Complexity Theory and Planning: Examining ‘fractals’ for organising policy

domains in planning practice.

Author: Dr Angelique Chettiparamb, School of Real Estate and Planning; University of Reading

Abstract

This paper examines selected methodological insights that complexity theory might provide for

planning. In particular, it focuses on the concept of fractals and through this concept, how ways of

organising policy domains across scales might have particular causal impacts. The aim of this paper

is therefore two fold: (i) to position complexity theory within social science through a ‘generalised

discourse’ thereby orienting it to particular ontological and epistemological biases; (ii) to re-

introduce a comparatively new concept – fractals - from complexity theory in a way that is

theoretically consistent with the ontological and epistemological biases argued for and expand on

the contribution that this might make to planning.. Complexity theory is theoretically positioned as a

neo-systems theory with reasons elaborated. Fractal systems from complexity theory are systems

that exhibit self-similarity across scales. This concept (as previously introduced by the author in

Chettiparamb, 2005) is further developed in this paper to i) illustrate the ontological and

epistemological claims for complexity theory, developed in this paper and to ii) draw attention to

ways of organising policy systems across scales to emphasise certain characteristics of the systems –

certain distinctions. These distinctions when repeated across scales reinforce certain

processes/values/end goals resulting in particular policy outcomes that may be definitive in

particular policy domains.. Finally, empirical insights from two case studies in two different policy

domains are presented and compared to illustrate the workings of fractals in planning practice.

Introduction

Complexity theory has attracted great attention from academics in planning. Arguments for the

precise contributions that the theory might make, however, have not yet been systematically teased

1
out. As Grunau and Schonwandt, (2010, p 43) rightly state, ‘complexity has the unenviable

distinction of meaning “all things to all people” and is characterised by imprecise and general

ambiguous usage’. While the unfamiliar vocabulary - some of which are best understood by natural

scientists - may account for the lack of non-metaphoric engagement, the absence of systematic

theoretical positioning of the theory itself with regard to other social science theories has not helped

(Chettiparamb, 2006). The aim of this paper is therefore to (i) position complexity theory within

social science – as belonging to the systems tradition - through what can be termed a ‘generalised

discourse’, thereby orienting it to particular ontological and epistemological biases; and (ii) as an

illustration of this argument, re-introduce a comparatively new concept – fractals - from complexity

theory and expand on the contribution that this might make to planning.

This paper draws on previous work by the author on fractals. The concept of fractals (previously

introduced in detail in Chettiparamb, 2005) is re-introduced briefly to illustrate some of the

ontological claims advanced for complexity theory. Empirical insights from two case studies in two

different policy domains are also presented and compared. The case study from Chettiparamb, 2010,

is compared with another case study from Chettiparamb, 2011, to further build up the concept, thus

enabling its identification while also contributing to understandings that might enable the

purposeful design of such systems.

The first part of the paper provides an overview of systems theories drawing out definitive features

of the same. The second part positions complexity theory with reference to systems theories and the

social sciences in general. These then provide the basis for the third section where the potential

contribution of complexity theory to planning is discussed. The fourth section provides a conceptual

exposition of one concept – fractals - from complexity theory while the fifth illustrates two fractal

systems from planning practice. The sixth section advances the overall arguments of the paper. The

seventh and final section summarises the various sections and concludes on the key arguments.

2
Systems theories – An overview

This section provides a generalised overview of systems theories in the social sciences, thereby

providing the base for arguments in the next section where complexity theory is positioned as a neo-

systems theory within the social sciences. The essential features of a system are discussed first,

followed by a discussion of changing system principles.

Any two or more interacting components constitute a system1 (Kuhn and Beam 1982). The

components and interactions must also be recognised as an entity with respect to a larger whole:

the ‘environment’. Differentiation from the environment is achieved by a ‘boundary’ which can be

‘closed’ or ‘open’. In a closed system, the boundary is absolute and a relationship of consequence

does not exist between elements of a system and the environment. However in an open system,

exchanges of material, energy or information can happen between the system and the environment

(Flood and Carson, 1988). A further requirement for the system can be introduced: the observer. As

Kuhn and Beam (1982, 28) point out, “the ocean is simply a heap of water for the casual visitor but a

complex system to someone interested in its currents or marine life”. Finally, systems can be

material (eg: the ecology), conceptual (eg: theories), or semiotic (eg: texts) (Bunge, 2004).

One of the main concerns of systems theory in the early days was ‘synthetic thinking’, a reaction

against the tradition of analytic reduction2 associated with ‘scientific’ thinking (Checkland, 1981).

Systems theories advocated and emphasised the holistic element of entities, elements that were

considered as more than just the sum of the parts. A second concern was for the need for

communication across disciplinary boundaries that would get to core analytical principles, which

would themselves be founded on synthetic and holistic criteria. Kuhn and Beam (1982) point out

that while each branch within the social science (sociology, economics, politics) has functional

1
If not constituted of ‘components’ it is just a ‘lump’ and if not interacting it is just a ‘heap’ (Kuhn and Beam 1982, 27).
2
A process whereby a whole entity is sought to be explained away solely by reduction into parts

3
categories which are understood within the disciplines, there is also a need for analytical categories

that transverse disciplinary boundaries. Systems theories, in this sense, qualify as a meta-theory with

a claim towards being more fundamental than disciplinary theories (see Chettiparamb 2005, for a

fuller discussion of the position of systems theories with respect to disciplinary theories).

