JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
Modelling Subjective Utility through
Entropy
Abstract— We introduce a novel entropy framework
for the computation of utility on the basis of an agent’s
subjective evaluation of the granularized information
source values. A concept of evaluating agent as an infor-
mation gain function of this entropy framework is pre-
sented, which takes as its arguments both an information
source value and the agent’s evaluation of the same. A
method to model the agent’s perceived utility values is
proposed. Based on these values, several new measures
are designed for the evaluation of the information source
values, perceived utilities, and the evaluating agent. A real
application is included.
Index Terms—Expected utility; information sets;
agent; Shannon transforms; utility measures; fuzzy sets;
Hanman-Anirban entropy function; multi-attribute de-
cision making.
I. Introduction
The area of decision making has always gained a lot of
attention with different approaches appearing in the lit-
erature (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1992, 1993; Townsend
and Busemeyer, 2010; Diederich, 1997; Roe et al., 2001;
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). The expected util-
ity theory (EUT) (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944)
is one of the most popular of these. It postulates that the
decision maker (DM) chooses among the risky (uncertain)
prospects by comparing their expected utility values. The
expected utility is the sum of the individual utilities of
the uncertain outcomes, weighted by the corresponding
probability values. For example, we consider two options
(decisions): picnic outdoor or picnic indoor, depending
upon the possible states of nature: rain or no rain. The
choice rests upon the likelihood of the rain and the relative
quality of picnic indoor/outdoor with or without the rain.
An agent prefers the option with a higher expected utility.
In the real world, any decision making process inevitably
characterizes the uncertainties (Liu, 2007), both due to
randomness (probability of rain or no rain) and vagueness
(intensity of rain). The expected utility theory is focussed
primarily upon probabilistic uncertainty, and it does not
have a provision to consider the possibilistic uncertainty
(or vagueness). For instance, in the rain example, we
encounter the following difficulties while applying the
expected utility theory:
• It is difficult to crisply (numerically) assess the utili-
ties associated with the uncertain outcomes.
• The utility derived from each of the possible choices
is specific to an individual agent.
• The decision outcomes may significantly vary with the
intensity of rain, which does not get a representation
in EUT.
1
A few studies (Savage, 1954; Green and Srivastava, 1986;
Kubler et al., 2014; Echenique and Saito, 2015; Yang and
Qiu, 2005a; Izhakian, 2016) are based on the notion of
subjective expected utility theory, but these works focus
more on the subjective probabilities of uncertain events,
and less on representing the subjective utility.
These difficulties are well addressed by the possibility
theory (Zadeh, 1999; Dubois and Prade, 1980a,b) that
deals with the vagueness and imprecision due to non-
specificity, or confusion of the agent. The possibility the-
ory is based on the fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965). A
fuzzy set F defined for a set of points (objects) X =
{x1 , x2 , . . . , xn } is characterized by a membership func-
tion (MF) µF (xi ) that associates with each xi a real
number in the interval [0, 1]. F is a set of ordered pairs
{(x1 , µF (x1 )), (x2 , µF (x2 )), . . . , (xn , µF (xn ))}. The value
of µF (xi ) gives the degree of association, referred to as
“membership grade”, of xi in the vague concept repre-
sented by fuzzy set F . Since the membership grade lies in
the interval [0, 1], the other non-membership component
is obvious.
The application of fuzzy set for utility representation
has gained attention in the recent times (Martinez-Cruz
et al., 2015; Porcel et al., 2015; Chamodrakas and Mar-
takos, 2012). A related concept of the possibilistic uncer-
tainty in decision making has also been studied in the
literature. One of the first studies in this direction is
the introduction of the interval-valued expectation of a
fuzzy number in (Dubois and Prade, 1987). In (Dubois
et al., 1998, 2001), the qualitative possibilistic decision
theory is developed based on a DM’s behavior (pessimistic
or optimistic). The notions of possibilistic mean value
and variance of a fuzzy number is proposed in (Carlsson
and Fuller, 2001, 2011). The weighted possibilistic mean
and weighted possibilistic variance are proposed in (Fuller
and Majlender, 2003). These indicators have been used
in decision making applications in (Carlsson and Fuller,
2002, 2011; Zhang and Li, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007, 2009;
Georgescu, 2009; Georgescu and Kinnunen, 2011c,a).
The elaboration of expected utility theory in the pos-
sibilistic domain has received some attention recently.
The transition from probabilistic to possibilistic models
is shown in (Georgescu and Kinnunen, 2011b) by replac-
ing the probability distribution (random variable) with
possibilistic distribution (fuzzy set) and by substituting
the probabilistic indicators (expected value, variance) with
possibilistic mean and variance. The possibilistic models
in the context of risk aversion are developed in (Georgescu,
2009; Georgescu and Kinnunen, 2011b). In (Georgescu and
Kinnunen, 2011a), the possibilistic model of (Georgescu
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
and Kinnunen, 2011b) is extended with a multidimen-
sional utility function to deal with multiple risk param-
eters.
The notion of possibilistic utility rests upon fuzzy sets
that are chosen to represent vague utilities specific to
an agent. This representation, however, suffers from the
following drawbacks:
• It treats the membership grades separate from the
information source values.
• It has no provision to connect them together as a
single entity, leading to interpretation difficulties.
• The overall extent of fuzziness in a vague utility
fuzzy concept, remains unconsidered. A fuzzy set
itself could be less or more fuzzy. For example, a fuzzy
set ‘middle income group’ is quite less fuzzy in the
case of population of a small island (with people in
same occupation of, say, agriculture) than that in the
case of population of a city or a country with people
with wide diversities. The gradualness in different
membership grades will be much higher in the latter
than the former. Consequently, area under the curve
(representing MF) will be higher for the latter than
the former.
• The pre-defined shape of a fuzzy set is restrictive for
uncertainty evaluation.
Due to these difficulties, the actual worth that an infor-
mation source value has for an agent is not reflected from
the possibilistic utility. At best, it only gives relatively
an agent’s satisfaction from different information source
values, but the issue of utility representation remains
unexplained. In this regard, we see a huge potential of
the information set theory (Aggarwal and Hanmandlu,
2016) in addressing these shortcomings. The information
set theory gives a linked representation of uncertainty in
terms of “information values” by combining the actual in-
formation source values with the agent’s evaluation of the
same through an entropy framework. The information set
theory also advances the state-of-the-art of the uncertainty
evaluation by introducing the concept of “agent” that can
be seen as an empowered MF.
This inspires us to cross-fertilize the expected utility
theory with the information set theory. The expected
utility value is synonymous with the expected return value
that takes into account the rewards (enjoyment by the
agent) and the uncertainties associated with the individual
outcomes. The information value yielded by the informa-
tion set theory is also the expected value of the information
(ucertainty). This interesting commonality between the
two motivates us to combine them. Specifically, our core
idea is to better model the subjective utility with the aid
of the information set theory.
The utility value, in general, refers to the units of
reward (or satisfaction) corresponding to the given in-
formation source value. However, this unit may have a
different definition as well as interpretation for each agent
and onlooker, respectively. This has been attempted to
be addressed by the possibilistic utility but the issues,
as discussed above, remain. Motivated by the same, in
2
this study, we develop the concept of utility information
value using the recent formalism of information set. The
proposed utility information value is a representation of
both the information source value, and its individualistic
evaluation that depends on the agent’s background, in-
dividual circumstances, values, and psychology. Besides,
it is based on the entire range of the information source
values available at the disposal of the agent. We also
present several uncertainty measures to evaluate the utility
information values provided by an agent, and the agent
oneself.
We briefly summarize the contributions made in the
paper:
• The state-of-the-art is discussed in Section II.
• The concept of information source values is formalized
in Section III.
• The proposed utility information theory is built based
on an information theoretic entropy function in Sec-
tion IV.
• The utility information theory and the related con-
cepts are introduced in Section V.
• Section VI delves upon different forms of the proposed
utility information sets.
• A few measures for subjective utility are presented in
Section VII.
• We show the usefulness of the proposed concepts
through a real application in Section VIII.
• Section IX gives the conclusions with an outlook on
the future work.
II. background
In this section, we briefly describe the concept of utility
followed by a brief overview of state-of-the-art fuzzy set
and possibility theory based methods for representation
of the subjective utility.
Let X = {x1 , . . . , xn } be a non-empty set. A preference
relation  defined on X is a binary, reflexive, transitive,
and a total relation on X . Therefore,  leads to a total
preorder relation (Candeal et al., 2001). Let us denote a
preference relation on X by . A real-valued function
u defined on (X , ) is said to be a utility function if
x1  x2 ⇐⇒ u(x1 ) ≤ u(x2 ). Therefore, if u is a utility
function on (X , ), then u also represents the underlying
preference relation .
We now discuss the fuzzy set based representation of
u in the context of multi attribute decision-making. Let
us consider a set of alternatives, each one of which is
described by multiple attributes. Let X = {x1 , . . . , xn }
denote a set of alternatives defined by a set of attributes
A. For a collection of the different values that an attribute
X from A assumes for the given alternatives in X ,
different soft concepts such as high satisfaction, moderate
satisfaction and low satisfaction can be conceived by the
agent. Each of these concepts is represented through a
k
fuzzy set, say FX , characterized by a membership function
µX that is specific to the agent, such that µkX (x) ∈ [0, 1]
k
k
denotes the degree of membership for x in FX . For in-
stance, in selection of a house, a buyer (agent) assesses
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
the membership grade µ3X (x) for each of the attributes X
of an available house (alternative), say x, in a concept, say
3
high satisfaction FX , as shown in Fig. 1. This membership
3
degree µX (x) would give the agent’s desirability (or the
utility) for the particular attribute value.
FX is a normal fuzzy set if there exists x ∈ X such that
µX (x) = 1. The support of FX is defined by s(FX ) = {x ∈
X |µX (x) > 0}. For any γ ∈ [0, 1], the γ-level set of fuzzy
set FX in R is defined by
(
γ {x ∈ X |µX (x) ≥ γ} ifγ > 0
[FX ] = (1)
cl(s(FX )) ifγ = 0
where cl(s(FX )) is the topological closure of the set
s(FX ) ⊆ R.
A fuzzy set of the real line R with a normal, fuzzy con-
vex and upper-semicontinuous MF of bounded support is
termed as the fuzzy number in (Dubois and Prade, 1987).
Let A be a fuzzy number and γ ∈ [0, 1]. Then [A]γ is a
closed and convex subset of R. We denote a1 (γ) = min[A]γ
and a2 (γ) = max[A]γ . Hence [A]γ = [a1 (γ), a2 (γ)] for all
γ ∈ [0, 1]. A function f : [0, 1] → R is said to be a weighting
function if f is non-negative, monotone increasing and sat-
R1
isfies the following normalization condition: 0 f(γ)dγ = 1.
III. Foundation for Utility Information Theory
A. Information Source Values
We consider a choice situation in which an agent faces a
choice to make among different alternatives, each of which
is characterized by multiple attributes. We use the term
information source values to refer to the various values
that an attribute takes, for the given alternatives that
form the choice set. For instance, while choosing a house,
a buyer evaluates multiple alternatives in the given choice
set X against a set of desired attributes, say {X: area,
Y : location, Z: sunlight}. The collection of the actual area
(X) values for X constitutes a set IX , and the actual area
values for the various alternatives xi ∈ X are referred to
as the information source values. The actual information
source value that xi points to is denoted by IX (xi ).
A collection of attribute X values is termed as the set
of information source values IX . Mathematically, it is
expressed as
IX = {IX (xi )} | ∀xi ∈ X , (2)
where IX (xi ) refers to an individual information source
value. In the continuous domain, we consider a continuous
stream of normalized information source values generated
by a function f : [0, 1] → R, and a continuous point
information source value is denoted as {f (x)}
The change in notation between the set of information
source values and the individual information source values
may be noted.
The information source values for attribute X, by their
own virtue, do not give a measure of the agent’s desirability
for the same. The fuzzy set and possibilistic methods,
as shown in Section II, have been used to this end. For
example, in Fig. 1, the membership grades {µkX (xi )}, k =
3
Fig. 1: Sample Membership Functions for IX
{1, 2, 3} (on the y-axis) in FX 1 2
, FX 3
and FX indicate the
relative satisfaction degrees of the agent for different in-
formation source values {IX (xi )}, shown on the x-axis.
However, these methods have their own limitations that
form the main motivation for this study, in which we are
motivated to develop an approach to model the unique
evaluation rationale of an information source value by an
agent, which is best known to the agent himself.
B. Motivation
The modelling of subjective utility holds significance in
many domains. Many interesting studies have appeared
in the literature for its measurement (Aumann, 1962;
Becker et al., 1964; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Weber, 1987;
Miyamoto, 1988; Mármol et al., 1998; Grable and Lytton,
1999; Clemen and Reilly, 2001; Bertsimas and Hair, 2013).
However, they do not give a structured approach to model
the subjective utility, which can be applied across domains.
Most of these approaches require an extensive interaction
with the DM, which restricts their applicability.
Besides, the extant approaches do not consider the
whole range of the available information source values in
the determination of the utility values. That is, the utility
values remain unaltered with the expansion or contraction
of the choice set, and thereby the set of information source
values. This, however, might not give a true modelling
of the utility assessment process. In the real world, our
appreciation for an information source value very much
depends on the alternative options, we have at our disposal
for the given information source value.
That is, our choices vary with the emergence (or omis-
sion) of alternatives in the choice set. It is not uncommon
to see an entrant information source value disintermedi-
ating all the other alternatives completely. For instance,
with the emergence of a new technology, as the speeds of
our toys, computers etc. significantly improves, the extant
specifications rapidly become unuseful. This real world
aspect is very much difficult to implement with the extant
utility modelling methods.
In practice, the subjective utility corresponding to an
information source value IX (xi ) depends on both IX (xi )
and its individualistic evaluation by the agent who consid-
ers the range of the information source values, i.e. IX in
his evaluation. For example, in a house buying scenario,
different buyers have different aspirations for each of the
attributes.
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
Consider two potential buyers, say A and B. Let A
strictly look for a house in the range of 2000 to 2200 sq.
ft., and let B be flexible with regard to X, but still prefers
X to be in the range of 2000-2200 sq. ft. In such a case,
any house outside this range holds nil utility for A. In
contrast, the subjective utility for B, with respect to X,
is maximum when the actual attribute value lies in the
preferred interval [2000, 2200], and it keeps on diminishing
gradually as X takes values outside this interval.
In this study, we are motivated to model this subjective
utility that is specific to the DM, and which depends on the
agent’s experience, background, priorities, values, inertia,
habits, and circumstances. We focus on the subjective
association between the information source value and its
corresponding utility for the agent. Little attention has
been paid to formalize this link between the two. For
instance, utility modelling through fuzzy set (Martinez-
Cruz et al., 2015; Porcel et al., 2015; Chamodrakas and
Martakos, 2012), or possibility theory (Georgescu and
Kinnunen, 2011b) only maps an information source value
to the degree of agent’s satisfaction. Hence, the agent’s
evaluation of an information source value remains delinked
with its material support in such a representation. Besides,
utility in this form may be interpreted differently by
different onlookers.
We consider the concept of utility as the subjective
appreciation of an information source value by the agent.
Hence, utility is analogous to the value that an informa-
tion source value holds for the agent. For instance, any
house with X outside the interval [2000, 2200] bears no
significance for A, whereas this may not be the case for B.
More specifically, we represent the utility as a function of
both the information source value and its corresponding
evaluation by the agent. In this regard, the information
set theory (Aggarwal and Hanmandlu, 2016) appears to
be useful as it fuses the actual information source value
with its corresponding evaluation by the agent through
an information-theoretic entropy function. The concept of
entropy, in the context of random variable, has been first
propounded in (Shannon, 1948), which gives a measure
of uncertainty about a discrete random variable having
a probability mass function. This entropy value also mea-
sures the spread of a probability distribution that achieves
its maximum value when the distribution assigns equal
probabilities to all outcomes (uniform distribution). These
interesting properties of the entropy function are imbibed
in the information set theory. Concretely, we develop an
information-based utility framework in this paper.
IV. Entropy Function and Agent as the
Underpinnings of Utility Information
A. Entropy as Subjective Utility
Entropy is a measure of uncertainty widely used in
computational intelligence applications. Recently, it has
been explored in the areas of risk measure (Yang and Qiu,
2005b), operations management (Andersson et al., 2013),
portfolio optimization (Glasserman and Xu, 2013), and
4
discrete optimization (Nakagawa et al., 2013). All these
studies make use of the conventional entropy functions like
Shannon (Shannon, 1948), and Pal & Pal (Pal and Pal,
1992) that deal with the randomness in the information
source values. For instance, the Shannon entropy function
ESh is given by
X
ESh = − p(xi ) log (p (xi )) , (3)
i
where p denotes the probability mass function for the
occurences of xi , p(xi ) is the probability of xi , and
− log(p(xi )) gives the information quantity arising from an
event with probability p(xi ). The quantity of information
conveyed in a random event depends on the probability
of the event. The information quantity arising from each
possible occurrence of xi with probability p(xi ) is given as
− log(p(xi )). The lesser the p(xi ), more is the − log(p(xi )).
This implies that the less probable an event is, more is
the uncertainty, or more is the gain in information with
its occurrence. For this reason, it is also referred to as
information gain.
The weighted sum of the information gains for all possi-
ble events with varying probabilities is termed as entropy,
where probability values p(xi ) constitute the weight vec-
tor. Hence, entropy indicates the extent of disorderliness
of a random system. A situation with a large number of
possible events with varying probabilties is bound to have
high disorderliness and a high value of entropy.
The conventional entropy functions, however, only give
a measure of uncertainty in the probabilistic domain,
and they have no provision to consider the possibilistic
uncertainty associated with an event. On the other side,
the fuzzy entropies (Luca and Termini, 1972; Kosko, 1986;
Liu, 1992; Xie and Bedrosian, 1983, 1984; Sander, 1989;
Pal and Bezdek, 1994) quantify the uncertainty in the
membership grades, disregarding the associated actual
information source values.
In this regard, Hanman-Anirban entropy function (Han-
mandlu and Das, 2011) comes in handy. The general-
ized non-normalized form of the Hanman-Anirban entropy
function EG (See Appendix A for details), is given as
3 α
+b(p(xi ))2 +c(p(xi ))+d)
p(xi )e−(a(p(xi ))
X
EHA,G = (4)
i
This entropy function converts to Shannon’s entropy func-
tion with a proper choice of parameters as shown in
Appendix C.
We now recast it in the information theoretic form to
develop the proposed utility framework. To this end, we
first normalize the information source values as:
IX (xi ) − min{IX }
IX (xi ) = , (5)
max{IX } − min{IX }
and replace p(xi ) in (4) with these normalized information
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 5

