Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing

Trust and negotiation tactics: perceptions about business-to-business negotiations in Mexico

Mohammad Elahee, Charles M. Brooks,
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Trust and negotiation
tactics: perceptions
about
business-to-business
negotiations
in Mexico
Mohammad Elahee and
Charles M. Brooks
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The authors
Mohammad Elahee is an Assistant Professor in the Department
of International Business and Charles M. Brooks is an
Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of Marketing
and Advertising, both at Quinnipiac University, Hamden,
Connecticut, USA.
Keywords
Negotiating, Competitive strategy, Trust, Ethics, Mexico
Abstract
Trust plays a significant role in business peoples’ choices of
negotiating tactics. This study compares the use of generally
accepted negotiating tactics with dubious ones. Findings from a
sample of Mexican business people indicate that the type of
negotiation (intra-cultural vs cross-cultural) is predictive of the
level of trust that a negotiator will place in an opponent and of
the likelihood of using various negotiation tactics.
Electronic access
The Emerald Research Register for this journal is
available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is
available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0885-8624.htm
Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
Volume 19 · Number 6 · 2004 · pp. 397-404
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited · ISSN 0885-8624
DOI 10.1108/08858620410556336
397
An executive summary for managers and
executives can be found at the end of this
issue.
Introduction
With the creation of the North American Free
Trade Association (NAFTA) in 1994, Mexico has
emerged as a key trading partner of the USA. Since
1994, US-Mexico trade has increased by nearly
seven-fold. In 1997, Mexico replaced Japan as the
second largest trading partner of the USA; and if
the current rate of growth in US-Mexico trade
continues, Mexico will soon overtake Canada as
the USA’s largest trading partner.
One notable aspect of the growing economic ties
between the USA and Mexico is the importance of
industrial products. Unlike the economic ties that
the USA has with the European Union and many
East Asian countries, which are characterized
mostly by the exchange of consumer goods, the
trading relationship between the USA and Mexico
is noted more for the exchange of industrial goods.
Along with the increase in business-to-business
exchange between Mexico and the USA, there has
also been an increase in the number of strategic
alliances and joint ventures as well as the
development of new forms of business
relationships and organizational structures. For
example, many large corporations from the USA,
EU, Japan, and Korea have established
manufacturing facilities in special economic zones
along the US-Mexico border known as
“maquiladoras”. These foreign firms often
manufacture as well as outsource industrial goods
from these “maquiladoras”, which employ more
than one million people and account for over 50
percent of total Mexican exports (Sowinski, 2000).
Finally, with the move toward harmonization of
business laws under the World Trade Organization
and NAFTA, we are likely to witness more
negotiations on issues such as protecting
intellectual properties, maintaining environmental
standards, and adhering to labor, health, and
industrial standards (e.g. ISO 9000). Such
complex issues will require extensive inter-
organizational negotiations.
While a number of researchers have focused on
different aspects of negotiations in Mexico (e.g.
Husted, 1998; Volkema, 1998; Adler et al., 1987),
we know little about the differences between cross-
cultural and intra-cultural negotiation behaviors
from the perspective of Mexican business people.
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap in
the literature by focusing on the role of trust in
business-to-business negotiations. Specifically, we
compare the level of trust that Mexican negotiators
 Trust and negotiation tactics
Mohammad Elahee and Charles M. Brooks
have in foreign opponents with that of Mexican
opponents. We then examine how trust may affect
the likelihood of using certain competitive
bargaining tactics.
This study investigates the behaviors that
Mexican negotiators are likely to display in initial
meetings with both foreign and Mexican
opponents and compares cross-cultural and intra-
cultural negotiations from the Mexican
negotiators’ perspective. A review of relevant
research is presented and hypotheses are
developed. Data from a sample of Mexican
business people was collected to test the
hypotheses. A discussion of the statistical findings
complemented with an analysis of insights gained
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from interviews with several negotiation experts is
presented. Finally, managerial implications and
directions for future research are provided.
Literature review
Negotiations require that parties with opposing
interests come together to make a decision.
