FERDINAND A.

CRUZ v ALBERTO MINA 

G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007
FACTS 

Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a
formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent
in the prosecution of the said criminal case. 
However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor
on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for
continuation of trial. 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse the
Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule
is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone. 
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June
10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the
supervision of a member of the bar. 
The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and contended that
the court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when they patently refused to heed to the
clear mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar matter
no. 730, providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts
(MTC’s). 

ISSUE 

Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant 

HELD 

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from
entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the
criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school. 
However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is
different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138
provides: 
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. 
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar.There is really no problem as
to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts. 
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to
act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is
not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that
appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts. 

DECISION 
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor
under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN
RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES,
NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR,
ABELARDO SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR,
JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA,
ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO,
JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO,
ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO,
CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO,
ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS,
EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES,
respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business

nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon
City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to
construct residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan
City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and
worked under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In
1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the
services of private respondents and its other employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before

Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all,
they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought
payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio
and Dulatre were named co-respondents.

The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers
Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990
before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner’s liability to private
respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay
on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived
petitioner’s right to file its position paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they,
too, were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints
as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to pay the
employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged

that it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no
authority to represent and bind petitioner. 

NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiters.

RULING: It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation

with principal address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed
in Iligan City and summons served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question
now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of
petitioner.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or
partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so
integrated with the corporation that they know their responsibilities and
immediately discern what to do with any legal papers served on them. 

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and
supervised the construction project. 9 According to the Solicitor General and private
respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised
the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay
the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for
petitioner was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle
the claims of private respondents is another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter
and respondent Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule,
viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .

A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made
to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred
thereto by the latter. . . . 10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he
represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its
members, with written authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited
member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter. 11

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited
members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their
capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule.
However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner required written proof of
authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the
arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer
Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were
authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only
in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s
liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay
amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the
express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly
presumed and should be duly established by evidence. 
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties
shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they
cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a
compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a
client’s claim.

After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as

promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their
respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits
without at least requiring private respondents to substantiate their complaints. The
parties may have earlier waived their right to file position papers but petitioner’s
waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid
and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since
petitioner reneged on its “promise,” there was a failure to settle the case amicably.
This should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their position
papers.

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to

agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the
Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed
upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their
respective verified position papers.

G.R. No. 92349

G.R. No. 92349 November 9, 1990

MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA petitioner, 

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GERRY R.
GONZALES, Presiding Judge, MTC, Br. 76, Marikina, respondents.

Manuel V. Regondola for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The legal effect of the appearance of a litigant in his own behalf is the focus of
controversy in this petition.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed against
Perla Y. Corpuz in an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina,
Metro Manila. By the same token, on a countercharge of petitioner, Perla Y. Corpuz
was charged in an information for the same offense before the same court.

The cases were consolidated and after a joint trial on the merits where both parties
were duly represented by counsel, the trial court rendered a decision dated January
12, 1989 convicting the petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing her to suffer
imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium period of eleven (11) days to twenty
(20) days but acquitting Perla Y. Corpuz with costs de oficio in both cases.

Not satisfied therewith petitioner through counsel filed a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein in due course the
judgment appealed from was modified as to the penalty by imposing a straight
penalty of eleven (11) days imprisonment.

A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioner was denied by the
Regional Trial Court on August 30, 1989.

On September 20, 1989, petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days from September
30, 1989 or up to October 19, 1989 within which to file a petition for review on the
ground that she has to look for another lawyer to represent her and prepare the
necessary petition. The motion was granted by the appellate court in a resolution
dated October 16, 1989.

However, instead of filing the petition for review, petitioner in her own behalf filed
on October 9, 1989 a written manifestation and motion to withdraw petition for
review for the purpose of applying for probation in the court of origin, "she being a
first offender and possesses (sic) all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided for under the said probation law." 1 The motion was
granted by the appellate court in a resolution dated October 24, 1989, copy of
which was received by petitioner on October 30, 1989.

The division clerk of court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment on
October 25, 1989.

On November 17, 1989, the petitioner filed a joint or alternative motion for
reconsideration and reinstatement of petition for review and petition for relief from
judgment with prayer for a temporary restraining order based on the ground that
the motion to withdraw the petition for review was filed without the advice of her
lawyer and under the honest impression that her application for probation pending
with the lower court will be granted.

In a resolution dated February 20, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the said
motion for lack of merit.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari with prayer for restraining order dated
March 10, 1990 predicated on the following grounds:
 I. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING YOUR
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN
TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN THE CASES
OF DELGADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 145 SCRA 357; REPUBLIC VS.
ARRO, 150 SCRA 626 AND SILVESTRE VS. MILITARY COMMISSION
NO. 21, NO. L-46366, MARCH 8, 1978.

II. THE DENIAL OF YOUR PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE HER

PETITION FOR REVIEW WOULD PERPETUATE THE SERIOUS AND
PATENT ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT ESPECIALLY AS
TO THE ALLEGED OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE WITNESSES'
DEMEANOR WHEN THE JUDGE WHO PENNED THE DECISION WAS NOT
THE SAME JUDGE WHO HEARD THE WITNESSES (WHO) TESTIFIED. 2

The petition is devoid of merit.

Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of

the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

From the foregoing provision of the rule, it is clear that a party in a case may
conduct a litigation either personally or by an attorney in the courts. He may also
be assisted by an agent or friend for the purpose in the inferior courts. And even if
a party may have chosen to appear through counsel, he may at any time dispense
with the services of his/her lawyer and prosecute or defend his/her case personally.

In this case the Court notes that before the Metropolitan Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court, the petitioner was duly represented by counsel. However,
when she decided to elevate her case to the Court of Appeals she chose to handle
her case personally, first, by asking for an extension of time within which to file a
petition for review and second, by filing thereafter a petition to withdraw the
petition for review to enable her to apply for probation. Unfortunately, under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1257 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1990 dated October 5, 1985, it is specifically provided that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted when the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction."

