TURKISH-AMERICAN

RELATIONS
Past, Present and Future

Editors
MUSTATAAYDIN
CACRI ERHAN
Ankara Uniaersity

Foreword by Norman Stone

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 5
Turkish-American Relations in
the Post-Cold War Era: Issues of
Convergence and Divergence
SABRI SAYARI

The international and domestic context oI Turksh-American relations

underu'ent major changes during the course of the 1990s. The end of
the Cold War and ihe global strategic dvalry between ihe US and the
Soviet Union ladically altered the structure of the international system
thai had been in existence since World War Il. For more than four
decades, the close militaryand political tiesbetween the US and Turkev
had largely been the product of the shategic rivahy between the two
superpowers and iheblpolar confiEuration of the iniernalional system.
Du ng the Cold War years, Washingion and Ankara shared similar
perceptiolls regarding the nahrre and implications of the threat posed
by the foimer SovietUnion andits Warsaw Pact allies. For the US,lbrkej'
served as an important strategic outpost in close proximity to its
superpower rival and a key ally in NATO's southern flank. For Tulkey,
the {orting ofclose military and political ielations with the US thiough
bilateral and multilateral ties represenied a critical dete ent against the
perceived Soviei threat. Consequentlt the disintegation of the Soviet
Union, the end ofthe bipolar intelnation al system, and the tlansforma-
tion of the political landscape of Eurasia marked a Iundamental change
in the international and regional context of the Us-Turkey ielations.
The domestic context of the bilateral relationship also expedenced
important changes in the post-Cold War era. In the US, the 1990s saw a
substantial military downsizing policy thai led to base closings at home
and abroad, and that also reduced the number oI Anedcan miliiary
installations and personnel in Turkey. US military assistance, whlch had
made Turkey the third largest recipient of American {oreign aid after
Israel and Egypt at the height of ihe Cold War, declined sharpl]' in the
post-Cold \{ar period and came to an end in 1998. At the same tine,
there was a marked increase of interest in ihe US Congress in human
 rights issues as a result oi the emergence of sh.ong democracy and
hulnan rights lobbies at1d constiiuencies. More importantly, ihe end of
the Cold lvar and the disappearance of the Soviet threat emboldened
the ef{orts of the powerful Gleek and Armenian ethnic lobbies in
Washington. Both Iound Ereater roon to manoeuvre in the Congress
and, in addition to their traditional arlti-Turkev agendas, also sought to
exploitthe Kurdish issue and Turkey's human rights problems to under-
mi-e lhcbrlrr, -" L >-lu kr) .e.alio. . ,'p.
On the lLlkish sid€, the absence of sh-on& durable, and effective
govenments {or nost oI the decade created pioblems in policV fornu
latior, continuit]', and implementation. Unlil the late 1990s, in addition
to governmental instability and political uncertainty, lLrkey also faced
najor challenges to its secular consiitutional order and teritorial
iniegrity r\ith the ascendancy ofpolitical Islam in electoral poliiics and
the intensification of the PKK'S (Kurdish Workers' tarty) campaign o{
political violence and terorism. The rising tide ofnationalism in Turkey
- ftlelled bv ethnonational conflicts jn the Balkans and the Caucasus,
Europe's reluctance to adnit Turkey to the EU as a {ull member, and
Popularbackiash against the PKK's actions -represented another nlajor
trend with potentially important implications {or'Iirrkish foreign policy.
Despite the signi{icant changes that tookplace in its intemational and
domestic context, the bilateral relationship betrveen thc US and lirrkev
hd- rern.rinHo.l'.-t. A- tre-i(lenrCl'nton -.feJ rr ni, hi.tnrir dJore--
to the Turkish crand National Assembly in November 1999,'in the
post Cold war era, our partne$hip has become even more impoftant
Ithan beforel'.'The US considers Iiirkey to be a strate$cally inportant
counhv and a key member of NATO r.ith the potential to influence
military, political, and economic developrnents that are of US interestill
the Middle East (containing lraq and han, support for the Palestinian
Isra€li peace process), the Balkans (regional stabilitt peacekeeping
operationsin Bosnia andKosovo), the Aegean and the EasternMeditei-
ranean (Cre€k-Turkish relations, the Cyprus conflict), and the Caucasus
and Central Asia (Cnspian energy der.elopment, the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute, limiting the influence of Russia and Iran).. lor Turket the
Ame can-Turkish alliance remains the most importantbilateral relation-
ship in Turkish foreign policy. Due to ihe protracted tersions in its
relations \^{th Europe, Turkey attached even greater importance to
str€ngthening its iies with th€ US in the post Cold War era. Most Turkish
observers believe that the US is the pr.e eminent player in global affairs
rnd thdl onl) ' ra- the p.(e' cdp.roitit)..rnd p.lilical v,ill ro pld) d
maior role in strategic and security issues thai concem Turkelr.
Despite these perceptions, however, the bilateral relationship
experienced its ups and do$'ns in ihe afteimath of the Cold War'The
decade began on a high note for bilateral ties following nrrkey's
pa icipation and role in the 1990-91 GulI War The close personal
relationship that was esiablished between Presidents Bush and Ozal
reflected the heightened cooperahon and understanding between
Washin8ton and Ankara. However, in the t$'o years {ollowing the Culf
Wat thebilateral relationship encountered difficuities, and the momen'
tum that 'as achieved during Operation Desert Storm could not be
maintained at the same ievel. According to a perceptive Ameican
observer of US policy toward nrrkey, during the {irst ft\,o years of the
Clinton administmtion,'Turkey rvas viewed by manyU.S. policymakers
as a declining asset'.' This stemned p n1aiily from WashinBton's
expectation that Saddam Hussein's rule would come to an end soon and
ihat Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) would cease to exist. Con-
sequently, the US tended to be generally unresponsive to Turke,y's
requests for sironger NATO policy in Bosnia and Ankara's concern
aboltt the reasse ion of Russian influence in the Caucasus. At the same
trme, the intensification of the KurdishprobleminTurkeyled to grorving
criticisms of Turkey's human rights r€cord in the US Congress. On the
Turkish side, the economic cost to Turkey of the sanctions regine that
was imposed on Iraq by the Lt J became a source of c ticism among the
policy makeis and in the media.
However, by ihe mid-1990s, the bilateral relationship was on track
more firmly, as Washington redefin€d its Bosnia policy and assumedthe
leaderchjp in the fight against Serbian allgression.' The Clinton admin
istration also became increasingly concerned about the Russian role in
the Caucasus after the eruption of the war in Chechnl,a. urashington's
changing view of Russia's near abroad' policy rvas instrumental in
its support for the Baku Ceyhan project for the transportation of the
Caspian oil and gas to Westem markets. The Amedcan support for
Baku-Ceyhan made a major contdbution to the improvement of the
bilateral relationship. In addition to regional developments in the
Balkans and the Caucasus, the changing US approach to lLrkey was
the product of the efforts of two ranking Amelican officials, Richard
Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state {or European affairs, and Marc
Grossman, US ambassador to Turkey. As champions oI Turkev's strate$c
importance and value for the US, they 'eneigized US loreign policy on
Turkey's behalf'.'Their efiorts created a much more favourable outlook
on Turkel' in Washington and helped to strengthen the alliance ties. In
ihe latter part of the decade, the level o{ cooperation between the two
countries on a number of key strate$c issues increased significantly.
President Clinton's lengthy visit to nlrkey during the Organization for
94 TURI<ISH-Ai'IERICAN RlLATloNs