Robinson et al. (2000, p. 650) note that while some
theorists view negotiations as cooperative, others
consistently describe negations as a competitive
process in which “negotiators will attempt to seek
whatever ‘opportunistic’ advantage may be
available”. Carr (1968, p. 144) states:
Most executives from time to time are almost
compelled, in the interests of their companies or
themselves, to practice some form of deception
when negotiating with customers, dealers, labor
unions, government officials, or even other
departments of their companies. By conscious
misstatements, concealment of pertinent facts, or
exaggeration – in short by bluffing – they seek to
persuade others to agree with them.
It is widely held that such tactics are not only
common but are also critical for a negotiator to be
effective (Lewicki, 1983; Carson, 1993; Cramton
and Dees, 1993). While Carr (1968) argues that
these tactics are necessary in the conduct of
business, he also notes that there is no clear
consensus among business executives concerning
the ethicality of such practices.
The ethicality of negotiation tactics
In light of the innately competitive nature of
negotiations and the potential for deceptive,
dishonest, or opportunistic behavior in the
process, a number of researchers have investigated
the ethics of common negotiating tactics. These
studies have commonly pursued two paths.
Researchers have developed classification schemes
to categorize negotiation behaviors, and they have
evaluated negotiators’ perceptions of the
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Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
Volume 19 · Number 6 · 2004 · 397-404
appropriateness and likelihood of use of such
tactics.
Lewicki and his colleagues (Lewicki and
Robinson, 1998; Lewicki and Stark, 1996;
Robinson et al., 2000) developed and validated a
five-factor classification scheme of negotiation
tactics. These factors include traditional
competitive bargaining, false promises,
misrepresentation of position, attacking
opponent’s network, and inappropriate
information gathering. Traditional competitive
bargaining includes tactics such as hiding the real
bottom line from the opponent or making an
opening demand so high (or low) that it seriously
undermines the opponent’s confidence that a
satisfactory settlement will be negotiated. False
promises is a tactic where the negotiator states
intentions to perform some act, but has no actual
intentions to follow through. For example, bluffing
can generally be described as making false
promises. Under misrepresentation of position,
the negotiator distorts his or her preferred
settlement point in order to create a rationale for
the opponent to make concessions. When
attacking an opponent’s network, the negotiator
tries to create dissension in the opponent’s network
or tries to lure the opponent’s people to join the
negotiator’s group. Finally, with inappropriate
information gathering, the negotiator attempts to
gain information about the opponent through the
use of payments or bribes.
In addition to validating the classification
scheme, these researchers (Lewicki and Robinson,
1998; Lewicki and Stark, 1996; Robinson et al.,
2000) have evaluated the ethicality of the various
negotiation tactics. Generally, they have found that
people are more accepting of traditional
competitive bargaining than they are from the
other four classes of tactics. Volkema (1998, 1999)
reports similar results from data collected in the
USA, Mexico, and Brazil.
Research also indicates that perceptions of the
acceptability of tactics vary across demographic
variables such as gender and nationality. Although
they found no difference between women and men
in terms of their perceptions of the appropriateness
of traditional competitive bargaining tactics (the
most acceptable of negotiating tactics), they did
find significant differences between women and
men on the other four categories of tactics
(Lewicki and Robinson, 1998). Men were more
accepting of ethically questionable negotiating
tactics than were women. These findings have
been replicated in other studies (Robinson et al.,
2000; Volkema, 1999) with similar sets of scale
items.
Research also indicates that the acceptability of
tactics differs by nationality. Lewicki and
 Trust and negotiation tactics
Mohammad Elahee and Charles M. Brooks
Robinson (1998) found that US citizens are more
accepting of traditional competitive bargaining
and of false promises than were citizens of other
countries; however US citizens were less accepting
of attacking opponent’s network when compared
to citizens of the other countries. An examination
of differences across regional groupings of
countries (e.g. Latin American, Western Europe,
Pacific Asia) revealed that no group was
consistently more accepting or was consistently
less accepting of all five categories tactics (Lewicki
and Robinson, 1998; Robinson et al., 2000). In
other words, no one country is across the board
more ethical or less ethical that another when it
comes to negotiation tactics.