Thus, as petitioner failed to secure favorable action on her application for probation,
she filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the appellate court —
granting her motion to withdraw — or in the alternative, a petition for relief from
judgment alleging that she was not duly assisted by counsel then and that she was
under the honest impression that she could apply for probation, and that if the
motion is granted, petitioner could very well demonstrate that the assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses by the lower court which was relied upon by the
Regional Trial Court is misplaced as the one who decided the case is different from
the judge who heard the case.

The said alternative motion for reconsideration or petition for relief from judgment,
however, was filed only on November 17, 1989, beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner received a copy of the questioned resolution dated October 24, 1989 on
October 30, 1989. Hence, said resolution had become final by the time petitioner
filed her motion. Besides, the alternative petition for relief from judgment is not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit as required by the rules. 3

The Court emphasizes the fact that it is always better for a party to be represented
by counsel in a litigation. Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to appear in his
or her own behalf to prosecute or defend a cause in court. If in the process
petitioner suffered reverses, she has only herself to blame. She is bound by the
consequences of her own voluntary act.

The judgment of conviction of the petitioner for slight physical injuries inflicted by
the petitioner upon the offended party was arrived at by the Regional Trial Court
based on the testimony of the offended party corroborated by her witnesses and
proof of the injury. Such judgment has become final and petitioner must now face
the reality of submitting herself for its execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar v Gonzales; G.R. No. 80578; 07 Oct 1988; 166 SCRA 316

FACTS:
Petitioner Zaldivar moved for Special Prosecutor Gonzales to be cited in contempt
for defying the Supreme Court’s cease and desist orders and for issuing
contemptuous statements to the media.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Gonzales is guilty of contempt.

HELD:
YES. Statements made by respondent Gonzales to the media were contemptuous as
they imply members of the Supreme Court acted on a manner not befitting the
officers of the highest court of the country. Respondent is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzales seems unaware of is that
the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the

Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales
was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist
Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the
investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent
Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting
"rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the
rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other,
and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court

then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in
the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that
he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute

contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others. It is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20 [b],
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices
of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the
Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power
in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the
dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must
be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he
alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to
the Zaldivar case.

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of

court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member
of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension
to take effect immediately.

Case Digest: Lee v. Tambago (544 SCRA 393)

paul
Lee v. Tambago
544 SCRA 393

FACTS:

Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with

violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will
that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father,
the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will, the
decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save
for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings
of complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June
30, 1965.Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificateof the
testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5,
1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature
as donor in a deed of donationwhich supposedly contained his purported signature.
Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in
the deed of donation were “in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from one
another in all angle[s].”

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of

the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had
likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the
archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).

ISSUE:

Was the will spurious?

HELD:

Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of
wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity.

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another. The will in question was attested by only two witnesses. On this
circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is in consonance with the
rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise
requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares
to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the
testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that

this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For
one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates
of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the
notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was
a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to

faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. These
formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 1227. May 13, 1903. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. HOWARD D.

TERRELL, Defendant-Appellant. 

Oscar Sutro for Appellant. 

Solicitor-General Araneta for Appellee. 

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA. — Where a bill of Bale of personal property is executed

as security for a loan and the borrower remains in possession of the property, a
subsequent sale thereof to a third person does not constitute the crime of estafa. 

2. PLEDGE; FORM OF INSTRUMENT. — An instrument in the form of a bill of sale

may be construed as a pledge if given to secure the performance of an obligation. 
3. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; PLEDGE. — The pledged named in a pledge executed in
the farewell of a bill of sale equal no lien upon the property if he fails to take
possession thereof. 

DECISION

McDONOUGH, J. :

The defendant and appellant, Howard D. Terrell, was convicted, in the Court of First
Instance, city of Manila, of estafa, under article 535 of the Penal Code, on the
charge of having on the 1st day of December, 1902, in the city of Manila, received
and obtained of William Tutherly a valuable consideration, to wit the dissolution of
the partnership of Terrell & Tutherly, consisting, of Howard D. Terrell and William
Tutherly by selling and transferring to said William Tutherly a certain law library,
then in the office of said Terrell, together with other property, and buy willfully,
know-illegally, falsely, and fraudulently representing to said William Tutherly that
the said law library was then the unencumbered property of the said partnership of
Terrell & Tutherly, and that the interest of said Terrell therein was unencumbered;
and by willfully, knowingly, falsely, and fraudulently conceal in the fact that he, the
said Terrell, had heretofore, to wit, on the 28th day of December, 1901, sold said
library, together with other personal property, to Jacinto Lim Jap; and the fact that
said Terrell had, on the 16th day of April, 1902, sold and transferred the said law
library, with other property, to A. S. Stevens, contrary to the statute in such case
made and provided. 

The proof does not show that any testimony was taken regarding the alleged sale to
A. S. Stevens, and that part of the complaint seems to have been abandoned. 

The fact was established that the defendant, desiring to borrow from Jacinto Lim
Jap 1,000 pesos in Mexican currency, wrote a letter to him on the 28th of
December, 1901, asking for a loan of that amount, for thirty days, and with the
letter inclosed the promissory note of the defendant for that sum and also a bill of
sale, absolute in form, of his law library, carriage and team of horses, and book
accounts, stating in the letter that the bill of sale was sent as security for the loan. 

On the 29th day of December, 1901, Jacinto Lim Jap delivered to the defendant the
1,000 pesos, and retained the note and bill of sale; but he did not take possession
of the law library or other personal property at that time, or at any subsequent
time; nor did he demand possession of the same, or take any legal steps at any
time to obtain possession or control of this property. 

The law library remained in the possession of the defendant; and on the 14th of
August, 1902, on the formation of a Partnership with William Tutherly for the
practice of law, the defendant sold to realm Tutherly a half interest in the law
library; and on the 1st day of December, 1902, on a dissolution of said partnership,
he sold his remaining half interest in said library to William Tutherly. 