To this end, let µX = |I1X | i IX (xi ) be the mean of

P
source values, as shown:
3 2 αXthe information source values in IX , |·| refers to the count
IX (xi )e−(aX (IX (xi )) +bX (IX (xi )) +cX (IX (xi ))+dX ) of values in IX , and σX is the standard deviation in the
X
EX =
Xi values in IX . We take aX = 0, bX = 0, cX = σ1X , dX =
= IX (xi )gX (xi ) − µσX
X
. Accordingly, we get
i  α
X
abs(IX (xi )−µX )
(6)α − σX
3 2 gX (xi ) = e , (8)
where gX (xi ) = e−(aX (IX (xi )) +bX (IX (xi )) +cX (IX (xi ))+dX ) X

refers to the information gain corresponding to IX (xi ); which corresponds to a generalized Gaussian function that
and aX , bX , cX , dX and αX are the real valued has gX (xi ) peaking out at some value(s) of IX .
parameters, corresponding to X, specific to the agent.
EX gives the possibillistic uncertainty with respect to X.
The entropy value EX , computed through (6) is analo-
gous to the expected value in the probabilistic domain, with
weights provided by the normalized information source
values IX (xi ) and the information gain by gX (xi ). In
essence, EX gives the expected value for IX , and the value
IX (xi )gX (xi ) gives the agent’s perceived net worth or sub- (a) α = 0.1 (b) α = 0.5
jective utility for IX (xi ). Hence, the two key determinants
of the subjective utility are the information source value
and the associated information gain, as assessed by the
agent. We now look more closely at the role of information
gain in the determination of subjective utility.

