Phil. Assn of Free Labor Unions vs. Binalbagan Sugar Co.

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition
for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's
fees for professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan
Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961,
ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision
became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio
Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963,
filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and,
on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty.
Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants
were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the
present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion
was overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained
averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for
reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was
considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief. 3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required
to be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations,
even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-
litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule
138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not
one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU,
and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation
of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe
the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection
of courts, clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed
or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of
authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who
has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were
rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has
been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney with
authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will
not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if were to
be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers)
cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent"
and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice
to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh
the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible
from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved
for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for
extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being
contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible
from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the
industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees'
moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union
may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the
Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as
"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective
action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this
matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners,
however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as
attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against
respondent Muning.

In re cunanan

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already
passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act
should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and
effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of law
and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by
Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can
practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of
an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to
the practice of law.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE

FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ &
CASTILLO".
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving
partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also
contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name;
there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of
a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already passed away in
the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and
the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the
deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch.
Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased
partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose.
… It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been
stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting
herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for
purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951

MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

Petitioners in their own behalf.

Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.

FERIA, J.:

These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the respondents
General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers of the Philippine Army, in which it is
alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners from the enjoyment of their right
to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled
because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are
disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said
Section 17 reads as follows:

SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially
interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as
counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or
any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. . . ..

The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition contained in the above
quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners.

We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General
Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our
Constitution.

It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any
criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a
Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a
general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context
clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).

In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the
word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words
"inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on
appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII,
of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.

Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon Ruffy et
al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following:

Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no relation
or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all,
and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is
bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of the
 subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law
courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between
the U.S. an the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws and
customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by
technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of
justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)

In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:

In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same
authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it
differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of the
army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty.

And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:

That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States,
have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in controversies
within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammeled an
exercise of their powers.

And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:

SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the right
to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues controlling
the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending that right to one
accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable
right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear
before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel
Huffaker vs.Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)

The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the
reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a
court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved
by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.

That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also
evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses against
the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is
one which involves a wrong or injury done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted
in the name of the People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or
special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."

Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:

In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is strictly a
criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award
damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper
function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents,
Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)

In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and
none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540,
544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S.
Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)

Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an
administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown by the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed.,
1088, 1092, in which the following was held:

If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the
finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgment of a civil court in a case of
which it may legally take cognizance; and restricting our decision to the above question of double
jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in
error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been
committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the
authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court
exercising authority in that territory.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our Constitution in
enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there exist the same if not more
reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives as counsel for
the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of
civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex.

Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial, the
respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions
for mandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and
FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

RELOVA, J.: ñ é+.£ªwph!1

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal
Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V.
Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed
against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4,
1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of
friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well
founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants
in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be
put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against
Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P.assistance to the
needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate
appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan
opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained
the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in
said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders of
respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining
respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases
Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo
Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such
dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqw â£

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct his
own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in
the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by
respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqw â£
 SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal
action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of the
fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of
the fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court
a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the
case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending
before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through
reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing
Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The
permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place,
the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to
disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other
hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the
private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control.
Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case
before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the
supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended
party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil
action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has
personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which
disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant
petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the
appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the
temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët