C H A P T E

DIPLOM
ARTHUR EY
1. INTROD
1.1. Perimeters
Diplomaqf, as a keen diplomat observed
centuries on end the wielding of power
wealth this generated. The ownership o
the execution of exclusive rights. Notabl
his prerogative to diplomacy and to wag
by other, forceful, means. For centuries
holder of these prerogatives. Theoreticia
form of society. The role of diplomacy wa
•"g interests of these state-champions o
Over the past half-century all this ha
•^ed the premise. As paramount gene
3ae and capital markets, and in recent
lary service sector. New competing ac
and processes of 'diplomatic' neg
lo •' ^ P^^'^Uel process of social renewa
^ ^ y being challenged by the concept
^ Calliferes De la Maniere de Negocier avec
 organization, by a host o f international and regional bodies, by global govg. .^streams ^ of diplomacy, often verified
and civil society.
l''**^yghout history, both types have foun
As ever, life i n its countless complexities has shown little patience with \ [ ^ gators ' often linked these types to na
tradition. I n its restless stride, it has overrun the boundaries of the public and '"^"j.jpjned by climate, region, or size."* Be
spheres. International contacts have expanded well beyond inter-state contacts'^^'^diplomacy i n the political sphere, th
• , J^"'^"^^*-^ weu oeyona mter-statp r r N . , . '
these i n turn long broken through the oerimetpr* n f Hcic<.;^-,i . '^"^'''^ploinatic practice is conditioned by p
these m turn long broken through the perimeters of classical, cTjZ>^^
macy As we speak, mtergovernmental organizations, the spok smen o cIf
(non-governmental organizations, NGOs), and financial and economi b ''three complementary elements o f old
''S
haveallbecomeglobalplayersmthemtegratednetworkofoverlap"^^^^^^^ negotiation, and the gathering of in
. , -
makes up world diplomacy today. They enter into partnershins I'^J'T'^'^^^^i
- t , . c x t ^ u i i c i . w u i K o i overiappmg interests ti
makes up world diplomacy today. They enter into partnerships i n debating dim oortional weight of these elements is
change, biodiversity, preventive diplomacy, or post-conflict peace building. Poijtjpiined ^ by the overall political climate, th
challenges by non-state actors have generated new types of conflict. The world'sjype fab' of diplomacy.
ric is under reconstruction and humanity in search of new directions and normative
guidance.
The above process is as irreversible as its outcome is unpredictable. Is our genera
tion witnessing the end o f the Westphalian states system? Are we recapturing the 1.3. The Law of Diplomacy
multilayered medieval society, when bankers, guilds, Hanse, and knighthood con-
Even i f diplomacy, as an executive to
versed with kings and emperors? Are we heading for a global 'civil society'? Or is our
age a new transition phase within the system, as when dynastic rule gave waydevice, to con- the law has been its steady com
of the oldest and most impressive, i f a
stitutional rights, and these i n t u r n to parliamentary control? W i l l the States system
absorb all change to valiantly challenge global issues?- international law. From time i m m e m o r i
functioning o f the diplomatic agent h
The answers to these penetrating questions lie in the lap of the gods and will not be
tected by safety valves. I n the commu
offered, nor expected, i n these pages. Quite the contrary: the above appraisal serves
precisely to justify the demarcation of this chapter. Institutionalized diplomacy, thattions developed. From it grew a fascina
is, the entertaining of international relations in a continuous process and by qualified arrangements, such as courtesy and p
officials, was the wilful creation of the State, both to express and to protect its sover- rules of law. A t its core are the concep
eignty. This chapter sets out to discuss the full span of that discipline's unchallenged defining the legal rights and duties o f
and unimpaired functioning, from its origins at the dawn of the states system untilto facilitating the envoy's functioning
the emergence of the current twilight zone (1450-1950). lates some o f humanity's most prec
codified i n the much acclaimed and wi
matic Relations.'
1.2. Diplomacy: A Political Device
The overarching purpose of diplomacy is to protect and further one's interest vis-a-
* For an amusing appreciation o f the nation
vis foreign actors. I t is the assessment o f what analysts such as Hobbes or Grotius
^Thornton Butterworth L o n d o n 1939) at 127-
identified as man's two paramount drives, his urge for self-preservation and his social ibid 50.
appetite. A l l civil society and commerce grew from these drives. Diplomacy, there- ' ibid 60 ff.
fore, long preceded documented history.^ The two drives, accordingly, mirrof ^ '^rt 3 o f the 1964 Vienna Convention ((s
•^TS 95) adds t o this the protecting o f intere
e m o t i n g o f friendly relations.
Ms Anderson The Rise of Modern Dipl
' J Black A History o/£),>/o»,flc;/(Reaktion L o n d o n 2010) 31248-63.
• ibid 17-22. ^^'Plomacy in 2) 62-3.
Vienna Convention o n Diplomatic Relation
 ^lyiyjiuiu^y: its Legislative and Executive Branches Tradition of Secrecy and Elitis
In monitoring international relations, conventional inter-state diplomacy ^j' J'^' .yjices die hard. Diplomacy is of
into two distinct branches: the legislative aspect o f formulating a policy '^^ (jl<J P^vctions cut some ice, yet both el
executive part of policy implementation.'" The legislative aspect is at the d'i^'^'^ ° ^ d the second i n historical circu
of a State's central organ, its administration. The executive part is usu '"'''^^le'ass^t. Bismarck, for one, under
to a specialized taskforce—in our day and age the foreign ministry and its '^^^^^^ s hysteria i n the volatile French me
matic staff—from the well-understood perception that each branch requij-g Up '''f^^fice rashly declare war on Prussia
cific skills, which do not by definition overlap. As critics have stipulated n ^ lieht of their own accord. Much li
the blurring of these two spheres has time and again compromised intern f'^^'^ th^ the fickle vox populi. Privacy f
relations. ^ roinise-'^ Our world's insistence on
Cssets of negotiating a huis clos.