B. Agent’s Evaluation Function (c) α = 1.0 (d) α = 1.5

We draw an interesting analogy between the entropic

information gain gX (xi ) and an agent’s evaluation of
information source value IX (xi ). Let us reproduce the
information gain function from (6):
3 αX
+bX (IX (xi ))2 +cX (IX (xi ))+dX )
gX (xi ) = e−(aX (IX (xi ))
(7) (e) α = 2.0 (f) α = 2.5
We shall also refer to this information gain function as
agent. In general, an agent is defined as anything that
can be viewed as perceiving its environment. A human
agent has eyes, ears and other organs to perceive informa-
tion. A robotic agent has sensors performing the task of
perceivers(Russell and Norvig, 2003). The parameters aX ,
bX , cX , dX and αX impart adaptability to the information
(g) α = 3.0 (h) α = 3.5
gain function, in the sense that they can be used to specify
the unique evaluation behaviour of an agent for attribute
X.
Let us consider the house example taken up in Sec-
tion III. If IX (xi ) < 2000 or IX (xi ) > 2200, then gX (xi ) =
0, and hence SX (xi ) = 0 for A. In contrast, the attribute
values outside the interval [2000, 2200] also hold some
utility for B. This subjectivity in the utility behaviour of (i) α = 4.0 (j) α = 5.0
different agents towards an attribute is modelled through
the function gX (·), determined by its parameters aX , bX , Fig. 2: The evaluation values, corresponding to the normalized
cX , dX and αX that are specific to the agent. information source values, as obtained with the information
Besides other values, they can be fixed to the statistical gain function given in (8).
moments such as mean and variance of the distribution of
the information source values. This leads to a generalized In this form, gx (xi ) gives the agent’s evaluation of an
Gaussian function (Aggarwal and Hanmandlu, 2016) that information source value IX (xi ) by virtue of not merely
gives different shapes, such as triangular, trapezoidal, IX (xi ) but the whole distribution of the information
Gaussian, etc., in accordance with parameter αX , as shown source values The representation of gx (xi ) in (8) portrays
in Figure 2. the agent’s aspired (ideal) value for X as µX , and the
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
fact that the agent’s satisfaction (evaluation value) is
maximum at IX (xi ) = µX , and it weans as the information
source values drift away from µX . This somewhat mimics
our evaluation behaviour in the real life. Our evaluation
of an information source value is also dependent on the
range of attribute values at our disposal (represented by
IX ), and we also have an ideal or the most suitable value in
our mind for each attribute, while making a choice among
different alternatives.
Hence, the information gain function in (8) yields the
gain in satisfaction (utility) gX (xi ), corresponding to an
information source value IX (xi ). Besides, gX (·) always
yields non-negative values, normalized to range between
0 and 1. These properties make evaluation values arrived
at through gX (·) easily interpretable. For instance, we
see from Fig. 2(g) that gX (xi ) = 0.4 at IX (xi ) = 0.2,
indicating that the agent with αX = 3 relatively obtains
a satisfaction of 0.4 (on a scale of 0 to 1) from the
normalized information source value of 0.2. By relatively,
we mean that given the entire range of values in IX ,
the agent evaluates a particular information source value
IX (xi ) = 0.2 as giving a relative satisfaction of 0.4 vis-a-
vis other information source values.
That is, gX (·) considers the entire distribution of the
information source values (through statistical moments
µX and σX ) in the evaluation of any information source
value. If IX changes, µX and σX also get modified, and
hence the evaluation function gX (·). This feature adds to
the usefulness of the proposed framework, as it brings
it closer to the real world decision making. Most often,
our satisfaction from an information source value quite
depends on the available range of the information source
values. For instance, a decade ago, our appreciation for
a Pentium or Celeron processors used to be much more
than what it is now, with the availability of more advanced
options. In a similar context, our appreciation for an item
(vehicle, toy, clothing) often varies, as new alternatives
(with different attribute values) get added to our consid-
eration, i.e. the choice set and the set of information source
values IX expands. The same is true in the case of omission
of alternatives from the choice set.
The agent’s individualistic evaluation characteristics
(experience, background, priorities, values, inertia, habits,
and circumstances) are captured through αX . This mimics
our process of evaluation of an information source value
in the real world, which inspires us to model the agent’s
evaluation function for X through gX (·) that gives the
degree of enjoyment gX (xi ) realised by the agent from
IX (xi ). In the sequel, we refer to gX (·) as the evaluation
function, and gX (xi ) as the evaluation of the information
source values IX (xi ) in IX . Based on the evaluation values,
we compute the subjective utility, as shown in the next
section.
We summarize the advantages of the proposed entropic
information gain based evaluation function as follows:
• The information source value is bound together with
its evaluation as a single entity, hence explicitly incor-
porating the information source values in the agent’s
6
evaluation function. This allows to better reflect the
interplay between an information source value and the
agent’s satisfaction from the same. It also addresses
the issue of ambiguous interpretation of the evalua-
tion values.
• The evaluation function is based on the entire distri-
bution of the information source values, making the
evaluation values dependent on the given choice set.
• Information gain is not restrictive. In comparison, MF
is generally defined by a pre-defined shape (triangle,
trapezoid etc.) that maps an information source value
to a membership degree. In comparison, the informa-
tion gain formalism is more flexible with wider repre-
sentation abilities, as it is defined by the parameter
values in the Hanman entropy function.
• The presence of the free parameters helps to represent
the complex individualistic evaluation behaviour of an
agent.
V. Utility Information Values
In this section, we introduce the concepts of utility
information values and utility information sets. Let us
reconsider (6) :
X
EX = IX (xi )gX (xi ) ,
i
where xi ∈ X . EX is obtained as the sum of IX (xi )gX (xi )
values, i.e. the evaluations weighted by the corresponding
normalized information source values. It gives the net
utility, X holds for the agent by virtue of the different
values that X takes for the alternatives in the given choice
set.
To have an indication of the overall utility values, irre-
spective of the choice set, we could conceive the concept of
normalized subjective utility. The normalized utility EX,N
associated with SX in the discrete domain is given by
1 X
EX,N = IX (xi )gX (xi ), ∀xi ∈ X (9)
|X | i
The continuous analog of the same is shown as:
Z b
1
EX,N = R b SX (x)dx (10)
a
f (x)dx a
where SX (x) = fX (x)gX (x) gives the continuous subjec-
tive utility with respect to f (x).
Normalized utility gives a quantified representation of
the subjective utility of an attribute for the agent. It helps
to bring the subjective utility corresponding to different
attributes on the same scale. Hence, it can be used to
gauge different attributes for their usefulness (utility) for
the agent. The more it’s value for an attribute, the more
desirable the attribute is for the agent. Similarly, it is
useful to compare the broad utility values that different
agents obtain from a particular attribute.
The weighted evaluation value IX (xi )gX (xi ) gives the
perceived worth of IX (xi ) in the eyes of the agent. It is
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
through this value that we model the subjective utility of
IX (xi ) for the agent, shown as:
SX (xi ) = IX (xi )gX (xi ) , (11)
where SX (xi ) denotes subjective utility. We also refer
to the same as utility information value in the sequel,
because it gives the utility information associated with an
information source value, as perceived by the agent. The
value SX (xi ) is nothing but the entropy value with respect
to a specific information source value IX (xi ).
It is interesting to note that EX computed through
(6) gives a measure of the average usefulness (or utility)
X provides to the agent by virtue of its various values
for the given choice set, in the same way as ESh in (6)
(or any conventional probabilistic entropy function) gives
a measure of uncertainty or information for a random
variable.
Similarly, while p(xi ) log (p (xi )) in (6) gives a measure
of the uncertainty about the specific possible outcome
xi before observing it, the entropy value SX (xi ) gives a
measure of the net worth IX (xi ) holds for the agent in
the information-theoretic domain. The set of such entropy
(also termed as utility information) values gives the utility
information set, shown as:
SX = {SX (xi )}, (12)
and the sum of the utility information values in SX gives
a measure of entropy or total information EX for IX , in
the eyes of the agent. We further demonstrate this analogy
between the entropy and the subjective utility by means
of the following example, adapted from (Friedman et al.,
2007).
Example 5.1. Let X be a random variable that takes any
value x from a finite set X . Let p(x) denote probability
that X = x. Consider a horse race with the winning horse
denoted by a random variable X with possible states x ∈ X.
An individual (agent) can place a bet of the form X = x,
indicating a bid of winning on horse x. The payoff (gain)
when indeed X = x is gX (x), and 0 otherwise. The net
gain of the agent when the bet is won thus is:
SX (x) = IX (x)gX (x) , (13)
where IX (x) represents the units of wealth bid on X = x,
and gX (x) denotes the associated gain from a single unit
of the winning bid X = x. Hence,
( utility distribution EX .
IX (x)gX (x) if X = x,
SX (x) = (14)
0 otherwise
This scenario depicts a typical probabilistic scenario,
with nil or unit gain from a random occurrence. The
proposed utility information value concept is a possibilistic
counterpart of the same in the qualitative settings for the
decision analysis problems, in which gX (x) takes any value
in the interval [0, 1]; and SX (x) gives the gain conditioned
by IX (x).
The entropy value computed in (13) stands true both in
the probabilistic as well as the possibilistic domains. The
7
following properties of the proposed evaluation function g(·)
helps to accomplish this analogy between the probabilistic
and qualitative domains:
• 0 ≤ gX (x) ≤ 1.
• It is free of any assumption about the function form.
• Easy interpretibility.
If the agent places multiple bids, each of which charac-
terized by a bidding units IX (xi ), and gain gX (xi ), then
the expected gain for the agent is:
X
EX = IX (xi )gX (xi ) , (15)
i
which is same as the entropy expression shown in (6).
This gives the entropy corresponding to random variable
X, with probability p(xi ) replaced by IX (xi ). This could be
seen as subjective probability. The more the agent believes
in occurrence of an event, the more he is likely to bid
for the particular occurrence. The same expression, in the
qualitative settings, gives a measure of the net worth, or
the subjective utility of X for the agent in the context of
the choice set X .
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the above utility
framework is applicable when X is a discrete variable, i.e.
X takes countable number of values IX (xi ), and gX (xi )
and SX (xi ) give the agent’s evaluation and utility informa-
tion value for a particular instance IX (xi ), respectively. In
this regard, SX (·) performs like a utility mass function that
gives the subjective utility corresponding to an information
source value. We now extend the proposed concept of
subjective utility to a continuous case, in which X always
takes an uncountable number of values, shown as f (x).
The continuous analog of (6) is shown as:
Z b
EX = SX (x)dx , (16)
a
where EX gives the subjective utility when fX (x) ∈ [a, b].
EX gives the expected value of utility over a predefined
interval [a, b], with IX (xi ) and gX (xi ) replacing p(xi ) and
− log(p(xi )) as the weight vector and the gain function,
respectively.
The greater the value of SX (x), the more is the subjec-
tive utility that the agent associates with f (x). We term
the continuous range of EX values as the subjective utility
distribution, and SX (x) as the subjective utility density
function that is obtained as the derivative of subjective
We briefly give the advantages of the proposed concept
of utility information value over the extant methods for
the representation of subjective utility as follows:
• The information source values get the representation
both in the individual assessment of the utilities
(gX (xi )) by the agent as well as in the total utility
(EX ) derived from a set of information source values.
• The information source value and its associated enjoy-
ment (for the agent) are combined as a single entity in
the utility information value. These two values remain
disconnected in the case of possibilistic utility that
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 8

mainly gives a quantification of the possibilities, while
disregarding the actual information source values.
• The evaluations of information source values are cap-
tured through the information gain function that
imbibes the statistics (knowledge) of the distribution
through the free parameters present in the Hanman-
Anirban entropy function.
VI. Forms of Utility Information Set
The uniqueness of the proposed utility information set
lies in the exponential gain function gX (·) that provides
different forms of agent through a choice of parameters.
With the proposed formalism, it is also possible to capture
the uncertainty in the various evaluations of the agent,
besides that in the information source values. We shall
look at this aspect of utility information set in Section VII,
where we develop some uncertainty measures for the same.
The forms in (6) and (16) are linear. Many more forms
of utility sets can be conceived, depending upon the
way quantification of utility values is performed. We now
introduce a few forms of the proposed utility information
set.
Definition 6.1. The non-linear variant of the proposed
utility information set is termed as non-linear utility in-
formation set, and is defined as
The concept of non-linear utility quantifies the subjective
utility for a non-linear utility information set.
We see from (11) that the agent’s evaluation plays the
primary role in the determination of the subjective utility
corresponding to an information source value IX (xi ). This
leads to the fact that different agents would have different
subjective utilities for the same information source value.
We now present the counterpart of the proposed utility
information set obtained by replacing the agent with its
complement.
Definition 6.2. The complement utility information set
gives the set of the complementary utilities as viewed by
the complement agent, and is expressed as
0
n 0 o
SX = SX (xi ) , (23)
0
where SX (xi ) = IX (xi ) (1 − gX (xi ))
While utility information set gives the subjective utility
values by an agent, it is a collection of the non-utility
values for the agent. Alternatively, it can be seen as
the utility information set given by another agent with
diametrically opposite evaluation scheme.
0
The utility values of SX is given as
0 X 0
EX = SX (xi ) (24)
i

