TAÑADA v.
TUVERA be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
Facts:
-petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
issuances, invoking people's right to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated.
-respondents contend that the petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition
absent any showing that petitioners are personally and
directly affected by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances. Respondents further argue that
publication in the Official Gazette is not an essential
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
-petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.
Issue: Whether or not publication should be made in
the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the people
were sufficiently informed.
It was held in this case that the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners is a public right. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat.”(ignorance of the law, excuses no one).
Without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated. Publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall
immediately upon their approval or as soon as possible,
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effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless
otherwise provided” pertains to the date of publication
and not the requirement of publication.
[Article 2, Civil Code: Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...”]
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances
of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect.
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FUENTES V. ROCA
Facts:
- a titled lot was sold to Tarciano Roca by her mother
under a deed of absolute sale but Tarciano did not, for
the meantime, have the registered title transferred to
his name.
-6 years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to
the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of
Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and
requirements to complete the sale. The agreement
required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down
payment for the transfer of the lot’s title to him and
within 6 months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of
structures and occupants and secure the consent of his
estranged wife Rosario to the sale.
-Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks
and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature
of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga.
-The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As
time elapsed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the
Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the
lot.
-Eight years later in 1997, the heirs of Tarciano and
Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the
property on the ground that the sale was void since the
consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’
signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses
however claim that the action has prescribed since an
action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years
from discovery.
-The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling
that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty.
Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be
given weight, and that the action has already
prescribed. However, CA reversed the said ruling stating
that the action has not prescribed since the applicable
law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale
of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other
spouse is voidable and the action must be brought
within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989
and the action was brought in 1997, hence, it was well
within the prescriptive period.
Issue: Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the
declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed.
Held:
Although Tarciano and Rosario were married during the
1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the
effectivity of the Family Code on Aug. 3, 1988. Hence,
the Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships
already established upon the enactment of the Family
Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano
without the consent of Rosario is completely void under
Art 124 of the Family code. Consequently, the said
provision did not provide a period within which the wife
who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of
the real property.
On the argument that the action has already prescribed
based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive
period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them
who should have assailed such contract due to the
fraud, though they failed to exercise that right. On the
other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no
consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe
since it is a void contract.
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COMMISSIONER V. HYPERMIX
Facts:
 -Commissioner of Customs issued a Memorandum
Order which provides that for tariff purposes, wheat will
be classified either as food grade or feed grade. Food
grade wheat has a corresponding tariff of 3% and 7% for
the feed grade.
-Hypermix Feeds Corporation assailed the order
contending that it was issued without following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the UP Law Center.
-the trial court ruled in favour of Hypermix thereby
declaring the memorandum order, invalid. The trial
court found that Commissioner of Customs had not
followed the basic requirements of hearing and
publication in the issuance of the assailed order. Hence
this appeal by the petitioner.
Issue: whether the memorandum order issued by
Commissioner of customs is valid?
Held:
It was held that the Commissioner of Customs’
memorandum order is invalid on the grounds that he
violated the right to due process when he failed to
observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code. RAC, Sec. 3(1) provides that every
agency shall file with the UP Law Center 3 certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
3 months from that date shall not be the bases of any
sanction against any party of persons. Meanwhile, sec. 9
states that if not otherwise required by law, an agency
shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption
of any rule. In fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall
be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least
2 weeks before the first hearing.
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KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
-Rafaela Rodriguez et al., children and heirs of the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, filed a civil case to recover
from Marcial Kasilag, the possession of the land and its
improvements granted by way of homestead to
Ambrosio. Marcial denied in his answer all the material
allegations of the complaint and by way of special
defense alleged that he was in possession of the land
and that he was receiving the fruits there by virtue of a
mortgage contract.
-To secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000
plus 12% interest per annum, Kasilag and Ambrosio
entered a mortgage contract of improvements of land
acquired as homestead. [contract: if Ambrosio pay the
debt with interest on or before November 16, 1936, or
4 ½ years after the date of the execution of the
instrument, then said mortgage shall become null and
void. Also, Ambrosio would execute a deed of absolute
sale upon expiration of the period, including all unpaid
interests at the rate of 12% per annum. ]
-In 1933, Emiliana was unable to pay the stipulated
interests as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. They then entered a verbal contract
whereby she conveyed to Kasilag the possession of the
land on the condition that Kasilag would not collect the
interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of
the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and
would introduce improvement in there.
-By virtue of the verbal contract, the petitioner Kasilag
entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the
products there, did not collect the interest on the loan
and introduced a P5,000 improvements upon the land.
A tax declaration was then transferred in his name and
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the assessed value of the land was increased from
P1,020 to P2,180.
Issue: Whether the petitioner should be deemed a
possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any
flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by
which it is invalidated?
Held:
YES. Kasilag is not conversant with the laws because he
is not a lawyer. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the
law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the
well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. He did
not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession
and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis(pledge of real property as
security for a debt) and that the latter, as a lien was
prohibited by Section 116 of Act. No. 2874, as amended.
Therefore, his ignorance of the provisions of Section
116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his
good faith.
[section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23
of Act No. 3517: “Except in favor of the Government or
any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of
the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent
or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction
of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said
period; but the improvements or crops on the land may
be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.”]
ELEGADO V. CA
Facts:
-Warren Taylor Graham, an American national, formerly
resident of the Philippines, died in Oregon, USA. As
certain shares of stock are left in the Philippines, his son
Ward Graham filed an estate tax return. Ward
appointed Elegado as his attorney-in-fact for the
allowance of the will in the Philippines. Elegado was a
Filipino lawyer representing the foreign company.
-On the basis of such return, the respondent
Commission of Internal Revenue assessed the deceased
estate on which assessment was protested by the law
firm of Bump, Yang, and Walker on behalf of the
estates. The protest was denied by the Commissioner.
-Elegado, as an ancillary administrator, filed a second
estate tax return with the BIR which was protested by
the Agrava Law Office on behalf of the estate.
-While the protest was pending, the petitioner filed a
motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of
P96,509.35. Elegado said that this liability had not yet
been paid although the assessment had long become
final and executory.
-Petitioner was denied contending that the first
assessment is not binding on him because it was based
on a return filed for by foreign lawyers who had no
knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax
appels.
Issue: Whether or not the first assessment is binding,
being filed for by foreign lawyers?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that Elegado’s
contention is flimsy when he argued that the first
assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers
who filed the return on which it was based were not
familiar with our tax laws and procedure. If our own
lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim similar preferences,
it follows that foreigners cannot be any less bound by
laws in our country. The foreign lawyers are not
excused from compliance of our law because of their
ignorance.
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HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners, vs. ELVIN*
CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
25, 20102.
Facts of the case:
-on Aug. 3, 2000, a civil action was commenced by Elvin
Chan against the late Eduardo Simon during the
pendency of the criminal case he filed against Simon on
violation of BP 22.
-on Aug. 9, 2000, the civil action of Chan, coupled with
application of preliminary attachment, was granted by
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Consequently, Simon
filed an urgent motion to dismiss the implementation of
the said attachment on the ground of litis pendentia (as
a consequence of the pendency of another action
between the instant parties for the same cause, the
instant action is dismissable).
-on Aug. 29, 2000, Chan oppose Simon’s motion to
dismiss with application to charge attachment bond for
damages on the ground of litis pendentia. Chan further
contends that under Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action.
-However, on Oct. 23, 2000, Simon’s motion to dismiss
the implementation of the attachment on ground of litis
pendentia was granted by MeTC.
-On September 25, 2002, Chan appealed to CA for
petition for review after RTC affirmed the decision of
MeTC, dismissing his motion for reconsideration.
-On June 25, 2002, CA reversed the decision of RTC on
the based on Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Simon then filed a motion for
reconsideration but nevertheless, denied by CA. Hence
this petition for review.
Issue: Whether Chan’s civil action to recover the
amount of the unfounded check was an independent
civil action?
Held:
It was held that no independent civil action to recover
the amount of bouncing check should be instituted
since according to Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, Sec.
1(a) when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. Note that in
this case (commenced on Aug.3, 2000), the Rules of
Court which came into effect on Dec. 1, 2000 was
applied retrospectively. The retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person
who may feel adversely affected. As a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, or arise from procedural
laws.
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FRANCISCO v. CA
This petition for review which seeks to reverse Court of
Appeal’s (CA) favoring private respondents, declaring
Eusebio Francisco as the administrator of the properties
involved in the case.
Facts of the case:
- Petitioner Teresita, the legal wife of private
respondent Eusebio Francisco, claims that she and
Eusebio have acquired properties during their marriage
including a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, an
appartment -- all situated in Brgy. Balite, Rodriguez,
Montalban, and a house a lot in Barrio San Isidro,
Rodriguez, Rizal.
-Teresita sought to administer the said properties
managed by Eusebio, claiming that her husband
became incapacitated and unfit to administer them
after he suffered various illnesses (tuberculosis, heart
disease, and cancer).
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-Petitioner also alleged the children of Eusebio by his
first marriage to have convinced their father to sign a
general power of attorney authorizing Conchita
Evangelista (daughter of Eusebio) to administer the
properties involved.
-on August 31, 1988, Teresita then filed a case against
private respondents seeking for annulment of the
general power of attorney and declaring her as the
administratrix of the properties in dispute contending
that those were acquired during the existence of the
second conjugal partnership. However, both the lower
court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the properties
belong exclusively to Eusebio and that he has the
capacity to administer them.
-Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the
previous decisions arguing that CA erred in applying
articles 160 and 158 of the New Civil Code [Title VI],
since the said title have already been repealed by article
253 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether Article 116 of the Family Code applies to
this case after Article 253 of the same Code expressly
repeals articles 158 and 160 of the Civil Code?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that, articles 158 and 160 of
the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family
Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3,
1988. However, SC cannot apply the new law in this
case since it would impair prior vested rights pursuant
to Article 256 in relation to Article 105 (second
paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal
of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code will not
impinge the rights which have become vested or
accrued while the said provisions were in force. Hence,
the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles
were in effect would not be affected by the repeal.
Therefore, the issue shall be resolved based on the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
[Art. 158, New Civil Code: Improvements, whether for
utility or adornment, made on the separate property of
the spouses through advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of either the
husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal
partnership.
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the
partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but
the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
who owns the same.]
[Art. 160, New Civil Code: "all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife".]
[Art. 116, Family Code: “All property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.”]
[Art.105(2), Family Code: The provisions of this Chapter
shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of
this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws, as provided in Article 255.]
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LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner vs. ZOSIMO A
PESCA, respondent.
This is a petition to review the ruling of CA, reversing
the decision of the Caloocan City RTC which has
declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Facts of the case:
-Petitioner Lorna Pesca and respondent Zosimo Pesca
got married on March 1975 after a brief courtship.
-Initially, the young couple did not live together as
petitioner was still in college while the respondent is a
seaman which means he had to leave barely a month
after they got married.
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-Six months later, the couple were able to build their
own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided.
The union begot four children.
-in 1988, according to Lorna, she noticed that her
husband showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to
perform his marital covenant. She also attested that
Zosimo’s true color became apparent as he manifested
his being a habitual drinker, emotionally immature,
irresponsible, cruel and violent not only to her but also
to their children. There was even a time when Zosimo
chased her with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill
her in the presence of their children.
-on November 1992, petitioner and her children left
their conjugal home as they could no longer bear the
respondent’s violence. Two months later, petitioner
decided to give her husband a chance so together with
their children, she returned to the conjugal home.
However, matters became worse.
-on March 1994, Lorna was assaulted/battered by
Zosimo for about half an hour in the presence of their
children. This incident prompted Lorna to file a petition
before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking Zosimo’s psychological incapacity.
-On November 1995, the trial court declared the said
marriage as null and void ab initio on the basis of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
-Respondent appealed to the CA to which the decision
of RTC was reversed. According to CA, Lorna has failed
to establish that her husband showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenant (as so provided for in Article
68 of the Family Code); that the incapacity is grave, has
preceded the marriage and is incurable; that the
incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is due to
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of
the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically,
and has been proven by an expert; and that the
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
-Petitioner, in her plea, seek the reversal of CA’s
decision saying that the doctrine expressed in Santos vs.
CA and the guidelines set out in Republic vs. CA and
Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature and that the decision on the
mentioned cases should have no retroactive
application.
Issue: Whether the guidelines for psychological
incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should
be taken in consideration in deciding in this case.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of CA that
Zosimo was not psychologically incapacitated on the
basis that the decision in the Molina case has force and
effect of a law, and that the guidelines laid down on it is
mandatory in nature.
When the SC has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases where the
facts are substantially the same. The interpretation
continues until overruled and the new doctrine is
applied prospectively in favor of the parties who have
relieved on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
"lex prospicit, non respicit”(The law looks forward, not
backward)
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NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORP. V. PNOC
Facts:
-National Electrification Administration (NEA) published
an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract
known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of
about 60,000 pieces of wood poles and 20,000 of cross-
arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders and the contract
was awarded to it being the lowest bidder. However,
NEA’s board of directors passed a resolution reducing
by 50% the material requirements for IPB 80 to which
Nerwin protested.
-A losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a
complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted
during the pre-qualification bid were falsified.
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-NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for
IPB 80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint
with prayer of injunction and a TRO to enjoin
respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
-PNOC – Energy Dev’t Corp issued an invitation to pre-
qualify and bid for O-ILAW project. Upon learning the
invitation, Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that
it was an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to
another bidding. The respondents sought for the
dismissal of the case arguing that it is in violation of a
rule that government infrastructure are not subject to
TROs. Notwithstanding, RTC granted TRO. After a
motion for reconsideration was denied in by the RTC,
respondents commenced in the CA a special civil action
alleging that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in: (1)holding
that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction despite the express
prohibition from the law and the SC; (2) issuing the TRO
which is a violation of the Rules of Court and
established jurisprudence. Then, CA ruled in favor of
respondents. CA grant the petition and dismissed the
Nerwin’s complaint for issuance of TRO/writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue: whether CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant
to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of TRO except SC to
gov’t projects?
Held:
No. it is clear that the RTC judge gravely abused his
discretion in entertaining an application for
TRO/preliminary injunction and issuing a preliminary
injunction through the assailed order enjoining Nerwin’s
bidding for O-ILAw project. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly
prohibits any court, except SC, the issuance of TRO,
preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory
injunctions against government. This law was earlier
upheld to have a mandatory nature by the SC in an
administrative case against a judge. To strengthen the
significance of the prohibition, SC had the same
embodied in its Administrative Circular 11-2000 which
reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of
preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction in
cases involving gov’t infrastructure projects.
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DM CONSUNJI V. CA
Facts:
-At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City which caused
his death.
-unaware of the employer’s negligence, Juego’s widow,
Maria,filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. She then filed in the RTC of Pasig, a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. after she received a copy
of the police investigation report and the prosecutor’s
memorandum, dismissing the criminal complaint
against Consunji personnel. The employer, as a
defense, argued that the widow has already availed of
the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. However,
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow.
-On appeal by the employer, CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC for the reason that Maria was not only ignorant
of the facts, but of her rights as well.
Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of CA’s
decision. Consunji assails the said ruling contending that
Maria failed to allege in her complaint that her
application and receipt of benefits from the
ECC(Employee’s Compensation Commission) were
attended by mistake of fact. Petitioner also argues that
Maria could not have been ignorant of the facts
because she was already a complainant in a criminal
case against Consunji.
-among others, petitioner COnsunji argues that Maria
had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from
claiming from Consunji the damages under the Civil
Code.
Issue: Whether or not Juego’s widow had waived her
rights on seeking for damages after previously availing
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herself of the death benefits provided under Labor
Code?
Held:
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that
a party has knowledge of his rights but chooses not to
assert them. But when one lacks knowledge of a right,
as in this present case, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of material fact negates
waiver and such waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake of fact. In this case, the
“fact” that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is
the negligence of Consunji’s employees, of which Maria
only learned only after the prosecutor issued a
resolution stating that there may be civil liability. To
add, there was no proof that Maria knew her husband
died in the elevator when she accomplished her
application for benefits from ECC.
{ note: Maria testified that she has reached only
elementary school for her educational attainment; that
she didn’t know what damages could be recovered from
the death of her husband}
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AUJERO VS. PHILCOMSAT   (PHILIPPINE
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION)
Facts:
-It was in 1967 that Aujero started working for
PHILCOMSAT as an accountant in the latter’s Finance
Department. After 34 years of service, Aujero applied
for early retirement and it was approved. It entitled him
to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to
one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of
service. At that time, the petitioner was Philcomsat’s
Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of
P274,805.00.
-On September 12, 2001, the Aujero executed a Deed of
Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor, following
his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of
P9,439,327.91.

