Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs.

Honorable
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989
FACTS:

These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No.
27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310

G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of
just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in
full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy
their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent

domain.

RULING:

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power
is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge
of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene
materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of
just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question

of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
 Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No.119694, May 22, 1995

FACTS:

On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which reads in

part Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print
space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of
general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from
March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21,
1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec
Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or
city.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No.
2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies,
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitute a valid exercise of the

power of eminent domain.

RULING:

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III,
Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for
"Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner
PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to
"donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or
perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free
print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind
of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec
purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
 Forfom Development Corporation v. PNR
G.R. No. 124795, December 10, 2008

FACTS:

P owned land in San Pedro, Laguna. 1972, PFMarcos approved a

project to be implemented by PNR for the installation of railroads from San
Pedro to Carmona. P’s property portion of 100Ksq.m were traversed as
right-ofway. 1990, P filed to recover possession of the property, alleging R
with military men, against P’s will, occupied th eproperty and installed
railroad facilities, and rented out portions along the tracks to squatters, and
despite demands,
PR failed to pay. P also prayed for rent, unrealized income, damages.
PR said it had authority of law, but denied leasing to tenants, and said
acquisition was by consent of former owner, Dr. Limcaoco, and acquisition
was through negotiations with respective owners, and no crop was damaged
in the acquisition. PR said former PF Marcos approved the project to serve as
squatters’ resettlement, that respective owners were paid just
compensation. P’s witnesses: one worked with Dr. Limcaoco from1951 until
his death, and P was owned by his children, said in 1972, forcible taking of
property portions, installed railroads, destroying 11hectares of sugar land,
even leased.
Another officer witness presented documents showing transfer of
ownership from Dr. Limcaoco to P, but disclosed notes saying Dr. Limcaoco
still owned the land, corroborated by daughter and EVP of P, that armed
men took the property without any court order. Both TCTs were in P’s name,
and OCTs were in Dr. Limcaoco’s name. For PR, the right-of-way was
acquired to provide efficient means of transporting squatters who were
relocated in Cavite, the commuter line for service rather than profit.
Allegedly, the lots of P were not paid because P could not present titles,
which had been used as mortgage elsewhere. The witness said PNR
employees were not allowed to settle on PNR’s right of way, and squatting
had never been encouraged. TC for P, CA increasing compensation. P
unsatisfied, appealed. PNR no longer appealed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not P can recover possession because PNR failed to file any
expropriation case and pay just compensation.

RULING:

Eminent domain inherent is an indispensable power of State, need not

be conferred by constitution. Restraints are public use and just
compensation, exercised by the Legislature. May be delegated to LGUs,
public entities, utilities. PNR, under charter, has expropriation power.
Circumstances present in taking for eminent domain: (1) expropriator must
enter private property; (2) entrance into must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) entry should be under legal authority; (4) property
must be devoted to public purpose or otherwise informally, appropriately or
injuriously affected; and (5) utilization of property for public use must be in
a way as to oust owner, deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of property.
PNR entered private land. Entrance permanent, PNR in control since 1972.
Entry with President’s approval, authorization from PNR Board. Property for
public use, with P deprived of material and beneficial use. The taking is
within constitutional sense. But P impliedly accepted fact of taking when it
negotiated for just compensation, knowing well no expropriation case was
filed at all. P’s inaction for almost 18years to question absence of
proceedings and discussions with PNR waived right, estoppel. No remedy for
recovery, only damages and compensation, due to irremedial injury to
railroad company and public in general. Interruption of public service causes
loss and inconvenience to all passengers and shippers using the line. Public
policy, if not public necessity, demands owner be denied ordinary remedies
of ejectment and injunction. Fact that railroad company can expropriate land
implies denial of usual remedies. Owner who stands by without objection,
cannot, after completion of project, reclaim land, but can file for damages
for value of land, injuries to him by construction or operation, or for
company to secure condemnation of land and pay. Land recovery and
possession cannot be allowed on grounds of estoppel and public policy
imposing upon public utility obligation to continue services to the public.
Non-filing will not necessarily lead to return of property. Non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle recovery of possession.
And due to estoppel, P cannot object to PR’s lease of land to 3rd
parties, since it impliedly acquiesced to PR’s authority to expropriate. The
leasing is for public use, such requisite being flexible and evolving influenced
by changing conditions. Whatever is beneficially employed for general
welfare satisfies public use requirement. “Public use” has now been held to
be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare,” and
“public convenience.” Includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage. Whatever may be beneficiallyemployed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. The leasing was an incidental power
and in response to government’s social housing project, that to prevent
squatting, special strict contracts entered into to
vacate leased property upon notice.
Public because addresses shortage of housing, concern of state,
directly affecting public health, environment, general welfare. Just
compensation: court appoints max3 competent, disinterested persons as
commissioners to report just compensation for property. Though
ascertainment is judicial prerogative, appointment of commissioners is
mandatory in expropriation cases. While commission findings may be
disregarded, court substituting own values, may only do so for valid reasons,
e.g. where they applied illegal principles to submitted evidence, where
disregarded preponderance of evidence, or where amount allowed is grossly
inadequate or excessive. So, trial with commissioners is substantive right,
cannot be done away with capriciously.
Here, no appointments made. So, valuation ineffectual. Where actual
taking made without proceedings, and owner sought recovery prior to filing
of expropriation proceedings, it is value at time of taking. Here, should be
from on 1/1973, but comissioners must first be appointed. But PNR’s
occupation for 18years entitles payment of interest. No return of leased
portions, or rent, because right was impliedly turned over to PNR. PR
directed to institute expropriation proceedings.
 Landbank of the Philippines vs Raymunda Martinez
G.R. No. 169008, July 31, 2008