SX,nl = {(IX (xi ))gX (xi ) }, ∀xi ∈ X (17) 0 1 X 0

EX,N = S (xi ) (25)
|X | i X
The individual elements of SX,nl are shown as:
For the continuous domain, these values are as follows:
SX,nl (xi ) = (IX (xi ))gX (xi ) (18) Z b
0 0
EX = SX (xi )dx (26)
The proposed non-linear utility information set com- a
bines the agent’s evaluation of an information source value, Z b
0 1 0
and the information source value itself through a non- EX,N = R b SX (xi )dx (27)
linear relationship. It provides another structure to model a
f (x)dx a
the subjective utility of an attribute value for an agent, 0

through the (non-linear) nature of relationship. It is quite
possible that subjective utility of an attribute may be
better represented through the non-linear utility than the
linear utility, while the reverse may be true for another
where SX (xi ) = f (x)(1 − gX (x)) The complement utility
information set gives the subjective utility values arrived
at through the linear combinations of the information
source values and their corresponding evaluations by the
0

attribute or another agent. agent. Its utility value EX indicates the overall utility an
The non-linear utility associated with SX,nl is given as: attribute holds for the complement agent, in the context
X of the given choice set.
EX,nl = SX,nl (xi ), ∀xi ∈ X (19) Non-linear complement utility information set gives a
i collection of the complement utility values, computed
through a non-linear relation. One of the forms of the same
The non-linear utility in the continuous case is:
is shown as n 0 o
Z b 0
SX,nl = SX,nl (xi ) , (28)
EX,nl = SX,nl (x)dx, (20)
a 0
where SX,nl (xi ) = (IX (xi ))(1−gX (xi )) . The overall utility
where SX,nl (xi ) = (f (x)) .gX (x) 0
value for SX,nl is shown as:
The normalized non-linear utility values are shown as:
0 X 0
1 X EX,nl = SX,nl (xi ), (29)
EX,N,nl = SX,nl (xi ), ∀xi ∈ X (21) i
|X | i
and the normalized utility is obtained as
Z b
1 0 1 X 0
EX,N,nl = R b SX,nl (x)dx (22) EX,N,nl = S (xi ) (30)
f (x)dx a |X | i X,nl
a
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
The utility values for the continuous case are as following:
Z b
0 0
EX,nl = SX,nl (x)dx (31)
a and B are 0.4 ∗ 1 = 0.4 and 0.9 ∗ 0.6 = 0.54, respectively,
0 1
Z b
0
EX,N,nl = R b SX,nl (x)dx, (32)
a
f (x)dx a
0
where SX,nl (x) = (f (x))(1−gX (x)) . We consider the follow-
ing example to show the mapping of information source
values to the utility information (entropy) values.
Example 6.1. In this example, we compare the proposed
approach with a fuzzy set based utility approach. We con-
sider two persons A and B with salaries over a period of
a few years be denoted by the sets {xi }ni=1 and {yi }m i=1
respectively. Consider two of the normalized information
source values one each from these sets as IX (xi ) = $0.4
and IX (yi ) = $0.9, where X denotes the salary attribute.
Let us first apply the fuzzy set based approach to represent
the utility, A and B obtain from their respective salaries.
In this case, A and B assign a membership value to their
own respective fuzzy sets for the concept high salary,
denoted by, say FX A
and FXB
. A, who has got an excellent
hike on his earlier remuneration as a result of a change
of job, evaluates his salary of $0.4 as relatively high (in
comparison with his earlier salary), and hence assigns it a
membership grade as µA A subjective utility. Depending on the type of informa-
X (xi ) = 1 in FX . In comparison, B
assesses his salary not very high, and he has µB
X (yi ) = 0.6
in FX B
. present a few such information measures. The presented
We note that in such a representation, it is difficult
to compare µA B be conceived on the same lines.
X (xi ) and µX (yi ), since they are defined
on different fuzzy sets, and by different agents. Secondly,
µX (·) may be interpreted differently by different onlookers,
as it is only an evaluation of the degree of membership
of an information source value, but not the utility value,
as perceived by the agent A or B. In contrast, let the
evaluation of the information source values be done through
the proposed evaluation function, as shown in (7) or (8).
In such a case, the evaluation of IX (xi ) is modelled in
accordance with the set of parameters aX , bX , cX , dX and
αX in the case of former, and αX with the latter, as shown
in Fig. 2. These parameters are specific to the agent, and
shape the evaluation scheme of the agent.
Unlike the case with the membership grades, both the
evaluation and the subjective utility values are uniquely in-
terpretable, and convey the absolute information. While the
evaluation value gX (xi ) indicates the satisfaction the agent
gets from an information source value IX (xi ) on a scale of
0 to 1, the subjective utility value SX (xi ) indicates the net
worth IX (xi ) has for the agent. In this example, if we equate
the membership grades with the agent’s evaluation gX (xi ),
then it would reflect that A evaluates the normalized infor-
mation source value for salary, i.e. IX (xi ) = 0.4 as giving
A the maximum possible satisfaction. For B, IX (xi ) = 0.9
gives an enjoyment degree of 0.4 on a scale of 0 to 1.
It may be worth noting the difference in µX (xi ) = 0.4
and gX (xi ) = 0.4. While µX (xi ) = 0.4 does not say
much on its own, gX (xi ) = 0.4 specifies the relative
9
evaluation of IX (xi ) unequivocally. Taking gX,A (xi ) = 1.0
and gX,B (xi ) = 0.4, we compute the subjective utility by
applying (11). The subjective utiltities, so computed, for A
establishing that B derives more utility from his salary,
than A.
These subjective utility values are absolute and compa-
rable across agents, unlike the membership grades. The
fuzzy set has the membership grade and the information
source value delinked, leading to the loss of interpretability.
In comparison, the proposed representation of subjective
utility is quite simpler and more comprehensive.
VII. Utility Information Measures
We develop a few measures to evaluate the effect of
the information source values or the agent’s evaluations
on the overall subjective utility. To this end, we adapt
the Shannon transforms (Aggarwal and Hanmandlu, 2016)
in the context of the proposed concepts. The proposed
measures get their name from their similarity in nature
to the Shannon entropy. These measures basically yield
the entropy values, like the utility information value, but
with the difference that they have the utility information
values as the evaluation values in the Shannon entropy
framework. These measures can be seen as second order
tion source values, and the utility information values, we
measures are not exhasutive, as many more measures can
Definition 7.1. The linear and non linear information
source transforms are expressed as
X
HX = − IX (xi ) log(SX (xi )) (33)
i
X
HX,nl = − IX (xi ) log(SX,nl (xi )) (34)
i
HX gives a measure of the average subjective utility
of X for the agent by means of the utility informa-
tion values gathered for X, weighted by the normalized
information source values. In this sense, the transform
can be seen as providing the secondary evaluation of
the information source values on the basis of the utility
information values as the primary evaluation. Similarly,
each of the IX (xi ) log(SX (xi )) values gives the subjective
utility corresponding to IX (xi ), based on SX (xi ). Like
Shannon entropy gives the average uncertainty about a
random variable, HX provides a higher order measure for
the subjective utility.
The continuous linear and non-linear information source
transforms are obtained as
Z b
HX = − f (x) log(SX (x))dx (35)
a
Z b
HX,nl = − f (x) log(SX,nl (x)) (36)
a
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 10

The proposed information source transform HX,S gives attribute. For example, it finds application in assessing the
an evaluation of the information source values for an evaluations of the commodity prices by an equity specialist
attribute, based on the utility information values. Different (hetero agent). Similarly, it can be deployed to study the
utility information values given by different agents would assessments of economic parameters by non-economists
lead to a different value of the transform for the same set (biologists, physicists, etc.) that perform the role of hetero
of information source values. In this light, we present the agents. In essence, the proposed hetero transform helps
complement information source, and hetero information in cross-fertilization of knowledge from two diverse disci-
source transforms. plines, enriching the overall pool of knowledge leading to
better progeny (outcome and results).
Definition 7.2. The complement information source
transform evaluates the information source values IX , on Definition 7.4. The relative source transform evaluates
the basis of the utility information values given by the the information source values in IX based on the relative
0
complement agent gX . It is shown as utility information values obtained from the agent with
0 X  0  respect to the hetero agent.
HX = − IX (xi ) log SX (xi ) (37)  
X SX (xi )
i HX,relative = IX (xi ) log (43)
0 X  0  i
TX (xi )
HX,nl = − IX (xi ) log SX,nl (xi ) (38)  
i SX,nl (xi )
HX,nl,relative = IX (xi ) log (44)
0 0 TX,nl (xi )
The variants of HX and HX,nl for the continuous do-
main are given as The evaluating factor in this measure is the ratio of
Z b the utility information values provided by the agent and
0 0
HX = − f (x) log(SX (x))dx (39) the hetero agent. This ratio gives the evaluation of an
a information source value, and the resulting transform
Z b gives the second order subjective utility for the particular
0 0
HX,nl = − f (x) log(SX,nl (x)) (40) attribute. For example, commodity prices are evaluated by
a the relative information given by the commodities expert
This transform gives a secondary evaluation of the (evaluating agent) with respect to that provided by the
information source values from the perspective of the com- equities specialist (hetero agent). This measure can also
plement agent. A comparison of information source and be applied to have a measure of difference of opinions (or
complement information source transforms would indicate the agreement) between a pair of agents about a set of the
the differences in the net worth of an attribute for two information source values.
different sets of agents with completely different ideologies.
Definition 7.5. The Kullback-Leibler transform is defined
For instance, how different indicators of an economy are
as
viewed by a communist and a capitalist, can be answered  
by this transform.
X SX (xj )
HX,KL (xj ) = IX (xj ) log ,
Note:- In the sequel, we skip the expressions for the i
SX (xi ) (45)
continuous transforms that can be derived on similar lines ∀xi , xj ∈ X ; and j 6= i
as shown for the information source transforms.  
X SX,nl (xj )
Definition 7.3. A hetero agent is an agent from a differ- HX,nl,KL (xj ) = IX (xj ) log (46)
SX,nl (xi )
ent domain. The hetero source transform gives a meaure i
of the information source values in IX on the basis of the This measure is used to evaluate an information source
utility information values given by a hetero agent, and is value with respect to the other information source values
expressed as from the same domain, based on the corresponding utility
X information values by the same agent. For example, a
HX,hetero = − IX (xi ) log (TX (xi )) (41)
politician in a country is evaluated with respect to the
i
X other politicians from the same country by an individual.
HX,nl,hetero = − IX (xi ) log (TX,nl (xi )) (42) The transforms, proposed so far, are about the evalu-
i ation of the information source values that could be the
where TX (xi ) = IX (xi )hX (xi ), TX,nl (xi ) = attribute values, probability values (useful in the proba-
hX (xi ) bilisic domain), or any set of values corresponding to a
(IX (xi )) and hX (xi ) is the hetero agent from
single entity. We now present the transforms to evaluate
another domain.
the evaluations of the agent. Such transforms have the
This transform yields an evaluation of the informa- (evaluating) agent values as the information source values.
tion source values through the utility information values Different kinds of utility information values gathered by
furnished by another agent from another domain. It is different agents lead to various such agent transforms.
particularly useful in a few situations, when it is desirable We now investigate these measures based on Shannon
to have an external perspective in the evaluation of an transforms.
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
Definition 7.6. The agent transform gives a measure of
the evaluations by an agent with the utility information
values, provided by the same agent, and is as following
X cist, corresponding to the evaluations by the economist,
AX = − gX (xi ) log(SX (xi )) (47)
i
X
AX,nl = − gX (xi ) log(SX,nl (xi ))
i the overall evaluation scheme (of the information source
This measure promises a lot of potential in the practical
decision making situations that inevitably require the
intervention of the agent and hence often the associated
discrepancies. It helps to evaluate the evaluations of the
agent based on the utility information values provided by
him. The information source values in this transform are
the evaluations {gX (xi )}i , provided by the agent (to be
evaluated). I useful to compare different agents who are
evaluating the same information source values.
Definition 7.7. A complement agent can be defined as
an agent with diametrically opposite views from that of the
evaluating agent. The complement agent transform helps
to evaluate the evaluations of an agent by making use of
the complementary utility information values. It is given
as
0 X  0 
AX = − gX (xi ) log SX (xi ) (49)
i
 0  can also be applied to study the extent of differences
0 X
AX,nl = − gX (xi ) log SX,nl (xi )
i evaluating agent and by the hetero agent.
This measure is an offshoot of the agent transform.
It evaluates the evaluations {gX (xi )}i by means of the
corresponding complementary utility information values
0
{SX (xi )}i . Together with the agent transform, it holds a
good potential in the real life decision making situations
in multiple domains such as economic analysis, supplier
selection (supply chain management), ranking models
(machine learning), medical diagnosis, credit score analysis
(finance), and auditing (accounting) etc. For instance,
when an alternative has equally compelling advantages
and disadvantages, the combination of these two measures
is useful in assessing the utility and disutility from such
an alternative.
Definition 7.8. The hetero agent transform evaluates the
agent with the utility information values given by a hetero
agent. It is obtained as
X his more demanding counterpart.
AX,hetero = − gX (xi ) log (TX (xi )) (51)
i VIII. Case-study
X
AX,nl,hetero = − gX (xi ) log (TX,nl (xi ))
i We consider a car selection problem in which a buyer
The hetero agent utility transform evaluates the evalu-
ations of the agent based on the utility information values
provided by an external agent. This measure assumes
significance in the real world situations where knowledge
from a diverse discipline is gathered to enrich the state
of operation. For instance, this transform can be used to
study how a physicist (hetero agent) perceives (through
11
TX (xi )) the evaluations (gX (xi ) about, say, the inflation-
ary parameters), provided by an economist (evaluating
agent). Given the utility information values by the physi-
the economist gets new insights that may improve his
evaluation scheme in the future. In general, this measure
(48) holds application wherever there is an intent to enrich
values), with the diverse knowledge from other domains,
which is otherwise primarily governed only by the domain
specific knowledge of the agent.
Definition 7.9. The relative agent transform provides a
measure to evaluate an agent with respect to the ratio of
the utility information values furnished by the agent and
those by a hetero agent, and is expressed as
 