There is no charge in the complaint that the defendant, by these sales, defrauded
Jacinto Lim Jap. There is, however, a charge that he defrauded William Tutherly by
falsely and fraudulently representing to him that the property was unencumbered,
and by fraudulently concealing from him the fact that the property had been sold to
Jacinto Lim Jap. 

In order to sustain a criminal clergy of fraud or cheating, it is necessary to specify

the person defrauded, and to prove that the design was successfully accomplished,
at least so far as to expose the person to danger of loss. 

At the time of the sale of the books to William Tutherly they were not encumbered,
because Jacinto Lim Jap had not complied with the requirements of the law to make
his security good. .Mr. Tutherly, therefore, acquired a good title to the library, and
was not, therefore, wronged, deceived, a defrauded; hence the prosecution failed to
make proof of the offense charged in the complaint. 

The learned judge before whom the cause was heard recalled the conclusion,
however, that although the proof showed that no fraud had been committed on Mr.
Tutherly, it did show that the defendant practiced a fraud upon Jacinto Lim Jap in
actually reselling and delivering the books to or. Tutherly, because Lim Jap "had a
right to assume that the defendant would stand radio upon demand to comply with
the terms of said contract," and by the reselling, of the property Lim Jap "lost his
right to recover the said property or enforce laws lien, if lien it may be called,
against the described property."cralaw virtua1aw library

It may be that Lim Jap had a right to "assume" that the defendant would comply
with the terms of his contract, that he would pay the debt when due and deliver the
personal property if demanded, but it does not follow that a failure on the part of
the defendant to fulfill his promises, express or implied, constitutes a crime — the
crime of estafa. Fraud is not to be presumed or assumed; it is to be proved; and it
might as well he said that a failure to pay the 1,000 pesos, when the, constituted a
fraud on Lim Jap, as to say that a failure to hold the library for him amounted to
fraud. 

While the bill of sale delivered by the diffident to Lim Jap appear on its face to be
an absolute sale of the books, etc., the letter of the defendant accompanying it
states in effect that it was a transfer of the property as security for the loan, and
battle parties treated it, throughout the trial, as security or an offer to pledge the
property for the payment of the debt. 

It has been frequently held that an instrument in the form of a bill of sale may he
construed as a pledge. (Denis on Contract of Pledge, 93.) 

If it should he assumed that Lim Jap had a valid lien on these books, even then the
defendant had ownership in them, which he had a right to sell. On the question of
pledges the civil law and the common law are alike; and at common law it has been
held that a pledgor is still the general owner of the property, and may transfer it
upon good consideration and by proper contract, subject to the rights of the
pledgee. (Whitaker v. Summer, 20 Pickering, Mass., 405.) But the answer to the
finding of the court below that Jacinto Lim Jap, because of the sale of the books to
Mr. Tutherly, lost his right to enforce his lien against the property, is simply this: He
never had a lien upon the books; he never took steps to acquire a lien; he never
complied with the requirements of the law. 

Under the Civil Code (art. 1863) it is necessary, in order to constitute the contract
of pledge, that the pledge should be placed in possession of the creditor, or of a
third person, by common consent. This is also the rule at common law. "It is of the
essence of the contract," says Judge Story in his work on bailments, 1 "that there
should be an actual delivery of the things to the pledgee. Until the delivery of the
thing, the whole rests in an executory contract, however strong may be the
engagement to deliver it; and the pledgee acquires no right of property in the
thing."cralaw virtua1aw library

The creditor acquires no rights in or to the property until he takes it into his
possession, because a pledge is merely a lien, and possession is indispensable to
the right of a lien. Jacinto Lim Jap, through his failure or neglect to take this
property into his possession, must be presumed to have waived the right given him
by the contract to make good his lien, if saw fit to do so. 

It has been held that an abandonment of the custody of the articles over which the
right extends necessarily frustrates any power to retain them, and operates as an
absolute waiver of the lien. 

The holder, in such a case, is deemed to yield up the security he has upon the
goods, and trusts to the responsibility of the owner. (Walker v. Staples, 5 Allen,
Mass., 34.) 

It follows that the element of possession failing, there can be no pawn or pledge,
and that the possession of the defendant, with the consent of Jacinto Lim Jap, was
absolute and unqualified, and not special or subordinate, and that he committed no
crawl in selling the property. In two cases decided by this Court the principles of
law involved in this case were passed upon, and in battle cases it was held that no
crime had been committed. 

In the case of the United States v. Mendezona, decided February 10, 1903, 1 where
the defendant sought and obtained a loan, and, in consideration of the loan,
promised to secure the creditor by giving a mortgage on certain real property, but
failed to execute and deliver the mortgage, and, in fact, sold the property to
another playwright, it was held that the defendant did not by these acts commit the
crime of estafa, because at the time the loan was made he possessed the title to
the property and was the owner, and therefore in contracting the debt in his
personal capacity he did layout act in bad faith, nor did he employ deceit, since the
mere failure to comply with the contract or obligation does not constitute the crime
of estafa. 
The other case is that of the United States v. Apilo, decided October 9, 1900. In
that case the defendant obtained a loan, pledging as security therefor horses,
carriages, and other vehicles. In the document of pledge it was expressly stated
that the debtor would not sell or encumber the pledged property, which was left in
his possession. Notwithstanding this express promise not to sell the property, the
defendant, in that case, shortly after obtaining the loan, sold the property and
thereupon the creditor caused him to be prosecuted for estafa. 

The facts in that case were more favorable to the prosecution than are the facts in
this Terrell case, because of the express covenant on the part of Apilo not to sell
the property. Terrell made no promise whatever to hold the library for his creditor,
and yet this court held that Apilo, in disposing of the property, did not defraud his
creditor, and that his acts did not constitute the crawl of estafa. 

The court stated in the Apilo case that the contract of pledge was not legally
consummated because "the objects of which the pledge was to consist were not
placed in possession of the creditor, nor of a third person, but remained in the
possession of the debtor, who, having the free disposition over those objects as if
they were his own, committed no infraction of the penal law by transferring
them."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of these decisions and of the authorities cited above, the court below erred
in convicting the defendant of the crime of estafa. 

