Spinoza on Self-Preservation and Self-Destruction

Mitchell Gabhart

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 37, Number 4, October 1999,

pp. 613-628 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0814

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/228749

Access provided at 7 Apr 2019 18:22 GMT from Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi
 Spinoza on Self-Preservation
and Self-Destruction
MITCHELL GABHART

1 .

I wIsR TO EXAMINE a difficulty that arises in S p i n o z a ' s t r e a t m e n t o f selffiood

as it p e r t a i n s to the possibility o f self-destruction. T h e t r o u b l e s o m e p r o b l e m
o f s e l f h o o d is o n e which I will n o t solve b u t which I h o p e to illuminate. W h a t
I h o p e to do is s h e d light on Spinoza's c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n essence as
necessarily self-affirming, a n d t h e r e f o r e o f willful self-destruction as impossi-
ble. Yet this issue too is t r o u b l i n g since the accounts S p i n o z a p r o v i d e s o f
suicides all h a v e o n e thing in c o m m o n : suicide always involves b e i n g over-
c o m e by the e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t , i.e., the e n v i r o n m e n t o p e r a t i n g in a way
c o n t r a r y to the n a t u r e o f the agent. T h u s , all suicide is a sign o f an i n t e r n a l
weakness in the face o f a hostile world. T o p r o v i d e the n e e d e d contrast to the
suicidal agent, necessarily a state o f the u t m o s t b o n d a g e or servitude, I will
first sketch Spinoza's t h e o r y o f the passions, t h e i r r e m e d y , the characteristics
o f the active free agent, a n d his curious a c c o u n t o f i m m o r t a l i t y . T h e n I t u r n
to the p r o b l e m in his a c c o u n t o f suicide: I c o n t e n d that he c a n n o t m a k e
m e a n i n g f u l a distinction b e t w e e n suicide a n d a n y o t h e r f o r m o f death.

2i

I b e g i n with Spinoza's analysis o f h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n , the e l e m e n t s o f which are

the affects, which he defines (E3D2) as the b o d y ' s p o w e r o f acting b e i n g
i n c r e a s e d or d i m i n i s h e d as well as the idea o f t h o s e a f f e c t i o n s ? S p i n o z a classi-

T h e source for all r e f e r e n c e s to Spinoza is The Collected Works of Spznoza, V o l u m e 1, E d w i n

Curley, trans. (Princeton: P r i n c e t o n University Press, 1985). A b b r e v i a t i o n s are: E=Ethzcs,
P=Proposition, Cor.=Corollary, Dem.=Demonstration, D=Definition, Sch.=Scholium, Post.=
Postulate. N u m b e r s in p a r e n t h e s e s follow the G e b h a r d t p a g i n a t i o n .
S p m o z a ' s u s e o f t h e t e r m 'affection' is p r o b a b l y best u n d e r s t o o d as w h a t we m e a n by ' e m o -
tion.' See W o l f s o n ' s clarification o f t h e relation b e t w e e n ' e m o t i o n ' a n d 'affection' in The Phdosophy
of Spinoza, vol. 2 (Cambridge: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 3 4 ) , a 9 4 - 5

[6t3]
614 J OU R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 9

ties e m o t i o n s , i.e., a f f e c t s u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e o f m i n d , i n t o t w o t y p e s : a c t i o n s
a n d p a s s i o n s . ~ S p i n o z a d o e s n o t ( c o n t r a r y to his p r e d e c e s s o r D e s c a r t e s ) p o s i t
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a s e p a r a t e f a c u l t y s u c h as will to t r a n s f o r m p a s s i o n s i n t o
a c t i o n s . R a t h e r , "we a c t w h e n s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n s , in us o r o u t s i d e us, o f w h i c h
w e a r e t h e a d e q u a t e c a u s e , i.e., (by E 3 D 1) w h e n s o m e t h i n g in us o r o u t s i d e us
follows f r o m o u r nature, w h i c h can be clearly and distinctly understood
t h r o u g h it a l o n e . " ~ C o n v e r s e l y , w e a r e a c t e d u p o n " w h e n s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n s
in us, o r s o m e t h i n g f o l l o w s f r o m o u r n a t u r e , o f w h i c h we a r e o n l y a p a r t i a l
c a u s e . " 4 C o n s e q u e n t l y it is n o t n e c e s s a r y to o p p o s e will a n d i n t e l l e c t in o r d e r to
differentiate action from passion. The mind includes both adequate and inade-
q u a t e i d e a s (E3P1) a n d t h e r e f o r e c a n b e a l t e r n a t e l y b o t h a g e n t a n d p a t i e n t .
T h e d e p a r t u r e f r o m D e s c a r t e s is s t r i k i n g : si n ce (1) i d e a s e i t h e r a r e o r a r e n o t
a d e q u a t e a n d (2) e a c h a d e q u a t e i d e a c a r r i e s its o w n c e r t i t u d e ( E 2 P 4 3 ) , t h e n e e d
f o r a s e p a r a t e f a c u l t y o f a s s e n t , w h i c h is w h a t v o l i t i o n m u s t a m o u n t to, is n u l l i -
fied. I n s t e a d , v o l i t i o n a n d a p p e t i t e a r e c o n s i d e r e d by S p i n o z a to b e n o m o r e
than distinct manifestations of one central striving, the former a purely mental
d e s c r i p t i o n a n d the latter an a c c o u n t o f b o t h m e n t a l a n d physical aspects o f the
individual.5

S p i n o z a i n t r o d u c e s t h e k e y t e r m conatus to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e activity o f m o d e s
b u t it is a c o n c e p t w h i c h also b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l -
ity, i n d e e d t h e e s s e n c e , o f f i n i t e m o d e s . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o n a t u s is d e f i n e d by
S p i n o z a as a s t r i v i n g (E3P7), i.e., " t h a t s t r i v i n g by w h i c h e a c h t h i n g strives to
p e r s e v e r e in its o w n b e i n g is n o t h i n g b u t t h e a c t u a l e s s e n c e o f t h e t h i n g . "6 T h i s

2At the end of Part 3 (General Definition of the Affects, 11/~o3, ~9-33), Spinoza defines the
affect. "An Affect that is called a Passion of the mind is a confused idea, by which the Mind affirms of
its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which, when it is given,
determines the Mind to think of this rather than that." Here, Spinoza might seem to imply that
affects are purely passive. But in E3P58 (11/187, ~5-27) Spinoza states: "Apart from the Joy and
Desire that are passions, there are affects of Joy and Desare that are related to us insofar as we act."
3E3De (11/139, 6-9).
4E3D 3 (11/139, ]1-13).
5Hampshire puts thas point as follows: "The word affectus.., represents the whole modifica-
tion of the person, mental and physical. The 'affection' is a passion (in Spinoza's techmcal sense)
insofar as the cause of the modification or 'affecuon' does not lie within myself, and it is an action
or active emotion in so far as the cause does lie within myself; this is another way of saying that any
'affection', of which the mental equivalent is not an adequate idea, must be a passive emotion; for
an adequate idea as an idea which follows necessarily from the idea which preceded it." Stuart
Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), lO6- 7. Reason is the mode of thought
which is sufficient for the adequacy of ideas, and at exists not as a separate faculty but as a mode of
knowing which has as its cause the understanding itself, as opposed to ideas which are occasioned
merely through the body's interaction with an external object.
6E3P 7 (II/146, 2o-2~).
 SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 615

striving to p e r s e v e r e in o n e ' s e x i s t e n c e - - a striving w h i c h c o n t i n u e s f o r an