System theories then, being abstract (not dealing with analytical categories), cannot yield knowledge

or testable hypotheses on their own. They can however suggest ways of re-interpreting knowledge

giving rise to research agendas in combination with disciplinary theories. In the early versions, the

emphasis was on establishing agreed goals for systems and developing modes of control that would

optimise the system towards achieving that goal (Checkland, 1981). An innate positivism thus

permeated their use. Blauberg et al (1977) identifies two fundamental postulates of this kind of

analysis: identification of the structure of the system as an invariant, and identification of the

functional description of the structure. The structural-functional analysis that followed focused on

the relationship of the parts among themselves and to the whole and relates this to a goal. In terms

of change, the stress was on system maintenance, with the system analysed primarily as an entity

retaining its identity as a whole regardless of external forces. This identity is then imagined to persist

only when changes to the whole of the system does not affect the positions and relations of the

components that make up the system - the concept of homeostasis.. This practice of system science

came to be characterised as ‘hard-systems’ science.

With the development of evolutionary theories in biology, came the concept of evolutionary

systems, moving on a pathway of steady change leading to functional, goal – oriented competence

(Waldrop, 1992, Briggs and Peat, 1992). In the evolutionary trajectory of irreversible change, the

system components were still locked into the maintenance of equilibrium, but a moving one. It

replaced the paradigm of linear cause and effect oriented to an idealised equilibrium state emerging

from a tendency of homeostasis (as discussed above), to one of multiple trajectories grounded in

4
possibilities of emerging order and multiple goals. However, differences in values, beliefs, etc made

the clear definition of a desired end-result ambiguous. The definition of system parameters also

proved to be equally difficult due to the complexity of social systems (Jackson, 2001).

Systems sciences then gave way to what is known as ‘soft-system’ science characterised by a shift

away from modelling the world to systemically learning about what kind of change may be possible

in the world (Jackson, 2001). Acknowledging the difficulties of problem definition (end state

definition), this development in systems sciences is characterised by an interest in understanding

‘structure’ and ‘processes/mechanisms3, their mutual relationships and consequent emergent

properties (Checkland, 1981). There is here a pre-occupation with components, relations,

mechanisms and the indeterminate effects that these give rise to, as opposed to variables of a

system that can produce pre-determined results. This shift was also simultaneously accompanied by

a grounding in practice and the ‘real world’, leading to action research as a research method in place

of system modelling: a turn towards ‘phenomenalism’ (Mingers, 2000). A further refinement within

this stream was the critical systems stream. The emphasis here is on a systematic appraisal for

values and emancipatory goals of particular structures and relations (Jackson, 2001).

The systems sciences thus came to be known for a particular mode of analysis – one of components,

relations and mechanisms, associated with multiple trajectories, giving rise to emergent properties.

Components and relations studied are identified in relation to the system as a whole and are

discussed at a level of abstraction that is devoid of substantial content. This makes system science

holistic with a claim to being a fundamental (abstract) science. However this means that for

disciplinary domains, systemic knowledge must be combined with disciplinary knowledge and

3
A structure might denote the set of internal (endo structure) or external (exo structure) relations that a system might
have. A mechanism denotes a process in the system. So, one can be changed while keeping the other unchanged (Bunge,
2004). For example, a teacher ‘imparts knowledge’ (mechanism) of systems to a class either through a formal lecture
(structure-1) or through a form of informal discussion (structure-2).

5
disciplinary theories to yield meanings that are useful for disciplinary domains. A work of

contextualisation is thus involved in using systems theories.

Complexity theory, systems theory and the social sciences.

In this section, complexity theory is first introduced in brief. It is then argued that complexity theory

is a further development in the systems tradition asserting transdisciplinary and abstract knowledge.

This, provided the work of contextualisation is done, can however be useful for disciplinary domains.

As mentioned previously, such a positioning allows for the clarification of the ontological and

epistemological biases of complexity theory in the social sciences. In the second half of this section,

complexity theory is related to the social sciences in general.