secudry and cooperation in EuroPe

(oscE) s;Tf'HTJffi;Jt?
ind th; warm re\ePtion thit -el'rn'n'hiP
'r'1""*..
he rcctrv
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bira rer'rl
"r, "',..'"'l e 1'ry,.1.qr1..r.s-gthunder.ha"*.
rL thr J..h n nr lher$vnr)-l-Gl
Althouch the rlhance irrs maintatned1
c'cum'tdn(' r hc b;rdr..Jr
:;l::;:;;',.i. ;:'i,'ron' rd c"m''rrc
r

on J
""
i";i;";.;;; i.^ o*,' birhour prnhr n-- in re((n' )cd''r'es'
"", of lLe
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,i;'.r' -;,".: - tu1\a - .rno \^d-hi'+; I i:::];:::,:., ::;:l
b.rrinx the Cold War, iht relationslrrP
"." i.i. *.,,..'1 nlhe-r:d- o-0-folr''sinr Ll-e lo-+'vDru'Irr'i'
';;."- rn' coro \^J'
Lh"'""i;.i; bph\een rhF L 5 orlo rJrip' oLr 'ne
orc\prL' Du-nrL\p Po'r(old
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i;;i" "-;' -rn-'er- thP L s 'o

REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUF'S

r1,h( DU.r curd h rf ,','.''"-": *' "1 \il::l:l;i.ill1; j;t ;:l

,u" oo6n;; cr rL. L5 ru,L-n i,, n"l-::,;..;;.;".,;cl_,"aptr,ric"r
*,u.."s The first \\'as the ('Iuptron
"^ "
il,;"' l'''r' rne BdlL"n' ano'qe
.l','"J.1
".," '.,"'o"-'niu"Mdd''
tl,'."1,1,""' i *1,,",1 "n, l:f:l X";l ; : i: ;'.L,'r.
". iqq0 broughi"a ""
ir Auglst
Kuwrit
malo
in'il) rol-dq
f.'Lloo \eJrlLrLe\ 'lL'nBDo'derhrl'lr qiarr;ed rhcP_''
rLl'lc$
lrari cil ro rh
i.-:;il.";';' ,he h''- DroeLn(' t"
MeJrl(rrdn,r_l're\Pnrtlo'rrL \\e_L
d neo esen(eorAn'eric nJ \d
inrporri'cF or
.;;ii;;;- L'"\'r 'rndp'r""d rn'( 'n'rresi'
" "-,";.
' Frrnr' Jsrrn-' \adclcT 11u\';n the
lj.i ]"1" .". *.'',r ll:eo df d"'i-u rhe d (qrd'io- nt the
.; ;..^ .nno'ario'rl *"f"" 'i'
rc norher 'n'.''.lnf 'ti
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'.i., , i"."-r"'
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;;t,':-,:" Pro!rri'[\ nihP' ol
oor,,ion, .nt in\ol\( flenl nr 'rre Mu''ir anJ rLr-k:'h '.ln
t;;;.;;.;i,;"'.', ntleLonr"r'rnBo'rrr anlrKn-o\on'rde
rurr'P\

." u;,;: ".' ; ";".., ,1.""' ,': i",i..':::;J,,*"":':iJ[""\.',:i':]:'.::