X SX (xi )
AX,relative = gX (xi ) log (53)
i
TX (xi )
 
X SX,nl (xi )
AX,nl,relative = gX (xi ) log (54)
i
TX,nl (xi )
By considering a ratio of the utility information values
provided by both the evaluating and the hetero agents,
this measure helps to have a balanced evaluation, without
putting a greater emphasis on either of the agents. It
(50) (or the agreements) between the evaluations given by the
Definition 7.10. The ratio of the difference between the
information source transform, and the complement infor-
mation source transform, and the difference between the
agent transform and the complement agent transform is
called the “measure of evaluations”, given by
0
HX − HX
MX = 0 (55)
AX − AX
0
HX,nl − HX.nl
MX,nl = 0 (56)
AX,nl − AX,nl
This measure is meant to study the evaluation scheme
of the information source values by an agent. The value
of the measure indicates the attitudinal character of the
agent. For example, a less demanding agent may give
higher utilities to the same information source value than
(52) A. Application in Car Selection
evaluates many alternatives (forming a choice set) to select
the one that suits him the most. To this end, he assesses
the desirable properties (attributes) of the available alter-
natives in the given choice set.
For the purpose of this application, we collected the
data regarding the key attributes of the recent car models
that are available for buying in the Indian car market. We
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 12

consider the following attributes :- X1 : length (mm), X2 : The similar is the case in the real world. We also determine
width (mm), X3 : height (mm), X4 : engine capacity (cc), the utility for an information source value after considering
X5 : power (hp), X6 : mileage (KM/pl), and X7 : cost (mil- the entire range of the information source values at our
lion rupees). The information source values corresponding disposal, and our evaluations vary as the choice set, and
to these attributes are populated in Table I. hence the set of the information source values changes.
We first normalize the information source values, given Given the subjective utility values, corresponding to
in Table I, by applying (5). The normalized information different attributes of an alternative, the total utility
source values, so obtained, are shown in Table II. For the for the alternative can be computed by aggregating the
sake of confidentiality, the alternatives are designated as subjective utility values. The alternative with the greatest
x1 , . . . , x60 rather than by their original identities. subjective utility gives the likely choice of the agent.
For each of the attributes, Xi , a set of information However, we restrict ourselves here from going deeper into
source values can be conceived, which is denoted as Ii , i = this application, as focus of the study is on the modelling
1, . . . , 7. We compute mean µi and σi values for Ii . The of subjective utility values.
evaluation behavior of a buyer towards an attribute Xi
is modelled through the evaluation function shown in (8),
and hence governed by the αi .
We consider two buyers A and B, who may have dif-
ferent evaluation patterns for an attribute. To model the
evaluation behavior of A towards different attributes, we
choose α1 = 2.0, α2 = 2.5, α3 = 3.5, α4 = 1.5, α5 = 2.8,
α6 = 5.0, and α7 = 4.1. For B, we take these values as
α1 = 4.1, α2 = 5.0, α3 = 2.8, α4 = 1.5, α5 = 3.5, α6 = 2.5,
and α7 = 2.0.
We replace αi , µi and σi in (8) to compute the evalua-
tion values {gi (xi )}, ∀xi ∈ X for A and B. The values, so
computed, are given in Tables III- IV.

B. Results
We note from Tables III and IV that for the same infor-
mation source value, the evaluation values vary for A and
B. This variation is explained by the different αi values
for A and B. We also notice that the evaluation value
does not always directly relate to the subjective utility.
For instance, consider the evaluation and subjective utility
values of A corresponding to x2 and x4 , and X1 . It is ob-
served that though the evaluation for x4 (g1 (x4 ) = 0.9976)
is more than that for x2 (g1 (x2 ) = 0.9044), indicating a
greater gain in utility in the case of x4 than x2 from X1 ,
the overall subjective utility from x4 (S1 (x4 ) = 0.5264) is
lesser than that from x2 (S1 (x2 ) = 0.5350). This is because
of the greater information source value of x2 (4456 mm)
than x4 (4324 mm), which also plays an equally important
role in the determination of the subjective utility. For
the given case, this reflects that A finds the length 4324
mm of x4 quite suitable for his purpose, and therefore
g1 (x4 ) > g1 (x2 ). However, since S1 (x2 ) > S1 (x4 ), A still
prefers x2 over x4 with respect to X1 , indicating his overall
preference for the longer car.
Another interesting aspect here is that the agent’s
evaluation for an information source value is determined
after taking into consideration the distribution of the
information source values, generated from the given choice
set, i.e. X = {x1 , . . . , x60 }. If the choice set changes with
the addition or omission of alternatives, then the set of the
information source values for each attribute changes, and
therefore the evaluations and the subjective utility values
for each of the information source values also get modified.
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 13

TABLE I: Information Source Values TABLE II: Normalized Information Source Values

X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
x1 4739 1940 1279 5198 600 6 43.70 x1 0.7286 0.5794 0.0924 0.6264 0.6039 0.0818 0.3574
x2 4456 1796 1416 1968 141 20.38 3.101 x2 0.5915 0.3655 0.2526 0.1947 0.1342 0.6699 0.0233
x3 5141 2223 1742 5950 600 10.90 39.41 x3 0.9234 1.0000 0.6339 0.7269 0.6039 0.2822 0.3221
x4 4324 1765 1421 1995 143 20.58 3.108 x4 0.5276 0.3194 0.2584 0.1983 0.1363 0.6781 0.0234
x5 5020 2140 1360 5935 552 10.9 41.00 x5 0.8648 0.8766 0.1871 0.7249 0.5548 0.2822 0.3352
x6 4421 1793 1409 1798 177 16.60 4.838 x6 0.5746 0.3610 0.2444 0.1720 0.1711 0.5153 0.0376
x7 5299 1984 1488 3993 500 6.38 32.15 x7 1.0000 0.6448 0.3368 0.4653 0.5016 0.0973 0.2623
x8 4633 1811 1429 1995 188 22.69 4.312 x8 0.6773 0.3878 0.2678 0.1983 0.1823 0.7644 0.0333
x9 4380 2025 1241 5935 380 6.0 38.00 x9 0.5547 0.7057 0.0479 0.7249 0.3788 0.0818 0.3105
x10 4933 1874 1455 1968 190 16.66 5.306 x10 0.8226 0.4814 0.2982 0.1947 0.1844 0.5177 0.0415
x11 4818 1947 1391 5998 626 6.45 45.12 x11 0.7669 0.5899 0.2233 0.7333 0.6305 0.1002 0.3691
x12 4899 2094 1464 2993 258 14.69 6.188 x12 0.8062 0.8083 0.3087 0.3317 0.2540 0.4372 0.0487
x13 4462 1998 1204 7993 987 4.0 121.80 x13 0.5944 0.6656 0.0046 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
x14 3640 1595 1520 936 57 25.44 0.5470 x14 0.1962 0.0668 0.3742 0.0568 0.0483 0.8768 0.0023
x15 3785 1635 1485 1198 67 20.63 0.3630 x15 0.2664 0.1263 0.3333 0.0918 0.0585 0.6801 0.0008
x16 4550 1965 1200 1998 250 10.00 3.709 x16 0.6371 0.6166 0.0000 0.1987 0.2458 0.2454 0.0283
x17 3235 1585 1856 511 9.78 28.45 0.2595 x17 0.0000 0.0520 0.7672 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
x18 4435 1680 1765 2499 80 13.72 0.8110 x18 0.5814 0.1931 0.6608 0.2657 0.0718 0.3975 0.0045
x19 3429 1560 1541 799 53 25.17 0.3573 x19 0.0939 0.0148 0.3988 0.0384 0.0442 0.8658 0.0008
x20 4571 1951 1203 4497 597 8.47 41.66 x20 0.6472 0.5958 0.0035 0.5327 0.6009 0.1828 0.3406
x21 3235 1585 1856 511 9.78 28.45 0.2595 x21 0.0000 0.0520 0.7672 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
x22 4435 1680 1765 2499 80 13.72 0.8110 x22 0.5814 0.1931 0.6608 0.2657 0.0718 0.3975 0.0045
x23 3429 1560 1541 799 53 25.17 0.3573 x23 0.0939 0.0148 0.3988 0.0384 0.0442 0.8658 0.0008
x24 4571 1951 1203 4497 597 8.47 41.66 x24 0.6472 0.5958 0.0035 0.5327 0.6009 0.1828 0.3406
x25 4570 1910 1322 3855 553 9.52 33.75 x25 0.6468 0.5349 0.1426 0.4469 0.5558 0.2257 0.2755
x26 4618 1942 1273 6262 731 6.49 48.33 x26 0.6700 0.5824 0.0853 0.7686 0.7380 0.1018 0.3955
x27 4907 1953 1379 6262 652 4.00 40.91 x27 0.8100 0.5988 0.2093 0.7686 0.6571 0.0000 0.3344
x28 4568 1952 1211 3902 660 8.77 42.45 x28 0.6458 0.5973 0.0128 0.4532 0.6653 0.1950 0.3471
x29 3657 1627 1485 1368 158 11.12 3.0231 x29 0.2044 0.1144 0.3333 0.1145 0.1516 0.2912 0.0227
x30 3989 1687 1505 1368 145 16.32 1.0414 x30 0.3653 0.2035 0.3567 0.1145 0.1383 0.5038 0.0064
x31 3989 1706 1542 1248 92 20.50 0.8651 x31 0.3653 0.2318 0.4000 0.0985 0.0841 0.6748 0.0049
x32 4596 1730 1494 1368 89 14.9 0.7971 x32 0.6594 0.2674 0.3438 0.1145 0.0810 0.4458 0.0044
x33 4860 1780 1885 2149 139 11.6 1.2551 x33 0.7873 0.3417 0.8011 0.2189 0.1322 0.3108 0.0081
x34 3992 1820 2055 2596 80 17 0.6382 x34 0.3667 0.4011 1.0000 0.2786 0.0718 0.5317 0.0031
x35 3995 1695 1525 1196 87 18.16 0.5382 x35 0.3682 0.2154 0.3801 0.0915 0.0790 0.5791 0.0022
x36 3999 1765 1708 1498 99 22.7 0.8551 x36 0.3701 0.3194 0.5941 0.1319 0.0913 0.7648 0.0049
x37 4892 1860 1837 2198 158 12.61 2.8011 x37 0.8028 0.4606 0.7450 0.2254 0.1516 0.3521 0.0209
x38 3886 1695 1525 1196 87 18.16 0.5353 x38 0.3154 0.2154 0.3801 0.0915 0.0790 0.5791 0.0022
x39 4784 1961 1391 4951 396 13.11 6.6685 x39 0.7504 0.6107 0.2233 0.5934 0.3952 0.3726 0.0527
x40 3886 1695 1525 1498 99 25.83 0.6021 x40 0.3154 0.2154 0.3801 0.1319 0.0913 0.8928 0.0028
x41 4933 1849 1464 1993 212 23.1 4.022 x41 0.8226 0.4442 0.3087 0.1980 0.2069 0.7811 0.0309
x42 3990 1680 1505 1498 99 25.8 0.788 x42 0.3657 0.1931 0.3567 0.1319 0.0913 0.8916 0.0043
x43 4456 1735 1686 1498 99 21.91 1.215 x43 0.5915 0.2748 0.5684 0.1319 0.0913 0.7325 0.0078
x44 4386 1683 1603 1498 99 24.2 1.0875 x44 0.5576 0.1976 0.4713 0.1319 0.0913 0.8261 0.0068
x45 4386 1683 1603 1498 99 24.2 1.146 x45 0.5576 0.1976 0.4713 0.1319 0.0913 0.8261 0.0072
x46 4440 1695 1495 1497 117 17.8 1.153 x46 0.5838 0.2154 0.3450 0.1317 0.1097 0.5644 0.0073
x47 4545 1820 1685 1997 154 13.7 2.258 x47 0.6346 0.4011 0.5672 0.1986 0.1475 0.3967 0.0164
x48 3955 1694 1544 1498 98 27.3 0.911 x48 0.3488 0.2139 0.4023 0.1319 0.0902 0.9529 0.0053
x49 4270 1780 1630 1396 89 21.38 1.024 x49 0.5014 0.3417 0.5029 0.1182 0.0810 0.7108 0.0062
x50 4570 1800 1465 1582 126 22.54 1.506 x50 0.6468 0.3714 0.3099 0.1431 0.1189 0.7582 0.0102
x51 3985 1734 1505 1396 89 23.14 0.862 x51 0.3633 0.2734 0.3567 0.1182 0.0810 0.7828 0.0049
x52 3495 1550 1500 814 55 21.1 0.430 x52 0.1259 0.0000 0.3508 0.0405 0.0462 0.6993 0.0014
x53 3765 1660 1520 1197 81 18.9 0.527 x53 0.2567 0.1634 0.3742 0.0916 0.0728 0.6094 0.0022
x54 3585 1595 1550 1086 68 19.81 0.4933 x54 0.1695 0.0668 0.4093 0.0768 0.0595 0.6466 0.0019
x55 3995 1760 1555 1396 89 21.19 0.976 x55 0.3682 0.3120 0.4152 0.1182 0.0810 0.7030 0.0059
x56 4690 1880 1690 2199 194 13.01 3.230 x56 0.7049 0.4903 0.5731 0.2256 0.1885 0.3685 0.0244
x57 3675 1715 1635 1198 82 18.15 0.536 x57 0.2131 0.2451 0.5087 0.0918 0.0739 0.5787 0.0022
x58 4475 1850 1660 1995 182 18.42 2.198 x58 0.6007 0.4457 0.5380 0.1983 0.1762 0.5897 0.0159
x59 4375 1700 1475 1591 121 17.4 1.079 x59 0.5523 0.2228 0.3216 0.1443 0.1138 0.5480 0.0067
x60 3995 1660 1520 1120 71 24.4 0.733 x60 0.3682 0.1634 0.3742 0.0814 0.0626 0.8343 0.0039
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 14