Complexity theory4 arises from the study of ‘complex systems’ and theorisations of the same in the

natural, biological and social sciences. It is difficult to define concisely the nature of ‘complex

systems’ as it has emerged from various disciplines and claims a number of properties. However, in

general it can be said that complexity science deals with properties of non-linear systems, systems

where the causes and effects are not related linearly, i.e. systems where the pieces do not add up and

where the combined actions of different causes are not just a superposition of the effects of each cause

The quality of ‘proportionality’ is lost here (Gleick, 1987). In such systems small changes can lead to

large outcomes or even catastrophes. Further complex systems can exhibit properties not generally

observed in linear systems such as self-organisation 5 leading to the emergence of patterns/order; the

co-existence of order and chaos at the same time; resilience or adaptive behaviour in the face of

shocks, etc (for more on complexity theory see Gleick, 1987 and Waldrop, 1992). The latter

behaviour in particular has been the study of a particular class of complex systems known as complex

adaptive systems. Complex adaptive systems are made up of a network of entities (cells, agents,

4
In the case of complexity science, I use the terms complexity science and complexity theory interchangeably;
and in the case of systems science, I use the terms systems science and systems theory interchangeably,
because within the literature, there does not seem to be a distinction made between the terms used here
interchangeably.
5
The notion of ‘self-organisation’, as used in the context of complex systems, refers to the spontaneous
formation of order within systems, be they physical, biological or social, without the presence or help of
external forces.

6
species, neurons etc) operating simultaneously. The control of such a system is highly dispersed and

they usually have many levels of organisation with each being the building block for the next level.

The system as a whole however ‘anticipates’ and ‘predicts’ 6 certain outcomes which inter alia

contributes to the evolution of the system towards particular niches or adaptive outcomes (Holland, et

al, 1989).

Complexity theory has been characterised as neo–evolutionism (Knorr-Cetina, 1981, pg 19), second

order cybernetics (Rasch and Wolfe, 2000, pg 12), neo-functionalism (Alexander, 1998, pg 6) and so

on. Each of these terms emphasise particular aspects of complexity theory and particular ways in

which it has been and is being used in the social sciences. Knorr-Cetina (1981, 28) categorises

complexity theory as belonging to the ‘neo-systems’ tradition. This broadly is the epistemological

stand that this paper concurs with, for this categorisation also signals a conceptual pre-disposition in

examining the theory. It is suggested that complexity theory can be seen as a theoretical

reconstruction of the systems science movement, where some aspects of the core of the systems

movement have been targeted and radically changed. Yet, the newer forms of theoretical

advancements build on much that has existed before, never really fully departing from the more

general lines of the tradition of systems thinking. Thus complexity science shares with systems

science the general ontological foundations but adds more to it.

What then does complexity theory bring to this ‘ontological bias’ of systems theory? In order to

discuss this, it must first be acknowledged that complexity theory does not invalidate any of the

earlier ontological claims of systems theory. In other words, it continues to deal with structure,

mechanisms and emergent properties. However, complexity theory deals with the study of entities

that reveal non-linear dynamics; entities that though having determinate properties, yield

indeterminate results. Through research in natural sciences, this has been tied to the presence of
6
‘Anticipation’ and ‘prediction’ is at an abstracted level, beyond human foresight or consciousness. From
bacteria onwards every living organism can be said to have an implicit prediction based on an ‘internal model’
(as manifested in survival instincts) of the world encoded in its genes (Holland, et al, 1989).

7
iterations or feedback loops, when the outputs of the system are repeatedly fed into itself. This

means that in a complex system, the system is ontologically tied to something other than its

structure and the processes between structural components. This is the feedback loop (or the

property of recursivity). Over and above the ontology of classical systems theory, there is here an

additional layer of concern. As Jantsch (1980, pg 6), comments: “The notion of system itself is no

longer tied to a specific spatial or spatio-temporal structure nor to a changing configuration of

particular components, nor to sets of internal or external relations”. Complex systems thus occupy a

new level of ‘ontological depth’ and constitute a realm of systems that are open to processes of

feedback loops (which can be of varied forms such as learning for instance). They are therefore not

just evolutionary, but are self-organising with the potential for structural re-configuration. This

innate dependence on the ontology of systems theory, while taking off from it, makes complexity

theory a revisionist account of systems theory thus justifying it as a ‘neo-systems’ theory.

If the above self-organising ontology of complex systems is accepted, the question of system

definition will present itself for if systems can change structurally how then can they retain their self-

identity? Questions of identity with respect to systems were first answered by Bertalanffy (1968),

when he made the distinction between a system and its environment. In the earlier waves of system

sciences, the system was deemed to acquire an identity by distinguishing itself from its environment.

The significance of this conceptualisation was that a system could now be defined as long as it

retained its particular distinction from its environment. This leads to an independence of the identity

of the system from any particular structure of the system thus providing a great deal of ‘freedom’ to

the system for it could now undergo changes that may be structural as long as the distinction from

the environment is maintained. This acknowledgement of the possibility for diversity has mistakenly

given rise to a coupling of complexity theory to postmodernism giving it the nomenclature of ‘post

modern science’ (Turner, 1997, pg xi). For the reasons provided earlier and in concurrence with

8
others who do not see a correspondence between postmodernism and complexity theory (Price,

1997; Lee, 1997), I argue that this view is misplaced.

