G.R. No.

182498               December 3, 2009

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief
Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG);
Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, 
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean
B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an
"enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo
Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him;
(2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent
GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE
TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence
and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend
the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report
of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of
respondents.

This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding
General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet,
Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the
police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.

This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against violations or threats
of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive
to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual,
in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored.

We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that
call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these
situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions
and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is
unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points
remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may
promulgate.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.

The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.5 The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with
the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary
who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station.8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.9

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition was directed
against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel
Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet
[collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances and the facts outlined
above, the petition went on to state:

xxxx

7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch
but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly
took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student,
Arsimin Kunnong;

8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was
surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also
around and his room was closed and locked;

9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the
room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell
phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;

10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;

11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
and other groups known to be fighting against the government;

12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators
of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who
was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;

13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;

14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information
from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the
uniformed men;

15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody
of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups;

xxxx

17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondent’s] request and pleadings
failed to produce any positive results;

18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners’] refusal to help and provide police assistance in
locating her missing husband;

19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis
to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subject’s whereabouts,
and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights
and serious anxieties;

20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been
visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these
places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives
only to try complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts
produced no positive results up to the present time;

21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured
her not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;

22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondent’s] request for help and
failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two
(2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of
[respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;

xxxx

25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under
the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get
the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except
the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two
(72) hours from service of the writ.11

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition
were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12

The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any
personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to address
concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated
with the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these
cases; and gave the following summary:13

xxxx

4.

a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on
the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim
checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then
roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the
said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu
PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing
person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate
findings of the whereabouts of the person.

b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The
said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar
set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a
Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly
arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House.
At about 6:15 o’clock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast
craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on
or about 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as
 stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to
purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not
return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and
information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.

c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find
Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no
such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.

5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions
available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This
immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand
alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them
before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.

The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to
the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following:14

xxxx

That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to
conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis.

That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October
28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October
30, 2007, at around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student
identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of
the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October
30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six o’clock in the morning of even date, Engr.
Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the
same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but
the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who
reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis
to make out a case of an enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of
the government.

That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N.
Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since
October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is being
detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.

That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged
enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue
investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible therefore.

Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER 15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina’s affidavit
which alleged that:16

xxxx

That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or
illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in
the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER nor was there
any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by
our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally
detained ENGR. TAGITIS.

That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED
in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-for-
ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in
kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in
court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.

That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao
Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify
and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of
ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to
identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the
cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the disappearance.

That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to
submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.

That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.

That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with
Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial
Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to
leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are
brought to the bar of justice.

That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.

Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his
affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance, viz:17

xxxx

3) For the record:

1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;

xxxx

4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced
disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office;

5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through
Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain
Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of
Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator
of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;

6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the
Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan
Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or arrest;

7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was
requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student
returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he immediately
inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the counter
informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 o’clock p.m. and
never returned back to his room;

8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police
Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to
determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat,
act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and
manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the
disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court;

9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have
caused the following directives:

a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO
to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;

b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO
to expedite compliance to my previous directive;

c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of
directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the
owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative
statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
 d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize
efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit
for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may
somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;

e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to
investigate the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their
area of operational jurisdiction;

f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed
to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr.
Tagitis;

10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic]
on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his
disappearance and submitted the following:

a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-
2007;

b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;

c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu
PPO;

11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:

a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of
the disappearance and the action being taken by our office;

b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation
and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;

c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;

4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office
is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the
immediate solution of the case.

Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far
taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of
disappearance – to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18

Task Force Tagitis

On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK
FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was
exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 As planned, (1) the first hearing
would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence
with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu
and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives.21

In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from
PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis’
disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4,
2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the
Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told
the Provincial Governor of Sulu that:23

[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken
and carried away… more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his …
[personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was]
intended for the … IDB Scholarship Fund.

In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he
personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation,
particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE
TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any
abduction.25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given specific
instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed
to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated January 16,
2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27

9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no
participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last
October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development
Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the
IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by
resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which
was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.

20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and
wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student
scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among
them.

xxxx

It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed
considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their
efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and
investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with
other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our investigation
for the resolution of this case.

On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be
exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’ disappearance on the following grounds:28

(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have
been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for
the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to
all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of
Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month
since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks
when battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on
January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the
missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis’ claim that they already had an
"all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How
could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?

(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM
was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s official designated post. Yet,
P/Supt KASIM’s subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to
understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the military
intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par.
15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE
TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this court’s subpoena
and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of
the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.

Testimonies for the Respondent

On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to
Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding
a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that allowed her to
"specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition." 29 This friend also told her that her
husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her
former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP
CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis." 31 The respondent recounted that she went to
Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who
read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the
"alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is
under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema’ah Islamiah."32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis’ second wife, and
they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. 33 She last
communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging;
Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34

The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her
stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the
time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007.35 The respondent explained that it took her a
few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband’s disappearance to
the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her
because his cellular phone’s battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had
fully-charged his cellular phone’s battery.36

The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in
paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp
Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people, namely,
Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to
them the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent
further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group
and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic
taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to
give him his medication.38

On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports,39 signed by the respondent,
detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine
Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col. Ancanan, the
respondent recounted, viz:40

On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from
Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 o’clock. We
[were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao
Command (WESTMINCOM).

On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information
about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed
to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of
the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was
not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.

While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said
meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall
to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.

When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were
discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and he’s last looked
[sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my
husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG.
I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held
him but he refused.

While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give
me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon alam mo
na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by
the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of
Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my
husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.

I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet
failed to do so.

The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41

On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr.
Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in
Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu
where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan
located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind
the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to
Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that he’ll do the best he can to help me find my husband.

After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp
Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.

On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that
Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different
terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a
Balik Islam.

It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier.
These are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP
Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.

He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He assured me
that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to
please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic
patient.

In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.

On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate
her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she
received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she went to
Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.42

In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a
report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis’ cellular phone, which showed that
Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43

She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with
two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col.
Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told
them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read
in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism;
Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was abducted when he
was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism.
Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a "raw report." 45 She
also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he
mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his
January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated,51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis
took away money entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had received an e-mail
report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance
of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account.54

On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit
was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof Matli clarified that although he
read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of… [its] contents."56

On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondent’s
testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the
military or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her
narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the
injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the
respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed
abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG
Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu
did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG.59 He also stressed that the information he
provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still
needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity.60

On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him
by his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial." 61 Col.
Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading by others. 62 He
testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions
because "it was not important to him" and also because the information it contained had no importance in
relation with the abduction of Tagitis.63 He explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not
contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his
abduction.64

In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent
Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondent’s allegation that Tagitis
was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the "investigative
arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the
Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes."66 Col. Pante further testified that the
allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they
did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’ reported disappearance.67 Col. Pante
added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation,"
since they were only assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation.68 He denied
that his office conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latter’s disappearance.69 Col. Pante further
testified that his investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still
facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of Tagitis.70

THE CA RULING

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision 71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
"enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm
of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced
disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent’s testimony,
corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the
police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis’ abduction came from no less than the military – an
independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim’s
asset, pointing to the CIDG’s involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an
"asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s
subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved
in the abduction of Tagitis.

The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories
painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law
or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of
the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend.
The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his
second wife," on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many
wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in
order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by
the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the
military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom
– the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family,
and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis
heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert
extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to
provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against
the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the
finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in
its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73

THE PETITION

In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal
remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and
security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the
ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial
evidence.74

THE COURT’S RULING

We do not find the petition meritorious.

Sufficiency in Form and Substance

In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition, the petitioners
contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the
petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:

1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty
and security;

2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondent’s source of information;

3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with their consent;

4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;

5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;

6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in
the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and

7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of
the portions the petitioners cite):75

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of
course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her,
or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by
those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token
gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the
test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s
rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be
read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required
elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.

In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which
Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to
be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of
the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he
was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives
since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77

These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about
Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the
State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual
violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a
cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required
by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to
facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct testimony. 78 This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if
not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement
by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn
statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the
required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified
in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the
allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.

Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have
been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to
establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with
the reported disappearance.79

We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply with the Section 5(d)
requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his
companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as
they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready
answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups.
The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the
PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the police that her
husband was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance was alleged to have been
reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries
that yielded the factual bases for her petition.80

These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities,
and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the
investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their
failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be
a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and
conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondent’s
frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more
than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete
for purposes of bringing the petition forward.

Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The
petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were taken
by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of
cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.

We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.

Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege "the
actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the respondent’s
petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her
to file her petition.

xxxx

7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch
but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly
took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student,
Arsimin Kunnong;

xxxx

10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;

11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators
of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who
was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;

13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;

xxxx

15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody
of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups;

xxxx

17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo,
as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondent’s] request and
pleadings failed to produce any positive results

xxxx

20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police
headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these
places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her
trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends
and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which,
her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;

xxxx

25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under
the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except
the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient
in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of
the case.

The Desaparecidos

The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in
an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an
enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced
disappearances would be very helpful.

The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s
Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reich’s Night and Fog
Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security";
they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize
the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about
the fate of these targeted persons.83

In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the
world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared"
during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue
became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State
security forces in that continent under Operation Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and
1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of
governments’ counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere
in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the
phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the "desaparecidos," 86 which literally
means the "disappeared ones."87 In general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:

1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again;
 2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the
military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention
center or another; and

3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.88

In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855 cases
were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained
missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term,
820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number,
407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances
dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-
year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-
governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of
193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The
Commission on Human Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from
1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still
have undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the
period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.92

Enforced Disappearances Under Philippine Law

The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:94

JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition
[for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to
formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances… so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances
will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So we’ll have to agree among ourselves about the nature of
killings and disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an
element incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other
jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors.
Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings,
the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others.
So, again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will
be covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95

In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in
the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear
textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of
the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an
elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not
crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and
enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.99 The
simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are
criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive
law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power
structure.

Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate
to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature
and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life,
liberty and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the
public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious,
judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same
investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.

Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of
criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires
criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in
determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for
this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the
public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The
first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect
contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require.
The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her
liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing
efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully
addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production
of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case,
by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.

Enforced Disappearance  Under International Law

From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant
violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the
desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the
circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a
double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their
own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones"
and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance
of the household breadwinner.102

The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under
Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from "reports
from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and requested the
"UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making
appropriate recommendations."103

In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a
global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third
preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:

Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in
the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their
liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the
Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of
the law. [Emphasis supplied]

Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention).105 The Convention
was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention defined
enforced disappearance as follows:

For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be
subject to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall
be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political
instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an
offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of
relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and
whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies
enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the
fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.111

Binding Effect of UN  Action on the Philippines

To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet
committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal
law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying
every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the
Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.

Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo
cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various
conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN
Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion." 112 Although no
universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter, 113 it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced
disappearance, and this Declaration states:114

Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of
the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  and reaffirmed and developed in
international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]

As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration,
the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to
"generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."115

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 116 we
held that:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]

We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary

international law that are binding on all states. We held further:117

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of custom include State practice,
State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions
relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of
international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are
indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the
following in these respects:

First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June
1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced
disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees."123 One of
the key provisions includes the States’ obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their
respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was
committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and "when the alleged
criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be interpreted as
establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention. 124 At present,
Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in accordance with the
Inter-American Convention and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be
criminal.1251avvphi1

Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the
protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has
applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by
enforced disappearance through the Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition
of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial;
and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection
afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey, 126where the ECHR found a violation of the right to
liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicant’s son disappeared after being taken into
custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant
(the disappeared person’s mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the
authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of
any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13.127

Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary
international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third, 128 which
provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages,
or condones… (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals." 129 We significantly note that in
a related matter that finds close identification with enforced disappearance – the matter of torture – the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 130 that the
prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated
on the significance of UN declarations, as follows:

These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of
member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do
not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is,
according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions
when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’
against ‘non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international
community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is
gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules
binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration
has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]

Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN
Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that
the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the
ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against humanity.131

Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute,133 the Philippines is still
merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been
incorporated in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special
Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia.134 In addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC
has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance.135

While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance
(or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a
specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been
repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of
international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to
the extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.

The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course
of a disappearance:136

1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;

2) the right to liberty and security of the person;

3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;

4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;

5) the right to an identity;

6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;

 7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;

8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.

9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;

10) the right to an adequate standard of living;

11) the right to health; and

12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]

Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:

Article 2

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting
in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis
supplied]

In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective
remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations
promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137

15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights…
The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative
mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law… Administrative mechanisms
are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations
promptly, thoroughly and effectivelythrough independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party
to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant.
Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis
supplied]

The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to
investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138

18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights,
States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate,
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate
breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as
criminal under either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance
(articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of
sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of
the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population,
these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a
guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government, held that:

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security
of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization
of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality

preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or
his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
[Emphasis supplied]

Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as
a prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive
duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:

[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely
to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent
on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as
requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody
and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]

These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made
effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through
substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced disappearance,"
the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the
medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security that underlie every enforced disappearance.

Evidentiary Difficulties Posed  by the Unique Nature of an  Enforced Disappearance

Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the
allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we
shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these
difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.

These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged –
investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary
difficulties are generally threefold.

First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators.141 Experts note
that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:

The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of
governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are
generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed
through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or
prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to secret
detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other
controls.142

In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to
speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives. 143 We have had
occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo144 when we acknowledged that "where
powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them
comes as no surprise."

Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance – i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body – is
usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have
begun.145 The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent
evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez
Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the State’s
power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the
State to commit the perfect crime.147

Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring
the victim’s human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for
information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing
people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or
another, in our consideration of this case.

Evidence and Burden of Proof in  Enforced Disappearances Cases

Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree
and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:

Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice
or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of
obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

xxxx

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable
laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.

Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]

These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required
level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of
an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of
diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point,
too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.

Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and
form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and
prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.

The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 151 provided the Court its first opportunity
to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To
directly quote Ang Tibay:

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative
force. [Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we
recognized that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly
requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:

The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that
will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[Emphasis supplied]

Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties
presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court
must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary
difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without
transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.

In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez’ disappearance – adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a
disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice. 154 The IACHR took note of the realistic
fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by
logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to disappear. It
held:

130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.
Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions
consistent with the facts.

131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances,

because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]

In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who
acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay
testimony of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who described Manfredo’s kidnapping on the basis of
conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad
daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo
was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces. 155 The
IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that he had been told
by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had
spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.156

Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission
and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective
counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another
wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence
the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are
administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while
we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we
shall take into account.

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality,
and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all
other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.

We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of
the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or
non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the
adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective
and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. 158 These
requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions
for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearance cases.

Assessment of the Evidence

The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of
this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?

The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law."159Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:160

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;

(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; and

(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand
only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel
desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned –
the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her
petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below.

We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested
Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands
on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.

In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her
allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga
custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied
a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came
out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col.
Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part,
admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information about the disappearance.

The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together
with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the
respondent’s testimony:

Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband
particularly those in charge of any records or investigation?

A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband
is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason
ng J.I.", sir.

Q: What is J.I.?

A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.

Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?

A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential,
sir.

Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?

A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.

Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?

A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]

She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:

Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?

A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?

A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a
military report, ma’am.

Q: But you were able to read the contents?

A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.

Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?

A: There were three of us, ma’am.

Q: Who were your companions?

A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, ma’am.162

xxxx

Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?

A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista
na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel,
my husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa
ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163

xxxx

Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?

A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because
I know that they would deny it, ma’am.164

On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her
husband was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:

Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with
you when you went there?

A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.

Q: Only the two of you?

A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.

Q: Who were they?

A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?

A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk to him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: The four of you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the
location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He
is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He
was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he
was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As I’ve said earlier, he was seen
under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is
also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked
him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also
told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.

Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it
in the computer or what?

A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know if it was computerized but I’m
certain that it was typewritten. I’m not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.

Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?

A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165

xxxx

Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?

A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.

Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?

A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to
us [sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied]166

Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them
information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the
"informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of
the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report"
from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.167

To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners
pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that
"her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly
‘parang liason ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbin’s testimony imputing certain
statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the
PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would
certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military."

Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the
petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the
respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than
anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the
inconsistencies are not on material points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in
so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is
not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various
witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material
circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.170

Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we
hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informant’s
letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007,
was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking
to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The
respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and his
claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates
the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted destruction of this letter – effectively, a suppression
of this evidence – raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the
respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the
respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."

Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct
evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation,
knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col.
Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The
Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial
investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis’ custodian.

Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence – i.e., evidence whose
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and
Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant).172

To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states
is to acknowledge – as the petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct evidence, we
should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different
from a statement that the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the
special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent
or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to
provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no
choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that
these difficulties demand.1avvphi1

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we
should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece
of evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking
into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence
before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other
evidence in the case.

The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was
reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a
seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to
Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the
records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on
informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof
Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although he
confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’
personal account. Other than these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records relating
to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.

The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition
recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no evidence
whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis
was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 – the day he arrived in Jolo – and was never seen again.

The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects
of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is
the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it
injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State
reacted to the disappearance.

Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize
the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been
taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on
whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this
conclusion. The respondent’s own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with
another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an
investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent
results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded
positive results. Col. Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and,
impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody.
The more significant part of Col. Kasim’s story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking
with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin
mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in
the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which this information was
relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.

More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP
Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the
Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report of
the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the
PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M.
Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the
CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research, records
show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER
Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao
did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their
units to search for Tagitis.

The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force
Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ
were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned
"retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for
students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or
complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit
had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to conclude that
Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did
not pursue any investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the
IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with
terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look
into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in
investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA findings
that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after the disappearance that the police
authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his
subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s
last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation – even an internal one – appeared
to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim’s "asset" and what he indeed wrote.

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government’s denial of
any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the
respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the
disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive
trait that runs through these developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance,
starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to
the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husband’s
disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.

As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities
were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to
the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of
Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was
a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever
appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention
places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and
extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and
units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police
authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule
requires.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded
denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the
government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what
they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least
credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances of
the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim
evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From
the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, 173the evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity,
under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The
disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will
subsist unless this Court acts.

This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced
disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to
those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the
basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was
abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in
this case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including
the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The applicant
contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of
the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six
and one half years after the apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap
and then transferred him to another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the
apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of
events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the commander of gendarme
operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a
subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi
region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahap’s enforced disappearance.

Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo
remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case – we
believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular,
the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
"PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution."
The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative
arm" of the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 176 Under the PNP organizational
structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).177 No indication exists in this case showing that the President
ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI.

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in
their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo
remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the
CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall
initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed
results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall
pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as
indicated in this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners’ submissions; the
sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions
and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the
end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have
one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration
of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari for lack of
merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:

a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance

covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;

e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
action;

g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the
 respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision;

h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the
Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and
shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National
Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when
the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature
of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives – particularly, the referral
back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be
applied to every Amparo situation.

The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150224             May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount
of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00,
and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on
the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of
force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn
Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West,
Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to
appellant earlier that morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn
that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just
stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in
the house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel.
They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the
kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he
was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house.6 She
later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth
at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house
of Isabel Dawang.7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a
black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he
had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp."
Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband
then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were
off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She
noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up
the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was
tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body
that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter
of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel
Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked
body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked
cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50
meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly
heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando
Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was
approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. 12 He was
charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not
guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief,
appellant assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent
reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being
that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial
judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect.15 Where there is nothing
to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.16

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised,
were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her
body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m.
on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to
twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death
was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within
which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, 20 Dr.
Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr.
Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual
intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution
that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm
indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A person’s DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the
same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin
tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect
to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For
purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently
facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion
in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the
crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the
victim’s body during the assault.27Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant,
DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR
testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting
sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene
types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and
the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine
criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters.
Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant
and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial
court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the
victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels;
(3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning
on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June
30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt
with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m.,
wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly
left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty
white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8)
The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim,
Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11)
The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of
slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant
escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of
guilt.35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him
as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as
there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that
there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to
a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied
shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time
when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not
demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time,
especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay. 40 He lives within a one
hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach
one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in
convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of
probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value." 41 This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant
but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of
such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court
can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that
the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole,
to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view of
the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral
certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the
victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant
running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same house. 46 She also
testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar
attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or
attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her
grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our
family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the
appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I
will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.

Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule
in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts
or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion
thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her
repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge
of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation;
and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation,
appellant killed the woman.52However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-
father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was
committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are
invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law,
together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents,
approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity
within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the
victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their
position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the
victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages
cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the
family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in
actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148220               June 15, 2005

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, 
vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-
VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals
("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders 3 issued by Branch
48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February
2000 directed Rosendo Herrera ("petitioner") to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing,
while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To
support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified,
Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also
head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis
laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where
she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos
described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity.4

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity
testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:

In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals,
namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity
testing in a laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Order, and to submit the results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties
are further reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of other evidence in
support of the petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that "under the
present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen…, unconstitutional."

In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.6

On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders dated 3 February 2000
and 8 June 2000 "in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitioner further contended that there is "no appeal nor any [other] plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law." Petitioner maintained his previous objections
to the taking of DNA paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to support his objection:

1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of Appeals (270 SCRA 2).

2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the limitations on, and conditions
precedent for the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious constraints affecting the
reliability of the test as admitted by private respondent’s "expert" witness.

3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent relying on scientific
findings and conclusions unfit for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field and
scientific treatises.

4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to take will be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen from the
petitioner, unconstitutional.7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the
questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct
the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed
DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to
testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible
adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and ordered

dismissed, and the challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution dated 23 May
2001.9

Issues

Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial
system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit.10

Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it authorized the trial
court "to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the absence of legislation to
ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of
Appeals and the presence of technical and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its
implementation."11 Petitioner maintains that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against
self-incrimination.12

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an overview of a
paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family Code
and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship,13 support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have
to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child.14

A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our
jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father.15

There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or impotency. 16 The
putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 17 The child’s legitimacy
may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.18

Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness
is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or
must not look like his biological father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondent’s mother,
put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent’s biological father. Aware
that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of
letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever having
sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi
Alba countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to
show how much they resemble each other.

Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules, and
governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation
are allowed in this jurisdiction.

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

xxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.—The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.—The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and
the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court’s rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation.
In Pe Lim v. CA,20 a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made
in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father.21 A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence.22 Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to
the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation.23 However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a
father’s operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing.24 Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism25 nor family pictures26 are sufficient to
establish filiation.

So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to
incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and
filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that
blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.27

In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,28 the result of the blood grouping test showed that the putative father
was a "possible father" of the child. Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the possibility of
paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and circumstances other than the results of the
blood grouping test.

In Jao v. Court of Appeals,29 the child, the mother, and the putative father agreed to submit themselves
to a blood grouping test. The National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") conducted the test, which indicated
that the child could not have been the possible offspring of the mother and the putative father. We held
that the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative father.

The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked whether DNA analysis may be
admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

DNA Analysis as Evidence

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human
cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA
profile can determine his identity.30

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual
is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom
the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. 31 We quote
relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with approval:

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to
an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA
is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an
individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from
buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.

The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine)
and T(thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individual’s DNA determines his or her
physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired
bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a
person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ.
They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests,
fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing
simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may
proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are:
the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was
used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA
process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-
([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed
of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match
two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime
scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or
fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these regions,
a person possesses two genetic types called "allele", one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test,
the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the
child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological
father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his
profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child,
the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.32 (Emphasis in the original)

Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,33 it was
only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals34 that more than a passing mention was given to
DNA analysis. In Tijing,we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners’
youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish
parentage. However, we observed that:

Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in
aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in
this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180
degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we
stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our
courts." In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the
accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to
death. We declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.37

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of
according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in
conducting DNA analysis.

In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA
testing: People v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.39 In Yatar, a
match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood
sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the conviction
of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant
guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that
he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a
difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim’s child does
not preclude the convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two United States
cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v.
U.S.40 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of
murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Frye’s
counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test42 made
on defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Frye’s conviction and ruled that "the systolic blood
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." The Fryestandard of general acceptance states
as follows:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

In 1989, State v. Schwartz43 modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged with stabbing and

murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the accused and the victim were submitted for DNA
testing to a government facility and a private facility. The prosecution introduced the private testing
facility’s results over Schwartz’s objection. One of the issues brought before the state Supreme Court
included the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded
that:

While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the scientific
community, we hold that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory’s
compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and results.44

In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further modified the Frye-

Schwartz standard. Daubertwas a product liability case where both the trial and appellate courts denied
the admissibility of an expert’s testimony because it failed to meet the Frye standard of "general
acceptance." The United States Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence
have superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides the
foundation for admissibility of evidence. Thus:

Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any "tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.

Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean that the
Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure
that the testimony’s reasoning or method is scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility
would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.

Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further modified

the Daubert standard. This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as follows:

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously, neither
the Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines.47 At
best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of
Court.48 Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony,
provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue."50

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing,
Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the
restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight
of the evidence.

Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to
DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.51]

We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:

In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he
has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do
not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he
is not excluded as the father.52

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match
between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily
establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American
jurisdiction,53 trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity
("W") prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative
father compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate
reference population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for W.
Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy
of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis
compared to those conducted between the putative father and child alone.54

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity.
If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right
against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable
only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order
with approval:

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis,
154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence)
from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a
defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis,
Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof
(US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size
was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to
submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on "testimonial compulsion."56

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim
his or her own defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities
of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by
the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June
2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176527               October 9, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
SAMSON VILLASAN y BANATI, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this appeal the May 25, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
00250.1The appellate court affirmed the May 29, 2001 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18, Cebu City,2that in turn found appellant Samson Villasan (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of murder under the following
Information:3

That on or about the 1st day of June, 2000, at about 6:30 in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a .357 caliber Magnum
revolver S&W (Homemade), with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent
to kill, did then and there attack, assault and shot one Jacinto T. Bayron, hitting him on his [sic] vital
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, as a consequence of which said Jacinto T.
Bayron died instantaneously.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment. 4 The prosecution presented the following
witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Jose Secula (Jose); Gaudioso Quilaton (Gaudioso);
Sergio Bayron (Sergio); and Dr. Rene Enriquez Cam (Dr. Cam). The appellant, Carlito Moalong (Carlito),
and Police Senior Inspector Mutchit Salinas (P/Sr. Insp. Salinas) took the witness stand for the defense.

Jose, a security guard of PROBE Security Agency, testified that he was outside his employer’s branch
office at the Ayala Business Center, Siquijor Road, Cebu City at around 6:15 p.m. of June 1, 2000, when
he heard three successive gunshots.5 He mounted his motorcycle to go and investigate but before he
could start it, he saw the appellant "walking fast" and carrying a gun. He ordered the appellant to stop
and to drop his weapon. The latter obeyed and dropped his gun. He then approached the appellant,
conducted a body search on him,6 and turned him over to his (Jose’s) supervisor who, in turn, contacted
the police. The police forthwith brought the suspect to the police station. Jose recalled that he executed an
affidavit on the shooting incident before the police.7

On cross examination, Jose clarified that he did not see the actual shooting; he only saw the victim’s
lifeless body after the appellant had been arrested.8 On re-direct, Jose stated that before the appellant
was brought to the police station, the latter told him that he had shot a fellow driver.9

Gaudioso, a store assistant at Healthy Options, narrated that he boarded a jeep at the waiting shed at the
Ayala Business Center at around 6:30 p.m. of June 1, 2000.10 He occupied the jeep’s front seat, beside the
driver Jacinto Bayron (Bayron). While so seated, he heard the appellant briefly converse with Bayron,
requesting the latter to be allowed to ride the jeep because his own jeep conked out. 11 Soon after the
appellant got into Bayron’s jeep, Gaudioso heard a gunshot. He looked back and saw the appellant shoot
Bayron twice in the head.12 Gaudioso immediately jumped off but later returned to assist in bringing
Bayron to the hospital.13 It was then that he learned of Bayron’s name. Thereafter, the police invited him
to the police station for his statement regarding the shooting.14

On cross examination, Gaudioso recalled that there were three other passengers at that time inside the
jeep. He immediately turned his head towards the passenger’s side when he heard the first shot; two
more shots followed. He got scared and jumped off the jeep together with the other passengers. He later
returned and found that the driver was already dead.15

On re-direct, he reiterated that he was the only passenger at the jeep’s front seat, and that the appellant
was seated at the jeep’s rear seats. He maintained that the appellant shot Bayron.16

Sergio, the victim’s brother, testified that Bayron was a jeep driver earning more or less ₱500.00 daily. He
further stated that the funeral and burial expenses for his brother amounted to ₱100,000.00. He also
added that Bayron had a common-law wife and had a 1 ½ year-old son with her.17

Dr. Cam, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Cebu City, testified that
he conducted a post-mortem examination on the victim’s body on June 2, 2000,18 and made the following
findings:

NECROPSY REPORT

GUNSHOT WOUNDS:

1) ENTRANCE: 1.0 x 1.3 cms., ovaloid edges, with an area of tattooing around the wound, 8.0 x
10.0 cms., contusion collar widest supero-laterally, located at the right side of the face, below the
right eye, 3.5 cms. x x x

2) ENTRANCE: 0.9 x 1.0 cm., ovaloid, edges inverted, contusion collar widest infero-posteriorly,
located at the right side of the head, just in front of the right ear x x x

3) ENTRANCE: 0.6 x 0.8 cm. ovaloid, edges inverted, contusion collar widest, supero-medially,
located at the right side of the head, occipital area, 4.0 cms., above 13.0 cms., behind the right
external auditory meatus, x x x

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Hematoma, scalp, frontal area and right parietal.

Hemorrhage, intracranial, intracerebral, subdural, subarachnoidal, massive, generalized

Internal Organs, congested

Stomach, empty

CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUNDS OF THE HEAD

Remarks: Two (2) bullets were recovered and submitted to Firearm Investigation Section for
Ballistic Examination.19
On cross-examination, Dr. Cam stated that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the entrance
wounds was two feet, more or less.20

The defense presented a different version of events.

Carlito testified that he was with the appellant at the parking lot of the Ayala Business Park at past 5:00
p.m. of June 1, 2000, when Bayron and another person approached the appellant. Bayron pointed to the
appellant and said: "Pre, pagtarong sa imong pagkatawo, basig magkaaway ta" (Behave like a good man,
otherwise we will become enemies). The appellant replied, "pre tell me who was the person who told you
about that"?21 Bayron’s companion then accused the appellant of being a traitor.22

The jeepney dispatcher soon after called Bayron as it was his jeep’s turn to load passengers. 23 Bayron and
his companion boarded the jeep; Bayron sat at the driver’s seat while his companion proceeded to the
passengers’ seats at the rear. The appellant followed them into the jeep and sat behind Bayron. There
were 5-7 passengers on board the jeep, one of them at the front seat beside Bayron. Bayron then drove
away, leaving the parking area.24According to Carlito, he learned of Bayron’s death at 6:30 p.m. of that
day.25

On cross examination, Carlito testified that he went to Ayala on June 1, 2000 to meet the appellant to ask
for help on his application as a driver.26 He saw the appellant and Bayron talking to each other when he
arrived, and overheard Bayron warning the appellant to be careful. Bayron thereafter got into his jeep,
followed by the appellant who sat behind him (Bayron). While inside the jeep, Bayron pointed his finger at
the appellant and continued to argue with the appellant as he drove away.27 He heard gunshots 15
minutes after the jeep left the parking area. Carlito later saw the appellant being apprehended by security
guards.28

The appellant stated that he was a driver plying the Ayala-Colon route. At around 5:00-6:00 p.m. of June
1, 2000, he talked to "Lito" at the parking area of the Ayala Business Center. Lito was a friend of his son
who had been asking for his assistance in applying as a driver. 29 He read a newspaper after talking to Lito.
Not long after, Bayron and a certain Roel came and pointed their fingers at him. Roel uttered, "Even if you
are double your body [sic], I am not afraid." 30 The appellant suspected that Roel was mad at him for an
incident in 1999 when he reprimanded Roel for indiscriminately firing a gun.31

The appellant further narrated that Bayron went to the jeep’s driver’s seat after the dispatcher called him.
Roel followed Bayron but sat on the rear passenger seat. The appellant also got into the jeep and sat
across Roel because he was bothered by what was happening between Bayron and Roel. 32 He asked Roel
to get off the jeep so they could settle their differences, but Roel instead drew a gun from his waist. 33 The
appellant and Roel wrestled for the gun which discharged while they were grappling for its possession.
Thereafter, Roel immediately alighted from the jeep. The appellant followed but was unable to catch up
with Roel.34

On cross examination, the appellant recalled that he read a newspaper at the parking lot after conversing
with Lito. At that point, Bayron and Roel came; Roel pointed a finger at him and blamed him for his
(Roel’s) arrest for illegal possession of firearms.35 Bayron went to board his jeep when the dispatcher
called him; Roel followed him inside the jeep. The appellant then also boarded the jeep, sitting across Roel
to "clear the matter" with him.36 When the jeep was already on its way, Roel suddenly drew a gun from his
waist. The appellant held Roel’s hand, but the gun went off while they were grappling for its possession.
He did not notice if anyone had been hit. The passengers, including Roel, ran out of the jeep.37 The
appellant saw the gun on the ground and picked it up. The appellant tried to follow Roel, but the latter
was able to board another jeep. Thereafter, the security guards arrested appellant and then turned him
over to the police.38

P/Sr. Insp. Salinas testified that he conducted a paraffin test on the appellant at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory on June 2, 2000 to determine the presence of gunpowder nitrates. The appellant tested
negative for the presence of gunpowder nitrates.39

On cross examination, P/Sr. Insp. Salinas explained that the absence of gunpowder nitrates was not
conclusive proof that person did not fire a gun. According to him, a person could remove traces
gunpowder nitrates by washing his hands.40

The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of murder in its decision of May 29, 2001, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, accused Samsom B. Villasan is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jacinto Bayron
in the sum of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The accused is, however, credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided that he will
signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.

SO ORDERED.41
The appellant directly appealed to this Court in view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the RTC
imposed. We referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in
People v. Mateo.42

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto in its May 25, 2006 Decision.43

In his brief,44 the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the appeal but modify the awarded indemnities.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

An established rule in appellate review is that the trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions
drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and
conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA. Despite the RTC and the CA’s unanimity
in the findings of fact, we nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records of this case, as the penalty of
reclusion perpetua demands no less than this kind of scrutiny.45

Gaudioso, in his July 25, 2000 testimony, positively identified the appellant as the person who shot Bayron
inside the latter’s own jeepney on June 1, 2000; he never wavered in pointing to the appellant as the
assailant. To directly quote from the records:

FISCAL VICTOR LABORTE:

Q: At about 6:30 in the evening of June 1, 2000, can you recall where you were?

GAUDIOSO QUILATON:

A: Yes, I can remember.

Q: Please tell the Court where you were at that particular date and time.

A: When I went out of my work place, I boarded a jeep.

Q: In what place did you board the jeep?

A: At the waiting shed at the Ayala, where the jeepney stop is located.

Q: Where is this Ayala situated, in what city?

A: Cebu City.

Q: Were you the only one who boarded that jeepney?

A: We were four (4), sir.

Q: I see. In what particular seat of the jeepney were you seated?

A: Front seat, sir.

Q: While you were on board that jeepney, what happened?

A: First, the driver had conversation.

Q: With whom did that driver have conversation?

A: The one who shot. [sic]

Q: So, what happened afterwards, while that man and the jeepney driver were talking with each
other?

A: First, I heard there was a request that he would be boarding a jeepney because his jeep conked
up. [sic]

Q: Who made that request?

A: That one person who shot. [sic]

Q: And what happened afterwards, after that request was made by the person to the driver?

A: He was able to board.

Q: And then what happened next?

A: Then I heard one (1) gunshot.

Q: And what did you do when you heard that gunshot?

A: I turned towards my back.

Q: And what did you see, if any, when you turned your head?

A: When I turned back, there were two (2) gunshots I heard, two (2) gunshots. [sic]

Q: You only heard two (2) gunshots?

A: Three (3), sir: the first one, and then followed by two (2) gunshots.

Q: Who caused that gunshot?

A: That person who shot the driver.

Q: Did you actually see that person shot the driver?

A: Yes.

Q: How far were you to that person who shot the driver?

A: Very near.

Q: How near?

A: Two (2) "dangaw" only, which may be loosely translated as thumb and forefinger extended, is
less than, from the thumb to the forefinger, because he was sitting at my back. [sic]

Q: Was the driver hit?

A: Yes, he was hit.

Q: In what portion of his body was the driver hit?

A: On his head.

Q: Now, if that person, whom you said you saw shot the driver, is in the courtroom now, can you
point to him?

A: Yes, I can.

Q: Please point to that person.

A: That man, third (3rd) from the left.

(Witness pointed to the person who stood up and identified himself as Samson Villasan)

xxxx

Q: Now you told the Court Mr. Witness that you were the only one seated at the front of the
jeepney, Right?

A: Yes.

Q: And three other passengers were at the back of the jeepney?

A: Yes.
 Q: And one of the three passengers at the back shot the driver?

A: That’s right, sir.

Q: Is that person whom you saw shot the driver inside the courtroom now?

A: He is around.

Q: Can you point to him again?

A: Yes.

Q: Please do.

A: That person.

(Witness pointing to the person who stood up and identified himself as Samson Villasan).

x x x x46 [Emphasis supplied]

Time and again, we have ruled that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the determination of
the trial court as this tribunal had the actual opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
binding on this Court, except when that tribunal overlooked facts and circumstances of weight and
influence that can alter the result.47

We carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found no reason to disbelieve Gaudioso’s
straightforward narration of the events surrounding Bayron’s death. Nor did we see anything on record
indicating any improper motive that could have led Gaudioso to falsely testify against the appellant. In
fact, the appellant never imputed any ill motive on Gaudioso. To reiterate, Gaudioso and the appellant
were in the same jeep during the shooting incident; there was light inside the jeep. More importantly,
Gaudioso saw the actual shooting because he was "very near" the appellant when the latter shot Bayron.
To Gaudioso, what he witnessed must have been a shocking and startling event he would not forget in a
long, long time. Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt on the positive identification of the
appellant as the assailant.

The Appellant’s Defenses

The appellant sought to exculpate himself by claiming that the shooting of Bayron was accidental; and
that he (appellant) was not sure who pulled the trigger because the gun went off when he and Roel were
grappling for its possession.

We do not find the appellant’s claim of accidental shooting believable as it contradicts the available
physical evidence provided by Dr. Cam that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds on the face and
head. Dr. Cam’s Necropsy Report corroborated by the Autopsy Report of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes
showing that the victim suffered a total of three gunshot wounds, supported the testimony of Gaudioso
that the appellant shot the victim thrice. Jose notably also testified that he heard three successive
gunshots. These pieces of evidence are clearly inconsistent with the appellant’s claim that the victim’s
shooting was accidental and that only one shot was fired.

The nature, number and location of the victim’s gunshot wounds also belie the appellant’s claim of
accidental shooting. The three wounds, all sustained in the head and the face from shots coming from the
rear, are clearly indicative of a determined effort to end the victim’s life.

The appellant nonetheless claims that his identity as the assailant was not proven with certainty as no
trace of gunpowder nitrates was found in his hand.

We do not find the appellant’s claim persuasive.

While the appellant tested negative for gunpowder nitrates, Forensic Chemist Salinas testified that a
paraffin test is not conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun. This view is fully in accord with past
findings and observations of this Court that paraffin tests, in general, are inconclusive; the negative
findings in paraffin tests do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm. 48 Our ruling in
People v. Teehankee, Jr.49 on this point is particularly instructive:

Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has "… proved extremely unreliable in use. The
only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It
cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or
nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco."
In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the
gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at
the time of firing. x x x x [Emphasis ours]

In sum, the positive, clear and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses deserve full merit in
both probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on the
appellant.

The Crime Committed

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of murder as follows:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, x x x

In convicting the appellant of murder, the courts a quo appreciated treachery. This circumstance exists
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense
that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to conclude
that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked
no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of this means
of execution.50 The essence of this qualifying circumstance is in the elements of suddenness and surprise,
and the lack of expectation that the attack would take place, thus depriving the victim of any real
opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the offender.51

The evidence in this case showed that the appellant briefly talked with Bayron as the latter sat on the
jeep’s driver’s seat preparatory to driving off. Thereafter, the appellant entered the jeep through its rear
entrance, and sat behind Bayron. Not long after Bayron started his jeep, the appellant shot him three
times, hitting him in the head and at the side of the face. This manner and mode of attack by the
appellant, to our mind, indicate treachery. The appellant’s attack came without warning, and was swift
and sudden. The appellant attacked Bayron from behind; the unsuspecting victim had no expectation of
the coming attack and was totally defenseless against it. From these facts, the appellant clearly
and purposely DENIED the victim of any real chance to defend himself and secured the commission of
the crime without risk to himself.52

In People v. Vallespin,53 we explained:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without
risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It can exist even if
the attack is frontal, if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself
against such attack. In essence, it means that the offended party was not given an opportunity to make a
defense.

No Evident Premeditation

The Information alleged that the crime was committed with evident premeditation. We do not find any
evidentiary support for this allegation.

Evident premeditation, like other qualifying circumstances, must be established by clear and positive
evidence showing that planning and preparation took place prior to the killing. For evident premeditation
to be appreciated, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to this determination; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between the resolve to kill and its execution that would have allowed the killer to
reflect on the consequences of his act.54Significantly, the prosecution did not even attempt to prove the
presence of these elements. In People v. Sison,55we held that evident premeditation should not be
appreciated where there is neither evidence of planning or preparation to kill nor of the time when the plot
was conceived.

The Proper Penalty

The crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659) with reclusion perpetua to death.

While evident premeditation was alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not adequately proven.
Hence, in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the felony, the
courts a quo correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.

Civil Liability

The grant of civil indemnity as a consequence of the crime of murder requires no proof other than the fact
of death as a result of the crime and proof of the appellant’s responsibility therefor. While the RTC and the
CA commonly awarded ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity to the murder victim’s heirs, prevailing
jurisprudence dictates an award of ₱75,000.00.56 Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity to this
extent, to be paid by the appellant to the victim’s heirs.

Moral damages are likewise mandatory in cases of murder and homicide. We award ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages to the victim’s heirs in accordance with prevailing rules.57

The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary damages since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was firmly established. When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either
qualifying or generic, an award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the
New Civil Code.58

The lower courts were correct in not awarding actual damages to the victim’s heirs because they failed to
present any supporting evidence for their claim. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove
the actual amount of loss with reasonable certainty, based on competent proof and the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party. In the absence of proof, jurisprudence dictates an award of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages for the victim’s heirs on the reasonable assumption that when death occurs, the
family of the victim incurred expenses for the wake and the funeral.59

We cannot award indemnity for loss of earning capacity to the victim’s heirs because no documentary
evidence was presented to substantiate this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented
to substantiate a claim for this type of damages. While there are exceptions to the rule, these exceptions
do not apply; although self-employed, Bayron did not earn less than the current minimum wage under
current labor laws.60

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the May 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00250 with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the awarded civil
indemnity is INCREASED to ₱75,000.00; (2) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of the victim
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of the victim ₱25,000.00
as exemplary damages; and (4) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of the victim ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116196 June 23, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
PABLO ADOVISO, defendant-appellant. 

KAPUNAN, J.:

Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur2 declaring
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Murder.

Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was originally
charged with four unidentified persons who have, however, remained at large. The information 3 charging
appellant with the Murder of Rufino Agunos under Criminal Case No. P-2079 alleges:

That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 o'clock [sic] in the evening at
Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several times with said
firearms hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which were the direct and
 immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino
Agunos.

That the crime complained of against the accused is not service connected.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except for the name of the victim, the information in Criminal Case No. P-2080 with respect to the killing
of Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations.4

Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080,
the prosecution presented their version of the events that transpired on the evening of February 18, 1990,
as follows:

The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay
Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a camalig where they stored harvested
rice. The spouses preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living area of the camalig had walls of
bamboo called salsag. This area was elevated from the ground. Three steps led down to an awning
(suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These slats were placed horizontally approximately four to six inches
apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen but another portion had a papag where the Vasquez'
grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their daughter Virginia, would sleep whenever he tended the irrigation
pump. The spouses son Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the camalig with his
own son Elmer.

At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as his wife
was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag. Anastacia
had just finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four gunshots. Emeterio then
uttered that he had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, "Why should you not be hit when
infact there are guns in front of you." Anastacia saw the "protruding edge of the gun" on the wall near the
stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated
the camalig but Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband.

The Vasquez' son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that evening,
Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking
when he noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latter's back against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio left
Rufino snoring in the papag and went to the other house. Only a minute had passed after he had gone up
when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer immediately went down the front
yard to investigate.

Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a distance of eight (8)
meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig, being shot by several persons from the outside.
Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall. Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a
large built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside
the camalig. Of Rufino's assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask. Appellant was holding a long
firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed where Rufino was sleeping.
Appellant then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his father Emeterio shout "Pino,"
(referring to his grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs carrying a gas lamp. Appellant
fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.

For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons aiming
their firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of these persons had a cover over their faces.
Three (3) of them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while two (2) others were near its door.
Elmer saw these five (5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on the papag. Although his
back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag. Elmer's grandfather was also hit on the stomach
but he managed to up the camalig. When appellant and his companion by the camalig door saw Elmer,
they fired at him then, with the three others at the ditch, escaped to the banana plantation Elmer, on the
other hand, fled towards the coconut plantation.

Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also found
Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer
that he had been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took Elmer's hand and put it on
his back. Elmer then moved Rufino "sidewise." Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his
grandfather and bandaged his stomach with diapers.

In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector Antonio
Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime with him. The police
brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol Regional Hospital. Both
Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning.

The certification5 dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the
Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-year-old Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot
wounds: at the inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh and the abdomen. The wounds at the inguinal
area and the thigh bore contusion collars. The same physician certified that Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of
age, sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical area, lumbar area, hypogastrium, anterior
aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect left arm and
anterolateral aspect of the left arm. Four (4) of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars — at the
paraumbilical area, the hypogastrium, the right forearm and the left arm.6

Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.

Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose headquarters was located in Barangay
Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio
Durabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with Francisco
Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr. and PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante
until around 11:00 p.m.

Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified
that from 7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18, 1990, he and appellant had a drinking spree at
the Tragante store. He distinctly remembered that date because it was the fiesta of Balatan.

To support his denial appellant presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of police and SPO2 Claro
Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a police certification 7 prepared by Pfc. Ramon N.
Canabe to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated "by unidentified armed men." Lopez said
that he (Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital who were then still conscious.
The victims told him that they did not know who shot them or why they were shot.

SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up investigation he conducted several days after
the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him that he (Bonifacio) "vividly saw the incident and
recognized" appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that the killings had some something to
do with land dispute between Bonifacio's parents and the Galicia family.

The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on appellant. In
Polygraph Report No. 900175, 8 Lucena opined that appellants ''polygrams revealed that there were no
specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant" to the investigation of the
crimes.

In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the police, he did not
identify appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of appellant who was a member of the
CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that he recognized appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime although he told them that he did not recognize appellant's four (4) companions.
He did not mention to Lopez and Canabe appellant's identity because he was "confused" about what had
happened in their house.

On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for two (2) counts of murder and disposing of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080 as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, joint judgment is hereby rendered:

In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding the accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of Rufino Agunos, consisting of the widow, Evelyn T.
Agunos and their four (4) children the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
Philippine Currency;

In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise finding said accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him another penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of the late EMETERIO VASQUEZ,
consisting of Anastacia Vasquez and Bonifacio Vasquez, another sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency with all the accessory penalties provided therefore
in both cases and to pay the costs in both instances.

SO ORDERED.9

Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2)
eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer
Vasquez presented an "incredible" story because it is "highly improbable" that they could have "distinctly
and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes." 10 According to
appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have
identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and
Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that
he saw his grandfather shot by appellant, could have identified appellant because of the poor lighting
coming from the gas lamp being carried by his grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by
Elmer's grandfather was "a small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette"
and the lamp inside the camalig "was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light
emanating therefrom was upwards and not sidewise." 11

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified
the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally
be accepted. 12 Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of
persons. 13 Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious. 14

In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place — the one placed inside
the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire.
Appellant's contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it
was placed inside a can is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not describing either of the gas lamps during the
incident. The defense counsel at the trial and appellant's counsel misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer
and his grandmother on that matter. Thus, Elmer testified:

ATTY. CORTES:

Q Is it not that the lamp you said placed along the door, which is already
marked as lamp, is that not this lamp was placed inside a kerosene can as
testified to by your grandmother so that the cat could not cause it to fall?

A It was placed just on the floor not inside the can. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)

For her part, Anastacia testified as follows.

ATTY. CORTES:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Because you were already about to retire, the doors and windows were
already closed, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q That you also shut down or closed the light, is that correct?

A No, sir, we even placed the kerosene lamp inside a can.

Q You said, you placed the lamp inside a can so that the light is going up, is
that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, the light was not illuminating sidewise because it was inside a can?

A When we left, I got the kerosene lamp and brought it with me.

ATTY. CORTES:

I think, the witness did not get the question right, Your Honor.

COURT:

Repeat the question.

ATTY. CORTES:

Q My question Madam Witness is, when you were about to retire?

A The lamp was placed on the floor where my husband was drinking coffee.

COURT :
 Q Who are the persons you are referring to as having left when you placed
the light inside the can?

A My son, Bonifacio, and the policemen, Your Honor, when the(y) brought
Emeterio and Rufino to the hospital. 16 (emphasis supplied).

Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a can was placed over it only after
the incident when Anastacia left with her son and the police to bring the victims to the hospital.

The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant,
considering that the slats were built four (4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of
victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities,
and the manner in which the crime is committed. 17 A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the
malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). 18 It must remembered
that appellant was not a complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10)
years 19 while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant used to
join the rabuz at the barracks. 20 Familiarity with appellant's face and appearance minimized if not erased
the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity.

Appellant's allegation that it was "improbable" for him to have committed the crimes without a mask,
unlike the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not contrary to human experience for a
person to commit a crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to them. Indeed, some may
even take pride in their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act.