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the defendant is acquitted, with
the costs of both instances de oficio. 

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA

A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness
which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored
because the account against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was
forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.

The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C.
Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule
139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant
filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made
mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for
having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document.
Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks
drawn against a closed account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time
of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held
that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year‘s
suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial
payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has,
apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly
fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are
constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v.
Narciso N. Jaramillo, ―the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon
us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate
argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed
on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.

PEREZ VS. CATINDIG

PEREZ VS. CATINDIG

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:

Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already
wed to Lily Corazon Gomez. Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the
process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage
to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had
been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. 

 
On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia
in the United States of America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a
nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican
Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine
laws.Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to
legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous
letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with
Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter  written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter,
Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his
“impediment is removed.”
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he
moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty.
Baydo was frequently seen.

allawlibrary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968.
He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs
that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Eventually, their
irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that
the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in
the Philippines.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually,
he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.

IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complaint against Atty. Baydo – dismissed for dearth of evidence.

ISSUE:
WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.

HELD:

YES.
RATIO:

The Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.cralawred

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a
lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia,
for grossly immoral conduct.

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.roblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts

to a grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and,
ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern
of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled,
but reprehensible to a high degree.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that

Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he
resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty.
Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to
properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then
already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer
employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms
part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not
on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to
Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of
the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the
process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere
allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed
having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by
Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings

against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.

anroblesvirtuallawlibrary
DISPOSITION: Catindig – disbarred. Baydo – dismissed.

BANSIG VS CELERA
by The ScepticJuly 22, 2015

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014 ]

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, COMPLAINANT,  VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.
CELERA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan,

entered into a contract of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondent’s
marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage with a certain Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was
still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with
Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any
lawful authority.

 Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of
a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the
Bar.

Issue:

 whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the

dispensation of justice

Ruling:

 For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar

 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

 Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him

as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his
first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

VENTURA VS. ATTY. SAMSON, A.C. NO. 9608, NOV. 27, 2012

Facts: MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Complaint stating therein that the
crime of RAPE was committed against her when she was merely thirteen (13) years
of age by herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON which constitutes a grossly
immoral conduct. Respondent averred that there is no human law that punishes a
person who has sex with a woman with mutual agreement and complainant accepts
compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant once with just compensation
does not amount to immoral conduct.

Issue: Whether or not it constitutes grossly immoral act.

Ruling: The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the
highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of
the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant,
then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether
the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with
the latter’s consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful,
grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of
the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly. A lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.

In the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its
power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE,
respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED
PIMENTEL, JR. V. LLORENTE SALAYON
( FINE ---- P1,000.00/ STERNLY WARNED)
RULE 1.01, LAWYER’S OATH

FACTS:

Complaint for disbarment against respondents who were members of the Pasig BOC
in the May 8, 1995 elections for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and
violation of the lawyer’s oath in connection with the discharge of their duties

Salayon--- Chairman of the Board Llorente---- Vice-Chairman

filed by complainant who was a SENATORIAL candidate

alleged tampering the votes received by them either adding or reducing the number
of votes of particular candidates in their SOV’s.

Denied allegations---- the preparation of the SOV’s was made by the 12 canvassing
committee which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing.
---- claimed that errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest
mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT

HELD:

YES. A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a

member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as government
official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the CPR or
lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as member
of the bar for such misconduct.

By certifying as true and correct the SOV’s in question, respondents committed a

breach of RULE 1.01 of the CODE.
By express provision of CANON 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in government
service.
Likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood.

As lawyers in government service, respondents were under greater obligation to

observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public officer is a public trust.

In Re: IBP Elections AM No 491 06 October 1989

Rachel Chan
Facts: After the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereafter “IBP”) held on June 3, 1989, the newly-elected officers were
set to take the their oath of office before the Supreme Court en banc. However,
disturbed by the widespread reports from lawyers who had witnessed or
participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns
of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the
candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon,
the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain
public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP
By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking
of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

The election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3,
1989) was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above
board. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the
three candidates for president of the IBP.

The Court en banc formed a committee and total of forty-nine (49) witnesses
appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light
on the conduct of the elections.

Issue:  Whether or not IBP by-laws were violated.

Decision: IBP by-laws were violated. Elections held on June 3,1989 be annulled,

relevant by-laws be amended as per the court’s resolution and new elections be
held such that the persons named in the resolution cannot contest for any IBP
position.

ALEX ONG vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO [Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

FACTS:

The complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent as legal counsel of

one Nemesia Garganian claiming for the support of the alleged child of the
complainant with the latter. A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a
letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the complainant.  In this
letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms.
Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action that he
would take against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his
obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son.  

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the complainant’s
brother and that the complainant merely assumed his brother’s obligation to
appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue them.  The complainant then
did not comply with the demands against him.

Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal
(now Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife,
Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.

The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the
complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law.

In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the

complainant before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor General. According to the
complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed by
the aforesaid government agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for
disbarment.  The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to
anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he
would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. The complainant branded
the respondent’s tactics as “highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constituting…malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of law and conduct

unbecoming of lawyer.

HELD: YES.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within
the bounds of the law.  Rule 19.01 further commands that “a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.”

We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against

the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client,
Ms. Garganian.  Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19,
Rule 19.01.  His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to
the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.
A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.  Thus,
every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty

of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN vs. ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA A. M.

No. 2104, 24 August 1989
View all posts by SunnyDayApril 7, 2016

Facts:

There was two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4k loan obtaine
d by the spouses secured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the r
eal estate mortgage document that the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.
00 instead of 4k. He said that the signing of the documents was just for formality. s
o, they did. The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as interest for only 3months b
ecause of financial reverses. Consequently, Atty. Decena made a second real estate 
mortgage document and the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,0
00.00. Again, on the assurance that it was only for formality, the spouses signed th
e new REM document.