The findings of complexity theory have been quite revolutionary in the natural science, resulting in

exalted heralding of a total paradigm shift (Gleick, 1987, p.6). This may be true in the case of natural

science, but its truth in the biological sciences can be questioned. It can also be argued as being even

less true in the social sciences. This is because the social science has always had to deal with complex

entities, reacting non-linearly through reflexive feedback loops thus revealing the unsuitability of the

methods of the natural sciences, especially the material/physical sciences, quite early. It is

acknowledged that the social sciences in their initial phase - the modernist period, following the

Enlightenment period in western history - were modelled along the lines of the natural sciences

(Giddens and Turner, 1987; Wilson, 1987, Rundell, 2001). The reaction against this however, did not

wait for the advent of the complexity theory. There is therefore considerable conceptual thought

and debate already in the social sciences on issues that are totally new (in terms of scientific

attention) to the natural scientists. For example the question of emergence (Checkland 1981,

agency-structure debates (Giddens, 1984; Archer, 1982; Boudieu and Wacquat, 1992) and micro-

macro linkages (Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel, 1981) in systems are old concerns. However, in this paper I

argue that the social sciences may still stand to gain from complexity theory. This is because though

the social sciences having identified very many problems and issues in research due to the nature of

the entities it studies, have also been methodologically restricted by the very same nature of the

entities. In the absence of test conditions and experimental control, ontological claims are difficult to

unearth and reveal conclusively. Following a realist argument, mechanisms can always be modified

or blocked by counter-veiling forces, and given the myriad number of forces operating in the social

world; it is difficult for a mechanism to be visible in undiluted pure form, making conjunctures of the

‘real’ always susceptible to a relativist counter-argument of denial of the ‘real’. This is further

compounded by the necessarily limited contextual range that results from a research might apply to,

9
thus making knowledge claims ultimately susceptible to the charge of limited validity or situated

reality. The natural sciences on the other hand, being comparatively less restricted (though by no

means insulated) by these inhibitions, have been able to advance ontological claims and identify the

possible presence of mechanisms or phenomena more effectively. This then can help focus the

attention of social science researchers to particular new categories and concepts that might not have

received as much attention previously. Arguments and elaborations of ways for bridging the natural

and social sciences are beyond the scope of this paper, but for one method using metaphors see

Chettiparamb, 2006 and for yet another method, based on systems theories see Chettiparamb,

2007.

Complexity theory and planning theory

In this section, the theoretical relevance of complexity theory for planning thought and the re-

conceptualisations and re-presentations that this draws attention to are discussed. The potential

contribution of complexity theory for planning thought is thus hypothesized here.

Maffesoli (1996, pg 135) characterises interpretive social theorists as “intellectual workers’ who are

all too often so obsessed with their concepts and critiques that they forget that the social flow often

obeys a logic which is not logical” and he cautions: “if we try too hard to keep our distance, we tend

to forget what gives intellectual work its legitimacy”. There is a word of caution for planning

theorists here, as charged with a mandate for informing the profession of planning we need to

engage with the day to day problems that ‘planning in real’ throws up. However, planning practice

cannot be observed/studied completely neutrally for what the community of planning theorists, see

in practice, post event is framed by the ‘discourses’, ‘concepts’ ‘models’ ‘frames of reference’ that

we gain from the academic community we relate to 7. Thus advances that happen in fields of enquiry

different from planning practice can also help us ‘see’ different things, enabling the infusion of new

7
As Kuhn (1996) in relation to the natural sciences has so well brought out.

10
abstractions into planning thought. The infusion from without, together with experience from within

and the resulting adaptations that occur within planning practice and thought can lead to results

that are transformative. However, what gains prominence in this ‘play’ of knowledge is and will be

conditioned, as Kuhn (1996) argues, by the social factors that make the production of knowledge a

social activity.

Planning theory cannot afford to ignore the variations that are thrown up from practice. A relativist

view is therefore inevitable if it is to address specific people in specific situations in specific times

with specific concerns. Yet, the very definition of theory demands some level of abstraction and

generalisation. The extrapolation of the specific to the general can only be through an act of

abstraction (as opposed to simplification), that distinguishes between the specific form that a

general entity exhibits and its general form. The general form here will be of such a nature that it

remains valid (though manifest in different forms) regardless of the specificity (unlike simplification

which tends to lose validity in specificity). If this act of abstraction is not made, the extrapolation

from specific to general becomes nothing but conflation. There is then here a challenge for planning

theory in that it needs to reconcile the dichotomous requirement of having to be general and

abstract, yet remain specific and situated.

I suggest that the above dilemma actually says a lot. It demands a split in levels of concern and

thereby a split in ways of conceiving how planning can be done. I shall explain further. Planning as

we know it now is typically (not always) engaged with direct experiences of planning practice in the

first order. By that I mean, situations where the planner is directly involved in aspects of planning.

