1. Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA27 GRNo. 63915 Dec.

29, 1986

FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it “would be granted to a private individual only
in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular
right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved”.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the
reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUE:
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2
“unless otherwise provided”.
ruling:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

2. De Roy vs. CA GRNo. 80718 Jan. 29, 1988

Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa Perdosa De Roy,
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal,Sr., et
al., resulting in injuries to their family and death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed
to do so. 
 Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. This decision
was affirmed into by the Court of Appeals. 
On the last day of the 15-dayperiod to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of tie to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate
court. They again filed for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
Petitioner filed for a special civic action for certiorari to declare null and void the
previous decision and claimed that the appellate court committed grave abuse
of discretion. 
They contended that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision
in the Official Gazette. Also they argued that the petitioners had the “last clear chance”
to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the shop.

Issue:
WoN the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-day period for
appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, could be applied to
the case at bar.

Held:
The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to the case at bar,
notwithstanding the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
        There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the duty of the counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court, which are published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G.R.’s) and in publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and law journals.
           The ruling in the Habaluyas case was that the 15-day period for appealing or
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Such motion may be filed only in
cases pending in the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which in its discretion
may grant or deny the extension requested. Such decision was given prospective
application to subsequent cases like Lacsamana vs Second Special Cases Division
of the Intermediate Appellate Court and Bacaya vs Intermediate Appellate Court.

3. Phil. International Tradingh Corp. vs. Judge Zorimo Angeles et al. GRNo. 108461 Oct. 21, 1996.

FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued  Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the People's
Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of
Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate
 importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply,
at one is to one ratio.

Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to import from PROC with
the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers, and after
they executed respective undertakings. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to
submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were
withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter were both barred from importing
goods from PROC. As a result, the private respondents filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
against the PITC.

The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not
published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the ground that it was
not published in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context
of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. . . .

The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their

applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with,
and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect
related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances
which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

4. People vs. Bagares GR.No. 99026 Aug. 4, 1994

FACTS:
 This is an appeal from the judgment finding appellant RAFAEL BAGARES y MENDOZA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425, as
amended). the trial court rendered its judgment, acquitting co-accused Imelda Santos of the charge
in conspiracy with Bagares.

On January 12, 1990 At about 9:30 A.M. of said date (TSN, ibid., p. 26), a team, composed of
policemen, was formed to conduct a surveillance at Sixto De la Paz St., Sta. Elena, Marikina, Metro
Manila after receiving a telephone call from an unidentified party. The surveillance continued for
three days. They observed that appellant regularly came out to do business in the street at about
8:00 P.M. On January 15, at around 9:30 P.M the police team conducted a buy-bust operation,
appellant handed over the shabu,  he named accused Imelda Santos y Lopez as his source of
the shabu

The police team, together with appellant, proceeded to the residence of accused Santos, who
surrendered to them four plastic bags of shabu, Crime Laborator  found specimens positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu 

Appellant denied the charges against him.

ISSUE:

that the trial court erred in not acquitting him of the crime charged despite its acquittal of his co-
accused Imelda Santos because "the evidence of the prosecution is common against both and is
based on the same factual setting, arising from the same single incident."

RULING:

Appellant was arrested when caught selling shabu in flagrante while accused Santos was arrested
after a warrantless search on information furnished by appellant himself after his arrest. The
acquittal of accused Santos was based mainly on the grounds of constitutional infirmity and the
unreasonableness of the warrantless search and seizure of the evidence against her.

Under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a police officer may arrest a person
even without a warrant, when the person arrested has committed or its actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in his presence. Under Section 12, Rule 126 of the same Code, a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense, without a search warrant.

5. Municipal Governement of Coron vs. Cariño GRNo. 65894 Sept. 24, 1982
FACTS:
 Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Palawan
and Puerto Princess City, Branch IV where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 35. The action sought
authority from the court to demolish the structures built by the private respondents alongside the
rock causeway of the petitioner's wharf. 

President Ferdinand E. Marcos had the Mayor of plaintiff-municipality to demolish and remove all
constructions along the pier after giving the defendants one month notice, that despite said mayor's
desire to comply immediately he defendants had already been given 3 extensions thereby delaying
their ejectment therefrom

After a series of postponements, the trial court, eset the hearing of the case for the last time ith
further warning to the private respondents that no more postponements shall be allowed. despite
proper notice, the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
Consequently, the petitioner moved that private respondents' non-appearance be considered as a
waiver on their part of their right to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses and their right to present
evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 19 (b)  in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court applies, wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being
required.

RULING:

For a proper exercise of their right to appeal, the private respondents should have complied with
Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, as amended by our resolution en banc dated September
17, 1974, which partly provides that:

Sec. 5. Duty of Appellant upon Receipt of Notice. — It shall be the duty of the
appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the
preceding section, to pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the
docketing of the appeal, and within sixty (60) days from such notice to submit to the
court twelve (12) printed copies of the record on appeal, or twelve (12) typewritten or
mimeographed (on one side of good quality paper, eleven inches in length by eight
and a half inches in width — commonly known as letter size — written double
spaced) copies of said record on appeal together with proof of service of two (2)
printed, typewritten or mimeographed copies thereof upon the appellee.

Thus, upon failure of the appellant to comply with the above rule, the Court of Appeals may dismiss
his appeal. Since the private respondents failed to submit the required printed record on appeal, the
lower court's judgment in favor of the petitioner became final. and executory as an eventual result of
the dismissal of the appeal.

6. Cui vs. Arellano University L 15127 May 30, 1961

FACTS:
 Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University.  He then enrolled in its College
of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4 th year.  During these years, he was
awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87.  He then
transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University.   To secure
permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University.  The
defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which
Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all
heads of private schools, colleges and universities.  Part of the memorandum states that “the amount
in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to
the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant
provided by Arellano University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was
advisory and not mandatory in nature.  Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous
students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public
policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights
and hence, null and void.      
  
The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal
rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing
defendant’s counterclaim.

7. Plesantville Dev. Corp. vs. CA GRNo. 79688 Feb.1 1996

253 SCRA 10 FEBRUARY 1, 1996
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. The burden of proving bad faith belongs
to the one asserting it.

Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation, a parcel of land at
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. The property was designated as Lot 9, Phase II. In
1975, herein respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the said subject lot from the former purchaser.
Eldred later discovered that the property he purchased had improvements introduced therein by
respondent Wilson Kee.
Kee bought on installments Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.
(CTTEI). Under the contract Kee was allowed to take possession of the property even before full
payment of the price. CTTEI through an employee, Zenaida Octaviano accompanied Kee’s
wife Donabelle to inspect Lot No. 8. Octaviano however mistakenly pointed towards Lot 9.
Hence spouses Kee had their residence, an auto repair shop, a store and other improvements
constructed on the wrong lot.

Upon discovery of the blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach an amicable settlement but
they failed. Jardinico demanded that the improvements be removed but as Kee refused, Jardinico
filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City. Kee filed a third-party complaint against herein petitioner and
CTTEI.