peace and stabiht\ rn thc reglon rri€
\dgor-o-K i:'th-i"1
.1.,n-. ccr lic,'rn rn ( aLrcd'tr' 'n U'o-g "' r n' rror
;:,.:il': "ti; ,"' "lJ '' 'n' .. ' d war o'ouenr \ eL dnurh(
i."ili:: n *l;i:H L':: :' l::l',Ii ::ll.;:':i^':"':
the conflicts in the Caucasus underscored Turkey's potential role and
inflrience in redonal secudqr problems.
The second major reason Ior thc gro$'in8 importance o{ r€gional
secu tyissuesin thebilateralrelationship was Turkey's efforts to pursue
a new activist and asseltive {oreign policy in the Mjddle East, the
Balkais, and the Caucasus and Central Asia after the disintegration of
the former Soviet Union.'! This ne$. orientation in Turkish foreign policy
in ihe 1990s stemmed frorn a numbel of developments. The collapse of
the Soviet regime opened up ne(t areas of potential Turkish influence
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It also gave Tultey greater room for
manoeuwe in the Middle East, where pieviously the Soviet Presence
had linited Turkey's achons vis-;-vis Moscow's allies such as Syda.
Political instabiliry,, war, and conflict near the Turkish borde$ in the
Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasris - and the presence of
kindred ethnic or religious groups in many areas of conflict - rrlised
Turkish concerns aboui the possible spillover of armed conflict into
nlrkev and pro pted Ankara to become irvolved in these re$ons to
anunprecedented degree in recenthistorv Tuikev's new activlst forei gn
policy also reflected its desire to reassert the country's geopolitical
imporiance for ihe West, and particularl)' the US, at a tirne of growillg
uncertainlies about furkey's role in the newly emerging post-Cold War
Europ€an secu ry architecture and environment. Last, but not least, the
declining milita{r sirength olTurkey's tiaditional dvals, such as Russia,
Svria, and Iraq, ai a time o{ increased Turkish nilitary and economic
capabiljties facilitated Ankara's efforts to pursue a more assertive and
actrve regional ioreign policy.
The Ame can and Turkish views concerning regional conflicts and
secudty largely tended to converge. Both countdes emphasized the
importance oI regional stability and peace, and opposed the expan-
siorlist policies ofregional states that tlreatened to alter the status quo.
The convergence betweenAnkara andWashingionin thetu approach to
regional security problems was best displayed in the Middle East and
the Balkans. In the Middle East, the 1990-91 Guli War proved to be a
cdtical development for thebilatelal lelationship. Turkey departed from
its traditional policy oI non involvement in regional conflicts, took a
strong stand against Saddam Hussein's regime, ancl participated in ihe
US-]ed Allied Coalition that repelled the invading liaqi forces 11om
Kur\.ait. 'ILrkey's contrlbutions to the Allied Coalition were pivotal for
the success of Operation Desert Storm. These included terminating the
flow o{ Iracli oil exports through the trvin pipelines in Tulkey, pemlitting
the US Air Force to use NATO bases in llukey Ior strikes in northern
lracl and deploying approximat€ly 100,000 Turkish troops near the Iraqi
96 TUK1SH AMERtc,{\ tull AroNs

border to pin down an equal nu bei of Saddam Hussein's forces ln

addition to this nlix of military and ecoironlic contribuiions, Ankara
provided stlong diPlomatic suPport for the Bush administration, both
in internaiional forums such as the UN and in regional diplomatic
initiatives." In the aftermath o{ the Cul{ Uhi, the strateFc cooperation
between Ankara and Washington became even more Pronounced with
the establishment o{ a'no-fly zone'ln northern Iraq above the 36th
parallel under the Protection of an allicd {orce Opeiation Provide
Comfort (OPC), later renamed OPeration Norihern Watch (ONW)
based in Turkey at incirlik.
In addilion to theirPartnershiP dudng the Gulf war, Washington and
Ankara have dlsplayed similar persPectives on several other regional
security issues in the N4iddle East. I'ossibly the most imPortant of these
is the suppoit that the US has lent to the emergence and development
of a new strategic relationsliP between Ismel and Turke]' ln the mid-
1990s. The US has viewed the lsraeli-Turkish alignment favourably since
It bdngs together t\'vo ol Washington's closest al1ies with the slrongest
miliiary capabilities in the Middle East. The US and Turkey also share
the same stron8 commitment to the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process
Both countdes view the Peaceful resolution of this conflict as essential
to regional stability and order in ihe Middle East. From the US per-
spective, Tirkey has the Potenhal to Play an influential role in the
P;lestinian-Israeli peace process since it is a major regional Power and
maintains close ties with boih Partres to theconflict. The US and lxrkish
peispectives on the proliferaiion of weaPons of mass destruction
(WMD) nl the Middle East also converge: both count es are concerned
about the issue and view the develoPmeni of new WMD programmes
as a se or-1s threat to regional stability and peace.
The secondmajorarea oI cooPeration between the US and Turkey in
regional secudty affairs concerns the Baikans " Thc eruPtion of violeni
ethnic conflicts that {ol1owed the disintegration of the Iormer Yugoslavia
sedously undermined regional stabiliiy and increas€d the Possibility
of drawing other regional states, such as Tirrkey, into a wider war To
contaln the escalation of the conflicts and Prevent the annjhilation of
the BosnianMuslims under attack from the ndical Serbian nationalists,
Turkey embarked on activist diPlomacy in Western caPitals and
internaiional organizaiions on behalf of Bosnia's Muslim conmunity
Although the Clinton adrninistration initially aPPeared reluctant to
become involved in the crises in the Balkans, it laier took the initiative
to restore peace and stability to the region, first in Bosnia and later in
Kosovo. Since there was siSnificant overlap in their policy obiectives,
Ankara and Washington cooperated extensively in these initiatives
 TURKISH-1,\4I]RICAN RELTTTIONS AITEII THE COI-D r\AR !r/

Wiih US support ancl backin& Turkey parlicipated in the NAIO

Enforcement/Stabitity Foice (IFOMFOR) thatwas established to en{orce
the provisions oI the Dayton Peace Agreement. Later Turkel' ioined
NATO's Kosovo force and deployed a small contingent of F 16s in Italy
during N-ATO's air campaign against the Nlilosevii regime.In addition,
the cooperation between the US and Turke-v for le$onalsecurity in the
Balkans invoh'ed the 'equip-and-train' pro8ramme for a ner r nilitary
Iorce for the Bosnian Musljm-Croat lederation whereby officers from
Bosnia-Herzegovina received training in Turkey.
Althoughthe US and Turkey share similar perspectivesregardingthe
need {or regional order and peaceful resolution of conflicts, the 1990s
have also witnessed ihe emerflence of divergent vieu's beiween ih€
trvo alLies on several issues. Undoubtedly, the most important of these
corlc€rns their approach to Iraq. The prio ties and aims of the two
countries regarding Iraq differ considerably.'r The primar)' goal of the
US is the ouster of Saddam Hussein from povu-el and the collapse of the
Ba'athist redme in Baghdad. To achieve thls toal, the US has sought to
'contain'Iraq through the enforcement of the UN backed economicand
trade sanctions, and it has supportedlraqi opposition Eroups. As part of
its strategv against Saddam Hussein, Washington has also encouraged
unity among the dval Kurdish forces and the emergence of a new
'political entity'for the Iraqi Kulds in the north. The Turkjsh pdorities,
on the other hand, are to restore trade and economic ties with lraq to
recoup the losses thai Turkey has suffered from the sanctions regime and
to preselve the territorial integritlr of lraq. Anklia is concerned about
the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish eniiiy in noithem Iraq
because ofits potential impact on Turkelr's own Kurdish population. lor
the samc reason, it is also l\'aly o{ the US e{forts to unifi' val lraqi
(urdish groups."
The establishment of OI'>C/ONW in nukey in the aftermath of the
Gulf War to protect ihe northern lraqi Kurds from an assaultby Saddam
Hussein's regime has been a controversial issu€ in Turke)'." The oppo
sition to OPC/ONW stems from lLrkish concerns about its role in
strengthening the Kurdish political autonomlr in northern ]raq. How-
ever, the operaliorl based in incirlik has also been ihe single most
irnportantpart of the US'Tuikish military relationship in the 1990s, and
ii has providedTurkey $,ith avaluable means to influenceUS policy. For
example, Washington has officially continued io designate ihe I'KK as a
terrorist ortanization, supported Turkey in its fight against the Kuidish
.eP,',h-t'. dno enF lcereJ tlle . dplu"e nl the IKK - le"oer O, " -rn.
Moreo\'er, unlike Turkey's Western European NATO allies, the US has
generally reh'ained from criticizing the Turklsh military's periodic
98 TURKIsH-,\ivllRlcA^- REL,{TIoNS