Appellant also considers as a "positive sign," Bonifacio's failure to immediately identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime to the police. 21 The delay in reporting his participation to the police was however
sufficiently explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was a member of the
CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying appellant immediately
lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of the law. The failure of a
witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not
affect, much less, impair his credibility as a witness. 22 The general or common rule is that witnesses react
to a crime in different ways. 23 There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a strange,
startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react. 24

There is no merit in appellant's contention that Bonifacio had a motive in implicating him. According to
appellant, Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia family to kill Bonifacio's father who had
earlier won in a land dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk of motive on the part of
Bonifacio inasmuch as to credible witnesses had positively identified appellant as one of the participants in
the killing of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos.

Appellant's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes. 25 For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof that the defendant was not only
somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present at the place of
the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 26 Appellant did not prove the physical
impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote from Sitio Palsong where he
claimed to be when the incident happened. Both places are within the Municipality of Bula. Appellant
admitted that the distance between the two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even without any
means of transportation. 27 On the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong, Antero Esteron,
testified that the distance could be traveled in thirty-five (35) minutes by "trimobile" or private vehicle. 28

Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was not even sure where he was and
who were his companions at the time the crimes were committed. We quote the observation of the trial
court on this point:

On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of "mere conjectures
and speculations," 29 appellant argues that the negative result of the polygraph test should be given
weight to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.

A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain

physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee's
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. 30 The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a
person who lie deliberately will have rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which
will be recorded on the graph. 31 However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of
polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of establishing the guilt or innocence of one
accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that
polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or
deception. 32 The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, 33 stating that much
faith and credit should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case,
has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to him.
Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the killing
to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might make. 34 In other words, there
is treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden,
unexpected and without warning. 35 The victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault
— Rufino was sleeping and Emetario was going down the stairs when they were shot.

WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged
with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24,
1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:

That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the first week of April
1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
 this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have (sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a
woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving
rational and legal consent. 1

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and due trial ensued.

The facts as established by evidence are as follows:

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto
Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and
dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself by motions.

Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security men were
assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno
Tumimpad.

The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and wife and daughter
Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in
Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the
lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the four security men and the other by
Alexander Salcedo and his wife.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her to a
doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve.
Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.

The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told
her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to Regina Hospital. Sandra was
able to relieve herself the following day but still remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath
in spite of scoldings from her mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.

Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the examining
physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The result
revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her daughter was
pregnant and so she brought Sandra to Madonna and Child Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and
OB-GYNE Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound examination. The results
were positive. The fetus' gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-sound examination
at the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed that she
was indeed pregnant. 5

On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of
the complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.

During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different persons were laid on
the table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures
of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out of the investigation room to a
police line-up of ten people, including Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to
her assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.8

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa
Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually molested her. 9

Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested her. Sandra revealed that
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was
raped. First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her panty was taken off. A push and pull
movement followed. 10Celsa testified that she was present when the victim demonstrated how she was
sexually abused by the two accused, including the way her nipples were touched saying "dito hawak," and
holding her breasts to emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty, uttering
at the same time "hubad panty."

Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped her
and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to her. 11 She once again demonstrated how
she was sexually abused. She held her two thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying,
"panty" and then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if she were sucking. She also touched her
private organ and made a push and pull movement. 12

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood
Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo
type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant type "O".

Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was impossible for them to have
committed the crime of rape.

After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted
the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type of blood with
(sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child Jacob Salcedo is 
type "O".

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and
pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime,
said accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00;
and to suffer the other accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.

On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED from the charge.

SO ORDERED. 13

Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:

1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of committing the offense
charged without detection.

2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant base on major blood grouping
test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime of rape because
most of the time he and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on inspection tours
while the victim was always in the company of her mother. He further contends that it was likewise
impossible for Sandra, if she had really been molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a
virgin. As if adding insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's brother, Cristopher
Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her.

We are not convinced.

It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection tours but sometimes they were
left behind and would play pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While
Sandra was always with her mother, there were times when she was left alone in the house with the
accused. 14

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:

Q How many security men remain if you can recall when your husband
reported for work?

A Two (2).

Q Who were these security men who remained?

A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.

Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and Colaljo?

A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and sometime they used to go
with my husband to the office.

Q Every time when your husband is out what they do while they were (sic) at
the headquarter?
 A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were playing at the porch with my
daughter Sandra playing pingpong and sometime they were listening music.

Q Where did they play usually take place?

A Living room. 15

xxx xxx xxx

Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you were at the
headquarters you were able to do your choirs, (sic) doing laundry jobs in the
second storey of your house. Do you know where is your daughter Sandra at
that time?

A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.

Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to stay?

A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the living room.

Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?

A Moreno and Prieto.

Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with your daughter?

A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards. 16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out
accused-appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons shown to
her. Second, at the police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again
unerringly pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped her. Third, in open court,
Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.

The following is the victim's own testimony:

PROS. RAMOS:

Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what Moreno and
Ruel did to you?

RECORD:

The witness when she stood up held both her thighs (sic) with her two hand
(sic) down to her sexual organ saying a word "panty" and she placed her
hand on her breast and did something as if sucking and held her private part
(sic) and did a push and pull movement and she cried.

Q When you said that there was a push and pull movement of the body and
when this was being done did you feel pain?

A Yes pain.

Q What part of your body is painful?

RECORD:

The witness touching her private parts.

Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?

A Yes.

Q Where did you see these blood?

RECORD:

The witness touching her private parts.

Q When this push and pull movement was being made, did you see a man's
organ?

A Yes sir.

Q Where did you see this male organ?

A Witness touching her private part.

Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty?

A Moreno and Ruel.

Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?

A Yes.

Q Did you see his sex organ?

A The witness touching her private parts.

Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken (sic) off his pants?

A Yes.

Q Did you see his sex organ?

A Yes, witness again touching her private part.

Q Both of them?

A Yes.

Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your panty?

A Moreno.

Q In your house?

A Yes.

Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your panty?

A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.

Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the room?

A In the room.

Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now, can you point to
them?

A Yes.

Q Will you please point to them?

PROS. RAMOS:

May we request the accused to stand up your honor?

RECORD:

Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the courtroom.

PROS. RAMOS:

Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno Tumimpad)?

 A Moreno.

RECORD:

The witness pointing to a certain person who is standing and when asked
what is his name, he readily answered that he is Moreno Tumimpad.

PROS. RAMOS:

Who is that person standing besides Moreno?

A Joel.

PROS. RAMOS:

If your honor please, she could not pronounced (sic) well the word Ruel but
the way she called this name is Joel which refers to the same person who is
one of the accused in this case. 17

Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra demonstrated to her how she was
ravished by the two accused, thus:

Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to
how she was abused?

A By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.

Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did Sandra
Salcedo was abused as narrated or demonstrated to you by Sandra Salcedo?

A According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was hugged and
then the panty was taken off and making a push and pull movement (witness
demonstration by holding her thigh)?

Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you how she was
abused. What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had told you any more
matter?

A She did not say anything more.

Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything else. What
happened next?

A Then it was Celsa who asked her.

Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo?

A I was just beside her.

Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did the
questioning, did you hear the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra
Salcedo?

A Yes.

Q And what was the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?

A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other things that these two had
done to her?

Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to what was done to her?

A By way of talking and action.

Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?

A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.

 Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as related by her to Celsa
through words and action?

RECORD:

The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic) nipple going down to her thigh.

Q What else had transpired next?

A No more.

Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of accused Moreno

Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you observed whose names was usually
mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?

A She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.

Q And what happened after that?

A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told us.

Q When did you tell your mother-in- law about what Sandra Salcedo told you
and Celsa?

A That very evening sir. 18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was based on the medical
finding that he and the victim have the same blood type "O".

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim herself
and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one
of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child. As held by this Court
in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:

Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother,
the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is.
Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations
of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-
paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of
the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as
have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the
results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of
paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178830               July 14, 2008

ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner, 
vs.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY
ROMULO L. NERI, and the NEDA-INVESTMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented by DOTC SECRETARY
LEANDRO MENDOZA, including the COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, headed by its Chairman, RAMON P. SALES, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE,
BIDS AND AWARDS FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT), headed
by DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELMER A. SONEJA as Chairman, and the TECHNICAL WORKING
GROUP FOR ICT, AND DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO, AND ALL OTHER
OPERATING UNITS OF THE DOTC FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY,
and ZTE CORPORATION, AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR
BEHALF, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179317

AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., and NATHANIEL SAUZ, Petitioners, 

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA,
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ASSISTANT
SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO III, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179613

GALELEO P. ANGELES, VICENTE C. ANGELES, JOB FLORANTE L. CASTILLO, TRINI ANNE G.

NIEVA, ROY ALLAN T. ARELLANO, CARLO MAGNO M. REONAL, ETHEL B. REGADIO, RAENAN B.
MALIG, AND VINALYN M. POTOT, TOGETHER WITH LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (LATIGO), Petitioners, 
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented by DOTC
SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, and ZHONG XING EQUIPMENT (ZTE) COMPANY, LTD., AND
ANY AND ALL PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, R.T., J.:

Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion1 dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which states:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement dated October 24,
2007, the Legal Service of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it
of the Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project
(see attachment2). That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to resolve.
WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully pray that the present petitions be DISMISSED.

On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSG’s manifestation and motion and required petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 178830, 179317, and 179613 to comment.

On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and
Opposition,3opposing the aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:

66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Chinese President Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October 2007
Manifestation and Motion – thus depriving petitioners of the opportunity to comment thereon – a
mere verbally requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that the ZTE-
DOTC NBN deal has been permanently scrapped.

67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving, especially without the Notes of
the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to
support its allegations or other proof of the supposed decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN
deal. Public respondents can certainly do better than that.4

Petitioner Suplico further argues that:

79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot (which
is vehemently denied), this Honorable Court, consistent with well-entrenched jurisprudence, may
still take cognizance thereof.5

Petitioner Suplico cites this Court’s rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,6 Rufino v. Endriga,7 and Alunan III v.
Mirasol8that despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on
the merits due to the Court’s symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding
and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.

On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No.
179317, also filed their comment expressing their sentiments, thus:

3. First of all, the present administration has never been known for candor. The present
administration has a very nasty habit of not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another.
 4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring themselves to feel even a bit
reassured that the government, in the event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not
backtrack, re-transact, or even resurrect the now infamous NBN-ZTE transaction. This is especially
relevant since what was attached to the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion was a mere one (1) page
written communication sent by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
the OSG, allegedly relaying that the Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the
NBN project "x x x due to several reasons and constraints."

Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues
raised in the petition, which among others, included the President’s use of the power to borrow, i.e., to
enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent
mootness.

On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents’ reply to petitioners’ comments on
its manifestation and motion.

On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents’ reply, reiterating their position that for a court to exercise
its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice.9

Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the
government or public interest. Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an executive agreement,
respondents stress that it remained in the negotiation stage. The conditions precedent10 for the agreement
to become effective have not yet been complied with.

Respondents further oppose petitioners’ claim of the right to information, which they contend is not an
absolute right. They contend that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question which
the judicial branch of government would generally hesitate to pass upon.

On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights
from the Notes of Meeting between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao,
held in XI Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the Notes of Meeting, the Philippine
Government conveyed its decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project due
to several constraints. The same Notes likewise contained President Hu Jintao’s expression of
understanding of the Philippine Government decision.

We resolve to grant the motion.

Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual
prayers in each of the three (3) consolidated petitions are:

G.R. No. 178830

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:

1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court, issue forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining respondents, their
subordinates, agents, representatives and any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing,
entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;

2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as
agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;

3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule
56 of the revised Rules of Court; and,

4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT
contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.11 (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 179317

WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz respectfully pray as follows:

A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned upon the posting of a bond in such
amount as the Honorable Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
 injunction be issued directing the Department of Transportation and Communication, the
Commission on Information and Communications Technology, all other government agencies and
instrumentalities, their officers, employees, and/or other persons acting for and on their behalf to
desist during the pendency of the instant Petition for Mandamus from entering into any other
agreements and from commencing with any kind, sort, or specie of activity in connection with the
National Broadband Network Project;

B. the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and,

C. after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be rendered directing respondents to
allow herein petitioners access to all agreements entered into with the Government of China, the
ZTE Corporation, and/or other entities, government instrumentalities, and/or individuals with
regard to the National Broadband Network Project.12 (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 179613

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:

1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as
agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;

2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule
56 of the Revised Rules of Court;

3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent
ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to
preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy;

4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding
procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to
undertake the construction of the national broadband network.13 (Emphasis supplied)

On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO14 in G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from
"pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal
and Project" as prayed for. Pertinent parts of the said Order read:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled case, to
wit:

"G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development Authority, represented by NEDA
Secretary Romulo L. Neri, and the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee, Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, including
the Commission on Information and Communications Technology, headed by its Chairman, Ramon P.
Sales, The Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications Technology
Committee (ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The Technical
Working Group for ICT, and DOTC Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other Operating Units of
the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, and ZTE Corporation, Amsterdam Holdings,
Inc., and ARESCOM, Inc.—Acting on the instant petition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to

xxxx

(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, enjoining the (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment
Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on
Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for
Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and
all other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE
Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on
their behalf from ‘pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC
Broadband Deal and Project’ as prayed for."

NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondents (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination
Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on Information and
Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and
Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii)
Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf are
hereby ENJOINED from "pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the
ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project" as prayed for.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished certified true copies of the
"contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation." It appears that
during one of the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the supply contract 16 were readily made
available to petitioners.17Evidently, the said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held on
October 2, 2007 in China, informed China’s President Hu Jintao that the Philippine Government had
decided not to continue with the ZTE-National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several
reasons and constraints, there is no doubt that all the other principal prayers in the three petitions (to
annul, set aside, and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN Project) had also become moot.

Contrary to petitioners’ contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive
branch on the Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving,
hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official act of the
President of the Philippines.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official
acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further
provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without
introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the
proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as
an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without
need of evidence.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,18 We took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.

In Estrada v. Desierto,19 the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the
petition.

Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the
executive officials20 of informing this Court of the government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN
Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. Other than
petitioner AHI’s unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard
this disputable presumption in the present instance.

Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciary’s role
of strengthening political stability indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on
issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than good
to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic
issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further discussed, the
legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or
make any pronouncement.

Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado.

In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,21 the lone issue tackled by the Court of
Appeals (CA) was whether the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and upholding,
respectively, the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ enjoined the execution of the questioned
agreements between Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The
implementation of the agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the SICD and the SEC en
banc which, however, were nullified by the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court
praying for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc.
However, before the matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating table. Its
withdrawal had thwarted the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether
the implementation of said agreements should be enjoined became no longer necessary.

Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited Republic Telecommunications.
There We held, thus:

Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision nullifying the orders of the
SEC en banc and the SICD, has been rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on the
correctness of the questioned orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD will be indulging in a theoretical
exercise that has no practical worth in view of the supervening event.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case
or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or
value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of injunction to prevent the
concerned parties from pushing through with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm,
Inc. is no longer interested in pursuing the contracts, there is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court of Appeals’ Decision had the
effect of overruling the Court’s Resolution dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the
appellate court.

A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of
judicial review. The exercise of the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies.
Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems.

While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered
those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those
cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.

In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the
implementation of the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar
only to the transactions and parties involved in this controversy. Except for the determination of whether
petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this
petition do not call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory
provision.22

Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush
aside mootness, the Court cannot completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the
three petitions involves settling factual issues which definitely requires reception of evidence. There is not
an iota of doubt that this may not be done by this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated
often enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.

Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.

Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830,23 correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico
filed his petition directly with this Court, without prior factual findings made by any lower court, a
determination of pertinent and relevant facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some of these factual issues, to
wit:

(1) Whether an executive agreement has been reached between the Philippine and Chinese
governments over the NBN Project;

(2) Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the DOTC, and ZTE International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the executive agreement;

(3) Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually been executed;

(4) Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN Project be completed under a Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Scheme;
 (5) Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements for an unsolicited proposal under the
BOT Law;

(6) Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked public finds for disbursement under
the ZTE Supply Contract; and

(7) Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied under the ZTE Supply Contract is more
extensive than that under the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.24

Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior
determination of facts before pertinent legal issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.

In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal
and compel public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement
of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.

In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for
the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as
well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to
law and to public policy. They also ask the Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply with
pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public
bidding for said contract to undertake the construction of the national broadband network.

It is simply impossible for this Court "to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal"
without any evidence to support a prior factual finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead to
such annulment order. For sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for this factual matter to be
threshed out.

Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order "public respondents to
forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and
public bidding for the NBN contract."25 It would be too presumptuous on the part of the Court to
summarily compel public respondents to comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government infrastructure projects without any factual basis or prior determination of very particular
violations committed by specific government officials of the executive branch. For the Court to do so would
amount to a breach of the norms of comity among co-equal branches of government. A perceived error
cannot be corrected by committing another error. Without proper evidence, the Court cannot just presume
that the executive did not comply with procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall into this
trap, it would plainly commit grave error itself.

Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa
pangongontrata ng pamahalaan kung wala pang pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang paglabag
dito.

Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision
which requires a judicial finding of facts.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband Network Project should be declared
null and void. The foregoing threefold reasons would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed
colleague.

The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course because of
mootness and because their resolution requires reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original
petition brought before the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on September 11, 2007 is DISSOLVED. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, 
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a
premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered
essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after
midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly
learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1

Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to
know the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in
the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the
legal principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from
beginning to end. 2

In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and
Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:

1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases
(docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the
undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against
the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of
Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;

2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August
11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the
announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the
government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the
Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;

3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting
of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national
circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported
by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction,
and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not
to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction;"

4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank
Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially
issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance
announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign
exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no
way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and
whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending
criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations
previously issued on the matter;

5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice
purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President
had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of
dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take
judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text
published as required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of
the fundamental precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his
gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet
come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published
and ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed
to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave Misconduct;

6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment
of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board
resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the
Government of its right to due process;

7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be
gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled
continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having started
presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10,
21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all
notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly
exposing his bias and partiality; and

8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting
for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order
suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB)
circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange
controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only
on the basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the
President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs.
Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18,
1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the
President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment
by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the
consequence of their failures to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of
the President which had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353
specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318,
whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the
accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that
assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have
been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake
committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can
reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were
reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how
much more for the lower courts?"

He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as
he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat'
(to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged
by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic)
does not affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB
Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him
to take judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that
the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of
dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the
President announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in
the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends
to lift," foreign exchange controls.

Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice,
violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first
instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing
of the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately
resolve a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for
speedy disposition of cases.

In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section
16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section
111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular,
in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No.
1353, pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof.
Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution
the opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against
accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad
faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.

On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and
recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.

The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:

These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265,
as amended.

The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the
other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore
the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced as against Mrs.
Marcos.

His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the
government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central
 Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same
date). The Court has to give full confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the
Executive Department, specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts are
charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, without introduction
of proof, the announcement published in at least the two newspapers cited above which are
reputable and of national circulation.

Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People
vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61
Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal law without re-enactment
extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old law and if
the law repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of
the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the
old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws
and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control
Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is
considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to
the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since
according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu
proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to do so
opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.

This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed
to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was
ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of
preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to
92-101969.

In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:

The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for
the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on
the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the President has lifted all foreign exchange
restrictions.

The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can
become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is
otherwise provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353,
series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in
the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila
Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect
on September 2 . . . .

Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular
No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under
which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . .
.

xxx xxx xxx

A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the
regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a
provision that with respect to violations of former regulations that are the subject of
pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations existing at the
time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the
criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by
the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his
resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not speculation.

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. 13

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court,
and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. 18

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account
which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the
supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of
common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation
which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial
notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not
yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of
a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order
of dismissal was issued.

II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign
exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade
transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:

Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB
Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of
this Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on
non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by
this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall
not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned,
it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.

Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318,
whereas the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he
insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the
saving clause in the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which
therefore warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.

Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on
non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations
of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as
such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions
or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms
of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the
accused in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of
violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took
effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite
of the existence of Circular No. 1353.

Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars
involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially
similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:
 Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028,
including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of
Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as
such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such
pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action
accrued shall govern.

It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular
No. 960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which
were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to
Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.

III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing
it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that
a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as
to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge
should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is
more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have
confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor
is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that
belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21

Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should
show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence
in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should
be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government
of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he
seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the
general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond
the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of
dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.

The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation
lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is
beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be
well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is
inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an
established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his
indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-
times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing
premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.

IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity
to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial
of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license
for abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a
deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26

The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to
dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution
inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how
carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a
result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to
show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively
deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own
admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately
refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action,
respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the President
was talking 'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still
then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the
minutest legal scrutiny.

In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give
the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not
be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the
conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." 29 At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright
dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.

V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially
affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering
that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have
spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of
the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not
set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we
reiterate what we have heretofore declared:

It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting
aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its
right to due process is thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises
a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where
the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30

It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or
an answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy
invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly
unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a
record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said
dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.

VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a
very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31

In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no
substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any
legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation
given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of
respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent
unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:

On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order
dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper
reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting the official
publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must
be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of
"all foreign exchange controls" was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has
lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report
of the same date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the
President made the announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in
the announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting
how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."

Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange

transactions, there was no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the
Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of laws and administrative rules affecting
 the public is to inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs and how they will
conform to the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls,
there is no need to await publication. It would have been different if the circular that in
effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the
cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the provisions of said
Circular No. 960.

The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the
cases but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the
President's announcement of the lifting of controls was stated in the present perfect tense
(Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the
announcement did not say that the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange
restrictions but instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange
controls," and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday lifted
the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last
remaining exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.

The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign
exchange regulations. The President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central
Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board
which decides the policies of the Central Bank.

No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10,

published the following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do
not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my Order, and
the third day after report of said order was published) and after the President said on
August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign
exchange rules have nullified government cases against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters
that the charges against the widow of former President Marcos "have become moot and
academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out of the
country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be
drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman
Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised
by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the
Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court
and such a position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."

I will elaborate on two points:

1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August
11, 1992, newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have
relied on the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the President
was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no one
bothered to advise the President to correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a
few hours after the President had made another announcement as to the charges against
Imelda Marcos having been rendered moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to
do, and is not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore
behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters
of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls,
designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing
the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their
failing to me, who only acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which had
become of public knowledge.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed
with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is,
accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that
respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency
thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.

In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB
Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law
and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount
seized, on the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure.
Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence
and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross
ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an
accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating
judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34

Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and
quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference
to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities. 35

Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of
the law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the
name of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36

Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all
the accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof
of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly
rendering an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to
carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38

Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order,
or continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated
February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight
Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein
private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a
contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January
20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years
effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a flight,
committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p.
307, Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft
scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was
investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed and
passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the
Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-
300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17)
expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n.,
July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its
excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-
300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17
excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of
the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982
and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-
42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-
month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention.
Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p.
25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal
together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code"
and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract
and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should
apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in a
complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor
benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the
 field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's
dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls
under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its
motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from
instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against
defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of —

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time
of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid;

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time
of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE
RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED
PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law,
thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws
apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do
not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the
Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore,
the Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court.5 On
this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further
the issue of jurisdiction.6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the
Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an
employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided
for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where
prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal
dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed
again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is
Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

xxx     xxx     xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In
illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to
claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money claims
specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an employee-
employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money
claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes
are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail."
(Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non
derogant.11

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's
action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle
only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription period at
three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim
deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of
Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of
prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the
same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate
court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We
agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the
same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was
bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual
termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such
provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.
 xxx     xxx     xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the Agreement, as
he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's
employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots)
Association, the signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped
from questioning the legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting
in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where
the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down
services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-
300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300
pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination
from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be
heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to
respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No.
34476 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160236               October 16, 2009

"G" HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, 
vs.
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION Local 103 (NAMAWU); SHERIFFS RICHARD H.
APROSTA and ALBERTO MUNOZ, all acting Sheriffs; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
Region VI, Bacolod District Office, Bacolod City, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
October 14, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75322.

The Facts

The petitioner, "G" Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of
owning and holding shares of stock of different companies.2 It was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 1992. Private respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union
Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Maricalum
Mining Corporation (MMC),3 an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay, Negros
Occidental.4

MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) on October 19, 1984, on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation’s assets. MMC started its commercial operations in August 1985. Later, DBP and PNB
transferred it to the National Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-
performing asset.5

On October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement 6 executed between GHI and Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMC’s shares and financial
claims.7 These financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes8 issued by MMC in favor of GHI
totaling ₱500M and secured by mortgages over MMC’s properties. The notes, which were similarly worded
except for their amounts, read as follows:

PROMISSORY NOTE

AMOUNT - Php114,715,360.00 [Php186,550,560.00 in the second

note, and Php248,734,080.00 in the
third note.]

MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES, October 2, 1992

For Value Received, MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION (MMC) with postal address at 4th Floor, Manila
Memorial Park Bldg., 2283 Pasong Tamo Extension, Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, hereby promises to
pay "G" HOLDINGS, INC., at its office at Phimco Compound, F. Manalo Street, Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila, the
amount of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY (Php114,715,360.00) ["PESOS ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND FIFE HUNDRED AND SIXTY (Php186,550,560.00)" in the second note, and "PESOS TWO
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND AND EIGHTY
(Php248,734,080.00)" in the third note], PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, on or before October 2, 2002. Interest
shall accrue on the amount of this Note at a rate per annum equal to the interest of 90-day Treasury Bills
prevailing on the Friday preceding the maturity date of every calendar quarter.