After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried 
to raise the 10k and went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter did not accept the 
money and instead gave them a sheet of paper indicating that the total indebtednes
s had soared to 20,400.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capac
ity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal c
ase for estafa against accused. It was alleged that Atty. Decena effected a compro
mise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused without the consent and ap
proval of the complainants and that he received the amount of P500.00 as an adva
nce payment  and he did not inform the spouses about this. And even after he was 
confronted, he still did not turn over the money.

Issue:
Ruling:

As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses.Fr
om the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to 
sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representatio
ns of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a l
awyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the 
provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as 
the complainants’ attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of 
complainants.

As to the second charge, repondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 13
8 that lawyers cannot “without special authority, compromise their clients’ litigation 
or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim, but the full amount in cash.” Res
pondent’s failure to turn over to spouses the partial payment underscores his lack o
f honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

The SC reiterated that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to ad
mission to the practice of law but a continuing requirement.

Atty. Decena was disbarred.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22304           July 30, 1968

SAMAR MINING CO., INC., petitioner-appellant, 

vs.
FRANCISCO P. ARNADO, POMPEYO V. TAN and RUFINO
ABUYEN,respondents-appellees.

Benedicto G. Arcinas for petitioner-appellant.

Villavieja and Zapanta for respondents-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dismissing this case,
with costs against the petitioner, and lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
therein issued.

Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428, filed by Rufino Abuyen,
on June 18, 1956, for a disease allegedly contracted in the course of his
employment, as foreman of the Samar Mining Co., Inc. — hereinafter referred to as
the petitioner — and docketed as WC Case No. R-VI-217, decision was rendered, on
October 14, 1958, by Pompeyo V. Tan — an officer of Regional Office No. VI of the
Department of Labor — sentencing petitioner herein:

1. To provide continued medical treatment and hospitalization to the claimant

in accordance with Section 13 of the Act until his tuberculosis is cured or
arrested; 

2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED

TWENTY THREE (P2,523.00) PESOS and a weekly compensation of P17.40
from date hereof until he is cured or his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested
as certified by a competent physician but the total compensation should not
exceed P4,000.00; payment to be made, thru the Regional Office No. VI of
the Department of Labor; 

3. To pay to the workmen's compensation fund the amount of P26.00 as

administrative costs pursuant to Section of 55 of Act 3428, as amended.

A reconsideration of said decision having been denied, on March 24, 1960,

petitioner commenced Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, against Francisco
P. Arnado, as Regional Administrator of said office, Pompeyo V. Tan, as the writer
of said decision, and claimant Abuyen, upon the ground that Tan had acted without
jurisdiction in hearing said claim and rendering decision thereon, and that Arnado
had committed a grave abuse of discretion in sustaining and upholding said acts of
Tan. Sustaining respondents' objection, upon the ground of wrong venue, the case
was, however, dismissed by said court, the decision of which was, on June 30,
1961, affirmed by Us.

On July 21, 1961, petitioner commenced, against the same respondents in said
Case No. 42836, the present action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
injunction, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the filing of the case, said
court issued a restraining order, which was, later, followed by a writ of preliminary
injunction, upon the filing and approval of the requisite bond. After appropriate
proceedings, said court subsequently rendered the decision mentioned in the
opening paragraph hereof, dismissing the petition, upon the ground that
respondent Tan had authority to hear and pass upon the aforementioned claim of
Abuyen, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued meanwhile. Hence,
this appeal by petitioner herein, who insists: 1) that, being merely a labor attorney,
respondent Tan had no authority to make the award complained of; 2) that as
Regional Administrator, respondent Arnado could not delegate said authority to
respondent Tan; and 3) that no such delegation of authority to him has been made.

It is not disputed that respondent Tan is a labor attorney, assigned to Regional

Office No. VI of the Department of Labor, and that, as such, he has no authority to
hear claims for compensation under Act No. 3428 and to render decisions thereon.
Based, however, upon Plan No. 20-A, submitted to the President of the Philippines
by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, and Executive Order
No. 218, dated December 10, 1956, particularly section 32 thereof 1 as well as on
Rule 21, section 1, of the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 2 pursuant to section 12, of Article III of said Plan No.
20-A, and section 45 of Act No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772, 3 we
have held, as early as August 21, 1961 —

... that a regional office of the Department of Labor has original jurisdiction
to hear and determine claims for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. If a claim is controverted, it shall be heard and decided
only by a regularly appointed hearing officer or any other employee duly
designated by the Regional Administrator to act as hearing officer. But when
the claim is uncontroverted and there is no necessity of requiring the
claimant to present further evidence, the Regional Administrator may enter
an award or deny the claim. Furthermore, an employer is duty bound to
controvert a claim within 14 days from the date of the accident or illness of
the laborer or within 10 days after he or his representative first acquired
knowledge of the said accident or sickness. Failure to do so within the period
provided will result in the renunciation of his right to controvert the claim.
But an employer may reinstate his right to controvert the claim by filing a
petition under oath specifying the reasons for his failure to do so. 4 .

We have repeatedly reiterated this view,5 which is now well settled. In the case at
bar, respondents-appellees contend and have introduced evidence to the effect that
Regional Administrator Arnado had — by virtue of an office order, dated November
29, 1957, and marked as Exhibit 1 — designated respondent Tan — who is a duly
qualified Member of the Philippine Bar — "as Hearing Officer in the case of Rufino
Abuyen vs. Samar Mining Co., WCC Case No. 44238 (R-VI-217)." As a
consequence, the only issue for determination is whether or not there has been
such designation in his favor.

Petitioner assails the evidence thereon upon the theory: 

1) that the lower court erred in reopening the case, after its submission for
decision, for the reception of said evidence; and 2) that the same is insufficient to
establish the designation aforementioned.