of PKKmilitants Nevertheless'
incursions into northern Iraq in search
li., -" rf-l"' '" u ne Pd'l JeL roe hd"re'rled'r'cre I r'iu'
i.-"t tr,." "-Uerr tr-q 'nd 'rop'"b'' n' urr'nll) 'atrie' ror'
" "'r. '"'t\;
for damage to those relations"'r
*';;
roteniial
*iu.h approaches to secudtv issues in tlle
caucasus
il";J d r
JJ ;" : " '"' ' a 'i"r'11'n elenLnr' 'r' bo'h
"n\'r3'n' "n'
rLr{ll "
Lon'<'n:
::"." i; .'i, 1"or', n;'"n J:J n'l -lr"rH
". ""
-,-:;n.''t" ea''ertir-;nf'r'\H^\erlLe orre->uripr
i 1t' h,'
.'"iin 'on'_"* o.' 'n rne relron lnlenr o nlcgrr'ing'r'Rr'_i'r Jnd
"4
;.:;.'"".";;";'; ophrnisti' dh'Jr PoL'r'ar
"j "'"."' '"a o oenrq- -esr''r
i.lll.'' t:",.i".;". "; ih" ' ' "Jrp" d a po' 'ra d'\r-'nF nruLrrlh
,"-rr.j t". 'etnrrrormo''rr'nr ri' "",r"u'"
"" Aniara's objections to ihe Russian violations
"..t, ".i-.,*'*t
iiir-r"'i,rro
""a"s Forces in Europe (CFE) Treatv in thc norhern
C.;".",*"al borders
;"::J. ;;;;;;'*oning of Russian forces alons rurkev's rr(a_i 'g rr
* , .r." \/croJrl n J;d rr'r recrr\H ? '\nDJlhehc
*-.i,","'...ff ""'"', lLetJSPTJd' ll\InoJi itdil-poL\)
""a I l-csJrc
-n'or) nor" c"'ri'rr'
:;';. ;-Ji.i i; i ';. nr., ,'i."'ropt"a o cr '( (

rr'J'u' "ret>'L'oP'rr rJrrrL

:;",::*;;;*,--:- i"'ci'' 1"'i r rn' Arnc'i(dn'b' r'd " 'r-$P't
;:i"-.':'i,,; t;;'';e Proi('r ' nc\ rpPrn r' r' $ hrcn c'c'el) 'rrig'ed
""".* .,jt,,4"r- p,. '" t "i n''
" uoO' I l'el--l) naror e\ceul-o-
i-t r?'a''r"^:'r ooi'.'','."-'"'''a-' washinston was the
;;il."#;'iJi;"*s bet''e"n A'rk"ra ond
rhe
::;ll;;.lJ;i;i;i;"ri A,'ne"ia in rts cnnflict with Azerbaiian
rn$d+rnq'n
l,-..t."a'^"","'" hFt q rhrn'er r'- poterturl-bo1
ha.infu, .eo t\e'h;p;nbL'r I )foh ) ont( A_/er'-\_me'r'rnronnr(r'
of Us forejgn
,qii* i.*"l.Ar'"** nas b"een the secondhighesi recipient
oi",r. r.-c,,p:r"ba'i--e-p" ir'uc 'p 'tnona'r-'rerndle rfr\of
Lorr
-^- :;,.";;:;"*'i,', ", ''"r"'or""i be'n r'rudeJ
l";, 'no \r poo-r \'r rur'H\ hd'
-..ri"'onzof I rfl ourn
-",..,"";6t
:.'.Ji:";;;';;';."'''.r, "'"t'p..r:ciP''nrhJ'reo'r'(dr)
nore even-handecl apploach . .
.ol".t Wu.ttingto" to actopt a
'' .r-t
.'*i '*u.'."J.0"p- "",e'rhe \eg'dn dnd:''" t)?""'":b-:l
h.l\'(.llhnUedlab.d''i'l:..':.LJS-lurle\re]aiio].|nlq'Do<|-Lil|u
il* #f: *til*;; has olten asked iis t$'o N'{To allies to resolve
peaceful means
-rhe
ir.'"i'- iiir"*"i* -'* ,he Aegean issues through
ft'' ,.'f""'io', n
' , rn" ln '.r L?-Ja'
c;"
,.nr'lnnon"rn,"dclo-nbet\lHLn n lhuc' "'jlld*drr"'t.r."','.
rlne- OnL\o u' l'i ur
:.- 1.,: ;".-.";-.. .;,c, it,rJr(,,iegori,reLl'er.'|e..r'r^-r'o rnF d'PLrH
or rcc ( \ek
i"";:*'.;'' ',"i;"''','o' o" c, r'-' 'i''' 'tror '' err'rr- ' ru.
L'""'' c u-er rL'r
:'flLre'rP
i'"" : ;;; "'',;;"' r\ ' d"'l \'\r'hi elari"n'
;-ii.\:.';' e,,: r,"li.). nr- !rLdreJ ten'io'r' In rne firJrerdl
The US has welcLrmed the rapprochement b€tween Creece and Jurkey
that followed the devastating earthquakes in bothcouniries in 1999. The
continualion of that process and progress to 'ards better Creek-Turkish
relations will play an impofiant role in shengihening the bilateral ties
between the US and Turkey