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While investigating perceived appropriateness
of negotiation tactics, Volkema (1998, 1999) also
investigated the likelihood of the use of alternative
tactics. He found no differences between the USA
and Mexico concerning the acceptability of 12 out
of 17 bargaining tactics, but did find that five of the
ethically questionable tactics were more acceptable
in the USA. However, results from that same study
indicate when the acceptance of tactics was
compared to the likelihood of the use of those same
tactics, there was a greater disparity within the
Mexican group. Although members of the
Mexican sample found certain tactics to be less
acceptable than did members of the US sample,
Mexicans were more willing to compromise their
standards of ethics.
In addition to the five categories of negotiation
tactics developed by Lewicki and his colleagues,
tacit bargaining in which communication is
conducted in a non-explicit form (e.g. messages
are passed between the negotiators in the form of
hints, signs, and obscure imitations) has been
identified as an important negotiation technique
(Wall, 1985). According to Schelling (1960), tacit
bargaining is typically used when negotiating
parties do not trust each other in an explicit
negotiation. Volkema (1998) notes that non-verbal
forms of communication are very important to
negotiations in Mexico. Therefore, in addition to
the five negotiation tactics identified by Lewicki
and his associated, we also investigate the
perception of Mexican business people about tacit
bargaining as a negotiation tactic.
Just as research has shown that traditional
competitive bargaining is generally more
acceptable as a tactic as compared to the four other
negotiations tactics, we posit that tacit bargaining
will also be viewed as an acceptable practice and
will be seen as distinct from the four other
categories of questionable tactics. We, therefore,
label traditional competitive bargaining and tacit
bargaining as “generally acceptable tactics” and
the four other tactics: false promises,
misrepresentation of one’s position, attacking
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Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
Volume 19 · Number 6 · 2004 · 397-404
opponent’s network, and inappropriate
information gathering as “dubious tactics.”
The role of trust in negotiations
Within the context of negotiations, the importance
of trust has been considered in a number of
studies. Walton and McKersie (1965) indicate that
trust is related to integrative bargaining in labor
negotiations, and Butler (1995) has found that the
expectation of trust leads to increased information
sharing between parties involved in a negotiation.
In a later study, Butler (1999) confirmed that
relationship and found that information sharing
leads to collaborative negotiation. He also found
that trust between negotiating parties can result in
less complex and more efficient outcomes.
Trust has also been linked to the types of
bargaining tactics used during negotiations
(Kimmel et al., 1980). Kimmel et al. (1980) found
that when negotiators had high aspirations (as it
commonly the case in business-to-business
negotiations) trust was positively related to
information exchange. That is, higher levels of
trust lead to more communication between parties
involved in negotiations. Again, under a condition
of high aspirations, they found that when males
were negotiating with a more trusted partner, there
was less use of tactics aimed at pressuring the other
party into making concessions (i.e. the use of
threats, requiring heavy commitments, making
derogative comments about the other party, or
introducing extraneous issues into the
negotiations).
Many researchers (e.g. Gewirth, 1982; Hosmer,
1995) argue that ethics and trust are highly related.
Following the assertion of Brien (1998) that trust
promotes ethical behavior, we posit that trust plays
an important role in the ethical behavior of
negotiators during a negotiation process.
Specifically, we hypothesize that trust will be
negatively related to all six categories of
negotiation tactics.
H1. Trust will be negatively correlated with the
use of traditional competitive bargaining,
tacit bargaining, false promises,
misrepresentations of position, attacks on
the opponent’s network, and inappropriate
information gathering.
In addition, as suggested by the distinction
between generally acceptable tactics and dubious
tactics, we hypothesize:
H2. The degree of negative correlation between
trust and generally acceptable tactics
(traditional competitive bargaining and tacit
bargaining) will be less than that between
trust and dubious tactics (false promises,
misrepresentations of position, attacks on
the opponent’s network, and inappropriate
information gathering).