TABLE III: Evaluation gi (xi ) and Subjective Utility Values Si (xi ) for A

Evaluation Values Subjective Utility

Alt.
g1 (xi ) g2 (xi ) g3 (xi ) g4 (xi ) g5 (xi ) g6 (xi ) g7 (xi ) S1 (xi ) S2 (xi ) S3 (xi ) S4 (xi ) S5 (xi ) S6 (xi ) S7 (xi )
x1 0.4515 0.3873 0.0729 0.1474 0.0163 0.0000 0.0052 0.3290 0.2244 0.0067 0.0923 0.0098 0.0000 0.0019
x2 0.9044 0.9998 0.8714 0.8664 0.9335 0.9670 0.9790 0.5350 0.3654 0.2201 0.1687 0.1254 0.6478 0.0229
x3 0.0541 0.0000 0.1383 0.0637 0.0163 0.5491 0.0538 0.0499 0.0000 0.0877 0.0463 0.0098 0.155 0.0173
x4 0.9976 0.9885 0.8907 0.8766 0.9376 0.9563 0.9790 0.5264 0.3158 0.2302 0.1739 0.1278 0.6485 0.0229
x5 0.1178 0.0004 0.5362 0.0648 0.0610 0.5491 0.0256 0.1019 0.0003 0.1003 0.0470 0.0338 0.155 0.0086
x6 0.9413 1.0000 0.8412 0.7988 0.9849 1.0000 0.9918 0.5409 0.3611 0.2056 0.1374 0.1685 0.5153 0.0374
x7 0.0163 0.1639 0.9978 0.4477 0.1798 0.0001 0.4276 0.0163 0.1057 0.3361 0.2084 0.0902 0.0000 0.1122
x8 0.6328 0.9935 0.9175 0.8766 0.9924 0.6402 0.9888 0.4286 0.3853 0.2457 0.1739 0.1810 0.4894 0.0330
x9 0.9739 0.0537 0.0126 0.0648 0.7132 0.0000 0.0942 0.5403 0.0379 0.0006 0.0470 0.2702 0.0000 0.0293
x10 0.1915 0.8019 0.9739 0.8664 0.9934 1.0000 0.9939 0.1575 0.3861 0.2905 0.1687 0.1832 0.5178 0.0413
x11 0.3305 0.3452 0.7461 0.0602 0.0069 0.0001 0.0019 0.2535 0.2036 0.1667 0.0441 0.0044 0.0000 0.0007
x12 0.2276 0.0038 0.9845 0.8469 0.9963 0.9955 0.9968 0.1835 0.0031 0.3040 0.2809 0.2531 0.4353 0.0486
x13 0.8973 0.1160 0.0012 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5334 0.0772 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
x14 0.1660 0.1553 1.0000 0.4541 0.6310 0.0418 0.9388 0.0326 0.0104 0.3743 0.0258 0.0305 0.0367 0.0022
x15 0.3351 0.3495 0.997 0.5519 0.6779 0.9533 0.9346 0.0893 0.0441 0.3323 0.0507 0.0397 0.6484 0.0008
x16 0.7726 0.2474 0.0009 0.8777 0.9984 0.3022 0.9845 0.4923 0.1526 0.0000 0.1744 0.2454 0.0742 0.0279
x17 0.0093 0.1213 0.0002 0.3189 0.4012 0.0000 0.9322 0.0000 0.0063 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
x18 0.9275 0.6390 0.0613 0.9962 0.7358 0.9740 0.9445 0.5392 0.1234 0.0405 0.2647 0.0529 0.3872 0.0043
x19 0.0438 0.0602 0.9995 0.4071 0.6118 0.0672 0.9345 0.0041 0.0009 0.3986 0.0157 0.0271 0.0582 0.0007
x20 0.7385 0.3221 0.0011 0.2924 0.0179 0.0396 0.0180 0.4780 0.1919 0.0000 0.1558 0.0107 0.0072 0.0061
x21 0.0093 0.1213 0.0002 0.3189 0.4012 0.0000 0.9322 0.0000 0.0063 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
x22 0.9275 0.6390 0.0613 0.9962 0.7358 0.9740 0.9445 0.5392 0.1234 0.0405 0.2647 0.0529 0.3872 0.0043
x23 0.0438 0.0602 0.9995 0.4071 0.6118 0.0672 0.9345 0.0041 0.0009 0.3986 0.0157 0.0271 0.0582 0.0007
x24 0.7385 0.3221 0.0011 0.2924 0.0179 0.0396 0.0180 0.4780 0.1919 0.0000 0.1558 0.0107 0.0072 0.0061
x25 0.7402 0.5818 0.2684 0.4976 0.0595 0.1883 0.3155 0.4788 0.3112 0.0383 0.2224 0.0331 0.0425 0.0869
x26 0.6588 0.3751 0.0576 0.0437 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.4414 0.2185 0.0049 0.0336 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
x27 0.2187 0.3108 0.6702 0.0437 0.0026 0.0000 0.0268 0.1772 0.1861 0.1403 0.0336 0.0017 0.0000 0.0089
x28 0.7435 0.3164 0.0019 0.4803 0.0019 0.0674 0.0115 0.4802 0.1890 0.0000 0.2177 0.0013 0.0131 0.0040
x29 0.1819 0.3037 0.997 0.6200 0.9635 0.6075 0.9782 0.0372 0.0348 0.3323 0.0710 0.1461 0.1769 0.0222
x30 0.6712 0.6836 0.9999 0.6200 0.9415 1.0000 0.9491 0.2452 0.1392 0.3567 0.0710 0.1303 0.5039 0.0061
x31 0.6712 0.7951 0.9994 0.5716 0.7851 0.9609 0.9456 0.2452 0.1843 0.3997 0.0563 0.0661 0.6484 0.0047
x32 0.6966 0.9052 0.999 0.6200 0.7732 0.9972 0.9442 0.4593 0.2421 0.3435 0.0710 0.0627 0.4446 0.0042
x33 0.2742 0.9987 0.0000 0.9310 0.9293 0.7227 0.9531 0.2159 0.3413 0.0000 0.2038 0.1229 0.2246 0.0078
x34 0.6764 0.9839 0.0000 0.9780 0.7358 1.0000 0.9408 0.2481 0.3947 0.0000 0.2725 0.0529 0.5317 0.0029
x35 0.6816 0.7326 1.0000 0.5511 0.7651 0.9998 0.9386 0.2510 0.1578 0.3801 0.0505 0.0605 0.5790 0.0021
x36 0.6884 0.9885 0.3308 0.6738 0.8118 0.6377 0.9454 0.2548 0.3158 0.1965 0.0889 0.0741 0.4877 0.0046
x37 0.2356 0.8699 0.001 0.9464 0.9635 0.8917 0.9757 0.1891 0.4007 0.0008 0.2134 0.1461 0.3140 0.0204
x38 0.4934 0.7326 1.0000 0.5511 0.7651 0.9998 0.9386 0.1556 0.1578 0.3801 0.0505 0.0605 0.5790 0.0021
x39 0.3804 0.2677 0.7461 0.1898 0.6396 0.9396 0.9978 0.2855 0.1635 0.1667 0.1126 0.2528 0.3501 0.0526
x40 0.4934 0.7326 1.0000 0.6738 0.8118 0.0188 0.9400 0.1556 0.1578 0.3801 0.0889 0.0741 0.0168 0.0027
x41 0.1915 0.9134 0.9845 0.8759 0.9994 0.5324 0.9869 0.1575 0.4058 0.3040 0.1735 0.2068 0.4159 0.0306
x42 0.6729 0.6390 0.9999 0.6738 0.8118 0.0201 0.9440 0.2462 0.1234 0.3567 0.0889 0.0741 0.0179 0.0041
x43 0.9044 0.9228 0.4887 0.6738 0.8118 0.8071 0.9524 0.5350 0.2537 0.2778 0.0889 0.0741 0.5912 0.0075
x44 0.9699 0.6583 0.9384 0.6738 0.8118 0.2373 0.9500 0.5409 0.1301 0.4423 0.0889 0.0741 0.1960 0.0065
x45 0.9699 0.6583 0.9384 0.6738 0.8118 0.2373 0.9511 0.5409 0.1301 0.4423 0.0889 0.0741 0.1960 0.0069
x46 0.9222 0.7326 0.9991 0.6733 0.8723 1.0000 0.9512 0.5384 0.1578 0.3447 0.0887 0.0957 0.5644 0.0070
x47 0.7806 0.9839 0.496 0.8774 0.9574 0.9732 0.9690 0.4954 0.3947 0.2814 0.1743 0.1413 0.3861 0.0159
x48 0.6123 0.7266 0.9992 0.6738 0.8081 0.0002 0.9465 0.2136 0.1555 0.4020 0.0889 0.0730 0.0002 0.0051
x49 0.9963 0.9987 0.8436 0.6315 0.7732 0.8856 0.9488 0.4996 0.3413 0.4243 0.0747 0.0627 0.6295 0.0060
x50 0.7402 0.9991 0.9854 0.7089 0.8979 0.6768 0.9576 0.4788 0.3711 0.3054 0.1015 0.1068 0.5132 0.0098
x51 0.6643 0.9195 0.9999 0.6315 0.7732 0.5215 0.9455 0.2414 0.2514 0.3567 0.0747 0.0627 0.4082 0.0047
x52 0.0691 0.0439 0.9996 0.4121 0.6214 0.9162 0.9362 0.0087 0.0000 0.3507 0.0167 0.0288 0.6408 0.0013
x53 0.3073 0.5074 1.0000 0.5516 0.7400 0.9980 0.9384 0.0789 0.0829 0.3743 0.0506 0.0539 0.6082 0.0021
x54 0.1215 0.1553 0.9982 0.5089 0.6825 0.9866 0.9376 0.0206 0.0104 0.4086 0.0391 0.0407 0.6380 0.0018
x55 0.6816 0.9821 0.9969 0.6315 0.7732 0.9071 0.9478 0.2510 0.3065 0.4139 0.0747 0.0627 0.6378 0.0056
x56 0.5339 0.7690 0.4592 0.9467 0.9952 0.9316 0.9802 0.3764 0.3771 0.2632 0.2136 0.1876 0.3433 0.0240
x57 0.1998 0.8411 0.8199 0.5519 0.7443 0.9998 0.9386 0.0426 0.2062 0.4171 0.0507 0.0550 0.5786 0.0021
x58 0.8812 0.9098 0.6738 0.8766 0.9887 0.9995 0.9682 0.5294 0.4056 0.3625 0.1739 0.1742 0.5895 0.0154
x59 0.9770 0.7618 0.9928 0.7127 0.8841 1.0000 0.9498 0.5396 0.1698 0.3193 0.1029 0.1006 0.5481 0.0064
x60 0.6816 0.5074 1.0000 0.5218 0.6961 0.1923 0.9428 0.2510 0.0829 0.3743 0.0425 0.0436 0.1604 0.0037
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 15

