of western UP, provided
me important information. They also sensitised me to some of the issues
axial to this paper. The college where I worked till recently (the end of
June 2004) is located in Baraut (Baghpat district) and surrounded by
villages. I have visited some of the villages from time to time and spent
time among the farmers for this study. My fieldwork in the villages of
Baghpat district (Chhaprauli and Nirpada) and Muzaffarnagar district
(Bhaju and Sisauli) started when Dipankar Gupta provided me an
opportunity for assisting him in his work on the BKU and political life of
the western UP farmers. Later on, I conducted fieldwork in association
with Stig Toft Madsen. Both Gupta and Madsen have acknowledged
these parts of my fieldwork in their respective works (see Gupta 1997;
Lindberg and Madsen 2003).
The political impact of the peasantry has been generally marked by its
sociopolitical weakness. The vertical segmentation of peasants into local
communities, clans and groups and the differentiation of interests within
400 Gaurang R. Sahay
these communities themselves has made for difficulties in crystallising
nationwide aims and symbols and developing national leadership and
organisation which, in turn, has made for what we have called low ‘class-
ness’ (1971: 255; see also Wolf 1969; Shanin 1972).
BKU meetings are patterned on the panchayat. All senior males of the
farmers’ castes in the area deliberate on a loosely defined and ever-shifting
agenda in an informal but often protracted manner, with a minimum of
procedural rules. Disagreement is openly voiced, but consensual decisions
are preferred to voting. The panchayats vary in size, and it is rarely clear
what constitutes a quorum (2003: 206).
408 Gaurang R. Sahay
Like the traditional panchayat, a BKU panchayat is structured in
such a way that all the farmers participating in it feel at home and
respected. They are given opportunity to speak and their views are taken
into account. No difference is observed between the leaders and other
participants as regards seating arrangement. Generally, a small stage is
prepared using a tractor-trolley or wooden cot to address the panchayat.
Invariably, three persons are seen on the stage: Ch. Tikait, the person
conducting the panchayat, and the speaker. After making their speeches,
the speakers sit among the farmers. It is noteworthy that, during the
Inter-State Farmers’ Coordination meeting, which was held in Delhi on 2
September 1989, Ch. Tikait objected to the big rostrum set up for the
meeting. He questioned the motives of Sharad Joshi, President of the
Shetkari Sanghtan, by asking: ‘Why such a big stage? It looks more like
a political battlefield of those engaged in power politics’ (The times of
India, Delhi, 3 October 1989). Eventually, he dissociated himself from
this meeting, and it was split into two opposing camps (Rana 1994: 132).
Ch. Tikait used the traditional concept of khap-chaudhary to gain
the confidence and faith of the farmers. He never presented himself as a
leader of a formal registered union before the farmers, but as a chau-
dhary of his farming community. As he reasons, the farmers do not trust
a neta (leader), whom they see as power mongering to realise his self-
interest, whereas a chaudhary is believed to be acting for the well-being
of his community or khap. The traditions of clan-community make the
farmers believe in the pristine sanctity of khap-chaudharyship. A khap
chaudhary is held in high esteem because he is considered to be a person
of high moral character. M.C. Pradhan quotes the following resolution
passed by the Baliyan Jats in their khap panchayat on 12 May 1941:
‘“We will work with our body, heart and soul under the leadership of our
chaudhary for the good of our khap. Towards this end, the chaudhary
has the right even to demand our lives”’ (1966: 179). M.S. Rana also
notes, ‘According to the khap panchayat system the chaudhary of a khap
panchayat enjoys supreme powers. His fiat runs through all villages of
the khap’ (1994: 41). Though a chaudhary is taken to be the unques-
tioned head of his khap and his decisions are viewed as binding on his
community, he is supposed to follow the wishes of his clan members and
the mandate granted to him by the conventions and traditions of the khap
panchayat.