As collateral security, MMC hereby establishes and constitutes in favor of "G" HOLDINGS, INC., its
successors and/or assigns:

1. A mortgage over certain parcels of land, more particularly listed and described in the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction sale conducted
pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135, a copy of which certificate of sale is hereto attached as
Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;

2. A chattel mortgage over assets and personal properties more particularly listed and described in
the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff
of Negros Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction
conducted pursuant to the provisions of Act 1508, a copy of which Certificate of Sale is hereto
attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof.

3. Mortgages over assets listed in APT Specific Catalogue GC-031 for MMC, a copy of which
Catalogue is hereby made an integral part hereof by way of reference, as well as assets presently
 in use by MMC but which are not listed or included in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and shall include
all assets that may hereinafter be acquired by MMC.

MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION

(Maker)

x x x x9

Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full satisfaction of the stipulated down
payment, GHI immediately took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took full control
of the management and operation of MMC.10

Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute (refusal to bargain collectively and
unfair labor practice) arose between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice of strike.11 Then Labor Secretary, now Associate
Justice of this Court, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, later assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in
favor of NAMAWU. In his July 30, 1997 Order in OS-AJ-10-96-014 (Quisumbing Order), Secretary
Quisumbing declared that the lay-off (of workers) implemented on May 7, 1996 and October 7, 1996 was
illegal and that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off
workers, with payment of full backwages and benefits, and directed the execution of a new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of the previous CBA providing for an
annual increase in the workers’ daily wage.12 In two separate cases─G.R. Nos. 133519 and 138996─filed
with this Court, we sustained the validity of the Quisumbing Order, which became final and executory on
January 26, 2000.13

On May 11, 2001, then Acting Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary, now also an
Associate Justice of this Court, Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a partial
writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises for the
execution of the same.14 Much later, in 2006, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 157696-97, entitled Maricalum
Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU,15affirmed the propriety of the issuance of the Brion Writ.

The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMC’s resident manager resisted its enforcement. 16 On
motion of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance of the July 18, 2002
Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ). 17 On October 11, 2002, the respondent
acting sheriffs, the members of the union, and several armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and
levied on the properties of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay, Negros Occidental.18

On October 14, 2002, GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 1127 for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriff’s Levy on Properties.19 GHI
contended that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage,
dated September 5, 199620 executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the aforesaid ₱550M promissory
notes; that this deed was registered on February 24, 2000; 21 and that the mortgaged properties were
already extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest bidder on December 3, 2001,
as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated December 4, 2001.22

The trial court issued ex parte a TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the hearing on the application for a
writ of injunction.23 On October 17, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Injunction
(issued on October 18, 2002)24 enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further enforcing the Sto. Tomas Writ and
from conducting any public sale of the levied-on properties, subject to GHI’s posting of a ₱5M bond.25

Resolving, among others, NAMAWU’s separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and
for the dismissal of the case, the RTC issued its December 4, 2002 Omnibus Order, 26 the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent NAMAWU Local 103’s Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 23, 2002 for the reconsideration of the Order of this Court directing the issuance of Writ of
Injunction prayed for by petitioner and the Order dated October 18, 2002 approving petitioner’s Injunction
Bond in the amount of ₱5,000,000.00 is hereby DENIED.

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as embodied in its Opposition to Extension of Temporary Restraining

Order and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Motion to Dismiss and Suspend Period to File
Answer dated October 15, 2002 is likewise DENIED.

Petitioner’s Urgent Motion for the return of the levied firearms is GRANTED. Pursuant thereto, respondent
sheriffs are ordered to return the levied firearms and handguns to the petitioner provided the latter puts
[up] a bond in the amount of ₱332,200.00.

Respondent’s lawyer, Atty. Jose Lapak, is strictly warned not to resort again to disrespectful and
contemptuous language in his pleadings, otherwise, the same shall be dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.27

Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the October 17, 18
and December 4, 2002 orders of the RTC.28

After due proceedings, on October 14, 2003, the appellate court rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC
issuances and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ. The CA ruled, among others, that
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent; that it was executed
two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24,
2000, immediately after the Court affirmed with finality the Quisumbing Order. The CA also found that the
certificates of title to MMC’s real properties did not contain any annotation of a mortgage lien, and,
suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to protect its right as a
mortgagee of virtually all the properties of MMC.29

The CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to
prevent the satisfaction of the judgment against MMC. It noted that the foreclosure proceedings were
initiated in July 2001, shortly after the issuance of the Brion Writ; and, more importantly, the basis for the
extrajudicial foreclosure was not the failure of MMC to pay the mortgage debt, but its failure "to satisfy
any money judgment against it rendered by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, in favor of any
person, firm or entity, without any legal ground or reason."30 Further, the CA pierced the veil of corporate
fiction of the two corporations.31 The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. The October 17, 2002 and
the December 4, 2002 Order of the RTC, Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess or without authority. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by the said court is lifted, and the DOLE Sheriff is directed to immediately enforce the
Writ of Execution issued by the Department of Labor and Employment in the case "In re: Labor Dispute in
Maricalum Mining Corporation" docketed as OS-AJ-10-96-01 (NCMB-RB6-08-96).32

The Issues

Dissatisfied, GHI elevated the case to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS A PARTY TO THE LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN NAMAWU AND MMC.

II

WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PERTINENT DECISION OR ORDER IN THE SAID
LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN MMC AND NAMAWU MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST GHI, THERE IS ALREADY A
FINAL DEETERMINATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN SAID LABOR
DISPUTE CONSIDERING THE PENDENCY OF G.R. NOS. 157696-97.

III

WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES UNLAWFULLY GARNISHED BY
RESPONDENTS SHERIFFS.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE HENRY D. ARLES CORRECTLY ISSUED A WRIT OF INJUNCTION
AGAINST THE UNLAWFUL EXECUTIOIN ON GHI’S PROPERTIES.

WHETHER OR NOT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF REAL AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BETWEEN MMC AND GHI MAY BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.

VI

WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE VALIDITY OF THE SAID REAL AND CHATTEL
MORTGAGE MAY BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED, THE SAID MORTGAGE IS SHAM, FICTITIOUS AND
FRAUDULENT.

VII

WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS A DISTINCT AND SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY FROM MMC.
 VIII

WHETHER OR NOT GHI CAN BE PREVENTED THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF A RESTRAINING ORDER OR
INJUNCTION FROM TAKING POSSESSION OR BE DISPOSSESSED OF ASSETS PURCHASED BY IT FROM
APT.33

Stripped of non-essentials, the core issue is whether, given the factual circumstances obtaining, the RTC
properly issued the writ of injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Sto. Tomas Writ. The resolution of
this principal issue, however, will necessitate a ruling on the following key and interrelated questions:

1. Whether the mortgage of the MMC’s properties to GHI was a sham;

2. Whether there was an effective levy by the DOLE upon the MMC’s real and personal properties;
and

3. Whether it was proper for the CA to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between MMC and GHI.

Our Ruling

Before we delve into an extended discussion of the foregoing issues, it is essential to take judicial
cognizance of cases intimately linked to the present controversy which had earlier been elevated to and
decided by this Court.

Judicial Notice.

Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo
D. Brion and NAMAWU,34 in which we upheld the right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor
claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of the
Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. "G" Holdings, Inc.,35 in which GHI was
recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of
the company notes accompanying the said purchase. These company notes, consisting of three (3)
Promissory Notes, were part of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations "establishing
and constituting in favor of GHI" mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties. The stipulations
were subsequently formalized in a separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed was registered on February 4, 2000.36

We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts
below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat, these decisions
respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims 37 and affirm the right of GHI to its financial
and mortgage claims over the real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The
assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar.
Thus, we find it timely to reiterate that: "courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable
to the case under consideration."38

However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the challenged writ of
injunction depends on the validity of the third party’s (GHI’s) claim of ownership over the property subject
of the writ of execution issued by the labor department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the
CA decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute, whose
properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001.39

In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid, as
they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid ownership
claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban v. Espina, 40 we held that "in some
instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected
to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as
to invoke a rule of judicial notice." The two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such
character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.

Having recognized these crucial Court rulings, situating the facts in proper perspective, we now proceed to
resolve the questions identified above.

The mortgage was not a sham.

Republic etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc. acknowledged the existence of the Purchase and Sale Agreement
between the APT and the GHI, and recounts the facts attendant to that transaction, as follows:

The series of negotiations between the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the APT as its
trustee, and "G" Holdings culminated in the execution of a purchase and sale agreement on October 2,
1992. Under the agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver 90% of the entire issued and
outstanding shares of MMC, as well as its company notes, to "G" Holdings in consideration of the
purchase price of ₱673,161,280. It also provided for a down payment of ₱98,704,000 with the balance
divided into four tranches payable in installment over a period of ten years."41

The "company notes" mentioned therein were actually the very same three (3) Promissory Notes
amounting to ₱550M, issued by MMC in favor of GHI. As already adverted to above, these notes uniformly
contained stipulations "establishing and constituting" mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties.

It may be remembered that APT acquired the MMC from the PNB and the DBP. Then, in compliance with
its mandate to privatize government assets, APT sold the aforesaid MMC shares and notes to GHI. To
repeat, this Court has recognized this Purchase and Sale Agreement in Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc.

The participation of the Government, through APT, in this transaction is significant. Because the
Government had actively negotiated and, eventually, executed the agreement, then the transaction is
imbued with an aura of official authority, giving rise to the presumption of regularity in its execution. This
presumption would cover all related transactional acts and documents needed to consummate the
privatization sale, inclusive of the Promissory Notes. It is obvious, then, that the Government, through
APT, consented to the "establishment and constitution" of the mortgages on the assets of MMC in favor of
GHI, as provided in the notes. Accordingly, the notes (and the stipulations therein) enjoy the benefit of
the same presumption of regularity accorded to government actions. Given the Government consent
thereto, and clothed with the presumption of regularity, the mortgages cannot be characterized as sham,
fictitious or fraudulent.

Indeed, as mentioned above, the three (3) Promissory Notes, executed on October 2, 1992, "established
and constituted" in favor of GHI the following mortgages:

1. A mortgage over certain parcels of land, more particularly listed and described in the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction sale conducted
pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135, a copy of which certificate of sale is hereto attached as
Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;

2. A chattel mortgage over assets and personal properties more particularly listed and described in
the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff
of Negros Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction
conducted pursuant to the provision of Act 1508, a copy of which Certificate of Sale is hereto
attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof.

3. Mortgages over assets listed in APT Specific catalogue GC-031 for MMC, a copy of which
Catalogue is hereby made an integral part hereof by way of reference, as well as assets presently
in use by MMC but which are not listed or included in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and shall include
all assets that may hereinafter be acquired by MMC.42

It is difficult to conceive that these mortgages, already existing in 1992, almost four (4) years before
NAMAWU filed its notice of strike, were a "fictitious" arrangement intended to defraud NAMAWU. After all,
they were agreed upon long before the seeds of the labor dispute germinated.

While it is true that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was executed only on September 5,
1996, it is beyond cavil that this formal document of mortgage was merely a derivative of the original
mortgage stipulations contained in the Promissory Notes of October 2, 1992. The execution of this Deed in
1996 does not detract from, but instead reinforces, the manifest intention of the parties to "establish and
constitute" the mortgages on MMC’s real and personal properties.

Apparently, the move to execute a formal document denominated as the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage came about after the decision of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 95-76132 became final in
mid-1996. This conclusion surfaces when we consider the genesis of Civil Case No. 95-76132 and
subsequent incidents thereto, as narrated in Republic, etc. v. "G" Holdings, Inc., viz:

Subsequently, a disagreement on the matter of when installment payments should commence arose
between the parties. The Republic claimed that it should be on the seventh month from the signing of the
agreement while "G" Holdings insisted that it should begin seven months after the fulfillment of the closing
conditions.

Unable to settle the issue, "G" Holdings filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, against the Republic to compel it to close the sale in accordance
with the purchase and sale agreement. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-76132.

During the pre-trial, the respective counsels of the parties manifested that the issue involved in the case
was one of law and submitted the case for decision. On June 11, 1996, the trial court rendered its
decision. It ruled in favor of "G" Holdings and held:
"In line with the foregoing, this Court having been convinced that the Purchase and Sale Agreement is
indeed subject to the final closing conditions prescribed by Stipulation No. 5.02 and conformably to Rule
39, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, accordingly orders that the Asset Privatization Trust execute
the corresponding Document of Transfer of the subject shares and financial notes and cause
the actual delivery of subject shares and notes to "G" Holdings, Inc., within a period of thirty
(30) days from receipt of this Decision, and after "G" Holdings Inc., shall have paid in full the entire
balance, at its present value of ₱241,702,122.86, computed pursuant to the prepayment provisions of the
Agreement. Plaintiff shall pay the balance simultaneously with the delivery of the Deed of Transfer and
actual delivery of the shares and notes.

SO ORDERED."

The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the Republic on June 28, 1996. Contrary to the
rules of procedure, however, the notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals (CA), not with the
trial court which rendered the judgment appealed from.

No other judicial remedy was resorted to until July 2, 1999 when the Republic, through the APT, filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. It claimed that the decision should be annulled on the
ground of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. x x x

Finding that the grounds necessary for the annulment of judgment were inexistent, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. x x x x43

With the RTC decision having become final owing to the failure of the Republic to perfect an appeal, it may
have become necessary to execute the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996,
in order to enforce the trial court’s decision of June 11, 1996. This appears to be the most plausible
explanation for the execution of the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage only in September 1996.
Even as the parties had already validly constituted the mortgages in 1992, as explicitly provided in the
Promissory Notes, a specific deed of mortgage in a separate document may have been deemed necessary
for registration purposes. Obviously, this explanation is more logical and more sensible than the strained
conjecture that the mortgage was executed on September 5, 1996 only for the purpose of defrauding
NAMAWU.

It is undeniable that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was formally documented two weeks
after NAMAWU filed its notice of strike against MMC on August 23, 1996. However, this fact alone cannot
give rise to an adverse inference for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the mortgages had already
been "established and constituted" as early as October 2, 1992 in the Promissory Notes, showing the clear
intent of the parties to impose a lien upon MMC’s properties. Second, the mere filing of a notice of strike
by NAMAWU did not, as yet, vest in NAMAWU any definitive right that could be prejudiced by the
execution of the mortgage deed.

The fact that MMC’s obligation to GHI is not reflected in the former’s financial statements─a circumstance
made capital of by NAMAWU in order to cast doubt on the validity of the mortgage deed─is of no moment.
By itself, it does not provide a sufficient basis to invalidate this public document. To say otherwise, and to
invalidate the mortgage deed on this pretext, would furnish MMC a convenient excuse to absolve itself of
its mortgage obligations by adopting the simple strategy of not including the obligations in its financial
statements. It would ignore our ruling in Republic, etc. v. "G" Holdings, Inc., which obliged APT to deliver
the MMC shares and financial notes to GHI. Besides, the failure of the mortgagor to record in its financial
statements its loan obligations is surely not an essential element for the validity of mortgage agreements,
nor will it independently affect the right of the mortgagee to foreclose.

Contrary to the CA decision, Tanongon v. Samson44 is not "on all fours" with the instant case. There are
material differences between the two cases. At issue in Tanongon was a third-party claim arising from a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Olizon and Tanongon on July 29, 1997, after the NLRC decision
became final and executory on April 29, 1997. In the case at bar, what is involved is a loan with mortgage
agreement executed on October 2, 1992, well ahead of the union’s notice of strike on August 23, 1996. No
presumption of regularity inheres in the deed of sale in Tanongon, while the participation of APT in this
case clothes the transaction in 1992 with such a presumption that has not been successfully rebutted.
In Tanongon, the conduct of a full-blown trial led to the finding─duly supported by evidence─that the
voluntary sale of the assets of the judgment debtor was made in bad faith. Here, no trial was held, owing
to the motion to dismiss filed by NAMAWU, and the CA failed to consider the factual findings made by this
Court in Republic, etc. v. "G" Holdings, Inc. Furthermore, in Tanongon, the claimant did not exercise his
option to file a separate action in court, thus allowing the NLRC Sheriff to levy on execution and to
determine the rights of third-party claimants.45 In this case, a separate action was filed in the regular
courts by GHI, the third-party claimant. Finally, the questioned transaction in Tanongon was a plain,
voluntary transfer in the form of a sale executed by the judgment debtor in favor of a dubious third-party,
resulting in the inability of the judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment. On the other hand, this case
involves an involuntary transfer (foreclosure of mortgage) arising from a loan obligation that well-existed
long before the commencement of the labor claims of the private respondent.

Three other circumstances have been put forward by the CA to support its conclusion that the mortgage
contract is a sham. First, the CA considered it highly suspect that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage was registered only on February 4, 2000, "three years after its execution, and almost one month
after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the labor dispute."46 Equally suspicious, as far as the CA
is concerned, is the fact that the mortgages were foreclosed on July 31, 2001, after the DOLE had already
issued a Partial Writ of Execution on May 9, 2001. 47 To the appellate court, the timing of the registration of
the mortgage deed was too coincidental, while the date of the foreclosure signified that it was "effected
precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment awards." 48Furthermore, the CA found that the
mortgage deed itself was executed without any consideration, because at the time of its execution, all the
assets of MMC had already been transferred to GHI.49

These circumstances provided the CA with sufficient justification to apply Article 1387 of the Civil Code on
presumed fraudulent transactions, and to declare that the mortgage deed was void for being simulated
and fictitious.50

We do not agree. We find this Court’s ruling in MR Holdings, Ltd. v. Sheriff Bajar 51 pertinent and
instructive:

Article 1387 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

"Art. 1387. All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by gratuitous title are presumed
to have been entered into in fraud of creditors, when the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay
all debts contracted before the donation.

Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom some
judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The decision or
attachment need not refer to the property alienated, and need not have been obtained by the party
seeking rescission.

In addition to these presumptions, the design to defraud creditors may be proved in any other manner
recognized by law and of evidence."

This article presumes the existence of fraud made by a debtor. Thus, in the absence of satisfactory
evidence to the contrary, an alienation of a property will be held fraudulent if it is made after a judgment
has been rendered against the debtor making the alienation. This presumption of fraud is not conclusive
and may be rebutted by satisfactory and convincing evidence. All that is necessary is to establish
affirmatively that the conveyance is made in good faith and for a sufficient and valuable consideration.

The "Assignment Agreement" and the "Deed of Assignment" were executed for valuable considerations.
Patent from the "Assignment Agreement" is the fact that petitioner assumed the payment of
US$18,453,450.12 to ADB in satisfaction of Marcopper’s remaining debt as of March 20, 1997. Solidbank
cannot deny this fact considering that a substantial portion of the said payment, in the sum of
US$13,886,791.06, was remitted in favor of the Bank of Nova Scotia, its major stockholder.

The facts of the case so far show that the assignment contracts were executed in good faith. The
execution of the "Assignment Agreement" on March 20, 1997 and the "Deed of Assignment" on December
8,1997 is not the alpha of this case. While the execution of these assignment contracts almost coincided
with the rendition on May 7, 1997 of the Partial Judgment in Civil Case No. 96-80083 by the Manila RTC,
however, there was no intention on the part of petitioner to defeat Solidbank’s claim. It bears reiterating
that as early as November 4, 1992, Placer Dome had already bound itself under a "Support and Standby
Credit Agreement" to provide Marcopper with cash flow support for the payment to ADB of its obligations.
When Marcopper ceased operations on account of disastrous mine tailings spill into the Boac River and
ADB pressed for payment of the loan, Placer Dome agreed to have its subsidiary, herein petitioner, pay
ADB the amount of US$18,453,450.12.

Thereupon, ADB and Marcopper executed, respectively, in favor of petitioner an "Assignment Agreement"
and a "Deed of Assignment." Obviously, the assignment contracts were connected with
transactions that happened long before the rendition in 1997 of the Partial Judgment in Civil
Case No. 96-80083 by the Manila RTC.Those contracts cannot be viewed in isolation. If we may
add, it is highly inconceivable that ADB, a reputable international financial organization, will connive with
Marcopper to feign or simulate a contract in 1992 just to defraud Solidbank for its claim four years
thereafter. And it is equally incredible for petitioner to be paying the huge sum of US$18,453,450.12 to
ADB only for the purpose of defrauding Solidbank of the sum of ₱52,970,756.89.

It is said that the test as to whether or not a conveyance is fraudulent is ― does it prejudice the rights of
creditors? We cannot see how Solidbank’s right was prejudiced by the assignment contracts considering
that substantially all of Marcopper’s properties were already covered by the registered "Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage" executed by Marcopper in favor of ADB as early as November 11, 1992. As
such, Solidbank cannot assert a better right than ADB, the latter being a preferred creditor. It is basic
that mortgaged properties answer primarily for the mortgaged credit, not for the judgment
credit of the mortgagor’s unsecured creditor. Considering that petitioner assumed Marcopper’s debt
to ADB, it follows that Solidbank’s right as judgment creditor over the subject properties must give way to
that of the former.52
From this ruling in MR Holdings, we can draw parallel conclusions. The execution of the subsequent Deed
of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996 was simply the formal documentation of what
had already been agreed in the seminal transaction (the Purchase and Sale Agreement) between APT and
GHI. It should not be viewed in isolation, apart from the original agreement of October 2, 1992. And it
cannot be denied that this original agreement was supported by an adequate consideration. The APT was
even ordered by the court to deliver the shares and financial notes of MMC in exchange for the payments
that GHI had made.

It was also about this time, in 1996, that NAMAWU filed a notice of strike to protest non-payment of its
rightful labor claims.53 But, as already mentioned, the outcome of that labor dispute was yet
unascertainable at that time, and NAMAWU could only have hoped for, or speculated about, a favorable
ruling. To paraphrase MR Holdings, we cannot see how NAMAWU’s right was prejudiced by the Deed of
Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, or by its delayed registration, when substantially all of the properties of
MMC were already mortgaged to GHI as early as October 2, 1992. Given this reality, the Court of Appeals
had no basis to conclude that this Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, by reason of its late
registration, was a simulated or fictitious contract.

The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529,54 which reads:

SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.—An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He
may use such forms, deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But
no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or effect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the Office of the Register
of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.55

Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land. Further, entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that registration in a public
registry creates constructive notice to the whole world. 56 Thus, Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by
Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529, provides:

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration.—Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates
lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

But, there is nothing in Act No. 496, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, that imposes a period within which to
register annotations of "conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or
entry affecting registered land." If liens were not so registered, then it "shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration." If
registered, it "shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned." The mere lapse of time from the execution of the mortgage document to the moment of its
registration does not affect the rights of a mortgagee.

Neither will the circumstance of GHI’s foreclosure of MMC’s properties on July 31, 2001, or after the DOLE
had already issued a Partial Writ of Execution on May 9, 2001 against MMC, support the conclusion of the
CA that GHI’s act of foreclosing on MMC’s properties was "effected to prevent satisfaction of the judgment
award." GHI’s mortgage rights, constituted in 1992, antedated the Partial Writ of Execution by nearly ten
(10) years. GHI’s resort to foreclosure was a legitimate enforcement of a right to liquidate a bona fide
debt. It was a reasonable option open to a mortgagee which, not being a party to the labor dispute
between NAMAWU and MMC, stood to suffer a loss if it did not avail itself of the remedy of foreclosure.

The well-settled rule is that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property mortgaged.57 While it is true
that GHI’s foreclosure of MMC’s mortgaged properties may have had the "effect to prevent satisfaction of
the judgment award against the specific mortgaged property that first answers for a mortgage obligation
ahead of any subsequent creditors," that same foreclosure does not necessarily translate to having been
"effected to prevent satisfaction of the judgment award" against MMC.

Likewise, we note the narration of subsequent facts contained in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor
General. Therein, it is alleged that after the Partial Writ of Execution was issued on May 9, 2001, a motion
for reconsideration was filed by MMC; that the denial of the motion was appealed to the CA; that when the
appeal was dismissed by the CA on January 24, 2002, it eventually became the subject of a review
petition before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 157696; and that G.R. No. 157696 was decided by this
Court only on February 9, 2006.
This chronology of subsequent events shows that February 9, 2006 would have been the earliest date for
the unimpeded enforcement of the Partial Writ of Execution, as it was only then that this Court resolved
the issue. This happened four and a half years after July 31, 2001, the date when GHI foreclosed on the
mortgaged properties. Thus, it is not accurate to say that the foreclosure made on July 31, 2001 was
"effected [only] to prevent satisfaction of the judgment award."

We also observe the error in the CA’s finding that the 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was
not supported by any consideration since at the time the deed was executed, "all the real and personal
property of MMC had already been transferred in the hands of G Holdings." 58 It should be remembered
that the Purchase and Sale Agreement between GHI and APT involved large amounts (₱550M) and even
spawned a subsequent court action (Civil Case No. 95-76132, RTC of Manila). Yet, nowhere in the
Agreement or in the RTC decision is there any mention of real and personal properties of MMC being
included in the sale to GHI in 1992. These properties simply served as mortgaged collateral for the 1992
Promissory Notes.59 The Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Promissory Notes themselves are the best
evidence that there was ample consideration for the mortgage.

Thus, we must reject the conclusion of the CA that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage executed
in 1996 was a simulated transaction.

On the issue of whether there had been an effective levy upon the properties of GHI.

