March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land
as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make
your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of
affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as
any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He
offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in
his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction
into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for
the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my
house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the
following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public.
Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as
a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure
you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive
any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn
to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be
 disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case
and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will
have my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve
with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as
yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land
titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for
every registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.
In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act
No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28
of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective

advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business
by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional

for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only
unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any
other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for
like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
 physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant
or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a
crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of
jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The
reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results
in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should
be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal
of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of
the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go
further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be
distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced
the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929,
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES,
RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M.
NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG,
JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to
enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel.
He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not,
what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he
filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec.
1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine
bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of
the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. L-1117             March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
 EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-91-766. April 7, 1993.]

JOSE P. UY and RIZALINA C. UY, Complainants, v. HON. JUDGE TERESITA

DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Respondent.

Romeo M. Mendoza for complainants.

JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Branch 172, Metro Manila, is charged 1 with gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint filed on 15 November 1991
with the Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy,
relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for settlement of the estate of the late
Ambrocio C. Pingco. chanrobles law library : red

The records show that on 21 November 1988, a certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to
be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement of the estate of
Ambrocio C. Pingco. Two (2) days after, or on 23 November 1988, respondent Judge
appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court.

On 27 March 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion stating
that sometime in February 1978 two (2) parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio
C. Pingco and his wife covered by TCT Nos. 7537 and 75101 had been sold to
complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the Register of
Deeds of Manila in February 1989. Consequently, counsel requested the court to direct
the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction without the signature of
Herminia Alvos" involving the properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-
15354 to B-15359, TCT Nos. T39565, T-50276, T-52754, T-220168, TCT. Nos. T-7537
and 75101. On 29 March 1989, respondent Judge granted the motion.

On 18 April 1989, upon order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela
reported on the status of the titles to the properties subject of the "freeze order;"
informing the Court that on 3 February 1989, a deed of absolute sale executed by the
spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez dated 9 December 1978 was filed with
the Register of Deeds, describing therein fifteen (15) parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, and B-163276; that, by virtue of the
deed of sale, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants
Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT No. B-163276 which could not be located
in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City; that TCT Nos. T-50276 and 52754 were still
registered in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez, and, that the status of
TCT Nos. T-39565 and T-220168, which were with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan,
could not yet be determined.

On 5 May 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed with the court an urgent
motion to cancel the titles issued in the name of Jose P. Uy stating that the latter was
able to register the titles in his name in February 1989 through fraud, and the
signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale were forged.

On 7 June 1989, respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of
complainant Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C.
Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of new titles in their name.

On 3 July 1989, complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
annul the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from implementing the
Order of 7 June 1989, and that respondent Judge be restrained from further proceeding
against him.

Meanwhile, acting on the questioned Order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds
of Valenzuela cancelled the certificates of title of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina
C. Uy and reverted them to Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On 28 September 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and

prohibition of complainants and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent
Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding against complainant Jose P. Uy in the
intestate proceedings thus —

". . . a probate court has no authority to y decide questions of the ownership of

property, real or personal. The only purpose of the examination . . . is to elicit
information or to secure evidence from the persons suspected of having possession or
knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If after such examination there is
good reason for believing that the person so examined has property in possession
belonging to the estate, it is the duty of the administrator, by ordinary action, to
recover the same (Alafriz v. Mina, 28 Phil. 137 [1914]; Modesto v. Modesto, 109 Phil.
1066 [1959]; Chanco v. Madrilejo, 12 Phil. 543 [1909])." cralaw virtua1aw library

Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos sought a reconsideration of the ruling of the

Court of Appeals but the same was denied on 15 November 1989.

On 28 December 1989, Alvos then filed with Us a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 91092.

On 6 February 1990, respondent Judge approved a project of partition dated 18 August

1990 submitted by Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos, together with Paz Ramirez
(surviving spouse of Ambrocio C. Pingco) and Alicia Alinsunurin. In the project of
partition, TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352 and B-15354 to B-15359 covering the parcels
of land in Bulacan (which were reverted in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco pursuant to
the Order of 7 June 1989) were adjudicated to the surviving spouse Paz Ramirez
Pingco.