-Almost (3) years after, the petitioner filed a complaint
for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the actual
amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00 and the
P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed
settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is
more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as
null and void.
-According to the petitioner, he had no choice but to
accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof
and was all set to return to his hometown and he signed
the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as no
single centavo would be released to him if he did not
execute a release and waiver in Philcomsat’s favor.
-The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full
amount of his retirement benefits, which is equivalent
to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of
service, is provided under the Retirement Plan that
Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of
its employees. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of
petitioner Aujero. However, NLRC, in a resolution,
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for unpaid retirement
benefits and salary in consideration of the Deed of
Release and Quitclaim. According to NLRC, petitioner
failed to allege and produce evidence that Philcomsat
employed means to vitiate Aujero’s consent to the
quitclaim.
Issue: Whether the quitclaim executed by Aujero in
Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right
to institute any claim against Philcomsat?
Held:
Considering the petitioner’s claim of fraud and bad faith
against Philcomsat to be unproven, the Court finds the
quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver, thus, the
quitclaim executed by Aujero constitutes a valid and
binding agreement. While the Aujero contended that he
has been pressured into signing the release and waiver,
his failure to present evidence renders his allegation
self-serving to invalidate the same. That no portion of
his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent
need for funds does not constitute the pressure or
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coercion contemplated by law. The court ruled that
“dire necessity” may be an acceptable ground to annul
quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low
and the employee was tricked into accepting it, which is
not the case because it could not have been that Aujero
has voluntarily waived a total amount of P4, 474,
727.09. moreover, Aujero is well-educated, a licensed
accountant and was Philcomsat’s Senior VP prior to his
retirement, hence, he cannot claim that he signed the
quitclaim without understanding its consequences and
implications.
[not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid against public
policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represent a reasonable settlement, it is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind.]
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VILLAREAL V. PEOPLE
Facts:
- 7 Freshmen Law students of Ateneo School of Law
have been initiated by the Aquila on February 1991. The
initiation rites started when the neophytes were met by
some members of the fraternity and were consequently
brought to a house and briefed on what will transpire
during the 3 days when they will be initiated. They were
informed that there will be physical beatings and that
the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were
brought to another house to commence their initiation.
-as soon as the initiation for the day ended, accused
fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head
of the initiation rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation.
After the last session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not
walk. Later that night, he was feeling cold and his
condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but
was declared dead on arrival.
-Criminal case was filed against 35 fraternity members
to which 26 of them was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for of the crime of homicide. After a
few weeks, another criminal case was commenced
against the remaining 9 accused. The criminal liability of
each of the accused were then modified by the CA
according to their individual participation on which
Dizon and Villareal were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
-CA based there ruling that there could have been no
conspiracy on the ground that the neophytes, including
Leny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of
hazing during their initiation rites.
Issue: whether the death of Leny is due to his consent
to undergo the “traditional” fraternity rites?
Held:
Yes. It was held that the rituals were performed with
Leny’s consent. A few days before the rites, he asked
both his parents for permission to join the fraternity
and his father knew that he would go through an
initiation process for 3 days. It is worth noting that the
neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to
undergo physical initiation and hazing; prior to the rites,
they were briefed on what to expect and it is of
common knowledge that before admission in fraternity,
the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. They were
also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any
time they wanted to. Indeed, there can be no fraternity
initiation without consenting neophytes. Significantly,
after going through the 1st day of the initiation, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the 2 nd day.
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FF CRUZ V. HR INDUSTRIES
Facts:
-FFCCI entered into a contract with DPWH for the
construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct. FFCCI, in turn,
entered into a Subcontract Agreement with respondent
HRCC for the supply of materials, labor, equipment,
tools and supervision for the construction of a portion
of the said project. [Subcontract Agreement: HRCC
would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which
the FFCI would then pay within 30 days from its receipt.
The requests of HRCC for payment should include
progress accomplishment of its completed works as
approved by FFCCI.]
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-Eventually, FFCCI did not pay the amount stated in the
second billing claiming that it had already paid HRRC for
the competed works and likewise did not immediately
pay for the third progress billing, claiming that it had to
evaluate the works accomplished. HRCC
demanded payment but still was not paid so the
construction corporation halted operation of the
subcontracted project.
-HRRC, pursuant to the arbitration clause in their
Subcontract Agreement, filed a complaint against FFCCI.
In its Answer, FFCCI argued that it no longer has any
liability on the said agreement as the 3 payments it
made to HRCC already presented the amount due to
HRCC in view of the works actually completed.
-petitioner maintained that HRCC failed to comply with
the condition under the agreement for the payment of
the joint measurement of the completed works, thus, it
was justified in not paying the amount stated in HRCC’s
progress billings. The arbitration commission rendered a
decision in favour of HRCC.
Issue:
1. Whether FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a
joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works under
the Subcontract agreement?
2. whether HRCC had waived its right to rescind/end the
Subcontract agreement?
Held:
1. on account of its failure to demand the joint
measurement of HRCC’s completed works, FFCI had
effectively waived its right to ask for the conduct of the
same as an essential condition to HRCC’s submission of
its monthly progress billings. It is evident that the joint
measurement in the Subcontract Agreement never
materialized. Despite the lack of joint measurement,
FFCCI did not contest against the progress billings
submitted by HRCC on separate occasions. FFCCI’s
voluntary payment in favour of HRCC is an indication
that it had effectively waived its right to demand for the
joint measurement of the completed works. Hence,
FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC’s
valuation of the completed works.
2. yes. HRCC have effectively waived its right to effect
extrajudicial rescission of its contract with FFCCI. Based
on the Effects of Disputes and Continuing Obligations
clause of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC shall at all
times proceed with the prompt performance of the
Works in accordance with the directives of FFCCI and
the agreement, notwithstanding the existence of
dispute or controversy between the parties during the
course of the said agreement.
[the right of rescission, without prejudice to the rights
of thirds person, is statutorily recognized in reciprocal
obligations according to Civil Code (art. 1191). This right
may be waived, expressly or impliedly.]
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THORNTON V. THORNTON
Facts:
-American petitioner and Filipino respondent were
married and had one daughter. After 3 years, the
woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife
and wanted to return to her old job as GRO. One day,
the woman left the family home with their daughter
and told her servants that she was going to Basilan.
-The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati City but was
dismissed because the child was in Basilan. He then
went to Basilan, but didn’t find them and the barangay
office issued a certification that respondent was no
longer residing there.
-Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in
CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country. The petition was
however denied by CA on the ground that it did not
have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family
Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, as it
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.)
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[Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981): the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a
writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction
was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act
expanding the jurisdiction of this Court.]
Issue: whether CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in
light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions?
Held:
It was held that CA should take cognizance of the case
because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors. The provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts
have concurrent jurisdiction. The literal interpretation
of the word “exclusive” in the repealing law, will result
in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the
rights and promote welfare of children. Thus, what is
controlling is the spirit and intent of the law, not the
letter of the law. It is a settled rule in statutory
construction that implied repeals are not favoured. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed
to have known the existing laws on the subject and not
have enacted conflicting statutes.
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KIDA V. SENATE
Facts:
-this is a motion assailing the decision of the court
upholding the constitutionality of RA 1053 or an act
postponing the regional elections in ARMM [scheduled
to be held on the 2nd Monday of August 2011] to the 2nd
Monday of May 2013.
-petitioners argue that ARMM elections are not covered
by the Constitutional mandate since it was not
specifically mentioned in the Transitory Provisions. They
further contend that the provisions of RA 1053, in
postponing elections, amend RA 9054.
The following issues were sought to be resolved in this
petition:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization
of ARMM regional elections with national and local
elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does
RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements?
Held:
a) it was held that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local election, which
includes ARMM elections. While the Constitution does
not expressly instruct Congress of the said
synchronization, but it can be inferred from the
Transitory Provisions stating that first elections of
members of the Congress under this Constitution shall
be held on the 2nd Monday of May. It is also reiterated
in Article X clearly shows the intention of the
Constitution to classify ARMM as local governments,
thus elections held therein are also considered as local
elections.
b) RA 10153 does not amend RA 9054[providing the 1 st
elections would be held on the 2nd Monday of
September 2001]. Thorough reading of RA 9054 reveals
that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections and does not provide for the succeeding
regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of
the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 10153 clearly do
not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change
or revise any provision in RA No. 9054; RA No. 10153
merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054 thus, there is
no need for it to comply with the amendment
requirements.
The court ruled that supermajority vote requirement
makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law thus making the
said requirement unconstitutional for violating the
principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the
power to amend and repeal these laws. The power of
repeal may be exercised at the same session at which
the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its
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progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature
cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.
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DE CASTRO V. JBC
Facts:
-this is a motion for reconsideration with regard to the
midnight appointment made by outgoing president
GMA [7 days before presidential election].
-some of the petitioners argue that Article VII, Sec. 15 of
the Constitution, being unambiguous, does not lead to
an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments
from the express ban on midnight appointments.
-moreover, some petitioner claimed that the ruling
which declares Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary, runs in conflict
with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory
construction. The provision admits only one exception,
temporary appointments in the Executive Department.
-even one petitioner argues that since it has been a
practice that the most senior Justice will act as a Chief
Justice whenever the incumbent is unfit, it goes to show
that the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is
not urgently necessary.
-most of the petitioners claimed that the principle of
stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that
the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning
Valenzuela ruling that Section 15, Article VII prohibited
the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to
judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
Issue: Whether Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
should be interpreted as that which exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban on midnight
appointments?
Held:
The court ruled that, had the framers of the
Constitution intended to extend the prohibition to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. The court emphasized
that the framers would have easily and surely written
the prohibition. Thus, the President is now left with an
imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the
vacancies created by such inevitable retirements within
90 days from their occurrence.
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TY V. BANCO FILIPINO
Facts:
-Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank wanted to
purchase real properties as new branch sites for its
expansion program. Since the General Banking Act
limits a bank’s real estate holdings to no more than 50%
of its capital assets, the respondent’s Board of Directors
decided to warehouse some of its existing properties
and branch sites.
-Nancy Ty, a major stockholder and a director of the
respondent, persuaded two other major stockholders,
Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, to
organize and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and
purchase real properties in trust for the respondent.
-In implementing their trust agreement, the respondent
sold to Tala Realty some of its properties. Tala Realty
simultaneously leased to the respondent the properties
for 20 years, renewable for another 20 years at the
respondent’s option with a right of first refusal in the
event Tala Realty decides to sell them. However, in
August 1992, Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed
the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals,
deposits, and goodwill, with a threat to eject the
respondent.
-the respondent filed 17 complaints against Tala Realty,
the petitioner, Pedro, Remedios, and their respective
nominees for reconveyance of different properties with
17 Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) nationwide, including a
civil case the RTC of Malabon. Upon move to dismiss on
the ground of forum shopping and litis pendentia,
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Malabon RTC denied the motion finding no
commonality in the 16 other civil cases since they
involved different causes of action.
-In its May 6, 2008 order, RTC granted the respondent’s
motion to revive proceedings, noting that res judicata[a
thing adjudged] is not applicable since there are
independent causes of action for each of the properties
sought to be recovered. Ty then elevated the case to
the CA assailing the RTC orders. However, CA affirmed
the RTC’s orders noting that res judicata does not apply
since the issue of validity or enforceability of the trust
agreement was raised in an ejectment case, not an
action involving title or ownership, citing the Court’s
pronouncement in G.R. No. 14470560 that G.R. No.
137533 does not put to rest all pending litigations
involving the issues of ownership between the parties
since it involved only an issue of de facto possession.
Issue: whether the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 137533
applies as stare decisis to the present case?
Held:
The case at bar presents the same issue that the Court
already resolved on previous cases wherein it applied
the ruling in G.R. No. 137533, one of several ejectment
cases filed by Tala Realty against the respondent arising
from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance
case subject of the present petition, that the trust
agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced.
The Bank and Tala entered into contracts of sale and
lease back of the disputed property and created an
implied trust "warehousing agreement" for the
reconveyance of the property. In the eyes of the law,
however, this implied trust is inexistent and void for
being contrary to law. Clearly, the Bank was well aware
of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the
General Banking Act and that its "warehousing
agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the
limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the
agreement in writing, but instead phrased its right to
reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a
"first preference to buy" at the "same transfer price".
Thus, while the sale and lease of the subject property is
binding upon the parties, implied trust cannot be
enforced even assuming the parties intended to create
it. The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the
property based on its alleged implied trust relationship
with Tala.
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VIRTUCIO V. ALEGARBES
Facts:
-respondent Alegarbes filed Homestead application for
a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land in Lantawan
Basilan. His application was approved however, the land
was subdivided into 3 lots as a consequence of a public
land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Custodio
while lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Virtucio.
Alegarbes opposed to the said homestaid application
claiming that his approved application cover the whole
area including lots 139 and 140.
-the Director of Lands denied Alegarbes’ protest,
amending his application to exclude Lots 139 and 140.
He appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources then sought a relief from the Office of the
President after the appeal was dismissed. However, the
office of the Pres. affirmed the decision of Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and thereafter, the
Land Management Bureau of DENR ordered Alegarbes
and all acting in his behalf, to vacate the lot but he
refused.
-Virtucio filed a complaint for “Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction” before the
RTC. Alegarbes then argued that the decision of Bureau
of Lands was void from the beginning considering that
the acting Director of Lands acted without jurisdiction
and in violation of the Public Land Act. He further
contended that the patent issued in favour of Virtucio
was procured through fraud and deceit, rendering it
void ab initio. Moreover, Alegarbes argued that the
approval of his homestead application had already
attained finality and could not be reversed, modified or
set aside. To add, he averred that his deceased brother
and the latter’s family helped him developed Lot 140
and that he and his family had been permanently
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occupying the lot, introducing improvements thereto
since 1960.
-upon appeal on the decision of RTC, CA declared
Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140 explaining that
even if the decision to approve Virtucio's homestead
application over Lot 140 had become final, Alegarbes
could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive
prescription. CA also found reversible error on the part
of the RTC in disregarding the evidence before it and
relying entirely upon the decisions of the administrative
bodies, none of which touched upon the issue of
Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of
over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. The CA held
that the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the OP did not determine
whether Alegarbes' possession of the subject property
had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of
public land and, thus, was beyond their jurisdiction.
Issue: whether CA erred in disregarding its decision on a
previous case, for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership which involved the same factual
circumstance and ruled against Alegarbes?
Held:
It must be noted that the subject property in the said
case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio
was not a party to that case. Virtucio cannot enjoy
whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have
had just because it involved similar factual
circumstances. Moreover, it is settled that a decision of
the CA does not establish judicial precedent. The
principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by Supreme Court
in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.
PEOPLE V. RITTER
Facts:
-Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide involving a young girl (Rosario Baluyot) of
about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and
who later died because a foreign object left inside her
vaginal canal.
-it was alleged that on October 1986, Ritter brought
street children Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot
inside his hotel room. After his sexual advancements
upon Jessie, he then proceeded with Rosario. The
following morning, he paid Jessie and Rosario then left
the hotel.
-after the American left, Rosario told Jessie that Ritter
had inserted something in her vagina but they couldn’t
do anything about it anymore nor did they report it to
the police because Ritter had already left. The following
day, Jessie claimed that he saw Rosario complaining of
pain in her vagina due to the foreign object that was not
yet removed.
-on May 1987, while garbage scavenging, Gaspar
Alcantara saw Rosario being stared upon by people
because of the blood in her skirt and she was found
unconscious. Gaspar brought her to the hospital and
gave personal circumstance of Rosario on the
information desk, although he admitted that he did not
know her name when he brought her there.
-while Rosario was confined in the hospital, 3 good
Samaritans belonging to a religious and civic
organization chanced upon Rosario who was all alone,
with no relatives attending to her since she is a street
child, having stowed away from the custody of her
grandmother. The Samaritans discovered that Rosario
was only 12 and decided to help her since then.
-when attended by physicians, on May 17, 1987, it was
found out that there was a foreign object lodged in her
vaginal canal. She was then scheduled for operation
after an ob-gyne failed to extract the object using
forceps. It was discovered that the foreign object was a
portion of sexual vibrator. The operation was
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considered successful however, the following day,
Rosario got serious and was pronounced dead.
-after what happened, Sis.Palencia (one of the
Samaritans) was able to track the grandmother of
Rosario and asked if she was interested in filing a case
for her granddaughter. But, the atty. of Ritter went to
see the grandmother and offered money to settle the
case.
-the police of Olongapo made a follow up of the case of
Rosario on which they conducted various investigation
leading them to Ritter who was thereafter arrested,
facing the charge of Rape with Homicide. He was
convicted by the Trial court, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the
accused rendered by the lower court?
Held:
No. all evidence presented by the prosecution showing
Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the
incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of
her birth which is very vital in this case. It is not
incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario’s age.
Since her age was not established to have been 12 years
old at the time, it was necessary to prove that the usual
elements of rape were present: that there was force
and intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious. Again, the prosecution does not
have the proof of such facts. The evidence even showed
that she was paid P300 which appears that she have
consented to the sexual advances. Based on the
inaccuracy of facts and lack of sufficient evidence, Ritter
should be acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is
not exempt from civil liability.
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ALONZO V. PADUA
Facts:
-5 brothers and sisters inherited in equal, a pro indiviso
(for an undivided part) shares a parcel of land registered
in the name of their deceased parents.