 Trust and negotiation tactics
Mohammad Elahee and Charles M. Brooks
Trust can evolve from a number of different bases.
Deutsch (1958) suggests that trust exists when an
individual is able to predict the actions of another.
In the context of international business, Brenkert
(1998) argues that trust comes about when two
parties share common values. Based on this, two
negotiators from the same country – by being able
to predict the one another’s behaviors and by being
more likely to share common values – should have
more trust in each other than two negotiators from
different countries. As such, during a negotiation,
a negotiator may make certain judgments about
the trustworthiness of an opponent based on that
opponent’s nationality. Such judgments may in
turn influence the negotiator’s choice of tactics.
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Therefore, nationality of the negotiating parties
becomes very important in international
negotiations where ethnocentric and nationalistic
tendencies often impede the development of trust.
H3. Negotiators will place more trust in an
opponent from their own country than they
will place in a foreign opponent.
Adair et al. (2001) found that some negotiators
adapt their behaviors across cultural contexts.
That is, they negotiate differently in a cross-
cultural situation than in an intra-cultural
situation. Research indicates that cross-cultural
negotiations tend to be more difficult and result in
less favorable outcomes than do intra-cultural
negotiations (Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965;
Graham, 1985; Brett and Okumura, 1998).
Individuals bargain harder in a cross-cultural
context than in an intra-cultural arena. Rubin and
Brown (1975) found that when parties were from
different racial groups, they tended to be less
cooperative when negotiating. They suggest that
the similarity between the negotiating parties
increases the level of trust, and trust allows for
more cooperative behaviors.
H4. Negotiators will engage in more tacit
bargaining, traditional competitive
bargaining, false promises,
misrepresentations of position, attacks on
the opponent’s network, and inappropriate
information gathering in cross-cultural
negotiations as compared to intra-cultural
negotiations.
Methodology
A questionnaire was developed to test the
hypotheses. The survey instrument was first pre-
tested with a sample of Mexican business students,
and then data was collected from sample of
Mexican business people. In addition, to gain a
clearer picture of negotiation practices in Mexico,
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Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
Volume 19 · Number 6 · 2004 · 397-404
a series of in-depth interviews were conducted with
a group of Mexican negotiation experts. Those
interviewed were a diplomat, a law professor, two
negotiation consultants, a director of a family
business center at a Mexican university, and an
attorney specializing in international dispute
resolutions.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire included measures previously
reported in the literature. Two bilingual marketing
professors translated the questionnaire into
Spanish. The Spanish version of the questionnaire
was then back-translated by a different individual.
In translating the questionnaire, efforts were made
to ensure equivalence, and not just literal
translation. The translation process went through
several iterations before the questionnaire was
deemed acceptable.
Following Lewicki and Robinson (1998), all
respondents were asked to assume that they are
about to enter into a negotiation for something
that was very important to their business. They
were further requested to assume that the
opponent was of the same gender as the
respondent, that the opponent was unknown to the
respondent, and that they are negotiating for the
first time with each other. No information about
the negotiation context that might have influenced
responses (such as the negotiator’s own personal
motivations, the specific issues being negotiated,
or the relationship between the parties) was
provided.
Because the study involved a comparison of
intra-cultural and cross-cultural negotiation
behaviors, two separate sets of questionnaires were
administered. The respondents were randomly
divided into two groups. In the first group,
respondents were asked to assume that they are
negotiating with someone from Mexico. The
second group was asked to assume that they are
negotiating with someone from Maldives. This
second set of questionnaires contained a brief
description about the location of the Island of
Maldives, but otherwise was identical to the first.
Evidence suggests that negotiators commonly
develop biases based on the nationality of their
opponents. For example, Mexican negotiators
commonly have a more positive perception of
Spanish opponents than they have of opponents
from the USA. In the survey concerning intra-
cultural negotiations, we portrayed Maldives as the
home country of the opponents. Since Mexico
does very little business with Maldives, Mexican
respondents are less likely to suffer from any bias –
positive or negative – toward opponents from
Maldives. To further guard against any bias, all
respondents were asked if they knew anyone from
 Trust and negotiation tactics
Mohammad Elahee and Charles M. Brooks
Maldives. Any respondent who knew someone
from Maldives was excluded from the analysis.