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

In the 1990s, energy issues emerged as a key factor in Us-Turkish

relations. In general, there has been a broad con\.ergence ofvietvs and
extensive cooperation between Ankara and Washingtorl on Caspian
cnergy development and secudtn The emergence of the Caspian region
asanlajorsource o{ oil and natural Eas in the rvorld has had far-reachnrg
economic and geopolitical implications. laced with a gowing demand
for domestic energy consumption, Tiukqr has viewed Caspian oil and
natural gas deveiopment as a much-needed new source to meet its
energy requiremenis. In addition, Turkey has activelybecome involved
in the competition concerning the routing of d1e nerv pipelines that
would iransport Caspian oll and 8as to Westernmarkfts. Producingstates
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turknenstan), neighbou ng courltries
(prirnarily Ru ssla, Turket and Iran),West€rn oil companies, and the US
have all sought to influence the choice concerning the construction of
the pipelines from the Ca+rian region.'!
In tlis intense competition, the Turkish governmcnt has heavily
promoted the Baku-Ceyhan project for the transport of the nain
Azerbaijani crude oil to Western markets. The Turkish proposal envis-
ages the construction oI a 1,730 mile pipeline 6-om Azerbaijan, across
Ceorgia and Turkey to the Turkish Medit€nanean port of Ceyhan, at a
cost€stlmated tobe approximately 52.7 billion. Turkey's officially stated
case for the Bakl Ceyhan project rests mainly on en\,ironmental and
safety concerns. Turkey has maintained that the Baku Ceyhan rouie
offers an eivironmentallv saier alternative to the northern rolrte that
hasbeen strongly promoted byRussia and thatwouldlead io increased
tanker iraffc ihrough the Bosporus. However, geopoliiical conc€rns
have also piayed an important role in Ankara's efforts to secur.e the
construction of the Baku Ceyhan pilreline. The potitics of Caspian
pipeline conshuctiorl has been iniertwined !\'ith the competition for
political and econornic influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia
among Russia, Turkev and Iran. Tlrkey has viewed the Baku,Ceyhan
route as a valuable strategic and political assei that $.ould hjghlight its
position as an energy br.idge bet$'een the Caspian region and Wcstefll
100 TLRKISH-Ai{ERICn \ RELATIoN5

ties between Turkey

markets and an important means to creatc closer
rn.l
" AreroJrld_ Ceorgro l,rkrren'l"n and laze[''ta'
'ru"'pl'
i't,',"1, iL'r" L>"ha', n p,rn';pre e-dor'ed rhe iJed J'
r\e
^
''1""1;;"-1,
nr' ur- p-'ia"o ru"c) \^:'n ' rons bd'kj"R ror prrl
L'., ,-"rf,r." ornic.. w.r'hi'Blo" 'Lpo'-l f'r Brkt-'erhan'-
..iJ"i" i eJsLr'L'r'o'riJor ror'hPe\Port'l
l',..','Ir"'i't,' "io.
",
"t
"o'l"e:'"
-pc- lhrl uould prercnrI rr rr'lrbecomingd
tr"-ll 'u* rni al'o L r'r 'np Ru"''n rol drd nf Len";n lhe
".,r"".*
iJ". ff," U5 prererr..r ,or Bak-.Cernan d sn -ren' fion1 d '.ronq
-',t'-c\ J'd- arr\ a"d st-d egicd 'y Lnoo ldni ' ourlry
*i,r" ,o.rpp"i, in CasPjan
for the US i; its bicl for a greater economic and Politicalrole
encrw
' develuPmcnt
c"";;.';;" i C"-or.n rn"rs i"ue' ! ' Decn o'e o rhc mtun
,':,,;- ;ii , po i, \ rot'arJ l. rl.i; 'n ttse lao0- lurkey
il;;-.";;;" ,:" rnlp,n"r th' L> h"' olarcd i'tcr Proi'otio ur
nDpo{ron \o-
lhe BJl. -LH\ndn proje'r dgarn'l 't'on! llu-'rdn hon.oL new
oD-ra.i"n on C:'pr.n en. rgr, parn'u'arl\ r]'e con'hu
'aclor rn
nioeline- tor the etporr o o: d'd e ' h I' been Jn inrPorlanl
i,. -ur","nr"." +'.fo'- b r"re'al rie' betrn een nF I$nro rnrie'du-;nSp'
;;: ..',.r.;u *r' nd H.,sP'crl we'rrrn o 'onprnie- n"\e b'
."ir.t",1" ."le i".conmiL-re ' ro Br^Lr' Ce\ h'rn be' r' 'e o ir' rela
;;ilt;;.;;;;;J;"t niua"quut" tr"un'r"s bv counides involved in
il"p-ii,. r",aa,'i.n u-rerrarnric"on(r r'i-gr' ed!tu'rrdr'untof
nenoleum ro-e re- i_ lhe Ca'pian
tea ddd to LLp reluc drrce ri lhH orl
:;;;""1.' lr B.^u (.\' ooH' not -na errarize ' 'lrlr b' J maior
Ji.""""i'..",. f.r lulke1 .'-d 'e"Ln wd'hi'tlo-' cr'orb" r 'n
-l *",f. t t 'uppo- lo r\e P'oei | ncred\ed e\Pr!lJlion'
^"il* 'd! Casplan energy m
that Turkey will emer8e as the main transii route ior
the first decade of the new millennium
develoPment
,tttt o.,gtt .oup"rution on CasPian energy and pipeline
relationshiP' ihe vieu's ol
has been ine oithe pillars of the bilateral
g,itn have ten'led to diverge on two issues The {irst
,^,"i"-
ft.t","" Jecisiorl io Purchase naftLlal gas from llan ln th€
.."""t".""Jw*rlit an