As regards the first alleged error, it appears that petitioner had asked the lower
court to render judgment on the pleadings; that, thereafter, both parties submitted
their respective memoranda; that, in order to bolster up their contention,
respondents attached to their Memorandum, as Annex 1, the alleged designation of
respondent Tan by Regional Administrator Arnado that petitioner, however,
objected to the consideration of said Annex 1; that, accordingly, the lower court
deemed it best to reopen the case for the introduction of additional evidence and
the determination of the admissibility in evidence of said Annex 1; and that the
same was identified, marked and admitted as Exhibit 1 at the rehearing.

In this connection, it should be noted that trial courts have discretionary power to
reopen a case either before or after rendition of judgment, for the introduction of
additional evidence, so as to dispel doubts on material points. Such power is
controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interest of justice, and its
exercise will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse thereof. 6 No
such abuse has been committed in the case at bar. On the contrary, the exercise of
said power by his Honor, the trial Judge, served to promote the interest of justice,
by clarifying the question whether or not respondent Tan had been given the
aforementioned designation.

As a matter of fact, said Exhibit 1 merely confirmed the allegation in respondents'

answer to the effect that respondent Tan had acted "not as Labor Attorney but as
Hearing Officer designated pursuant to the authority granted him by the previous
Regional Labor Administrator to try and hear the merits of the compensation
case ... WCC Case No. R-VI-217, Rufino Abuyen vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc."
Moreover, pursuant to the very cases cited by petitioner, 7 the truth of this
allegation had been deemed impliedly admitted by the petitioner, when it submitted
the case for judgment on the pleadings.8

Independently of the foregoing, the second alleged error is obviously devoid of

merit, the signature of Regional Administrator Arnado on said Exhibit 1 having been
identified by one of his subordinates, who, as such, as familiar therewith.

One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyen's claim is based
took place in 1956. Yet, — through the present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila — petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the
litigation, for the compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years. What is
more, petitioner's contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected by
this Court as early as August, 1961. Then again, the compensability of Abuyen's
disability had never been questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that
the purpose of this case, like the previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy
"Often resorted to" — in the language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) — "as a means
of draining the resources of the poorer party" — in this case a tuberculosispatient —
"and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion." 9 Thus, the conduct of
petitioner's counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the
Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with treble costs,
jointly and severally, against the petitioner and its counsel, Attorney Benedicto G.
Arcinas and let certified copy of this decision be attached to the personal record of
the latter, as a Member of the Bar. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando JJ.,
concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1
Reading: "The functions, powers, duties and responsibilities of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission shall consist of those quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial functions, powers, duties and responsibilities now vested
by law Act No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772) in the
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, as
further amended by Section 12 of the Plan: Provided, That any provision of
law or rules of court to the contrary notwithstanding, all cases falling under
the Workmen's Compensation Law shall be filed and heard in the Regional
Office where the respondent or any of the respondents resides or may be
found, or where the claimant or any of the claimants resides, at the election
of the claimant."

2
"Only regularly appointed Hearing Officer shall hear and decide
compensation claims. However, when the exigencies of the service so
require, the Regional Administrator may designate any other employee of
the Regional Office, who is a duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar or
has graduated from a law course in an accredited law college, to act a
hearing officer." .

3
Which provides that: "In case the employer decides to controvert the right
to compensation, he shall, either on or before the fourteenth day of disability
or within ten days after he has knowledge of the alleged accident, file a
notice with the Commissioner, on a form prescribed by him, that
compensation is not being paid, giving the name of the claimant, name of the
employer, date of the accident and the reason why compensation is not
being paid. Failure on the part of the employer or the insurance carrier to
comply with this requirement shall constitute a renunciation of his right to
controvert the claim unless he submits reasonable grounds for the failure to
make the necessary reports, on the basis of which grounds the Commissioner
may reinstate his right to controvert the claim." .

4
Caltex v. Villanueva, L-15658, August 21, 1961.

5
Tan v. De Leon, L-16254, September 16, 1961; San Miguel Brewery v.
Sobremesana, L-18730, September 16, 1961; La Mallorca v. Ramos, L-
15476, September 19, 1961; Manila Railroad v. Manalang, L-20845,
November 29, 1965; NASSCO v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-
22628, January 31, 1967.

6
Capellania of Tambobong v. Antonio, 8 Phil. 683; Soriano v. Aquino, 31 Phil.
176; Alvarez v. Guevara, 47 Phil. 12: Gaas v. Fortich, 54 Phil. 196; Delfin v.
CAR, L-23348, March 14, 1967; Sharruf v. Bubla, L-17029, Sept. 30, 1964;
 Colcol v. PBC, L- 23117, Nov. 17, 1967; PAL v. Salcedo, L-22119, Sept. 29,
1997; Bernabe v. CA, L-18278, March 30, 1967; People v. Halasan, L-21495,
July 21, 1967.

7
Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 823; Bauerman v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386; La
Yebana Co. v. Sevilla, 9 Phil. 210.

8
Villamor v. Lacson, L-15945, November 28, 1964.

9
Harrison Foundry and Machinery v. Harrison Foundry Worker's Association,
L-18432, June 29, 1963.

G.R. No. L-35867

G.R. No. L-35867 June 28, 1973

FRANCISCO A. ACHACOSO, in his own behalf and in behalf of Capital

Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, COTRAM, S.A., CAPITAL LIFE ASSURANCE
CORP., JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO, respondents.

Rodrigo M. Nera for petitioner.

Norberto J. Quisumbing & R.P. Mosqueda for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated extensions of time
to file their pleadings and thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting
the pleading or even an explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so. The
Court herein reprimands petitioner's counsel for such misconduct with the warning
that a repetition thereof will be dealt with more severely.

Upon the filing on December 15, 1972 of the petition at bar for review of the Court
of Appeals' decision dismissing petitioner's petition for mandamus filed with said
court to compel the Manila court of first instance to allow petitioner's proposed
appeal from its adverse judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the Court per its
resolution of December 22, 1972 required respondents to comment thereon.

Respondents filed on February 8, 1973 an extensive eighteen page comment and

petitioner's counsel, Rodrigo M. Nera, filed on February 12, 1973 a motion for leave
to file reply within 15 days  from notice alleging that there was need for such reply
"in order that this Honorable Court may be fully and completely informed of the
nature of the controversy which gave rise to the instant petition." The Court
granted such leave per its resolution of February 23, 1973 and notice of such leave
was served on counsel on February 27, 1973.

On the last day for filing of the reply, viz, March 14, 1973 counsel asked for an
additional 15 days averring that "due to the pressure of urgent professional work
and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel during the original period
granted, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the preparation of
petitioner's reply." The Court granted the requested extension per its resolution of
March 20, 1973.

On the last day of the extended period for filing of the reply, viz, March 29, 1973
counsel again asked for still another 15-day extension stating that "due to the
pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements of the
undersigned counsel, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the
preparation of petitioners reply. The undersigned counsel humbly apologizes that in
view of his crowded schedule, he has been constrained to ask for this extension,
but respectfully assures the Honorable Court that this will be the last one
requested.' As per its resolution of April 6, 1973, the Court granted counsel's
motion for such third and last extension.

The period for the filing of petitioner's reply lapsed on April 13, 1973 without
counsel having filed any reply manifestation explaining his failure to do so.

Accordingly, the Court in its resolution of May 24, 1973 denying the petition for
review for lack of merit, further required petitioner's counsel to show cause why
discipline action should not be taken against him for failure to file the reply after
having obtained such leave and three extensions time within which to do so.

Counsel filed in due course his verified Explanation dated June 7, 1973 stating that
he was retained in the ease "on a piece-work basis on the verbal understanding
that all expenses for the preparation of pleadings and the cost of services of
stenographer-typist shall be furnished in advance by petition upon being notified
thereof," that when he asked for a third extension on March 29, 1973, he so
informed petitioner and requested him to remit the expenses for the preparation of
reply as per agreement" and that he tried to contact petitioner before the expiration
of the extended period but failed to do as petitioner "was then most of the time out
of his office."

Counsel relates that it was only on May 30, 1973 when he received notice of the
Court's resolution of May 24, 1973 denying the petition and requiring his
explanation — long after the expiration on April 13, 1973 of the extended period for
the filing of the reply — that he wrote petitioner and in turn asked the petitioner to
explain the latter's failure to comply with his request for a remittance of P500.00 to
cover the necessary expenses, and that petitioner had replied that counsel's letter
had been misplaced by a clerk and hence, petitioner had "failure to act on the
same."
Counsel pleads that "this counsel has not the least intention of delaying the
administration of justice and much less trifle with the resolutions and orders of this
Honorable Court. The inability of this counsel to submit the reply within the
extension granted by this Honorable Court was due to supervening circumstances
which could not be attributed to this counsel and that "if this poor and humble
practitioner has been impelled to inaction it surely was not intentional on his part,
the truth of the matter being that this counsel was just helpless in the face of
petitioner's failure to comply with his commitments aforesaid;" and that "this
counsel deeply regrets this incident and hereby apologizes to this Honorable Court
for all his shortcomings relative to this case, which after all were due to causes and
circumstances not of his own making and far beyond his control."

Counsel's explanation is far from satisfactory. If indeed he was not in a financial

position to advance the necessary expenses for preparing and submitting the reply,
then he could have filed timely the necessary manifestation that he was foregoing
the filing of such reply on petitioner's behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the
Court's prompt disposition of the case after the filing by respondents on February 8,
1973 of their comments on the petition showing its lack of merit.

The Court would have then so disposed of the petition had it not been for
petitioner's plea to be given time and opportunity to file a reply to the comments in
order to fully apprise the Court of the nature of the controversy, which plea the
Court granted in reliance on his good faith. Yet after having obtained three
extensions of time for the filing of the reply, counsel simply failed to file any reply
nor to give the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure
to do so.

Counsel readily perceived in his explanation that his conduct comes close to
delaying the administration of justice and trifling with the Court's processes. It does
not reflect well on counsel's conduct as an officer of the Court that after assuring
the Court that the third extension requested by him "in view of his crowded
schedule" and "of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements" would be
the last within which period he would at last file the awaited reply, for him
thereafter to let the period simply lapse without any explanation whatsoever, and
worse, to wait to be found out, and have the Court require him to explain.

Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his

part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be
lenient in this instance.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M.

Nera, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be filed in his personal record.
 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements
complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. 
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign 
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as
a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of
law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Held: 

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined: Black defines "practice of law" as:"The rendition
of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law." The contention of
respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description
of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of
law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that
respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law
and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within
the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court
appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting,
and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
law by virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within
the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of
the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE
CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise
his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The
canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right
and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it
and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
B.M. No. 2012

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.M. No. 2012             February 10, 2009

PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING

LAWYERS

RESOLUTION

Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re:
Comment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the
Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court
Resolved to APPROVE the same.

This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said
Rule and its implementing regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general
circulation.

February 10, 2009

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
 NACHURA Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid
Service."

SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society
as agents of social change and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve
access to justice by the less privileged members of society and expedite the
resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal service by members of the
bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective
administration of justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.

SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for
practicing lawyers to render free legal aid services in all cases (whether, civil,
criminal or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where the
assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other members of
the legal profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and
in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but
not limited to the National Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation
and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and National Commission
for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers" shall exclude:

(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed

by law to practice;

(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in

duly accredited legal clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples’ organizations (POs)
like the Free Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of their work
already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants and
 (iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including
those who are employed in the private sector but do not appear for
and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.

(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section
19 of the Rules of Court and Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City
of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);

(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are
criminal, civil and administrative in nature in whatever stage wherein
indigent and pauper litigants need legal representation;

(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body

for and in behalf of an indigent or pauper litigant and the preparation of
pleadings or motions. It shall also cover assistance by a practicing lawyer to
indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation and in other modes of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Services rendered when a practicing
lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also be considered as free legal aid
services and credited as compliance under this Rule;

(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization

of lawyers in the country;

(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP

which is specifically tasked with handling legal aid cases;

(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is

specifically tasked with disciplining members of the Bar;

(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

located in the different geographical areas of the country as defined in Rule
139-A and

(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing
lawyer rendered free legal aid services. In the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it
refers to an officer holding an equivalent or similar position.