A tragic victim of misconception o f
h res of policy and diplomacy was W
1.5. The Balancing of Interests teen Points Rule (1918), Wilson sailed t
(Jiplomacy of secrecy'. At Versailles he s
Professional diplomacy boasts distinct techniques and a toolkit that reflects the yflth democratic control—and ended u
world's accumulated experience with human nature and the human condition In quished powers, most o f his allies, and
effecting its objectives, diplomacy is committed to peaceful means, short of the use of discredit 'secrecy' all too rashly. I n the
force, i f not necessarily towards peaceful ends. Even so, and inasmuch as commerce revolutionary movements, from the Am
and trade are held to profit from peace, it is in neutralizing dispute and in balancing ism and communism, bellowed their d
and levelling conflicting interests that, historically, diplomacy has consummated its soon to recant. The art of manoeuvring
role and effectively served international society. Not by coincidence. Western diplo-
macy's paramount concept constitutes the theory of the balance of power." The con- left to experts.
cept was familiar to domestic politics from the days of Polybius (c. 150 BC), in analogy
to the medical 'balance o f humours'. It was first applied in modern times within the
Quattrocento world of ItaHan city-States.
Following successive bids for w o r l d hegemony by Habsburg Spain and Bour-
bon France, the balance was adopted as the overriding instrument of European 2. T H E R I S E OF M O
policy at Utrecht (1713)- It had a special appeal to a world imbued with the thought
o f Newton and Boyle. Reason and 'political arithmetic' suggested a benign politi-
cal order. I n practice, state-actors found the mechanism fairly elusive—and doc- 2.1. International Relations: Thre
trine proved of little help. A balance is by nature easily tipped and a precarious
instrument to base durable equilibrium on. Its appliance w i t h a view to freezing Three political concepts have steered E
change and protecting vested interests hampered the natural flow of society, nei empire or universal monarchy; the sta
ther d i d i t serve social justice.'^ The peaceful balancing o f interests is "^^^'^f^^g and third concepts embodied steadfa
under the best o f circumstances. I t never was w i t h i n a single civilization, an never did. It was the consequence of s
global interacting o f widely diverging traditions from 1850 onwards only exa ^orlack of alternative, and i n breach of
bated the challenge.
' Diplomacy (n 4) 12-13.
The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (n 8) 149-203.
A n account o f early balance systems i n A History of Diplomacy (n 2) 20. ^ Press Princeton 1994)-
 The concept o f the vmiversal, hegemonic empire—the dream o f the ^ ^ j j j definite qualifications, tasks o
legacy—was the Utopian Leitbegrijf in Europe up to early modernity. A long fof^^^ j^jjger for Italian city councils, on w
cause ever after the division of Charlemagne's empire (843), the notion was kent v"^^ •jjjposed itself on a daily basis.
in the illusory Translatio Imperii; still glorified in Dante's DeMonarchia (c. 1300) Competing expansionism of Flo
ideal faded with time, i f reluctantly; the ambition was never quite abandoned ' ^ jjerated the concept of the resid
The concepts of supranational order and international organization can like ' Earlier experience with consuls i n
be traced back to (idealist) literature of the early modern period.'^ Only towards th^ as 1197' ^^^^ suggested the f
end of the 19th century the concept became salonfahig and a factor of acute political py 1460 Savoy had an orator et a
interest—then to be implemented, with qualified success, in the 20th century. Venice had two merchants as perm
The concept of the states system grew from the political and moral bankruptcy of At first, no need to reciprocate w
the bipolar medieval power constellation of empire and church in the face of socio Jid the intensity of contacts not y
economic renewal at the dawn of the modern nation-state. The concept drew its raison reached that sophistication. Actual
d'etre and rationale from forestalling universal hegemony. It was this concept that express hostility rather than frien
prompted modern sedentary diplomacy and down the centuries remained its steady Until Francis I , France declined th
companion. This concept, therefore, constitutes the backdrop of our narrative. positively despised these envoys a
necessarily seen as a paradigm sh
the institution became widely acce
permanent envoys were well below
2.2. Resident Envoys and Sedentary Missions the Herrschernahe. -° Rulers kept
The rise of modern diplomacy is intricately linked to the fascinating world of the Ital- intimates. The new institution's so
ian Quattrocento J'' Here, way ahead of Europe across the Alps, a fabric of sovereign will have accounted for this.
city-States had emerged that thrived on trade and commerce w i t h the Levant and Titles o f sedentary envoys var
controlled silk routes and international banking. This world's keen political insights legatus to ambaxiator.-^ By 160
and aspirations were underpinned in the works of shrewd early 16th-century obser- permanent envoys was motley o
vers like the Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini. velli, Giucciardini, Jordaens, Rub
It was a cynical world perhaps, ruled by princes, usurpers, and oligarchs, and a diplomatic epicentre,^' produced
chronically unstable crucible o f intrigue and scheming. Still, the common sense of Bernard du Rosier's Ambaxiator
merchant and banker readily perceived the profits to be reaped from levelling powers lished his De Officio Legati in Ve
in equilibrium of peace. Political expansionism and keen commercial rivalry prompted dignite de I'ambassadeur, 1604
the first modern application of the classical concept of the balance of power. followed suit in France and Britai
From that same bedrock sprung the notion of sedentary embassies, and for similar A new era of diplomacy was he
pragmatic reasons. Throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages diplomacy had been aspirations to absorb the cisalpin
episodic, an ad hoc phenomenon spurred by representation at coronation or wed- ian power play. Charles VIII's ca
ding ceremonies, by acute conflict or the conclusion of treaties and negotiating of presented was, if not by right, on
alliances. No need for permanency had ever arisen, let alone for a specific functionary
" A History of Diplomacy (n
" The Rise of Modern Diplo
" A History of Diplomacy (
" C L Lange Histoire de I'mternationalisme (3 vols Aschehoug Kristiana 1919); J Ter Meulen I ^° ibid 26 and 47-8.