On 16 January 1991, on motion of counsel for the Special Administratrix, respondent

Judge ordered the Registers of Deeds of Valenzuela and Manila to cancel the titles in
the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez and to issue new ones in favor of the
persons mentioned in the approved project of partition.

On 4 February 1991, respondent Judge granted the ex-parte petition of the Special
Administratrix for approval of the deed of absolute sale of the parcels of land covered
by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351, B-15348 and B-15349, and stating therein that as far
as the intestate proceedings were concerned, complainant Jose P. Uy was not a
participant either as heir or oppositor; that the property covered by TCT Nos. B-15350,
B-15351 and B-15348 and B-15349 were part of the intestate estate of the late
Ambrocio C. Pingco over which the trial court had jurisdiction and in whose name said
titles were registered when the proceedings were instituted, that even as the Decision
of the Court of Appeals annulled her Order of 7 June 1989, it did not prevent her from
proceeding with her actions on the properties, neither did it direct the Register of Deeds
of Valenzuela to revert the titles again from Ambrocio C. Pingco to complainant Jose P.
Uy. As a result, instead of complying with the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
respondent Judge directed the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to comply with her own
Order of 16 January 1991 cancelling the titles of the Pingcos and ordering the issuance
of new titles in accordance with the project of partition she obstinately approved.

On 8 March 1991, in G.R. No. 91092, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
which annulled and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge. Thus —

"We find no merit in the petition. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply
provides that a person who is suspected of having in his possession property belonging
to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath on the matter.
Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question of ownership
of such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land
under administration and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title issued in
favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through a mere motion in the probate
proceedings over the objection of said vendee over whom the probate court has no
jurisdiction. To recover the property, an independent action against the vendee must be
instituted in the proper court" (citing Tagle, Et. Al. v. Manalo Et. Al., 105 Phil 1124).

On 2 April 1991, respondent Judge, in utter disregard of Our Resolution of March 1991,
granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of the deed of
absolute sale of properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 and B-15346 of the Register
of Deeds of Valenzuela and reiterated the rationale of her questioned Order of 4
February 1991.

On 29 April 1991, undaunted by her reversal by the Court of Appeals and this Court,
and in blatant disobedience to judicial authority, and established precedents and
jurisprudence, respondent Judge again granted an ex-parte petition of the Special
Administratrix for approval of another deed of absolute sale covering three (3) more
parcels of land originally titled in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy, to wit: TCT Nos.
B-15347, B-15355 and B-15356 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, reiterating for
the second time the reasons stated in her Orders of 4 February and 2 April 1991.

In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite the
Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the pendency of the
petition for review by way of certiorari before this Court, respondent Judge continued
issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the properties in the
name of persons stated in the project of partition, to the damage and prejudice of
complainants. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Complainants further contend that even after this Court had affirmed the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain further
proceedings concerning the ownership of the properties, respondent Judge still, in an
attempt to defeat the proscription imposed by higher judicial authority, issued, orders
approving the sale of the properties to the further prejudice of complainants.

In her comment, respondent Judge alleges that the filing of the complaint against her is
merely to harass her. While she admits that her Order of 7 June 1989 was annulled and
set aside by the Court of Appeals, which annulment was affirmed by this Court, she
argues that no temporary restraining order was issued and that before the Decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated her Order of 7 June 1989 was already complied
with by the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela. She further contends that even as she was
prohibited from proceeding against complainants herein, the Court of Appeals did not
order the reversion of the titles to them.

We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge. The charges against her are clearly
meritorious and supported by the records. Hence, there is no need in fact for Us to
conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her culpability 2 as it is well
documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display her open defiance of
higher judicial authority.