The well-settled principle is that the rights of a mortgage creditor over the mortgaged properties are
superior to those of a subsequent attaching creditor. In Cabral v. Evangelista,60 this Court declared that:

Defendants-appellants purchase of the mortgaged chattels at the public sheriff's sale and the delivery of
the chattels to them with a certificate of sale did not give them a superior right to the chattels as against
plaintiffs-mortgagees. Rule 39, Section 22 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 25 of the
Revised Rules), cited by appellants precisely provides that "the sale conveys to the purchaser all the right
which the debtor had in such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied." It has long
been settled by this Court that "The right of those who so acquire said properties should not and can not
be superior to that of the creditor who has in his favor an instrument of mortgage executed with the
formalities of the law, in good faith, and without the least indication of fraud. This is all the more true in
the present case, because, when the plaintiff purchased the automobile in question on August 22, 1933,
he knew, or at least, it is presumed that he knew, by the mere fact that the instrument of mortgage,
Exhibit 2, was registered in the office of the register of deeds of Manila, that said automobile was subject
to a mortgage lien. In purchasing it, with full knowledge that such circumstances existed, it should be
presumed that he did so, very much willing to respect the lien existing thereon, since he should not have
expected that with the purchase, he would acquire a better right than that which the vendor then had." In
another case between two mortgagees, we held that "As between the first and second mortgagees,
therefore, the second mortgagee has at most only the right to redeem, and even when the second
mortgagee goes through the formality of an extrajudicial foreclosure, the purchaser acquires no more than
the right of redemption from the first mortgagee." The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a
subsequent judgment creditor is now expressly provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which states with regard to the effect of levy on execution as to third persons that "The levy on
execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the
judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing."

Even in the matter of possession, mortgagees over chattel have superior, preferential and paramount
rights thereto, and the mortgagor has mere rights of redemption.61

Similar rules apply to cases of mortgaged real properties that are registered. Since the properties were
already mortgaged to GHI, the only interest remaining in the mortgagor was its right to redeem said
properties from the mortgage. The right of redemption was the only leviable or attachable property right
of the mortgagor in the mortgaged real properties. We have held that —

The main issue in this case is the nature of the lien of a judgment creditor, like the petitioner, who has
levied an attachment on the judgment debtor's (CMI) real properties which had been mortgaged to a
consortium of banks and were subsequently sold to a third party, Top Rate.

xxxx

The sheriff's levy on CMI's properties, under the writ of attachment obtained by the petitioner, was
actually a levy on the interest only of the judgment debtor CMI on those properties. Since the properties
were already mortgaged to the consortium of banks, the only interest remaining in the mortgagor CMI
was its right to redeem said properties from the mortgage. The right of redemption was the only leviable
or attachable property right of CMI in the mortgaged real properties. The sheriff could not have attached
the properties themselves, for they had already been conveyed to the consortium of banks by mortgage
(defined as a "conditional sale"), so his levy must be understood to have attached only the mortgagor's
remaining interest in the mortgaged property — the right to redeem it from the mortgage.62

xxxx
There appears in the record a factual contradiction relating to whether the foreclosure by GHI on July 13,
200163over some of the contested properties came ahead of the levy thereon, or the reverse. NAMAWU
claims that the levy on two trucks was effected on June 22, 2001,64 which GHI disputes as a misstatement
because the levy was attempted on July 18, 2002, and not 2001 65 What is undisputed though is that the
mortgage of GHI was registered on February 4, 2000,66 well ahead of any levy by NAMAWU. Prior
registration of a lien creates a preference, as the act of registration is the operative act that conveys and
affects the land,67 even against subsequent judgment creditors, such as respondent herein. Its registration
of the mortgage was not intended to defraud NAMAWU of its judgment claims, since even the courts were
already judicially aware of its existence since 1992. Thus, at that moment in time, with the registration of
the mortgage, either NAMAWU had no properties of MMC to attach because the same had been previously
foreclosed by GHI as mortgagee thereof; or by virtue of the DOLE’s levy to enforce NAMAWU’s claims, the
latter’s rights are subject to the notice of the foreclosure on the subject properties by a prior mortgagee’s
right. GHI’s mortgage right had already been registered by then, and "it is basic that mortgaged
properties answer primarily for the mortgaged credit, not for the judgment credit of the mortgagor’s
unsecured creditor."68

On the issue of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.

The CA found that:

"Ordinarily, the interlocking of directors and officers in two different corporations is not a conclusive
indication that the corporations are one and the same for purposes of applying the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction. However, when the legal fiction of the separate corporate personality is abused,
such as when the same is used for fraudulent or wrongful ends, the courts have not hesitated to pierce
the corporate veil (Francisco vs. Mejia, 362 SCRA 738). In the case at bar, the Deed of Real Estate and
Chattel Mortgage was entered into between MMC and G Holdings for the purpose of evading the
satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the petitioner against MMC. The notion of separate personality is
clearly being utilized by the two corporations to perpetuate the violation of a positive legal duty arising
from a final judgment to the prejudice of the petitioner’s right."69

Settled jurisprudence70 has it that –

"(A) corporation, upon coming into existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from those persons composing it as well as from any other legal entity to which it may be related. By this
attribute, a stockholder may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of the said
corporation, and vice versa. This separate and distinct personality is, however, merely a fiction created by
law for convenience and to promote the ends of justice. For this reason, it may not be used or invoked for
ends subversive to the policy and purpose behind its creation or which could not have been intended by
law to which it owes its being. This is particularly true when the fiction is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues,
perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. This is likewise true where the corporate entity is
being used as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of
another corporate entity. In all these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded
with reference to the particular transaction involved.

Given this jurisprudential principle and the factual circumstances obtaining in this case, we now ask: Was
the CA correct in piercing the veil of corporate identity of GHI and MMC?

In our disquisition above, we have shown that the CA’s finding that there was a "simulated mortgage"
between GHI and MMC to justify a wrong or protect a fraud has struggled vainly to find a foothold when
confronted with the ruling of this Court in Republic v. "G" Holdings, Inc.

The negotiations between the GHI and the Government--through APT, dating back to 1992--culminating in
the Purchase and Sale Agreement, cannot be depicted as a contrived transaction. In fact, in the
said Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc., this Court adjudged that GHI was entitled to its rightful claims─
not just to the shares of MMC itself, or just to the financial notes that already contained the mortgage
clauses over MMCs disputed assets, but also to the delivery of those instruments. Certainly, we cannot
impute to this Court’s findings on the case any badge of fraud. Thus, we reject the CA’s conclusion that it
was right to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, because the foregoing circumstances belie such an
inference. Furthermore, we cannot ascribe to the Government, or the APT in particular, any undue motive
to participate in a transaction designed to perpetrate fraud. Accordingly, we consider the CA interpretation
unwarranted.

We also cannot agree that the presumption of fraud in Article 1387 of the Civil Code relative to property
conveyances, when there was already a judgment rendered or a writ of attachment issued, authorizes
piercing the veil of corporate identity in this case. We find that Article 1387 finds less application to an
involuntary alienation such as the foreclosure of mortgage made before any final judgment of a court. We
thus hold that when the alienation is involuntary, and the foreclosure is not fraudulent because the
mortgage deed has been previously executed in accordance with formalities of law, and the foreclosure is
resorted to in order to liquidate a bona fide debt, it is not the alienation by onerous title contemplated in
Article 1387 of the Civil Code wherein fraud is presumed.
Since the factual antecedents of this case do not warrant a finding that the mortgage and loan agreements
between MMC and GHI were simulated, then their separate personalities must be recognized. To pierce
the veil of corporate fiction would require that their personalities as creditor and debtor be conjoined,
resulting in a merger of the personalities of the creditor (GHI) and the debtor (MMC) in one person, such
that the debt of one to the other is thereby extinguished. But the debt embodied in the 1992 Financial
Notes has been established, and even made subject of court litigation (Civil Case No. 95-76132, RTC
Manila). This can only mean that GHI and MMC have separate corporate personalities.

Neither was MMC used merely as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of GHI, to
justify piercing the former’s veil of corporate fiction so that the latter could be held liable to claims of
third-party judgment creditors, like NAMAWU. In this regard, we find American jurisprudence persuasive.
In a decision by the Supreme Court of New York 71 bearing upon similar facts, the Court denied piercing the
veil of corporate fiction to favor a judgment creditor who sued the parent corporation of the debtor,
alleging fraudulent corporate asset-shifting effected after a prior final judgment. Under a factual
background largely resembling this case at bar, viz:

In this action, plaintiffs seek to recover the balance due under judgments they obtained against Lake
George Ventures Inc. (hereinafter LGV), a subsidiary of defendant that was formed to develop the Top O’
the World resort community overlooking Lake George, by piercing the corporate veil or upon the theory
that LGV's transfer of certain assets constituted fraudulent transfers under the Debtor and Creditor Law.
We previously upheld Supreme Court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint (252 A.D.2d 609, 675 N.Y.S.2d 234)and the matter proceeded to a nonjury trial. Supreme
Court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of defendant upon its findings that, although defendant
dominated LGV, it did not use that domination to commit a fraud or wrong on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
appealed.

The trial evidence showed that LGV was incorporated in November 1985. Defendant's principal, Francesco
Galesi, initially held 90% of the stock and all of the stock was ultimately transferred to defendant. Initial
project funding was provided through a $2.5 million loan from Chemical Bank, secured by defendant's
guarantee of repayment of the loan and completion of the project. The loan proceeds were utilized to
purchase the real property upon which the project was to be established. Chemical Bank thereafter loaned
an additional $3.5 million to LGV, again guaranteed by defendant, and the two loans were consolidated
into a first mortgage loan of $6 million. In 1989, the loan was modified by splitting the loan into a $1.9
term note on which defendant was primary obligor and a $4.1 million project note on which LGV was the
obligor and defendant was a guarantor.

Due to LGV's lack of success in marketing the project's townhouses and in order to protect itself from
the exercise of Chemical Bank's enforcement remedies, defendant was forced to make monthly
installments of principal and interest on LGV's behalf. Ultimately, defendant purchased the project note
from Chemical Bank for $3.1 million, paid the $1.5 million balance on the term note and took an
assignment of the first mortgage on the project's realty. After LGV failed to make payments on the
indebtedness over the course of the succeeding two years, defendant brought an action to foreclose its
mortgage. Ultimately, defendant obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale in the amount of
$6,070,246.50. Defendant bid in the property at the foreclosure sale and thereafter obtained a deficiency
judgment in the amount of $3,070,246.50.

Following the foreclosure sale, LGV transferred to defendant all of the shares of Top of the World Water
Company, a separate entity that had been organized to construct and operate the water supply and
delivery system for the project, in exchange for a $950,000 reduction in the deficiency judgment.

the U.S. Supreme Court of New York held—

Based on the foregoing, and accepting that defendant exercised complete domination and control over
LGV, we are at a loss as to how plaintiffs perceive themselves to have been inequitably affected by
defendant's foreclosure action against LGV, by LGV's divestiture of the water company stock or the sports
complex property, or by defendant's transfer to LGV of a third party's uncollectible note, accomplished
solely for tax purposes. It is undisputed that LGV was, and for some period of time had been, unable to
meet its obligations and, at the time of the foreclosure sale, liens against its property exceeded the value
of its assets by several million dollars, even including the water company and sports complex at the values
plaintiffs would assign to them. In fact, even if plaintiffs' analysis were utilized to eliminate the entire $3
million deficiency judgment, the fact remains that subordinate mortgages totaling nearly an additional $2
million have priority over plaintiffs' judgments.

As properly concluded by Supreme Court, absent a finding of any inequitable consequence to plaintiffs,
both causes of action pleaded in the amended complaint must fail. Fundamentally, a party seeking to
pierce the corporate veil must show complete domination and control of the subsidiary by the parent and
also that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff that resulted in the
plaintiff's injury ( 252 A.D.2d 609, 610, 675 N.Y.S.2d 234, supra; see, Matter of Morris v. New York State
Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 141, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 623 N.E.2d 1157). Notably, "[e]vidence
of domination alone does not suffice without an additional showing that it led to inequity, fraud or
malfeasance" (TNS Holdings v. MKI Sec. Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 335, 339, 680 N.Y.S.2d 891, 703 N.E.2d 749).
xxxx

In reaching that conclusion, we specifically reject a number of plaintiffs' assertions, including the entirely
erroneous claims that our determination on the prior appeal (252 A.D.2d 609, 675 N.Y.S.2d
234, supra) set forth a "roadmap" for the proof required at trial and mandated a verdict in favor of
plaintiffs upon their production of evidence that supported the decision's "listed facts". To the contrary,
our decision was predicated upon the existence of such evidence, absent which we would have granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant. We are equally unpersuaded by plaintiffs' continued reliance
upon defendant's December 1991 unilateral conversion of its intercompany loans with LGV from debt to
equity, which constituted nothing more than a "bookkeeping transaction" and had no apparent effect on
LGV's obligations to defendant or defendant's right to foreclose on its mortgage.72

This doctrine is good law under Philippine jurisdiction.

In Concept Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,73 we laid down the test in determining
the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, to wit:

1. Control, not mere majority or complete control, but complete domination, not only of finances
but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own.

2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate
the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and, unjust act in
contravention of plaintiffs legal rights; and,

3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of.

xxxx

Time and again, we have reiterated that mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation
of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not, by itself, a sufficient ground for disregarding
a separate corporate personality. 74 It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from that composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Clear and
convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.75

In this case, the mere interlocking of directors and officers does not warrant piercing the separate
corporate personalities of MMC and GHI. Not only must there be a showing that there was majority or
complete control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in
respect to the transaction attacked, so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own. The mortgage deed transaction attacked as a basis for piercing
the corporate veil was a transaction that was an offshoot, a derivative, of the mortgages earlier
constituted in the Promissory Notes dated October 2, 1992. But these Promissory Notes with mortgage
were executed by GHI with APT in the name of MMC, in a full privatization process. It appears that if there
was any control or domination exercised over MMC, it was APT, not GHI, that wielded it. Neither can we
conclude that the constitution of the loan nearly four (4) years prior to NAMAWU’s notice of strike could
have been the proximate cause of the injury of NAMAWU for having been deprived of MMC’s corporate
assets.

On the propriety of injunction to prevent execution by the NLRC on the properties of third-
party claimants

It is settled that a Regional Trial Court can validly issue a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and, later, a
writ of preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal on
the basis of a third-party’s claim of ownership over the properties levied upon. 76 While, as a rule, no
temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute shall be issued by any court--where the writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be
enforced upon the property of a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere prima facie showing of
ownership of such claimant--a separate action for injunctive relief against such levy may be maintained in
court, since said action neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute insofar as the third party is
concerned.77 Instructively, National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union v. Vera78

Petitioners' reliance on the provision of Art. 254 of the New Labor Code (herein earlier quoted) which
prohibits injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a 'labor dispute' is not
well-taken. This has no application to the case at bar. Civil Case No. 2749 is one which neither "involves"
nor "grows out" of a labor dispute. What 'involves' or 'grows out' of a labor dispute is the NLRC case
between petitioners and the judgment debtor, Philippine Iron Mines. The private respondents are not
parties to the said NLRC case. Civil Case No. 2749 does not put in issue either the fact or validity of the
proceeding in theNLRC case nor the decision therein rendered, much less the writ of execution issued
thereunder. It does not seek to enjoin the execution of the decision against the properties of the judgment
debtor. What is sought to be tried in Civil Case No. 2749 is whether the NLRC's decision and writ of
execution, above mentioned, shall be permitted to be satisfied against properties of private respondents,
and not of the judgment debtor named in the NLRC decision and writ of execution. Such a recourse is
allowed under the provisions of Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

To sustain petitioners' theory will inevitably lead to disastrous consequences and lend judicial imprimatur
to deprivation of property without due process of law. Simply because a writ of execution was issued by
the NLRC does not authorize the sheriff implementing the same to levy on anybody's property. To deny
the victim of the wrongful levy, the recourse such as that availed of by the herein private respondents,
under the pretext that no court of general jurisdiction can interfere with the writ of execution issued in a
labor dispute, will be sanctioning a greater evil than that sought to be avoided by the Labor Code
provision in question. Certainly, that could not have been the intendment of the law creating the NLRC.
For well-settled is the rule that the power of a court to execute its judgment extends only over properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor."

Likewise, since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the action, he cannot, strictly speaking,
appeal from the order denying his claim, but he should file a separate reivindicatory action against the
execution creditor or the purchaser of the property after the sale at public auction, or a complaint for
damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.79

A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of the property would not constitute interference with the
powers or processes of the labor tribunal which rendered the judgment to execute upon the levied
properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is not subject to levy. Thus, a separate
action for recovery, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the petitioner, cannot be
considered as interference.80

Upon the findings and conclusions we have reached above, petitioner is situated squarely as such third-
party claimant. The questioned restraining order of the lower court, as well as the order granting
preliminary injunction, does not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the labor
department. The registration of the mortgage document operated as notice to all on the matter of the
mortgagee’s prior claims. Official proceedings relative to the foreclosure of the subject properties
constituted a prima facie showing of ownership of such claimant to support the issuance of injunctive
reliefs.

As correctly held by the lower court:

The subject incidents for TRO and/or Writ of Injunction were summarily heard and in resolving the same,
the Court believes, that the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right over the levied properties. The
existence of the subject Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, the fact that petitioner initiated a
foreclosure of said properties before the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC Branch 61, Kabankalan
City on July 13, 2001, the fact that said Ex-Officio Sheriff and the Clerk of Court issue a Notice of
Foreclosure, Possession and Control over said mortgaged properties on July 19, 2001 and the fact that a
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on December 3, 2001 are the basis of its conclusion. Unless said
mortgage contract is annulled or declared null and void, the presumption of regularity of transaction must
be considered and said document must be looked [upon] as valid.

Notably, the Office of the Solicitor General also aptly observed that when the respondent maintained that
the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel mortgage was entered into in fraud of creditors, it thereby admitted
that the mortgage was not void, but merely rescissible under Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code; and,
therefore, an independent action is needed to rescind the contract of mortgage.81 We, however, hold that
such an independent action cannot now be maintained, because the mortgage has been previously
recognized to exist, with a valid consideration, in Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc.

A final word

The Court notes that the case filed with the lower court involves a principal action for injunction to prohibit
execution over properties belonging to a third party not impleaded in the legal dispute between NAMAWU
and MMC. We have observed, however, that the lower court and the CA failed to take judicial notice of, or
to consider, our Decisions in Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v.
Brion and NAMAWU, in which we respectively recognized the entitlement of GHI to the shares and the
company notes of MMC (under the Purchase and Sale Agreement), and the rights of NAMAWU to its labor
claims. At this stage, therefore, neither the lower court nor the CA, nor even this Court, can depart from
our findings in those two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.

From our discussion above, we now rule that the trial court, in issuing the questioned orders, did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, because its issuance was amply supported by factual and legal bases.

We are not unmindful, however, of the fact that the labor claims of NAMAWU, acknowledged by this Court
in Maricalum, still awaits final execution. As success fades from NAMAWU’s efforts to execute on the
properties of MMC, which were validly foreclosed by GHI, we see that NAMAWU always had, and may still
have, ample supplemental remedies found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to protect its rights
against MMC. These include the examination of the judgment obligor when judgment is unsatisfied,82 the
examination of the obligors of judgment obligors,83 or even the resort to receivership.84

While, theoretically, this case is not ended by this decision, since the lower court is still to try the case
filed with it and decide it on the merits, the matter of whether the mortgage and foreclosure of the assets
that are the subject of said foreclosure is ended herein, for the third and final time. So also is the
consequential issue of the separate and distinct personalities of GHI and MMC. Having resolved these
principal issues with certainty, we find no more need to remand the case to the lower court, only for the
purpose of resolving again the matter of whether GHI owns the properties that were the subject of the
latter’s foreclosure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2003 is
SET ASIDE. The Omnibus Order dated December 4, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 of
Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187917               January 19, 2011

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, 

vs.
SPOUSES EDMUNDO MIRANDA and JULIE MIRANDA, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the June 30, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87775, affirming
the June 16, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 35, as well as its
subsequent Resolution dated May 7, 2009,3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Respondents, spouses Edmundo Miranda and Julie Miranda, applied for and obtained a credit
accommodation from petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank). On August 27, 1996,
respondents obtained a ₱4,000,000.00 loan from Metrobank and executed a real estate mortgage 4 over a
parcel of land in Poblacion, Santiago, Isabela, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 202288.
Upon respondents’ request, Metrobank increased the loan from ₱4,000,000.00 to ₱5,000,000.00. The real
estate mortgage executed on August 27, 1996 was thus amended 5 to increase the principal amount of
loan secured by the mortgage to ₱5,000,000.00.

Subsequently, respondents obtained additional loans from Metrobank - ₱1,000,000.00 on December 3,

1996, and ₱1,000,000.00 on May 8, 1997. The additional loans were secured by mortgage6 over lands
situated in Dubinan and Mabini, Santiago, Isabela, covered by TCT Nos. T-202288, T-180503, T-260279,
and T-272664.

Respondents encountered difficulties in paying their loans. They requested for a longer period to settle
their account and further requested for the restructuring of their loans, which requests Metrobank
granted. Respondents then signed Promissory Note (PN) No. 599773 7 for ₱6,400,000.00, and PN No.
5997728 for ₱950,000.00, both payable on February 24, 2002, with interest at 17.250% per annum. They
also amended the deeds of real estate mortgage they executed in favor of Metrobank to increase the
amount of loans secured by mortgage to ₱6,350,000.00. The amendment was inscribed on TCT Nos. T-
202288,9 T-260279,10 and T-180503.11

On August 25, 2000, Metrobank sent respondents a demand letter12 to settle their overdue account of
₱8,512,380.15, inclusive of interest and penalties; otherwise, the bank would initiate "the necessary legal
proceedings x x x, without further notice." Respondents, however, failed to settle their account.
Consequently, Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of the mortgaged
properties on November 16, 2000. The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Santiago City sold the
mortgaged properties at public auction for the sum of ₱9,284,452.00 to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.
A Certificate of Sale13 was issued in favor of Metrobank on November 27, 2000, which was registered with
the Registry of Deeds on November 29, 2000.

Claiming that the extrajudicial foreclosure was void, respondents filed a complaint for Nullification of the
Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction 14 with the
RTC of Santiago City. They alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
107915 and Act No. 3135,16 particularly the publication requirement. Respondents further asserted that
Metrobank required them to sign blank promissory notes and real estate mortgage, and that they were
not furnished with copies of these documents. Later, they discovered that the terms and conditions of the
promissory notes and of the mortgage were entirely different from what was represented to them by the
bank. The right to fix the interest rates, they added, was

exclusively given to the bank. Respondents, thus, prayed for the annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings.

Metrobank answered the complaint, denying its material allegations and asserting the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings. Specifically, it averred compliance with the posting and publication requirements.
Thus, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.17

Meanwhile, on December 20, 2001, Metrobank caused the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of
respondents and the issuance of new ones in its name. On December 21, 2001, the Ex-Officio Sheriff
executed a Final Deed of Sale.18
On June 16, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision19 annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The
RTC reviewed the records of the foreclosure proceedings and found no proof of publication of the sheriff’s
notice of sale; there was no affidavit of publication attached to the records. This fatal defect, it held,
invalidated the auction sale and the entire foreclosure proceedings. The RTC further held that, when
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgaged properties, respondents’ loan account was still outstanding for there
was an overpayment of interests amounting to ₱1,529,922.00. Thus, the foreclosure proceedings were
without factual and legal basis. The RTC further noted that Metrobank consolidated its title even before
the issuance of the sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale. The trial court considered it an irregularity sufficient to
invalidate the consolidation.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondents] and against
[petitioner] Metrobank as follows:

1) DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, dated November 27, 2000, Exhibit
"11";

2) DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale, dated December 21, 2000, Exhibit
"12";

3) CANCELLING [Metrobank’s] TCT Nos. T-319236 (Exhibit "13"); T-319235 over Lot 6-B-18
(Exhibit "14"); T-T-319235 over Lot 4-F (Exhibit "15"); and T-319237 (Exhibit "16");

4) RESTORING [respondents’] TCT Nos. T-260279 (Exhibit "E"); T-202288 (Exhibit "F"); T-180503
(Exhibit "G"; and T- 272664 (Annex "E"); and

5) ORDERING x x x Metrobank to pay PHP50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 20

Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on July 31, 2006.

Metrobank then appealed to the CA, faulting the RTC for annulling the foreclosure proceedings. It insisted
that the bank complied with the publication requirement. Metrobank also disagreed with the trial court’s
finding of overpayment of interests amounting to ₱1,529,922.00, claiming that the applicable interest
rates on respondents’ loans were 17% and not 12% as computed by the trial court. It further asserted
that a final deed of sale is not necessary for purposes of consolidating its ownership over the subject
properties. Finally, Metrobank assailed the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.

On June 30, 2008, the CA resolved Metrobank’s appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated June 16, 2006 of the RTC of Santiago
City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 35-3022 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.21

Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration also suffered the same fate, as the CA denied it on May 7, 2009.22

Before us, Metrobank insists on the validity of the foreclosure proceedings. Essentially, it argues that
foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the party alleging irregularity has the
burden of proving his claim. Metrobank asserts that, in this case, the presumption of regularity was not
disputed because respondents failed to prove that the notice of sale was not published as required by law.

At the outset, it must be stated that only questions of law may be raised before this Court in a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not
the function of this Court to reexamine the evidence submitted by the parties.23

It has been our consistent ruling that the question of compliance or non-compliance with notice and
publication requirements of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue, and the resolution thereof
by the trial court is generally binding on this Court. The matter of sufficiency of posting and publication of
a notice of foreclosure sale need not be resolved

by this Court, especially when the findings of the RTC were sustained by the CA. Well-established is the
rule that factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the
said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.24

The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that there was non-compliance
with the publication requirement bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting them with our
own. Metrobank has not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. It has not sufficiently
demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.

Metrobank makes much ado of respondents’ failure to present proof of non-compliance with the
publication requirement. It insists that respondents failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof.