Gedanke der internationalen Organization in seinerEntwicklung (3 vols Nijhoff The Hague 1929-40); ^ " The Rise of Modern Diplo
Rise of Modern Diplomacy (n 8) 204-90. A Gentili Dejure belli libri
" Diplomacy (n 4) 26-30; The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (n 8) 1-40; A History of Diplomacy (n " A History of Diplomacy (
43-6- " The Rise of Modern Diplo
 well beyond the purse of cities, guilds, or knighthood?^ To curb the Habsb s imposed the need fo
Charles leaned heavily on his Genovese bankers. It was a historic turn- th^'^'^^'*'^ jui**''' household, residence, a
necessity' of State and capital would prove indissoluble. " P^ct of
Peace was only secured by the bankruptcy of the antagonists. France's bare f O " ^ first legal device develope
determined the course of history against the hegemonic empire, and accel ^^"^^^'^1 '^^oncep^ of extraterritorialit
growth towards a system of sovereign States. Diplomacy was scaled up too ^' ib^ ' ' ^ j 31 j t vvas abandoned as
array of otherwise short-lived leagues that may perhaps count as the open'' his^ quartier for whole em
European Balance System.^* The modern State, capitalism, and political interd"^ °^ ^ ded to the bewilderment o
ence had aU assumed new dimensions. ^nus strife, was impaired by
"^hole embassies into places of
^ The envoy's personal sacros
pa Legnano (1360). Still, practi
2.3. The Institutional Framework / n! arrested for spying. Granvelle
integrity of the discipline, the s
From 1550, the exchange of permanent missions and the rise of a professional class of
virtu of these 'licensed spies'
diplomats changed the discipline. Firstly, it generated a diplomatic bureaucracy
Madrid sent envoys to conspir
Chanceries were launched and archives kept of reports, such as of the legendary
Orange, the charismatic leader
Relazione of Venetian ambassadors. The Papal Chancery that issued decretals was
dors intrigued with Huguenots i
reputed for its legal expertise. Secondly, diplomacy as 'intelligence' gathering gener-
a vexing issue, until in Grotius'
ated a network of espionage. The quest for sensitive information made the diplomat's
Still, abuse abounded. As late
correspondence a keen target for interception. Early records are colourful: dispatches
Hague were arrested for sediti
were sent in duplicate, by different routes, or sewn into clothing. Couriers were dis-
guised as merchant or wandering scholar. till the 20th century.
The two pragmatic grounds
Codes and ciphers were ubiquitous.^^ Already by 1550 Rome employed a secretary
had been reliabihty and mea
in charge of cipher systems to serve its nuncios}'^ The obvious rejoinder was code-
capped by irregular and arbitra
breaking by specialized cabinets noirs (Paris) or Black Chambers (London).'" The
Grotius himself. Scholars or m
16th century produced expert monographs on the issue, like Von Trittenheims
selvesfinanciallyleft out in the
Polygraphia (1516), Delia Porta's Defurtivis litterarum notis (1563), or De Vigen^re's
itors. From this circumstance
Traite des chiffres (1586). A later benchmark was Antoine Rossignol's Le grand chiffre
criminal proceedings.Insolve
(c. 1650). It brought about the coming of age of the law of diplomacy.
country. Gifts (free lodgings,
But then, diplomats had their s
tion from custom duties as lic
The same interplay of theo
2.4. Privileges and Immunities
premises. In the days of the S
Until the 15th century, the alpha and omega of the law of diplomacy had been the nots took shelter in the Dutch
diplomatic agent's personal inviolability or sacrosanctity. The rise of permanent dents and were dens of upro
" cf GP Geoffrey The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (CUP
Cambridge 1988) ch 1; C Tilly Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 (Basil Blackwell Cam " The Rise of Modern Diplomacy
bridge Massachusetts 1990); R Bonney The European Dynastic States 1494-1660 ( O U P Oxford 1990)- °f Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and
M Sheehan The Balance of Power. History and Theory (Routledge London 1996). A History ofDiplomaq' ( n 2) 59
^' The Rise of Modern Diplomacy ( n 8) 20-3. " The Rise of Modern Diplomacy
^' i b i d 22-3 and 43. i b i d 34-5. AHistory of Diplomacy {112) 10&-9. ibid 53-5.
premises also was a slow process. To conclude, for centuries on end immunities Tolerance did not come easi
arranged on a bilateral and ad hoc basis. lack of alternative, upon actors
ereignity insisted on absolutism
strife for hegemony, the states
rent shifting and rebalancing—
process, historians generally di
ancien regime (1648-1815
3. T H E WESTPHALIAN EXPERIENCE broke down i n 1914, finally, th
principle of national self-dete
hegemonic aspirations and cu
3.1. The States System action and i n a purposeful man
this imposing architecture.
The Westphalian Peace Conference (1644-48) that put an end to the ideological clash
of the Thirty Years War constituted a critical benchmark i n the history of European
diplomacy. As a diplomatic accomplishment it was an unprecedented tour deforced'
It tremendously enhanced the prestige of the discipline, enlarged its expertise, and
refined its techniques and procedures.