indefinite time ( E 3 P 8 ) - - m u s t , o f course, u n d e r g o b o t h successes a n d failures.
Modes, such as the h u m a n individual, exist conditionally, as finite a n d t e m p o -
rally c h a n g i n g c o n s t i t u e n t s o f the substantial reality which Spinoza refers to as
" G o d or N a t u r e . " So, h u m a n beings are entities possessing (1) an essential
identity t h r o u g h an indefinite d u r a t i o n a n d (2) a consciousness o f that identity
which alternately resists or s u c c u m b s to outside forces.
T h u s , their existence can be t h o u g h t o f as m e r e l y adjectival, which poses
difficulties in u n d e r s t a n d i n g self-identity. Vital, it seems, to an acceptable con-
ception o f identity is s o m e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n - - s o m e t h i n g which m a k e s
Peter distinct f r o m Paul.7 L e t us first t h e n sketch the a c c o u n t o f individuation
that Spinoza p r o p o s e s . It is i m p o r t a n t to b e a r in m i n d first t h a t c o n a t u s is a
striving o f the o r g a n i s m as a w h o l e - - b o t h b o d y a n d m i n d . M o r e o v e r , c o n a t u s
c o n s i d e r e d p u r e l y as a striving a n d c o n s i d e r e d in isolation f r o m o t h e r m o d e s
(hypothetically, o f course) is necessarily a positive s t r i v i n g - - i t has n o t h i n g
within it which can exclude its existence (E3P 4,1o). T h u s , w e r e t h e r e n o t h i n g
outside the o r g a n i s m to cause its dissolution, it w o u l d m e e t the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f
a substance, i.e., it w o u l d exist f r o m the necessity o f its n a t u r e alone, a n d c o u l d
n o t will its self-destruction. H o w e v e r , the strictly m o d a l status o f the o r g a n i s m
n e g a t e s such a possibility. Affectations are constantly p r e s e n t which increase or
diminish its t e n d e n c y to persist. T h e c h a n g e in the balance o f the m o t i o n o f an
o r g a n i s m ' s i n t e r n a l p a r t s - - t h e alteration o f the characteristic ratio o f m o v i n g
parts which distinguishes o n e m o d a l individual f r o m a n o t h e r - - i s the f u n c t i o n
n o t only o f t h a t p a r t i c u l a r b o d y ' s internal m o v e m e n t b u t also o f the i m p i n g e -
m e n t o f external bodies (see E2P13, Sch. a n d the s u c c e e d i n g Physical Digres-
sion). C o n a t u s is essentially the striving o f an individual m o d e - - t o resist the
potentially dissipating influences o f e x t e r n a l i m p i n g e m e n t s w h i c h m a y d a n g e r -
ously alter the h a r m o n y o f m o t i o n characteristic o f that i n d i v i d u a l - - i n s o f a r as
the individual as a whole is c o n c e r n e d , s F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e is a f o r m essential to

7 R u t h Saw is critical o f Spinoza's a s s u m p t i o n o f h u m a n individuality, given his p e r c e i v e d

failure to be able to metaphysically s u p p o r t s u c h a n a s s u m p t i o n ; see R u t h Saw, " P e r s o n a l I d e n t i t y
in Spinoza," in Studzes ~n Sp*noza, Paul K a s h a p , ed. (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y o f California Press, 1972),
8 6 - 9 9 . For a d e f e n s e o f Splnoza's a c c o u n t o f h u m a n identity as a p r o c e s s o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n , see Lee
Rice's "Spinoza o n I n d i v i d u a t i o n , " in Spznoza: Essays ,n Interpretatwn, M a u r i c e M a n d e l b a u m a n d
E u g e n e F r e e m a n , eds. (LaSalle: O p e n Court, 1975), x 9 5 - ~ 14.
SAccording to Allison: " O n e c a n n o m o r e h e l p striving to p r e s e r v e o n e ' s b e i n g t h a n a s t o n e
can h e l p f a l h n g w h e n d r o p p e d . It is simply o n e ' s n a t u r e , a n d n o t h i n g can violate t h e laws o f its
o w n being. Viewed f r o m a psychological s t a n d p o i n t , this e n d e a v o r can be called "will" (Voluntas);
thus o n e c a n in a m a n n e r of speaking, say t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s "will" to p r e s e r v e their being. B u t
t h e r e is n o t h i n g u n d e t e r m i n e d or free a b o u t this will. As before, this "act o f will" is n o t h i n g
m o r e t h a n t h e m e n t a l decision a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e bodily appetite. T h e n o t i o n o f appetite
(Appetitus), therefore, is basic m t h e characterization o f a n individual's conatus. T h i s r e f e r s to t h e
616 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 9
t h e h u m a n b o d y ; t h e h u m a n b o d y consists o f a n u m b e r o f s m a l l e r p a r t s o f
v a r i o u s d e n s i t i e s w h i c h a r e a l w a y s b e i n g i m p i n g e d u p o n b y b o d i e s e x t e r n a l to
t h e m . T h e h u m a n b o d y m a i n t a i n s its f o r m b y p r e s e r v i n g a c o n s t a n t r a t i o a m o n g
its c o m p o n e n t p a r t s , t h e m s e l v e s c o n s t a n t l y b e i n g i n t e r c h a n g e d w i t h p a r t s o f t h e
s u r r o u n d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t . 9 T h e c o n t i n u i n g e x i s t e n c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r b o d y is
consequently sustained by something of an inertial principle; a pattern or ratio
o f r e l a t i v e c o n s t a n t v e l o c i t i e s a m o n g c o m p o n e n t b o d i e s c o n s t i t u t e s a stasis a n d
g r a n t s i n d i v i d u a t i o n to a b o d y as a d e t e r m i n a t e m o d e . T h e h u m a n m i n d is t h e
i d e a o f a n e x i s t i n g t h i n g (E2P 11) a n d t h e e x i s t i n g t h i n g in q u e s t i o n is t h e h u m a n
b o d y (E2P 13)- S i n c e (1) t h e m i n d h a s as its o b j e c t t h e h u m a n b o d y , a n d (2) t h e
h u m a n b o d y ( d u e to its c o m p l e x i t y a n d n u m b e r o f p a r t s ) is a f f e c t e d - - a n d in
t u r n r e a c t s - - i n m a n y d i f f e r e n t w a y s (E2P13, Post. 3, 6), a n d (3) t h e m i n d
p e r c e i v e s all t h a t h a p p e n s to t h e b o d y , S p i n o z a d e d u c e s (E2P 14) t h a t t h e m i n d
m u s t t h e r e f o r e h a v e t h e c a p a c i t y o f p e r c e i v i n g m a n y t h i n g s in p r o p o r t i o n to t h e
states the body can assume? ~
W e s h o u l d n o t e t h a t t h e c o m p o n e n t p a r t s o f t h e b o d y a r e in a c o n s t a n t
s t a t e o f flux. T h u s , t h e i n t e r n a l o b j e c t s w h i c h i d e a s a r e s o m e h o w " o f " c a n n o t
be the human body's token parts. Rather, ideas collectively constitute an
a w a r e n e s s ( m o r e o r less a d e q u a t e ) w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s to a f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i -
zation-an organization which the operations of the component parts of the
h u m a n b o d y a l s o e x h i b i t u n d e r t h e a s p e c t o f e x t e n s i o n . T h e m a n n e r in
w h i c h m a t e r i a l p a r t s a r e i m p i n g e d u p o n b y e x t e r n a l b o d i e s is a m a n i f e s t a t i o n
o f t h e c o m m o n o r d e r o f n a t u r e as it a f f e c t s t h e i n d i v i d u a l ; i n d i v i d u a l i t y is
maintained through a conservation of balance, proportion, and ratio. The
h u m a n b o d y i t s e l f p e r s i s t s as a p a r t i c u l a r r a t i o o f m o t i o n a n d r e s t t h o u g h its
c o m p o n e n t e l e m e n t s a r e c o n s t a n t l y in flux. I t is t h e p a t t e r n w h i c h m u s t
a c c o u n t f o r i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y . T h e h u m a n b o d y r e t a i n s its i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h

endeavor for self-preservation viewed m relation to both the mind and the body." Henry E.
Allison, Benedict de Spinoza (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 134- 5.
0For a discussion of Spinoza's physics and tts importance in Spmoza's overall system, see
David Lachterman, "The Physics of Spmoza's Ethics," in Spinoza: New Perspectives, Robert Shahan
andJ. I. Biro, eds. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 71-112.
~~ the importance of Spmoza's physics for his theory of knowledge and individua-
tion, Lachterman notes" "The familiar thesis of psycho-physical parallelisms attributed to Spinoza
and regarded as his chief "advance" over Descartes fails to do justice to a point of capital importance
subtly woven through the text of the Ethzcs; where the career of the body is autonomous, the life of
the mind is heteronomous, in the sense that thinking has no objects all its own, no noeta; it has as its
object the nature and affections of the external bodies by which its own body is affected, i.e., forced
to move or to come to rest. The advance from inadequate imagination to adequate conception is by
means of the things which are common to all (E I I, P38); the reference (in the Corollary) to Lemma 2
of the "Physical Digression" makes it plain that common notions are those of the physical character-
istics of all bodies (e.g., motion, rest quantity, etc.) ." Lachterman, "The Physics of Spinoza's Ethics,"
In Spinoza" New Perspectzves, 145-6.
 SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 617
t i m e by m a i n t a i n i n g a r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e p a t t e r n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to
its e n v i r o n m e n t . 11