-In 1963, Celestino Padua sold his undivided share by
absolute sale, to the petitioners Alonzo while a year
late, Eustaquia Padua sold her share to the same
vendees in an instrument denominated “con pacto de
retro sale”. By virtue of the agreements, petitioners
occupied portion of the land sold to them and they
subsequently enclosed it with a fence. In 1975, with
their consent, their son Eduardo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on part of the enclosed area.
-In 1976, Mariano Padua (one of the five coheirs),
sought to redeem the area sold to Alonzo spouses but
his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he
was an American citizen. Thereafter, in 1977, Tecla
(another coheir), filed a complaint invoking the same
right of redemption claimed by her brother. The trial
court likewise dismissed the case on the ground that
the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
30 days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964.
Although there was no written notice the co heirs have
actual knowledge of the sales.
-proof of actual notice: the other co-heirs, including
Tecla, lived in the same lot; Estaquia herself who sold
her portion, was staying in the same house of her sister
Tecla; and petitioners and the Alonzo spouses were
close friends.
-on appeal, respondent court (IAC), declared that the
notice required by art. 1088 of the Civil Code was a
written notice and actual notice would not suffice as
substitute. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: whether the SC should base the ruling of the case
on the strict letter of the law? or to the spirit or intent
of the lawmakers in enacting the said law?
Held:
SC deviated from the strict letter of the law. Though
from earliers decision of the Court, the written noticed
being referred to in the article 1088 should be given by
the vendor and not the vendees and therefore the
notice given by vendees would not induce the running
of the 30-day period, this instant case is an exception to
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the general rule in view of the peculiar circumstances.
In seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of
the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker, that is, to render justice. Thus,
laws are interpreted and applied in consonance with
justice.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure
that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale
and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting
time of the 30-day period of redemption. The instant
case presents no such problem because the right of
redemption was invoked 13 years after the first sale and
14 years after the second sale. From the established
facts, the claim of the respondents that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in
1963 and 1964 is unmeritorious.
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BARCELLANO V. BARZA (BAÑAS)
Facts:
-Dolores Bañas is an heir of Bartolome Bañas who owns
in fee a lot situated in Albay. Adjoining the lot is the
property of Vicente Medina.
-Medina offered his lot for sale to the adjoining owners
of the property, the heirs of Bartolome, including
Dolores, Crispino Bermillo and Isabela Beruela. As the
representative of the family, Crispino agreed to the
offer which is to take place after the harvest season.
-on April of the same year, Medina sold the same
property to Armando Barcillano. The following day, the
heirs of Bañas learned about the sale and Medina
confirmed it. The heirs conveyed their intention to
redeem the property but according to Medina, there
was already a deed of sale executed between the
parties.
-unable to settle the disputes, Dolores filed an action for
Legal Redemption before the RTC but the petition was
withdrawn on the ground that the amount supposed to
be paid for the redemption was badly needed for their
immediate emergency needs.
-on the following year, Dolores, represented by
Bermillo, filed another action for Legal Redemption
which was opposed by Barcellano insisting that he
complied with the provisions under Art. 1623 of the
New Civil Code and that the Bañas failed to exercise
their right within the period prescribed by law. The
court dismissed the Bañas heirs petitions for failure to
comply with the condition precedent of making a formal
offer to redeem and for failure to file an action in court
together with the consignation of the redemption price
within the 30-day reglementary period.
-on appeal, CA reversed the decision and granted the
heirs the right to redeem the property for the reason
that the filing of a complaint before a katarungang
pambarangay should be considered as a notice to
Barcellano and Medina that the heirs were exercising
their right of redemption over the property. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari of Barcellano.
-Barcellano maintains that the written notice required
under Act 1623 to be given to adjoining owner was no
longer necessary because there was already actual
notice.
Issue: whether the court should adhere to the strict
letter of the law concerning the requirement of written
notice under Act 1623 of the New Civil Code?
Held:
It was held and again that notwithstanding the actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the said co-owner is still
entitled to a written notice from the selling of the co-
owner. Nothing in the records show that a written
notice was sent to the Bañas and without such notice,
the period of 30days does not start. But, the petitioner
contends that the only purpose behind the provision is
to ensure that the owner of the adjoining land is
actually notified of the intention of the owner to sell his Issue: Whether the employer, who has furnished a
property. However, the court ruled that this is not the
case considering that “peculiar circumstances”
mentioned in the Alonzo is absent in the Barcellano
case. Thus, the strict letter of the law must apply. The
departure from the strict letter should only be for
extraordinary reasons like as expressed in art.1623
–“the deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry
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of Property unless accompanied by affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.” Wherefore, respondent Bañas
has perfect right of redemption.
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MARTINEZ V. VAN BUSKIRK
Facts:
-Carmen Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita,
Manila when a delivery wagon(used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses are
attached) owned by Buskirk, came from the opposite
direction, while their carromata  went close to the
sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. 
The horses ran into the carromata occupied by the
Martinez with her child and it overturned which caused
serious cut upon the Martinez’s head.
-Buskirk describes the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time of the accident, as a good
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero.
He contended that the cochero was tasked to deliver
some forage and for that purpose, the conchero tied
the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the
delivery wagon while unloading the forage to be
delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and
made noises that frightened the horses causing them to
run. The cochero failed to stop the horses since he was
thrown upon the ground.
-the court ruled that Buskirk was guilty of negligence
based on the provision of the Civil code in effect that
time on which it states that the obligation imposed to
repair the damage done by fault or negligence is
demandable as well for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and
capable driver, is liable for the negligence of his
cochero?
Held:
No. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the
evidence in this case.  The court held that it is a
universal practice of merchants during that time to
deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is
also considered universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left during the accident.
It has been practiced for a long time and generally has
not been the cause of accidents or injuries, thus, the
judgment is should be reversed.
It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long
time, have not been destructive and which are
approved by the society are considered as custom.
Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or
imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted
by the society is that they are beneficial rather that
prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone
negligent because of some act that led to an injury or
accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the
cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
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INTERNAL REVENUE V. PRIMETOWN
Facts:
- on March 11, 1999, Primetown’s Vice Chair Gilbert
Yap, applied for a refund or credit of income tax which
Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are
entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that
year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials,
etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence,
they were claiming for a refund.
-On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos
required Primetown to submit additional documents to
which Primetown complied with but their claim was not
acted upon. This prompted Primetown group to file a
petition for review in Court of Tax Appeals on April 14,
2000. CTA dismissed the petition contending that as it
was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing
a judicial claim for tax refund, under Sec 229 of NIRC.
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-According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to
730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown
filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and
that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed
731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return.
Primetown thereafter appealed to CA and the decision
of CTA was reversed since the rule that a year has 365
days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular
year is a leap year.
Issue: whether Primetown’s petition was filed within
the 2-year period?
Held:
Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed
within the 2-year reglementary period. However, the
court held that the basis for ruling should be in
pursuance to EO 292[Administrative Code of 1987],as it
impliedly repealed Art. 13 of the New Civil Code since
the provisions are irreconcilable. The Administrative
Code provides that a “year” shall be understood to be
12 calendar months. The SC defined a “calendar month”
as a month designated in the calendar without regard
to the number of days it may contain. It is the period of
the rime running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if
there is no sufficient number of days in the next month,
then up to and including the last day of the month.
[example: one calendar month from Dec. 31, 2007 will
be—from Jan 1, 2008 to Jan 31, 2008; one calendar
month from Jan.31, 2008 will be—from Feb. 1, 2008
until Feb.29, 2008.]
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MONTAJES V. PEOPLE
Facts:
-petitioner Montajes was charged with the crime of
Direct Assault before the MTC after having allegedly
hacking Punong Barangay Rellon while in the
performance of his duties, and knowing fully that Rellon
is a barangay official. Rellon declared that at about 1am
of Dec. 8, 2002, he was at benefit dance sponsored by
the Sangguniang Kabataan when he met Montajes who
uttered offensive words then drew his bolo, approached
then strucked him once. Luckily Rellon was not hit by
the bolo. During the mediation in the barangay hall, the
accused asked for forgiveness from Rellon which he
declined.
-from the testimony of Rellano, he went to the benefit
dance to stop it since it was already 1am. The stoppage
resulted to anger from the people causing a stone to be
thrown at the house of Montajes. This made Montajes
to get out of the house and look for persons responsible
for it. The testimony of Montajes was somewhat similar
to that of Rellano, except that Montajes denied the
accusation that he attacked the barangay captain.
-on December 29, 2005, MTC rendered a judgment
finding Montajes guilty of the crime filed against him.
Two years later, he appealed to the RTC but the court
affirmed the decision of MTC. On May 4, 2007, he filed
for a motion for reconsideration but the RTC likewise
denied his motion. He then filed with the CA for
extension of time to file petition for review praying for
an extended period of 15 days (from May 21, 2007 to
June 5, 2007). He subsequently filed the petition on
June 5.
-on Sept. 21,2007, the petition was denied for being
filed out of time. The court ruled that petitioner
received the copy of the resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration on May 4 thus, the 15-day
reglementary period to file a petition for review expired
on May 21 (considering that the last day, May 19, fell on
a Saturday). It is well settled that when the day of the
period falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, and a
party is granted an extension of time, the extension
should be counted from the last day which is either a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
Issue: whether CA erred in denying due course to
Montajes’ petition for being filed out of time?
Held:
No. under sec. 1, rule 22 of the Rules of Court on which
Montajes relied, if the last day to file a petition falls on a
Saturday, the time shall not run until the next working
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day. However, although Montajes’ filing of the motion
for extension was within the period provided by law,
the filing of the petition itself was not on time. Any
extension of time to file the required pleading should be
counted from the expiration of the period regardless of
the fact that the due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday. In this case, the original period for filing the
petition for review with the CA was on May 19 (a
Saturday).
However, the court ruled that being a few days late in
the filing of the petition for review does not
automatically warrant its dismissal especially so, where
strong consideration of substantial justice are manifest
in the petition, the court may relax the stringent
application of technical rules in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction. Courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice.
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TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAÑO
Facts:
-Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got
married before a Catholic chaplain and planned to
elope. But, the elopement did not materialize because
Vicenta’s mother discovered such marriage. Her parents
asked the advice Father Reynes and subsequently
agreed to recelebrate the marriage. However, Vicenta
refused to proceed with the ceremony because a letter
from the students of san Carlos College disclosed that
Pastor and their matchmaker, Pacita Noel had an
amorous relationship.
-Vicenta had gone to Misamis Occidental and she filed
for a petition to annul her marriage with Tenchavez.
Apparently, the case was dismissed because of her non-
appearance at the hearing.
-without informing Tenchavez, Vicenta left for the
States, indicating in her passport that she was single.
She then filed for divorce against Tenchavez in a District
Court in Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character.” Thereafter, the decree of
divorce “final and absolute” was issued.
-meanwhile, Vicenta’s parents filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter’s marriage
with Tenchavez.
-Vicenta then married an American (Russell Moran) in
Nevada and subsequently acquired an American
citizenship.
-Tenchavez filed a complaint against the Catholic
Church thru its Diocesan tribunal (for having decreed
the annulment), against Vicenta, and against Vicenta’s
parents(for allegedly having discouraged Vicenta from
joining him). Thru the complaint, he asks for legal
separation and one million pesos for damages.
-in an answer, Vicenta claimed that the divorce is valid
and therefore making her marriage with Moran as
equally valid.
Issue:
1. whether there was valid marriage between
Tenchavez and Escano?
2. whether the marriage between Tenchavez and
Escano still subsists in lieu of the divorce?
Held:
1. There was a valid marriage between Vicenta and
Tenchaves. The chaplaine’s alleged lack of authority
from the parish priest as required by the Canon law, is
irrelevant in our civil law because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (marriage law in force that time)
expressly provides that actual authority of the
solemnizing officer was only a formal requirement and
therefore not essential to give the marriage civil effects.
To add, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her
original action for annulment and subsequently suing
for divorce implies her admission that her marriage to
Tenchavez was valid and binding.
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2. valid marriage between Tenchavez and VIcenta
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
Law. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
was still a Filipino citizen and therefore was then a
subject of our law. Article 15 of the Civil Code already in
force at the time does not admit absolute divorce. Thus,
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code is
invalid; The marriage, as well, contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country.
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ATCI OVERSEAS CORP V. ECHIN
Facts:
-Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in
behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical
technologist under 2-year contract with a monthly
salary of US$1,200.00. Within a year, Echin was
terminated for not passing the probationary period
under the Memorandum of Agreement.
-Ministry denied respondent‘s request for
reconsideration and she returned to the Philippines
shouldering her own fare.
-Echin filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented by Ikdal, and the Ministry as the foreign
principal. Since herein petitioners did not show that
there was just cause to warrant Echin’s dismissal,
petitioners were ordered by the Labor Arbiter to pay
her salary for the 3-months unexpired portion of the
contract. NLRC affirmed this decision.
-petitioner appealed to CA contending that their
principal, being a foreign government agency, is
immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to
them. However, their appeal was likewise denied and so
as their motion for reconsideration. But, petitioners
maintain that they should not be held liable Echin’s
employment contract specifically stipulates that her
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service law
and regulations of Kuwait. Petitioners also contended
that assuming arguendo that the Philippine labor laws
are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a
government agency which is immune from suit,
petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable since the
Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as
jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable
considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondent‘s employment shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait?
Held:
It was held that ATCI, as a private recruitment agency,
cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of
OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency
of claiming that its foreign principal is a government
agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such
foreign principal’s liability must first be established
before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable. Based on RA 8042, obligations in the recruitment
agreement entered into between the local agent and its
foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the parties
decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of
such parties towards the contracted employees under
the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends
up to and until the expiration of the employment
contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws
on probationary employment are not applicable since it
was expressly provided in Echin’s employment contract,
which she voluntarily entered into was not
substantiated. Thus, a contract freely entered into is
considered the law between the parties who can
establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, including the laws which
they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long
as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
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To add, international law, the party who wants to have
a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law
is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours
thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in the present case.
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TUNA PROCESSING INC. V. PHIL KINGFORD
Facts:
-Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of a US Patent,
Philippine Letters Patent, and an Indonesian Patent,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
5 Philippine tuna processors including respondent
Philippine Kingford, Inc.  The MOA provides for the
enforcing of the abovementioned patents, granting
licenses under the same, and collecting royalties, and
for the establishment of petitioner Tuna Processors, Inc.
(TPI).
-Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition,
the tuna processors, including KINGFORD, withdrew
from TPI and correspondingly infringing on their
obligations. TPI submitted the dispute for arbitration
before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution
in California, USA and the case won against Kingford.
-To enforce the award, TPI filed a Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City.
KINGFORD filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the RTC
denied for lack of merit. Respondent KINGFORD then
sought for the inhibition of the RTC judge Alameda, and
moved for the reconsideration.
-Judge Ruiz, to which the case was re-raffled, granted
KINGFORDS’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed
the petition on the ground that TPI lacked legal capacity
to sue in the Philippines. [TPI is a corporation
established in the State of California and not licensed to
do business in the Philippines.]
-the present Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to
nullify the order of the trial court in dismissing the TPI
filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, on the basis of
Rule 45. Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled to
seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject
foreign arbitral award in accordance with RA No. 9285
(Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 ), the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (Model Law), as none of these specifically
requires that the party seeking for the enforcement
should have legal capacity to sue. 
Issue: Whether a foreign corporation, not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, but collects royalties from
entities in the Philippines, can sue here to enforce a
foreign arbitral award?
Held:
It was held that Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to
do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance
with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004.  A foreign corporation’s capacity
to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award
is concerned. When a party enters into  a  contract  have been deprived of their legitimes, as illegitimate
containing  a  foreign  arbitration  clause and, as in this
case,  in  fact  submits itself to arbitration, it   becomes
bound by the contract, by  the arbitration and by the
result of arbitration, conceding thereby  the  capacity of
the  other  party to enter into the contract, participate
in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the
result.  the national law of the decedent is applied—in this
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign
arbitral award should be respected not because it is
favored over domestic laws and procedures, but
because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any
conflict of law question.
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AMOS V. BELLIS
Facts:
-Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States who had 5 legitimate children with his
first wife (whom he divorced), 3 legitimate children with
his second wife (who survived him) and, 3 illegitimate
children.
-6 years prior his death, he executed 2 wills: 1) after all
taxes, obligations and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, to his 1st wife and 3 illegitimate children; and 2)
the remainder of his estate and properties to his 7
surviving children (by his 1st and 2nd wife). 
-People’s Bank and Trust Company, as an executor of
the will, paid all the inheritance, which is released from
time to time. Preparatory to closing its administration,
the executor submitted and filed it’s “Executor’s Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project
Partition” wherein it reported the satisfaction of the
legacies according to the will.
-Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
children, to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law as a compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Their respective oppositions were overruled by the
court and thus approving the “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project Partition”. The
basis of the ruling is Art. 16 of the Civil Code on which
case, the Texas Law—which did not provide for
legitimes.
Issue: Whether Philippine law or Texas law should be
applied in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional rights
Held:
The Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article
10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code provides that
the said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled
in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not
require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.  The
Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are
not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.
[The doctrine of renvoi is pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country and a domicile of another. It
is not a problem in this case. Even assuming, Texas has a
conflict of law rule providing that the law of domicile
should govern, the same would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflict rule adopting the
situs theory calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would
arise, since the properties involved are found in the
Philippines. ]
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RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE
Facts:
-Brand Marine Services, Inc., (BMSI) a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, and respondent Rouzie entered into a
contract. Rouzie was hired by BMSI as representative to
negotiate the saleof services with the Philippine
government. He then, secured a service contract with
the government on behalf of BMSI.
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-In 1994, Rouzie filed before NLRC, a complaint against
BMSI and Rust International Inc. for illegal termination,
non-payment of commission, and breach of contract.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a favorable decision for
respondent. However NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
-Rouzie elevated the case before the Supreme Court but
it was dismissed. He then filed an action for damages
before the RTC against the petitioner and sued BMSI
and RUST International reiterating the allegations made
in the earlier labor case. The respondent also alleged
that BMSI, Rust International, and petitioner, combined
and function as one company. The petitioner sought the
dismissal of the case on grounds of failure to state a
cause of action and forum non conveniens. RTC and CA
however denied the petition.
Issue: Whether CA erred in refusing to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens?
Held:
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court in
conflicts- of -law cases may refuse impositions on its
jurisdictions where it is not the most convenient forum
and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere. However, the Supreme Court
rejected petitioner’s contention stating that the
presence of a valid choice of law clause did not suggest
that Philippine courts are precluded from hearing the
civil action.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws
problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and
where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the matter, it may or can
proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-
laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of
the country where the case is filed.
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TAMANO V. ORTIZ
Facts
-Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites.
Prior to Sen. Tamano’s death, he married Estrellita in
civil rites too. A year after his death, Zorayda and her
son filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground
that it was bigamous. Zorayda further argues that her
husband and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as
divorced and single, respectively, thus making the
entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.
-Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC
has no jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage
could file an action for annulment against the other
spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and
Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim
rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested
in Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.
-RTC denied the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction
since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance
with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance
with Muslim Personal Laws. The case was referred to CA
and ruled that the instant case would fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courst ONLY when filed
in places where there are shari’a court. Thus, the case
should be properly filed before RTC since there are no
shari’a court in Quezon City.
Issue: Whether Shari’a courts and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature of
action?
Held:
SC held that RTC, under The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, have jurisdiction over all actions involving
the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal
actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where
the complainant resides, or where the defendant or any
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of the principal defendants resides, at the choice of the
complainant.
In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were
married through a civil wedding. And whether or not
they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia
courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction over
marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by private respondents Zorayda and Adib, it was
alleged that Estrellita and Sen. Tamano were married in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never
was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083.
Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to
Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano
under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her
Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were
likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would
still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts. The Code of Muslim Personal
Laws is silent in cases where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a
courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated
under both civil and Muslim laws.
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LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past.
Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no
vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the
protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its
subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner
Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen.
Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano
married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws
and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4
In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status
was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to
the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his
death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad
A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of
the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with
Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married
Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant
Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil
Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent
marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted
the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being
declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis,
because the deceased never divorced Complainant
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly
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done so because divorce is not allowed under the New
Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not
have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the
provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the
marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda
was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been
one contracted under Muslim law as provided under
Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and
Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual
desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December
19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an
extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted
from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or
until February 18, 1995, both of which the court
granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita
filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where
she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as