The focus here is on the substantial, technical and methodological side of planning as a professional

activity and the skill, attitude, competence of the planner as a professional. It typically asks of

planning theory answers regarding the substantive, technical and methodological problems faced by

planners in the daily execution of their work. Planning theory comes up with explanations, models,

11
mechanisms, techniques and tool-kits that can help planners understand and perform better in their

job. Planning theory also observes planning practice and points out the personal and inter-personal

skills that must be embedded in a planner for ‘successful’ or ‘good’ planning (Schon, 1991, Healey,

1992; Forester, 2008). This is the level which most accounts of planning practice and planning theory

address. However the legitimacy of the planner as the person who ‘leads’, ‘decides’ or ‘facilitates’ is

increasingly being questioned within practice and theory (Chettiparamb,2005; Van der Broek, 2008,

Thomas, 2004). Also forms of professional and technical knowledge are being increasingly

challenged by other forms of knowledge, including experiential knowledge, perceptive knowledge

and tacit knowledge. By and large, prescriptions within planning to address this increasing

questioning of planning have centred on prescribing a multi- dimensional perspective or analysis

(Harvey, 1996, Shields, 1995) that effectively casts the planner as a person able to respond to and

incorporate all these various forms of knowledge. In other words I argue we have a planner-centred

and planning-centred view in this first level of engagement.

Even while retaining the first level of planning, it is now increasingly becoming evident that it is time

to enter into a second level, where the planner is not in the forefront directly, but is engaged in a

sort of indirect planning: the planning of planning. Here the first order process is opened up and

incorporates many actors including the planner who are involved in the shaping of lives –

citizens/communities, different types of ‘experts’, politicians, bureaucrats and so on (see recent

changes to planning incorporated in the Localism Act 2011 of UK for instance or the People’s

Planning Campaign of Kerala, India – Chettiparamb, 2005). While the first order process is direct,

specific and contextualised in the local milieu, planning in the ‘second order’ (ordering of ordering) is

concerned with how inputs from first order planning can be channelled into the overall concerns of

the discipline of planning. The concerns for planning theory at this level are different from the

concerns of first order planning. We are now dealing with ordering the various components of

planning (particular plans, projects, decisions, procedures, for instance), that may be inputted from

12
the bottom, into the overall planning system thus retaining some sense of overall direction. Here the

concern for planning is about organising bottom-up diverse inputs into a cohesive but emergent

plan. We have here a level of abstraction that is not the same as when dealing with local specificities

for local specificities may be many and varied and need to be conceptualised in meaningfully

abstract terms. The level of abstraction, the involvement of myriad specificities, the bottom-up

nature of emergent order, the possibility for infinite end states and the concern with ordering of

relationships rather than specificities, makes this level of abstraction akin to that of complex

adaptive systems as detailed earlier. More theories of planning are needed here to help understand

the abstract nature of activities conducted in planning. In the above level of second order planning

(see also Chettiparamb 2006 for another argument for second order planning) there is a sense of

holism involved in that the system as a whole is under consideration and parts of the system is

considered in relation to planning objectives. Thus whatever the substantive content of planning

proposals, and whatever be the local variation, the level at which it is analysed for second order

planning is in a sense general and abstract. Though abstract, there is in this realm of second order

planning a concept of holism that resonates with Maffesoli’s (1996, pg 137) statement “Holism is a

specific methodology designed to bring us into intimate contact with the meanders of social

existence”. It is concerned with how entities within it are related to each other to produce an

evolving order that is not predetermined in its specificities, yet determined in its general objectives;

how a self-evolving system through structural/mechanistic parameters might legitimise the act of

planning while moving away from prescription. This in turn poses questions of what types of

causality are involved, what types of dynamics get activated and under what circumstances, how

parts within a system come to be constituted as parts of the system, and so on. It is this detailing of

holism that brings it into intimate contact with social existence and reality, and for planning it

addresses questions of ‘how to’ which might guide planning interventions that remain specific to

time and place.

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The above level of engagement has not attracted as much academic attention as the first order. In

today’s world of relativity and difference, yet efficiency and order, when meaning and sense needs

to emerge from a myriad of formal and informal processes, this realm of practice could demand

increased academic attention. Important contributions are now emerging in the areas of meta-

governance and management (Sorenson and Torfing,2009, Jessop,2003, Fotel and Hanssen, 2009,

Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009), with as yet little in planning 8.

Fractals and Planning

In this section, I focus on one new concept from complexity theory and argue for its relevance and usefulness

to planning. The mode of explanation here is based on relations (in line with systems theories) as well as

recursivity9 (in line with complex systems). Further, it is pitched at the level of second order planning argued for

earlier. The conceptual exposition here illustrates one particular elaboration of the dynamics associated with

complex systems.

Fractals define systems that exhibit self-similarity across scales. They are structures that give rise to

symmetries that are not limited to one scale, but extend across scales. In stressing self-similarity,

fractals essentially imply recursive repetitive scaling. Key relational characteristics of a fractal

configuration can be isolated to provide a general descriptive statement of what is involved. A

figurative representation of a fractal configuration is provided in Figure 1 below:

8
Exceptions might be Sehested, 2009.
9
Involving a process that can repeat itself.

14
Fig 1: Guiding Parameters of a Fractal System

Source: Chettiparamb, 2005.

First, the nature of self-similarity can be seen as a critical property of fractals. The nature of

repetition (property/process/value/form) across scales leads to reinforcement of key characteristics

in the system as a whole. When systems are self similar in at least some aspects, they can become

operationally coupled and consequently aligned and correlated across different scales. Through such

alignments, change in one level can result in a change through-out the system and the alignments

can therefore be an important mechanism for co-evolution. The local and global in fractal systems

can then be co-constitutive.