Three items drawn from the work of Rotter
(1967) and Dwyer and Oh (1987) were used to
measure the level of trust that respondents felt
toward their opponents. These items were
measured along a seven-point scale with a score of
“7” indicating more trust than a score of “1.” The
likelihood that respondents would use various
negotiation tactics was initially measured with a
19-item scale. Out of these 19 items, 16 statements
are taken from the “Self-reported inappropriate
negotiation strategies scale” (SINS) developed by
Robinson et al. (2000). For these items,
respondents were asked to indicate their likelihood
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of using of the various tactics along a seven-point
scale with a “1” indicating “Not very likely” and a
“7” indicating “Very likely.” Finally, the
questionnaire contained demographic questions
that were used to develop a profile of sample.
The instrument was validated in a pre-test using
a student sample. Questionnaires were distributed
among students enrolled in a bachelor’s business
degree program in a North Mexican university.
Students were randomly divided into two groups
of equal size. Two different sets of questionnaires,
one dealing with intra-cultural negotiations and
one dealing with cross-cultural negotiations, were
given to the two groups of students. A total of 84
usable responses were collected. Of these, 47 were
completed by male respondents, and 37 were
completed by females. Factor analysis and
reliability tests were conducted. Based on the pre-
test results, one item was dropped from the final
version of the questionnaire.
Sample
A systematic random sample was used for the
study. To ensure representativeness of the sample
and to increase the generalizability of the study,
respondents were selected from different
geographic regions of Mexico. Samples were
selected from the members of Chambers of
Commerce of Mexico D.F., Monterrey, and
Guadalajara-Jalisco. Samples were also selected
from the members of the Mexican-American
National Chambers of Commerce and from a
Bancomext database, the largest listing of Mexican
exporters and importers.
Out of the 600 questionnaires mailed, 84
responses were completed and returned, including
two responses received by fax. A total of 23
questionnaires were undeliverable due to changes
in respondents’ addresses. The effective response
rate was 14.6 percent. Of the 84 responses, 41
pertained to intra-cultural negotiations, while the
remaining 43 pertained to cross-cultural
negotiations. Of the respondents, 76 were males,
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Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
Volume 19 · Number 6 · 2004 · 397-404
72 were from the manufacturing sector, while only
ten were from the service sector, indicating the
dominance of manufacturing sector in Mexico.
Questionnaires were mailed in two different
waves. The responses of the two waves were
compared to determine if non-response error
existed. Separate MANOVAs examining the
likelihood rating were performed for both intra-
cultural and cross-cultural negotiations. No
significant differences were found between the two
waves.
Instrument validation
Principal component analysis with a varimax
rotation was performed on the 18 items measuring
the likelihood of use of negotiation tactics. As in
the pre-test and as suggested by the literature,
these items clustered into six categories. The
Cronbach alphas computed from the aggregate
responses on the six categories as well as trust are
as follows: trust 0.8261; tacit bargaining 0.7732;
traditional competitive bargaining 0.8567; attacks
on opponent’s network 0.8595; false promises
0.8257; misrepresentations 0.8991; and
inappropriate information collection 0.8532.
Hypotheses tests
Pearson’s correlations were computed to assess the
relationship between trust and each of the six
categories of negotiation tactics (H1 and H2). The
correlation results, reported in Table I, show that,
as hypothesized in the paper, trust is negatively
correlated with each of the types of negotiation
tactics. Also, an examination of the correlations
between negotiation tactics and trust indicates that
the negative correlation between dubious
negotiation tactics (false promises,
misrepresentations of position, attaching
opponent’s network, and inappropriate
information gathering) and trust is stronger than
that between generally acceptable tactics (tacit
bargaining and traditional competitive bargaining)
and trust. When Mexican negotiators do not trust
their opponents, they are more likely to use
ethically questionable negotiation tactics. H1 and
H2 were both supported.