In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala, respondent Judge
committed the following highly irregular and questionable acts indicative of gross
ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the public interest, to wit: (a)
respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party the titles of complainants Jose P.
Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who were not parties to the case, to the great prejudice of the
latter; (b) respondent Judge issued two (2) orders which disregarded the Decision of
the Court of Appeals annulling her disputed Order of 7 June 1989; 3 (c) respondent
Judge issued another order authorizing the sale of the other properties previously titled
in the complainant Jose P. Uy; 4 (d) respondent Judge issued still two (2) more orders
approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already affirmed the Decision of the
Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989. 5

These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant disobedience to the
lawful orders of superior courts and belie any claim that she rendered the erroneous
orders in good faith as would excuse her from administrative liability.

Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible representation of law and
justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the
judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave
an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid
even the slightest infraction of the law. 6 To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep
abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. 7 If the judge is already
aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them, otherwise
such omission can never be excused. 8

Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise as to
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administration
proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction. 9 The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle
indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules.

Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has already been
registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only be raised in
an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional
mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. In
cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and
without affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to
uphold the law and promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the
law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. 10

The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal
to abide by the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989
which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was in fact specifically
enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision, respondent Judge
skill authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation to other persons of properties
titled in the name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect
for the judgment of a higher court constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the
interest of the public, the bench and the bar. The absence of a temporary restraining
order or an order from the Court of Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is not
sufficient justification for respondent Judge to issue subsequent orders contrary to the
appellate court’s proscription. Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the
necessary consequence of the appellate court’s decision is to put back the complainants
to their former status prior to the issuance of the annulled order. Consequently, the
Order of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the ownership of the properties
subject of the settlement proceedings remains vested in complainants and will continue
to be so until declared void in an appropriate proceeding, not in the intestate
proceedings before respondent Judge. Thus, an order from the appellate court that will
revert the titles to complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from its
decision annulling the questioned cancellation.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991
cannot be condoned. Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in cancelling the titles of complainants.
Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our pronouncement. She issued two
(2) more orders approving the sale to other persons of the remaining properties which
were titled in the name of complainants.

We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as

grave and serious misconduct. 11 Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to
Our authority and utterly failed to show proper respect for, and due and needed
cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court. 12

By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance
of her duties that prudence and circumspection which the law requires for public
service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of which she is a part and
which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act or omission which
would diminish the faith of the people in the administration of justice. 13 As Chief
Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated, "the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of
the people and the integrity of the courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence
of the court is gone and popular respect impaired." cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG guilty of

gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the
judicial service; consequently, she is hereby DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in
any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including
government owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4018             March 8, 2005

OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu,
Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and
Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli
Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent. 3

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique
Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that
he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises
considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be
dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.4

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08
September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of
illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-
accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from
service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal
from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this
Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that
respondents6 in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V.
Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he
abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).

In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order."7 Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had
"proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney" 8 and that he poses a
"serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession." 9

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No.
T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law 10 and jurisprudence support his
stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications
for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of
the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion,
hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-
defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the
various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case
by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties.
Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.

Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, 11 this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP
commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent
portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of
the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to
the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action. 12

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner
Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the
Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the
investigation, report, and recommendation.13 The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for

the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region
Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the
investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter
dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato
Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation
and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. 14

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter 15 informed the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel 16 had sent notices to both
complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said
notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years.

On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the
records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No.
XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to
comment on respondent's motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition
to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25
September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for
the reception of respondent's evidence.19 This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution
provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal
of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-
evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the
Board of Governors.20

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion
praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the
records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not
have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and
Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the
power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the
investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.

Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to

complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states
that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite
these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother
to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of
IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is
possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail
a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.