Ch. Tikait used this time-tested concept of khap chaudhary to project
his leadership of the BKU among the farmers. It proved to be extremely
good for the BKU and brought wonderful results in terms of the mobili-
sation and organisation of farmers under the banner of the BKU. The
farmers believe in the words of Ch. Tikait because he lives a life of a
Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices … 409
common western UP farmer. Like most of the farmers, he is not
educated. He presents his views in the local dialect. He is always cons-
cious of his culture and tradition. He wears homespun cotton clothes
(knee-deep dhoti and kurta, and Gandhi topi) and locally made shoes.
His food is very simple, and it is made up of roti (bread), dal (pulse),
ghee (clarified butter), gud (jaggery) and milk. Like other villagers, he
smokes hookah (a type of smoking-pipe). All this has generated a feeling
among the farmers that the BKU President, Ch. Tikait is their chaudhary
and is one among them.
The BKU and Ch. Tikait used local cultural practices and symbols to
arouse consciousness, enthusiasm, feeling of brotherhood and dedication
among the farmers. The BKU farmers always shout religious chants like
‘Allah-O-Akbar’ and ‘Har Har Mahadev’ during the panchayats and
agitations. The BKU meetings always conclude with these chants; all
speeches end with these chants. Such a cultural practice, observed as a
rule, generates a feeling of brotherhood among the farmers irrespective
of their religious identity.
The BKU uses cultural or religious figures to name the sites where it
organises agitations or movements. During the Meerut agitation, the
union named the sites as ‘Ram Garh’ and ‘Hanuman Garh’ to convey the
message that they, like Ram and Hanuman, are fighting with full com-
mitment and dedication against injustice and evil rule. Such chants and
naming generate religiosity among the farmers towards the BKU agendas
and programmes. This apart, Ch. Tikait always refers to the cultural or
religious teachings in the course of his speech or discussion with the
farmers. Some of his general comments are: ‘Have faith in the almighty.
He would help us through the struggle. Since god is with us, we would
emerge victorious. We are fighting a dharmyudh. God will take care of
our problems’ (quoted in Rana 1994: 49).
Ch. Tikait has all the reverence for the sacred ritual of yajna (sacri-
ficial fire), quite popular in western UP. During the long agitations, such
as the Meerut and Rajabpur agitations, the BKU performed yajnas every
morning with all solemnity at the agitation site. Yagna is an old cultural
practice meant to purify the environment and to have sanctifying effect
upon human thought and action. It also symbolises truth. There is a
popular belief that Sita came through the sacrificial fire to prove her
fidelity and sexual purity. Following such a belief, Ch. Tikait told the
newspaper correspondents during the Delhi Boat Club rally on 25
October 1988: ‘Let there be two pyres, place him [Rajiv Gandhi, the then
Prime Minister] on one and I will sit on the other. Light the pyres. We
believe that he who is truthful cannot be affected by fire’ (quoted in
Gupta 1997: 59).
410 Gaurang R. Sahay
For such cultural meanings and sanctifying effects, Ch. Tikait lights
a ghee (clarified butter) flame before he goes for a serious thinking over
a problem. Such a flame also burns continuously in the BKU office in
Sisauli in memory of those who have lost their lives during the agitations
(Ibid.). The BKU is so much guided by the culture and traditions of the
local community that Ch. Tikait generally expresses his feelings in reli-
gious terms. He often claims that his inspiration to be active in the BKU
is religious in character; he says that it is god ‘who told him to fight for
the cause of cultivators. On many occasions he has said that his fight is a
dharmyudh, or religious war, or even for a just moral order’ (Ibid.: 60).
However, such religious expressions did not detract the secular character
of BKU. The BKU agitation has been frequently presided over by
Muslim farmers; Muslim religious leaders like Sayyad Ahmad Bukhari
(the present Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Delhi) have addressed its big
panchayats.
Hookah is not just a traditional smoking instrument for the farmers in
western UP, it is also a cultural instrument that symbolises bhaichara
(brotherhood). The persons who share the same hookah are believed to
be united with each other based on the idea of brotherhood. Generally, in
the villages of western UP, the persons belonging to the same caste get
together regularly and share a hookah. Gupta observes that members of a
cultivating caste, such as the Jat, do not mind sharing a hookah with
other cultivating castes like the Tyagi, Rawa or Gurjar. The villagers
generally say that ‘to smoke a hookah alone is a sign of misfortune, but
to smoke a hookah in a panchayat or gathering is a sign of good fortune’
(Ibid.: 47). The BKU used this cultural instrument in its panchayats or
agitations to arouse the feeling of brotherhood among the farmers of
different social classes. In the BKU panchayat, it is always possible to
see the farmers in groups sharing the same hookah by turns. Many news-
papers and magazines have published photographs of the BKU farmers
and their chaudhary sharing a hookah during the panchayats and agita-
tions.
There is another cultural instrument in western UP, known as rana-
singha, which is traditionally used to spread a message. The BKU blew it
to spread messages and announcements during the panchayats and
agitations. Thus, the BKU reiterates its sensitivity to the age-old tradition
and culture of the local community.
The BKU strategy of using the primordial institutions of caste, clan and
panchayat and the elements of traditional culture for agrarian mobili-
Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices … 411
sation and movement has proved to be quite effective. It mobilised the
farmers in large numbers and organised many massive movements
during 1987-89. Its primary demand during this period related to the
withdrawal of state government’s decision to hike the farm-electricity
rate from Rs 22.50 to Rs 30 per-horsepower-per-month. Its demand to
roll back the hike got a ring of urgency because the farmers in western
UP were facing a drought situation in 1987-88. The BKU called a
panchayat of the farmers on 3 January 1987 in Sisauli and passed a reso-
lution to gherao Karmukhera (a township in Muzaffarnagar district)
powerhouse for four days (from 27 January 1987) to press its demands.
An estimated fifty thousand farmers/peasants participated in this agita-
tion and staged a successful gherao at the powerhouse (Ibid.: 32). This
successful protest was widely reported in the newspapers and it helped
the BKU and Ch. Tikait achieve national prominence. On the concluding
day, Ch. Tikait handed over a charter of demands to the Muzaffarnagar
district magistrate with an ultimatum of one month.
In the meantime, Ch. Tikait, being aware of the government’s apathy
towards the farmers, asked the khap chaudharys to assemble in Sisauli
for a discussion on the future course of action. The khap chaudharys
jointly toured the villages of Muzaffarnagar, Baghpat and Meerut
districts and appealed to the farmers to assemble again at Karmukhera
powerhouse for a demonstration on 1 March 1987. During the period of
ultimatum, the state government did not initiate any step to make the
BKU rescind its decision. On the scheduled date, the farmers, in large
numbers, started coming to the powerhouse. By noon, the number
swelled up to one lakh (Rana 1994: 62). All arrangements made by the
district administration to control and manage the situation were of no
avail. To control the violent farmers the police opened fire, killing two
persons and injuring many. In retaliation, the BKU farmers killed a
police officer and set the powerhouse on fire.
After this incident, the state government paid serious attention to the
demands of BKU. It constituted a three-member cabinet committee to
negotiate with the BKU. The Union told the committee that, if its charter
of demands were not implemented without any precondition by the end
of March, it would stage a demonstration in Shamli (an old and impor-
tant town in Muzaffarnagar district) on 1 April 1987. Meanwhile, the
state government accepted the main demand of the Union, that is, a total
rollback of the hike in farm-electricity rate with certain conditions. The
government’s decision brought about a needed confidence among the
farmers, but the BKU did not suspend its plan to stage a demonstration,
as the hike in the farm-electricity rate was not withdrawn uncondi-
tionally. This time more than a lakh farmers participated in the demons-
412 Gaurang R. Sahay
tration (Ibid.: 65). A meeting of the farmers held at the demonstration
site was presided over by a local Muslim farmer and addressed by the
chaudharys of various khaps and many non-political leaders, including
the farmer leaders Sharad Joshi of Maharashtra and Balbir Singh of
Punjab. In the evening, Ch. Tikait handed over a charter of demands to
the district magistrate and called off the demonstration.