FACTS:

The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the
purpose of CARP, of which the LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just
compensation. Convinced that the amount was just and confiscatory,
Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of the just compensation.
PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP
in its computation, so they rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just
compensation.
LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB
on the just compensation has become final after the lapse of 15 days.
Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari
against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its discretion when it
issued the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition
in the RTC. CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition,

ISSUE:

(1) whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal
department;
(2) whether or not petitioner committed forum shopping; and
(3) whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the
pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special
Agrarian Court (SAC).

RULING:

The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari
could not be filed without the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal legal counsel of the bank or
without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing
of the petition. The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped when
it moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for
their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65.
Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office
of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to
execute the September 4, 2002 decision on land valuation. The said
adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period
stated in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure. On the supposedly
conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its
ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land
valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the
DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should
therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC
within the said period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that
the PARAD’s decision had already attained finality because of LBP’s failure to
file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day period.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES CANCIO
G.R. No. 170147 January 30, 2009

FACTS:

On January 15, 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18115

which reserved certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City
in favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for
the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of
the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent
spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land. Petitioner offered to
purchase respondents’ lot P52,294,000 which respondents rejected.
Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’
property. It sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was
willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount with LBP in accordance with
A.O. No. 50.7. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to
comply with RA 8974, specifically Sec 4(a) thereof, which requires that,
upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency
shall immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to
100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a
writ of possession.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the

issuance of the writ of possession.

RULING:

RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. RA

8974 applies to instances when the national government expropriates
property for national government infrastructure projects. The economic zone
is a national government project. Also, the complaint for expropriation was
filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost 1 year after the law was approved
on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this
case.

It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be

paid that just compensation will be determined. In establishing the amount
of just compensation, the parties may present evidence relative to the
property’s fair market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA 8974.
 EUSEBIO VS. LUIS
October 13, 2009
Facts:
Respondents are owners of land with an area of 1,586 square meters.
Said land was taken by the city of Pasig and used in the construction of a
municipal road. The Sanggunian of Pasig City approved the payment for the
land at 150 pesos per square meter as set by the Appraisal Committee.
Respondents requested that the value be raised to 2000 pesos instead. They
later sent a letter to the petitioner informing him of the situation and
requesting that the land be paid for in 2000 per square meter as that was
the price that they initially bought the land in. The respondent’s counsel also
sent a demand letter requesting 5000 pesos per square meter instead.
In response, petitioner replied that he cannot pay more than what is
set by the appraisal committee. The respondents later filed suit.
Respondents prayed that the property be returned to them with payment of
reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or
P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from date of filing of the
complaint until full payment, or in the event that said property can no longer
be returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the
amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per
square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum
from the date of filing of the complaint until full payment.

Issue:
Whether the expropriation was legal.

Ruling:
No. The Court decided in favor of the Respondents declaring as
ILLEGAL and UNJUST the action of the defendants in taking the properties of
plaintiffs covered by without their consent and without the benefit of an
expropriation proceedings required by law in the taking of private property
for public use.
Petitioners were ordered to return to jointly RETURN the subject
properties to plaintiffs with payment of reasonable rental for its use in the
amount of P793,000.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the filing of the instant Complaint until full payment is made as well as
payment of attorney’s fees.
 NPC VS. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
August 24, 2001
Facts:
Respondents sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of
the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just
compensation. They alleged that they belatedly discovered that one of NPC’s
tunnels which diverted water from the Agus river traversed their land
without their knowledge. They claim that the underground tunnel had been
constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the
tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an
unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing
through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and
their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
In its answer with counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of
Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act
No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established;
that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already
prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by
reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action
arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
Both the RPC and CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether NPC is still liable to pay damages
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court also ruled in favor of the respondents. Due to
the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved
to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender
to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case, NPC
would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the
land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to
pay the fair market value of such property at the time of the taking
The CA upheld the RTC’s granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of ₱
30,000.00/month "from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum"
by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to
construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent.
 DE OUANA VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
February 9, 2001
Facts:
Landowners claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener,
assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands should the
Lahug Airport expansion... project not push through or once the Lahug
Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of
the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a
right of repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the
aforementioned... lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered
was viewed as way below market, forcing the Republic, represented by the
then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the
NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of the lots. In view of the
adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the owners of the
lots no longer appealed the decision of the trial court
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA,
Lahug Airport completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened
to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the ground,
the expropriated lots were never utilized for the... purpose they were taken
as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. Petitioners likewise filed
to reclaim the lots which was ordered to be returned to them by the RTC,
but was later dismissed in a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Petitioners may reclaim expropriated land.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and
justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question
to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also
dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as
just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus
legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run
from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. They must
likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred in
sustaining their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in
managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private owners,
were benefited thereby.