In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to

submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the
submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty.
Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner
Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August 1997. 24 Attached to said order was
Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt
was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation
submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors
through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the

Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an
investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
notice.25

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali,
complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in
interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. 26

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman
of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-
Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case.27 This motion was effectively denied
by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002. 28 According to Atty. Castillo –

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the
report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a
re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del
Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP
Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the
Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in
the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal
complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against
respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into
account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the
finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully
supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the
professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
 In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato. 29

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification
pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato
Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be
proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter
denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court. 30

The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave
misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in
the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. 32

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct.
Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared –

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character. 34

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to
disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case –

… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public
faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of
his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to
practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature
cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." 37 As we have
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest

of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice.39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 46371             February 7, 1940

FORTUNATO N. SUAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
SERVILLANO PLATON, Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas, The PROVINCIAL
FISCAL OF TAYABAS, VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas Hermogenes Caluag for respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez with
this court, to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 of the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course.

It appears on May 9, 1935, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the
respondents in this case, filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag,
Province of Tayabas, charging the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas,
with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint, upon preliminary
examination, was docketed and given due course. While the said case was pending preliminary
investigation, Lieutenant Orais, in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas,
moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace
of Calauag on May 20, 1935, and the case thus dismissed.

At the instance of the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas,
Perfecto R. Palacio, in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of
the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary detention committed, according to the
information under date of July 8, 1935, as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of May, 1935, in the municipality of Calauag, Province of
Tayabas, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Vivencio Orais being then
a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and
qualified as such and detailed in the Province of Tayabas, without warrant of arrest and
without any legal ground whatsoever, moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he
entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was
going to Calauag, and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and
detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other
accused, Damian Jimenez, justice of the peace of the said municipality, prepared and
subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of
sedition; that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez, conniving with the other accused
Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention
of said Fortunato Suarez, without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an
order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and
unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of
Calauag for eight hours.
The justice of the peace of Calauag, being one of the accused, the preliminary examination was
conducted by the justice of the peace of Lopez, Tayabas, who thereafter bound the defendants over
to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as criminal case No. 6426. While the
case was pending in the latter court, on petition, of the accused, the provincial fiscal of Tayabas,
Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After such reinvestigation, he filed on April 23, 1936,
a motion for the dismissal of the case. Fortunato N. Suarez, the petitioner herein, on May 5, 1936,
asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the
prosecution, alleging, among other things, that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the
accused. On May 11, 1936, Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal. The Bar
Association of Tayabas, through its president, Emiliano A. Gala, entered its appearance as amicus
curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. On August 14, 1936, the then presiding
judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Hon. Ed. Gutierrez David, after hearing,
denied the motion, ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. The court, upon
petitioner of the provincial fiscal, designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio to handle
the prosecution. But Fiscal Palacio, being apparently of the same opinion as the provincial fiscal,
declined to proceed, and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of
Justice be designated in his stead. Accordingly, the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson, at
the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution
of the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. So, on
September 23 1936, he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14, 1936, denying
the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again
vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the
prosecution of the accused. The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the
place of Judge Gutierres David. Later, Judge Serviliano Platon, one of the respondents herein, was
appointed to preside over case No. 6426 corresponded, and the case was thus transferred to that
sala for action. Judge Platon, after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case,
considered the court's order of August 14, 1936, and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence
was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. From this order, the petitioner herein
appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed as G.R. No. 45431. On June 30, by a closely
divided court, the appeal was dismissed.

The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition, in which, as stated in the opening
paragraph of this decision, we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by the said
judge. The petitioner gives the following grounds for the issuance of said writ:

Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de

discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais
y Damian Jimenez, despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que
existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de que un Juez de Primera
Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por
creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados.

Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion
por cuanto que las pruebas existentes en la causa, en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial
al presentar la querella en el Juzgado de Paz, demuestran de un modo claro y concluyente
el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los acusados. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a
paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A").]

Que el Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas
pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era
 considerarlas bajo el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador". (E.U. vs. Barredo, 32
Jur. Fil., 462, 482.)

Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the
information by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and
the justice of the peace of Lopez, the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case, because
'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa, y
examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi como las circunstancias
del caso, ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de esta
causa." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said motion for dismissal
of April 23, 1936:

En sintesis, los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935, en ocasion en que el abogado
Fortunato N. Suarez y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia, se encontraron en el
tren que iba a Calauag, aquel para defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio, y
este para atender a sus deberes officiales en relacion con el orden publico algo anormal, por
causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de Calauag, ambos tuvieron un cambio
de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli, y por haber el abogado
Suarez proferido en tono acalorado, de que los sakdalistas estaban perseguidos en Calauag
por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia, y que era un abuso de las autoridades
dicha persecusion, trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los municipios de
Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna, que se levantaron contra el gobierno por los
abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en dichos pueblos, y que lo mismo podia tenerlugar en
esta Provincia de Tayabas, y que el podia incitar a lossakdalistas, teniendo en cuenta que
con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que los sakdalistas en Calauag
habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas, uno de los acusados en el municipiode
Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion, que el abogado ayudaria a los
sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion,fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado
Suarez, conduciendoleal municipio como asi lo hizo con respecto a Tomas Ruedas, quien
salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a la estacion del tren en Calauag, diciendo a este
que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag. Que despues de haberles arrestado,
presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de sedicion, en el juzgado de paz de
Calauag, aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores, dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el
sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia.

Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas, ni que haya
incitado a los sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las
autoridades y oficiales, sin embargo, de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la
acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son consistentes, se desprende claramente que el
abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden considerarse como sediciosas y
subversivas, maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque atravesaba el
municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los
sakdalistas, a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los
municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. Rosa.

La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr. Godofredo Reyes contra el
teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L. Jimenez, por el delito
de detencion arbitraria.

El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo Penal
Revisado, que dice asi:
 El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno sera
castigado; etc. . . .

Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos, y
que a la acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito, el
que suscribe, haanalizado este extremo, relacionando los hechos que determinaron
laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el abogado FortunatoN. Suarez, con las
circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia
de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna, acondicionandolos con las palabras
proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y subversivas,por
lo menos eran abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno, especialmente con las de la
Provincia de Tayabas a las cuales se referian. Asi entendido el aspecto legal de la cuestion,
y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la misma ley en lo en que consiste la detencion
arbitraria, que para que exista este delito, la detencion tenia que haber sido sin motivo legal
alguno, creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la detencion del abogado Sr. Suarez y
su companero Tomas Ruedas, y estaba justificada por haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello.
(E.U. vs. Vallejo y otro, 11 Jur. Fil., 202; E.U. vs. Santos, 36 Jur. Fil., 909.)

We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David
of August 14, 1936. It appears, however, that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who, as stated above
was assigned by the Department of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case, moved for
reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal. Judge
Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. In this motion for
reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y
Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal, but adds:

(a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais, no existe prueba alguna en los autos de
esta causa que dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas,
solamente por el mero gusto de arrestarles. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente
Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o resentimiento alguno contra dicho
abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. Aunque es verdad que el
Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de
autoridad', sin embargo, no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y
Tomas Ruedas hayan intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma,
por tanto, no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de
estos por dicha causa. (Vease pag. 1, Anexo O.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos, en
nuestra humilde opinion, existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de haber
cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas,
teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz
de los disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y
Sta. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna, dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. Se debe
tener en cuenta, ademas, el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado
Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais presento
denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez, juez de paz de Calauag, por
infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of
all cases handled by them, but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in
the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order
to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the
corresponding informations. In the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one," (69
United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309.)

Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon, in granting the
motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of
the peace of Lopez, abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of justice, a
departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within
the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. This is especially true
in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and fact, since
such a duty is not ministerial. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec. 156, pp. 173-175). Upon
the other hand, it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais, in the face of the
circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial
fiscal of Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed
and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the arrest
effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be entirely unjustified. If, "under trying
circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the
law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the
courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves
violating the law. See generally Voorhees on Arrest; 5 Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R.C.L., 450.
(United States vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853, 855.)"