The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since at present the contract with
Kee has rescinded for Kee’s failure to pay installments. Kee no longer had any right
over the subject property and must pay rentals for its use. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not
negligent. It argued that Kee was a builder in bad faith.
Even if assuming that he was in good faith, he was no longer so and must pay rentals from the
time that he was given notice to vacate the lot. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder
in good faith as he was unaware of the mix-up when he constructed the improvements. It was in
fact due to the negligence and wrongful delivery of CTTEI which included its principal
the herein petitioner. It further ruled that the award of rental was without basis.

Pending the resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico and Kee entered into a deed
of sale, wherein Lot 9 was sold to Kee. In the said deed a provision stating that regardless of the
outcome of the decision, such shall not be pursued by the parties and shall be considered
dismissed and without effect. The appellate court was not informed of this deal.

Issue: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property
erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent, a builder in good faith
delivered by the owner’s agent, a builder in good faith?

Held: Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the
burden of proving that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for the violation
of the contract with CTTEI but this may not be used as a basis of bad faith and as a
sufficient ground to negate the presumption of good faith. Jardinico is presently only allowed
to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
Good faith is based on the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any flaw or defect in is title. Since at the time when Kee constructed his
improvements on Lot 8, he was not aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was delivered to him.
Petitioner further contends that Kee was negligent as a provision in the Contract of Sale on
Installment stated that the vendee must have personally examined the property and shall bear on
his own the consequential expenses in the changes that may happen thereon. The court held that
such provision cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the
vendee’s right to recover damages resulting from petitioner’s negligence. Such interpretation of
the
waiver is contrary to law and public policy and cannot be allowed. Petitioner cannot claim and
excuse itself from liability by claiming that it was not directly involved in the delivery of the
property. The principal must be responsible for the acts of the agent done within the scope of his
authority. CTTEI was the sole real estate representative of the petitioner when the delivery was
made. Wilson Kee is therefore declared a builder in good faith. Petitioner and respondent CTTEI
are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence. The award of rentals to Jardinico is
dispensed with.

8. De Borja vs. Vda De Borja 46 SCRA 577

G.R. No. L-28040, 18 August 1972, 46 SCRA 577
FACTS:

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for
the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was
appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-
administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the
testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto
himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco’s death, Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special
administratrix. The validity of Tasiana’s marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits;
In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963,2 by and between “[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage,
namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,” and
“[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de Borja,
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid

RULING:

Yes
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between “Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco” on the one hand, and on the other, “the
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja”, it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon
the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.

9. Valenzuella Hardwood & Industrial Supplies Inc. vs. CA et al GRNo. 102316 June 30, 1997
10. Leal vs. IAC GRNo. 65425 Nov. 5, 1987
Facts:

A document entitled “Compraventa”, involving three parcels of land, was sold with
annotations of right to repurchase only by the Santiago brothers themselves or by their
heirs to Cirilio Leal the deceased father of some of the petitioners, when Cirilo died on
December 10, 1959, the subject lands were inherited by his six children.

Sometime before 1966-1967, Vicente Santiago offered to repurchase the subject

properties. The petitioners refused the offer. Vicente Santiago instituted a complaint for
specific performance before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City on August 2,
1967.

All the trial,  rendered its decision dismissing the complaint, the private respondent
appealed. The petitioners filed a motion to amend the annotations at the back of the
Transfer certificates of Title. The private respondent filed a timely motion for
reconsideration of the above decision and an opposition to petitioners’ motion to
amend.

The decision is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered ordering
petitioner-appellees to accept the sum of P5,600.00 from respondent-appellant as
repurchase price of the lots and thereafter to execute a deed of repurchase to appellant
Salud M. Santiago.

Issue:

whether or not the annotation at the back of the title is contrary to law.

Held:

Yes. The condition present on the contract is contrary to public policy because of the
restriction to the right of ownership, specifically the owner’s right to freely dispose of his
properties. According to Art. 1306, which states: “That contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.”
11. Floresca vs. Philex Mining L 30642 June 30, 1985
FACTS:

Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet
on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The
heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue
Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part
of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working
underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already
claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction
over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of
the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions. 

RULING: 

The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
12. Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank GRNo.46158 Nov. 28, 1986
13. Norma A. Del Soccoro vs. Ernest Johan Brinkman Van Wilsen GRNo. 193707 Dec. 10, 2014
FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and
her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed
a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged
in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we

agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision
of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent
upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing,
even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
14. Bank of America NT and SA vs. American Realty Corp. 378 Phil. 1279, 1294 (1999)
“In a conflict between a Philippine law and a foreign law, Philippine law prevails”

Facts:

The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a real estate mortgage by the
respondent. Upon the loan maturity, the corporation debtor failed to pay and the petitioner bank filed 4
collection cases in the foreign courts (England and Hong Kong) against the corporation debtors. At the
same time it also filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in the office of the Provincial Sheriff
of Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said was sold in a public auction. The
respondent files action for damages against petitioner due to the act of foreclosing the real estate
mortgage extrajudicially despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect the principal
loan. Petitioner contends that the respondent is not made a party on the collection case before the
foreign courts for being a third party mortgagor and such actions were filed in foreign courts and thus
decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action is filed
in the Phils to enforce such judgment and that under the English law which is the law governing in the
principal agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil action for sum of
money. The court rendered judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on
collection of a sum of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the security of the mortgages.

SSUE:

WON the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors before foreign courts
constitutes a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

RULING:

The court held that Section 4 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides that “if two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” A mortgagor creditor may
pursue two remedies either to institute against the mortgage debtor a personal action for collection of
money or foreclosure of a mortgage but cannot avail of both remedies. In Phil. jurisdiction these
remedies are alternative and not cumulative. Thus, choosing one remedy is a bar to avail of the other
remedy. Plaintiff cannot split up a single cause of action by filing both remedies as expressly prohibited
by the rules on civil procedure.

On the contention of the petitioner that the English law should apply to the principal agreements that
states that the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of
money, the court held that a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as fact. If not pleaded,
the court will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is
the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION.

Granting however that the English law is applicable in the Phil. court, such law is contrary to sound and
established public policy of the forum which proscribes the splitting of a single cause of action, thus
still cannot be applied by the court in the case.
It is proper that Philippine law should be upheld since it is the country upon which the case is filed.
Therefore the filing of a collection case by the petitioner in foreign courts is a waiver for the remedy of
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. 

15. Felicilas Amor Catalan vs. CA et al GRNo. 167109 Feb. 7, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in

Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced
in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy

RULING:

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.  Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.
16. Racho vs. Tanaka GRNo. 199515 June 15, 2018
FACTS:

Rhodora Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They
lived together for nine years in Japan and did not have any children. Racho alleged that Tanaka filed for
divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of
the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated by an authentication officer of the
DFA./Back in the Philippines, she tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of
Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there was no court order recognizing it. /Thus, her
divorce could only be annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her
to remarry. Racho filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry. The
RTC ruled that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was
able to prove Tanaka’s national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent evidence since it was not
the divorce decree itself.

Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that under Japanese law, a divorce by agreement
becomes effective by oral notification, or by a document signed by both parties and by two or more
witnesses. Racho’s MR was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent was valid.

RULING:

Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national

law of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a fact before the Regional
Trial Court. /The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once our courts find that the
foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his or her national law, and that
the foreign spouse’s national law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be
absolute./Recent jurisprudence holds that a foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as
long as it is validly obtained, regardless of who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.

Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the
divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital
tie./Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties
the legal capacity to remarry. Thus, Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws, petitioner is still married to
respondent despite the latter’s newfound companionship with another cannot be just. Justice is better
served if she is not discriminated against in her own country. As much as petitioner is free to seek
fulfilment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment within
the institution of marriage.

17. Quita vs. Dandan GRNo. 124862 Dec. 22, 1998

FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.
They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in
the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the
third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the
estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also
referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro,
Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as
surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage
between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed
between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence
of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

RULING:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as
to their respective hereditary shares. Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
her in spite of the divorce they obtained. The implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters
in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.
The trial court did not grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her
motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines.” It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.,
was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. The question to be determined by the trial court should be
limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private
respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married
on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in
a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship.
The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding
petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights
of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

18. Saudia Arabian Airlines vs. CA GRNo. 122191 Oct. 8, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner SAUDIA hired private respondent MORADA as a flight attendant in 1988,
based in Jeddah. On 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party with 2
male attendants, and on the following morning in their hotel, one of the male attendants
attempted to rape her. She was rescued by hotel attendants who heard her cry for help. The
Indonesian police arrested the 2.

MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was asked by the company to go back to Jakarta and help
arrange the release of the 2 male attendants. MORADA did not cooperate when she got to
Jakarta.

What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi Courts which she did not
understand as this was in their language. In 1993, she was surprised, upon being ordered by
SAUDIA to go to the Saudi court, that she was being convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition, sentencing her to five months imprisonment
and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with the
2, for what happened in Jakarta.

SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, But because she was wrongfully convicted,
Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly
before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-
Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country manager.
SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule.

MORADA ALLEGES: Since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.

ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case
HELD: YES.
On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in the case: A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a
“foreign element”. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic
affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth
or conception. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a
foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated
in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a
resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also,
by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events
did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to
arise.

COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic case. However, the court finds
that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its
authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to
wit:

BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney`y’s fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where
she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience
have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private
respondent) should be upheld.

The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties. MORADA through her act of filing,
and SAUDIA by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack
of jurisdiction.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts
occurred in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor”
or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could
be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in
the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and
observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in
our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged,
according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to
identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.

In applying “State of the most significant relationship” rule, to determine the State which has
the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c)
the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here,
although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the
record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in
our view, has been properly established.

NOTE:
These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In
particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex
loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance
of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex
fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier,
matters of “procedure” not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by
it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under
one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
 (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships
of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.

19. United Airlines Inc. vs. CA et al GRNo. 124110 April 20, 2001

FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines,through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila,
three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minors on, Mychal, to visit the
cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles.All flights had been confirmed previously by United
Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Anice to
changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued tickets with
corresponding boarding passes with the words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to
leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked. The CA ruled that private
respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules
were not complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of
the USA

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD:  No.

According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the
rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed.
Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore,
although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through
petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C.,however, such fact did not change the
nature of the original contract of carriage entered Into by the parties in Manila.
20. Seacom Co. Inc. Vs. CA et al GRNo. 122823 Nov. 25, 1999
FACTS: SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural
machinery, products and equipment.  On September 20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership
agreement whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo. The
agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the
dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis.  In the course of the business relationship arising from
the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and
SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and attorney’s fees.

JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing
unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) 21units of
Mitsubishi power tillers.  In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in
1977 24units of Mitsubishi power tillers to FSDC, which fact JII allegedly made known to SEACOM, but
the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it
and sold 21 units of said tractors with much lower prices, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit
of P85,415.61.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held affirmatively; the act of SEACOM in dealing directly
with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its agent, and that there was fraud in the transaction between FSDC
and SEACOM to the prejudice of JII.  “SEACOM not satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII in the
market, joined the competition even as against the latter, and thereby changed the scenario of the
competition thereby rendering inutile the dealership agreement which they entered into to the
manifest prejudice of JII” On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no agency
relationship between the parties but SEACOM is nevertheless liable in damages for having acted in bad
faith when it competed with its own dealer in the sale of the farm machineries to FSDC.  Both courts
invoke as basis for the award Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:"Art. 19. Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith.”

ISSUE:  Whether  SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale
of farm machineries to FSDC.

HELD: Yes. Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM
may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith;
otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code
above-quoted.  This provision, together with the succeeding article on human relation, was intended to
embody certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order.” What is sought to be written into the law is the
pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.

SC accordingly resolves to affirm the award for unrealized profits.  The Court of Appeals noted that the
trial court failed to specify to which the two appellees the award for moral and exemplary damages is
granted. However, in view of the fact that moral damages are not as a general rule granted to a
corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who testified on his feeling very aggrieved and on his
mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how SEACOM “dealt with us behind (our) backs”, the
award should go to defendant Jamandre, President of JII.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award
of P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages shall be paid to defendant Tirso Jamandre.

CONCEPT:

The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the classical theory that
"he who uses a right injures no one". The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and
traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of
rights, even when the act is not illicit.

RATIONALE:

Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for
injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The
absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities
of the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the
transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of
affairs.

ELEMENTS OF AN ABUSE OF RIGHT:

While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the "cardinal law on
human conduct" expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a
person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner
that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of
an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM
may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good
faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of
the Civil Code above-quoted. This provision, together with the succeeding article on human
relation, was intended to embody certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human being and for the stability of the social order." What is sought to be
written into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.
21. Elizabeth Diaz vs. Encanto et al GRNo. 171303 Jan. 20, 2016
 in the processing of her application; and that there is no malice on the part
of the private respondents in requiring petitioner to accomplish the Report
for Duty Form which is the basis of the date of her actual return to the
service.
Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be
held liable for any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. "The law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal wrong. 
22. Dart Phil. Inc. vs. Calogcog 613 Phil. 224 (2009
Abusr of Right NCC 19

