The Structure of Scientific Theories
perspectives on scientific theory will be reviewed in this entry. Their
relations will be briefly considered in the Conclusion.
1.1 Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views: The Basics
It will be helpful to pare each perspective down to its essence. Each
endorses a substantive thesis about the structure of scientific theories.
For the Syntactic View, the structure of a scientific theory is its
reconstruction in terms of sentences cast in a metamathematical language.
Metamathematics is the axiomatic machinery for building clear
foundations of mathematics, and includes predicate logic, set theory, and
model theory (e.g., Zach 2009; Hacking 2014). A central question of the
Syntactic View is: in which logical language should we recast scientific
theory?
Some defenders of the Semantic View keep important aspects of this
reconstructive agenda, moving the metamathematical apparatus from
predicate logic to set theory. Other advocates of the Semantic View insist
that the structure of scientific theory is solely mathematical. They argue
that we should remain at the mathematical level, rather than move up (or
down) a level, into foundations of mathematics. A central question for the
Semantic View is: which mathematical models are actually used in
science?
Finally, for the Pragmatic View, scientific theory is internally and
externally complex. Mathematical components, while often present, are
neither necessary nor sufficient for characterizing the core structure of
scientific theories. Theory also consists of a rich variety of nonformal
components (e.g., analogies and natural kinds). Thus, the Pragmatic View
argues, a proper analysis of the grammar (syntax) and meaning
(semantics) of theory must pay heed to scientific theory complexity, as
well as to the multifarious assumptions, purposes, values, and practices
4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther
informing theory. A central question the Pragmatic View poses is: which
theory components and which modes of theorizing are present in scientific
theories found across a variety of disciplines?
In adopting a descriptive perspective on the structure of scientific theories,
each view also deploys, at least implicitly, a prescriptive characterization
of our central topic. In other words, postulating that scientific theory is X
(e.g., X = a set-theoretic structure, as per Suppes 1960, 1962, 1967, 1968,
2002) also implies that what is not X (or could not be recast as X) is not
(or could not possibly be) a scientific theory, and would not help us in
providing scientific understanding, explanation, prediction, and
intervention. For the Syntactic View, what is not (or cannot be)
reconstructed axiomatically is not theoretical, while for the Semantic
View, what is not (or cannot be) modeled mathematically is not
theoretical. In contrast, in part due to its pluralism about what a scientific
theory actually (and possibly) is, and because it interprets theory structure
as distributed in practices, the Pragmatic View resists the definitional and
normative terms set by the other two views. As a result, the Pragmatic
View ultimately reforms the very concepts of “theory” and “theory
structure.”
This encyclopedia entry will be organized as follows. After presenting this
piece’s two sustained examples, immediately below, the three views are
reviewed in as many substantive sections. Each section starts with a brief
overview before characterizing that perspective’s account of theory
structure. Newtonian mechanics is used as a running example within each
section. The interpretation of theory structure—viz., how theory “hooks
up” with phenomena, experiment, and the world—is also reviewed in each
section. In the final section of this entry, we turn to population genetics
and an analysis of the Hardy-Weinberg Principle (HWP) to compare and
contrast each view. The Conclusion suggests, and remains non-committal
about, three kinds of relations among the views: identity, combat, and
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