The second feature is the axis of correlation. Fractals can achieve global characteristics in a way

uniquely sensitive to the fine-grained local. The vertical axis formed by the alignment of self similar

entities and the iterative process creates a vertical coupling. The nature of the coupling – both

quantitatively and qualitatively - is crucial. The quantitative dimension - that is how much variety of

points of coupling exist/are needed and the qualitative dimension - that is which features are

coupled/need to be coupled, will define the way the system performs.

15
The third factor of importance is the length of the ruler that separates the levels. Detail at one level

can be lost if too large a measure is used, while it would just be replicated if too small a ruler is used.

The sensitivity of the system as a whole to scale dependent detail – the resolution of the system, will

be a function of the ruler used to define different time-scales. So the calibration and length of the

ruler demands attention.

Fourth, there is a need for a mechanism for the system to acquire ‘roughness’ or variation, with

respect to adjacent scales, while still remaining orderly in the vertical dimension. This ‘horizontal’

mechanism assimilates contextual phenomena unique and meaningful to a particular scale. It is the

presence of this horizontal dimension that prevents the local from being subsumed by the global.

Further, the horizontal mechanisms allow the global to be a result of emergent properties from the

detail of the local.

The above four parameters can generate a number of configurations that suit different situations

and different purposes. There is discernable an unmistakable logico-scientific argument here that

lays claim to a universality. The claim follows a systems ontology in that it is the relations of

constituent parts and process related mechanisms (iterations) therein that are attributed

significance. The history and contextual specificities of entities within the fractal system inform the

specificity of the outcomes. In a fractal system then, entities at particular scales are particular

manifestations of a repetitive self similarity, while entities at different levels are scale transformed

manifestations of the same repetitive self-similarity. Thus each level is unique and exists in its own

right and possesses attributes that are not easily substitutable across scales. It follows then that the

scales in a fractal formation are not hierarchical, though they are mutually constitutive. Further, the

level of complexity can remain the same between scales even while the realisation at particular

scales are inherently different. The study of a city or a region can thus be as complex or as simple as

16
the study of a neighbourhood, family or an individual depending on the abstraction involved

(Strathern, 1991cited in Jensen, 2007).

A complexity theory based analysis would however remain at how changes in the parameters and

the type of processes therein create a change in outcomes at the systemic level; for in this form of

analysis an explanation means understanding the various components, its relations to each other,

types of processes therein and the rules that govern their evolution over time. Regardless of the

detail of the parameters, in fractal systems the global and the local can get defined simultaneously,

and variety and order can co-exist at the same time. This is an operative goal that planning as a

profession can identify with.

Fractal configurations in planning practice

In this section, I recount two types of empirical case studies that I have identified as fractal

configurations. These two case studies also specify two fundamentally different types of fractal

configurations emanating from the differences in which self similarity is generated. I shall argue

below that the nature of the fractal systems also illustrate potentially different types of causal

tendencies.

The two case studies I discuss in this paper are from the state of Kerala in India. They deal with

different sectoral issues: the first is about solid waste management (Chettiparamb et al, 2011a) and

the second is about planning for poverty alleviation (Chettiparamb, 2011b). The first case study

illustrates iteration of a process across scales, while the second illustrates iteration of a form, as well

as a recurrent referent for multiple scales.

17
Solid waste is conventionally organised as in Figure 1 below. The key structural features of the model

is that lower levels (individual households and other producers) are active in the reduction, reuse

and recycling of waste, while the upper levels are generally involved in the facilitation for lower

levels and the collection and transportation of waste. There is no particular iterating feature across

scales in this case and dominant principle of organisation of the system as a whole is subsidiarity.

Upper levels facilitate efforts at lower levels, but also orient themselves to achieve economies of

scale in transportation and disposal. In Chettiparamb et al (2011a) we argued that the above model

may not perhaps be sustainable for organising solid waste across spatial scales. This, we argued, is

because economies of scale are not really present in solid waste management. In tropical countries

in particular - where the heat and humidity are intense, and the waste contains large amounts of

organic content – the collection and accumulation of solid waste centrally only serves to make the

system as a whole unstable leading to a potential for system failure. In the above article cited we

presented one account of such a failure in Kerala, but similar failures in solid waste management

have also been seen in other countries (Naples for instance).

Figure 1. General distribution of Stages in SWM through different scales in an urban area.