TABLE IV: Evaluation gi (xi ) and Subjective Utility Values Si (xi ) for B

Evaluation Values Subjective Utility

Alt.
g1 (xi ) g2 (xi ) g3 (xi ) g4 (xi ) g5 (xi ) g6 (xi ) g7 (xi ) S1 (xi ) S2 (xi ) S3 (xi ) S4 (xi ) S5 (xi ) S6 (xi ) S7 (xi )
x1 0.5352 0.4067 0.1153 0.1474 0.0028 0.0334 0.1059 0.3900 0.2357 0.0107 0.0923 0.0017 0.0027 0.0378
x2 0.9910 1.0000 0.8150 0.8664 0.9654 0.8325 0.8583 0.5863 0.3655 0.2059 0.1687 0.1296 0.5577 0.0201
x3 0.0001 0.0000 0.1780 0.0637 0.0028 0.4611 0.1851 0.0001 0.0000 0.1128 0.0463 0.0017 0.1301 0.0596
x4 1.0000 0.9999 0.8368 0.8766 0.9681 0.8095 0.8585 0.5276 0.3194 0.2163 0.1739 0.1320 0.5489 0.0201
x5 0.0086 0.0000 0.5040 0.0648 0.0268 0.4611 0.1519 0.0075 0.0000 0.0943 0.0470 0.0149 0.1301 0.0509
x6 0.9968 1.0000 0.7822 0.7988 0.9947 0.9993 0.9083 0.5728 0.3611 0.1912 0.1374 0.1702 0.5150 0.0342
x7 0.0000 0.0380 0.9926 0.4477 0.1403 0.0445 0.3971 0.0000 0.0245 0.3343 0.2084 0.0704 0.0043 0.1042
x8 0.8176 1.0000 0.8688 0.8766 0.9977 0.5128 0.8941 0.5538 0.3878 0.2327 0.1739 0.1820 0.3920 0.0298
x9 0.9994 0.0002 0.0386 0.0648 0.7728 0.0334 0.2185 0.5544 0.0001 0.0018 0.0470 0.2928 0.0027 0.0679
x10 0.0607 0.9524 0.9468 0.8664 0.9981 0.9995 0.9202 0.0499 0.4585 0.2824 0.1687 0.1841 0.5176 0.0382
x11 0.2918 0.3226 0.6876 0.0602 0.0006 0.0468 0.0865 0.2238 0.1903 0.1536 0.0441 0.0004 0.0047 0.0319
x12 0.1071 0.0000 0.9647 0.8469 0.9991 0.9353 0.9407 0.0863 0.0000 0.2979 0.2809 0.2538 0.4089 0.0459
x13 0.9895 0.0097 0.0099 0.0041 0.0000 0.0057 0.0000 0.5883 0.0064 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
x14 0.0361 0.0312 1.0000 0.4541 0.6843 0.1684 0.7712 0.0071 0.0021 0.3743 0.0258 0.0331 0.1476 0.0018
x15 0.3009 0.3312 0.9905 0.5519 0.7356 0.8035 0.7644 0.0802 0.0418 0.3302 0.0507 0.0431 0.5465 0.0006
x16 0.9397 0.1422 0.0084 0.8777 0.9997 0.3349 0.8768 0.5987 0.0877 0.0000 0.1744 0.2457 0.0822 0.0249
x17 0.0000 0.0117 0.0041 0.3189 0.4095 0.0221 0.7605 0.0000 0.0006 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0221 0.0000
x18 0.9950 0.8182 0.1029 0.9962 0.7958 0.8501 0.7807 0.5785 0.1580 0.0680 0.2647 0.0572 0.3380 0.0035
x19 0.0000 0.0004 0.9976 0.4071 0.6627 0.1934 0.7641 0.0000 0.0000 0.3979 0.0157 0.0293 0.1675 0.0006
x20 0.9171 0.2770 0.0095 0.2924 0.0033 0.1658 0.1395 0.5936 0.1651 0.0000 0.1558 0.0020 0.0303 0.0475
x21 0.0000 0.0117 0.0041 0.3189 0.4095 0.0221 0.7605 0.0000 0.0006 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0221 0.0000
x22 0.9950 0.8182 0.1029 0.9962 0.7958 0.8501 0.7807 0.5785 0.1580 0.0680 0.2647 0.0572 0.3380 0.0035
x23 0.0000 0.0004 0.9976 0.4071 0.6627 0.1934 0.7641 0.0000 0.0000 0.3979 0.0157 0.0293 0.1675 0.0006
x24 0.9171 0.2770 0.0095 0.2924 0.0033 0.1658 0.1395 0.5936 0.1651 0.0000 0.1558 0.0020 0.0303 0.0475
x25 0.9183 0.7458 0.2879 0.4976 0.0258 0.2747 0.3423 0.5940 0.3989 0.0411 0.2224 0.0143 0.0620 0.0943
x26 0.8464 0.3822 0.0989 0.0437 0.0000 0.0482 0.0530 0.5672 0.2226 0.0084 0.0336 0.0000 0.0049 0.0210
x27 0.0945 0.2552 0.6184 0.0437 0.0001 0.0057 0.1536 0.0765 0.1528 0.1295 0.0336 0.0001 0.0000 0.0514
x28 0.9206 0.2660 0.0131 0.4803 0.0001 0.1935 0.1256 0.5946 0.1589 0.0002 0.2177 0.0000 0.0378 0.0436
x29 0.0506 0.2417 0.9905 0.6200 0.9838 0.4936 0.8558 0.0103 0.0277 0.3302 0.0710 0.1492 0.1438 0.0195
x30 0.8592 0.8653 0.9991 0.6200 0.9706 0.9971 0.7890 0.3139 0.1762 0.3564 0.0710 0.1343 0.5024 0.0051
x31 0.8592 0.9488 0.9973 0.5716 0.8440 0.8189 0.7827 0.3139 0.2199 0.3989 0.0563 0.0710 0.5526 0.0039
x32 0.8832 0.9901 0.9959 0.6200 0.8326 0.9488 0.7802 0.5824 0.2648 0.3424 0.0710 0.0675 0.4230 0.0034
x33 0.1835 1.0000 0.0010 0.9310 0.9626 0.5656 0.7966 0.1445 0.3417 0.0008 0.2038 0.1273 0.1758 0.0065
x34 0.8643 0.9997 0.0000 0.9780 0.7958 1.0000 0.7745 0.3170 0.4011 0.0000 0.2725 0.0572 0.5317 0.0024
x35 0.8693 0.9077 1.0000 0.5511 0.8248 0.9869 0.7708 0.3201 0.1956 0.3801 0.0505 0.0652 0.5715 0.0018
x36 0.8757 0.9999 0.3382 0.6738 0.8686 0.5113 0.7823 0.3242 0.3194 0.2009 0.0889 0.0793 0.3911 0.0038
x37 0.1189 0.9808 0.0093 0.9464 0.9838 0.7128 0.8488 0.0955 0.4518 0.0069 0.2134 0.1492 0.2510 0.0177
x38 0.6123 0.9077 1.0000 0.5511 0.8248 0.9869 0.7707 0.1931 0.1956 0.3801 0.0505 0.0652 0.5715 0.0017
x39 0.3936 0.1760 0.6876 0.1898 0.6940 0.7791 0.9507 0.2954 0.1075 0.1536 0.1126 0.2743 0.2903 0.0501
x40 0.6123 0.9077 1.0000 0.6738 0.8686 0.1362 0.7732 0.1931 0.1956 0.3801 0.0889 0.0793 0.1216 0.0022
x41 0.0607 0.9918 0.9647 0.8759 0.9999 0.4521 0.8859 0.0499 0.4407 0.2979 0.1735 0.2069 0.3531 0.0274
x42 0.8609 0.8182 0.9991 0.6738 0.8686 0.1385 0.7799 0.3149 0.1580 0.3564 0.0889 0.0793 0.1235 0.0034
x43 0.9910 0.9936 0.4651 0.6738 0.8686 0.6294 0.7952 0.5863 0.2731 0.2644 0.0889 0.0793 0.4611 0.0063
x44 0.9992 0.8396 0.8955 0.6738 0.8686 0.3014 0.7907 0.5572 0.1659 0.4221 0.0889 0.0793 0.2490 0.0054
x45 0.9992 0.8396 0.8955 0.6738 0.8686 0.3014 0.7927 0.5572 0.1659 0.4221 0.0889 0.0793 0.2490 0.0058
x46 0.9942 0.9077 0.9963 0.6733 0.9203 0.9946 0.7930 0.5805 0.1956 0.3438 0.0887 0.1010 0.5614 0.0058
x47 0.9444 0.9997 0.4711 0.8774 0.9803 0.8480 0.8311 0.5994 0.4011 0.2672 0.1743 0.1447 0.3364 0.0137
x48 0.7928 0.9031 0.9965 0.6738 0.8652 0.0536 0.7843 0.2765 0.1932 0.4009 0.0889 0.0781 0.0511 0.0042
x49 1.0000 1.0000 0.7848 0.6315 0.8326 0.7057 0.7884 0.5014 0.3417 0.3947 0.0747 0.0675 0.5016 0.0050
x50 0.9183 1.0000 0.9664 0.7089 0.9402 0.5353 0.8054 0.5940 0.3715 0.2995 0.1015 0.1118 0.4059 0.0083
x51 0.8522 0.9930 0.9991 0.6315 0.8326 0.4462 0.7826 0.3097 0.2715 0.3564 0.0747 0.0675 0.3493 0.0039
x52 0.0006 0.0001 0.9980 0.4121 0.6736 0.7439 0.7668 0.0001 0.0000 0.3502 0.0167 0.0312 0.5203 0.0011
x53 0.2456 0.6311 1.0000 0.5516 0.8001 0.9568 0.7704 0.0631 0.1031 0.3743 0.0506 0.0583 0.5831 0.0017
x54 0.0099 0.0312 0.9935 0.5089 0.7406 0.8904 0.7692 0.0017 0.0021 0.4067 0.0391 0.0441 0.5758 0.0015
x55 0.8693 0.9997 0.9901 0.6315 0.8326 0.7318 0.7867 0.3201 0.3119 0.4111 0.0747 0.0675 0.5145 0.0046
x56 0.6806 0.9333 0.4412 0.9467 0.9987 0.7664 0.8623 0.4798 0.4577 0.2529 0.2136 0.1883 0.2824 0.0211
x57 0.0702 0.9705 0.7600 0.5519 0.8043 0.9872 0.7707 0.0150 0.2379 0.3867 0.0507 0.0594 0.5713 0.0017
x58 0.9857 0.9911 0.6216 0.8766 0.9963 0.9786 0.8291 0.5922 0.4418 0.3344 0.1739 0.1756 0.5772 0.0132
x59 0.9996 0.9287 0.9808 0.7127 0.9296 0.9990 0.7904 0.5521 0.2070 0.3154 0.1029 0.1058 0.5475 0.0053
x60 0.8693 0.6311 1.0000 0.5218 0.7550 0.2769 0.7779 0.3201 0.1031 0.3743 0.0425 0.0473 0.2310 0.0030
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 16