The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding cost. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN,
ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO,
MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA,
WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW
HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE
FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the
efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect
on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. It was later found
1 

by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders
and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and ₱0.505
million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK
2 

which reached a total of ₱310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from
3 

its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held
4 

from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then
5 

Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo,
Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita,
Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia
Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp.,
Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading
Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et
al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea,
Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
6 

sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage

of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of
7 

the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et
al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for

respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005 and 0096-0099. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and
8  9  10 

counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was

subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et
al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank
in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s

motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It found that the PCGG failed to
11 

prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent
Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term
as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
12 

respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic
Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from
public office. The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.
13  14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second

Division to the Fifth Division. In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
15 

the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent

Mendoza. It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that
16 

the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005.
The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001. 17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
18 

Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not
waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the
resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply. 19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import
and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation
conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to
any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but
the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single
colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards
of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of
the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable
fees.20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By
mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field,
the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards
of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states
in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David
Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad
outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and
thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century
laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial
regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The
developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client
property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and
its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service
to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary
periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's
duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties,
and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. 21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers
in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical
standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical
guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave
detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures,
however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as
binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar
associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but
they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations
began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association,
assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. 22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for
the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the
full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine
Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service." These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
25 

conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government

lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On 26 

the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers

and apply primarily to former government lawyers. For several years, the ABA attempted to correct
27 

and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. To deal with problems peculiar
28 

to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-
interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts." The rationale for disqualification
29 

is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced
by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. Canon 36 provides, viz.:
30 

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after
his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46
and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively. 31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics. 32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
33 

Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to
which the lawyer must adhere. In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) became the applicable
34  35 

supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code. 36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards were
set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter
Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the
content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements
particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9,
37 

citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The
Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform
with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
39 

government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2,
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated
and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to
both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of
whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the
rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government
lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as
any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by

respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz: 40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then
Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.,
where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent
portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to
resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and
indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it
was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in
order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The
pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977,
together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by
P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then
CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court
should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of
any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed
that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned
forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines
and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as
possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits
and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires,
order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central
Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such
institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce
individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such
institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary
Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously
appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be
necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can
be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank
from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act,
unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an
amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the
damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and
ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an
otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver
under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law,
general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 &
1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the
said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
"matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the
stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-
gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was
liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners
and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03.
"Intervene" means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or

come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay
on both sides of an intervening river . . .)
41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of
others.42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first

interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant
or has no effect or little influence. Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act
43 

of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. We hold that this second
44 

meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not
exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x
x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided

that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection
with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As
aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted
in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence,
in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the
government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted
the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public
officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of
years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed
merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort
on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed,
it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To
date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of
equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse
that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
45 

sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical
rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. Indeed, "to
46 

make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter." 47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that
the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in
order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in
recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." Even the United States
48 

Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as
"a dangerous game." In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is
49 

difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the
hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar
was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
50 

disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in
whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
51 

the benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an
52 

effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan:
"An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving
the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them
to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of
private employment does not enjoy such freedom." He adds: "Any system that affects the right to
53 

take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence." The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once
54 

occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor

General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that
allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that
gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue
dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the
freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. Former government lawyers
55 

stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a
highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No less than Judge
56  57 

Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any
detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys
which the canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
58 

rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some courts have
59 

abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest

exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the
case, and the public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors
lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former
government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this
concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares
of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent
"sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On
the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating
GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for
this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil
Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two
sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service. The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who
61 

plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted
to prosecute less vigorously. In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
62 

1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the
period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies." Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." He opines "x x x
63  64 

it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal
to his or her last client – the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms
want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or
least vigorous advocates." But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar.
65 

There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate
GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he
continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above
cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive
influence of former officials" or their "clout." Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this
66 

concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an
employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." More, he contends that the concern can
67 

be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present
officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in
federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials
will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the
Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the
bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any
standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and
deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.