3.2. The Negotiation Pr
The acquiescence of belligerents in the military deadlock and their grudging resig- With hindsight, and from the po
nation to come to terms—prompted by exhaustion rather than lofty ideals of peace- Congress left a great deal to b
was historic i n itself. It put an end to one of Europe's most complex eras of crisis. For option anyway. It had taken th
well over a century, and i n a merciless clash of dynastic, national and religious the Vatican i n the 1630s and b
interests. Protestantism had challenged Catholicism; Bourbon and Vasa dynasties Informal talks started i n 1641
had defied Habsburg supremacy, and German nobility had contested imperial the protracted negotiations (1
centralism. opportunism, eagerly awaiting
Westphalia was a watershed: it undid the universal claims of papacy and empire, suppressed each spring awaitin
the dream of a single Christianity, and the last vestiges of overlapping sovereignty on Political power-play and bla
varying titles that were the relics of the medieval world. I t embraced the exclusive applying pressure. Rather than
principle of territorial sovereignty and reserved the prerogative of diplomatic rela- ferences, preferring competiti
tions for States. Westphalia formally replaced universahsm with a society of com- bloody encounters of staff. Pr
monwealths that interacted along shared norms and values embedded in legal opening was delayed six mont
precepts of universal application, such as the principle of non-intervention. It head to head, brandishing sove
accepted—or paid lip-service to—the formal equality of States, thus introducing a slightest concession. The shee
horizontal and ideologically clear cut international order: the states system. Vatican share the same conferen
Of essence to our discussion, 1648 was a negotiated result that rehed on the diplo- c and international issues, Os
matic device of the balance, now shouldered by ample reflection and theory T e empire.3' Nor was Westphalia
label of'anarchical society'^* along Hobbesian lines does not quite fit this system^ most were indirect. At Muns
Keen political and economic competition was kept i n check by sophisticated alliance parties did not accept papal me
strategy. The instruments of mediatio
erishing hidden agendas, the
'5 AHistoryofDiplomacyim) 66. -nustok^
H Bull The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics {2nd edn MacmiUan Basing 3e K Hami]jQj^ ^^^^j Langhorne
1988). Pnncen Intermediaries in I
trality. Even so, they were not to be envied. France risked complete failure by delibg putch, and British aspired at colonies to ser
ately insulting Venice and persistently undermining the position of the nuncio amount State in Europe after Westphalia
account of Rome's political aspirations. '^^ ^ere directed at territorial gains."- By 1630,
Proceedings were delayed by the lack of mandate of delegations that had to stick t ^^pglomerate from justified fear of being su
the letter of their instructions. It left no latitude for compromise and made th ° ove, broke the deadlock of a century by cro
entirely dependent on slow, often intercepted communications with their home base" jpd join forces with Lutheran Swedes and C
On top came the quarrels within delegations. The noblemen or patricians at the^ (}ie Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin even f
head rarely bothered to enter into the debate, a phenomenon described by Juan de Henceforward, raison d'etat, and nothing e
Vera's ElAmbajador (1620),^' and willingly left technicalities to their assistants. These which revealed Bourbon aspirations at
were mostly lawyers, who, i f luminaries in their profession, lacked political genius to the continent, henceforth they dreamt of t
and were treated with perfect disdain by their superiors. The composition of the
French, Swedish, and Dutch delegations reflected friction and clashing interests at
home. The overall atmosphere at the conference breathed mistrust and intrigue
W i t h gifts or female charms considered perfectly acceptable instruments to gain 4.2. 'Heroic'Diplomacy
influence, bribe and espionage were in the order of the day.
Styles of diplomacy are determined by poli
Negotiations at Westphalia may have been fairly rudimentary, delegates proved ically presented the 'heroic' type. As formula
themselves veritable masters in the subtle art. Negotiation, to be sure, may aim at (1638) this amounted to 'war by other mea
dispute resolution, but it may also serve as an effective excuse to postpone unwel- took the slightest concession or penchant to
come solutions. The process may mislead by hiding problems or introducing doubts.
French warrior diplomacy had some d
I n the international arena of clashing cuhures and traditions, negotiating is by defini-
Europe to such an extent dominated by a
tion an unpredictable process that requires versatility and dexterity Maximizing
French replaced Latin as diplomatic langu
profit does not always pay; to accept an immediate small loss may well turn out more
first, French diplomacy of intimidation ev
profitable in the long run.'"'
William I I I of Orange, who became King in
A n intelligent Dutch observer in French service readily drew his conclusions. In his Hague,'The Whispering Gallery of Europe'.
manual L'ambassadeur et sesfonctions (1681), Abraham de Wicquefort called for the rallying against French dominance implem
separation of politics and diplomacy, and the recruiting of competent professional Amply discussed in literature—from Ph
diplomats with full mandate to make binding decisions." Paolo Paruta's Discorsipolitici (1599), and
ico Gentili's Dejure belli (1612) and Paul d
had been adroitiy applied before.Thus 16t
Habsburg rivalry From 1659 Britain reser
the balance. In 1713 the mechanism was fir
4. POWER POLITICS dron of high politics, and as the 'natural' a
son'. Hegemonic aspirations were abjured a
at Utrecht was based on its steadfast belief
4.1. Raison d'etat •Machinery' and monitor collective security
tice as controversial in theory Critics prote
The lust for power is innate to politics and has many faces. Sixteenth-century Habsburg
political reality the equihbrium proved har
supremacy was based on intermarriage and succession strategies. Seafaring Portuguese-
" A History o f Diplomacy ( 0 2 ) 7 2 . Diplomacy (n 4) $
W F G Mastenbroek Negotiate (Basil Blackwell Oxford 1989); FC Ikle How Nations Negotiate (Harper A History of Diplom
NewYorkNYi964). The Rise of Moder
A History o f Diplomacy (n 2) 83 and 112. A History of Diplom
•H^o- J - ' e i t J t i r i t t ; ana rrestige" ,^ • yfvck, deemed the European St
9 jrinS' nations should exhaust
By 1650 inter-state diplomacy had come of age: a veritable corps diplomatiqn^,
^ insisted on integrity,'" and a
sprung up."" Diplomacy had become the adjunct o f an aristocratic elite ^ jjiai!"
enjoyed well-defined privileges and agreed on conventions and etiquette.
h e s i t a n t l y , Callieres' call for pro
sies were prestigious centres that rivalled in hospitality and patronage of the
changing perspective and gr
Hierarchy was strict: after Pope, emperor, and heir-apparent, hereditary r^'^^^'
ted by a map (1718);" the co
archs preceded elective ones. These in t u r n were followed by the repubj"'^"
^^llection (1435-1690), Leibniz' C
proudly headed by Venice and the Dutch. O n the oceans, British and Dutch navT'
^^pressive European survey (17
keenly contested the first salute and lowering of colours. A m o n g envoys simij^^
hierarchy ruled, the title of ambassador being a precious privilege. Career dipig"^ ^as opened, in 1712 a Paris Acad
mats, mostly lawyers, were found in j u n i o r ranks. Consular posts were bestow ri had its Kabinettsministerium (17
on merchants.'''* Louis XV's Secret du Roi (1745),
more than technical expertise."