respondents objected to the second audit, petitioner exercised its option under the agreement to vary the
manner in which orders are processed—this time, instead of the usual credit arrangement, petitioner only
admitted respondents’ purchase orders on pre-paid basis.   With the expiry of the distributorship
agreement on September 30, 1992, petitioner no longer acceded to a renewal of the same.
rom these facts, we find that bad faith cannot be attributed to the acts of petitioner. Petitioner’s exercise
of its rights under the agreement to conduct an audit, to vary the manner of processing purchase orders,
and to refuse the renewal of the agreement was supported by legitimate reasons, principally, to protect its
own business. The exercise of its rights was not impelled by any evil motive designed, whimsically and
capriciously, to injure or prejudice respondents. The rights exercised were all in accord with the terms and
conditions of the distributorship agreement, which has the force of law between them. [10] Clearly,
petitioner could not be said to have committed an abuse of its rights. It may not be amiss to state at this
juncture that a complaint based on Article 19 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
support it but innuendos and conjectures.[11]
23. Metroheigts Subdivision Homeowners Association Inc. Inc. vs. CNS Construction and
Development Corp. GRNo.209359 Oct. 13, 2018
Facts:
On June 29, 1992, petitioner Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[3] of Quezon City a complaint[4] for damages with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents
Petitioner alleged, among others, that it sought the assistance of respondent MWSS to
address the insufficient supply of water in its subdivision to which the latter advised the
improvement and upgrading of its private internal water distribution lines, foremost of which
was the transfer or change in the location of its tapping source and the change in size of its
water service line from the old line tapped at Sanville Subdivision to a new tapping source
on Visayas Avenue, Quezon City; that on November 16, 1990, petitioner entered into a
contract with respondent MWSS for the new water service connection, and respondent
MWSS awarded the project to a contractor which implemented the same, the cost of which
was solely shouldered by contribution from petitioner's members amounting to
P190,000.00, inclusive of labor, materials, and respondent MWSS' fees and charges; and
that since then, there was already sufficient and strong water pressure twenty-four (24)
hours a day in the petitioner's subdivision.
However, sometime in April 1992, respondent CMS Construction made diggings and
excavations, and started to lay water pipes along Fisheries Street and Morning Star Drive in
Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City, petitioner's neighboring subdivision; that in the process,
respondent CMS Construction, with the knowledge and consent of respondent MWSS but
without petitioner's knowledge and consent, unilaterally cut-off and disconnected the latter's
new and separate water service connection on Visayas Avenue... espondent CMS
Construction only made a temporary reconnection with the use of a 2-inch rubber hose to
the new water line it constructed at Sanville Subdivision; and that despite petitioner's verbal
and written demands, respondents have failed to restore petitioner's water line connection
in its original state and to return the missing PVC pipes and radius elbow.
RTC rendered a Decision... in favor of the plaintiff
The RTC found, among others, that respondents did not have the authority to simply cut,
disconnect and transfer petitioner's water supply with impunity, without notice to or without
getting its consent; and that respondents acted in concert and in bad faith, which made
them jointly and severally liable for damages. Respondent MWSS filed its notice of appeal
while respondents CMS Construction and the Cruzes filed a motion for new trial which the
RTC granted. On May 18, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision[7] which affirmed its earlier
Decision
The RTC found that respondents' claim of damnum absque injuria was not tenable.
CA
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The CA found that the respondents' rehabilitation project was not undertaken without any
notice at all; that respondents' actions were merely consequential to the exercise of their
rights and obligations to manage and maintain the water supply system, an exercise which
includes water rehabilitation and improvement within the area, pursuant to a prior
agreement for the water supply system; and that the alleged abuse of right was not
sufficiently established.
Issues:
whether the respondents should be held liable for damages for the cutting off, disconnection
and transfer of petitioner's existing separate water service connection on Visayas Avenue
without the latter's knowledge and consent which also resulted in petitioner's subdivision
being waterless.
Ruling:
We reverse the CA. Article 19 of the New Civil Code deals with the principle of abuse of
rights, thus: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide[,] specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one's
acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should
abuse or bad faith make him liable.
The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right.
The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another."...
had petitioner's officer not complained about the water service interruption in their
subdivision and the rubber hose connection was not made to temporarily fix petitioner's
concern, petitioner's homeowners would have continuously suffered loss of water service.
respondents admitted in their respective Comments that the inconvenience of the temporary
stoppage of water supply in petitioner's area was highly inevitable in the process of
changing petitioner's water pipe size crossing the bridge up to Visayas Avenue where the
tapping source is connected. Notwithstanding, respondents proceeded with the cutting off
and disconnection of petitioner's water connection without the latter's consent and
notification thereby causing prejudice or injury to the petitioner's members because of the
unexpected water loss for three (3) days. Respondents' actions were done in total disregard
of the standards set by Article 19 of the New Civil Code which entitles petitioner to
damages.
In MWSS v. Act Theater, Inc.,[20] we held that petitioner's act of cutting off respondents'
water service connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the
latter, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the New Civil Code
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms (set under Art. 19)
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held
accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent
what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent's water service
connection.
We do not agree with the CA's finding that respondents' actions were merely consequential
to the exercise of their rights and obligations to manage and maintain the water supply
system. "Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to
be exercised.
Article 19 of the New Civil Code sets the standard in the exercise of one's rights and in the
performance of one's duties, i.e., he must act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. "The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears,
and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a
right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modem concept of
social law.
Here it was established, as shown by the above discussions, that respondents indeed
abused their right.
We find that respondents MWSS and CMS Construction should be held liable for damages
to petitioner but not the Cruzes who are the directors and stockholders of respondent CMS
Construction. Section 31 of the Corporation Code is the governing law on personal liability
of officers for the debts of the corporation
24. Velayo vs. Shell Corp. Phil. L 7817 Oct. 31, 1956
Facts:
Since the start of CALFs operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by the defendant.
the books, of the Defendant showed a balance... in its favor for goods it sold and delivered
to CALI.
Defendant had reasons to believe that the financial condition of the CALI was for from being
satisfactory.
the management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors
Mr. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of Directors of the CALI, informed the creditors
present that this corporation was insolvent and had to stop operations. He explained the
memorandum agreement executed by... the CALI with the Philippine Air Lines), Inc.
regarding the proposed sale to the latter of the aviation equipments of the former
Mr. Alexander Sycip was assisted in the explanation by CPA Alfredo Velayo of Washington,
Sycip & Company, Auditors of the CALI, who discussed the balance sheets and distributed
copies thereof to the creditors present
The said balance sheet made mention of a C-54 plane in the United States, the property
now involved in this suit.
After the creditors present knew the balance sheet and heard the explanations of the
officers of the CALI, it was their unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to
present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair... pro-rata division of its assets...
although the management of the CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the
creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file insolvency proceedings... the
American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., filed a complaint against -the CALI in the
Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. in and for the County of San- Bernardino for
the collection of an assigned credit... and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued on
the same date against a C-54 plane
Unaware of Defendants assignments of credit and attachment suit, the stockholders of CALI
resolved in a special meeting... to approve the memorandum agreement of sale to the
Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
the National Airports Corporation learned of Defendant's action in the United States and
hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against the CALI
The CALI,... also prompted by Defendant's action in getting the alleged undue preference
over the other creditors by attaching the C-54 plane in the United States, beyond the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, filed... a petition for voluntary insolvency.
an order of insolvency was issued by the court... which necessarily stayed the National
Airports Corporation's action against the CALI and dissolved its attachment... thus
compelling the National Airports Corporation to file its claims with the insolvency... court
After properly qualifying as Assignee, Alfredo M. Velayo instituted this case... against the
Shell Company of P. I., Ltd., for the purpose of securing from the Court a writ of injunction...
restraining Defendant, its agents, servants, attorneys and solicitors from prosecuting in and
for the County of San Bernardino in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 62576 against the in solvent Commercial Air Lines, Inc.
and as an alternative remedy,... that judgment for damages in double the value of the
airplane be awarded in favor of plaintiff against Defendant, with costs.
the Court rendered decision... dismissing the complaint
Issues:
Whether or no... the defendant Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., taking advantage of its
knowledge of the existence of CALI's airplane C-54 at the Ontario International Airport
within the Country of San Bernardino, State of California, U. S.
A.,... acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of
CALI... by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation
Shell Oil Company, Inc.
Ruling:
Defendant, upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that with all
probability, it could not get much of its outstanding cerdit because of the preferred ... claims 
of certain other creditors, forgot that "Man does not live by bread alone" and entirely
disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.
The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of the other creditors of
CALI may be a shrewd and... surprise move that enabled Defendant to collect almost all if
not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of Justice cannot countenance such attitude
at all, and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of our Government and
local business.
ART 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith".
It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such
statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is implemented by
Article 21... which prescribe the following: 
"ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage".
It may be argued that the aforequoted provisions of the Civil Code only came into effect on
August 80, 1950, and that they cannot be applicable to acts that took place in 1948, prior to
its effectivety. But Article 2252 of the Civil Code, though providing... that: 
''Changes made and new provisions and rules land down by this Code which may be
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall
have no retroactive effect.
mplies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation and it cannot be alleged that in the
case at bar Defendant had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence of the...
insolvent CALI or of its creditors said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can
be given retroactive effect.
the Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from which it could derive
practically nothing) to its sister corporation in the
United States where CALI's plane C-54 was then situated, succeeding by such swift and
unsuspected operation in disposing of said insolvent's property by removing it from the
possession and ownership of the insolvent.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from
is reversed and Defendant-Appellee, Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd., is
hereby sentenced to pay to Plaintiff-Appellant, as Assignee of the insolvent CALI, damages
25. G.F. Equity Inc. vs. Arturo Valenzona GRNo. 156841 June 30, 2005
26. Garcia Jr. vs.Salvador et al GRNo.168512 March 20, 2007
Facts
Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in LBHT. She underwent a medical exam @ CDC with
Garcia (medtech) conducting the HBs Ag test. Her result was REACTIVE. The company physician (Sto.
Domingo) told her she is suffering from HepaB, and based on the medical report SD submitted, LBHT
terminated her employment. Ranida told her father Ramon about her condition, then the latter suffered a
heart attack and was confined  at Bataan Doctors Hospital. Ranida took another HBs Ag test in BDH, and
the result was NON-REACTIVE. She told Dr. SD about it but the latter said the CDC test was more
reliable, so she took another test at CDC again, and the result this time was NON-REACTIVE. She took
the same test used in CDC @ BDH and the result was NON-REACTIVE (four tests!). She submitted the
results to the LBHT ExecOff who requested her to undergo under test (WTF!) - result is NEGATIVE (5th
test, haha), so LBHT rehired her.

 Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against medtech Garcia + pathologist Castro, claiming
that the erroneous interpretation led her to lose her job, suffer mental anxiety, while Ramon was
hospitalized + lost business opportunities. Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and
incompetence; explained "false positive." Castro said he did not examine Ranida, and that the results
bore only his stamped signature.

  RTC dismissed the Salvadors' complaint for failure to present sufficient evidence. CA reversed this and
ordered Garcia to pay moral damages (50k), exemplary damages (50k), and atty's fees (25k). Castro was
exonerated.
27. Albenson Ent. Corp. et al vs. CA GRNo. 88694 Jan. 11, 1993
28. Amonoy vs. Spouses Jose Gutierez & Angela Fornilda GRNo. 140421 Feb. 15, 2001
29. Manila Doctors Hospital vs. So Un Chua et al GRNo. 150355 July 31, 2006
 after procuring the consent of respondent Chua's family33 as
admitted by respondent Ty herself,34 and even called on other
specialists, nd conduct other tests as well36 according to their
fields of specialty, all of which yielded no serious finding;37.
30. Bunag Jr. vs. CA et al GRNo. 101749 July 10, 1992
FACTS:

Plaintiff Bunag filed a case against Bautista for recovery of possession of parcel of land in Pampanga. He
contends that the property was originally owned by his father Apolonio and that he has been living
there with his father until 1920 when they transferred to Tarlac.
Jose Bautista, a nephew in law was allowed to build a house and live therein on condition that he would
pay the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. After becoming a widow, he transferred his
residence and accompanied his sister Estrudes to stay in that house.

Thereafter, he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista to vacate the land. The defendant
answered that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale signed by Apolonio with
his thumbmark. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from Apolonio and
that she was present when Bunag affixed his thumbmark on the document

The trial court decided in favor of Bunag and ordered the defendants to vacate the property and deliver
its possession thereof to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, finding the deed of sale to have
been validly executed, set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale has been properly proved to be authentic and validly executed.

HELD:

It must be emphasized that the deed of sale was not acknowledged before a notary public and neither
are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of the attesting witnesses. The document
is typewritten in English and over the typewritten name of Apolonio is a thumbprint. The deed is not
notarized and therefore a private writing whose due execution and authenticity must be proved before
it can be received in evidence as required in Sec. 21 Rule 132 (now Sec. 20 Rule 132) of the Rules of
Court. The Court upheld the decision of the trial court that private respondents have failed to prove the
due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale. It should be noted that the document was written in
English and was merely thumbmarked which could be reasonably inferred that he was illiterate. The
minimum proof should in the least include evidence that the document was duly read, explained and
translated to him. Furthermore, there are no instrumental witnesses to the deed. The mischief that lurks
behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumbmarked without any witnesses to it and
not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the
rules of evidence. Petition is therefore granted reinstating the decision of the trial court.
31. Tenchavez vs. Escano 17 SCRA 674
FACTS:

Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June
1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same
year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on
the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and
absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in
California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship. 

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having,
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any
way influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:

1.     Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts
of the Philippines.

2.     Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents were sufficient in form.

RULING:

1.     No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved
under the Philippine Law.  Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid
under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree
was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause,
leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally
getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus
entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

2.     No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents  are not supported by credible

evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the
court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters
written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents
of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
part.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages.
32. Valenzuela vs. CA GRNo. 56168 Dec. 22, 1988

FACTS:

 June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta
avenue towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk
about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and seeked help
 She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
 While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires,
she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who
was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the
ground
 She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.
 Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000
(aritificial leg)]
 RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to
Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500 unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks
after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized
profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this
judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000
in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
 CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side
but absolved Li's employer
 Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
 Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment
located just across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car
parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving
on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy
rain)
ISSUE: 
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable -
YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO
 If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and
slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the
mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and
distance
 it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in
order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there
is plenty of space for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at
the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also
on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection
 emergency rule
 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or
alley where she would likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place where there were
people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed
 she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away,
behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
 Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master
liable for acts of the servant (must be in the course of business),
but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon
the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised
diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the
latter‘s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the
liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. 
  situation is of a different character, involving a practice
utilized by large companies with either their employees of
managerial rank or their representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the
night of the accident because he was coming from a social visit with
an officemate in Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he
really came from his officemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he
and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of the family in entrusting its company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the
opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater
accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological -
suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi
Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would
also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which
her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements,
changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and
occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are
painful.
33. Quisumbing vs. Meralco GRNo. 142943 April 3, 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house located at
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City.  Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s
inspectors were conducting a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the
house.  Permission was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary.  It was found that the meter had
been tampered with and the information was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the
information to the owners of the house.  The inspectors brought the meter to their
laboratory for further verifications.  If proven that the meter was indeed tampered,
defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services.

The inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the findings of the laboratory.  And unless
they pay the amount of P178, 875.01 representing the difference in the bill, their electric
supply will be disconnected.

The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not

1. MERALCO acted without due process and lack of regard for Quisumbings’ rights
and reputation.
2. The Quisumbings be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the
deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.  Exemplary damages on the
other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public.

The Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. 
However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. Meralco
may immediately disconnect service in cases of meter tampering, but it has to be personally
witnessed and attested by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board.  During the inspection, no government official or ERB
representative was present.

Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential 0f P193, 332.
96 while MERALCO was ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including
attorney’s fees.
34. Ledesma vs. CA GRNo. 54598 April 15, 1988
FACTS: A college student was scheduled to graduate with magna cum laude
honors. However, this was deprived of her because her lending of money to
members of an organization of which she was a member, purportedly in
violation of existing school rules and regulations, according to the President of
the State College. This was done although the Bureau of Public Schools already
intervened and instructed give her said honors. Despite this, she was made to
graduate as a plain student. The Supreme Court held the President liable for
damages.
ISSUE: IS THE PRESIDENT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES?
HELD: Yes, the President is liable for damages.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be
reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal
which was brought about by the petitioner’s neglect of duty and callousness. Thus,
moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):

"There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of defendant's wrongful act or omission." (People v. Bayln, 129 SCRA 62, 1984)
35. People vs. Bayotas GRNo. 102007 Sept. 2, 1994
FACTS: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was
charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas
died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his
comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant
did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the
appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower
court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgment is rendered.
ISSUE/HELD: WON death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his civil liability? AFFIRMATIVE
RATIO DICIDENDI:
‘ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
“When a separate

e civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.”
What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any
criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act
will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to
justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect
merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of
the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is
because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability
ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter.
In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that
when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending
appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of
and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability
is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced
in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated
under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action
that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed
to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil
action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one
such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
“Sendaydiego’s appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.”
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made
a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it
upheld Sendaydiego’s conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil
liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego’s civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego’s civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape.
36. Heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring Jr. vs. CA et al GRNo. 108395 March 7, 1997
37. Fortich –Celdran vs. Celdran et al 19 SCRA 502
38. Apa et al vs. Fernandez GRNo. 112381 march 20, 1995
Facts: This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Romuldo
Fernandez of RTC, Branch 54 of Lapu-Lapu City denying petitioners motion for suspension of
arraignment and  motion for reconsideration in a criminal case filed against them. Petitioners
anchor their claim on a prior case regarding ownership. Petitioners allege that the civil case filed
in 1990 seeking declaration for nullity of land title of the owner which had been filed three years
before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them constitutes a
prejudicial question.

Issue: Whether the question of ownership is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of

the criminal case against petitioners.

Ruling: Petition to suspend Criminal Case No. 012489 based on the prejudicial question
presented was granted on basis that;
 the prejudicial question is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
 elements of prejudicial question - (1) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 the criminal case alleges that petitioners squatted without the knowledge and consent of
the owner, which, in 1994 the civil case rendered the nullity of the title of the owner and declared
both petitioners and respondents as co-owners of the land.
 respondents argue that owners can be ejected from his property only if for some reason,
that is, he has let it to some other person. However, both case of respondents and petitioners are
based on ownership.
39. Alsons Development and Investment Corp. vs. Heirs of Confesor GRNo. 215671 Sept. 19,
2018