Source: Chettiparamb et al (2011)

18
We then documented a case of a ‘successful’ instance of solid waste management albeit at a smaller

scale. From this case we abstracted the systemic components and suggested that an alternate model

of organisation accounted for the success of the project. This was a model of iterating process

wherein the different stages in the waste hierarchy were repeated at different scales thus forming a

fractal system (Figure 2 belwor). This model leads to an inherent stability of the system as a whole,

allowing for almost immediate treatment of solid waste at source with any leakage handled at the

next higher scale (which in the context of warm tropical climates is an inevitable necessity). The

fractal configuration, leads to an amplification of the principle of the process repeated at each stage

– in this case efficient material and energy recovery from solid waste – making the system as a whole

very efficient with respect to this principle. The overall configuration thus becomes a stable (as

failure in this model at the lower most scale will inevitably be localised while presenting numerous

alternatives within the system at similar scales), resource viable (as material and energy in the waste

is fully recovered with any ‘leakage’ picked up by the higher scale) and environmentally sustainable

(as waste is processed as soon as it is produced with full material and energy recovery) and

replicable model (can be conceptually transferred to other locations while the specificities can be

contextualised), though details of how exactly the relationships may transpire on the ground may

vary from context to context.

19
Figure 2: Alternate model of distribution of Stages in SWM through different scales in an urban area.

Source: Chettiparamb et al (2011)

The second case study is that of the Kudumbashree programme of Kerala. This is a state sponsored

poverty alleviation programme with broader goals of women’s empowerment (realised through the

working of women’s collectives) and local economic development (realised through close integration

with local government). This programme illustrates a case of iterating form across scales which carry

an iterating orienting parameter - an explicit goal of poverty reduction across scales. The structure

through which poverty alleviation attempts are organised is closely linked to the local government

system (which in Kerala, holds considerable funds and powers). Overall coordination is done by the

State Poverty Eradication Mission through its District offices. The overall structural form is as below:

Kudumbashree
State Mission for
poverty
State Government reduction
programmes
Various line Local Kudumbashree
department District Mission
s Governments for poverty
Evaluation Committee reduction
programmes

Community Development Ward

Societies (CDSs) Councill
or as
Area Development Societies patron
(ADSs) Ex-officio
officers
Neighbourhood Groups (NHGs)

Democratic spaces
Bureaucratic spaces
Advisory spaces

Figure1: Organisational structure of the Kudumbashree Programme.

Source: Author.

20
The fundamental planning unit is the Neighbourhood Groups (NHGs) each of which has 10-20

families of the poor10. The NHGs are federated at ward level to form Area Development Societies

(ADS) which are in turn federated at city/village level to form a Community Development Society

(CDS). Women’s empowerment is central to the aims of the Kudumbashree. Each poor family is

represented in the NHG, by a woman member. The CDS Byelaws mandate that all office bearers at

all levels of the Kudumbashree programme must be elected. Though only one member per family

can be an official member and thus hold voting rights, all members can participate in training and

other development activities organised by the programme. Elections are conducted once in three

years and a person cannot hold office for more than two terms. The governing Body at the NHG level

consists of 5 members – a President, a Secretary, an Income generation Volunteer, a Health and

Education Volunteer and a Basic Amenities Volunteer. The ADS General Body consists of all

Governing Body members from the NHGs. The ADS Governing Body consists of seven elected

representatives from the General Body and certain officers who hold particular responsibilities (such

as a Junior Public Health Nurse, the Literacy Mission campaigner, etc). CDS General Body in turn

consists of the seven Governing Body members from all the ADSs. Each ADS group elects a member

to the CDS Governing Body. The Governing Body thus elected votes for the CDS President and Vice-

President. A multi level system of largely self-governing entities is thus institutionalised. Planning for

poverty alleviation in the Kudumbashree programme starts from below. Needs identified through

dialogue and discussion at the NHG level are shaped into micro plans. These micro plans in turn are

integrated into mini plans at ADS level. At the CDS level, these mini plans are integrated with

projects from various government agencies and local government departments into action plans.

In the configuration above, the democratic structure itself iterates across scales. It is participatory at

the bottom-most scale, and representative at higher levels with an overlap of membership between

layers, thus vertically aligning the forums. This aligning becomes the medium by which the ‘global’

10
Membership now is open to non-poor members as well.

21
can potentially reach the ‘local’ and vice versa. The structure also carries with it an iterating

referrent – the orientation to poverty alleviation – which is a continuous point of reference for the

plans of the higher scales. The system thus becomes fractal and has proved to be remarkably

efficient in terms of reach. In other words, the voices of the poor are heard at various scales, with

actions initiated at any particular scale reinforced by other scales. The system as a whole is thus

stable and efficient in terms of the iterating parameters – the participatory structure and the

orientation towards poverty alleviation. Studies of the programme report great success and the

participatory democratic structure has led to significant empowerment of women over the years

(see table 1 below, also see Oommen, 2008, John, 2009).

Table : 1: Distribution of members according to type of empowerments after joining the NHG

Source: Oommen, 2008.

In terms of general poverty alleviation, the programme has been fairly successful with most

members reporting significant improvement (see Table 2 below as well as Oommn, 2008, John,

2009). In fact the increased levels of well being has led to an upward revision of the poverty risk

index used to classify the poor. This then is an inversion of the thesis of a ‘fractal poverty trap’

22
wherein it is argued that multiple deprivations across scales entrap the poor in poverty (Barrett and

Swallow, 2006).