;;;;;;; i,. growing demand for natural sas and div€rsirv

a$eement with
;;;;; s". j"mP".ts,'tukev sig"ed a $20 bjilion
i."" J ";;i;iss6 ittat aiio lrtuot.",es'ttre constructioll of a new Pipeline
fr"i*""t-t tft" t*" countries Turkey's gas deal rvith lran
""ighboudng of 'dual contain
,or'r .oor-tt", to the Cilnton adminisiration's shate8y
..ni 'ftu,-."f. tu Fnlale lrdn and lrao Tre L- Jdm;nr'lrJtrnn sJ'
ro
.nnce _.d.Lal .n, aB_.ernenl b'rne rlr'n rtJrLrle\
hould Leao

sr:or\ irl: dc.ppl.r'.c of lran r'. Pa_'n( r ln el.e e\

b\ ol (
:-o"rr"" "ou'rrie'
"t',rl,ri , rr-' "J rni-i-trdr:on dio not 80 a' f rf a':'nPn-int
'to
 TIrR<1SH-iI!LI{ILAN I{LLAt L

sanctions against Tirrkey for possible violalion of H.R. 3107 - the bil that
would impose sanctions against f oreiSn invesiment in Iran's and Libya's
encrgy sectors Washington nevertheless Publicl]/ aircd its obiection io
Turkey's naturalgas accord lvith Iran."
Turkey's decision to increase its natural gas imports Irom Russia
through the'Blue Stream' project has also been a controve$ial issue. In
1997, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement in which the Russian gas
companl,, Gazprom, inajointventure with Italy's ENI, would construct
a 750 mite pipeline under the Black Sea thai wor d Provide Turkey with
16 bcm of gas by the year 201i1. The Blue Siream pioPosal runs counter
to thc US backed trans-Caspiai pipeline project for the transPort of
Kazakhstani and Turk en energy to the Tlukish end o{ the EuioPean
markets. By supportin8 both the Blue Stucam and tlans-Caspian Pro
posals, Turkey has sent mixed signals to Washington concerning its
policy objectives. Moreover, given the strong US endorscment o{ d1e
trans Caspjan route, Tirrkey's new gas deal $,iih Russia has led to a
divergence of views between fu*ara and Washington ai a li e when
Turkey counts ot1 continued US supportfor the Baku-Cevhan pioject."

TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

The unanimity ofviews between the US and Turke)' has nolvhere been
rnore pronounced than on the queslionofTurkey's flLll membershiP and
integration into the EU. Since the beginning of Turkey's lonB and
ioriuolrs quesi foi entry into the EU, the US has be€n a firm supporter
o{ the Turkish efforts. The Anedcan support for Tirikey on this issue
became especiallf important in the a{termath of the Cold War when
lirrkey's European allies in the Western Alliance appeared to discotrnt
Turkey's value and importance to EuroPe rvith the disintegration of the
forner Soviet Union. In addition, Turkey's econooic and political
problems, the spectre ofincreased migrant flows from Turkey to Europe,
and Greece's opposition all contibuted to the EU's reluctance to favour
full Turkish membership.']Unlike its transatlanticallies, however, the US
continued to value Turkey's strategic importance for the \\'est and
supportcd its full i ntegration into the EU on thegroundsthat this would
more fumly anchor Turkey to ih€ West and contribute io Turkev's
e.onomic and political proF ess.
Du ng the course of the 1990s, the US has ]obbied cxtensivelv on
Turkey's behalf with the EU oflicials in Brussels as well as ln other
Western European capitals. Washington's e{forts to push Tuikey's full
membership have, ai times, led to tensions in transatlantic relalions
102 tuLKrsH-ANlERIc,\N RELATIoNS

;.H :;t;,i;i:Til:;: xl;. I::: ff ;:i:i!r:l:i,'If

iill:;'il :j.
iii'."i.i. i.l-"" o "v"o " :qi".,:',1";;
rhe I L anr r'r'kp\
li:'.''.".';'il;
in'on b.t*e'r " ::,:i";;;", ,n r t -t,,t-n
'r. eh
."--.enent markd d -:gific i'"^r".i".""- *g-a,"g 'lr"
,.' ,i.n-. ', 'nor' ol.neerirg '''*l ,;.:i;. ,";oT -c,b'c, in
*i"ill':::;i;,,,g
nenb. r-hro '""
q,.',ion
thtr deosion ot ihe
'1"'"
I summ]!rn t-urt
qq7 EU "",," i".r,a" ',*.1
1,,,i",i.. ": ". lrp". n'. :"""r::,: T l"J:j"'Jt;::;
-unmir wa"t'onb\ (riLicr/pJ but' I I trrn ro h" \ or.e. Horle\er
::;il:l;:
re.ri,U -_ b. L\\ecn FL dnd
lurlc\ toor d.
rh" I t modrFed'r"tanc1 o''t" ;;f.:"",':::;;
i".a,"u'.
"...^.,.",",,,,*"
i'
Hel'nU a'd '' ' "*"''"0. '' ll'-,
;..1',",,,,r.,.u""-
-LmmiL i-r.n,d-n:n,.rr nn
nrgtr-r
shlo. Asain,intensi\ e Prcssures by "|.t"ri
rrli' ru' oo"un'o'"1"'t"'l:,lfl ii:;l'J::i:]; ll:
"in".;,i:;"
rnodihcation o{ the EU policy iowards^l
s
qre'l lnr
rhe L5 na' pro\ ;ocd lo fLrrley r' r^e'"0' "ciardrre tu'ler - 1o Lne
hd- rrrde J -ienrFc rnr 'ortrrb"tion
;:-'',',;;.;"'r';"'netr
relatrons
siretg th-cn in g o{ the bilater'l