I t is i m p o r t a n t to stress t h a t S p i n o z a ' s m i n d - b o d y d o c t r i n e is a n identity view.12

Thought a n d E x t e n s i o n , as i n f i n i t e a t t r i b u t e s o f s u b s t a n c e , c o n s t i t u t e d u a l
aspects o f all f i n i t e m o d e s t h a t i n h e r e i n s u b s t a n c e , n o t o n l y h u m a n b e i n g s b u t
all b e i n g s . O n e ' s m i n d is a c o m p l e x i d e a w h o s e i d e a t u m is o n e ' s b o d y : t h e r e is
n o o n t o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n t h e two. T h u s , all o n e ' s t h o u g h t s are c o i n c i -
d e n t w i t h f l u c t u a t i o n s i n t h e state o f o n e ' s b o d y . Yet t h e r e is n o r e d u c t i v i s m
posited in either direction: mind does not control body nor does body control
m i n d . I n d e e d all w i l l i n g is m e r e l y a f u n c t i o n o f c o n a t u s , w h i c h p e r t a i n s to t h e
i n d i v i d u a l as a w h o l e , b o d y a n d m i n d . A n d this r e d u c t i o n o f will to d e s i r e b e a r s
n o r m a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s . As S p i n o z a states at E 3 P 9, Sch. " . . . it is c l e a r t h e n t h a t
we n e i t h e r strive for, n o r will, n o r w a n t , n o r d e s i r e a n y t h i n g b e c a u s e we j u d g e
it to b e g o o d ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , we j u d g e s o m e t h i n g to b e g o o d b e c a u s e we
strive f o r it, will it, w a n t it, a n d d e s i r e it."13
Since the individual may be conceived either u n d e r the attribute of
t h o u g h t o r o f e x t e n s i o n , c o n a t u s m a y b e r e f e r r e d to e i t h e r a t t r i b u t e . W h e n
c o n a t u s is c o n c e i v e d solely u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e o f t h o u g h t , S p i n o z a t e r m s it
d e s i r e (cupiditas); d e s i r e is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f
its s t r i v i n g to c o n t i n u e to exist. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f d e s i r e , a l o n g w i t h t h e m i n d -
b o d y i d e n t i t y d o c t r i n e , lays t h e g r o u n d w o r k f o r his p s y c h o l o g y ; it a d d s to t h e
c o n c e p t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f its c h a n g i n g states, i.e., t h e
affects, o r e m o t i o n s . T h u s , will o r d e s i r e is s i m p l y t h e m i n d ' s r e c o g n i t i o n o f its
s t r i v i n g to p e r s e v e r e i n e x i s t e n c e as a n i n d i v i d u a l .
J o y (laetitia) is t h e a w a r e n e s s o f t h e success o f t h a t s t r i v i n g , i.e., o f its p a s s i n g
to a g r e a t e r state o f p e r f e c t i o n o r c o m p l e t e n e s s . ~ 4 A n o b v i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n o f

11Lee Rice observes: "It Is also the case that, disregarding the external forces operative in this
union, [between bodies forming an individual and external bodies] the bodies umted will interact
among themselves. If this interaction is such that it results in a fixed and determinate relation
among the simpler bodies, then the resultant complex is an individual; and it is this fixed relation
of motion and rest (or interchange of energy) among ~ts parts which mdividuates it. It is the
relauon among the parts, and not the parts themselves, upon which Spinoza fixes in order to
characterize an individual. . . . Individuation is thus accomplished solely through the constant
presence of a fixed quantum of motion and rest." Lee Rice, "Spinoza on Indlviduation,"in Spinoza:
Essays ~n Interpretatzon, 2o~.
~ Spinoza's position on the mind-body relationship has been characterized as neutral in the
sense that mind is not reducible to matter or vice versa but "neutral" is a misleading term: rather,
mind and matter are expressive aspects of a fundamental substance; the modes that constitute
individuals have determinate existence within that reality.
~sE3P9, Sch. 01/148, 5- lo).
14See E4, Pref. (II/2o5, 16-II/2o9, ao) for Spinoza's elaboration of the term 'perfection.'
618 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER I999

this c o n c e p t i o n o f the conatus is that the individual is s o m e t h i n g which only

can posit its existence (E3P4); desire, as the consciousness o f that affirmation,
is paralleled by an increase in the vitality o f the body. F u r t h e r m o r e , j o y can
only affirm desire. J o y is an awareness o f an individual's power relative to its
external influences.
However, an unrestricted state o f j o y is n o t possible for finite modes. H u -
m a n beings, as modes, are always u n d e r the sway o f external factors (E4P3)
a n d t h e r e f o r e are always subject to forces which can diminish their p o w e r o f
persisting. T h e consciousness o f a transition f r o m a g r e a t e r to a lesser state o f
p e r f e c t i o n Spinoza terms sorrow (tristitia)?5 T h e triad o f desire, joy, and sor-
row are the elements o f Spinoza's psychology, elements f r o m w h i c h all other
affects are constructed. Each o f the affects which are derivative o f these ele-
m e n t s are distinguished f r o m o n e a n o t h e r by taking into a c c o u n t their respec-
tive intentional objects. Cognitive attribution o f an object to a particular affect
plays a decisive role in d e t e r m i n i n g the identity o f that affect; to c h a n g e the
intentional object is to c h a n g e the affect.16 T h e central c o n c e r n in o u r liberat-
ing ourselves f r o m the b o n d a g e o f these affects lies in c h a n g i n g passive emo-
tions into active ones, i.e., ones in which, as a manifestation o f desire, we
perceive o u r c o n a t u s - - o u r e s s e n c e - - a s b e i n g s t r e n g t h e n e d .
Spinoza c o n t e n d s (E3P58) that the emotions o f j o y and desire can be re-
lated to us n o t only insofar as we are passive but, in addition, insofar as we are
active. T h e m i n d feels j o y simply in the activity o f conceiving its p o w e r o f
acting, i.e., having a d e q u a t e ideas (E3P53,E2P43). Moreover, a d e q u a t e ideas
express o u r conatus a n d t h e r e f o r e o u r desire, a n d are necessarily related to j o y
(E3P59). N o experience o f sorrow can be an active emotion. T h u s the distinc-
tion between action a n d passion is this: an active e m o t i o n is one (1) whose
source and object is clearly a n d distinctly u n d e r s t o o d and (2) which arises from
desire or joy. T h e possibility exists o f attaining a d e q u a t e knowledge o f one's
emotions; the g a i n i n g o f this k n o w l e d g e m e a n s that one's desire (thus conatus)
follows f r o m one's own essence. T o be d e t e r m i n e d by one's e s s e n c e - - t o exist
f r o m the necessity o f one's own n a t u r e alone ( E 1 D 7 ) - - i s to exemplify virtue
a n d to be free, u n d e r s t o o d as being d e t e r m i n e d by the necessity o f o n e ' s own
nature. Virtue is defined in E4DS: "By virtue a n d p o w e r I u n d e r s t a n d the