As indicated in H3, respondents were predicted
to place more trust in opponents from their own
country than they would in opponents from a
foreign country. Mexican negotiators were more
trusting of their opponents in intra-cultural
negotiations (m ¼ 5:4472, std. dev: ¼ 0:7977)
than they were of their opponents in cross-cultural
negotiations (m ¼ 3:3256, std. dev: ¼ 0:8050).
The test of difference between these means
(t-statistic ¼ 12.125, p ¼ 0:000) indicates a
significant difference and provides support for H3.
 Trust and negotiation tactics Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
Mohammad Elahee and Charles M. Brooks Volume 19 · Number 6 · 2004 · 397-404

Table I Correlations between trust and alternative negotiation tactics

Trust TB TCB FP MOP AON IIG
Trust 1.000
Tacit bargaining 20.386 1.000
Traditional competitive bargaining 20.502 0.612 1.000
False promises 20.584 0.206 0.365 1.000
Misrepresentations of position 20.624 0.381 0.419 0.847 1.000
Attaching opponent’s network 20.638 0.324 0.447 0.889 0.951 1.000
Inappropriate information gathering 20.527 0.442 0.449 0.679 0.895 0.852 1.000
Note: All correlations are significant at p , 0.05; (n = 84)

Differences in the likelihood of using the various school, college, and inter-generationally – such as
types of negotiation tactics (comparing intra- young men doing business with their friends’
cultural and cross-cultural negotiations) were fathers, etc. In Mexico, personal relationship and
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assessed with t-tests. As indicated in Table II,
results from the analysis show significant
differences between intra-cultural and cross-
cultural negotiations. Mexican negotiators were
more likely to “bargain harder” (and engage in
more of all six categories of negotiation tactics)
when dealing with a foreign opponent than when
dealing with a Mexican opponent. These findings
provide support for H4.
Discussion and implications
The study makes an important contribution by
demonstrating that negotiation behavior differs as
a function of the trust that is reposed on an
exchange partner during a negotiation. The results
of the statistical tests show a strong negative
relationship between trust and the likelihood of
using six negotiation tactics. Since trust has been
shown to be influenced by the nationality of the
opponent, it is important that negotiators try to
build some form of relationship with their
counterparts, especially when the counterparts
come from collectivist, strong uncertainty
avoidance, large power distance, and high context
countries such as Mexico. To quote one of the
negotiation experts that we interviewed:
Business relationships in Mexico are very highly
personalized. Many business relationships have
begun in childhood and developed through high
mutually understood patron-client relationship
substitute for the rule of law.
Even though the statistical results indicate that,
Mexican negotiators are likely to be hard
bargainers when negotiating with foreigners,
caution should be exercised before making any
broad generalization of this finding. Although
foreign negotiators may find that Mexican
negotiators often make false promises or
misrepresent their positions, there may be a
cultural explanation behind this type of behavior.
To quote another of our negotiation experts:
[T]ime is not perceived in the same way in Mexico
as it is in the USA. Deadline is something unknown
in Mexico and there is always a possibility to defer a
work till tomorrow. Saying “yes” and “no” does not
necessarily mean yes and no. At times, people say
“yes” just to make the other person feel good.
“Yes” does not necessarily mean a commitment.
And Mexican people will hardly say “no”,
especially in a face-to-face conversation.
In this regard, another interviewee commented:
We need to distinguish between honest mistake and
deliberate falsehood . . . Generally, Mexican people
try to please the foreigners, but at times due to lack
of relevant information and out of their politeness,
they make promises that they cannot keep or follow
up. The intention is good (to please the foreign
guest), but at the end it is a disaster as they often
fail to meet the deadline or buy or supply what they
had promised to buy or sell.

Table II A comparison of likelihood of using various negotiation tactics in intra-cultural and cross-cultural negotiations
Intra-cultural Cross-cultural
Tactics Mean SD Mean SD t Sig.