Facts:
It was alleged that petitioner's rights in IFPMA No. 21 can be traced from Ordinary Pasture
Permit (OPP) No. 1475 issued to Magno Mateo (Mateo) by the Bureau of Forestry on June
23, 1953 over a pasture land
On June 28, 1960, Mateo assigned his rights and interests over the covered property to
Tuason Enterprises, Inc., thus, Pasture Lease Agreement (PLA) No. 61 was cancelled and
PLANo. 1715 dated December 13, 1960 was issued. On March 24, 1964, Tuason
Enterprises Inc. transferred its leasehold rights to petitioner, thus, PLANo. 1715 was
cancelled and PLA No. 2476 was issued. On June 26, 1992, petitioner and the DENR
entered into Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 21 for a period of 25
years.
IFMA No. 21 was converted to IFPMA No. 21, where the coverage area was further
increased. Finally, IFPMA No. 21 dated January 15, 1996 was executed.
The controversy ignited when on August 15, 2005, the Heirs of Romeo D. Confesor
(respondents) filed a protest... against petitioner before the DENR,... praying for the
cancellation of IFPMA No. 21 on the ground that the a large portion of the land subject
thereof was part of the property covered by consolidated Original Certificate of Title...
sserting ownership through their predecessor-in-interest, respondents basically argued that
the DENR had no jurisdiction to enter into the said leasehold agreement because the
subject property was no longer classified as a public land.
prior to the filing of respondent's protest, the subject property was put under investigation...
there was reasonable ground to believe that OCT No. V-1344 (P-144) P-2252 is a spurious
title... report was, however, set aside by the Department of Justice... sustaining the validity
and authenticity of OCT No. V-1344 (P-144) P-2252
Meanwhile, the DENR conducted its own investigation
However, the DENR found that while OCT No. V-1344 (P-144) P-2252 under PSU-120055
was genuine, there were segregated certificates of title... which were all fake and spurious
DENR... dismissed respondents' protest against IFPMA No. 21 for lack of merit.
DENR Secretary affirmed the regional director's findings and conclusion.
It was further ruled that respondents were guilty of laches for not having raised the issue of
ownership against petitioner's predecessor-in-interest
However, on appeal, the OP set aside the DENR's decision
OP ruled that laches does not apply to lands registered under the Torrens system.
OP resolved to grant petitioner's motion for reconsideration, this time ruling that laches
applies
OP again reversed itself, ruling that respondents have established their ownership of the
subject property, reinstating thus its July 6, 2009 Decision... etitioner filed a Petition for
Review with a Prayer for Status Quo Order before the CA
On January 24, 2011, petitioner filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Status
Quo Order or Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction in view of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 7711, arguing that the said civil case is a confirmation that the
State never recognized the validity of respondents' title
CA in its Resolution denied the said motion
Meanwhile, in an Order dated March 21, 2013, Civil Case No. 7711 was ordered dismissed
by the RTC, without prejudice, for failure of the parties to file judicial affidavits.
The CA then promulgated its assailed Decision... affirming the OP's December 20, 2010
Decision
First, the CA ruled that the subject property is alienable and disposable
OCT No. V-1344 (P-144) P-2252... is not spurious.
Third, the CA ruled that Section 38, of Act No. 496 provides only for a period of one year
from the date of entry of a decree of registration to question the same.
Further, the CA noted that while it may be argued that the right of the State to demand
reversion of unlawfully acquired lands of public domain cannot be barred by prescription,
the same can only be done in cases of fraud and irregularity and through a direct
proceeding attacking the validity of the title
. Fourth, as to the issue of laches, the CA ruled that the same does not apply considering
the indefeasible character of respondent's title being registered under the Torrens system.
In the meantime, the Republic re-filed its petition for the annulment of titles and reversion on
March 26, 2014, docketed as Civil Case No. 8374 before the RTC
Petitioner now argues that the CA erred in not considering that the herein issue of whether
or not to cancel IFPMA No. 21 is dependent solely on the outcome of the petition for
reversion and annulment of respondents' title pending before the RTC
Issues:
whether or not the civil case for annulment of title and reversion before the RTC constitutes
a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to the action for the cancellation of
IFPMA No. 21.
Ruling:
We find merit in the instant petition.Generally, a prejudicial question comes into play only in
a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because the resolution of the civil action is determinative juris et de jure of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[31] This, however, is not an ironclad rule.
It is imperative that We consider the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question,
i.e., to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern University, Inc.,[33] We applied the principle of prejudicial
question even when there was no criminal case involved therein. The cases involved were a
case for nullification of election of directors before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and a civil case for damages and attachment before the RTC.
The earlier case of Quiambao v. Hon. Osorio,[35] also finds relevant application in the case
at bar. In Quiambao,... the Court recognized the fact that the cases involved were civil and
administrative in character and thus, technically, there was no prejudicial question to speak
of. In ruling, however, the Court also took into consideration the apparent intimate relation
between the two cases in that, the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the
subject property depends primarily on the resolution of the issue of whether respondents, in
the first place, have the right to possess the said property, which was the issue pending in
the administrative case.
Here, the two cases involved are the cancellation of IFPMA No. 21 in the case at bar and
the cancellation of title and reversion case before the RTC.
petitioner cited the pending annulment of title and reversion case before the RTC, wherein
the Republic claims that respondents' title is fake and spurious and as such, the subject
property remains in the public domain Corollarily, the government claims that it has the right
to lease or dispose of the same. Thus, it is petitioner's position that said civil case between
the Republic and respondents operates as a bar to the action for cancellation of IFPMA No.
21.
Undeniably, whether or not IFPMA No. 21 should be cancelled at the instance of the
respondents is solely dependent upon the determination of whether or not respondents, in
the first place, have the right over the subject property. Respondents' right in both cases is
anchored upon the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) that they are invoking. If the RTC
cancels respondents' TCT for being fake and spurious, it proceeds then that respondents
do not have any right whatsoever over the subject property and thus, do not have the right
to demand IFPMA No. 21's cancellation. If the RTC will rule otherwise and uphold
respondents' TCT, then respondents would have every right to demand IFPMA No. 21's
cancellation.
Thus, applying the wisdom laid by this Court in the case of Quiambao, indeed, the
cancellation of the IFPMA No. 21 is the logical consequence of the determination of
respondents' right over the subject property. Further, to allow the cancellation thereof at the
instance of the respondents notwithstanding the possibility of finding that respondents have
no right over the property subject thereof is a "sheer exercise in futility."
In fine, as the outcome of the civil case is determinative of the issue in the case at bar, by
the dictates of prudence, logic, and jurisprudence, the proper recourse is to wait for the
resolution of the said civil case. Certainly, at this point, delving into the issue on the
propriety of IFPMA No. 21's cancellation is premature.
40. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. vs Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitration et al GRNo.
182836 Oct. 13, 2009
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)
and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife,
had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their unborn child.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. It posited
that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.

RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.

The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to
give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of
a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less
than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with
the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
41. In the matter of the Petition of Habeas Corpuz of Vivian Sanchez vs. PSupt. Darorra et
al GRNo. 242257 Oct. 15, 2019.

42. Bingcoy vs. CA GRNo. 118230 Oct. 16, 1997 

The Facts

For the period July 24 to 28, 2004, Caltex sold 804,370 liters of imported Jet A-1 fuel to PAL
for the latter’s domestic operations.4 Consequently, , Caltex electronically filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its Excise Tax Returns for Petroleum Products, declaring a
total amount of ₱2,975,892.90, as excise taxes due thereon. 5

On August 3, 2004, PAL received from Caltex an Aviation Billing Invoice for the purchased
aviation, reflecting the amount of related excise taxes on the transaction. This was confirmed
by Caltex in a Certification dated August 20, 2004 where it indicated that: (a) the excise
taxes it paid on the imported petroleum products amounted to ₱2,952,037.90,; (b) the
foregoing excise tax payment was passed on by it to PAL; and (c) it did not file any claim for
the refund of the said excise tax with the BIR.6

On October 29, 2004, PAL, sought a refund of the excise taxes passed on to it by Caltex. It
hinged its tax refund claim on its operating franchise, which conferred upon it certain tax
exemption privileges on its purchase and/or importation of aviation gas, fuel and oil,
including those which are passed on to it by the seller and/or importer thereof. Further, PAL
asserted that it had the legal personality to file the aforesaid tax refund claim. 8

Due to the CIR’s inaction, PAL filed a Petition for Review with the CTA on July 25, 2006. 9 In
its Answer, the CIR averred that since the excise taxes were paid by Caltex, PAL had no
cause of action.10

PAL moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution 14 dated January 14, 2010,

prompting it to elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc. he CTA En Banc Ruling

In a Decision dated May 9, 2011, 15 the CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of the CTA Second Division,
reiterating that it was Caltex, the statutory taxpayer, which had the personality to file the subject
refund claim.
 the tax burden may have been shifted to PAL, the liability passed on to it should not be
treated as a tax but a part of the purchase price which PAL had to pay to obtain the
goods.16 Further, it held that PAL’s exemption privileges on the said excise taxes, which it
claimed through its franchise, had already been withdrawn by LOI 1483. 17

ISSUE (a) whether PAL has the legal personality to file a claim for refund of the passed on
excise taxes;

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

PAL’s legal personality to file a claim for refund of excise taxes.

The CIR argues that PAL has no personality to file the subject tax refund claim because it is not the
statutory taxpayer. As basis, it relies on the Silkair ruling which enunciates that the proper party to
question, or to seek a refund of an indirect tax, is the statutory taxpayer, or the person on whom the
tax is imposed by law and who paid the same, even if the burden to pay such was shifted to
another.19

PAL counters that the doctrine laid down in Silkair is inapplicable, asserting that it has the legal
personality to file the subject tax refund claim on account of its tax exemption privileges under its
legislative franchise which covers both direct and indirect taxes

While the NIRC mandates the foregoing persons to pay the applicable excise taxes directly
to the government, they may, however, shift the economic burden of such payments to so

meone else – usually the purchaser of the goods – since excise taxes are considered as a
kind of indirect tax.

 NIRC, the Court has consistently held that it is the statutory taxpayer who is entitled to
claim a tax refund based thereon and not the party who merely bears its economic burden.