had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint
against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim
marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted
its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.13
Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari
petition with this Court questioning the denial of her
Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred
the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as
CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC
continued to try the case since there can be no default
in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was
allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing
parties presented their evidence. When it was
Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for
such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance
until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the
proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary restraining
order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from
hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition
adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30,
1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s
judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the
RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June
26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the
hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this
scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case,
Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for
decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been
delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground
that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits
the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC
of Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as
shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both
the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of
general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming
jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for
reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18,
1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment
declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void
ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen.
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Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab
initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family
Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra)
immediately shows that the second marriage of the late
Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the
subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This
renders the subsequent marriage void from the very
beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his
civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the
void character of the second marriage because, in this
jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is
not an acceptable method of terminating the effects of
a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family
Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied
her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for
the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have
required her to file her answer after the denial of her
motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is
capacitated to marry her as his marriage and
subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the
Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of
legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to
the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17,
2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be
allowed to file her answer as she was given ample
opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking
for numerous postponements. She never filed her
answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period
longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also
ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition
for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an
independent and original action, it does not interrupt
the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged
that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio
for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code,
which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted
that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites,
while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the
legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s
wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s
subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied
Estrellita’s Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the
allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on
the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of
the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s
judgment as the proceedings between the parties had
been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion.
Assuming that the issues have not been joined before
the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to
file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s
allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its
judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the
records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603
pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellita’s
marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo,
Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the
RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued,
depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and
to present her evidence to dispute the allegations
against the validity of her marriage. She claims that
Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule that the
filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer
suspends the period to file an answer and,
consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend
proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with
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finality. She maintains that she merely participated in
the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance
that the proceedings will be without prejudice to
whatever action the High Court will take on her petition
questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC
violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse
judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the
records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA
on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of
a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite
before further proceeding could be held when a party
has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage
with the late senator is valid as the latter was already
divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married
her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to
the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need
of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both
parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano
married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to
by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no
legal standing to file suit because only the husband or
the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen)
defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses that Estrellita
was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that
filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the
proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public
prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that
this is no longer essential considering the vigorous
opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows
the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private
respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of
Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano,
reasoning that any proper interested party may attack
directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and
Adib have such right to file the action as they are the
ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any
comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
judgment, even though the latter was rendered
prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered
without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution
of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she
has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due
process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late
Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to
have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the
loss of her right to answer; and her pending petition for
certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of
the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not
at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit
before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was
deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated
in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the
suspension of the period to file an answer and of the
proceedings in the trial court until her petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her
Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In
said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA
which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument,
to wit:
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However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion
to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the complaint.
The filing of said motion suspended the period for her
to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is
resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it
behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the
hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent
Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the
‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now
Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period
provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case
less than five (5) days computed from service on her of
the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within
which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41
(Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we
pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated
to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to
dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above
excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its
proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before
the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to
observe due process in the course of the proceeding of
the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to
dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband
to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with
undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure,
the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant
case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as
she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended
period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed
motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued
its judgment, as it should have waited first for the
resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding
the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a
petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings
before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation
of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the
judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case."43 In
fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered
judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present
her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by
way of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding
the trial court from proceeding with the principal
action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in
refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial
court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself
and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own
dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans
her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the
trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita
to have waived her right to present her side of the
story. Neither should the lower court wait for the
decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and
executory, nor should it wait for its records to be
remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves
strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not
the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC)44 also requries the participation of the public
prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his
investigation report to determine whether there is
collusion between the parties:
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Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1)
Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the
public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he
shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties
shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the
report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall
dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion
exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall
be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed
the public prosecutor to submit the required report,45
which we find to have been sufficiently complied with
by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his
Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he
attested that there could be no collusion between the
parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita
is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case
at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of
collusion or a lack of participation by the public
prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not
invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in
annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence
is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure
lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the
late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated
by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil
and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing
marriage relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any
given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil
Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the
law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603
that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil
and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on
February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain
rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The
former explicitly provided for the prospective
application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed
prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by
the laws in force at the time of their execution, and
nothing herein except as otherwise specifically
provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate
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to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred
thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the
principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the
contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every
case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive
operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force
and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place
before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim
Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the
effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim
law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim
law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to
this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual
consent for the marriage to be considered as one
contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of
mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will
still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage
was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code
governs their personal status since this was in effect at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of
Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the
time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage
is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal
personalities to file the declaration of nullity of
marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is
prospective in application and does not shut out the
prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the
Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that
under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the
wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and
Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their
own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a
void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. However, this interpretation does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the
spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of
compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate
heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section
3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory
or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or
injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is
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employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from
filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule
contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from
the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that
they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse"
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of
the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes
the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda
and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for
nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is
prospective in application and does not apply to cases
already commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity
of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While the
Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party
who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held
that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken
place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an
heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in
interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since
both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a
couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would
preserve their respective rights which include striking
down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA
Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution
issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
ZAMORANOS V. PEOPLE
Facts:
-Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in
Islamic rites. Subsequently, they wed again in civil rites
before RTC judge in Quezon City. However, a year after,
Zamoranos and de Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq
and the dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by
Shari’a court.
-thereafter, Zamoranos married Samson Pacasum under
Islamic rites and renewed their marriage vows in civil
ceremony before RTC judge in Iligan City. The two
separated and upon compromise agreement,
Zamoranos obtained primary custody of their children.
The agreement rankled Pacasum which made him file a
petition for the declaration of a void marriage on
ground that Zamoranos was previously married to de
Guzman at the time of their marriage, thus making their
(Zamoranos and Pacasum) marriage bigamous and void.
A separate criminal complaint for bigamy was likewise
filed by Pacasum.
-soon after filing the petition, Pacasum contracted a
second marriage with Catherine.
-on the account of the bigamy case, Zamoranos’ motion
for reconsideration was granted, therefore dismissing
the charge against her. Pacasum later fiiled a petition
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for review on the office of the Secretary of Justice which
eventually granted his petition, reversing the
resolutions of the City Prosecutor.
-with regard to the civil case, RTC favoured Zamoranos,
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
jurisdiction. The court ruled that both Zamoranos and
de Guzman were Muslims at the time of their marriage,
whose marital relationship was governed by Code of
Muslim Personal Laws. Thus, the allegation bigamy
against Zamoranos is misplaced. The fact that divorce
by Talaq was obtained by Zamoranos and de Guzman,
their marriage is dissolved which gave them the right to
re-marry. It is important to note that their second
marriage under civil rites is merely ceremonial. This is
similar in the case of Pacasum and Zamoranos.
Issue: whether the Code of Muslim Personal laws be
applied in this case?
Held:
The court held that since Zamoranos were both
Muslims and are married under Islamic rites, such
marriage is governed by the Code of Muslim Personal
laws. Thus, in all civil actions and proceedings between
the parties who are Muslims, the Shari’a Circuit Court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction. It is clear that
any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari’a
Court is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce
proceedings. Moreover, according to the same Code,
where in case of conflict between any provision of the
Code of Muslim Personal laws and laws of general
application, the Muslim Code shall prevail. In case of
conflict between this Code, which is a special law, and
another special law or laws of local application, the laws
of local application will carry out the provision of the
Muslim Code.
=============================================
GELUZ v. CA, 2 SCRA 801
FACTS: Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr.
Antonio Geluz which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not
aware of. Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue
of Art. 2206 which CA sustained.
ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for the death
of the unborn fetus?
HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not
have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth
determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not
yet possess a personality to speak of because it was
aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the
parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could
be no action for such damages that can be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received
because it lacked juridical personality. The damages
which the parents of an unborn child can recover are
limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the
appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However,
moral damages cannot also be recovered because the
wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did
not further investigate on the causes of the abortion.
Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against
the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment.
RATIO: Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for
damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who
voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover
damages from the physician who caused the same. (1)
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
person¬al injury or death pertains primarily to the
injured, no such right of action could deriva¬tively
accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In
fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of
the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-
natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from one that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act).
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under
Article 40 of the Civil Cod, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article." In the present case,
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there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to
collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished
from the injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because
the parents cannot expect either help, support or
services from an unborn child, they would nor¬mally be
limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the spes hominis that was the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should
warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is
no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the husband's indifference to the previous
abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born
if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an
intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb. 
Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is produced
by the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the
removal takes place naturally or by surgical operation.
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life is
immaterial; for acquisition of juridical personality, it is
enough that the child lives even for an instant. 
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that independent
life required for juridical personality can be shown only
by complete respiration. The cry of the child, although it
is not a necessary sign of life, is evidence that it has
acquired complete respiration. Another indication of
complete respiration is the floating of the lungs when
placed in water; this means that air has penetrated into
the lungs by breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that the child is
capable of living, and this is determined by the extent of
the development of its organs.
Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does not live
24 hours completely separated from the mother's
womb, it does not acquire juridical personality. This is
an absolute requirement for feotuses w/c have an
intrauterine life of less than 7 mos. (Balane quoting
Manresa and JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not reach the category of a
natural person and consequently is not born in the
contemplation of law." (Geluz v. CA, supra.)
This is so, even if the child is killed before the period
lapses and it can be proved that it could have survived
that period if it had not been prevented by the wilful act
of another. On the other hand, juridical personality is
acquired even if the survival for 24 hours is caused only
by medical or scientific means w/o w/c the child would
have died before the lapse of that period.
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
11FEB34 SCRA 132 | July 31, 1970 | J. J.B.L. Reyes
 Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio
and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of
Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for
support and damages and request for amendment of
complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix
Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her
through force and intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and
had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly
support, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in
light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a
child had been born in her complaint. The lower court
dismissed the case and subsequently denied further
amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the original
complaint to state a cause of action.
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 Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and
damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of
birth in complaint
 Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to
support of the child she was carrying and an
independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the
provisional personality of the unborn child, which
includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it
is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same
Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive
donations through persons that legally represent it.
Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article
29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case
for reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to
claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21
of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219,
which provides moral damages for victims of seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for
proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs
against Icao. 
Continental Steel v. Montaño
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Doctrines:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in
favor of labor.
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant
to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s
unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery
while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The
female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits.
It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor
Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically
state that the dependent should have first been born
alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that
his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA
death benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA
did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there
are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits,
namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel contended that only one with civil
personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42
of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following
article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered
born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb.
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Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The
effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child
never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality.
Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the
right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
another for support; he/she could not have existed or
sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother.
Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality
can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a
dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall
be settled in favor of the employee
Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40,
41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived
child acquires personality only when it is born, and
Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is
not relevant in this case.
The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at
all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that
only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die.
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to
the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The CBA did
not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such
that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality. Without such qualification,
then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s
womb.
3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in
enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation
of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be
interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA
and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of
labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning
the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities
and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)])
Bereavement leave and other death benefits are
granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family
who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the
death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery,
is any less than that of parents whose child was born
alive but died subsequently.
G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for
themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS
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IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
CONCENTRATE ON WHEN DOES
LIFE BEGINS!!!
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates
the right to life and health of the unborn child under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed
legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives
effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms
prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning
contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and
prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law
allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies, medical research
shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as
they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already
has life.
131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a
fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that
the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes
natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH
Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to certify that the product or supply is not to be used
as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively
confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will
actually supervise or administer the use of these
products and supplies to prospective patients, there is
no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall
not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and
family planning methods in the Philippines is not of
recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729,
entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,  to the promotion of male vasectomy and
138