After this successful demonstration of the BKU’s influence and
popularity among the farmers of western UP, Ch. Tikait extensively
toured the villages and appealed to the farmers to associate with the BKU
and to constitute the ground-level committees in their own villages. The
then Chief Minister of UP, Bir Bahadur Singh of the Congress party, also
realised the growing influence of the BKU and Ch. Tikait among the
farmers of western UP. To win over the trust and sentiments of the
farmers in his favour, he came to Sisauli to address them on 11 August
1987. The BKU neither received nor welcomed the Chief Minister. He
addressed a large gathering of farmers and promised them that his
government would fulfil the reasonable demands of the BKU within a
month. Ch. Tikait, in his address, asked the Chief Minister to take an
extra month to implement the demands. He was not satisfied by the Chief
Minister’s speech, and waited for his policy decisions for two months. In
the meantime, he toured many villages and mobilised the farmers in
BKU’s favour. In the monthly panchayat on 17 October 1987, the BKU
advised the farmers to stop paying government dues. In retaliation, the
government ordered the officials concerned to disconnect the power lines
of defaulting farmers latest by 31 January 1988. Following this, the BKU
called a panchayat to discuss this unanticipated decision of the govern-
ment and, as a pre-emptive move, the panchayat unanimously decided to
gherao the office of Meerut divisional commissioner on 27 January
1988.
However, the gherao of the commissioner’s office was initially
planned to be a four-day affair, but after seeing the enthusiasm of the
farmers, Ch. Tikait decided to continue it for twenty-four days. From the
very first day of the agitation, the farmers started arriving in Meerut. It
was estimated that around two lakh farmers were always present in this
agitation at the sit-in ground. Ch. Tikait asked a local Muslim farmer,
Hafiz Khalil Ahmad, to preside over this massive panchayat. In this
movement, the female members of farming families also participated in
noticeable numbers. Along with men, they remained on the sit-in ground
day and night, and shouted slogans and sang folk songs to express their
sentiments and anger. The BKU arranged food for the farmers from the
surrounding villages. Tractor was the main vehicle of transportation. The
BKU named the sit-in grounds as ‘Hanuman Garh’ and ‘Ram Garh’.
Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices … 413
Many non-political leaders from different parts of the country, including
Sharad Joshi, Swami Agnivesh and Sayyad Abdulah Bukhari (father of
Sayyad Ahmad Bukhari) addressed the farmers. Ch. Tikait did not ask or
allow political leaders, including Ajit Singh, the most prominent political
leader of western UP, to address the farmers.
As part of the agitation, Ch. Tikait called for a non-violent rail- and
road-blockade programme, which, however, resulted in violence. The
police force started arresting the farmers involved in the blockade
activity. In the ensuing conflict, the police opened fire on the farmer in
Rajabpur, killing five farmers and injuring 108 (Ibid.: 86). In view of the
police firing and the dictatorial attitude of the state government, Ch.
Tikait withdrew the agitation and appealed to the farmers to maintain
peace and observe non-violence. Though this twenty-four day agitation
was called off without any concrete achievement, it was quite significant
in more senses than one. D.N. Dhanagare observes:
The communication of commands and instructions from the top to the rank
and file of the BKU was unfaltering. This would not have been possible
without the farmers’ fraternal solidarity, commitment to a cause and above
all without their unflinching loyalty to their new leader Mahendra Singh
Tikait. Such a noticeable peaceful protest dharna, unruffled by minor
provocation from either police or administration, has been a rather new
phenomenon in the annals of the peasant struggle in India. [….] The
efficient organisation of the agitation in Meerut by BKU was reminiscent
of the organisation of the Bardoli Satyagraha by Sardar Patel sixty years
ago in south Gujarat (1988: 25).
Concluding Remarks
I would like to conclude this paper by pointing out that, after the Naiyma
Lao Andolan or Bhopa agitation, the BKU started sliding downwards in
terms of its influence and appeal among the farmers. After this agitation,
the Union has not been able to mobilise the farmers in large numbers for
a movement or agitation. This is because the BKU brought about some
drastic changes in its policy or strategy of agrarian mobilisation. It began
to take interest in electoral politics and started mobilising the farmers on
political lines. It entered into an agreement with the Janata Dal and
decided to support that party in the 1989 Legislative Assembly elections.