The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies
exercising quasi-judicial functions, or a responsible officer of an accredited
PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator who conducted the court-annexed
mediation proceeding.

SECTION 5. Requirements. -

(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60)

hours of free legal aid services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours
shall be spread within a period of twelve (12) months, with a minimum of
five (5) hours of free legal aid services each month. However, where it is
necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal aid service for more than
five (5) hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to the said
lawyer for the succeeding periods.

For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court
for cases where he may render free legal aid service. He may also coordinate
with the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about cases
where he may render free legal aid service. In this connection, the IBP Legal
Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter shall regularly and actively coordinate
with the Clerk of Court.

The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten
(10) days of the last month of each quarter of the year.

(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate

from the Clerk of Court attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free
legal aid services in a case.

The certificate shall contain the following information:

(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the
party or parties in the said case(s) for whom the service was rendered,
the docket number of the said case(s) and the date(s) the service was
rendered.

(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or

conducting trial on a particular case in the court or quasi-judicial body.

(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation,

conciliation or any other mode of ADR on a particular case.

(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading

or for postponement of hearing or conference) or pleading filed on a
particular case shall be considered as one (1) hour of service.

The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy
to be retained by the practicing lawyer, one (1) copy to be retained by
the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy to be attached to the lawyer's
compliance report.

(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of
the IBP Chapter within the court’s jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson
shall then be tasked with immediately verifying the contents of the certificate
with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of the certificate
attached to the compliance report with the copy retained by the Clerk of
Court.
 (d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to
the concerned lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit the compliance
reports to the IBP’s NCLA for recording and documentation. The submission
shall be made within forty-five (45) days after the mandatory submission of
compliance reports by the practicing lawyers.

(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of
compliance for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and
the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category
under Section 4(a)(i) and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which
states that, during that year, they are employed with the government or
incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice or lawyers who by
law are not allowed to appear in court.

The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National
Office together with the payment of an annual contribution of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for
the support of its legal aid program.

(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category
under Section 4(a)(iii) shall secure a certification from the director of the
legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO to the effect that, during that year,
they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or actively
participated in the NGO’s or PO’s free legal aid activities. The certification
shall be submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.

(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category
under Section 4(a)(iv) shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states
that, during that year, they are neither practicing lawyers nor covered by
Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP
Chapter or IBP National Office together with the payment of an annual
contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for the
efforts of practicing lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services.
Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the support of
its legal aid program.

(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty
of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for that year which amount shall also
accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.

SECTION 6. NCLA. -
 (a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the
IBP local chapters for the proper handling and accounting of legal aid cases
which practicing lawyers can represent.

(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid
Office with respect to the coordination with Clerks of Court on legal aid cases
and the collation of certificates submitted by practicing lawyers.

(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance
with this Rule.

(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by
the Clerk of Court and forms mentioned in Section 5(e) and (g).

(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and
penalties that will be paid by lawyers pursuant to this Rule to effectively
carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this purpose, it shall annually submit
an accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.

The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the Supreme
Court in connection with its request for the release of the subsidy for its legal
aid program.

SECTION 7. Penalties. -

(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet
the minimum prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be
required by the IBP, through the NCLA, to explain why he was unable to
render the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no explanation has been
given or if the NCLA finds the explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall
make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the
erring lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing.
Upon approval of the NCLA’s recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors
shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not in good standing. Notice
thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter which
submitted the lawyer’s compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the
lawyer is registered, in case he did not submit a compliance report. The
notice to the lawyer shall include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the special fund for the legal aid
program of the IBP.

(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of
three (3) months from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the
IBP Board of Governors. During the said period, the lawyer cannot appear in
court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided, however, that the "not
in good standing" status shall subsist even after the lapse of the three-month
period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
 (c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least
three (3) consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to
be instituted motu proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall afford the
erring lawyer due process in accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. If found administratively liable, the penalty of
suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be imposed upon him.

(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be

submitted under this Rule or any contents thereof shall be administratively
charged with falsification and dishonesty and shall be subject to disciplinary
action by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of criminal charges
against the lawyer.

(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of

Court or by any Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local
chapter where the case is pending or by the Director of a legal clinic or
responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an administrative
case against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice
to the filing of the criminal and administrative charges against the malfeasor.

SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). - A

lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in
a year for the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on
MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2) credit units for legal ethics, two (2)
credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for alternative dispute
resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit
units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units
for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(9),
Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.

A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours
in a year for at least two consecutive years within the three year-period covered by
a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: one
(1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills, one (1)
credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for legal writing
and oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence and three (3) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by
the MCLE Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.

SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given
authority to recommend implementing regulations in determining who are
"practicing lawyers," what constitute "legal aid cases" and what administrative
procedures and financial safeguards which may be necessary and proper in the
implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the various
legal chapters in the crafting of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon
approval by the IBP Board of Governors, the said implementing regulations shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final approval.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect
on July 1,2009 after they have been published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

Case Digest

Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974) 

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case

pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was
appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position
as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full
time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge
denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: 

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the
petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No,  Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty
rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the
bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of
service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de
oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or
other officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor
General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them,
remained as counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as
defendant-appellant’s counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was
substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the
defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February
28, 1963)

             To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent

defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban)
Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is
a constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing
with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and
given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)

                The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused
with a counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights
of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325,
August 31, 1930)

AC. No. 1261 TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID

A.C. No. 1261

December 29, 1983

FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in
the agreement lawyer David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional
fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal
directly with the clients.

However, mutual accusations of doublecross ended such.

Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil
Relation and to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.

RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers”

The practice of law is a profession and not a business.

A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.

The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and
discountenances his conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David
should have known better.

Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.