Apparently, Metrobank lost sight of our ruling in Spouses Pulido v. CA,25 Sempio v. CA,26 and, recently, in
Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo,27 viz.:

While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden
of proof, still negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one’s cause of action or defense
if they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party.

It would have been a simple matter for Metrobank to rebut the allegation of non-compliance by producing
the required proof of publication. Yet, Metrobank opted not to rebut the allegation; it simply relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

Unfortunately, Metrobank’s reliance on the presumption of regularity must fail because it did not present
any proof of publication of the notice of sale. As held by this Court in Spouses Pulido v. Court of Appeals:28

[P]etitioners' reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties falls in the face
of a serious imputation on non-compliance. The presumption of compliance with official duty is rebutted
by failure to present proof of posting.

Further, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo, 29 this Court
rejected a similar contention, viz.:

Petitioner's invocation of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of
Sheriff Castillo is misplaced. While posting the notice of sale is part of a sheriff's official functions, the
actual publication of the notice of sale cannot be considered as such, since this concerns the publisher's
business. Simply put, the sheriff is incompetent to prove that the notice of sale was actually published in a
newspaper of general circulation.

As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the records 30 of the foreclosure proceedings lacked any proof of
publication. This explains why Metrobank could not present any proof of publication.

We take this occasion to reiterate that the object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature
and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given
for the purpose of securing bidders and preventing a sacrifice sale of the property.

The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of the auction sale. This is
why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken judicial
notice of the "far-reaching effects" of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, the publication of the notice of sale was held essential to the validity of foreclosure proceedings. 31 In
this case, Metrobank failed to establish compliance with the publication requirement. The RTC and the CA
cannot, therefore, be faulted for nullifying the foreclosure proceedings.

Metrobank next questions the authority of the RTC and the CA to take cognizance of the records of the
foreclosure proceedings as basis for annulling the auction sale. It claims that the trial court may not take
judicial notice of the records of proceedings in another case, unless the parties themselves agreed to it.
Metrobank asserts that it did not give its consent to the trial court’s examination of the records of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Further, the RTC did not even set a hearing for the purpose of
declaring its intention to take judicial notice of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings, as required by
Section 332 of Rule 129. Metrobank, thus, contends that the RTC exceeded its authority in taking
cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings.

We disagree.

As a rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. This rule, however, is not
absolute.

In Juaban v. Espina33 and "G" Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103
(NAMAWU),34we held that, in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in
other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.

The RTC, therefore, acted well within its authority in taking cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, and the CA cannot be faulted for sustaining the RTC.
Metrobank further questions the trial court’s finding of overpayment of interests. But like the issue on
compliance with the publication requirement, the issue on overpayment of interests involves the
ascertainment of facts not subject of review by this Court. We reiterate that our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being
conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.35

Besides, we find nothing erroneous in this factual finding of the RTC. As explained by the RTC in its
decision:

[T]he Court notes that the original promissory notes evidencing the various loans of the plaintiffs were not
presented in court by either party; they are needed to determine the stipulated interest rate. The Court is
thus left to determine the same based on the testimony of the plaintiffs that the agreed interest rate is
12% per annum; amazingly, this was not denied or refuted by the [petitioner] bank, in which case, 12%
interest rate is applied at least for the period beginning 1997 until 1999, when the loan was renewed
under the two (2) new promissory notes which indicated a higher rate of interest of 17.250% per annum.
As mentioned above, the interest payments made by the [respondents] were already admitted by
[Metrobank] in its answer to the complaint as well as in its comment to [respondents’] formal offer of
evidence, and such interest payments are duly reflected and contained in the passbook account of the
[respondents], Exhibit "H," "H-1" to "H-10." But, in order to determine whether [respondents’] account
has become past due or not, as the [petitioner] bank represents, the Court deems it necessary to
undertake some mathematical computation the result of which would decisively guide the Court to arrive
at a rightful conclusion, thus:

1) Total interest payments by [respondents]

from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999 - ₱3,332,422.00
2) Interest due
from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999 - ₱1,802,500.00
computed as follows:
a) 1st year (₱7 M x 12%), from May 7, 1997 to May 28, 1998 - ₱ 840,000.00
b) 2nd year
i) from June 3, 1998 to Feb. 24, 1999 (8 mos.) - ₱ 560,000.00
ii) from March, 1999 to June 30, 1999 (4 mos.) - ₱ 402,500.00
3) Total Interest paid - ₱ 3,332,422.00
Less Interest due - ₱ 1,802,500.00
Overpaid interest - ₱ 1,529,922.00

From the foregoing, it is evident that [respondents] overpaid interests for the period of two (2) years,
from May 1997 to June 1999, in the total amount of Php. 1,529,922.00. Thus, the Court is convinced that
it is just and equitable that such an overpayment be construed as advance interest payments which
should be applied for the succeeding period or year of their contract. Otherwise, [Metrobank] would
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of [respondents]. In such a case, it was premature then for
[Metrobank] to declare [respondents’] account as past due, because at that juncture[, respondents’] loan
obligation was outstanding and in declaring otherwise, [Metrobank’s] action was without basis as there
was no violation of their loan contract. Consequently, it follows that the foreclosure proceedings
subsequently held on November 26, 2000 was without factual and legal basis, too. For, indeed, when the
foreclosure proceedings in question was conducted, [respondents’] loan account with [Metrobank], as it is
said, was still outstanding, because [respondents] were able to pay the interest due. Therefore, the Court
is again convinced that the nullification prayed for is in order.36

We need not say more.

In fine, the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor's failure to pay his obligation must
be exercised according to its clear mandate, and every requirement of the law must be complied with, or
the valid exercise of the right would end. The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.37

As further declared by this Court in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad
Geronimo:38

While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor's failure to pay
his obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and every
requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must be
remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused especially to the prejudice of others.
We, therefore, affirm the CA and sustain the RTC in nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage and sale, including Metrobank’s title.

With this disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the issue of the validity of the consolidation of title
by Metrobank.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 87775 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159507             April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The
assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25
thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case
No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge 2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case,
except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to
reverse and set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc.
(AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head
of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said
court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age,
and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing
business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services
with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other
defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served
with summons and other court processes at their office address.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX
credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when
petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States
some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit
card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from
the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents'
unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the
period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account.
Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card
and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents'
acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the
affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the
parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte.
Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he
executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To
buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in
Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
a quo.

Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for
Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any
allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was
the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a
quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his
admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office
thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax
certificate is not determinative of one's residence.

In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by
respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly
laid. It reasoned, thus:

x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is
enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of
the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil.
321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is
defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A
person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his
residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated
January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September
10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on
March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.

On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for
certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its
Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from
further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.

The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the
parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident
thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4

The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals 5 where the Court
distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:

x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it
is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent
abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant
the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time.
A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means,
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)

In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court
referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax
certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas.
Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located. 8 It also pointed out
that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City.
The foregoing circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner
Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required proof.

The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district
of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No
evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and
actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.

The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay
City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the
parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati
City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.

It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and
cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court. 9 Further, fundamental
in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by
the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the
maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the
courts of justice.10

The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents'
affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in
filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to
wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the
said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in
Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the
court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential
person in the locality.

The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are,
VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed
and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining
order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by
petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein
petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that
petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the
National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution
dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for
review with the Court alleging that:

The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and
Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.

(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein
petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a
residence (sic) of said district;
 (b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to
the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;

(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court; and1avvphil.net

(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and
even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to
vex the respondents.13

In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed
reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172
because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern
Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action.
As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's
caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural
rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by
the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides.
If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo
which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency
requirement of the rule.

However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was
not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly
on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also
taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.

The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was
improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the
occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to
the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of
justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation
with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a
given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous
stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -

'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any
means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.'
(Italicized for emphasis)

"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in
referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:

'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)

"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent
Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to
return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action
for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of
paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the
action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of
personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)

The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court,
was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et
al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:

"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.'
This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."18

There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district
of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court
admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house."19

As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo
as possessing the requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district
which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:

x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in
the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x21

It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in
that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."22When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1)
intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."23

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had
his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is
also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in
another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term
is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."

Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals 25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the
facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court
of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias,
Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the
intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident
therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein
because although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal
presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as
synonyms, imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27

In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of
filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess
the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the
definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention
to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was
sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.

The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:

Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person
can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C.
Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is
acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon
City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection
with his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal
residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode
if he stays there with intention to stay there permanently.

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or
doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for
election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can
have residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize
plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment
because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his
having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.29

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the
time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because
courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.

The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts
of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for
judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact
of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly
taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the
community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of
by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a
congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in
which he shall be elected.

In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a
"specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely
given this option.

Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner
Saludo deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the
contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my
own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes
substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185708               September 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, Appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, which
affirmed the Decision2 dated October 29, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 18 finding appellant Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra (Cabigquez) and Romulo Grondiano y Soco
(Grondiano) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery (Criminal Case No. 2001-816), and also convicting
appellant Cabigquez of rape (Criminal Case No. 2001-815), both crimes committed against private
complainant AAA,3 a 43-year old widow and mother of ten (10) children. Grondiano decided to withdraw
his appeal before the appellate court.4 Hence, this review shall consider only Cabigquez’s appeal.

Below are the facts, as culled from the records of both the trial and appellate courts.

In the evening of March 26, 2001, AAA and her three minor children – BBB, CCC, and DDD5 – slept inside
AAA’s small sari-sari store which was annexed through the exterior balcony of her house at Purok 1-A,
Tablon in Cagayan de Oro City. AAA’s head was close to the door, while a cabinet stood at her right side.
She left the 50-watt incandescent bulb on as they slept through the night.6

At around 3:30 a.m., March 27, 2001, AAA was awakened when clothes fell on her face. When she looked
up, she saw a man whose face was covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage jacket and
cycling shorts. He immediately poked a gun at her. AAA shouted "Ayyy!," rousing her three children from
sleep.7 Despite the cover on the burglar’s face, BBB was able to identify him as Romulo Grondiano, one of
their neighbors, based on the hanging mole located below his left eye. 8 Armed with a stainless
handgun,9 Grondiano ordered AAA and her children to lie face down. 10 Though stricken with fear, BBB
noticed that Grondiano had a companion who stayed at the balcony keeping watch.11 Grondiano then
ransacked the store, taking with him ₱3,000.00 cash from the cabinet and ₱7,000.00 worth of grocery
items. Before he left, Grondiano pointed the gun at AAA’s back and warned them not to make any noise.12

As soon as Grondiano left the store, the other man entered. BBB identified the man as appellant Juanito
Cabigquez as the latter did not conceal his face. Armed with Grondiano’s gun, Cabigquez stripped AAA of
her short pants and underwear, placed a pillow on her lower abdomen and mounted her from behind. He
lifted and twisted one of her legs and pinned the other. AAA shouted "Ayaw!" (No!), but offered no further
resistance. Cabigquez inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, and proceeded to ravish her in full view of her
children, and even as the latter cried for mercy. Before he left, Cabigquez threatened to kill AAA and her
children if they would tell anyone about the incident.13

Afraid for their lives, AAA and her children remained prostrate on the floor even after the two malefactors
had left. Shortly thereafter, they decided to proceed to the house of AAA’s older son, EEE, and asked for
help. AAA failed to disclose to her son the identities of the two men. Meanwhile, BBB, fearing retaliation
from the two men, decided not to divulge the identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her mother and
brother.14

That same morning, March 27, 2001, AAA reported the incident to the Puerto Police Station. No criminal
complaint, however, was filed since AAA was still uncertain of the identities of the two men. AAA was
physically examined by Dr. Cristilda O. Villapañe and Dr. Riman Ricardo, resident physicians at the
Northern Mindanao Medical Center.15Dr. Villapañe’s examination revealed that the smear recovered from
AAA’s vagina was positive for spermatozoa,16while Dr. Ricardo found a two-centimeter contusion on AAA’s
left hand dorsum.17
On May 24, 2001, Cabigquez was arrested for possession of illegal drugs.18 Grondiano was likewise
arrested on May 26, 2001 also for possession of illegal drugs. 19 With the two men incarcerated, and now
certain of their safety, BBB finally mustered the courage to reveal the identities of Cabigquez and
Grondiano to her mother.20

On July 18, 2001, two Informations were filed against Cabigquez and Grondiano, viz:

Criminal Case No. 2001-816 (For: Robbery)

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, alias "DODOY", and
ROMULO GRONDIANO y SOCO, alias "Molok", of the crime they committed, as follows:

That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 o’clock in the early morning in a store located at Purok 1-A,
Barangay Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping with one another, with intent to gain and
violence or intimidation of persons, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
carry away cash – Php3,000.00 and assorted [grocery] stocks valued Php7,000.00 all in all amounting to
Php10,000.00, owned by and belonging to one [AAA], in the following manner: that accused Romulo
Grondiano intimidated the offended party with a gun pointed to her and her three children and ordered
them to lay on the floor with face down and then took, robbed and carried away the aforementioned
valuable personal things while Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra acting/serving as lookout at the door of the
store, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party, in the total sum of Php10,000.00, Philippine
Currency.

Contrary to and in violation to Article 294, par. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.21

Criminal Case No. 2001-815 (For: Rape)

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses, JUANITO CABIGQUEZ Y ALASTRA ALIAS "DODOY", of
the crime of RAPE that he committed as follows:

That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 o’clock or thereabout, in the early morning, at Purok 1A,
Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a gun, and with the use thereof, by means of force, and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledged (sic) of the offended party [AAA],
against her will [and] in the presence and full view of her children.

Contrary to and in violation to (sic) Article 266-A (Formerly under Art. 335) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 8353.22

Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.23 During the trial, Cabigquez admitted that on the night of
March 26, 2001, he slept in the house of Leonila Omilao, a neighbor of Cabigquez and AAA. 24 He admitted
that he did not have any quarrel with AAA and found no possible reason why AAA would file the
complaints and testify against him.25 Omilao herself testified that Cabigquez was in her house on the night
of the incident and even saw the latter sleeping in the kitchen. During Omilao’s cross-examination,
however, the trial court noted Silvina Cabigquez, appellant’s daughter, coaching Omilao in her answers.26

On October 21, 2002, the trial court, on motion by the defense, ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila to conduct a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis on the sperm taken from
AAA’s vagina. On May 21, 2003, NBI Forensic Chemist III Aida Viloria Magsipoc testified that the sample
collected from AAA did not match Cabigquez’s DNA profile since the specimen submitted to them were
mere vaginal discharges from AAA.27

On October 29, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Cabigquez and Grondiano of the crimes
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under
Article 266-B of the same Code, and there being one aggravating circumstance [the used (sic) of a deadly
weapon (firearm)] without a[ny] mitigating circumstance, accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ is hereby
sentenced and is SO ORDERED to suffer the supreme penalty of Death by lethal injection, including its
accessory penalties. He is further directed and is SO ORDERED to pay the victim the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity, plus another TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P25,000.00), as moral damages. Pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. 7659 and Section 10 of Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court, let the entire record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

FURTHERMORE, the Court likewise finds accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Robbery punishable under paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, and [there] being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO are hereby
sentenced and are SO ORDERED to serve the [penalty of] imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as the MINIMUM, to SIX (6) YEARS, ONE
(1) MONTH AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS OF PRISION MAYOR, as the MAXIMUM, including its accessory
penalties, plus further SO ORDERED to pay the stolen items and cash in the sum of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00).

SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, October 29, 2003.28

The records of the case were elevated to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to our ruling in People
v. Mateo,29 the case was referred to the CA.

In his appeal, appellant maintained his defense of alibi and denial. He questioned the accuracy and
credibility of BBB’s testimony given her failure to immediately divulge the identity of the perpetrators after
the incident. Appellant also noted that AAA’s lone interjection, while she was allegedly being raped by him,
can hardly be considered as a manifest resistance.30 The defense also argued that the prosecution failed to
establish conspiracy since BBB did not actually see that Cabigquez was on the balcony while the robbery
was being committed.31

By Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA upheld the RTC in convicting appellant of both crimes of robbery
and rape. The CA found BBB’s testimony candid and not prompted by ill-motive. As to BBB’s failure to
promptly implicate Grondiano and Cabigquez for the crimes, the appellate court ruled that this cannot be
taken against her in the light of serious threats made by said accused on their family. The alleged
contradictions in the testimonies of AAA and BBB were likewise not fatal to the case of the prosecution as
they bear no materiality to the commission of the crime. The CA also noted that the accused were able to
consummate their criminal acts without any physical resistance from the victims who could not even cry
loudly because they were ordered at gunpoint not to make any noise. It rejected the defense of alibi put
up by Cabigquez in view of his admission that he stayed at a house within the vicinity of AAA’s store.32

The CA thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed October 29, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, convicting Juanito A.
Cabigquez, the lone appellant before Us, for the crimes of Robbery and Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that Juanito A. Cabigquez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the crime of Rape.

SO ORDERED.33

Before this Court, appellant Cabigquez reiterates the following arguments:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME

CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS COMMITTED ROBBERY, THE COURT A

QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THEM TO PAY THE COMPLAINANT P10,000.00 AS ACTUAL
DAMAGES.

IV.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT
BAR.34

We sustain the ruling of the CA.

The factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court, indubitably prove that appellant raped
AAA even if the specimen obtained from the vaginal swabs and submitted to the NBI failed to match
appellant’s DNA profile. Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
through force, threat or intimidation.35The commission of rape was clearly shown by testimonial and
documentary evidence; the defense submits that it is the identity of the perpetrator which is not duly
established.
For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is indeed a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence.36 In this case, however, the result of the DNA test is rendered inconclusive to
exculpate or inculpate the appellant since the sample tested by the NBI merely contained vaginal
discharges. In the laboratory test earlier conducted by Dr. Villapañe on the vaginal swab obtained from
AAA’s genitalia, the presence of spermatozoa was confirmed. This notwithstanding, the totality of evidence
satisfactorily established that it was indeed appellant who raped AAA.

AAA’s daughter, BBB, who witnessed the entire incident which happened inside their store on the night in
question, positively identified appellant as the one who raped her mother against the latter’s will by
threatening her and her children with a handgun he was then carrying. BBB’s unflinching and consistent
testimony, when taken together with Dr. Villapañe’s findings and AAA’s own declarations in court, provides
sufficient basis for the conviction of appellant for rape.

Quoted herein are the relevant portions of BBB’s testimony on direct examination as to her identification
of appellant as her mother’s rapist, viz:

Q Now, [BBB], you said that you are 13 years old and you said a while ago you sworn that you will
tell the truth, can you remember that?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay now, are you going to tell the truth and nothing but the truth before this Honorable Court?

A Yes, sir I will tell the truth.

Q Do you know what will happen to you if you tell a lie in court?

A Yes, sir I will be imprisoned.

Q Do you want to be imprisoned?

A No, sir.

Q So, you will tell the truth nothing but the truth?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know accused Romulo Grondiano?

A Yes, sir because he is our neighbor.

xxxx

Q Do you also know accused Juanito Cabigquez who is accused for rape and co-accused in robbery?

A Yes, sir he is also our neighbor.

Q For how long have you known Juanito Cabigquez before March 27, 2001?

A Since I came that age of reason I already knew Juanito Cabigquez.

Q Is Juanito Cabigquez also a resident of Purok 1-A at Tablon?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you also know the nickname of Juanito Cabigquez?

A Its Dodoy.

Q If Juanito Cabigquez is inside this courtroom, can you point to him?

A Note: Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his name identified himself as Juanito
Cabigquez.

Q Okay, on March 27, 2001 at about 3:30 early in the morning, do you remember where were
you?

A I was inside our store sleeping together with our mother.

Q Aside from you and your mother, who were other persons who were with you?

A Together with my two (2) siblings.

xxxx

Q Now, while you were sleeping together with your mother and your two (2) younger siblings at
that time, what happened?

xxxx

A The three (3) of us were awakened because of the shout of our mother.

Q Who is that us?

A I together with my two (2) siblings.

Q Your mother also woke up?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, after you were awakened by the shout of your mother, what did you observe, if there was
any?

A I saw my mother knelt down and I came nearer and then I embraced her because I thought she
was dreaming but I saw Romulo Grondiano with a gun.

xxxx

Q Alright, what happened while you saw accused Romulo Grondiano already at the door of your
store of your mother holding a gun and your mother was kneeling?

A He ordered us to lay face down.

Q After Romulo Grondiano ordered you to lay face down, what did you, your mother and your two
(2) siblings do?

A I let my mother lay face down.

Q How about you?

A I also lay face down.

Q How about your two (2) younger siblings?

A They also lay face down.

Q Alright, while the four (4) of you were lying face down, what did you observe?

A I noticed that he had a companion who is at our balcony.

Q How were you able to notice that he has a companion?

A Because we had a chair made of bamboo and then if somebody or a person hit it, it will sound.

xxxx

Q Now, after Romulo Grondiano took all those things that you have enumerated a while ago, where
did Romulo Grondiano go?

A He pointed a gun at my mother’s back and then ordered us not to move.

xxxx

Q Alright, after Romulo Grondiano told you, your mother and your two (2) younger siblings not to
move, where did Romulo Grondiano go?
A He went to the balcony and then Juanito Cabigquez replaced him (Romulo) in going up, he
(Juanito) went inside our store.

xxxx

Q Alright, you testified a while ago that after Romulo Grondiano went inside your store he passed
by the balcony of your house, then co-accused Juanito Cabigquez came in, where did Juanito
Cabigquez come in?

A He entered in our store.

Q The same store where you, your mother and two (2) younger siblings were staying at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q How were you able to recognize that it was Juanito Cabigquez who came in?

A Because I saw him.

Q When you saw Juanito Cabigquez, were you still lying face down or were you already sitting?

A I was already lying face down.

Q How were you able to see him?

A Because I looked back at the door because I thought that Romulo Grondiano already left but then
I saw Juanito Cabigquez came in and replaced Romulo Grondiano.

Q This Juanito Cabigquez who came in after Romulo Grondiano went out, is he the same Juanito
Cabigquez the co-accused for robbery and accused in rape case?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is inside this courtroom, can you point him again?

A Note: Witness pointed again to a person who when asked of his name identified himself as
Juanito Cabigquez.

Q After Juanito Cabigquez came in inside the store, what did you observe?

A He removed the shortpants of my mother and then he got the pillow of my mother and placed it
under her abdomen.

xxxx

Q Now, what was the position of your mother when Juanito Cabigquez took off the shortpants of
your mother?

A She was still lying face down.

Q What was the position of your mother when Juanito Cabigquez put the pillow under her
abdomen?

A She was still lying face down.

Q By the way, when Juanito Cabigquez entered the store, was the light still on?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, you said that your mother shouted when Juanito Cabigquez came in. My question is, when
did your mother actually shout?

A When Juanito Cabigquez was removing the shortpants of my mother.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q Can you tell the Court what kind of shout your mother did?

A My mother shouted "ay!"

PROS. M. NOLASCO: (cont’g.)

Q Now, was Juanito able to take off the shortpants of your mother?

A Yes, sir because it was a gartered shortpants.

Q Now, how about the panty of your mother?

A It was removed together with the shortpants.

Q Now, after the shortpants and panty of your mother were taken off and the pillow was placed
under her abdomen, what next did you observe?

A Juanito Cabigquez mounted on my mother.

Q And then, what did Juanito do when he mounted to your mother?

A He did a push and pull motion.

Q How about your two (2) younger siblings, were they still awake at that time?

A Yes, sir, they were crying.

Q How about you?

A I also cried.

Q When you noticed that he (Juanito Cabigquez) entered your store, was he carrying a gun?

xxxx

A He was bringing a gun.

xxxx

Q Can you demonstrate the length of the gun that you saw?

A The gun which Juanito Cabigquez was bringing was the same gun Romulo brought.

Q How about your mother while Juanito Cabigquez was already mounted on her and make a push
and pull motion, what did your mother do?

A My mother was crying.

xxxx

Q You said that you, your mother and your two (2) younger siblings were crying while Juanito
Cabigquez mounted on your mother and made a push and pull motion, what happened after that?

A He pointed his gun at the back of my mother and then told us not to tell to anybody because
they will return and kill us.

Q Now, after Juanito Cabigquez warned you not to tell anybody otherwise they will return and kill
you, what did Juanito Cabigquez do?

A He went up to the balcony.

xxxx

Q How about Juanito Cabigquez, when he entered your store of your mother and raped your
mother, what was he wearing?

A He was wearing a white t-shirt and maong pants.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q Was it long or short?

 A Long pants.

x x x x 37 (Emphasis supplied.)

Appellant asserts that it is significant that AAA herself did not recognize him and his co-accused despite
her familiarity with them as they were her customers in her store. It was pointed out that the
identification of the perpetrators was supplied solely by her daughter BBB, who should not have been
given any credence in view of her inconsistent declarations such as when she testified that when she woke
up, her mother was kneeling contrary to the latter’s testimony that when clothes fell on her face, she was
awakened and that her mother shouted but a gun was pointed to her. Moreover, BBB saw the accused
several times after the alleged crimes transpired and yet she did not manifest any alarm even when they
reported the matter to the police; it was only after the accused were detained that their identities were
revealed. In the light of serious discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, appellant
maintains that BBB’s identification of the perpetrators of robbery and rape was unreliable and doubtful.38

We are not persuaded.