'French' diplomacy was all about representation, infinite ceremonial and elaborate
In a steady process immunitie
protocol. Status was the essence of being. Diplomats emphatically represented mon-
legatorum (1721) and Vattel's Le
archs. To I'etat, c'est moi the most modest envoy embodied le roi soleil. An ambassa-
1750 precedence was arranged b
dor's entry occasioned public spectacles. Versailles was built to impress. Preseance
the lowering of colours.'* Even s
'the most delicate article of political faith', was this world's great preoccupation. The
riddles came as a great relief
signing of treaties, processions, seating orders at banquets, all meetings gave 'just
cause' for ceremonial war. A medal was struck to immortalize Louis XIV's victory
over Spain in a violent clash of coaches i n London, one out of many, but one that
counted fifty casualties."" To counter preoccupation with preseance, at the Peace of
4.5. The American and Fre
Ryswryck (1697) the 'Round Table Conference' was devised. Publications like Selden's
Titles of Honour (1614), Finet's Philoxenis (1656), Howell's Treatise of AmbassadorsThe world of conventional diplom
(1664), or De Wicquefort's L'Ambassadeur et sesfonctions (1681) attest to this culture.''Revolutions. The bid for independ
A n interesting publication in this context is the report by Johan Nieuhof of the edented step.'' Its success tran
contacts of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC,DutchEastIndia Company) hemisphere. Still, American revo
with China {Legatio Batavica, 1656).^^ diplomacy, i n favour of the repu
(1801-09), from fear of corruptio
The French Revolution (178
marked a fundamental change o
4.4. Professionalism on the Rise pling of a prestigious dynasty. It
categorically ruled out relation
After Utrecht (1713) common sense returned. Ceremonial and preseance became less
abjured all diplomacy as 'secret'.
obsessive, excuse for rivalry was substituted by the quest for consensus. The art of
negotiating was refined, witness Franfois de Callieres De la maniere de negocier avec
les souverains (1716) or Antoine Pecquet's Discours sur I'art de negocier (i737)-'"' Cal' A n evaluation o f the aspects o f cun
I Cambons Le Diplomate (Hachette Pari
lieres (1645-1717), a first-rank diplomat whose signature features on the Peace of
The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (n 8
^ A History of Diplomacy ( n 2) 80; Th
" The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (
and 113.
" Diplomacy ( n 4) 178-201; The Rise of Modern Diplomacy ( n 8) 15-20 and 56-68. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (n 8
*" AHistoryof Diplomacy in 2) 67-&. A History of Diplomacy ( n 2) 127-3
ibid 74 and 115. " ibid77. ibid 76. " ibid 67. ibid 112. " ibid 119. ibid 131-44.
and strategic opportunism legged up the military. Napoleon, for all his mil- ^ procedure i n signing treaties. A
genius, proved the archetype of the provocative d i p l o m a t . " His diplomacy ^"^"^^ ^^Icing of diplomats, to end centu
imperialistic i n its bullying as it was dynastic in its nepotism. The t u r m o i l did^^ ^ The Reglement distinguished th
duce one lasting asset: the nation-state. The concept was widely embraced as h^^' jadorS' envoys and charges d'affai
mark of identity and cement of cohesion. that of minister resident, as third in
jgjjjpotentiary') was stricdy rese
\\ye second rank, also with plenip
tries. This was the rank allotted to
VVar. With the adoption of the princ
most legations were upgraded to
5. T H E C O N C E R T OF E U R O P E second and third ranks virtually e
dence and the title o f dean {doye
diplomatique, as determined by d
5.1. The Vienna Congress " Roman Catholic States this role w
After Waterloo, repulsion of war and revolutionary ideology was ubiquitous. At the
Vienna Congress (1814-15)—the first truly multinational and perhaps most success-
ful major conference in the history of the Westphalian System—the leading powers
5.3. Merchant Diplomaq^
'in the Name of Europe' devised a Concert System of collective security in Tsar
Alexander's Holy Alliance (1815)." For all its grandiloquence, it was a sensible propo- The'long' 19th century (1815-19
sition in view of recent experience. It was conservative i n its insistence on order." It macy.** Its great protagonist i n th
was pretentious i n guaranteeing stability. It even spoke of arrogance in investing on changed diplomacy dramatically.
its petit comite the moral authority to monitor the small and deploy forcible interven- optimizing conditions for commer
tion. It was also modern in its level-headed acceptance of national differences and in adroit bargaining and fair dealing,
advancing consensus, trust and respect as means to bridge gaps. Yet, critically, Tsar for weakness by inveterate 'hero
Alexander I , Castlereagh, and Metternich failed to appreciate the durable impact of infinitely more effective than Fren
the revolutionary concept of nationality—and never consulted diplomats. long spans of peace, only briefly s
Prussian War (1870-71).
The Great Powers' insistence
Europe made powers try their luc
5.2. The Vienna Reglement lowed the tracks of colonialism, s
ture of 19th-century diplomacy,
A historic moment was the adoption, in an Annex to the Congress Act, of the so-
diversification. Time and distanc
called Vienna Reglement (1815).^' A controversial document, the outcome of months
challenges offered by the Digital A
of bargaining, and soon amended by the Aix-la-Chapelle Protocol (1818), it marked a
century, journals i n the 18th, teleg
first codification of widely diverging national diplomatic custom. It adopted alternation
_^ rnid-2oth century. In the 19th c
wide. At first, this was a fairly uni
" ibid 140-4. L|g
" Classical studies are H Nicolson The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1S22 ( ^ " " ^ j . j
L o n d o n 1946); P Schroeder The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (Clarendon Press Seen f r o m the Western perspective,
1994)- 58 {bid 95-8 on early European conditi
" A History of Diplomacy ( n 2) 144-50. gf Tr J^^'^ varying response
Congress o f Vienna, Final Act (1815) 64 CTS 453 annex 17; Diplomacy ( n 4) 3i-3; ^ -"'^ anH 1^^^ ^'^'^ M o d e r n i t y ; East Asia at T
Diplomacy ( n 2) 153-4. '^'^ International Law 1-48.
non-Western cultures rendered contacts reciprocal. Through standardized tr • bmitted propositions for leagues,
expert diplomats for specific regions emerged. ^ ^''^''^g, * f centuries. Overkill well beyond th
"jg^pted Lieber Code (1863), and
P jjtjons. W i t h i n two decades, the
were developed: the temperanc
5.4. The Balance Questioned grussels, a first, abortive attempt wa
Modernity did not only bring blessings to diplomacy Quite the contrary: it serio In this process, the pioneering
affected the social fabric and prompted calls for reform. 'Vienna' intended to sirT r Ittstitut de droit international and t
the complex balance by creating a two-tiered system. By 1815, however, the credib ] ' • 1873) was pivotal. For all raving
of the balance as such was seriously undermined. Critics dismissed it as at odds with of the age was V esprit d'internationa
political reality and as pretext for forceful intervention. Ideologically the concept was dependence, from patriotism to int
challenged from many quarters."' Each in its way contributed to the uprooting of and dynasties, internationalism se
ancien regime society. polarization, the second inspired co
other peace and wealth. The days of
A first challenge voiced the soul of British tradition: the Free Trade ideology of
The shared values of all peoples wer
Cobden and Bentham. British Liberals dismissed the balance as a delusion of war-
appliance expressing humanity's c
loving monarchs, and discredited diplomacy's secrecy and aristocratic privilege. As
this ideal to be institutionahzed in t
Montesquieu before, they relied on the exchange of goods and intellect as incentives
to harmony between nations. To have no foreign policy was the best of policies.
On the Continent, more Utopian and radical theories verified history with class
struggle. They insisted on change in the overthrow of balance, national boundaries
and diplomacy alike. I n concurring mainstreams of socialism, communism, and 5.6. The Erosion of a Cul
anarchism, and whether inspired by Bebel, Marx, or Bakunin, this 'internationalism' An immediate, dramatic effect of s
preached the revolution of the masses, the building blocks of society tional diplomatic culture. Foreign
This second, 'internationalist' ideology clashed with a third one, every inch as rad- archs. Its officials and diplomats w
ical, which intriguingly had far greater appeal to the masses: nationalism. Its ideolo- perfectly justified. Patronage warra
gist, Flegel, identified the Family of Fatherlands with the fulfilment of Europe's such as the Hertslets, Nelidovs or C
destiny to implement world peace. Spread by missionaries like Mazzini and Von tuted an international class with d
Treitschke, this ideology radicalized public opinion.™ Mass media demanded democ- Vienna Theresianum, or the Pete
racy and the breakup of an elitist world of secrecy.^' 'j versity corps like the Heidelberg
the world of protocol and etiquet
collecting." German-speaking dip
and Briefadel. It was a world in w
5.5. The Supranational Order July, the Spa season, was considere
And there was more. I n Waterloo also lay the roots of the supranational order. In For all its conventionalisms, thi
massive reaction to the unprecedented onslaught a peace movement emerge itanism in its sophisticated lingui
worldwide. Religious and moral concerns in the Mennonite and Quaker traditions ^ h H g h t e d the cultural connotati
merged with utilitarian concepts of liberal sociology and Kantian speculation. Pa'^'
fism contested heavy taxation, demanded disarmament and advocated arbitration. ibid 120.
^ A tradition o f long standing. A Histo
" TG Otte ' " O u t d o o r Relief for tiie A
The Rise ofModern Diplomacy {n 8) 1&9-96. Mosslang and T Riotte (eds) The Diplo
™ ibid 136-41. ibid 142-8. Oxford 2008) 23-57.
 siiocKing entrance ot t r e n c h RepubHcan 'bourgeois' diplomats after 1870 tore . fytile efforts to reach agreem
fabric apart. Their commercial links and interests raised suspicion o f corruption, I 'ous obstacle: a single mino
this w o r l d of—otherwise economically surprisingly well-informed—noblemen * a to launch a w o r l d court th
Inside attempts at streamlining services d i d not bring much.'' In the end, ext tation and election. Legal lu
pressure for reform and parliamentary control (as complied with i n the public f was the instrument of peace
of Blue Books)'* eroded this natural habitat and prerogative of the aristocracy g"^ mall, old Powers and new, p
1890, with industrialization and capitalism undermining land-based wealth th ^ one agreed on a bottom-line
outdated but moderate world gave i n to middle-class pressure. In expanding Pore' ^'^^ law of nations, as they result
Offices a new class of expert military, naval, economic and cultural attaches made' ^ l " rn the laws of humanity, and th
entrance." The expert bureaucrat replaced the gentleman amateur. It also opened the erience of success and setb
floodgates to mass politics and frenzied nationalism that would steer Europe towards ence system and international o
the abvss. jng at The Hague the internatio
5.7. The Hague Peace Conferences^^
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 epitomized the 19th-century diplo- 6. N E W D I P L O
matic legacy. They encapsulated all earlier efforts towards law codification, humani-
tarianism, and the implementation of courts and tribunals. It is trite to downgrade
these encounters on account of their few palpable results. For this, there were many 6.1. The Incompatibihty of
reasons, notably the overall climate of distrust that paralyzed European politics after
1870. Yet, the conferences stand out as the first w o r l d summits of'civilized' nations Versailles hailed a new epoch
(25 in 1899,44 in 1907 when the Latin-American republics attended) on the vexing nation. Dismissing 'old diplom
pohtical issues of the day. They tell of a global clash of cultures and ideologies, of speech (1918), championed all
representatives of absolutist regimes who felt out of their depth in democratic his moral, legalistic approach W
debate, of politicians, diplomats, mihtary men, and legal luminaries uncomfortably openly arrived at', disarmamen
crossing swords. The League's showpieces wer
world court, and the device of (
The gaps proved far too wide to be bridged overnight: reactionary Austrian diplo-
state sovereignty remained un
mats dismissed lawyers as mere technicians. American and British naval delegates
tioned by their registration an
perfectly ridiculed humanitarian concepts. German lawyers summarily dismissed
dentally incited secret protoco
compulsory jurisdiction. Yet after three months of splendid isolation in The Hague
aspired at moral guidance of it
woods, these 'Hundred Chosen' agreed on the profit reaped from personal encoun-
ters and prolonged talks—and easily decided on a sequel. They found out that these
meetings, in order to bear fruit, required careful preparation—and acted upon it. In
" Cf the preamble o f the Conventi
^ e x : Regulation concerning the La
" The Rise ofModern Diplomacy (n 8) 110-28. ibidn4. into force 26 January 1910) (1910) 187
" ibid 129-36; A History of Diplomacy ( n 2) 171-2. G Kennan American Diplomacy
™ J Diilffer Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedens-Konferenzen 1899 tmdi907 in der internation- ^cy of Woodrow Wilson (University
alen Politik (Ullstein Berlin 1981); A Eyffinger The 1899 Hague Peace Conference:'The Parliament of Man, the Law of Nations 1776-1939 (OUP O
the Federation of the World' (Kluwer Dordrecht 1999); A Eyffinger The 1907 Hague Peace Conference: 'The ""acy (n 4) 84-103; A History of Diplom
Conscience of the Civilized World' (Judicap The Hague 2007). ^ " Wartime propositions for a leag
 It is trite to put down the failure of the League to Axis Powers and Communis^ the field of humanitarian law, c
to leftovers of Versailles, reparation claims, economic depression, and failing ft^^^^' !!lpressive by all standards.
cial markets.*- Clearly, Wilson's idealism was lost on the totalitarian regimes of con^' t h e experiment of the League
munism, Fascism, and Nazism. I n amoral ideology they willfully headed for conflict sed fro"^ ^^''^ ° ^ political will
as their cynical reply to the idealists' appeasement pohcy i n the late 1930s pointed
• terest- Even so, there never w
out.*'
^ de in 1945 when the U N sub
Still, half-heartedness o f self-focused democracies likewise affected the cred- ^ t y for cooperation, and mad
ibility and stability o f the supranational order. Voting down Wilson's proposition eignly- This formula turned its C
the US Senate left the historic experiment fatally crippled. I t entrusted its inter' VVestphaUa.
ests to Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) and Saavedra Lamas Treaty (1933), relying on
Britain's stewardship o f the League. The U K , i n two minds and while paying lip.
service to Wilson's ideal, never lost sight of the balance, as Locarno (1925) amply
demonstrated. Rather than relying o n collective security, i t entrusted its naval 5.3. Summit Diplomac
interests to a bilateral treaty w i t h France, thereby obliging French military dom-
For all its pros and cons, ne
inance o n the Continent (1928). France, i n t u r n , built its own cordon sanitaire
against Germany. Cl^menceau, Lloyd George, an
in 1950 called summit diplomacy
The outcome was a double circuit of parallel and overlapping tracks and institu-
to the conference table accele
tions." The League Council watered down to a political showcase for prime ministers
of the Great Powers. Ideological issues were left to the Assembly of small fry that met stalemates.
once a year. Exploiting the Council's antagonism, representatives of smaller nations Over the past century, summ
in the Assembly played the gallery to optimize media exposure. The League was held The concept, otherwise, has a
hostage by the keen rivalry o f States w i t h i n its respective organs. The Secretary- representation. Even so, it has a
General had his share of in-fighting with nationally recruited officials. A major hand- Commines (1559)" and Calli^r
icap from the first, therefore, was the incompatibilite d'humeurs o f the old and the circumspect diplomats by pass
new order. Legendary summits like that
of Gold (1520) were presumab
however, was the secret treaty
yacht off Bjorkoe i n 1905. Dicta
6.2. The Inevitable Failure devastating results: Napoleon,
meetings w i t h Mussolini and Fr
Still, with the coming o f the League, diplomacy would never be the same. In the leaders such as Lloyd George
inflammable political climate nations soon acknowledged the organization's mediat- perhaps somewhat overrating
ing role. With the rise of technical commissions and the proliferation of legal, social of ceremonial and prestige as i
and administrative organs a new class of professional experts in Geneva replaced the Summits profited much from
old diplomat-in-disrepute. Within twenty years, the experience with international Yet external influence put asid
bureaucracy and multilateral conference techniques grew impressively The codifica- vis-a-vis diplomats—and is er
tion of international law progressed by leaps and bounces. The merits of the League "sks: history tells painful stori
A History of Diplomacy (n 2) 201-4.