tubal ligation,  and the ratification of numerous

139

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out
that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that
the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since
the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134
international agreements, the country has long
recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve
long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.140

According to the OSG, Congress has made a

legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH
Law was enacted with due consideration to various
studies and consultations with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical
field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and
respect to such a determination and pass judgment
only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive. 135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the
This has resulted in the enactment of various
measures promoting women's rights and health and
the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus,
aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this
paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle
of non-coercion."  As will be discussed later, these
141

constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH
Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent
the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.
principles are not merely grounded on administrative
policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to
life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
136

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the

The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human
being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being
grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore,
not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any
authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than
ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
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position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was
agreed upon that the individual members of the Court
could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that
life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus
should be made on the particular phrase of Section
12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the
unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For
said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is
mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because,
amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view
that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend
that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of
the female ovum by the male sperm.  On the other
142
side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized
ovum in the uterus. 143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of
the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain
and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of
Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold:
First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the
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objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document
but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional
meaning of the word "conception" which, as described
and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary
describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a
being like its parents. 145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the
term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a
legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Allan S. Montano,  it was written:
147
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has
life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life
of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,  Justice Anthony Kennedy,
148
writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State
"has respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest
in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in
the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a
baby or a child. 149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed
light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers
to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence
which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship
speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
that there is human life. x x x. 150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization
and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a
biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in
nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing
this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies
itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of
cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an
equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm
rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to
form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human
cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered
affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized
ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows
day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the
moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human
life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of
conception" was described by us here before with the
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scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is
given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is
sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular
view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define
when life begins. So, Congress can define life to
begin from six months after fertilization; and that
would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about
it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask
a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception,"
does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to
Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or
not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the
uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the
uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we
take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established,
then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore,
would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it
is up to Congress to state whether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically
and based on the provision as it is now proposed,
they are already considered abortifacient. 154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent
that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that
the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon
the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It
is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine
when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized
that the determination of whether a contraceptive
device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which
should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence. 155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on
the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would
like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also
the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be
assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the
term "protection of the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like
to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
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I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life
of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are
also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
contraceptives which are already being encouraged at
this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or
does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because
contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was
speaking more about some contraceptives, such as
the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to
the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of
conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the
fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by
the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners
during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that
tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not
classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm,
there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms
sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to
that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here
Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient,
Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of
medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant
a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote." 159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and
female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological &
Pathological Obstetrics),  used by medical schools in
161
the Philippines, also concludes that human life
(human person) begins at the moment of fertilization
with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in
the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental
stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also
reveals that: "Human development begins after the
union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception).
Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with
the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of
their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and
ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form
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a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is
a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being." 162
The authors of Human Embryology &
Teratology  mirror the same position. They wrote:
163
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a
critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23
chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in
46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid
number is restored and the embryonic genome is
formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical
Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood
Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH
Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this
stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of
conception, and that destroying those new lives is
never licit, no matter what the purported good
outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only
a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot
escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well
defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is
objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or
religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned
from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or
understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of
the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to
the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins
at implantation.  According to him, "fertilization and
165
conception are two distinct and successive stages in
the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."  Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote
166
that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation
of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of
conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the
fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
object - it is a living human being complete with DNA
and 46 chromosomes.  Implantation has been
168
conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but
also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this
position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly
legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that
would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the
uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution
proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of
the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot
interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of
the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be
no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any
pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line
with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While
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the Court has opted not to make any determination, at
this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law
itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded
from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by
Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions
that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe
travel to the uterus for implantation.
170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a
crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of
this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a
full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies
that contribute to reproductive health and well-being
by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It
also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is
the enhancement of life and personal relations. The
elements of reproductive health care include the
following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of
abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of
individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the
number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of
discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the
highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to
169
abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing
laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or
is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including
Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or
amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is
consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient
as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that
induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that
protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and
those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or
device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners,
the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because
the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb (third kind).
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By expressly declaring that any drug or device that
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient
(third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all
that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon.
Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that
protection will only be given upon implantation, as the
petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes
that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum
which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent -
all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized
ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug
or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum
prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as
it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law
does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's
position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in
the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning
of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the
said intestate estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-
half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to
sell the ice produced from the said plant in the
Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the
latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the
certificate applied for is a contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial
judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial
judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying.
The situation has not changed except for his death, and
the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice
plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the
mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. The reason
for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased
person is considered a "person", as deemed to include
artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of
exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal
obligations of the decedent as survived after his death
unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an
artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, include
the exercise during the judicial administration of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his
estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel
of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the
creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of
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the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death
like his pending application at the commission.
=============================================
DUMLAO v. QUALITY PLASTICS
70SCRA 472
April 30, 1976
SUBJECT MATTER: COMMENCEMENT AND
TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY (DEATH OF A
NATURAL PERSON)
PONENTE: J. AQUINO
FACTS
1. On April 23, 1959, Pedro Oria died.
2. On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
filed a case against Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria,
Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and
Juana Darang ordering them to pay solidarity
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03
plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958.
3. Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of
the judgment and after the decision had become
final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic
Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the
surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security
under the bond.
4. On September 24, 1962, Oria’s land was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction. The
sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of
November 20, 1962.
5. The summons and copies of the complaint for
the five defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 had
been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a
deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond,
who acknowledged such service by signing on the
back of the original summons in his own behalf and
again signing for his co-defendants.
6. On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and
Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. for the annulment of
the judgment against Oria and the execution
against his land.
7. On the other hand, QualityPlastic Products, Inc.
replied that the heirs were estopped to question the
court’s jurisdiction over Oria. After the said hearing,
the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over
Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case T-
662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It
reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith
because he did not apprise the court that Oria was
dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired
jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the
judgment was valid as to him. From that decision
the plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case
T-662 against the deceased Pedro Oria was valid
HELD
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's
judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was
not, and he could not have been, validly served
with summons. He had no more civil personality.
His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
(Articles 37 and 42 of the Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's
counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to
acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in
section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a
dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this
case.
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR. v. HON. ALEJANDRO M.
VELEZ
185 SCRA 425
May 17, 1990
SUBBJECT MATTER: COMMENCEMENT AND
TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY (DEATH OF A
NATURAL PERSON)
PONENTE: J. PADILLA
FACTS
1. Unaware of the death of Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana on
August 28, 1988, her full blood brothers and sisters filed
on September 27, 1988, a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and confined by Tomas
Eugenio in his palatial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal
authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged
that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
Tomas.
2. On September 28, 1988 the writ of habeas corpus
was issued, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Tomas
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refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana, reasoning
that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings. According to him, he had already obtained
a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the
palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian
Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of
which he is the Supreme President and Founder.
3. Vargases' alleged that Tomas, who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their
duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil
Code, the Vargases’ contended that, as the next of kin in
the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead
body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings
followed. Tomas claims that he is the spouse
contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code1.
ISSUE
Whether Tomas Eugenio can claim rightful custody of
the deceased
HELD
NO. The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters, as provided in
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code 2. Philippine
Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and
wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. The Court holds that the provisions of the Civil
Code when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her. In fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime because of his
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for
mandamus and prohibition asking to order respondents
to issue travel documents to him and his immediate
family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President "s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