Based on SEC 13 of the franchise , t is contemplated that direct and indirect tax exemptions
under its franchise, and applying the principles as above-discussed, PAL is endowed with
the legal standing to file the subject tax refund claim, notwithstanding the fact that it is not the
statutory taxpayer as contemplated by law.

43. Delgado Vda de Dela Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciano Rustia  Vda de

Damian GRNo. 155733 Jan. 27, 2006 
HELD:

1. YES, the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia may inherit from Josefa Delgado.

Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Also, under Article 1001 of the same
code, should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other one-half.

The petitioners are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of
her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her death. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and
sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the
new Civil Code.

Hence, the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia may inherit from Josefa Delgado.
2. YES, Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgados half-brother, may inherit from her.

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of
the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten
with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater
rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be allowed, even when the
illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood.. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives.

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. Therefore, Luis
Delgado, Josefa Delgados half-brother, may inherit from her.

3. NO, Guillerma Rustia may not inherit from

Guillermo Rustia.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new
Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on
condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent. Under the new law,
recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.

Recognition is compulsory in any of the

following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or
less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. There was apparently no doubt that she
possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which
she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial)
action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can
no longer be filed.

In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon
the death of Guillermo Rustia. Therefore, Guillerma Rustia may not inherit from Guillermo
Rustia.

4. NO, Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, may not inherit from Guillermo
Rustia.

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which created between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death.

*Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting
of his sisters, nieces and nephews.

44.Balogbog et al vs. CA et al GRNo. 83598 March 7, 1997 

FACTS:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino,
who predeceased their parents.

Private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas, and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate
of their grandparents.

Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died
single and without issue.
Private respondents presented Priscilo Trazo, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to
1934, and Matias Pogoy, afamily friend, who both testified that they attended the wedding of
Gavino and Catalina.

Catalina testified concerning her marriage to Gavino, and that after the wedding, she was handed
a “receipt,” presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the
war. 

A certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar showed that did not have a record of the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer that there
was no record of the birth of Ramonito, and for this reason, the record must be presumed to have
been lost or destroyed during the war.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering the
partition of the estate and delivery to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and
Genoveva, and to pay attorney’s fees and costs.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the assailed judgment.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Rule on the existence of marriage between Gavino and Catalina.

RULING:

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

In Pugeda v. Trias, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to
prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.  

Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were
married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage
subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were
recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

There is no merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because
there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two
witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife.  
An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses
who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange
vows of marital commitment. 

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the
family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. 

As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: 

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.

45.Silverio vs. Republic of the Phil. GRNo. 174689 Oct. 22, 2007 

FACTS:

Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using
his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence,
no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to
the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

46.Republic of the Phil. Vs. Albios GRNo. 198780 Oct. 16, 2013 

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2
years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to
acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent
summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound
by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within
the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That
the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void
ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are
present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

47.Quita vs. dandan GRNo. 124862 Dec. 22, 1998 

SAME as CASE #17
48. Engrace Niña et al vs. Norma Bayadog GRNo. 133778 March 14, 2000 
FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.  They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners.  Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal.  1 year
and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.  They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing
the marriage license.  Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977.  After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1.  Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2.  Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.  They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law.  Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.  It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.

49.De Guzman vs. People of the Phil. GRNo. 224742 Aug. 7, 2019 

On April 8, 1994, Prudencio De Guzman (Prudencio) and Arlene De Guzman (Arlene)
were married. In 2007, Prudencio abandoned his wife and children. 7

In December 2009, a friend informed Arlene that Prudencio contracted a second

marriage with a certain Jean Basan (Basan) on December 17, 2009 at the Immaculate
Church in Las Pinas City.8

Arlene went to the Immaculate Church and confirmed that Prudencio had indeed
married Basan. Arlene then filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor a Complaint
against Prudencio for bigamy under Article 34910 of the Revised Penal Code.11 

On arraignment, Prudencio pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.13

In his defense, Prudencio argued that his marriage with Arlene was void because the
copy of their Marriage Contract, which was secured from the National Statistics
Office,14 did not bear the solemnizing officer's signature.15

In its March 13, 2012 Decision, the trial court did not give weight to Prudencio's
defense. It explained that such discrepancy was inadvertent, as it found that a copy of
the same Marriage Contract in the Local Civil Registrar bore the solemnizing officer's
signature. The trial court concluded that Prudencio could not unilaterally declare that
his marriage with Arlene was void as only courts have the power to do so.17

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to show that all the elements of
bigamy were present:

(1) the marriage between the appellant and the private complainant is still existing; (2)
the same has not been legally declared to be dissolved; (3) appellant contracted a
subsequent marriage with a certain Jean Basan while his first marriage with the private
complainant is still subsisting; and (4) the second marriage has all the essential
requisites for its validity.18
Prudencio appealed before the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of his appeal,
Arlene executed an Affidavit of Desistance praying that the case be dismissed after she
had reconciled with Prudencio.20

the Court of Appeals denied Prudencio's appeal. It affirmed his conviction and modified
the penalty: the Court of Appeals denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Prudencio De Guzman y
Jumaquio's guilt for the crime of bigamy.

RULING: The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the
purposes of remarriage.

Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal
impediment for him to remarry based merely on the National Statistics Office's issuance
of a Certificate of No Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio and Arlene's Marriage
Certificate, along with the photos of the wedding ceremony, they were married on April
8, 1994.38 Thus, the Certificate of No Marriage Record is not enough for Prudencio to
assume that his previous marriage with Arlene has been voided.
Moreover, Prudencio claims that the prosecution's failure to offer a copy of the marriage
license is fatal to its case. This contention lacks merit. As the Court of Appeals noted,
"[t]he presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to
establish the existence of a marriage as the certified true copy of the [M]arriage
[Certificate is sufficient for such purpose."39

Prudencio also claims that the absence of the solemnizing officer's signature in the
Marriage Certificate renders the marriage void. It is worth noting that based on the trial
court's findings, the discrepancy was merely inadvertent since a copy of the Marriage
Certificate under the Local Civil Registry had been signed.40 

Lastly, Prudencio's argument that the case should be dismissed due to Arlene's Affidavit
of Desistance is unavailing. Affidavits of desistance that were executed after judgments
of conviction had been promulgated by trial courts are generally received with
extensive caution.42 Arlene's Affidavit of Desistance provides that she filed the
Complaint due to a misunderstanding, which both she and Prudencio had agreed to
reconcile.43 This Affidavit of Desistance cannot prove the nonexistence of all the
elements of bigamy.

Moreover, the Affidavit of Desistance was executed 13 months after the accused's
conviction in the trial court. As the Court of Appeals held, an afterthought merits no
probative value.44 

Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision are AFFIRMED.

Republic of the Phil. Vs. CA et al GRNo. 103047 Sept. 2, 1994 

Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas.  They
did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that
they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months.  Thereafter, they
parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. 

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put
in order her marital status before leaving for US.  She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the
nullity of her marriage.  Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to
the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a
marriage license to the contracting parties.  Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not
supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case.  Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.