ibid 192-4. J Bastin (ed) Les memo
J Kaufmann Conference Diplomacy (Macmillan L o n d o n 1996)- The Rise of Modern Di
shortcomings or debonair neglect o f dossiers.*' Apprehension to lose face leads to gjoinently combines existing practice w
vague, non-committal communiques. The volatility of public opinion has wrecked j},e basis o f generally accepted legal pr
many careers. Yet politicians become easily addicted to media hype, for electoral gaij, jjjere is no 'right' of legation. Diplomatic
or to swing political barometers. rocity is a cardinal feature of tradition.'-
The four wartime meetings of Allied Leaders to ward off crisis d i d much to boost fyotn which otherwise diplomatic relat
public confidence. Still, Stahn made sure the venues were well within the Soviet jjnplies the licence by the receiving St
sphere o f influence."* PoUticians as a rule chose their places o f venue with care. a c t i o n s on its territory, by granting it ce
Border-rivers have a long history i n diplomatic encounter. The Peace of the Pyrenees tions include representation, the protec
(1659) between France and Spain was concluded i n a pavilion on a border-island in a tiating, information gathering, and the p
river featuring separate bridges. Napoleon and Alexander I famously met on a raft in Xhe receiving State's paramount duty
Niemen River near Tilsen (1807).*" Capitals o f small, neutral nations, like Switzer- staff (article 1).
land, Belgium, or Norway lend their repute for hosting summits from this consider- Prerequisite to the sending of the hea
atiori. The current reputation of The Hague as 'judicial capital' harks back to the peace the receiving State, its agrement and a
conferences. Its choice, however, was a last-minute move, actuated by the deadlock of the receiving State, which is under no
between the Great Powers that ruled out major capitals, and the unavailability for non grata (article 4). The same holds
varying reasons, of Geneva, Brussels, and Oslo. State may notify the receiving State of
out further substantiation notify the se
welcome.
The receiving State pledges not just t
fianctioning (within the restrictions of its n
of its abilities protect its premises (articl
7. T H E C O D I F I C A T I O N OF C U S T O M damage, or impairment o f its dignity. T
premises or means o f transport (article 2
correspondence—the diplomatic bag sh
I n its Cambridge Regulation (1895) the Institut attamed a first, tentative codification
and to the agent's private files (article 31
o f diplomatic tradition. Subsequent benchmarks were the regional Havana Conven-
The convention warrants the perso
tion (1928) of the Pan-American Union and a Draft Convention drawn up in 1932 by
(article 29), who shall be treated w i t h due
the Harvard Research Project. I n 1954 the International Law Commission resumed
and be duly protected from attack. Besid
these efforts. From its endeavours generated the pivotal Vienna Conventions on Dip-
jurisdiction of local courts, a stipulation
lomatic Relations (1961) and on Consular Relations (1963).'° Both were eminently
receiving State's laws and regulations (a
timely undertakings given the multiplication of young sovereign States that did not
criminal jurisdiction (article 31): found
boast diplomatic expertise. Encompassing the world's rich, multifaceted tradition
declared unwelcome. The same applies
the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations stands out as a gem of legal genius and
immunity is quahfied, but never w i t h resp
as one o f the most successful accomplishments o f codification i n the U N Era." It
exempt from dues, taxes (articles 23,34)
•ngevidence in court (article 31).
Immunities are enjoyed from the mom
" R Cohen Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy
IS appointment is notified to its foreign
(US Institute o f Peace Washington D C 1997)-
" A History of Diplomacy (n 2) 209.
TheRiseof Modern Diplomacy in &) 10 (or more instances. ^j,)
^ Vienna Convention o n Consular Relations (signed 24 A p r i l 1963, entered into force 19 March 19
l)ip°^"''* ^'•'"CJp/es of Public International
596UNTS261. . .^an ontaticImmunity, Principles, Practices, Prob
" E Denza Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (i ^ History of Diplomacy ( n 2) 68-9.
O U P O x f o r d 2008); M Hardy Modern Diplomatic Law (Manchester University Press Manchester i9
iermination ot a mission may follow recall, the outbreak of war between the S ^ren, Paul G (ed) Diplomacy: N
or a State's extinction (article 39). , j . ^ , jvlacniillan London 1980).
vi ttingly' GarreU Renaissance Dipl
Treenthau, Hans Politics Among
'^5^cGraw-Hill New York 1967).
y^rat, Robert B A History of Europ
,•!! -
K[' olson. Harold Diplomacy (OUP
i,erts, Ivor (ed) Satow's Guide to
8. CONCLUSION Sheehan, Michael The Balance of P
Visscher, Charles de Theories et rea
V\ratson,Adam The Evolution of Inte
The 1961 Vienna Convention epitomizes the intellectual harvest of millennia of tro
bled human intercourse. More apposite, it embodies the diplomatic legacy of th"
Westphalian Era and of half a millennium of State practice. I n Vienna, therefore
narrative finds its natural ending. At the dawn of a new era of infinite challenge and
stunning complexity, the convention's acclaim world-wide suggests it may serve as
anchor for wandering humanity. In its restraint and tentative guidance it is a beacon
of wisdom. Yet none of this can close our eyes to its limitations i n dealing with con-
temporary problems. Many other forms of diplomacy await codification. As inci-
dents over the past fifty years suggest, diplomacy itself is losing some of its aura of
immunity. The symbolism of embassies is evaporating, the taboo being broken.
There is, i n short, ample ground for concern about the future of the discipline. StiD,
precisely its history presents comfort, more than any convention can. For one thing,
history definitely belies diplomacy's reputation of stubborn conservatism. Down the
centuries, i n coping w i t h perplexing reality, the discipline has shown remarkable
resihence and flexibility. A n d to top it all, the diplomat himself stands out as the true
chameleon. . "
RECOMMENDED READING
Anderson, Mathew S The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (Longman London 1993)-
Black, JeremyA Historyo/Dip/omflcy (Reaktion London 2010).
Bull, Hedley The Anarchical Society A Study of Order in World Politics ( 2 n d edn Basingstoke
Macmillan London 1977).
Denza, Eileen Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on DiplomaticRe a
( 3 r d edn OUP Oxford 2008).
Grewe, Wilhelm G The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter Berlin 2000). ^^^^
H a m i l t o n , Keith and Richard Langthorne The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory
Administration (Routledge London 1995). ^^jjp
Holsti, Kalevi J Peace and War; Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-194
Cambridge 1991). . ^^^ilav^
Koskenniemi, M a r t t i The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall oflnternation
1870-1960 (CUP Cambridge 2002).