Issue:  members of his family and to enjoin the
WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of the
powers granted in her by the Constitution.
Ruling:
Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power ".
The powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to
be executive. Even the members of the Legislature has
recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the power
under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.
Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.
Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.
Held: Among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of
the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted
with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in
arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.   "and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
------------------
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a "travel
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documents "to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the
right of the Marcoses "to return "in the Philippines is
guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights, specifically "Sections
"1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right
to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under "international law, their
right "to return "to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil "and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
Issue:
"Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted
by "the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved is not the right to "travel from "the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the
right "to return "to one's country, a distinct right under
"international law, independent from although related
to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil
"movement "and abode within the territory of a state,
the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
"movement "and residence within the borders of each
state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of "movement "and freedom to choose
his residence and the right to be free to leave any
country, including his own. Such rights may only be
restricted by laws protecting the "national security,
public order, "public health "or morals or the separate
rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right "to
return "to ones country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that
the right "to return "may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of "International Law "and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land. "
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses
a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and
therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
=============================================
G.R. No. L-5426             May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,  Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of
states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin
de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro,
deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge
Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which
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was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision,
modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was
elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts
related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom
were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese
troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found
the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this
order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion
and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The
Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except
that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have
survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which
is now being contested by the petitioner. The
importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de
Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa,
lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of
succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner
who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela
Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and
Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the
statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation
of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
and Angela Joaquin, together with their three
daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their
son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela
Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building
known as the German Club, at the corner of San
stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the
people inside the building, especially those who were
trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell
of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to
seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela
Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the
latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former
neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning
edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot
in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately
dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of
the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later,
the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping
many people inside, presumably including Angela
Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, the stayed there about three days, until
February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the
shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied
toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino
Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who
fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his
daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was
aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years
old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was
two or three years older than her brother; while the
other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y
Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the
testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously
survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of
Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela
Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence
of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the
statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate
Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship
cannot be established by proof of the death of only one
of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof
that one was alive when the other had already died.
Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole
witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
was shot and died shortly after the living the German
Club in the company of his father and the witness, and
that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after
the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may
infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin,
during the appreciable interval from the instant his son
turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he
died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela
Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape
from the German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might
have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters,
killed by falling beams from the burning edifice,
overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters
from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No
evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is
48 CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
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that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside,
and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she
died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to
fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it
could be said that the purpose of the presumption of
survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to
uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his
mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60
years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of
Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died
likewise disposes of the question whether she and her
deceased children perished in the same calamity. There
being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the
occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them;
that battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason
is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same
battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same
calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of
death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of
combats. During the same battle, some may die from
wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear
that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the
battle as an overall cause of death in applying the
presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which
the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their
end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela
Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days
later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin
Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of
whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69
(ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed
article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the
New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner
that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is
total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then
Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under
article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left
open for the consideration when obsolute necessity
there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion
is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the
reasons to be presently set forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court,
reads:
 When two person perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is
not (1) shown who died first, and there are no
(2) particular circumstances from when it can
be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from
the probabilities resulting from the strength and
ages of the sexes, according to the following
rules:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following
tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the
first to die to the two or more persons who
would inherent one from the other, the persons
who alleges the prior death of either must
prove the allegation; in the absence of proof
the presumption shall be that they died at the
same time, and no transmission of rights from
one to the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are
intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be
available when there are facts. With particular
reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation
which it present is one in which the facts are not only
unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no
specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is
assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since
the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may
apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different
legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence,
1940 ed., 483.)
In In re  Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court
of Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the
deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is
taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court
of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred"
that one died before the other it means that
there are circumstances from which the fact of
death by one before the other may be inferred
as a relation conclusion from the facts proven.
The statue does not mean circumstances which
would shown, or which would tend to show,
probably that one died before the other. Grand
Lodge A.O.W.W.vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96
Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone,
a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to
the statutory presumption, the circumstances
by which it is sought to prove the survivorship
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must be such as are competent and sufficient
when tested by the general rules of evidence in
civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot
rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or
conjecture. As was said in Grand
Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to
probably, then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule
123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the
evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may
be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there
are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step
in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from
which reasonable inference of survivorship between
Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco
Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this
purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is
convenient and necessary to detail the testimony,
which was described by the trial court as "disinterested
and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as
"entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as
you leave the German Club with Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the
latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin
Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where
were you? — A. We were out 15 meters away
from the building but I could see what was
going on.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen
minutes between the two events, that is the
shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the
collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I
could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you
know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an
hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A. Possible,
but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir,
about 40 minutes.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already
dead? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did
Angela Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few minutes
after we have dashed out, the German Club,
which was burning, collapsed over them,
including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. From your testimony it would appear that
while you can give positive evidence to the fact
that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro,
and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give
the same positive evidence to the fact that
Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the
sense that I did not see her actually die, but
when the building collapsed over her I saw and I
am positive and I did not see her come out of
that building so I presumed she died there.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German
Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr.
Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A.
Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club
and they were shooting people outside, so we
thought of running away rather than be
roasted.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out
of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad, were already
wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A.
On the ground near the entrance, because most
of the people who were shot by the Japanese
were those who were trying to escape, and as
far as I can remember they were among those
killed.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot
by the Japanese a few minutes before you left
the place? — A. That is what I think, because
those Japanese soldiers were shooting the
people inside especially those trying to escape.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is
that what you mean? A — . There were many
people shot because they were trying to
escape.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. How come that these girls were shot when
they were inside the building, can you explain
that? — A. They were trying to escape probably.
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It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains
facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of
the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can
be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died
before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the
son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the
more rational deduction from proven facts that it was
the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be
recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15
meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life,
30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from
the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to
flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and
unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son
tried hard to have her come along. She could have
perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated,
but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
True, people in the building were also killed but these,
according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried
to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops.
It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic
efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving
the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay
where she was may well give an idea, at the same time,
of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the
moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her.
It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked
to her, the perils of death from staying were not so
imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez'
statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred
about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was
shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the
collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of
Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's
death and the breaking down of the edifice was
"minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five
seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that
Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides
the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro
could have been killed. All these are speculative , and
the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are
against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside
as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining
living members of her family, she could not have kept
away form protective walls. Besides, the building had
been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was
no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition
except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor
was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling
beams because the building was made of concrete and
its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to
fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death;
certainly not within the brief space of five seconds
between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that
are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not
require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the
"particular circumstances from which it (survivorship)
can be inferred" that are required to be certain as
tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference
the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is
never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd.
427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199
N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.)
As the California courts have said, it is enough that "the
circumstances by which it is sought to prove the
survivorship must be such as are competent and
sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence
in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate,supra.) "Juries
must often reason," says one author, "according
to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact
in issue existed from collateral facts not directly
proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence.
The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the
proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely,
according to experience, is the existence of the primary
fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts,
Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a
jury was justified in drawing the inference that the
person who was caught firing a shot at an animal
trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot
about an hour before at the same animal also
trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but
rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration
leave greater room for another possibility than do the
facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de
Navarro died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure
foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that
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the mother outlived her son — is deduced from
established facts which, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong
probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance
of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this
inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in
an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon,
"bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the
game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the
defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the
bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1
Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R.
468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which has
been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not
be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well
considered. The particular circumstances from which
the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions
are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case,
the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions
raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1
Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed.
856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and
contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness
does not cease to be such because he is not impeached
or contradicted. But when the evidence is purely
documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be
placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an
agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in
the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law
which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation
of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a
question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on
questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by
substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant
real evidence or at least evidence about which
reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come
within the exception to the general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under
review, and hold that the distribution of the decedents'
estates should be made in accordance with the decision
of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which
was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs.
Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son.
Without costs.
=============================================
CATALAN V. BASA
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned
Feliciano’s capacity at the time he donated the
property, yet did not see fit to question his mental
competence when he entered into a contract of
marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed
deeds of donation of his other properties in their
favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained
competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is
bolstered by the existence of these other contracts.
Competency and freedom from undue influence,
shown to have existed in the other acts done
or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until
the contrary is shown (Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No.
159567, July 31, 2007).
DECISION
 PUNO, C.J.:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666,
dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano)
was discharged from active military service.  The Board
of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs
found that he was unfit to render military service due to
his “schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which
incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and
affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and
sparce (sic) and pointless speech.”[1]
 On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon
Cerezo.[2]
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 On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled
“Absolute Deed of Donation,”[3] wherein Feliciano
allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES
CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property
described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley,
Pangasinan.  Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe
Basa; on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs
of Segundo Catalan; and on the West by Roman
Basa.  Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801)
square meters, more or less.
The donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds.  The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued
Tax Declaration No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the 400.50
square meters donated to her.  The remaining half of
the property remained in Feliciano’s name under Tax
Declaration No. 18081.[5] 
On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust
Company filed Special Proceedings No. 4563 [6]  before
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare
Feliciano incompetent.  On December 22, 1953, the trial
court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency
for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing
Allowance[7] of Feliciano.  The following day, the trial
court appointed People’s Bank and Trust Company as
Feliciano’s guardian.[8]  People’s Bank and Trust
Company has been subsequently renamed, and is
presently known as the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son
Eulogio Catalan.[9]
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue
in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. [10]  The
Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register
of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax
Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of
respondents.[11]
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property
registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex
Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida
Catalan.  On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon
Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same
OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan. [12]
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed
a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery
of Possession and Ownership,[13] as well as damages
against the herein respondents.  BPI alleged that the
Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to
Mercedes.  In addition, BPI averred that even if
Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her,
the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound
mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid
consent.  Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute
Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of
Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be
nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the
property to anyone.  BPI raised doubts about the
authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its
registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan
indicated fraud.  Thus, BPI sought remuneration for
incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away.  The
original complaint was amended to substitute his heirs
in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the
evidence presented by the complainants was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano
was sane and competent at the time he executed the
deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus,
the court declared, the presumption of sanity or
competency not having been duly impugned, the
presumption of due execution of the donation in
question must be upheld.[14]    It rendered judgment, viz:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1.      Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint;
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2.      Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia
Basa the lawful owners of the land in question which is
now declared in their names under Tax Declaration No.
12911 (Exhibit 4);
3.      Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants
Attorney’s fees of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.[15]
 Petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before
the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. [16]   The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court and
held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a
reversible error in disposing that plaintiff-appellants
failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late
(sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when the
property in dispute was donated. 
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having
been present in the 1951 donation coupled with
compliance with certain solemnities required by the
Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real property under
Article 749, which provides:
x x x 
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over
the property in dispute.  By virtue of her ownership, the
property is completely subjected to her will in
everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence
with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March
1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees’ Folder of Exhibits) of the
property by Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees
Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld.  Nothing of
the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is
evident much less apparent in the deed itself or from
the evidence adduced.  As correctly stated by the RTC,
the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered
only in 1992, after the death of Mercedes Catalan does
not make the sale void ab initio.  Moreover, as a
notarized document, the deed of absolute sale carries
the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its due execution (Garrido vs.
CA 236 SCRA 450).  In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it
that documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than preponderant (Salame
vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[17]
 Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised
the following issues:
1.                  WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN HOLDING THAT “THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO
PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY  OF THE
LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT
WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED”;
 2.                  WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF
DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT “S”) AND THE
REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS “S-
1” AND “S-2”) ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
 3.                  WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO.
66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT
SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE
MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS
JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-
 4.                  WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.[18]
 Petitioners aver that the presumption of Feliciano’s
competence to donate property to Mercedes had been
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rebutted because they presented more than the
requisite preponderance of evidence.  First, they
presented the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge
of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by the
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran
Affairs.  Second, they proved that on December 22,
1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the
guardianship of BPI.  Based on these two pieces of
evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been
suffering from a mental condition since 1948 which
incapacitated him from entering into any contract
thereafter, until his death on August 14,
1997.  Petitioners contend that Feliciano’s marriage to
Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948  does not prove
that he was not insane at the time he made the
questioned donation.  They further argue that the
donations Feliciano executed in favor of his successors
(Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his
competency because these donations were approved
and confirmed in the guardianship proceedings. [19]  In
addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan
and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and
fictitious.  This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the
document was registered only on February 20, 1992,
more that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already
died.  Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that
Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract,
they cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of the
property in question.[20]   Lastly, petitioners assert that
their case is not barred by prescription or laches under
Article 1391 of the New Civil Code because they had
filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four
year period after Feliciano’s death on August 14,
1997 had begun.[21] 
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. 
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another,
who accepts it.[22] Like any other contract, an agreement
of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts
presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to
which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous.[23] The parties' intention must be clear and
the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract,
renders the donation voidable.[24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is
crucial is the donor’s capacity to give consent at the
time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in
the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given.
[25]
  However, the burden of proving such incapacity
rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient
proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.[26] 
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar
indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was competent when he
donated the property in question to
Mercedes.  Petitioners make much ado of the fact that,
as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be
suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs.  By itself,
however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence
of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that
Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending
to his property rights.  Schizophrenia was brought to
the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil
Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, combined
“hebrephrenia” and “catatonia” with certain paranoid
states and called the condition “dementia
praecox.”  Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified
Kraepelin’s conception in the early 1900s to include
cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the
condition “schizophrenia.”  According to medical
references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a
gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms becoming
increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses.  The
condition improves (remission or residual stage) and
worsens (relapses) in cycles.  Sometimes, sufferers may
appear relatively normal, while other patients in
remission may appear strange because they speak in a
monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no
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emotional feelings and are prone to have “ideas of
reference.”  The latter refers to the idea that random
social behaviors are directed against the sufferers. [27]  It
has been proven that the administration of the correct
medicine helps the patient.  Antipsychotic medications
help bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a
schizophrenic.  Medications reduce delusions,
hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or
eliminate chances of relapse.[28]  Schizophrenia can
result in a dementing illness similar in many aspects to
Alzheimer’s disease. However, the illness will wax and
wane over many years, with only very slow
deterioration of intellect.[29]  
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a
person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose
his property.  By merely alleging the existence of
schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial
proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental
faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that
Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary
was adduced.[30]   Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give
consent to contracts was only established when the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an
incompetent onDecember 22, 1953.[31] 
    It is interesting to note that the petitioners
questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he donated
the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental
competence when he entered into a contract of
marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed
deeds of donation of his other properties in their
favor.   The presumption that Feliciano remained
competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is
bolstered by the existence of these other contracts.
Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown
to have existed in the other acts done or contracts
executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary
is shown.[32]
Needless to state, since the donation was valid,
Mercedes had the right to sell the property to
whomever she chose.[33]  Not a shred of evidence has
been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale
of the property to her children was tainted with fraud
or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale
was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What
is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and
Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its
execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to
Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of
prescription and laches for the first time on appeal
before this Court.  It is sufficient for this Court to note
that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed
of Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As
such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a
proper action in court within four years. [34]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the
arguments of the petitioners, the petition is
DENIED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 ============================================
G.R. No. L-11872       December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA
MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,  123, Sec 68, Par. A
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of
the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Vicente Foz for appellee.  litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
TORRES, J.:
MERCADO v ESPIRITU
FACTS
This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which
two of the four parties were minors with age 18, and
19. On the date of sale, these minors presented
themselves that they were of legal age at the time they
signed it, and they made the same manifestation before
the notary public.
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ISSUE:Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the
minors presented themselves that they were of legal
age.
RATIO:The courts laid down that such sale of real estate
was still valid since it was executed by minors, who have
passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are
near the adult age, and that the minors pretended that
they had already reached their majority.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are
mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.
Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to
excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation
assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in
accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppels.
This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on
estoppel.
Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission
or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.
This is also in accordance with the provisions of Rule
Rule 123, sec 68, Par. A...”Whenever a party has, by his
own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to
be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
omission, cannot be permitted to falsify it.
=============================================
BAMBALAN v MARAMBA
FACTS: 
Bambalan’s parents Paula Prado and her first
husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received a
loan from Genoveva Muerong and German
Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving Bambalan
as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and
Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time, (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
a minor, to sell their land as payment for the loan. violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced
because they were threatening his mother with =============================================
imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought
Bambalan’s first cedula to acknowledge the
G.R. No. L-1720
document. 
SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners, 
ISSUE:  vs.
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
Muerong is valid. 
Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
RATIO:  Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a
minor at the time of execution. The Doctrine laid
down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not PARAS, J.:
applicable to this case, because the plaintiff did not On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by
pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and
as a minor. 
Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of
Important Statutes:  land. Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months
and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao
Civil Code, Article 38. 
(husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and
mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain accordingly disavowing the contract. After being
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara
or from property relations, such as easements.  executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez,

Civil code, Art. 1327.  attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara
ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon
The following cannot give consent to a contract:  Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In

(1) Unemancipated minors;  the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
who do not know how to write. (1263a) 
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon
Civil code, Art. 1390. 
Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the
The following contracts are voidable or annullable, annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided
even though there may have been no damage to
share in the two parcels of land covered by certificates
the contracting parties: 
of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio,
giving consent to a contract; 
Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the
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latter two being, respectively, the brother and father of
Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed
which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the
ground that the deed of sale is not binding against
Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of
its execution, and accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to pay
to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal
interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in
the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from
the complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an
undivided one-fourth interest in the lot originally
covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the
cost of the suit. From this judgment Sia Suan and Gaw
Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.
It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the
appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931, showed
that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was
then of legal age. It is not pretend and there is nothing
to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely
on such recital of fact. This conclusion is decisive and
very obvious in the decision of the Court of Appeals It is
true that in the resolution on the for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when
informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no
steps for nine years to protect their interest beyond
requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the
sale while still a minor, strongly indicates that the
appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale
was executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently
negative by the following positive pronouncements of
the Court of Appeals as well in said resolution as in the
decision.
As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of
laches, suffice it to say thatthe appellees were informed
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of his minority within one (1) month after the
transaction was completed. (Resolution.)
Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not
taking any action to protect their interest form and
after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in
writing of appellant's minority. (Resolution.)
. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised
within the month that appellant was a minor, through
the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing
appellees of his client's desire to disaffirm the
contract . . . (Decision.)
The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his
vendor shortly after the contract was made, the delay in
bringing the action of annulment will not serve to bar it
unless the period fixed by the statute of limitations
expired before the filing of the complaint. . . .
(Decision.)
In support of the contend that the deed of sale is
binding on the appellee, counsel for the appellants
invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs.
Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein this court held:
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid
down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they
are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have them
annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title
19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such
a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the
complaint filed against him does not violate the laws
relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical
rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11,
1868, and March 1, 1875.)
The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the
on the ground that the appellants did not actually pay appellants the sum of P500.
any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did
not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants

it being stipulated that the consideration therefore was could not have been misled as to the real age of the

a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino appellee because they were free to make the necessary

Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of investigation. The suggestion, while perhaps

Appeals erred. In the first place, in the case cited, the practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside

consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre- the point, because the findings of the Court of Appeals

existing obligation. In the second place, under the do not show that the appellants knew or could

doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be suspected appellee's minority.

of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually

The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that
part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a
the letter written by the appellee informing the
valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the
appellants of his minority constituted an effective
appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-
disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the choice
existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid
to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the
consideration), it should produce its full force and effect
courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice
in the absence of any other vice that may legally
shielded the appellee from laches and consequent
invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the deed
estoppel. This position is untenable since the effect of
of sale is null and void on any ground other than the
estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the
appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become
promptness with which a notice to disaffirm is made.
fully efficacious as a contract executed by parties with
full legal capacity.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed and the appellants absolved from the
The circumstance that, about one month after the date
complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon
of the conveyance, the appellee informed the
Alcantara. So ordered.
appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because
appellee's previous misrepresentation had already
Ozaeta, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.
estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said
belated information merely leads to the inference that
the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee
BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE
was a minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat
emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in FACTS:

mind that no sooner had he given said information than
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Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa
Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in
consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him
P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war.
Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in March
1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the
family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract
they signed. The family petitioned to review the
decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to
solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest,
praying for consideration of the minority of the
Braganza sons when they signed the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively,
are to be bound by the contract of loan they have
signed.
RATIO:
The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her
share in the contract because the minority of her sons
does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay
1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of
the CA which found them similarly liable due to their
failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained
previous sources in Jurisprudence – “in order to hold
the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not
constructive. It has been held that his mere silence
when making a contract as to his age does not
constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an
action of deceit.”
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the
contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they
have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even
if the written contract is unenforceable because of their
non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that
they may have profited by the money received. In this
case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when
converted to Philippine money is equivalent to
P1,166.67.
ATIZANO VS. PEOPLE
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=============================================
G.R. Nos. 9471 and 9472
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
William J. Rohde for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two
separate informations with parricide, in one for the
killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his
daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to
the payment of the costs in each case. From this
judgment he appealed. The two cases have been
submitted to this court together.
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have
killed his wife and daughter in the manner charged and
to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The
commission of these crimes is not denied. The
defendant did not testify but several witnesses were
introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant
appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to
the commission of the crimes. they also testified that he
had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach
prior to the killing.
Our attention has been directed to the following
testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the prosecution,
testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a
noise, and that he refused into the house and saw the
appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by
the appellant; that there "were seven, including the
small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did
not know of any disagreement between the appellant
and the two deceased; that on the morning before she
was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head
and stomach." The witness further stated that the
appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight
penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and
daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he
looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy
he would not have killed his family — his wife and
child."
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that
he helped Martin Agustin capture the appellant; that
the appellant "himself used to say before that time he
had felt pains in the head and the stomach;" that at the
moment he was cutting those people " he looked like a
madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at
random without paying any attention to who it was."
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that
her brother had headache and stomach trouble about
five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he
looked very sad at the time, but I saw him run
downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he
must have been crazy because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the
same jail with the appellant, testified that he had
observed the appellant about five months and that
sometimes "his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes
since he came to the jail when he is sent for something
he goes back he does without saying anything, even if
he comes back he does not say anything at all;" that
when the appellant returns from work he does not say a
word; and that about every other night he, the
appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are
you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and
the other wounded parties found that the appellant's
wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides
several other wounds on her hands; and that the
daughter's skull was split "through and through from
one side to the other." The witness stated that he made
a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that
he did not notice whether defendant in the jail and that
he did not notice whether defendant was suffering from
any mental derangement or not.
There is vast different between an insane person and But passion and insanity are very different things, and
one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of whatever indulgence the law may extend to persons
anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from
what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control
61 CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
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seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An
extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a
madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not
conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the
word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind,"
"idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one
witness testified that "according to my own eyes as he
looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy
he would not have killed his family." That witness'
conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of
some act by a person which an ordinarily rational
person would not think of doing. Another witness
testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because
he would cut everybody at random without paying any
attention to who it was." It is not at all unnatural for a
murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child,
to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those
who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said
"he must have been crazy because he cut me." This is
another illustration of the popular conception of the
word "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or
an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in
jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not
inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The
reflection and remorse which would follow the
commission of such deeds as those committed by the
appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to cry
out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you
doing to me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could
not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at
the time the deeds were committed.
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the
defendant was indicated for an assault with intent to
murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental
condition which would involved no guilt." The supreme
court on appeal in this decision distinguished between
passion and insanity as follows:
of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to
control their tempers and restrain their persons, and
are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow
their anger to lead them so far as to make them
reckless, the fact that they have become at last too
infuriated to keep them from mischief is merely the
result of not applying restraint in season. There would
be no safety for society if people could with impunity
lash themselves into fury, and then to desperate acts of
violence. That condition which springs from
undisciplined and unbridled passion is clearly within
legal as well as moral censure and punishment.
(People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32
Mich., 77.)
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The
court very properly continued with an explanation to
the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced
by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity.
The law holds the doer of the act, under such
conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large
share of homicides committed are occasioned by just
such motives as these.' "
The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p.
170), cites many cases on the subject of anger and
emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the
following concise statement:
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is
now well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral
insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease
of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral
system, where the person is mentally sense, does not
exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed
under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish
between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and
irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind.
In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep.,
62), the defendant was convicted of the crime
of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without
raising any question as to the actual commission of the
alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused
committed them, confined himself to the statement, in
behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime the
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defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind and
that in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts,
wounding his wife and the other members of her family,
without any motives whatever. In the decision in that
case this court stated:
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his
reason or became demented a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that
he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to
conclude that he acted unconsciously, in order to
relieve him from responsibility on the ground of
exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and
absence of will are proven.
Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is
pleaded in defense of criminal actions, we quote as
follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep.,
262, 265):
But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there
is a presumption that the accused is sane, which
certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact.
(State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and
nothing more appears, this presumption, without other
proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support
a conviction and as the State must prove every element
of the crime charged "beyond a reasonable doubt," it
follows that this presumption affords such proof. This
presumption however may be overthrow. It may be
shown on the part of the accused that the criminal
intent did not exist at the time the act was committed.
This being exceptional is a defense, and like other
defenses must be made out by the party claiming the
benefit of it. "The positive existence of that degree and
kind of insanity that shall work a dispensation to the
prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to
be proved as it s affirmed by him." (State vs.Stark, 1
Strob., 506.)
What then is necessary to make out this defense? It
surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege insanity to
put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a
denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to make
not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient proof
must be shown to overcome in the first place the
presumption of sanity and then any other proof that
may be offered.
In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court
said (syllabus):
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a
criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge,
which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the
moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield
from the consequences of the act by the plea of
insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a
criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear
that the person committing it was insane, and that the
offense was the direct consequences of his insanity.
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record,
being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal,
and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was
of unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes,
and the facts charged in each information having been
proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance
with the law, the judgments appealed from are
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
=============================================
People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65
FACTS: Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years
old when hired as a househelper by the mother of the
accused. The accused Policarpio Rafaran and his family
lived with his mother in the same house. Policarpio was
married and has children. One evening, the mother of
the accused called complainant to help him close the
door. When the complainant went near him, he pulled
her inside the store and raped her despite her
resistance. After that, he warned the complainant not
to tell anyone about it or he will kill her. The next day,
the family of the accused knew what happened.
Appellant claimed that he is suffering from
schizophrenia when he inflicted violent intentions to
Estelita. Trial court suspended the tria; and ordered his
confinement to National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong. After 2 years, he was reported to be
behaved and in improved condition and in mental
condition to stand court in trial. Trial of case resumed.
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ISSUE: W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to relieve
him from criminal liability
HELD: No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must
be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was
demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he
was in a normal condition.
=======================================
G.R. No. L-5921            July 25, 1911
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-
appellee, 
vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.
Chicote and Miranda for appellant.
W.A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and
Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso,
Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as
sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and
severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company
of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months
from date, with interest at P1 per month.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New
York sued the said five debtors for payment of the
P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the
rate of 1 per cent per month from the 15th of
December, 1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing
that summons was served on Vicente Sixto Villanueva
on April 17, 1909.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho
were declared to be in default and were so notified, the
latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May,
1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of
P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at 1 per
cent per month from December 15, 1908, until
complete payment should have been made of the
principal, and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution,
Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto
Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24,
1909, the latter was declared to be insane by the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she was
appointed his guardian by the same court; (3) that, on
October 11, following, she was authorized by the court,
as guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings
for the annulment of several bonds given by her
husband while in a state of insanity, among them that
concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The
Standard Oil Company of New York; (4) that she, the
guardian, was not aware of the proceedings had against
her husband and was only by chance informed thereof;
(5) that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the
subject of this suit, he was already permanently insane,
was in that state when summoned and still continued
so, for which reason he neither appeared nor defended
himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she
petitioned the court to relieve the said defendant
Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated
judgment rendered against him in the suit before
mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the introduction
of evidence in behalf of the said defendant with respect
to his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond
in question, which evidence could not be presented in
due season on account of the then existing incapacity of
the defendant.
The court granted the petition and the trial was
reopened for the introduction of evidence, after due
consideration of which, when taken, the court decided
that when Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th of December,
1908, executed the bond in question, he understood
perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act
performed by him and that the consent that was given
by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and,
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consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such
findings the court ruled that the petition for an
indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered in
the case be denied and that the said execution be
carried out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a
new hearing was requested "with reference to the
defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a
bill of exceptions was presented in support of the
appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a
single assignment of error as follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of
great wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva,
does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the
one herein concerned.
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the
basis of the medico-legal doctrine which supports the
conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not
necessarily imply the result that the defendant
Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a
contract of bond like the one here in question.
This court has not found the proof of the error
attributed to the judgment of the lower court. It would
have been necessary to show that such monomania was
habitual and constituted a veritable mental
perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by
the defendant Villanueva was the result of such
monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that
is, that there was not, nor could there have been any
other cause for the contract than an ostentation of
wealth and this purely an effect of monomania of
wealth; and that the monomania existed on the date
when the bond in question was executed.
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those
writers who have treated of this branch of medical
science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and
imbecility, some of them, as Casper, going so far into a
wealth of classification and details as to admit the
existence of 60 to 80 distinct states, an enumeration of
which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion and the
doubt in the minds of the majority of the authors of
treatises on the subject in determining the limits of
sane judgment and the point of beginning of this
incapacity, there being some who consider as a
sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity
and imbecility, but even those other chronic diseases or
complaints that momentarily perturb or cloud the
intelligence, as mere monomania, somnambulism,
epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the
divers passional states which more or less violently
deprive the human will of necessary liberty." (Manresa,
Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our
present knowledge of the state of mental alienation
such certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant
the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who suffers
the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very
wealthy when he is not, is really insane and it is to be
presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that
he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind, or that
his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous
contract .The bond, as aforesaid, was executed by
Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and his
incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for
him, was not declared until July 24, 1909.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the
defendant had for several years suffered from such
monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-
legal doctrine above cited, that a person's believing
himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion
for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity
or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Specifically,
in reference to this case, the following facts were
brought out in the testimony given by the physicians,
Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo,
witnesses for the defendant, the first of whom had
visited him some eight times during the years 1902 and
1903, and the latter, only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q.       But if you should present to him a document
which in no wise concerns his houses and if you should
direct him to read it, do you believe that he would
understand the contents of the document?
A.       As to understanding it, it is possible that he might,
in this I see nothing particularly remarkable; but
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afterwards, to decide upon the question involved, it
might be that he could not do that; it depends upon
what the question was.
Dr. Ocampo:
Q.       Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to
things other than those concerning greatness?
A.       Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to
the question of greatness and wealth.
Q.       He can take a written paper and read it and
understand it, can he not?
A.       Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is
probable that he can, I have made no trial.
Q.       Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only
with the exception of this monomania of greatness and
wealth?
A.       Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.
Q.       He knows how to read and write, does he not?
A.       Yes, sir I believe that he does.
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified
that as a notary he had prepared the instrument of
bond and received the statements of the signers; that
he explained to Mr. Villanueva its contents and when
the witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign
it he replied that he was willing and did in fact do so;
that the defendant's mental condition appeared to the
witness to be normal and regular and that he observed
nothing to indicate the contrary; and that the defendant
was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way
without giving cause fir any suspicion that there was
anything abnormal.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the
plaintiff that while trying in the Court of First Instance,
over which he presided, the case concerning the estate
of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva having
been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked
him some questions about his property, in order to
ascertain whether he was solvent and would be
adequate surety, and that Villanueva testified the same
as many, others had done, and witness did not notice
any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental
faculties; that he answered the questions concerning
the property that he held, stated its value, specified the
place where it was situated, his answers being precisely
relevant to the matter treated; that he therefore
approved the bond; and that all this took place between
July and September, 1908. This witness having been
asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva,
subsequent to the date mentioned, had again been
surety in any other case, and whether it appeared
strange to witness that Mr. Villanueva should engage in
giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected
this new bond, replied that it was in that same case
relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that
he endeavored to investigate, as he customarily did,
with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had given any
other previous bond, and the discovered that he had in
fact previously given bond in a criminal case, but that,
as it had already been cancelled, he had no objection to
accepting the one offered by Mr. Villanueva in the said
Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person
who has not previously been declared incapable, and
such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the
contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of
his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his
mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been
proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that
in every contract there must be a consideration to
substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even
though it should not be expressed in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the
debtor proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In
the contract of bond the consideration, general, is no
other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the
liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the
ordinary, a bond may be given for some other
consideration, according to the agreement and the free
stipulation of the parties and may be, as in onerous and
remuneratory contracts, something remunerative
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stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of the
beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the
bond in favor of the two members of the firm of Arenas
& Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testified
that he had never had dealings with Villanueva; from
which it is inferred that the latter could hardly have
been moved to favor the former by the benefit of an
assumed obligation to pay him some three thousand
pesos, with monthly interest .But he added that Arenas
& Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for them, to
whom Arenas paid a certain sum of money. The witness
did not know, however, whether Arenas gave the
money for the signature of the bond or simply in order
that the agent might find sureties. The fact is that the
sureties came with the agent and signed the bond.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva
concealed from his family his dealings with Arenas, a
note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr.
Villanueva, on the 13th of May, 1909, that is, two days
before Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting
him to a conference "for the purpose of treating of a
matter of great importance of much interest  to
Villanueva, between 5 and 6 of that same day, in the
garden and on the benches which are in front of the
Delmonico Hotel, on Calle Palacio, corner of Calle
Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can
not be affirmed with certainty (the trial court considers
it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the business of
giving bonds for a certain consideration or
remuneration; but neither can it be sustained that there
was no other cause for the giving of the bond in
question than the mental disorder that dominated the
intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his
believing himself so oversupplied with money as to be
able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. There is
no proof that the said bond was merely the product of
an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if
Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds,
among them that herein concerned, he was influenced
only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy,
when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the
third point, that is, that, granting that he was a
monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when
he executed the bond now under discussion. In the
interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity,
to wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant
application that is not enough that there be more or
less probability that a person was in a state
of dementia at a given time, if there is not direct proof
that, at the date of the performance of the act which it
is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the
part of the executor, the latter was insane or demented,
in other words, that he could not, in the performance of
that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate
and intentional consent. The witness who as physicians
testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's
conduct, referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903,
and another of them to the year 1908, but none to
December 15, 1908, the date of the execution of the
bond sought to be invalidated. the testimony of one of
these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife
endeavored, in 1908, to have her husband confined in
the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein,
objection was made by the director of the institution
who advised her that if he entered in that way and
lodged in the ward for old men, as soon as he shouted
and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be
locked up in the insane ward; to which Villanueva's wife
replied "that her husband was not exactly
insane enough to be placed among the insane." This
same lady, testifying as a witness in this case, stated:
that no restrictions had ever been placed upon her
husband's liberty to go wherever he wished and do
what he liked; that her husband had property of his
own and was not deprived of its management; that he
went out every morning without her knowing where he
went; that she did not know whether he had engaged in
the business of signing bonds, and that, with reference
to the one now concerned, she had learned of it only by
finding to note, before mentioned, wherein Arenas
invited him to a rendezvous on the benches in front of
the Delmonico Hotel; that she had not endeavored
legally to deprive him of the management of his own
real estate which had been inherited by him, although
he did not attend to the collection of the rents and the
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payment of the land tax, all this being done by her, and
she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the
family and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct
reference to the point under discussion, she was asked:
Q.       It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this
bond, he used to go out of the house and was on the
streets nearly every day? to which she replied:
A.       He went where he pleased, he does this even
now. He goes to the markets, and buys provisions and
other things. In fact I don't know where he goes go.
Q.       From his actions toward others, did he show any
indication of not being sane when he was on the street,
according to your opinion?
A.       Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this
fact and it is very strange that this should have
occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there are
many people who can testify in regard to this particular.
The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that
her husband, when he went to the market, would
return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes
and onions, and when she was asked by the judge
whether he was a man of frugal habits, she replied that,
as far as she knew, he had never squandered any large
sum of money; that he had never been engaged in
business; that he supported himself on what she gave
him; and that if he had something to count on for his
living, it was the product of his lands.
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated
incapacity of the appellant, and it is very evident that it
can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 15,
1908, when Villanueva subscribed the obligation now
contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to
give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he
freely executed.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
============================================
PEOPLE V. BUGALAO
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14,
2008 which affirmed the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 197-
M-2001 and Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January
23, 2006.
 Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with
two counts of rape in separate Informations both dated
December 21, 2000.  The Informations read as follows:
 CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001
 That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the
municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge of [AAA],[3] 14 years old, against the latter’s
will and consent.[4]
 CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001
 That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the
municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge of [AAA], 14 years old, against the latter’s
will and consent.[5]
 Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty on both
counts.  Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
 Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand
for the prosecution.  AAA was born on April 13,
1986.  According to her late-registered birth certificate,
her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC (father).   AAA,
however, testified that BBB and CCC are not her
biological parents, as she was only adopted when she
was very young.[6]  CCC died in December 1999.[7] 
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 In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and
settled in the house of her brother DDD (son of BBB and
CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan.  With
AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and
accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger
sister, then six-year-old FFF (who were also the children
of BBB and CCC).[8]
 On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF
were sleeping in a room which had no door.  AAA was
suddenly awakened when she felt somebody enter the
room.  She recognized the accused-appellant as the
intruder, and saw that he was holding a knife.  Accused-
appellant poked the knife at AAA’s neck, causing her to
freeze in fear.  Accused-appellant removed AAA’s
clothes, and then his own.  Both AAA and accused-
appellant were wearing t-shirt and shorts before the
undressing. Accused-appellant kissed her neck and
inserted his penis into her vagina.  FFF woke up at this
moment, but accused-appellant did not stop and
continued raping AAA for one hour.[9]
 On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her
sister, also located in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan.  At
around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was sleeping in the
second floor of the house, where there are no
rooms.  AAA was roused from her sleep when accused-
appellant was already undressing her.  Accused-
appellant removed his shorts and inserted his penis into
her vagina. AAA tried to resist, but accused-appellant
held her hands.  Accused-appellant then touched her
breasts and kissed her.  Accused-appellant remained on
top of her for half an hour.[10]
 AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about
the rape incidents.  Upon learning of the same, BBB did
not believe AAA and whipped her.[11]
 During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to
establish the character and chastity of AAA, asked AAA
about an alleged sexual intercourse between her and
the now deceased CCC.  AAA affirmed her statement in
her affidavit that CCC took advantage
(pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was still
alive.  This allegedly happened five times, the first of
which was when she was only seven years old.
[12]
  Answering a query from the court, AAA testified that
she was currently in the custody of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).[13]
 The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal
officer Dr. Ivan Richard Viray as its second
witness.  However, the latter’s testimony was dispensed
with upon the stipulation of the parties on the fact of
examination of AAA by Dr. Viray on September 5, 2000,
and the contents of the examination report, [14] which
includes the finding that AAA was in a “non-virgin
state.”
 When it was time for the defense to present their
evidence more than a year later, it also presented as its
witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the
prosecution.  This time, she testified that the sexual
encounters between her and the accused-appellant
were consensual.  She fabricated the charge of rape
against the accused-appellant because she was
supposedly angry with him.  She also claimed that she
was instructed by the police officer who investigated
the incident to say that the accused-appellant used a
knife. She also testified that she was raped by her father
CCC when she was seven years old.  She was recanting
her previous testimony because she purportedly was no
longer angry with accused-appellant.[15]  DEATH.  The accused is likewise directed to indemnify
On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated
the charge of rape because she was angry with the
accused-appellant for making her do laundry work for
him.  However, when asked if she “consented and
voluntarily submitted” herself to the accused-appellant
when she had sexual intercourse with him, she
answered in the negative.  She had been released from
the custody of the DSWD and was alone by herself for
some time, but she now lives with the family of
accused-appellant. [16]
 On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-
appellant did not force himself upon her.  She affirmed
that accused-appellant had a little defect in his
mind.  On re-cross examination, AAA testified that
accused-appellant was not her sweetheart. [17]
 Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a
clinical psychologist.  She conducted a mental
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examination on accused-appellant on September 12,
2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering
from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. [18]
   Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he
testified on June 15, 2005, claimed that AAA seduced
him by removing her clothes.  He asserted that they
ended up merely kissing each other and did not have
sexual intercourse.  He denied pointing a knife at
AAA.  AAA accused him of rape because she was asking
for P300 from him after they kissed.  Accused-appellant
also testified that there was no legal proceeding for the
adoption of AAA (“ampun-ampunan lang”).[19]    
 On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint
Decision in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 and 198-M-
2001, decreeing as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as
charged, and hereby sentences him to suffer:
 (a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of
DEATH.  The accused is likewise directed to indemnify
the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00;
 (b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of
the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00.[20]
  The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the
DSWD when she testified for the prosecution, and was
returned to the family of the accused-appellant after
her original testimony.  It was during the time when she
was back in the custody of the accused-appellant’s
family that she recanted her testimony for the
prosecution.  According to the RTC, it is clear that she
had no other place to go to as she was completely
orphaned and was dependent on the family of the
accused, and it was understandable that she may have
recanted in order to remain in the good graces of the
accused-appellant’s family.[21]
 As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he
was suffering from mental retardation, the RTC noted
that the psychological examination of accused-appellant
was conducted more than a couple of years after the
dates of the complained of incidents.  There was no
showing from the findings of the psychologist that
accused-appellant had the same mental or
psychological condition at the time of the said
incidents.  Even assuming that accused-appellant was of
such mental state at the time of the incidents, the
psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the
capacity to discern right from wrong. [22]
 On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision affirming that of the RTC, except with a
modification on the penalty in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of
death penalty.  The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.  The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 13, dated 23 January 2006, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and damages
awarded.  Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, in each of the two (2) counts of rape.  He is
further directed to pay private complainant the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each count of
rape, in addition to the civil indemnity awarded by the
court a quo.[23]
 Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present
appeal.  Both parties manifested that they are waiving
their rights to file a supplemental brief, as the same
would only contain a reiteration of the arguments
presented in their appellant’s and appellee’s briefs. [24]
 In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant
asserted that the prosecution evidence was insufficient,
particularly in view of AAA’s withdrawal of her original
testimony.
 We have recently held that “[c]ourts look with disfavor
upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained
from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
considerations.  Hence, a retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration.  They are
generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts.  Moreover, it would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a
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court of justice, simply because the witness who has
given it later on changes his mind for one reason or
another.”[25]  We have, in the past, also declared that
the recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, does not
necessarily render the prosecution’s evidence
inconclusive.[26]  In the often-cited Molina v. People,
[27]
 we specified how a recanted testimony should be
examined:
 Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible. The
rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony
is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary,
testimony is made by the same witness, the test to
decide which testimony to believe is one of
comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given
in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly,
and before this can be done, both the previous
testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully
compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under
which each was made, carefully and keenly
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change,
discriminatingly analyzed.  x x x.[28]  (Emphases
supplied.)
  These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where
the complainant is usually the lone eyewitness.  Thus,
in People v. Sumingwa,[29] where the rape victim later
disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her
father, this Court held: 
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused most often depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony.  By the very
nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and
usually the victim is left to testify for herself.  When a
rape victim's testimony is straightforward and marked
with consistency despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded.  If such testimony is clear, consistent and
credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable
doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding
its subsequent retraction.  Mere retraction by a
prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her
original testimony.
 A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor
by the courts.  It is exceedingly unreliable for there is
always the probability that such recantation may later
on be repudiated.  It can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or monetary
consideration.  Like any other testimony, it is subject to
the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the
witness on the stand.[30]  contradicts the testimony of accused-appellant
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court
of the credibility of AAA’s accusation and recantation is
facilitated by the fact that her recantation was made in
open court, by testifying for the defense.  Unlike in
cases where recantations were made in affidavits, the
trial court in this case had the opportunity to see the
demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the
sordid details of the alleged rape by her “adoptive”
brother, but also when she claimed that she made up
her previous rape charges out of anger.  As such, it is
difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court
convicted accused-appellant even after examining the
young witness as she made a complete turnaround and
admitted to perjury.  The legal adage that the trial court
is in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in this
case where AAA was subjected to grueling cross
examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross
examinations both as a prosecution and defense
witness.  Still, the trial court found that the private
complainant’s testimony for the prosecution was the
one that was worthy of belief.
 However, even if we disregard the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment
on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this Court
which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which
was concocted.  AAA’s testimony for the prosecution,
which was taken when she was in the custody of the
DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material
discrepancies. All accused-appellant can harp on in his
appellant’s brief was AAA’s failure to recall the length of
the knife used in the assaults, a minor and insignificant
detail not material to the elements of the crime of
rape.  She remained steadfast on cross-examination
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even as defense counsel tried to discredit her by
bringing up her dark past of being sexually molested by
the accused-appellant’s father when she was seven
years old.  This is in stark contrast to her testimony for
the defense, where AAA, now living with accused-
appellant’s family, claimed that she fabricated a
revolting tale of rape simply because accused-appellant
made her do laundry.  AAA’s recantation even
himself.  While AAA claims in her retraction that she
had consensual sex with her brother, accused-appellant
testified that they merely kissed and that AAA’s
purported motive for the rape charges was monetary.
 As furthermore observed by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, the cross-examination of AAA as a
defense witness revealed that it was taken at a time
when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay
with the family of accused-appellant and upon a
reliance on the family’s implied commitment to send
accused-appellant to Mindanao:
 PROS. JOSON:
 Q:        Where are you staying at present?
A:        In our house, sir.
 Q:        And your house where you were staying is the
house of the parents of the accused?
A:        Yes, sir.
 Q:        And you don’t have any relatives where you can
go and stay except from that house?
A:        None, sir.
 Q:        Where [are] your parents?
A:        I do not know, sir.
 Q:        Are they all dead or still alive?
A:        They are deceased, sir.
 Q:        All?
A:        Both are deceased, sir.
 Q:        Do you mean to say that do you have full blood
brother and sister?
A:        They all separated, sir.
 Q:        Do you know where they were living?
A:        No, sir.
 Q:        From the time you were released from the
DSWD you are alone by yourself?
A:        Yes, sir.
 Q:        And the person[s] who are now taking care of
you are giving you shelter and everyday foods [sic] from
the family of the accused, is that correct?
A:        Yes, sir.
 x x x x
 Q:        Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be
dismissed because you testify today[, would] you admit
for a fact that he [was] also staying in the house where
you are staying now?
A:        No, sir.
 Q:        Where will he stay?
A:        In Mindanao, sir.
 Q:        Because that was one of the promise or
commitment of the family of the accused, is it not?
A:        No, sir.
 Q:        And how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
A:        Because my other Kuya will not allow him to stay
in the house, sir.
 Q:        Because your other Kuya does not like Aniceto
Bulagao to do the things that you have complaint [sic]
against him, is it not?
A:        Yes, sir.
 Q:        And what you are “isinusumbong” is the case
today against him, is it not?
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A:        Yes, sir.[31] 
Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the
allegation in the trial court that he was suffering from
mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the
finding of the trial court that there was no proof that
the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly
exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was
already present at the time of the rape
incidents.  Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it
with clear and convincing evidence.[32]  Besides, this
Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-
appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in
his testimony, show a complete deprivation of
intelligence or free will.  Insanity presupposes that the
accused was completely deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of the
commission of the crime.[33]  Only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime should the exempting
circumstance of insanity be considered. [34]
 As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-
appellant the penalty of death for each count of
rape.  The Court of Appeals modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346.  It should be noted at this point
that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of death penalty, the presence of a
qualifying circumstance which would have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the
award of moral damages and civil indemnity to be
increased each from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under
prevailing jurisprudence.[35]
 In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of
rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon.  Under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when
committed with the use of a deadly weapon is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.  This crime
was proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001,
which was alleged to have occurred on June 17,
2000.  Since no other qualifying or aggravating
circumstance was alleged in the Information, the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
 On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the
accused-appellant used a knife on June 17, 2000, she
said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000, the
date of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.[36]  As such, the
crime that was proven in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 is
simple rape not qualified by any circumstance affecting
criminal liability.  However, simple rape is also
punishable byreclusion perpetua under Article 266-B.   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 In both cases, since the death penalty would not have
been imposed even without the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, both for each
count of rape. [37]  In addition, we have held that since
exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
[38]
  This Court believes that the conduct of accused-
appellant herein, who raped her minor adoptive sister
twice, falls under this category and is therefore liable
for exemplary damages in the amount ofP30,000.00 for
each count of rape, in line with existing
jurisprudence. [39]
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955
dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-appellant Aniceto
Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for
each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:   already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
 1)    Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby
ordered to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape, in addition
to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals,
namely: civil indemnity in the amount ofP50,000.00 and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, both for
each count of rape; and
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 2)    All damages awarded in this case should be
imposed with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 SO ORDERED.
OROPESA V. OROPESA
DECISION
 