,5 Tr~stitia and laetitza are translated by Curley, respectively, as ~joy'and 'sorrow.' This transla-
tion is not consistent among translations and sometimes the terms are translated, respectively, as
'pleasure' and 'pain': for example, compare Samuel Shirley's translation, Ethics (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1982). This can be confusing since Curley translates titillatzo and dolor,
respectively, as the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain.' This may particularly be the source of confusion
since quite a number of secondary sources follow Shirley.
16On this point, see Jerome Neu in Emotion, Thought and Therapy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), 87-9 a.
 S P I N O Z A ON S E L F - P R E S E R V A T I O N AND SELF=DESTRUCTION 6a 9

s a m e t h i n g , i.e., (by I I I P 7 ) , v i r t u e , i n s o f a r as it is r e l a t e d t o m a n , is t h e v e r y
essence, or nature, of man, i n s o f a r as h e h a s t h e p o w e r of bringing about
certain things, which can be understood through t h e l a w s o f his n a t u r e
alone."w But what we essentially endeavor--in accord with reason--is to u n -
derstand (E4Pz6)? s Since reason considers nothing t o b e to its a d v a n t a g e
except understanding (E4Pe6), good and evil are what, in a relative sense, aid
or detract from the exercise of understanding.
However, this state of activity enjoyed in the experiencing of adequate
i d e a s is n o t o u r c o m m o n lot. One's power--the force by which one perseveres
in e x i s t i n g - - i s n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d ( E 4 P 3 ) a n d o n e is a l w a y s s u b j e c t to p a s s i o n s ,
as a p a r t o f n a t u r e ( E 4 P 4, C o r . ) . B o n d a g e , i.e., " M a n ' s l a c k o f p o w e r to m o d e r -
a t e a n d r e s t r a i n t h e affects,"10 c h a r a c t e r i z e s the human condition. Bondage is
our condition because our own tendency to p e r s i s t , m e n t a l l y and physically,
lies n o t i n o u r o w n p o w e r ; it is c o n d i t i o n e d by the power of some contingent
cause greater than our own (E4D5). The relative contingency, possibility, and
temporal proximity--as w e l l as t h e s u p p o s e d good or evil--of the perceived
causes of our emotions are typically imagined b y u s to s u r p a s s o u r o w n p o w e r
of ordering our thoughts ( E 4 P 9 - 1 5 ) . ~~ K n o w l e d g e o f G o d is t h e n i n v o k e d b y
S p i n o z a as t h e g r e a t e s t a b s o l u t e g o o d , w h i c h h e e q u a t e s to k n o w l e d g e of the
most adequate i d e a s ; to t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e v a l u e t h e k n o w l e d g e of mind itself,
w e n e c e s s a r i l y a r e d e s i r i n g to k n o w G o d u n d e r the attribute of thought. Thus,

'7E4D8 (l//2xx, 19-24).

'SSpinoza explicates this definition in several passages. In E4Pa8, Sch. Spinoza equates
virtue with conatus and well-being; happiness depends upon things external to the individual, as
the individual is only a finite mode whose power is greatly overwhelmed by what is external to it.
We are impelled therefore to seek those things which are most advantageous to us and enhance
our existence. The most excellent of these things are those which are most in harmony with our
own nature. We further learn that we can only be said to possess virtue to the extent that we
form adequate ideas (E4P23) and preserve our being under the guidance of reason (E4P~4). To
the extent that another thing agrees with one's nature, it is good (E4P31). Spinoza is referring
here primarily to other human beings (see E2P27)--not other human beings insofar as they are
subject to passive emotions (E4P3~-34) but insofar as they are guided by reason (E4P35). This
commonality of reason as a basis for human affinity leads to the corollaries at the end of E4P35:
"There is no singular thing in Nature that is more useful to man than a man who lives according
to the guidance of reason." This echoes the discussion of virtue in E4P18, Sch. in which Spinoza
insists that what we want most for ourselves, we also want for other men; conscientiousness in
practicing virtue ts our greatest assistance to others. Accordingly, the s u m m u m bonum is some-
thing which can be enjoyed by all (E4P36) and something we naturally desire for others (E4P37).
~9E4, Pref. (1I/2o5,8).
~~Hampshire captures this point as follows: "The individual person's consciousness of his own
needs and strivings (appetitus) IS reflected in his consciousness as desire (cupd~tas). But the desire,
which is associated with his pursuit of particular ends, is no more than the reflection in idea of his
total state, which itself is determined by a variety of external and internal causes; we can therefore
adequately explain his pursuit of particular ends only in terms of these causes, and not vice-versa."
Hampshire, Spinoza, a 19-1~o.
6~o JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER x999
p e r f e c t i n g the m i n d by cultivating a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a moral pursuit;
m i n d expresses its essence most perfectly w h e n it acts in a c c o r d a n c e with its
own n a t u r e by attaining a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H u m a n perfection is at-
tained in knowledge, a n d therefore love, o f G o d (or Nature). Affects are a
source o f b o n d a g e so long as they are attached to objects which a d m i t o f
limitation, imperfection, c o m i n g to be, a n d passing away. W h e n positive af-
fects (those c o n n e c t e d with one's own t e n d e n c y to persist) b e c o m e c o n n e c t e d
to an object which is i m m u n e to c o n t i n g e n c y , one achieves ultimate f r e e d o m ,
virtue, a n d therefore, power. Since all m o d e s are m o d e s o f substance, or God,
the intellectual love o f G o d comprises the a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the
g r o u n d o f selfhood, i.e., the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of oneself (one's conatus) as an
expression o f G o d ' s i m m a n e n t causal p o w e r : as a determinate, finite p o t e n c y
to act, t h o u g h c o n d i t i o n e d externally by the transient causation o f all o t h e r
finite modes. His description o f the intellectual love o f G o d indicates a conver-
g e n c e o f the epistemological a n d the affective: "He w h o u n d e r s t a n d s himself
a n d his affects clearly a n d distinctly loves God, a n d does so the more, the m o r e
he u n d e r s t a n d s h i m s e l f a n d his affects. "2~
Spinoza concludes that the source o f this happiness is the a d e q u a t e intu-
itive knowledge o f the m i n d ' s ideas which (once adequately u n d e r s t o o d ) are
f o u n d to have G o d as their o b j e c t - - a n entity which c a n n o t be hated, which is
i m m u t a b l e a n d eternal, a n d f r o m which we n e e d n o t expect love, n o r with it
the possibility o f rejection (E5P 19,~~ B u t this intuitive knowledge a n d love of
G o d signals Spinoza's p e r p l e x i n g and controversial discussion o f the mind's
eternality.

E s P 2 o marks the e n d o f Spinoza's discussion o f the m i n d ' s power u n d e r the

aspect o f duration. Spinoza next extends his depiction o f the s u m m u m b o n u m
o f this e m b o d i e d life to a sort o f eternal and p u r e l y m e n t a l awareness o f God
(E5P23). A hint as to what this can possibly m e a n is f o u n d in the scholium to
E5P33:
Although this love towards God has had no beginning (P3~) [being eternal], it yet has
all the perfections of love just as if it had originated in the manner we supposed in the
corollary to the preceding proposition. There is no difference, except that the mind has
possessed from eternity those perfections which we then supposed to be accruing to it,
accompanied by the idea of God as external cause. If pleasure consists in the transition

~ E5P15 (II/a9o, 17-19). Spinoza further claims that such love is bound to hold the chief
place m the mind and that it cannot turn to hatred; of course, smce God does not possess
emotions he cannot love us in return--and indeed we should not wish God to love us in return
(E5P 16-19).
 SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 62~
to a state of greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the m i n d is
endowed with perfection itselfY 2