Table 2: Impact of Kudumbashree on poverty reduction: Opinion of members

Source: John, 2009

In both the case studies described above, there is an iterating principle of self similarity across

scales. In the first one it is an iterating process that when repeated across scales tend to produce

particular outcomes that are specific to the iterating parameter. This led to a sustainable way of

organising solid waste management. In the second instance, the iteration resulted from the

democratic institutional form of the system and the constant referent in plan making – the

orientation towards poverty alleviation - across scales. The outcomes in the second case thus led to

considerable empowerment and also significant poverty reduction.

Planning, fractal configurations and complexity theory

In this section below, I draw upon all the previous sections and advance the overall argument for the

significance of complexity theory for planning concluding on the significance of the generalised

principle of fractals and by extension complexity theory for planning. I also extend my previous work

on fractals by proposing ways of identifying fractal systems and iterating parameters that can be

used for understanding planning systems and also designing new ones.

23
We have seen above, that self-similarity in form can suggest the presence of

qualities/principles/processes that remain invariant across scales (the Kudumbashree project). The

presence of invariant qualities/principles/processes in turn can suggest the possibility of iteration in

form across scales (SWM case study). The causative tendency in these complex systems arises out of

the way the system components relate to each other and the presence of self similarity/iteration

across scales, for it is this structural configuration that allows the amplification of selected features.

In its dynamic form, the system gets hinged together and recursively feeds up to higher, and down

to lower levels producing outputs and plans that are specific to each level, though informed and

modified by both higher and lower levels. The actual manifestation of the form of the invariance that

the scaling preserves can vary (because the system takes into account other emergent factors that

may be pertinent to that particular scale), even when the invariance itself is retained. The observed

manifestation here is then a result of invariance as well as specific scale level factors. Thus

qualitatively different manifestations are possible even when constancy is implied – the presence of

regularity is implied within irregularity. This potentially gives rise to the possibility of achieving

infinite reach and detail and thus sampling variation even within extensive space.

The above cases then suggests the possibility of two different methods to achieve reach or detail –

the one starting with a form that gives rise to a process of plan making for poverty alleviation; the

other starting from a process that gives rise to a self-similar form that remains invariant. The success

of the repeating parameter can causally be accounted for in terms of information flow (at various

levels of resolution); involvement of different actors at different scales (thus helping garner different

types of power and knowledge); channelling of resources towards particular outcomes and finally

focussing policy attention. This then has methodological significance.

In a fractal system then, the context or the particular history of a location remains, yet the system as

a whole is ordered towards particular outcomes. This is a central tenement of complexity theory:

24
order within chaos and stability within potential instability. In the case of planning, this means a

separation of the way planning gets done. On one level there is a direct engagement in the particular

histories and contexts that are location specific, yet on a slightly removed – what I have elsewhere

termed as second order level (Chettiparamb, 2007) - the engagement is in designing institutional

forms that help channel the results from the first order level towards particular outcomes – a plan

that is generated by the system rather than imposed directly by planners.

Conclusions

In this essay, I have sought to position complexity theory with respect to planning theory and to

illustrate part of my argument through the application of a concept from complexity theory in a

planning situation. I have argued that complexity theory is a further elaboration on systems theory in

so much that causality (in realist terms) is tied to not just the components of systems and the

relations between them but also to the effects of feedback on the system as a whole. Thus the

theory has a rightful claim to the neo-systems genre.

With respect to planning practice, I have argued that two different realms of planning practice needs

to be conceptually separated. The first relates to planning in particular contexts and it deals directly

with planning issues. This second is the planning of planning processes and the careful calibration of

systems that leads to particular outcomes. This realm has received less attention in planning, yet it is

increasingly becoming relevant, given the diversity and uncertainty in planning contexts. It is to this

second realm I argue that complexity theory can contribute most.

The claims that have been theoretically advanced can also be demonstrated empirically. I have

shown two different instances of how a fractal configuration can be organised and how it might

bend systems to particular outputs depending on the details of parameters. I have advanced four

parameters in particular – the quality of self similarity, the iterating parameter and a vertical axis

25
that forms from this, a horizontal mechanism that allows the assimilation of scale specific

information and the distance between consequent scales. Using these parameters, systems can be

configured in an infinite number of ways to suit particular purposes, histories and contexts. My

arguments in this paper are based on a metaphysical position of transcendental realism and in line

with the systems tradition, I have sought to contextualise a transdisciplinary concept into the realm

of planning.

A raft of research agendas can follow from such an understanding of complexity theory. For

instance, studies can be designed to examine the effects of quantitative and qualitative dimensions

of each of the iterating parameters. This can provide more richness and a nuanced understanding of

the workings of such systems helping us planners to address practical problems on different levels. I

suggest that it is not very difficult to find fractal systems, for as in the natural sciences, once we are

aware of the concept, fractal systems seem to be present everywhere 11. I suggest that a good look at

the instances of planning experience could in fact lead to the identification of one or more fractal

systems, which can then be analysed in terms of its constituent parts. I hope that this paper will

serve to inspire such a research agenda.

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