          This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008, as well as the
Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both rendered
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449,
entitled “NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA.”  The
Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed the Order [3] dated
September 27, 2006 and the Order [4] dated November
14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-
0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesa’s
petition for guardianship over the properties of his
father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.
          The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed
Decision, follow:
 
          On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, a petition for
him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as
guardians over the property of his father, the
(respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed
as SP Proc. No. 04-0016and raffled off to Branch 260.
            In the said petition, it is alleged among others
that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were]
impaired and such has been evident after his
hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the
(respondent) was observed to have had lapses in
memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to
manage his property properly; that due to his age and
medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid,
manage his property wisely, and has become an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him,
particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
 
            In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding
judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing, and
directed the court social worker to conduct a social case
study and submit a report thereon.
 
            Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the
Court Social Worker conducted her social case study,
interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The
Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report
but without any finding on the (respondent) who
refused to see and talk to the social worker.
 
            On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August
3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental
Opposition.
            Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his
evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his
sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondent’s)
former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
 
            After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a
manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The
(petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of
evidence.
 
            Thus, the (respondent) filed his “Omnibus
Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the
presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not
formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the
Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to
the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
 
            In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a
quo granted the (respondent’s) Omnibus Motion.
Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to
Evidence dated July 23, 2006.[5] (Citations omitted.)
 
 
          The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to
evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006.  The
dispositive portion of which reads:
 
          WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has
failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that
Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his
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personal affairs and to administer his properties,
Oppositor’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the
case is DISMISSED.[6]
 
 
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was
denied by the trial court in an Order dated November
14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
 
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows
that petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient
documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that
Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal
affairs and to administer his properties, the Court
hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September
2006.
 
Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED for lack of merit.[7]
 
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through the
now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated
September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are
AFFIRMED.[8]
 
 
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but
this was denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly
assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008.  Hence,
the instant petition was filed.
 
Petitioner submits the following question for
consideration by this Court:
 
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN
“INCOMPETENT” PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION
2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE
PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]
 
 
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record,
we find the petition to be without merit.
 
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the
assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set
aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible
error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the
trial court which purportedly disregarded the
overwhelming evidence presented by him showing
respondent’s incompetence.
 
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the
nature and purpose of guardianship in the following
wise:
 
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred
character, in which one person, called a “guardian” acts
for another called the “ward” whom the law regards as
incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is
designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of
the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s
property, as well as to render any assistance that the
ward may personally require. It has been stated that
while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities,
but those of one in loco parentis as well.[11]
 
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a
qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to
be a minor or an incompetent.
 
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court
tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and
their property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship.  The full text of the said provision reads:
 
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word “incompetent.” – Under
this rule, the word “incompetent” includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation.
 
 
We have held in the past that a “finding that a person is
incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and
definite evidence.”[12]  We consider that evidentiary
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standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the
case at bar. 
 
In support of his contention that respondent is
incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in
guardianship, petitioner raises in his
Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:
 
a.       Respondent has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years
already;
 
b.      During the time that respondent was hospitalized
at the St. Luke’s Medical Center after his stroke, he
purportedly requested one of his former colleagues
who was visiting him to file a loan application with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital
bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had
substantial amounts of money in various banks
sufficient to cover his medical expenses;
c.       Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left
dilapidated due to lack of care and management;
 
d.      The realty taxes for respondent’s various
properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and
his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the
necessary taxes;
 
e.       Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell
his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the former
would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car
had been sold, respondent did not procure another
vehicle and refused to account for the money earned
from the sale of the old car;
 
f.       Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a
joint account under his name and his daughter’s
without the latter’s knowledge or consent;
 
g.      There was purportedly one occasion where
respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon
the “orders” of his girlfriend during one of their fights;
 
h.      Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to
ransack his house of groceries and furniture, despite
protests from his children.[14]
 
 
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner
and cited petitioner’s lack of material evidence to
support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner
did not present any relevant documentary or
testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of
his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely
due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition.  In fact, respondent points out that the only
medical document presented by petitioner proves that
he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and
administer his properties.  Portions of the said
document, entitled “Report of Neuropsychological
Screening,”[15] were quoted by respondent in his
Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact
favored respondent’s claim of competence, to wit:
 
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino,
he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in
conversations and could be quite elaborate in his
responses on many of the test items.  He spoke in a
clear voice and his articulation was generally
comprehensible. x x x.
 
xxxx
  
General Oropesa performed in the average range on
most of the domains that were tested. He was able to
correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of
number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST
in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy
geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to
render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing
Test. x x x.
 
xxxx
 
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was
able to suggest effective solutions to problem
situations. x x x.[17]
 
 
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his
documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by
himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in
their father’s real and personal properties) and their
father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be acting
under their direction).  These testimonies, which did not
include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient
to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action
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and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence
that was filed by respondent.
 
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural
lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of
certificates of title over real properties registered in his,
his father’s  and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax
declarations, and receipts showing payment of real
estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not
in any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to
make decisions for himself.  The only medical document
on record is the aforementioned “Report of
Neuropsychological Screening” which was attached to
the petition for guardianship but was never identified
by any witness nor offered as evidence.  In any event,
the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at
best, for although the report had negative findings
regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it
also contained findings that supported the view that
respondent on the average was indeed competent.
 
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the
soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue,
we had the occasion to rule that “where the sanity of a
person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and
that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the person’s state of mental
sanity will suffice.”[18]
 
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November
14, 2006 which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable
September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted
the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary
evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the
trial court made known its own observation of
respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit:
 
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a
medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa
does not have the mental, emotional, and physical
capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary,
Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1)
performs on the average range in most of the domains
that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations;
and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The
Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the
observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp,
alert and able.[19](Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, “only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of
facts.”[20]  We only take cognizance of questions of fact
in certain exceptional circumstances; [21] however, we
find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long
settled that “factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed
by this Court.  As a rule, such findings by the lower
courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are
deemed final and conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record.”[22]  We therefore
adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the
Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s
demurrer to evidence was proper under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
 
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
 
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
 
 
A demurrer to evidence is defined as “an objection by
one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.”[23]  We have also held that a
demurrer to evidence “authorizes a judgment on the
merits of the case without the defendant having to
submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have
to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled
to the relief sought.”[24]
 
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it
dismissed the petition for guardianship without first
requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely
because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence
other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to
preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence
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since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief.    
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED.  The assailed Decision dated February
29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449
are AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
=============================================
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age
was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.  Cesar
Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was
accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. 
He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship.   As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant
and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. 
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant
was a constant visitor.  On February 1931, he even
wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is
his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. 
Though he was out of the country, he continuously
wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time
for her and “junior’s” sake.   The defendant ask his
friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital
arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. 
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child
at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived
together for about a year.  When Antonia showed signs
of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and
he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the
child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was
first planned.
ISSUES: 
1.  Whether the note to the padre in connection with
the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during
her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2.  Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael

Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to
acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as

admission of paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission with the child
carried by Antonia.  The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable.   

 “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in

the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to
reveal the father's resolution to admit the status”.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court 
in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on
this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is
no proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby,
Pacita Loanco.  Finally, SC found no necessity to modify
the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed
to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per
month.  They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial
court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.

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