By this, I t h i n k S p i n o z a m e a n s t h a t b l e s s e d n e s s (love o f G o d as it a r i s e s
f r o m t h e t h i r d k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e ) is t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h a t w h i c h is p o t e n t i a l
in all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . T h i s a c t u a l i z a t i o n is a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h c o n s t a n t l y s t r i v i n g
to c u l t i v a t e a d e q u a t e i d e a s , t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e c o n a t u s u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e
o f T h o u g h t . T h e p e r f e c t i o n o f this s t r i v i n g is u n i o n w i t h t h e " m i n d o f G o d , "
the mediate infinite mode of the attribute of Thought, an infinite attribute of
s u b s t a n c e , y e t t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e h u m a n m i n d as well. A n d , as e s s e n c e , it is
e t e r n a l a n d c a n n o t b e d e s t r o y e d . 2 3 So, t h e m i n d ' s e t e r n a l i t y ( a n d w i t h it salva-
t i o n , f o r S p i n o z a ) is r e a l i z e d in love o f a n i m m u t a b l e e t e r n a l b e i n g , a l o v e
w h i c h (1) c a n n o t b e d e s t r o y e d ( E 5 P 3 7 ) , (2) is a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h i n t u i t i v e k n o w l -
e d g e , a n d (3) is its o w n r e w a r d in t h a t e v e n i f w e d i d n o t k n o w t h a t t h e m i n d is
e t e r n a l w e w o u l d r e g a r d t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f t h a t l o v e as o f p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e
(E5P 41).24 S p i n o z a s u c c i n c t l y c a p t u r e s this i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t y o f v i r t u e in t h e l a s t
p r o p o s i t i o n o f t h e Ethics: " B l e s s e d n e s s is n o t t h e r e w a r d o f v i r t u e b u t v i r t u e
itself."~5
I n P a r t I o f t h e Ethics, G o d is d e s c r i b e d as f r e e i n s o f a r as G o d is b o t h
d e t e r m i n e d a n d d e t e r m i n i n g , n a t u r e n a t u r i n g (natura naturans). F u r t h e r m o r e ,
G o d as e x p r e s s e d in t h e a t t r i b u t e o f T h o u g h t - - a s u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x p r e s s i n g
itself through the mediate infinite mode of one of God's infinite attributes--is
t h e s o u r c e o f a d e q u a t e k n o w l e d g e . A d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in t h e h u m a n
m i n d t h e n , in s o m e s e n s e , is u n i o n w i t h t h e m i n d o f G o d . A d m i t t e d l y this is
m u r k y b u t t h e p o i n t s e e m s to b e t h a t o n l y in t h e i n t e l l e c t , w h e n a d e q u a t e i d e a s
are determined purely by other adequate ideas, can one possess some sense of
e t e r n a l i t y , t h o u g h r e a l i z e d o n l y in t h i s life. E t e r n a l i t y s e e m s to t h e a w a r e n e s s
b y a f i n i t e m o d e t h a t w h a t is m o s t p e r f e c t in its e s s e n c e is a n e x p r e s s i o n o f G o d
as a n i n f i n i t e i m m u t a b l e b e i n g . T h i s i n v o l v e s a n i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d e m o t i v e i d e n t i -
f i c a t i o n w i t h G o d (or N a t u r e ) . O n e c a n n o t a c t u a l l y a t t a i n t h e s t a t u s o f G o d b u t ,
to t h e e x t e n t t h a t o n e ' s i d e a s , o r a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e m , a r e t h o s e w h i c h
a d e q u a t e l y u n d e r s t a n d s u b s t a n t i a l r e a l i t y , t h e s e l f c e a s e s to b e m e r e l y a f i n i t e

22E5P33, Sch. (1I/3ol,54I/3Ol, 14).

23The intellectual love of God is connected explicitly to the concept of freedom in E5P36,
Cor., Sch.: "From this we clearly understand in what our salvation or blessedness or Freedom
consists, namely, in the constant and eternal love towards God, viz. m a constant and eternal Love
of God, or in God's Love for all men." Here, we see the ultimate benefit of Spinozistic freedom: a
naturalistic salvation. Pamcularly interesting on this point is Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other
Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 153-171.
24See Yovel, Spinoza and OtherHeretics. The Marrano ofReason, 167-171, for an interpretation of
Spinoza's third kind of knowledge as a pathway to secular salvation.
~E5P42 (11/3o7, 26-27).
622 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 9

a n d passive s u f f e r e r o f affects. T h r o u g h a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e self

ceases to r e c o g n i z e itself as s o m e t h i n g s e p a r a t e f r o m the s u b s t a n t i a l r e a l i t y o f
w h i c h it is a n e x p r e s s i o n . R a t i o n a l b e i n g s h a v e t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a s s i m i l a t i n g
that knowledge through a process of conscious and adequate understanding of
t h e i r i n e l i m i n a b l e f u n c t i o n a l r o l e as m o d e s o f s u b s t a n c e . Self a n d w o r l d , since
n o t o n t o l o g i c a l l y s e p a r a b l e , c a n b e r e c o n c i l e d i n a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h su-
p e r s e d e s w h a t S p i n o z a c l a i m s to b e a falsely d u a l i s t a n d p u r e l y i m a g i n a t i v e
e m p i r i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e w o r l d . S p i n o z a p r e s e n t s a n a l t e r n a t i v e to the
view w h i c h c a n o n l y r e c o g n i z e t h e w o r l d as a set o f p a r t i c u l a r a n d f r a g m e n t e d
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e a d e q u a t e l y u n d e r s t o o d self---as S p i n o z a c o n c e i v e s i t - - a c t s
f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . S u c h a self d o e s n o t s e p a r a t e
its o w n e n d e a v o r i n m a i n t a i n i n g its e s s e n c e f r o m t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r e a l i t y w i t h i n
w h i c h its s t r i v i n g a n d its p o w e r c o n s t i t u t e a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t .

As p e r p l e x i n g as this a c c o u n t o f e t e r n i t y m a y be, it s h o u l d n o t b l i n d u s to the

c e n t r a l thesis t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s as we k n o w t h e m exist o n l y d u r a t i o n a l l y a n d the
n i s u s t o w a r d s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n c a n n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y resist e v e n t u a l d e s t r u c t i o n .
T h e p r o b l e m I n o w p o s e is: c a n a m e a n i n g f u l d i s t i n c t i o n b e m a d e , o n
S p i n o z i s t g r o u n d s , b e t w e e n s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n , i.e., s u i c i d e , a n d a n y o t h e r f o r m
o f d e a t h ? T h e p r o b l e m s t e m s f r o m t h e m i n d - b o d y i d e n t i t y thesis. T h e m o -
m e n t o f d e a t h is o n e i n w h i c h t h e b o d y ' s p o w e r to p e r s i s t is o v e r c o m e b y a n
e x t e r n a l n a t u r e c o n t r a r y to its o w n . S i n c e e a c h m e n t a l state is a n a w a r e n e s s o f
a state o f t h e b o d y , t h e last t h o u g h t o f o n e ' s life m u s t be t h e t h o u g h t o f o n e ' s
b o d y b e i n g o v e r c o m e b y a n e x t e r n a l n a t u r e c o n t r a r y to its own. B u t S p i n o z a
c h a r a c t e r i z e s s u i c i d e as a state o f m i n d s u c h " t h a t t h o s e w h o kill t h e m s e l v e s are
w e a k - m i n d e d a n d c o m p l e t e l y c o n q u e r e d b y e x t e r n a l causes c o n t r a r y to t h e i r
n a t u r e . "~6 T h u s , t h e r e s e e m s to b e n o l e g i t i m a t e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n suicide
a n d a n y f o r m o f death.27

~6E4PI8, Sch. (11/22~,24-26; 32-33).

27Victor Cosculluela, in The Ethzcs of Suzczde (Garland Publishing: New York, x995), 157, offers
the following definition and set of criteria for an act to be considered smcide, which is articulated
as follows: Person S commits suicide at time T if and only if:
(1) S intends at T to bring about his own death,
(2) S acts at T in such a way as to bring about his own death,
(3) the intention specified in (1) causes (through a number of generated actions) the action
described in (2),
(4) the causal route from the intention specified in (1) to the action described in (2) is more
or less in accordance with S's action-plan, and
(5) S acts voluntarily in bringing about his own death.
Th~s definition captures two essential elements in our everyday intuitions about what makes an act
of self-inflicted death a suicide: that the act is one that is intended by someone to bring about his
 SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND S E L F - D E S T R U C T I O N 623

S p i n o z a m a k e s f o u r d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e s to suicide. T h e first is i n the S c h o l i u m