IX. Conclusions where, the information gain g(p(xi )) corresponding to the

Pointing to the commonality and complementarity of occurrence of the ith event is defined as
the expected utility and the information set theories, we g(p(xi )) = e−(a(p(xi ))
3
+b(p(xi ))2 +c(p(xi ))+d)
(A.2)
have developed a framework to give utility information
values and the measures for the evaluation of the same, for all probabilities p(xi ) ∈ [0, 1].
specifically against the background of the entropy concept. The entropy EHA is an expectation of the information
The notion of agent is devised through an information- gain function. Some of the important associated properties
theoretic gain function that considers both the agent’s are
3 2
possibilistic utility and the distribution of the information 1) g(p(xi )) = e−(a(p(xi )) +b(p(xi )) +c(p(xi ))+d) is a con-
source values. Combining the information gain with the tinuous function for all p(xi ) ∈ [0, 1].
information source values, we introduce utility information 2) g(p(xi )) is bounded.
values to give the possibilistic uncertainty in the form of 3) With thePincrease in p(xi ), g(p(xi )) decreases.
information (entropy). The utility information values and 4) EHA = i p(xi )IX (p(xi )) is a continuous function
their evaluations through the proposed utility information for all p(xi ) ∈ [0, 1] and real valued a, b, c, and d
measures, together garner the essence of the utility infor- parameters.
mation theory. 5) If p(xi ) = n1 , ∀xi , then EHA is an increasing function
The proposed framework implements this real world of n.
aspect by considering the entire distribution of the infor- The generalized form of Hanman-Anirban entropy func-
mation source values in the form of its statistical moments tion is given as
for determining the agent’s evaluation of an information 3 2 α
p(xi )e−(a(p(xi )) +b(p(xi )) +c(p(xi ))+d)
X
source value. While the agent’s individualism in the eval- EHA,G =
uation of IX (xi ) is represented through αX in gX (·), the i
distribution of the information source values is assimilated (A.3)
through µX and σX . In the generalized form, the presence of free parameter
We have shown linear and non-linear forms of the α imparts more flexibility to the Hanman-Anirban entropy
proposed utility sets. On the similar lines, it is possible to function in the representation of various information gain
devise many forms of the utility sets through the Hanman- functions. The additional parameter α makes the Hanman-
Anirban entropy framework. Besides, higher forms of the Anirban entropy function adaptive. The parameter based
utility transforms can be derived following the proposed adaptive gain function makes the proposed formalism
approach. For instance, a transform taking the utility amenable to yield different forms through a choice of
information values over a period of time can help an agent parameter values.
to learn from his past mistakes and improve his evaluation The normalized Hanman-Anirban entropy function
scheme. The proposed theory has a very interesting com- EHA,N is defined as
plementarity with the risk theory and the combination of EHA − e−(a+b+c+d)
the two can help to invetigate risk aversion or risk loving EHA,N = (A.4)
λ
attitude of an agent. P −(a(p(xi ))3 +b(p(xi ))2 +c(p(xi ))+d)
The study has shown potential of applications in sev- where, EHA = i p(xi )e
a b c
eral areas such as Economic analysis, insurance, finance, and the constant λ = e−( n3 + n2 + n +d) − e−(a+b+c+d) ; n
consumer behavior, and decision support systems, which is the number of events in the probabilistic experiment
have been kept for a future study. We have focused upon (or the number of states in a system).
the attribute values as the information source values in Further, the generalized normalized Hanman-Anirban
this introductory paper. However, the information source entropy function is
values, can in fact assume multiple forms, say proba- α
EHA,G − e−(a+b+c+d)
bilistic, possibilistic, intuitionistic, or higher order fuzzy EHA,GN = (A.5)
memberships, to name a few. Several forms of the utility λG
3 2 α
information sets and utility transforms can be developed where, EHA,G = i p(xi )e−(a(p(xi )) +b(p(xi )) +c(p(xi ))+d) ;
P
α
depending upon the type of information source values, and a b c
and the constant λG = e−( n3 + n2 + n +d) − e−(a+b+c+d)
α

agent.
The parameters a, b, c, and d in the Hanman-Anirban
entropy function can also be varying when they take a
Appendix A
function as their value. In this form, the Hanman-Anirban
Generalized Hanman-Anirban Entropy Function
entropy function becomes approximate.
The fine details and the properties of the general-
ized Hanman-Anirban entropy function are reproduced Appendix B
here from (Aggarwal and Hanmandlu, 2016). The non- Proofs for the Properties of the Generalized
normalized Hanman-Anirban entropy function is ex- Hanman-Anirban Entropy Function
pressed as X For notational simplicity, we replace p(xi ) by pi in the
EHA = p(xi )g(p(xi )) (A.1)
following proofs.
i
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 17

Proof of Property 1 : g(pi ) is a continuous curve and Since a, b, c, d and α are real, k1 and k2 are finite. Hence
assumes a set of finite values even for discrete values of g(pi ) is bounded.
α
pi . Proof of Property 3 : We have k1 = e−d and k2 =
α
e−(a+b+c+d) , as defined in Property 2. The ratio,
Proof of Property 2 : As pi → 0, we obtain k1 e−d
α
α
= −(a+b+c+d)α = e(a+b+c) > 1f or(a + b + c) > 0
α
g(pi ) → e−d = k1 (B.1) k2 e
(B.3)
To prove that g(p) is a decreasing function, we
and as pi → 1
need to show that the derivative of g(p) with respect
α
g(pi ) → e−(a+b+c+d) = k2 (B.2) to p is always negative or zero. The derivative,

∂ ∂ −(a(pi )3 +b(pi )2 +c(pi )+d)α

g(p) = e
∂p ∂p (B.4)
3 2 α
= −e−(a(pi ) +b(pi ) +c(pi )+d) α(a(pi )3 + b(pi )2 + c(pi ) + d)α−1 (3a(pi )2 + 2bpi + c)

3 2 α
Since e−(a(pi ) +b(pi ) +c(pi )+d) > 0 for any 0 < p < 1. n ≥ 1. Then
Hence, when a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0, g(p) always decreases 3 2 α
e−(a(pi ) +b(pi ) +c(pi )+d)
X
E(p) =
for 0 ≥ p ≥ 1. i
X1 α (B.5)
Proof of Property 4 : Since g(pi ) is a continuous a b c
e−( n3 + n2 + n +d) =
X
= (1/n)(hn )
function (Property 1), multiplying it by a finite value pi i
n
retains its continuous nature and the sum of continuous a b c α
functions is also continuous. where, h(n) = e−( n3 + n2 + n +d)
To prove that H(P ) is an increasing function, it is
Proof of Property 5 :
sufficient to prove that h(n) is an increasing function.
Consider the case where p1 = p2 = . . . = pn = 1/n and Towards this end, we take the partial derivative of h(n)

 α−1  
∂  a b c α a b c 3a 2b c
h(n) = e−( n3 + n2 + n +d) α 3 + 2 + + d + + (B.6)
∂n n n n n4 n3 n2

∂
For n ≥ 1 and a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, ∂n h(n) ≥ 0. Therefore, function that is given as
H(p) is an increasing function for a, b, c ≥ 0.
X
EX,P P = p(xi )e−(p(xi )−1) (B.1)
i
Appendix C
Derivation of Important Entropy Functions
from the Generalized Hanman-Anirban Entropy
(2) Shannon Entropy: The exponential gain e−(p(xi )−1)
Function
in (B.1) can be approximated to − log (p (xi )) by taking
the first two terms in their respective series expansions.
It is possible to reduce the generalized Hanman-Anirban
This leads to the Shannon entropy function
entropy function to most of the prominent entropy func-
tions like the Pal and Pal, Shannon, and Luca and Termini
entropies. We derive these entropies using the generalized
X
EX,Sh = − p(xi ) log (p (xi )) (B.2)
Hanman-Anirban entropy. We append PP (Pal and Pal), i
Sh (Shannon) or HA (Hanman-Anirban) to the subscript
of EX to distinguish among the entropies.
(1) Pal and Pal Entropy: Taking, aX = bX = 0; cX = Alternatively, by taking aX = bX = dX = 0, cX = αX =
1; dX = −1 and αX = 1 in (4), we get Pal and Pal entropy 1, p(xi ) = − log (p (xi )) in (4), we obtain
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 18

Taking aX = bX = dX = 0, αX = 1, p(xi ) =
X − log (p (xi )) in (4), we obtain
EX,HA = − log (p (xi )) e−(− log(p(xi ))) X
i EX,HA,nl = − log(p(xi )ecX log(p(xi ))
n
i
X (B.3) (B.5)
= − p (xi ) log (p (xi )) X
= − (p(xi ))cX log(p(xi ))
i
i
= EX,Sh
(3) Luca and Termini Fuzzy Entropy: The Luca and
Similarly, the non-linear Shannon entropy is given as Termini fuzzy entropy relation for fuzzy sets is given as
X
EX,Sh,nl = − (p(xi ))q log(p(xi )) (B.4)
i

X
EX,LT = − (µX (xi ) log (µX (xi )) + (1 − µX (xi )) log (1 − µX (xi ))) (B.6)
i

We obtain the Luca and Termini fuzzy entropy from be written as

α
the generalized Hanman-Anirban entropy function in the 0
EHA,G =
X 3 2
(1−p(xi ))e−(a(1−p(xi )) +b(1−p(xi )) +c(1−p(xi ))+d)
following steps. i
(B.7)
In light of (A.3), the generalized Hanman-Anirban en- We add the generalized Hanman-Anirban
tropy function for complement probability (1 − p(xi )) can entropy functions in (A.3) and (B.7) to obtain

0
EHA,G + EHA,G =
X 3 2 α 3 2 α
(B.8)
p(xi )e−(a(p(xi )) +b(p(xi )) +c(p(xi ))+d) + (1 − p(xi ))e−(a(1−p(xi )) +b(1−p(xi )) +c(1−p(xi ))+d)
i

Busemeyer, J.R., Townsend, J.T., 1993. Decision field the-

Clearly, (B.8) is approximated to Luca and Termini
entropy in (B.6) if p(xi ) is replaced with − log(µX (xi ));
and the free parameters are taken as α → 1, and a = b =
d = 0, c = 1.
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 Highlights

• A new possibilistic utility framework

• Concept of evaluating agent
• Computation of agent’s perceived utilities
• Information measures for evaluation
• Illustrative examples