It appealed to the farmers to vote for the Janata Dal candidates. The
Janata Dal was voted to form the government in UP, with Mulayam
Singh Yadav as its Chief Minister. After the formation of the
government, Ch. Tikait tried in vain to get the agreement implemented.
Meanwhile, he started losing support among many caste segments of the
farming community in western UP owing to his association with the
Janata Dal. The Janata Dal president and the then state Chief Minister,
Mulayam Singh Yadav, sensed the situation and started using it to
establish himself as a leader of the farmers in western UP. He refused to
fulfil the promised demands of the BKU and ordered the police to use
416 Gaurang R. Sahay
force against the BKU functionaries when they agitate against the
government. In order to control the BKU, the state police put its
president, Ch. Tikait, behind the bar. This did not evoke a unified strong
reaction from the farmers, which used to happen before the Naiyma Lao
Andolan. When he was released from the jail, he met some national
political leaders, invited the then Prime Minister (Chandrashekhar),
Deputy Prime Minister (Devi Lal) and Chief Minister (Mulayam Singh
Yadav) to address the farmers in Sisauli, and urged them to accept and
implement the long-standing demands of the BKU. This decision of Ch.
Tikait backfired and it was strongly opposed by the local political
leaders. Ajit Singh, who has been, after the death of his father
(Chaudhary Charan Singh), the undisputed leader of Jat farmers in
western UP, toured the villages and vehemently opposed the politici-
sation of BKU. He criticised Ch. Tikait for his political act and ambition.
He opined that Ch. Tikait has dishonoured the farmers of western UP by
inviting the political leaders. The farmers responded positively to his
remarks and many of them dissociated from the BKU.
The BKU continued its own politicisation by openly supporting the
Bhartiya Janata Party in 1991 elections. In 1996, the BKU formed its
own political outfit known as the Bhartiya Kisan Kamgar Party and
participated in the elections. It miserably failed in its attempt to secure
votes for its own candidates. In the 2002 Legislative Assembly elections,
Om Prakash Chautala, President of the National Lok Dal and Chief
Minister of Haryana, tried to create a political space for himself and his
party through the BKU support. Recently, the BKU launched a political
party–the Bhartiya Kisan Dal–and fielded many candidates in the
constituencies of western UP in the Parliamentary elections of 2004.
However, none of its candidates was successful and most of them even
forfeited their deposits in areas where the BKU had successfully
mobilised farmers or peasants in huge numbers for movements or
agitations in the past.
Amidst all its politically oriented decisions and its interventions in
national and state politics, the BKU lost its non-political and secular
character and credibility among the farmers to a large extent. It lost the
support of many segments of the farming community which are associa-
ted with different political parties and belong to different castes and
religious communities. Its decision to support the Bhartiya Janata Party
in the 1991 elections alienated the Muslim farmers (who constitute a
major group in western UP) from its fold, and this alienation was
reinforced after the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhaya in
1992. The Muslim farmers lost faith in the leadership of Ch. Tikait and
they totally dissociated themselves from the Union. Its decision to invite
Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices … 417
Mulayam Singh Yadav, Devi Lal and then Om Prakash Chautala to
address the farmers created frustration and anger among the Jats of
western UP who consider Ajit Singh–whose father Chaudhary Charan
Singh, former Prime Minister of India, is traditionally revered–as their
political leader and the only representative of their community. With all
this, the BKU has almost become moribund.
Acknowledgements
This is the revised version of a paper presented at the felicitation seminar on ‘Social
dynamics of Indian society: Culture and politics’ in honour of Professor J.S. Gandhi, held
at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2-3 April 2003. I thank the organisers for
their hospitality, and the seminar participants for their comments. I am grateful to
Dipankar Gupta and Stig Toft Madsen who provided me opportunities for doing field -
work with them in some of the villages of Muzaffarnagar and Baghpat districts of
western Uttar Pradesh. I am also thankful to Avijit Pathak and Patricia Uberoi for their
encouragement and interest in this work.
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Gaurang R. Sahay, Reader, Unit for Rural Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences,
Deonar, Mumbai - 400 088
E-mail: <gaurangsahay@rediffmail.com>