I I I f o l l o w i n g E 2 P 4 9 w h e r e h e d i s p u t e s t h e C a r t e s i a n b i f u r c a t i o n o f will a n d
i n t e l l e c t , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e p u z z l e o f B u r i d a n ' s ass. H e r e m a r k s " . . . I g r a n t
e n t i r e l y t h a t a m a n p l a c e d i n s u c h a n e q u i l i b r i u m (viz. w h o p e r c e i v e s n o t h i n g
b u t t h i r s t a n d h u n g e r , a n d s u c h f o o d a n d d r i n k as a r e e q u a l l y d i s t a n t f r o m
him) will p e r i s h o f h u n g e r a n d thirst. I f t h e y ask m e w h e t h e r s u c h a m a n
s h o u l d n o t b e t h o u g h t a n ass, r a t h e r t h a n a m a n , I say t h a t I d o n o t k n o w - - j u s t
as I d o n o t k n o w h o w h i g h l y we s h o u l d e s t e e m o n e w h o h a n g s h i m s e l f , o r
c h i l d r e n , fools, a n d m a d m e n , etc. "2s T h i s a l l u s i o n to s u i c i d e is n o t m e r e l y
i n c i d e n t a l , as s o m e h a v e claimed.~9 B a r b o n e a n d Rice p o i n t o u t t h a t it o c c u r s
s i g n i f i c a n t l y at a p o i n t at w h i c h S p i n o z a m a k e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m a d i s c u s s i o n
o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e h u m a n m i n d to t h e p o w e r a n d n a t u r e o f the affects.3O
C o l l a p s i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n will a n d i n t e l l e c t as h e does, S p i n o z a ' s
r e f e r e n c e to s u i c i d e h e r e p o r t e n d s his u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t s u i c i d e is n e v e r
freely willed by an agent.
S p i n o z a r e f e r s to s u i c i d e a g a i n i n t h e S c h o l i u m to E 4 P 18, this t i m e i n c o n n e c -
t i o n w i t h his n o t i o n o f c o n a t u s , i.e., "Since r e a s o n d e m a n d s n o t h i n g c o n t r a r y to
n a t u r e , it d e m a n d s t h a t e v e r y o n e love h i m s e l f , seek his o w n a d v a n t a g e , w h a t is
r e a l l y u s e f u l to h i m . . , a n d a b s o l u t e l y , t h a t e v e r y o n e s h o u l d strive to p r e s e r v e
his o w n b e i n g as f a r as h e can";~ 1 a n d " F u r t h e r , since v i r t u e (by D8) is n o t h i n g
b u t a c t i n g f r o m the laws o f o n e ' s o w n n a t u r e , a n d n o o n e strives to p r e s e r v e his
b e i n g (by I I I P 7 ) e x c e p t f r o m t h e laws o f his o w n n a t u r e , it follows: . . . (iii) t h a t
those w h o kill t h e m s e l v e s a r e w e a k - m i n d e d a n d c o m p l e t e l y c o n q u e r e d b y e x t e r -
n a l causes c o n t r a r y to t h e i r nature."3~ S p i n o z a h e r e p r o p o u n d s his a f o r e m e n -
t i o n e d d o c t r i n e t h a t s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n is i n t r i n s i c to a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s e s s e n c e ,
p o w e r is always to o n e ' s a d v a n t a g e , a n d t h u s t h a t s u i c i d e i n d i c a t e s m e n t a l i m p o -
t e n c e , a w e a k n e s s i n face o f e x t e r n a l f o r c e s c o n t r a r y to o n e ' s n a t u r e .
A t h i r d , m u c h m o r e s u b s t a n t i a l series o f r e m a r k s o n s u i c i d e o c c u r s s h o r t l y
t h e r e a f t e r , i n t h e S c h o l i u m to E 4 P ~ o , a n d follows u p this t h e m e :

death and that the act is voluntary. But this account is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
as Cosculluela himself admits, condition (4) is vague since the phrase "more or less" is vague. Yet
that is not an important problem because the intention and the act coincide in the right kind of
way. Second, the intention to bring about one's death, as specified in (1) must be understood in a
way that is charitable toward questions of double effect. A martyr whose intentional death is not
done for the purpose of dying, but to effect some greater good, is still intending his death in the
act of martyrdom.
~sE~P49, Sch. [III.B. (iv)] (1][/135, 25-3a).
29Wallace Matson, for example, in "Death and DestrucUon in Spinoza's Ethics," Inquiry 2o
(1977): 4o3-17.
3oSteven Barbone and Lee Rice, "Spinoza and the Problem of Suicide," Internatzonal Philosophz-
cal Quarterly XXXIV (a994): 23o.
3~E4P18, Sch. (I1/222, 17-21 ).
s2E4Px8, Sch. (1I/~22,24-26; 3~-33).
624 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER X999

No one, therefore, unless he is defeated by causes external, a n d contrary, to his nature,

neglects to seek his own advantage, or to preserve his being. No one, I say, avoids food
or kills himself from the necessity of his own nature. Those who do such things are
compelled by external causes, which can h a p p e n in m a n y ways. Someone may kill
himself because he is compelled by another, who twists his right h a n d (which h a p p e n e d
to hold a sword) a n d forces him to direct the sword against his heart; or because he is
forced by the c o m m a n d of a T y r a n t (as Seneca was) to open his veins, i.e., he desires to
avoid a greater evil by [submitting to] a lesser; or finally because h i d d e n external causes
so dispose his imagination, and so affect his Body, that it takes on another nature,
contrary to the former, a n a t u r e of which there cannot be an idea in the Mind (by
IIIP lo). But that a m a n should, from the necessity of his own nature, strive not to exist,
or be changed into another form, is as impossible as that something should come from
nothing. A n y o n e who gives this a little thought will see it.as

I t s h o u l d b e r e m a r k e d t h a t n o t e v e r y o n e sees this. T h e first case is n o t suicide

i n a n y i n t u i t i v e s e n s e a n d so c a n be d i s m i s s e d . T h e s e c o n d case is m o r e p r o b -
lematic, however. B e n n e t t remarks:

W h e n the knife did its work, Seneca's body was not transmitting forces from the
outside. T h e causally sufficient conditions for his act were stored within him; the action
flowed from his n a t u r e as it then was, including his strengths a n d frailties, his attitudes
to pain a n d shame, his capacities to think thoughts through, and his belief that if he didn't
die that night he would suffer a worse death in the mormng. T h a t last deadly item was caused by
a message from Nero; but still it was an aspect of his nature at the m o m e n t when he
slashed his wrists. Seneca's death proceeded from his nature as it then was, including
his wish for dignity and a good reputation, and his having the deadly conditional belief.
I conclude that Seneca falsifies 3P4 [No thzng can be destroyed except through an external
cause]. I suppose that Spinoza would deny this, saying that I have misunderstood the
notion of Seneca's "nature." What, then, does he mean by nature?"34

T h a t is m y q u e s t i o n as well a n d it b r i n g s u s to S p i n o z a ' s t h i r d e x a m p l e , o f
" h i d d e n e x t e r n a l causes" a f f e c t i n g o n e ' s i m a g i n a t i o n so t h a t o n e ' s b o d y takes
o n a n o t h e r n a t u r e . T h e r e is s o m e d o u b t as to w h a t S p i n o z a m e a n s : h e c o u l d
p l a u s i b l y b e r e a d as r e f e r r i n g to (1) p h y s i c a l disease w h i c h c a u s e s d e l i r i u m , (2)
m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s s u c h as p a r a n o i a o r d e p r e s s i o n , o r (3) c h e m i c a l a g e n t s s u c h
as d r u g s w h i c h c o r r u p t o n e ' s n a t u r e . A n y o f t h o s e I t h i n k w o u l d b e c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h E 3 P 4 ( s u p p o s i n g m e n t a l disease to h a v e s o m e sort o f o r g a n i c basis).
H o w e v e r , S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f s u i c i d e t h e n c o m e s d a n g e r o u s l y close to o b s c u r -
i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s u i c i d e a n d a n y o t h e r f o r m o f d e a t h . T o say t h a t
J o n e s c o m m i t t e d s u i c i d e is to say t h a t J o n e s ' s n a t u r e was c h a n g e d by a n e x t e r -
n a l c a u s e i n s u c h a w a y t h a t it t o o k o n a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e t h a n b e f o r e .
O f c o u r s e , g i v e n the b a c k g r o u n d o f S p i n o z a ' s m e t a p h y s i c s , we k n o w t h a t all

33E4P2o, Sch. (II/224, 2o--1][/225, 2).

~Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spznoza's Ethics (Indianapolis Hackett Pubhshmg Co., 1984),
238.
 SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 62 5
finite m o d e s u n d e r g o c o n s t a n t change.35 All striving to persevere is limited in
d u r a t i o n a n d subject to b e i n g o v e r c o m e by the p o w e r o f c o n t r a r y external
forces. W h e n the ratio o f internal m o t i o n o f the parts o f the b o d y is altered
b e y o n d a relatively fixed p r o p o r t i o n , the b o d y ' s n a t u r e - - a finite m o d e consti-
tuted by its c o m p o n e n t finite m o d e s as a particular c o m p l e x i n d i v i d u a l - -
changes. This c h a n g e we call death. Given Spinoza's m i n d - b o d y correlativity
thesis (see E2P7 a n d E3P 1 a as particularly relevant here), the decrease o f the
body's p o w e r o f m a i n t a i n i n g its constituent ratio o f m o t i o n that characterizes
its physical individuality necessarily involves a decrease in the p o w e r o f the
m i n d to posit its own existence. T h u s , all d e a t h seems to involve a c h a n g e in
one's nature, b o t h mentally a n d physically, a n d so the distinction between
o t h e r f o r m s o f d e a t h a n d suicide is hazy, particularly in light o f Spinoza's own
examples o f suicide.
This brings us to Spinoza's f o u r t h m e n t i o n o f suicide, in a letter to
B l y e n b e r g h written in 166 5. B l y e n b e r g h was a grain m e r c h a n t and a pious,
albeit simple, d e f e n d e r o f Christian theology. T h e i r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e com-
m e n c e d with B l y e n b e r g h asking Spinoza to explain h o w G o d is n o t the cause
o f evil. T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e included some half-dozen e x c h a n g e s which in-
creasingly taxed Spinoza's usually polite a n d gracious d e m e a n o r . This context
I think most clearly reveals Spinoza's moral stance on the question o f suicide.
Ever the e n e m y o f superstition, Spinoza regards the suicidal impulse, as he
does all affects, with the dispassionate attitude o f the scientist, treating h u m a n
actions a n d passions, virtues a n d frailties, in the m a n n e r o f lines, planes, a n d
bodies (E 3, Preface). A d d r e s s i n g B l y e n b e r g h ' s c o n c e r n a b o u t the possible role
o f virtue in mitigating a h u m a n n a t u r e in which "the p u r s u i t o f pleasure a n d
villainy" was n o t r e p u g n a n t , S p i n o z a writes, in Ep. 23:

Finally, as to your third question, it presupposes a contradiction. It is just as if someone

were to ask me whether, if it accorded better with a man's nature that he should hang
himself, there would be any reason why he should not hang himself. However, suppose
it possible that there could be such a nature. Then I say (whether I grant free will or
not) that if anyone sees that he can live better at the gallows than at his own table, he
would be very foolish not to go and hang himself. And he who saw clearly that he
would in fact enjoy a more perfect and better life or essence by engaging in villainy
than by pursuing virtue would also be a fool if he did not do just that. For in relation to
such a perverted human nature, villainy would be virtue.36

Clearly, especially given Spinoza's a c c o u n t o f virtue as an expression o f the

self-determination o f the free a g e n t in Ethics 4 & 5, Spinoza posits such an

s~See, for example, E2Ax. 4; the Lemmas and Axioms following E2Pa3; E3P1; E4Ax. 1; and
E4P2- 5.
~6Ep. 23 in Spinoza: The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1995), 165-9.
626 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 9
i m p u l s e to s u i c i d e as a p u r e l y c o u n t e r f a c t u a l n a t u r e : "A f r e e m a n t h i n k s o f
n o t h i n g less t h a n o f d e a t h , a n d his w i s d o m is a m e d i t a t i o n o n life, n o t o n
d e a t h . "37
L e t u s f i n a l l y t r y to p i e c e t o g e t h e r w h a t S p i n o z a m e a n s b y a p e r s o n ' s
n a t u r e . O n e p o s s i b i l i t y is t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e o f a h u m a n b e i n g is t h e u r g e
to p r e s e r v e h i m - o r h e r s e l f a c c o r d i n g to v i r t u e , w h i c h is a f u n c t i o n o f a d e q u a t e
understanding. A human being who fully enjoys such understanding most
e x e m p l i f i e s h u m a n n a t u r e , a n d it is to t h a t p e r s o n t h a t s u i c i d e is i n c o n c e i v a b l e .
B u t w h a t S p i n o z a g r a n t s h e also t a k e s away. I n t h e S c h o l i u m to E 4 P 7 ~ [A f r e e
m a n a l w a y s acts h o n e s t l y , n o t d e c e p t i v e l y ] S p i n o z a q u e r i e s : " S u p p o s e s o m e o n e
n o w asks: w h a t i f a m a n c o u l d save h i m s e l f f r o m t h e p r e s e n t d a n g e r o f d e a t h
b y t r e a c h e r y ? w o u l d n o t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r e s e r v i n g his o w n b e i n g r e c o m -
mend, without qualification, that he be treacherous?" which Spinoza answers:
" T h e r e p l y to this is t h e s a m e . I f r e a s o n s h o u l d r e c o m m e n d t h a t , it w o u l d
r e c o m m e n d it to all m e n . A n d so r e a s o n w o u l d r e c o m m e n d , w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a -
tion, that men make agreements, join forces, and have common rights only by
d e c e p t i o n - - i . e . , t h a t t h e y r e a l l y h a v e n o c o m m o n r i g h t s . T h i s is a b s u r d . " 3 s
A s i d e f r o m a n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f K a n t ' s c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , w e see h e r e a n
apparent contradiction: someone fully possessed of reason would choose
d e a t h o v e r d e c e i t , d i r e c t l y c o u n t e r to E 3 P 4 a n d like p a s s a g e s . I c a n e n t e r t a i n
t h e d e f e n s e t h a t t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n is o n l y a p p a r e n t , n o t r e a l . B u t to s u r m o u n t
t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n , w e m u s t b e a b l e to a d m i t , as S p i n o z a I b e l i e v e i n t e n d s , t h a t
h u m a n e s s e n c e is o n l y f u l l y a c t u a l i z e d in t h e f r e e p e r s o n , p o s s e s s e d o f a d e -
q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d w h o s e m i n d is in s o m e s e n s e e t e r n a l a n d w h o t h e r e -
f o r e c a n n o t b e d e s t r o y e d . W e m a y n o t b e r e a d y to g o to s u c h l e n g t h s . Yet
o t h e r w i s e , I see n o w a y to m a k e s e n s e o f t h e n o t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e t h a t
a u t o m a t i c a l l y i m p l i e s t h a t s u i c i d e is a s t a t e o f b e i n g o v e r c o m e b y e x t e r n a l
f o r c e s in a w a y t h a t o t h e r f o r m s o f d e a t h a r e n o t .
Yet this a c c o u n t o f h u m a n n a t u r e c a n n o t u n e q u i v o c a l l y b e h e l d to b e
S p i n o z a ' s o w n . A s a f i n a l w r i n k l e in S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f a t h i n g ' s n a t u r e , we
c o n s i d e r his r e m a r k s in a p r e v i o u s l e t t e r to B l y e n b e r g h , E p . 21:

For instance, we say that a blind man is deprived o f sight because we readily imagine him
as seeing. This imagining may arise from c o m p a r i n g him with those who can see, or from
c o m p a r i n g his p r e s e n t state with a past state when he could see. W h e n we consider the
man from this perspective, c o m p a r i n g his nature with that o f others or with his own past
nature, we assert that sight pertains to his nature, and so we say that he is deprived of it.
But when we consider God's decree and God's nature, we can no m o r e assert o f that man
that he is deprived of sight than we can assert it of a stone. F o r to say that sight belongs to
that m a n at that time is quite as illogical as to say that it belongs to a stone, since nothing