DEVELOPMENTS
DOMESTIC ISSUES AND

Do r.i.t c p.
ri. ' rnd
i:::-
p ,,ed -ignrfi, rnt chdrrenqe-
'"'' :',T'lll:.11.:ili.i,Ji:;';;'"Ji:l;
lo lheLD'| a'|e'J " ,-.u", uno t,,,nrun .lgt
' ,

i"ld \l,r per;od ln P"rti("lar' lheNL'r,","r"".p".,-"f

l. r.,rr"-"
pr,,bten- d-iociJted \^,th :t. hr-permea-. "'' or rur\.1 -
',er..',i"n-. tne tJ> ha'. reoe"redl)" L n,tl,.i d rr. -lppor t
t. o .1,, ". *.',,, " ", r"o.j*
-
r_rr;rnrdl Inreqrir\ - nd rr- oppo-th"'
,] i n.'i - ;", "Fr ornc:drt\
:: iil,fil'::;T:'lilor \';Al::T; ;,'', ;rganiz't"" 'n,'a' '"n.
;";'ft :;";,;', * ^rencc ':noj'r:e:,,b:.;: i,* il,::;:,::
rine.ho ever .here h?'bH.'1(on-roe'li'1"'" *r'-ii-, p,"0,"'f .
'n Anr Jrd,o ir'd a P''it'c"r''"" "-a
r' rn or'ld l,; ;;";;;";, girr. or elrlurirr
inrPlenenl rerorn' r n 'a'equr
t'nii,l.., h're 5ir' n rr'e to Jrdrp crrh-
'.n"',- '" -upPre'- Lhe IKK' ,,."a on 'h" 3-orno- ih:r LhL
.,'-'- ,i;..""r''l ' 'l "'*
rr" '
':;;
tJJilt ''I-ls l:;;:j;:'::':;llT'xi lll;"''"iil".'
:*ii l:'Jt :::i:t;!l s"-l:1" i:l;" *;:;,'*''t;"'""1;!'iil ll
 TUI]KI5H-A\1IJI{IO{N I{LLA] I

coverage to the developments in Tu rkey with pariicular emPhasis on the

problems related to ihe Kuidish issue. Turkey's shortcomings in human
rights issues have also becone afavouite target of criticisms forvarious
influential NGOS and the anti-Turkey ethnic lobbies in Washington.
The mostimportant consequence of Turkey's human riShts problems
on the Us-Turkish relatr ons conce rns the arns transfer and procurem ent
process.:r Since the late 1940s, when Ankara and Washington began to
{orge close ties, militaiy assistance and arms transfers to Turkey hale
been a bindint factor in the bilateral relations. Over the years, most oI
the rveapons systems and equipment usedby the Ttrkish militarycame
hom the US. As noted earliet military aid to Turke), declined sharplyin
the aftermath of the Cold War before coming to an end in 1998. Turkey
continued to depend on the US as its p ncipal source of new weapons
svsiems and military technology. Howeler, in the 1990s, the US
Congress began to restrict arms transfers to Turkev to pressure Ankara
toimprove its human rightsrecord and, in some instances,to modifyits
position in the Creck Turkish disputes. The withholding oI militar),
equipment, sometimes bought and paid for in advance by Turket was
bitterly resented by Turkish olficials and especially by the Turkish
military, which hasbeen a strongsupporter ofclose liesbehveen the two

The ascendancy of political Islam in Turkel' in recent years has

introducecl another potential irritant into the bilateral relationship.
Turkcv's lslanist parties and politicians have trad itionally been voci{er-
ous in their c ticisms of the West, the close lies between the US and
lbrkey, and American policies in the Middle Easi.:iAs a result, the rise
to power o{ the Islamist Welfare Partv (WP), as the senior partner of a
coalition governmentin 1996,created iustlfiableconcernsinWashington.
Durin8 its crisis-ddden tenure in lrovernment h 1996 92 the WP
pursued relativeiy moderate policies and toned down its anti-Western
rheto c. This shifiinpartystrategybecame even more pronounced after
the WP's ouster from power {nder strong presslrre from the secularist
{orces led blr the militarl,. The US refrained from taking a position on
thatcrisis,butWashirlgton has if creasinglytended to vie$' the sanctions
imposed on ihe lslamist paities and politicians largelv in the context of
l'ruman rights and democratization issues. Aloigside the Kurdish
question, Turkev's policytoward the Islamist parties hasbecome palt oi
the agenda of human rithts issues in the bilateral agenda.
With respectto Amerlcan domestic poljtics, the increased activism of
ihe Greek American and Armenian Amedcan lobbies has posed the
most seiious challenge to continued goodrelations between the US and
Turkey. In addition to theil sizable electoral strength, ihe inlluence of
ITI4 IURKISH-AIVIERICT\N RLLAIIONS

these lobbies in Waslirrgton has increased significantly in the 1990s due

to thei( success in forging coaliiions with the Powerful hrLman rights
lobbies and NGOs. l11 comparison, Turkish lobbying efforts sufler fiom
the absence o{a significantly large Turkish tuneican diasporathatcould
plav a role in US electoral polilics. lil rkey's growing ties with Jsraelhav€
led to increased support from the Je .ish lobby on a number o{ issues
Ne\.ertheless, Turkey continues to face an uPhill battle in Washington in
terms of counieiing the activities oI the anti-Tiukey lobbies
The main focus of the Greek lobbi/ has been the Aegean and the
Cyprus conllicts. On both of these issues, it has sought to cr€ate a pro
Greek tilt to Washingion's Policies. The Creek lobb]' has also been a
sharp c tic ofthe sale o{arrnsand weapons systems to Turkey. In a rvell-
publicized case, Senator Paul Serbanes, a prominent Creek-American
legislaior, peisonally held Lrp the authorization of the transf€r of two
frigates to Turkey for mole than two years." The recent rapProchemellt
behveen Greece and Turkey has not, so far; led io a discernible change
of attitudes and policies anong the Greek American diaspora The
aciiviiies ofthe Armenian tobby have created even greater problems for
the Us-Turkish lelationship. The \{'e]l-organized and -financed eftorts oI
the Armenian lobby to persuacle Con$ess to pass a resolution that
officiallv recoBlizes the so-called Armenian genocide have periodically
created crises beth'een Ankara and Washin$on, most recentl]rin autumn
2000. Had it not been for the last-ninute intervention bY President
Clinton, H.R. 596 nould probably have been aPProved by the US
Congress, 1\''ith potentially highly undesirabte consequences for the US-
Turkey bilateral relationship.