Tacit bargaining 4.04 1.14 5.58 0.84 27.027 0.000
Traditional competitive bargaining 3.91 1.51 5.54 0.96 25.085 0.000
False promises 2.02 1.58 3.50 0.79 25.469 0.000
Misrepresentations of position 1.89 1.52 4.18 0.23 29.701 0.000
Attaching opponent’s network 1.69 1.49 3.65 0.48 28.147 0.000
Inappropriate information gathering 2.31 1.78 4.89 0.62 28.909 0.000

402
 Trust and negotiation tactics
Mohammad Elahee and Charles M. Brooks
The unstable business environment of Mexico may
also explain some Mexican negotiation behaviors
that may seem questionable in the eyes of their
foreign counterparts. To quote one of the
interviewees:
The Mexican business environment is far more
chaotic than the predictable environment of the
USA, Europe, or Japan. In a developing, third-
world, less industrialized country like Mexico,
delivery times, deadlines and resources can be
subject to electrical supply failures, truck accidents,
train hi-jacks, currency devaluation, 100 percent
plus annual inflation, industrial sabotage, customs
and tax authority interference, etc., etc. Also,
Mexican people operate in a highly volatile
economic environment where orders for products
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and services can be suddenly placed and then just
as suddenly evaporate. As a result and as an effort
to compensate for possible financial losses due to
this volatility, Mexican businesses as a common
practice take on more work orders than they can
normally complete on time. The alternative is to
have a highly planned and scheduled system that
looks good on paper but results in not enough
orders to keep busy. Everybody in Mexico
understands and practices this “Mexican
scheduling”.
While commenting on Mexican peoples’ level of
trust toward foreigners, one interviewee
commented:
Generally with foreigners, there is a mixture of
eagerness, combined with low self-esteem.
Mexicans tend to over-value or respect persons
from foreign cultures. But there is also always a
deep feeling of suspicion.
Just as many foreigners may have had bad
experience dealing with Mexican business people,
Mexican business people have had bad experiences
with a number of foreign firms. In this regard, one
interviewee noted that the Mexican Ministry of
Commerce maintains a “blacklist” that contains
names of Taiwanese and US firms that have
engaged in cheating and other unscrupulous
business activities in Mexico.
A number of implications can be drawn from
this study for practitioners. First, to successfully
conduct business-to-business negotiations, efforts
should be made to build trust and relationships not
just between the business firms, but also between
the people representing the firms. In this regard, an
interviewee commented:
The most effective way for a foreigner to negotiate
effectively is to develop a network of personal
relationships within the company or group of
people with whom they are going to negotiate. This
should be done long before the negotiation begins.
Established personal relationships are an absolute
requirement for successful [business] negotiations
in Mexico.
403
Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
Volume 19 · Number 6 · 2004 · 397-404
Conclusions and directions for future
research
Results from this research indicate that the
nationality of an opponent plays an important role
in determining the extent to which a Mexican
business person will trust that opponent and the
extent to which that businessperson will use
various negotiation tactics. The findings presented
in this paper are expected to deepen our
understanding of how Mexican negotiators may
behave in business-to-business negotiation with
both Mexican and foreign opponents. However,
the analyses presented in this paper should be
viewed in light of the limitation that the findings
represent measures of likelihood, not actual
behavior. Future efforts should be directed
towards understanding the role of trust in actual
business-to-business negotiation behavior in
various settings. Future researchers should,
therefore, make an attempt to complement their
studies with lessons from actual negotiation
behavior. Moreover, any study focusing on such
controversial and sensitive issues like trust and
ethical behavior are likely to suffer from social
desirability bias displayed by the respondents
(Dubinsky et al., 1991).
While this study is expected to make a
significant contribution toward understanding the
likely behavior of Mexican negotiators in a
business-to-business context, there remain certain
unexplored areas for potential research. Future
studies should focus on the role of power in
increasing or mitigating the incidents of unethical
tactics in negotiation. Future research should also
investigate how time, budgetary constraints, and
the context of the negotiation may influence
ethicality in international negotiation behavior.
Finally, since a large percentage of Mexico’s
international trade comes from family-owned
enterprises, the role of families in the process and
outcome of negotiations should be investigated.
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