37E4P 7 (II/261).
~SE4P72, Sch. (II/264, 20-29).
 SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 627
m o r e pertains to that man, and is his, than that which God's intellect and will has assigned
to him. T h e r e f o r e God is no more the cause o f his n o t seeing than of a stone's not seeing,
this latter being p u r e negation. So, too, when we consider the nature of a m a n who is
governed by a lustful desire and we c o m p a r e his p r e s e n t desire with the desire of a g o o d
man, or with the desire he himself once had, we assert that this man is deprived of the
better d e s i r e , j u d g i n g that a virtuous desire b e l o n g e d to him at that p o i n t of time. This we
cannot do if we have r e g a r d to the n a t u r e of the decree and intellect of God. For from
that perspective the better desire pertains to that man's nature at that p o i n t of time no
m o r e than to the nature of the Devil or a stone. T h e r e f o r e f r o m that perspective the
better desire is not a privation but a negation. So privation is simply to d e n y of a thing
something that we j u d g e pertains to its nature, a n d negation is to deny something o f a
thing because it does n o t pertain to its nature.39

T h i s f i n a l l y calls i n t o d o u b t a n y m e a n i n g f u l d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t c a n b e m a d e b y
S p i n o z a b e t w e e n d e a t h a n d s u i c i d e s i n c e at t h e t i m e o f o n e ' s d e a t h , o n e ' s n a t u r e
is w h a t it i s , j u s t as it is at a n y o t h e r j u n c t u r e o f i n d i v i d u a l d u r a t i o n . T h e t i m e o f
o n e ' s d e a t h is n e c e s s a r i l y o n e in w h i c h o n e is o v e r w h e l m e d b y o u t s i d e f o r c e s ,
j u s t as w i t h s u i c i d e . F u r t h e r m o r e , his t r e a t m e n t o f n a t u r e h e r e u n d e r s c o r e s his
t h o r o u g h g o i n g n e c e s s i t a r i a n i s m : t h e n a t u r e o f a t h i n g c a n b e n o o t h e r t h a n it is
d e t e r m i n e d to b e s i n c e all c a u s a t i o n a n d all e s s e n c e p r o c e e d s f r o m " G o d ' s d e -
c r e e . " G i v e n t h a t p e o p l e d o kill t h e m s e l v e s , w e s e e m f o r c e d to t h e f o l l o w i n g
c o n c l u s i o n s : (1) f o r S p i n o z a , a t h i n g ' s e s s e n c e c a n n o t g i v e rise to its o w n s e l f
d e s t r u c t i o n ; (2) t h e i m p u l s e to s e l f d e s t r u c t i o n m u s t b e t h e r e s u l t o f a n a l t e r a t i o n
in a t h i n g ' s n a t u r e r e s u l t i n g f r o m e x t e r n a l f o r c e s , s u c h t h a t it c a n n o l o n g e r
m a i n t a i n its e s s e n c e ; h e n c e , (3) ' e s s e n c e ' a n d ' n a t u r e ' c a n n o t m e a n t h e s a m e
t h i n g in e a c h c o n t e x t in w h i c h S p i n o z a u s e s t h o s e t e r m s . S o m e t i m e s , ' n a t u r e ' is
to b e e q u a t e d w i t h e s s e n c e , e.g., in t h e S c h o l i u m to E 4 P 18: call t h i s n a t u r e 1. I n
o t h e r p a s s a g e s , s u c h as E p . 21, ' n a t u r e ' s e e m s to r e f e r to c o n d i t i o n e d e x i s t e n c e
as a d e t e r m i n e d f i n i t e m o d e : call this n a t u r e s. B u t t h e e q u i v o c a t i o n , i f s u c h t h e r e
is, e i t h e r r e n d e r s S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f s u i c i d e t r i v i a l o r i n v o l v e s h i m in a f u n d a -
m e n t a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y in w h i c h s u i c i d e s r e a l l y d o f a l s i f y E 3 P 4.
T h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m is this: t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y t h i n g , as d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
its e s s e n c e , i n v o l v e s its d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y o t h e r o t h e r f i n i t e m o d e s , i.e., a t h i n g ' s
e x i s t e n c e c a n n o t b e e q u a t e d w i t h its e s s e n c e (this is t r u e o n l y o f G o d ) a n d , t h i s
b e i n g so, o n e ' s a c t i o n s a r e b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d as f o l l o w i n g f r o m o n e ' s n a t u r e 2
r a t h e r t h a n f r o m o n e ' s e s s e n c e . H e n c e , to s a y t h a t o n e ' s e s s e n c e c a n n o t b e t h e
s o u r c e o f o n e ' s s e l f d e s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t c o n t r a d i c t E 3 P 4 b u t t h e n it also d o e s
n o t b e a r o n t h e p r o b l e m o f s u i c i d e as S p i n o z a t r i e s to m a i n t a i n . O n this i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n I c o n c l u d e , c o n t r a r y to B e n n e t t , t h a t t h e f a c t o f c o e r c e d s u i c i d e , s u c h as
t h a t o f S e n e c a , d o e s n o t f a l s i f y E 3 P 4 : it m e r e l y t r i v i a l i z e s it s i n c e s u i c i d e t h e n
f o l l o w s f r o m S e n e c a ' s n a t u r e ~ , n o t his e s s e n c e . T h e d e a t h o f a S e n e c a , a S o c r a t e s ,

~gEp. 21, Spinoza: The Letters. x53- 4.

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those o f f e r i n g t h e i r lives to save others, or acts o f self-immolation as political
s t a t e m e n t s m u s t on Spinoza's a c c o u n t be seen as the o u t c o m e o f self-alienation
i n d u c e d by hostile e x t e r n a l forces, r a t h e r t h a n as expressions o f courage, integ-
rity, h e r o i s m , or defiance. I think Spinoza w o u l d w a n t to resist this conclusion
(as w o u l d I) b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y his a c c o u n t o f suicide entails it if the n a t u r e o f the
suicide victim is that o f b e i n g c o m p l e t e l y o v e r c o m e in m i n d a n d b o d y by the
hostile circumstances o f c o n d i t i o n e d existence.
O n the o t h e r h a n d , if ' n a t u r e ' is e q u a t e d with essence a n d u n d e r s t o o d as
n a t u r e , t h e n S p i n o z a s e e m s guilty o f a f u n d a m e n t a l inconsistency, as B e n n e t t
charges. T h i s inconsistency m i g h t be resolved or e x p l a i n e d in o n e o f the
following ways: (1) a d m i t t i n g t h a t Spinoza is i n d e e d using ' n a t u r e ' equivocally
in a h a p h a z a r d fashion (not an attractive option), (~) is using ' n a t u r e ' equivo-
cally in an i n t e n t i o n a l fashion in o r d e r to o b s c u r e w h a t he h i m s e l f sees to be a
f u n d a m e n t a l inconsistency in his central doctrine (also n o t an attractive op-
tion), or (3) is covertly e q u a t i n g essence to nature 2 only in the case o f the ideal
f r e e m a n w h o c a n n o t b e d e s t r o y e d b e c a u s e the g r e a t e r p a r t o f his m i n d is
eternal, an o p t i o n that, as alluded to earlier, involves g o i n g to g r e a t lengths to
m a k e Spinoza's doctrine consistent.

W h a t has n o t b e e n t o u c h e d on explicitly yet is the question o f the willfulness,

a n d with it the n o r m a t i v e status, o f c o m m o n f o r m s o f suicide. Spinoza's ac-
c o u n t o f b o t h suicide a n d o f willful action m a k e s it clear that o r d i n a r y suicide
c a n n o t be a willful act, n o r a sinful or b l a m e w o r t h y one. I n d e e d , it is scarcely
an act at all: it h a p p e n s d u e to the external influences that o v e r w h e l m the
a g e n t into passivity. T h e suicide victim is exactly that. I n this m u c h , I find
m y s e l f a g r e e i n g with Spinoza: o n e c a n n o t look u p o n suicide with m o r a l r e p u g -
n a n c e a n y m o r e t h a n o n e can a b h o r a n o t h e r for s u c c u m b i n g to a disease.
W h a t Spinoza o p p o s e s is the view t h a t suicide is a m o r t a l sin, deserving o f
d a m n a t i o n . Spinoza scourges such superstition t h r o u g h n o t only his vigorous
critique o f religion b u t also in his r i g o r o u s analysis o f h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n as it
s t e m s f r o m his necessitarian metaphysics. Practically, it implies that o n e whose
life is a m o r a s s o f s u f f e r i n g with little ease a n d n o h o p e o f relief has already
s u c c u m b e d to e x t e r n a l forces.

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