CONCLUS]ONS

Despite the exisience of divergent views on a number of issues and

problems, the relations between the US and Turkey have gcnerally
remained strong ihroughout the past decade. Clearly, with the Possible
exceptiorl oi the question of Iraqr there is nore understanding and
cooperation lhan conflict and disaFeemeni between the tu,'o allies on
most of the k€'i/ issues. Given the vast and radical changes ihat hav€
occurred in world politics since the end oi the Cold War, the ability of
the bitateral alliance to wcather these changcs arrd even gain piound in
the 1990s underscor€s the importance that the two countries attach to
maintainint close strategic, political, and economic relations.
tsaring radical ne ' developments in th€ inteinational or domesiic
context o{ the Us-Turkish partnership, the relations between the two
countries are likely to remain stlongin the near {uture. ArecentRAND
study su8gests that {our areas are likely to'form the basis of a solid,
coopelative lelationship'.r' The fust concerns cooPeration bctween
Ankara and Washingon to ensure the security o{ energy supplies fiom
ihe Persian GL f region a nd th e Caspian basin. The second is a concerted
effort by the two counbies to counier thc proliferation of ballistic
missiles and weapor-rs ofmass destruction. The third involves the formu-
lation and irnplementation oI a common policy that would simultane-
ouslv seek to contain Russian expansionism in the Caspian region and
Central Asia and also persuaclc Russia to foster a better clinate for
political and economic coop€ratioi with its neighbolLrs and ihe West.
Finatty, the stud)' notes that 'integrating Turkey into the EU should be
an important objectrve o{ the {uture stiate€iic coo}reration between the
US, Eluope, and Turkey'." Pro$ess in ihese and related areas o{
common iitercst to the US and Turkey r,'ill be cdtical lor the continued
strength of the partnerslip in the first decades of the twenty-first

NOTES
I Rr arks blt thr hBide t nr A,litr rs r! t/k T!/l:isl (l/, d Niliotrdi ,4s.,,b1j/, the White Housc
Ofice oi the lr€ss Secreta], 15 Nlvenb.r le9{r.
2 Se€ Zalnay Khaltuad,'lvhy th. ['.st Nccds lr rk€y ,lvt]i Srr..i J,!titl,22 D€.ember 19!7'
ZlignerBrern.k|Tn.Crr,d(-htil(ttl:A.ti.n Prnmnta"dlt:C sttntqiL|alttntiL.s
(N!{ York: Bnsic Books, 1997), and l{obert S Chas€, lnily B HiI atd Paui Kenr(d),
'Pn otal Sbtes and L S Skrt.gy', F n,U r, ,yldt!, 75, 1 0arua{ FebNary 1996), tt i}a l .
: For r...nt a.allscs, see CeorEe S. Hads,'Lr.s -nukish Relatio , in Ald lvlalovs(t nnd
SabLi Srlaj1 (cds), lirrt.trt \ica Wnrdr ahnn! n! Dvnd i.s,r T'rrknl n,?rg, /1tirr,,
(t'adrngton, DC $inhin8l.n Inslilule l.r Nearlan folic],201111), pp.189 202, Morton
Abranowitz, The CoDrpl€nde; ol Arnei.ar I'oli.y Vaking on Tur(€y, in Mod.n
Abmnowirz (.d.), frt*t)t s Tn i ,rnan nntt Arttnit Ptut.:! (Ncw YorL (:cn1$y
Foundation Press,2000l, pp 15!81; and K.hal Ki.i!qi,'Turk.v ind thc Uninrd States
Ambival€rt ,Allies', in Bnrry Rubin dnd T Kcr.cl l.!ls), US ,41/i.r irr r ('/rdrgrt l\\illd
(l.ondon h.nkCa$,2!01).
I Ah. Vd(ovsk], L.5 Poli.y nuard nrrkcr: Plo8re$ and l'..blens', in r\brano$rtz,
ti(ll,t s Ttnn:j.n"nt n,p )23

7 See Siiha Baln kbalr, rnr ftilj-1,,.ri.x" R,/trr io s d L_rprl6 (Lanham, MD: Unive$it_v lle$
8 See SabriSalan,'Turkish F.r€ign foli.I nr tne lost Cold l\lar Era: The CnalLngrs ol Mu Lti
RegionalGm , /ouml .Lr Ifir,rrt.,iJ,4jft,1, 54, 1 {FaI 2000), nr 69 182
9 Alan lvlabvsLf and Sabi Sayan, 'lnhodn.tifLr', in Nlakov.k],sdy.n, T,,kry'J l{nnd, \.
10 SaLri Sayal, Behr'€er Allies.nd Neighlrob: Tukr" s Bnrden Shdnng Poli.y in thc Cllf
Confli.t', fi Andrcrv B€rnett, Jorph Lelgold ond Ddnny Unger (edt, Itr.,ir in N.rdl
Bnnlen Slui,ry nt the CtLl l iu iN e\! Y!rk: St Nl.ttin's I}$s, 1997), W. 1ir7 2 L6
ll r.r a f.reptive anal),si\, se. llhdn Uzge,'DoksJnlarla Tnrkly. tlin rln libnliEi r.
Itekab.t Ala., Olrrrk rlalkr.ll', in Cfr.cr Oz.in in.1 !rlc Klt l.ds), f, ll:rn Onrl'l
(lstanbll: lnr}'ut, l9!ir),pt .11191
12. NlakNsbt 'U.S. lbliq' torLard li1rket', pp.2l0 3
I(la1 TLRKISH-,\i\ !tlcr\\ RLI ATloNs

litrle! s lolq in \orthernlraq'1991 t5 ' rulldl' l'n"I 5r 'nrj'

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