While it is true that the most natural reaction for victims of crimes is to strive to remember the faces of
their assailants and the manner in which the craven acts are committed, 39 in this case, AAA cannot be
faulted for failing to recognize appellant as her rapist though the latter was their neighbor. It must be
recalled, as narrated by AAA and BBB, they were all still lying face down when appellant suddenly entered
the store right after his co-accused Grondiano exited through the balcony taking the loot with him. BBB
recounted that her mother was still lying face down when appellant removed her mother’s short pants and
panty, placed a pillow below her abdomen and then proceeded to rape her. It was BBB who had the
opportunity to look at this second person who entered their house because she looked back at the door
thinking that Grondiano (the one who first entered the store) already left, but then appellant immediately
came in after Grondiano. Although AAA was able to shout at that time, she could not move because she
was afraid that her three children, who were already crying, will be harmed.40

As to the alleged inconsistency in the position of her mother when accused Grondiano entered their store,
the same is inexistent considering that AAA was relating the exact moment when she woke up and
realized the presence of an intruder because clothes fell on her face, while BBB who was awakened by the
shout of her mother, simply described her mother then already in a kneeling position as she woke up first.
BBB had thought her mother was just dreaming but then she saw Grondiano already inside the house with
a gun.

Neither would BBB’s delay in revealing the identities of the perpetrators to the police taint her
identification of appellant as the one who raped her mother and conspirator of Grondiano in robbing their
store. Failure to immediately reveal the identity of a perpetrator of a felony does not affect, much less
impair, the credibility of witnesses, more so if such delay is adequately explained.41 BBB sufficiently
explained her action in not immediately divulging to her mother and brother nor reporting to the police
whom she saw inside their house that early morning of March 27, 2001. She was afraid that the assailants
would make good their threat that they will return and kill their family if they reported the incident to
anybody. But when a couple of months later appellant and his co-accused Grondiano were arrested on
drug charges, BBB finally felt it was safe to come out in the open and inform the police of the identities of
the two men who robbed their house, one of whom subsequently raped her mother (appellant).

Appellant cannot seek acquittal on the basis of the negative result of the DNA test on the specimen
conducted by the NBI.

A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the totality of the evidence presented before the court points
to no other possible conclusion, i.e., appellant raped the private offended party. A positive DNA match
may strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, but an inconclusive DNA test result may not be sufficient
to exculpate the accused, particularly when there is sufficient evidence proving his guilt. Notably, neither a
positive DNA match of the semen nor the presence of spermatozoa is essential in finding that rape was
committed. The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the penetration of
the female genitalia by the male organ.42

Moreover, it is evident that the rape of AAA was committed in the presence and in full view of her three
minor children. Thirteen (13)-year old BBB, as well as her two minor siblings who were present at the
time when the rape was committed, was already old enough to sense the bestiality being committed
against their own mother.43 Such circumstance, as recited in the last portion of the Information for
Criminal Case No. 2001-815 is, by itself, sufficient to qualify the rape under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code,44 as amended. Consequently, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of appellant for
qualified rape.

With respect to the charge of robbery, we find no merit in appellant’s argument that the prosecution failed
to establish that he conspired with co-accused Grondiano in stealing goods from private complainant’s
store. He asserts that there was no proof that he was outside the store when the crime of robbery was
being committed; private complainant and her daughter merely surmised that another person was outside
the store because of a creaking sound created by a bamboo chair, but they actually did not see that
person or if there was indeed that person.45

On this issue, we hold that the CA correctly ruled that conspiracy was sufficiently proven by circumstantial
evidence on record, thus:

We also find that the trial court correctly appreciated conspiracy against Cabigquez with respect [to] the
crime of robbery. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred upon the acts of the accused themselves when
such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.

Neither [AAA] nor [BBB] saw Cabigquez acting as a lookout outside the store. However, the creaking
sound coming from the balcony and the fact that [BBB] saw Cabigquez go inside the store, as soon as
Grondiano left, reasonably verify a discernment that someone stood by outside and close to the store’s
entrance during the looting, and that such person was Cabigquez. The fact that only Grondiano concealed
his face reasonably indicates a prior agreement between the two (2) malefactors for Cabigquez to act as a
lookout in the commission of robbery. After raping [AAA], Cabigquez also warned of killing [AAA and her
children] if they told anyone about the incident, which threat contributed to the common sentiment of
concealing both crimes of robbery and rape. These circumstances sufficiently establish a joint purpose and
design, and a community of interest, between Cabigquez and Grondiano, in committing the crime of
robbery.46

On the matter of actual damages awarded by the trial court, appellant questions the amount thereof,
insisting there was no basis for the actual cost of the items taken from the store.

We find no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining such award. In People v. Martinez, 47 this
Court ruled that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because
these are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration. Judicial cognizance,
which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being
equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve. Surely, matters like the
value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably within public knowledge and easily
capable of unquestionable demonstration.48 Here, what is involved are common goods for everyday use
and ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores like private complainant’s store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee,
sugar, liquor and cigarettes. The RTC was thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of ₱10,000.00
as computed by the private complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store.

Further, the Court deems it proper to adjust the sums awarded as civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages. Applying prevailing jurisprudence, the private complainant is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.49

Lastly, the death penalty imposed on appellant was correctly modified to reclusion perpetua, in view of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines."50Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for
parole following Section 3 of the said law, which provides:

SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals,
Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00409 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant in Criminal Case No. 2001-815 for qualified rape is herein
clarified as without eligibility for parole, and the appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150949             June 21, 2007

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
Cavite,petitioner, 
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 12, 2001 and
Resolution dated November 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.

The facts are:

On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece
of land consisting of 33,130 square meters in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece
Martires City.

Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was
issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession of
the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker
claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found
that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.

On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a
complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as defendants were spouses
Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons
are spurious and falsified.

In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Español, petitioner, issued an Order
stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel,
Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it
(Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner declared
respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the
municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Petitioner’s Order is partly reproduced as follows:

 From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds that the instant case is a
callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations,
through the extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former counsel,
Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who
connived with this private group on one hand, and some officials and employees of the government
agencies responsible for the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other.
Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the
mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.

Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified document is the forger
thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges
be filed against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of
this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice for
their appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant’s Office, Supreme Court. Manila.

Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc.,
respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are
declared and held in contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents in
the pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant case filed before this Court. Let the
corresponding Warrants of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents who should serve
ten (10) days of detention at the Dasmariñas Municipal Jail, Cavite.

Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT No. T-511462 allegedly
issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from
another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on
December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for
being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its
implementation with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the Assessor’s Office of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious instruments.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas,
the private defendant’s counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are likewise dismissed.
However, the said private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful course(s) of
action in the interest of justice.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of title, she "stumbled"
upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.2 Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judge’s
Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents
are responsible therefor.

On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They were confined in the
municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to
lift the order of arrest. But they were denied outright by petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.

On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the same is
hereby GRANTED. Respondent judge’s July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein petitioners
in direct contempt and ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the Warrant of
Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment, dated July 13, 2001, which the
respondent judge issued against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Español erred in taking cognizance of the Decision rendered by then
Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for
quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have
conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as charged.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of
November 15, 2001.
Hence, this petition.

The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct
contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.

The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act or conduct which tends to interfere
with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of
disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly
proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been described
as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their
witnesses during litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the
court.5

The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but
divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront
to the sovereign.6 This concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with
modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of
the judicial institution.7 Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very
administration of justice.8

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment,
not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or so near
the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie
curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one may be summarily
adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of
contumely.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has
been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including
the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another
to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue
of an order or process of a court held by him.
 But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to
bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may
include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process
or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.11

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it
constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an
improper conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch VI,12 we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the
document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to
such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a
contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been
given to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel.13 Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt
proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises
limited jurisdiction.14 Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are
assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. 15 Perforce, petitioner judge
erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their
incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.

Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took judicial notice of the Decision in
Civil Case No. 623-92, assigned to another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129
of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we
reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the
basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax
declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in
ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.

Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ
of habeas corpusin favor of respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were released after
posting the required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf
of a person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained
of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.17

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177809               October 16, 2009

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners, 

vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
89300:1(1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil
Case No. 04-0052;2 and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.3

First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.

The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane
Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
Baclaran, Parañaque City.

On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses
Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.1 a vv
ph!1

The contract of lease reads:

CONTRACT OF LEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B.
Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,

- and -
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24
Anahan St. RGV Homes Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.

WITNESSETH

1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes
Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Parañaque Ctiy;

2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area
of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:

a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND
(₱60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES
agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;

b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the
LESSOR;

c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said
premises;

d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a
written permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the
Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses;

e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall
not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.

f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate
any of the above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease.
Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals
for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.

3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to
December ______, 2005.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999
at City of Manila, Philippines.

(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAÑA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSOR LESSEE

(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua

Republic of the Philippines)

City of Manila)s.s.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:

Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Parañaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No.
12885654 at Parañaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Parañaque City on Nov.
11, 1999.

known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2)
pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the
same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.

IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day
of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased
cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s
demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.

In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles
had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of
₱2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalie’s handwriting, read:

1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip &
Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner
Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[arañ]aque City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs.
Contract.

₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua

(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:6

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two
(2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they
readily accepted Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be
used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished
cubicles.

Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them
without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease
they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were
surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint
against them.

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are
hereby ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a
Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran,
Parañaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to
December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(₱72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each
and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until
the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the
[Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00) as attorney’s fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) per [Rosalie’s] appearance in
Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.

[Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give
credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects,
incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of
Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the
specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only
starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the document,
albeit the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of
deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.

The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented;
and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses
Latip in the amount of ₱2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 was simply
goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights,
the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce
evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties
for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be
ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.

The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is
reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter
to pay the former –

(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorney’s fees;
and

(4) costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.8

In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the
decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and
not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the
alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the
amount of ₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of
this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the
appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at
Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
Thus, ruling on Rosalie’s appeal, the CA disposed of the case:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision
of RTC Parañaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.9

Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.

The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.

As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took
judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to
the lessor.

We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory
or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis
of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person.11

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel &
Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12 which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have
been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of
any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the
appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA
took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was
of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence
to prove her claim that the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint
declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to
Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for
matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the
taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by
the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary
evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the
alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court – What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in
the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that
the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.

Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what
remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both parties – the contract of lease and the
receipts evidencing payment of ₱2,570,000.00.

We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a
novation of the contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for
the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:

Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of
Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist
Road, Baclaran, Parañaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6)
years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract
of Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another
agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease
contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is unclear.13

We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties
as set forth in the contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand
Chua as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts for ₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00, respectively,
which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the
stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husband’s consent. The findings of the
three lower courts concur on this fact.

The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again
buttressed by Spouses Latip’s admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999,
bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.

On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold
that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial
notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted
Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of
goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.

In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of
contracts, to wit:

Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.

Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.

The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for ₱2,570,000.00 modified or
supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was
payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this
finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are
again reproduced:
 1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra
Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran
P[arañ]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.

₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua

(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:14

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to
full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s receipt of cash in
varying amounts. The first receipt for ₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this
cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect.
Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the ₱2,000,000.00 is
not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalie’s
receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after
the commencement of the lease.

Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased
premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance
with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of ₱2,570,000.00, covering
advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to
respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already received by her
as advance rentals. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156052             February 13, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

x----------------------x

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION, movants-intervenors.

x----------------------x

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron),
Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil
companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed
their respective motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.

Chevron1 is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the
Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise
importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines. 2 The DOE is a
governmental agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 76383 and tasked to prepare, integrate,
coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government relative to
energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.4

The facts are restated briefly as follows:

Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original
petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001,5 approved by respondent Mayor on
November 28, 2001,6 and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication. 7 Sections 1 and 3
thereof state:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety,
and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the
land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in
the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the
west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in
the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the
Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from
Industrial II to Commercial I.

xxx       xxx       xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no
longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date
of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)8 with the oil companies. They agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97.9 In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a
period of six months starting July 25, 2002.10 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 1311 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the
mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies.12

This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our March 7, 2007
decision. We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city,"13 including Ordinance No. 8027.
We also held that we need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the
oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly
gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally
hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE sought to intervene and filed
motions for reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively. On April
11, 2007, we conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and movants-
intervenors oil companies and DOE.

The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003, Chevron had filed a complaint
against respondent and the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the
annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction.14 The case was docketed as civil case no. 03-106377. On the same day,
Shell filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus likewise assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8027
and with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction.15 This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106380. Later on, these two cases were consolidated
and the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 issued an order dated May 19, 2003 granting the applications for writs
of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction:

WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php 2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ
of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their
officers, agents, representatives, successors, and any other persons assisting or acting in their
behalf, during the pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from taking steps to enforce Ordinance No.
8027, and let a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue
[Chevron and Shell] the necessary Business Permits to operate at the Pandacan Terminal.16
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the validity of
Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO). This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004,
the RTC enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo.17

Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.18 This was approved by respondent on June
16, 2006.19

Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8119.20 This was docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its own
complaint on the same causes of action in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41. 21 This was docketed as civil case
no. 07-116700.22 The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of Manila and respondent
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119.23

Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint and
counterclaim on February 20, 2007.24 In an order dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion was granted and
all the claims and counterclaims of the parties were withdrawn.25

Given these additional pieces of information, the following were submitted as issues for our resolution:

1. whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this case;26

2. whether the following are impediments to the execution of our March 7, 2007 decision:

(a) Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and existence of which were not previously brought
by the parties to the attention of the Court and

(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction and
status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42 and

3. whether the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will unduly encroach upon the DOE’s powers
and functions involving energy resources.

During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Court’s power to rule on the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of consolidated cases involving this issue in the
RTC.27 The importance of settling this controversy as fully and as expeditiously as possible was
emphasized, considering its impact on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue here. The
parties were after all given ample opportunity to present and argue their respective positions. By so doing,
we will do away with the delays concomitant with litigation and completely adjudicate an issue which will
most likely reach us anyway as the final arbiter of all legal disputes.

Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of the history of the Pandacan Terminals is called for to put
our discussion in the proper context.

History Of The Pandacan Oil Terminals

Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the Pasig river. At the
turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the industrial center of Manila. The
area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the
transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an industrial zone. 28 Among its
early industrial settlers were the oil companies. Shell established its installation there on January 30,
1914.29 Caltex (now Chevron) followed suit in 1917 when the company began marketing its products in
the country.30 In 1922, it built a warehouse depot which was later converted into a key distribution
terminal.31 The corporate presence in the Philippines of Esso (Petron’s predecessor) became more keenly
felt when it won a concession to build and operate a refinery in Bataan in 1957. 32 It then went on to
operate a state-of-the-art lube oil blending plant in the Pandacan Terminals where it manufactures lubes
and greases.33

On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the Philippine Islands. Although
Manila was declared an open city, the Americans had no interest in welcoming the Japanese. In fact, in
their zealous attempt to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the
Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive the advancing
Japanese Army of a valuable logistics weapon.34 The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a
frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:

After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set
on fire. The flames spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze,
endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. … For one week longer, the "open city" blazed—a
cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by night.35
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network of depots and service
stations inoperative.36

After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three
major oil companies resumed the operation of their depots.37 But the district was no longer a sparsely
populated industrial zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has
become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of whom are urban poor
who call it home.38 Aside from numerous industrial installations, there are also small businesses, churches,
restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated there.39 Malacañang Palace, the official
residence of the President of the Philippines and the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers
away.40 There is a private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of
informal settlers.41 More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near
these facilities.42 A university with a student population of about 25,000 is located directly across the
depot on the banks of the Pasig river.43

The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies’ distribution terminals and depot
facilities.44 The refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are
connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer45 underground pipeline system.46 Petron’s
refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot. 47 The terminals store fuel and other
petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel requirements of Metro Manila, 48 50% of Luzon’s
consumption and 35% nationwide.49 Fuel can also be transported through barges along the Pasig river or
tank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.

We now discuss the first issue: whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this case.

Intervention Of The Oil Companies And The DOE Should Be Allowed In The Interest of Justice

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceedings.50 The pertinent rules are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

SEC. 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties.

Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a non-party:

(1) Legal interest

(a) in the matter in controversy; or

(b) in the success of either of the parties; or

I against both parties; or

(d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of

property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof;

(2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of original parties;

(3) Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding51 and

(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely absent. As a rule, intervention is
allowed "before rendition of judgment" as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. Both filed their separate
motions after our decision was promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon,52 a recently
decided case which was also an original action filed in this Court, we declared that the appropriate time to
file the motions-in-intervention was before and not after resolution of the case.53

The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of substantial justice:
 The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.54

The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because the implementation of
Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property rights.55

[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the
action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive
and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the
subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the
intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment of
which plaintiff could not recover.56

We agree that the oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the implementation of Ordinance
No. 8027. Their claim is that they will need to spend billions of pesos if they are compelled to relocate
their oil depots out of Manila. Considering that they admitted knowing about this case from the time of its
filing on December 4, 2002, they should have intervened long before our March 7, 2007 decision to
protect their interests. But they did not.57 Neither did they offer any worthy explanation to justify their late
intervention.

Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was not filed on time, we will allow it because
they raised and presented novel issues and arguments that were not considered by the Court in its March
7, 2007 decision. After all, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court before which the case is pending. 58 Considering the compelling reasons
favoring intervention, we do not think that this will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of
the original parties. In fact, it will be expedited since their intervention will enable us to rule on the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 instead of waiting for the RTC’s decision.

The DOE, on the other hand, alleges that its interest in this case is also direct and immediate as Ordinance
No. 8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and national authority over matters affecting the oil industry. It
seeks to intervene in order to represent the interests of the members of the public who stand to suffer if
the Pandacan Terminals’ operations are discontinued. We will tackle the issue of the alleged encroachment
into DOE’s domain later on. Suffice it to say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all sides and
considering the transcendental importance of this case, we will also allow DOE’s intervention.

The Injunctive Writs Are Not Impediments To The Enforcement Of Ordinance No. 8027

Under Rule 65, Section 359 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. According to the oil companies,
respondent did not unlawfully fail or neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he was lawfully
prevented from doing so by virtue of the injunctive writs and status quo order issued by the RTC of
Manila, Branches 39 and 42.

First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo order in favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the
court granted the joint motion of the parties to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim.60

Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive writs. Respondent (who was
also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends himself by saying that he informed the court of the
pendency of the civil cases and that a TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by
Chevron and Shell. It is true that had the oil companies only intervened much earlier, the Court would not
have been left in the dark about these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should have updated the Court, by
way of manifestation, on such a relevant matter.

In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of 20 days. This is why, in our March
7, 2007 decision, we presumed with certainty that this had already lapsed.61 Respondent also mentioned
the grant of injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited
pleading. The parties and their counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.

In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the parties. 62 Courts, as
well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues
presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal
knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects
of mandatory judicial notice.
We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs are legal impediments to the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. ― A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(g) IThat a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right to be protected
exists prima facieand (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that
the violation sought to be prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.

The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027. It is a settled rule that
an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be restrained by
injunction.63 Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded
from issuing an injunctive writ against its enforcement. However, we have declared that the issuance of
said writ is proper only when:

... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong
enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought....64 (Emphasis supplied)

Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003, stated his basis for issuing the injunctive writs:

The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction should be issued, is guided by the following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the
complainant; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the Writ to
prevent serious damage. The Court believes that these requisites are present in these cases.

There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have been legitimately operating their business in
the Pandacan Terminal for many years and they have made substantial capital investment therein.
Every year they were issued Business Permits by the City of Manila. Its operations have not been
declared illegal or contrary to law or morals. In fact, because of its vital importance to the national
economy, it was included in the Investment Priorities Plan as mandated under the "Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful business, the plaintiff/petitioners have a
right, therefore, to continue their operation in the Pandacan Terminal and the right to protect their
investments. This is a clear and unmistakable right of the plaintiff/petitioners.

The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027 passed by the City Council of Manila
reclassifying the area where the Pandacan Terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial I
and requiring the plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the operation of their business has
certainly violated the rights of the plaintiff/petitioners to continue their legitimate business in the
Pandacan Terminal and deprived them of their huge investments they put up therein. Thus, before
the Court, therefore, determines whether the Ordinance in question is valid or not, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of Mandatory Injunction be issued to prevent serious and
irreparable damage to plaintiff/petitioners.65

Nowhere in the judge’s discussion can we see that, in addition to a showing of a clear legal
right of Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, he was convinced that they had made out a
case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of validity
of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the
contrary in clear and unequivocal terms.66 The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. 67 The presumption is
all in favor of validity. The reason for this is obvious:

The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
 local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.68

X—x—x

...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the
determination of actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.69

The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness
appears on the face of the ordinance itself.70 We see no reason to set aside the presumption. The
ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from
industrial to commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of municipal corporations:

The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial, commercial and
residential zones is recognized in almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police
power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants.71

X—x—x

There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential
and industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are
to be established exclusively in the latter zone.

xxx       xxx       xxx

Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the authority, derived from the police
power, of forbidding the appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now
situated, which has been declared residential....72

Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such
showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTC’s May 19, 2003 order had no leg to
stand on.

We are aware that the issuance of these injunctive writs is not being assailed as tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. However, we are confronted with the question of whether these writs issued by a lower court
are impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 (which is the subject of
the mandamus petition). As already discussed, we rule in the negative.

Ordinance No. 8027 Was Not Superseded By Ordinance No. 8119

The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and
Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto" which was approved by
respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this
ordinance.

While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to
local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by
mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.73

Although, Section 50 of RA 40974 provides that:

SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the
ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].

This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken
steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court
about it.

Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court
is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have
access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text
of the rules the party desires it to have notice of.75 Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a
trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice
of local ordinances.76
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any
discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute
does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the
ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.77

In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance No.
8119 because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not
inconsistent with each other.78

In the same way that we deem the intervenors’ late intervention in this case unjustified, we find the
failure of respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.

The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that "the
issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]." 79 They
contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.

Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the validity and
legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said ordinance’s constitutionality,
opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119. 80 The oil companies deny this and further
argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for
the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No.
8027:81

... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the reclassification
were given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect,
replaced Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance
No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven
years;82 (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
(Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with what was pleaded,83 the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the
statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the
same" as this case before us.84 To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the
same case in which it is offered.

Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance
No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the
argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its
(8119’s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever
positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties
cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute85 or ordinance. Nonetheless,
we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

Ordinance No. 8119 Did Not Impliedly Repeal Ordinance No. 8027

Both the oil companies and DOE argue that Ordinance No. 8119 repealed Ordinance No. 8027. They assert
that although there was no express repeal86 of Ordinance No. 8027, Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly
repealed it.

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area covering the Pandacan Terminals
to "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)"87 whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
same area from Industrial II to Commercial I:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and
general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St.
in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon
in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. (Emphasis
supplied)

Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven years:

SEC. 72. Existing Non-Conforming Uses and Buildings. - The lawful use of any building, structure or
land at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance may be continued, although such use does not
conform with the provision of the Ordinance, provided:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(g) In case the non-conforming use is an industrial use:

xxx       xxx       xxx

d. The land use classified as non-conforming shall program the phase-out and
relocation of the non-conforming use within seven (7) years from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)

This is opposed to Ordinance No. 8027 which compels affected entities to vacate the area within six
months from the effectivity of the ordinance:

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no
longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date
of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil depot area as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD)":

SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). – O-PUD Zones are
identified specific sites in the City of Manila wherein the project site is comprehensively planned as
an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/ design, building siting,
complementarily of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of
significant natural land features, pursuant to regulations specified for each particular PUD.
Enumerated below are identified PUD:

xxx       xxx       xxx

6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area

xxx       xxx       xxx

Enumerated below are the allowable uses:

1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located

2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are located shall, in all instances be
complied with

3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the development controls and
regulations specified for each PUD as provided for each PUD as provided for by the masterplan of
respective PUDs.88(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent claims that in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the Sanggunian did not intend to repeal Ordinance
No. 8027 but meant instead to carry over 8027’s provisions to 8119 for the purpose of making Ordinance
No. 8027 applicable to the oil companies even after the passage of Ordinance No. 8119.89 He quotes an
excerpt from the minutes of the July 27, 2004 session of the Sanggunian during the first reading of
Ordinance No. 8119:

Member GARCIA: Your Honor, iyong patungkol po roon sa oil depot doon sa amin sa Sixth District
sa Pandacan, wala pong nakalagay eith sa ordinansa rito na taliwas o kakaiba roon sa ordinansang
ipinasa noong nakaraang Konseho, iyong Ordinance No. 8027. So kung ano po ang nandirito sa
ordinansa na ipinasa ninyo last time, iyon lang po ang ni-lift eithe at inilagay eith. At eith eith
ordinansang …iyong naipasa ng huling Konseho, niri-classify [ninyo] from Industrial II to
Commercial C-1 ang area ng Pandacan kung nasaan ang oil depot. So ini-lift lang po [eithe] iyong
definition, density, at saka po yon pong … ng… noong ordinansa ninyo na siya eith naming inilagay
eith, iniba lang po naming iyong title. So wala po kaming binago na taliwas o nailagay na
taliwas doon sa ordinansang ipinasa ninyo, ni-lift lang po [eithe] from Ordinance No.
8027."90 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with respondent.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the
intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.91

There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one.92 The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.93 The oil companies
argue that the situation here falls under the first category.

Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest.94 As statutes and ordinances are presumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with
knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not
intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter. 95 If the intent to
repeal is not clear, the later act should be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the
earlier act.96

These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence. We disagree that, in enacting Ordinance No.
8119, there was any indication of the legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. 97 The excerpt
quoted above is proof that there was never such an intent. While it is true that both ordinances relate to
the same subject matter, i.e.classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil depot is located,
if there is no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made
to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given effect:

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute
is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may
merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of
legislative purpose to repeal.98

For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances.
There is no conflict between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from
Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it as a "Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex C which defined the zone boundaries,99 the Pandacan
area was shown to be within the "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)." These zone
classifications in Ordinance No. 8119 are not inconsistent with the reclassification of the Pandacan area
from Industrial to Commercial in Ordinance No. 8027. The "O-PUD" classification merely made Pandacan a
"project site ... comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in
planning/design, building siting, complementarity of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and
the preservation of significant natural land features...."100 Its classification as "R-3/MXD" means that it
should "be used primarily for high-rise housing/dwelling purposes and limited
complementary/supplementary trade, services and business activities."101 There is no conflict since both
ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119).

Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does not repeal
a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the
latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant (a general
law does not nullify a specific or special law).102 This is so even if the provisions of the general law are
sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act.103 The special act and the
general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the law of
general application.104 The special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a
qualification of, the general act or provision.105

The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character, considers and
makes special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being
so, the legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to those of the
special law and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify such special law,
cannot be deemed to have intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the latter.106

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law107 since it deals specifically with a certain area described therein (the
Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law 108 as it covers the
entire city of Manila.

The oil companies assert that even if Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law, the existence of an all-
encompassing repealing clause in Ordinance No. 8119 evinces an intent on the part of the Sanggunian to
repeal the earlier ordinance:

Sec. 84. Repealing Clause. – All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with the provisions of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the effectivity of
this Ordinance shall not be impaired.
They cited Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City v. Department of Agrarian Reform:109

The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the legislative
intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, whether the prior law is a general
law or a special law... Without such a clause, a later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior
special law on the same subject. But with such clause contained in the subsequent general law, the
prior special law will be deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear legislative intent to bring about
that result.110

This ruling in not applicable here. The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate
the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No.
8027, a special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in
the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.

To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent than real. The two ordinances
can be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area particularly described therein whereas
Ordinance No. 8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.

Mandamus Lies To Compel Respondent Mayor To Enforce Ordinance No. 8027

The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in consideration of the separation
of powers of the executive and judiciary.111 This argument is misplaced. Indeed,

[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative [or executive
departments] of the government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. 112 (Emphasis
Supplied)

since this is the function of a writ of mandamus, which is the power to compel "the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station."113

They also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel respondent to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was to seek relief from the President of the Philippines through the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the President’s power
of supervision over local government units. Again, we disagree. A party need not go first to the DILG in
order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. This suggested process would be unreasonably long,
tedious and consequently injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents
whose welfare is sought to be protected. Besides, petitioners’ resort to an original action
for mandamus before this Court is undeniably allowed by the Constitution.114

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid

Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027, we now proceed to
make a definitive ruling on its constitutionality and validity.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable.115

The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027

Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police
power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.116 This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law).117 While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power
may be delegated.118 Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the
delegated police power to local governments:119

Section 16. General Welfare. ― Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
 their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.

LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the city:

Section. 458. – Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The sangguniang panglungsod,
as the legislative branch of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
xxxx

This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila:

Section 18. Legislative powers. — The [City Council] shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter
xxxx120

Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to "reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city."121

The Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of Police Power

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.122

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health,
public safety and general welfare"123 of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the
ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of
the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products which
include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among
others;

(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;

(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and

(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.124

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of
Manila and not just of a particular class. 125 The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation
of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their
midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat. According to respondent:

Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed that what was perceived
to be impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible.
The destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful day became the
impetus for a public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued
[such] that it became imperative for governments to take measures to combat their effects.126

Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public
require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.127 Clearly,
the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.128 Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare.129 However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to
forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must
have a reasonable relation to the end in view.130

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the
area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local
city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. 131 As a result of the zoning,
the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be
permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the
police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality.132 Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust:

There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential
and industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are
to be established exclusively in the latter zone.

"The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations (zoning) may be summarized as
follows: They attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and
attachment to the city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize the use and value
of property and promote the peace, [tranquility], and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to
say that the attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise of the police
power. He who owns property in such a district is not deprived of its use by such regulations. He
may use it for the purposes to which the section in which it is located is dedicated. That he shall
not be permitted to use it to the desecration of the community constitutes no unreasonable or
permanent hardship and results in no unjust burden."

xxx       xxx       xxx

"The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to engage in any lawful business, but it does
not prevent legislation intended to regulate useful occupations which, because of their nature or
location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public."133

We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a
concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which Amounts To Taking
Without Compensation

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not only regulate
but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the City of Manila. Respondent counters
that this is not accurate since the ordinance merely prohibits the oil companies from operating their
businesses in the Pandacan area.

Indeed, the ordinance expressly delineated in its title and in Section 1 what it pertained to. Therefore, the
oil companies’ contention is not supported by the text of the ordinance. Respondent succinctly stated that:

The oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of Manila. They may still very well do
so, except that their oil storage facilities are no longer allowed in the Pandacan area. Certainly,
there are other places in the City of Manila where they can conduct this specific kind of business.
Ordinance No. 8027 did not render the oil companies illegal. The assailed ordinance affects the oil
companies business only in so far as the Pandacan area is concerned.134

The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of
Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it established:

As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, it will be
seen that the ordinance copied above does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the
municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If the municipal council of
Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said zone, it is also authorized to provide what kind of
engines may be installed therein. In banning the installation in said zone of all engines not
excepted in the ordinance, the municipal council of Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their
installation by means of zonification.135

The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have invested billions of
pesos in the depot.136 Its forced closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in
constructing new facilities.
Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of
property interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is
necessary only when the state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power,
on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not
compensable.137 The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a
taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights
of the public.

Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but
also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society. 138 The
principle is this:

Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them
from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may
think necessary and expedient.139

In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there
is no compensable taking.140 In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses
situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to
other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Partial And Discriminatory

The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences
that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code.141

This issue should not detain us for long. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate
the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law.142 The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to
all members of the same class.143

The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and
substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.144 Here, there is a reasonable classification.
We reiterate that what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a
terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any
damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage
caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The
enactment of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals removes
the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not
limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally,
the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated.

Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Inconsistent With RA 7638 And RA 8479

The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it contravenes
RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992)145 and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).146 They
argue that through RA 7638, the national legislature declared it a policy of the state "to ensure a
continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy" 147 and created the DOE to implement this policy.
Thus, under Section 5 I, DOE is empowered to "establish and administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy
resources." Considering that the petroleum products contained in the Pandacan Terminals are major and
critical energy resources, they conclude that their administration, storage, distribution and transport are of
national interest and fall under DOE’s primary and exclusive jurisdiction.148

They further assert that the terminals are necessary for the delivery of immediate and adequate supply of
oil to its recipients in the most economical way. 149 Local legislation such as Ordinance No. 8027 (which
effectively calls for the removal of these terminals) allegedly frustrates the state policy of ensuring a
continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy expressed in RA 7638, a national law.150 Likewise,
the ordinance thwarts the determination of the DOE that the terminals’ operations should be merely
scaled down and not discontinued. 151They insist that this should not be allowed considering that it has a
nationwide economic impact and affects public interest transcending the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of Manila.152
According to them, the DOE’s supervision over the oil industry under RA 7638 was subsequently
underscored by RA 8479, particularly in Section 7 thereof:

SECTION 7. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices. ― The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
DOE shall take all measures to promote fair trade and prevent cartelization, monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade, and any unfair competition in the Industry as defined in Article
186 of the Revised Penal Code, and Articles 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as the "Intellectual Property Rights Law". The DOE shall continue to encourage certain
practices in the Industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve
efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products, and
enhance environmental protection. These practices may include borrow-and-loan agreements,
rationalized depot and manufacturing operations, hospitality agreements, joint tanker and pipeline
utilization, and joint actions on oil spill control and fire prevention. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent counters that DOE’s regulatory power does not preclude LGUs from exercising their police
power.153

Indeed, ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress. The rationale for this
was clearly explained in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.:154

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is
a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which
they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.

"Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates,
so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it
capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the
right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere
tenants at will of the legislature."

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not
been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains
control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant
still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still
the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.155

The question now is whether Ordinance No. 8027 contravenes RA 7638 and RA 8479. It does not.

Under Section 5 I of RA 7638, DOE was given the power to "establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources." On the other hand, under Section 7 of RA 8749, the DOE "shall continue to encourage
certain practices in the Industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and
cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products." Nothing in these statutes prohibits the
City of Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police power.

The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution. In Article
II, Section 25 thereof, the people expressly adopted the following policy:

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local
governments as mandated by the Constitution:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. ― (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
 powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed
from the National Government to the local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its
power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land uses within its
jurisdiction. To guide us, we shall make a brief survey of our decisions where the police power measure of
the LGU clashed with national laws.

In Tan v. Pereña,156 the Court ruled that Ordinance No. 7 enacted by the municipality of Daanbantayan,
Cebu allowing the operation of three cockpits was invalid for violating PD 449 (or the Cockfighting Law of
1974) which permitted only one cockpit per municipality.

In Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,157 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City enacted

Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV, Inc. a permit to operate a cable television (CATV) system in
Batangas City. The Court held that the LGU did not have the authority to grant franchises to operate a
CATV system because it was the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the power
under EO Nos. 205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. EO 205 mandated the NTC to grant certificates
of authority to CATV operators while EO 436 vested on the NTC the power to regulate and supervise the
CATV industry.

In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,158 we held that Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna could not be used as justification to prohibit lotto in the municipality of San Pedro,
Laguna because lotto was duly authorized by RA 1169, as amended by BP 42. This law granted a franchise
to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and allowed it to operate lotteries.

In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,159 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City passed
Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos in the city. We ruled that these
ordinances were void for contravening PD 1869 or the charter of the Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation which had the power to operate casinos.

The common dominator of all of these cases is that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict
with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room
for doubt. This is not the case here.

The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to "establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources" and "to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest
and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum
products." These powers can be exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them.
When these ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power
and zoning ordinances for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the
latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila:

SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. ― In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor,
and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of
the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power
shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

xxx       xxx       xxx

(g) IThe general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers
to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community xxxx

The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local autonomy is not to force an
interpretation that negates powers explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the
power of LGUs to reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local
autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. 160 As we have noted in earlier decisions, our national
officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.161

The DOE Cannot Exercise The Power Of Control Over LGUs

Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution
confines the President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision:
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Xxxx

Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over
them.162Control and supervision are distinguished as follows:

[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter.163

Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it
does not include any restraining authority over such body.164 It does not allow the supervisor to annul the
acts of the subordinate.165 Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local
officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has. This is because:

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads
of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority
or power given them by the Constitution and the law.166

Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities of
local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot
substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local
affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law.167

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Invalid For Failure To Comply With RA 7924 And EO 72

The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be submitted to the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan
physical framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924:168

SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. ― Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the
MMDA are those services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries
or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual [LGUs] comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(g) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and shelter services which include the
formulation, adoption and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs
and projects to rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban growth and
expansion, the rehabilitation and development of slum and blighted areas, the development of
shelter and housing facilities and the provision of necessary social services thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)

Reference was also made to Section 15 of its implementing rules:

Section 15. Linkages with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and Other National Government Agencies
Concerned on Urban Renewal, Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services. Within the
context of the National Housing and Urban Development Framework, and pursuant to the national
standards, guidelines and regulations formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
[HLURB] on land use planning and zoning, the [MMDA] shall prepare a metropolitan physical
framework plan and regulations which shall complement and translate the socio-economic
development plan for Metro Manila into physical or spatial terms, and provide the basis for the
preparation, review, integration and implementation of local land use plans and zoning, ordinance
of cities and municipalities in the area.

Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among others, planning and zoning policies and
procedures that shall be observed by local government units in the preparation of their own plans
and ordinances pursuant to Section 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well as the identification of sites
and projects that are considered to be of national or metropolitan significance.
 Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use plans and zoning
ordinances and submit the same for review and integration by the [MMDA] and
indorsement to HLURB in accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent
laws.

In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical framework plan and regulations, the [MMDA]
shall coordinate with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, HLURB, the
National Housing Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other agencies of the national
government which are concerned with land use and zoning, urban renewal and shelter services.
(Emphasis supplied)

They also claim that EO 72169 provides that zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities of Metro Manila
are subject to review by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines. They
cite Section 1, paragraphs I, (e), (f) and (g):

SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating. ―

xxx       xxx       xxx

(g) Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall continue to formulate or update

their respective comprehensive land use plans, in accordance with the land use planning
and zoning standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to EO 392, S. of
1990, and other pertinent national policies.

xxx       xxx       xxx

(e) Pursuant to LOI 729, S. of 1978, EO 648, S. of 1981, and RA 7279, the comprehensive land
use plansof provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be reviewed
and ratified by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines.

(f) Pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1999, the comprehensive land use plans of cities and
municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall be reviewed by the HLURB to ensure compliance with
national standards and guidelines.

(g) Said review shall be completed within three (3) months upon receipt thereof otherwise, the
same shall be deemed consistent with law, and, therefore, valid. (Emphasis supplied)

They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review process, it is invalid.

The argument is flawed.

RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72
expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a
CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a
defined area in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119
which was explicitly formulated as the "Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006." CLUPs are the
ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework
plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and policies.

Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil companies
did not present any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed. The burden of proof is
on the oil companies which already had notice that this Court was inclined to dispose of all the issues in
this case. Yet aside from their bare assertion, they did not present any certification from the MMDA or the
HLURB nor did they append these to their pleadings. Clearly, they failed to rebut the presumption of
validity of Ordinance No. 8027.170

Conclusion

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property.171 The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to
property, the former should prevail.172

Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a
doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives and
safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.

Secondary to the legal reasons supporting the immediate implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 are the
policy considerations which drove Manila’s government to come up with such a measure:

... [The] oil companies still were not able to allay the apprehensions of the city regarding the
security threat in the area in general. No specific action plan or security measures were presented
that would prevent a possible large-scale terrorist or malicious attack especially an attack aimed at
Malacañang. The measures that were installed were more directed towards their internal security
and did not include the prevention of an external attack even on a bilateral level of cooperation
between these companies and the police and military.

xxx       xxx       xxx

It is not enough for the city government to be told by these oil companies that they have the most
sophisticated fire-fighting equipments and have invested millions of pesos for these equipments.
The city government wants to be assured that its residents are safe at any time from these
installations, and in the three public hearings and in their position papers, not one statement has
been said that indeed the absolute safety of the residents from the hazards posed by these
installations is assured.173

We are also putting an end to the oil companies’ determination to prolong their stay in Pandacan despite
the objections of Manila’s residents. As early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with the
DOE obliging themselves to:

... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall include the preparation of a
Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the
Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure including government support
essential for the relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of
way acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability
which shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.174

Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot
feign unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.

Just the same, this Court is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation of the
Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision of this Court, specially one with
far-reaching consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a
comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies with the letter and spirit
of our resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no choice but to obey the law.

A Warning To Petitioners’ Counsel

We draw the attention of the parties to a matter of grave concern to the legal profession.

Petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara, submitted a four-page memorandum that clearly
contained either substance nor research. It is absolutely insulting to this Court.

We have always tended towards judicial leniency, temperance and compassion to those who suffer from a
wrong perception of what the majesty of the law means. But for a member of the bar, an officer of the
court, to file in this Court a memorandum of such unacceptable quality is an entirely different matter.

It is indicative less of a personal shortcoming or contempt of this Court and more of a lawyer’s sorry
descent from a high sense of duty and responsibility. As a member of the bar and as an officer of the
court, a lawyer ought to be keenly aware that the chief safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law
and its magistrates.

There is nothing more effective than the written word by which counsel can persuade this Court of the
righteousness of his cause. For if truth were self-evident, a memorandum would be completely
unnecessary and superfluous.

The inability of counsel to prepare a memorandum worthy of this Court’s consideration is an ejemplo
malo to the legal profession as it betrays no genuine interest in the cause he claims to espouse. Or did
counsel think he can earn his moment of glory without the hard work and dedication called for by his
petition?

A Final Word
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters
of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan
Terminals, causing death, extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the incident.
Need we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to 211 million liters 175 of petroleum
products in the terminal complex which blow up?

WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department
of Energy, are hereby GRANTED. Their respective motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. The
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39 is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of Civil Case No.
03-106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.

We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In
coordination with the appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby
ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.

To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron
Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-
extendible period of ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly been prepared. The presiding judge of
Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict enforcement of this resolution.

Atty. Samson Alcantara is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from notice why he should not be
disciplined for his refusal, or inability, to file a memorandum worthy of the consideration of this Court.
Treble costs against petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165153               August 25, 2010

CARLOS DE CASTRO, Petitioner, 
vs.
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. and EDGARDO QUIOGUE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The respondent, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), filed the present Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Suspend Proceedings, asking us, first, to set aside our Decision1 and, second, to suspend
the court proceedings in view of the Stay Order issued on August 19, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 138, in relation to the corporate rehabilitation proceedings that LBNI initiated.

The dispositive part of our Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Decision and Resolution of the CA promulgated on May 25, 2004 and August 30, 2004,
respectively, and REINSTATE in all respects the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated September 20, 2002. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.2

The facts, as recited in our Decision, are summarized below:

The petitioner, Carlos C. de Castro, worked as a chief building administrator at LBNI. On May 31, 1996,
LBNI dismissed de Castro on the grounds of serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of the trust
reposed in him as a managerial employee. Allegedly, de Castro committed the following acts:

1. Soliciting and/or receiving money for his own benefit from suppliers/dealers/traders [Cristino
Samarita and Jose Aying], representing "commissions" for job contracts involving the repair,
reconditioning and replacement of parts of the airconditioning units at the company’s Antipolo
Station, as well as the installation of fire exits at the [LBNI’s] Technology Centre;

2. Diversion of company funds by soliciting and receiving on different occasions a total of

₱14,000.00 in "commissions" from Aying for a job contract in the company’s Antipolo Station;

3. Theft of company property involving the unauthorized removal of one gallon of Delo oil from the
company storage room;

4. Disrespect/discourtesy towards a co-employee, for using offensive language against [Vicente

Niguidula, the company’s supply manager];

5. Disorderly behavior, for challenging Niguidula to a fight during working hours within the
company premises, thereby creating a disturbance that interrupted the normal flow of activities in
the company;

6. Threat and coercion, for threatening to inflict bodily harm on the person of Niguidula and for
coercing [Gil Balais], a subordinate, into soliciting money in [de Castro’s] behalf from
suppliers/contractors;

7. Abuse of authority, for instructing Balais to collect commissions from Aying and Samarita, and
for requiring Raul Pacaldo (Pacaldo) to exact 2% - 5% of the price of the contracts awarded to
suppliers; and

8. Slander, for uttering libelous statements against Niguidula.3

Aggrieved, de Castro filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against LBNI with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, praying for reinstatement, payment of
backwages, damages, and attorney’s fees.4 He maintained that he could not have solicited commissions
from suppliers considering that he was new in the company. 5 Moreover, the accusations were belatedly
filed as the imputed acts happened in 1995. He explained that the one gallon of Delo oil he allegedly took
was actually found in Gil Balais’ room.6 He denied threatening Vicente Niguidula, whom he claimed
verbally assaulted him and challenged him to a fight, an incident which he reported to respondent Edgardo
Quiogue, LBNI’s executive vice president, and to the Makati police. 7 De Castro alleged that prior to
executing affidavits against him, Niguidula and Balais had serious clashes with him.8

On April 30, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 9 in de Castro’s favor, holding LBNI liable for
illegal dismissal.10 The Labor Arbiter found the affidavits of LBNI’s witnesses to be devoid of merit, noting
that (1) witnesses Niguidula and Balais had altercations with de Castro prior to the execution of their
respective affidavits; (2) the affidavit of Cristino Samarita, one of the suppliers from whom de Castro
allegedly asked for commissions, stated that it was not de Castro, but Balais, who personally asked for
money; and (3) Jose Aying, another supplier, recanted his earlier affidavit.11

LBNI appealed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling to the NLRC. Initially, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision but on de Castro’s motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s
decision.12 It ruled that the charges against de Castro "were never really substantiated other than by ‘bare
allegations’ in the witnesses’ affidavits who were the company’s employees and who had altercations with
De Castro prior to the execution of their affidavits."13
LBNI again appealed the NLRC’s adverse decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). On May 25, 2004, the CA
reversed the NLRC’s decision and held that de Castro’s dismissal was based on valid grounds. It ruled too
that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded the affidavits of all of LBNI’s witnesses.14

In our September 23, 2008 Decision, we found that de Castro’s dismissal was based on unsubstantiated
charges. Aying, a contractor, earlier executed an affidavit stating that de Castro asked him for
commission, but in his second affidavit, he recanted his statement and exonerated de Castro. 15 The other
witnesses, Niguidula and Balais, were LBNI employees who resented de Castro. 16 We noted that de Castro
had not stayed long in the company and had not even passed his probationary period when the acts
charged allegedly took place. We found this situation contrary to common experience, since new
employees have a natural motivation to make a positive first impression on the employer, if only to ensure
that they are regularized.17

Thus, we ruled that the grounds that LBNI invoked for de Castro’s dismissal were, at best, doubtful, based
on the evidence presented. These doubts should be interpreted in de Castro’s favor, pursuant to Article 4
of the Labor Code.18 Between a laborer and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or
interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor.19

The Motion for Reconsideration

LBNI now moves for a reconsideration of our September 23, 2008 Decision based on the following
arguments: (1) LBNI had valid legal grounds to terminate de Castro’s employment for loss of trust and
confidence;20 (2) the affidavits of LBNI’s witnesses should not have been totally disregarded;21 and (3)
LBNI is currently under rehabilitation, hence, the proceedings in this case must be suspended. 22 LBNI
points out that it filed, with the RTC of Makati, a petition for Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for
Suspension of Payments (docketed as S.P. Proc. Case No. M-6126), and on August 19, 2005, the RTC
issued a Stay Order directing, among others, that the –

enforcement of all claims against Liberty Telecoms, Liberty Broadcasting and Skyphone, whether for
money or otherwise and whether such enforcement is by Court action or otherwise x x x be forthwith
stayed.23

Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration

In his comment, de Castro contends that LBNI’s motion for reconsideration contains a rehash of LBNI’s
earlier arguments. He avers that despite the RTC’s Stay Order, it is premature for this Court to suspend
the proceedings. If a suspension of the proceedings is necessary, the proper venue to file the motion is
with the Office of the Labor Arbiter. 24 De Castro further posits that LBNI should have informed this Court
of the status of its Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation.25

THE COURT’S RULING

Except for the prayer to suspend the execution of our September 23, 2008 Decision, we do not find LBNI’s
Motion for Reconsideration meritorious. Although we reject, for lack of merit, LBNI’s arguments regarding
the legality of de Castro’s dismissal, we suspend the execution of our Decision in deference to the Stay
Order issued by the rehabilitation court.

The issue of illegal dismissal has already been resolved in the Court’s September 23, 2008
Decision

LBNI’s motion for reconsideration merely reiterates its earlier arguments, which we have already
addressed in our September 23, 2008 Decision. LBNI has failed to offer any substantive argument that
would convince us to reverse our earlier ruling.

LBNI argues that there is no logic for it to illegally dismiss de Castro because being on probationary
employment – a fact which this Court had stated in its decision – all that the company had to do was not
to re-hire him.26 By this claim, LBNI has misread the import of our ruling. The September 23, 2008
Decision declared that de Castro "had not stayed long in the company and had not even passed his
probationary period when the acts charged allegedly took place."27 Properly read, we found that the acts
charged against de Castro took place when he was still under probationary employment – a finding
completely different from LBNI’s claim that de Castro was dismissed during his probationary employment.
On the contrary, de Castro was dismissed on the ninth month of his employment with LBNI, and by then,
he was already a regular employee by operation of law. Article 281 of the Labor Code provides that
"[p]robationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working,
x x x [a]n employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee." As a regular employee, de Castro was entitled to security of tenure and his illegal dismissal
from LBNI justified the awards of separation pay, backwages, and damages.

The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve the case,
but merely suspends the execution of the September 23, 2008 Decision
On October 18, 2005, while de Castro’s petition was still pending before the Court, LBNI filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings, citing the Stay Order, dated August 19, 2005, issued by the RTC of Makati,
Branch 138 in S.P. Case No. M-6126.28 The Stay Order read:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN and applying Section 6 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, x x x it is ordered that enforcement of all claims against [LBNI] whether for money or
otherwise and whether such enforcement is by Court action or otherwise, its guarantors and sureties not
solidarily liable with the petitioner, be forthwith stayed.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.29

LBNI’s motion was denied in our Resolution of December 12, 2005 for being premature, as de Castro then
had yet to file his reply to LBNI’s comment on the petition. 30 Thereafter, nothing was heard from LBNI
regarding the Stay Order or the rehabilitation proceedings it instituted before the RTC of Makati, Branch
138. Even the memorandum, dated May 4, 2006, that LBNI filed with the Court contained no reference to
the rehabilitation proceedings.31

The filing of a memorandum before the Court is not an empty requirement, devoid of legal significance. In
A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC, the Court declared that issues raised in previous pleadings but not included in the
memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Being a summation of the parties’ previous
pleadings, the memoranda alone may be considered by the Court in deciding or resolving the petition.
Thus, on account of LBNI’s omission, only the issues raised in the parties’ memoranda – principally, the
validity of de Castro’s dismissal from LBNI – were considered by the Court in resolving the case.

"The Court does not take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of justice in the
Philippines."32 At the time we decided the present case, we were thus not bound to take note of and
consider the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings, as the matter had not been properly brought to
our attention. In Social Justice Society v. Atienza,33 we said that:

In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the
parties.1âwphi1 Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only act
on the facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute
their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those expressly
provided as subjects of mandatory judicial notice.

xxxx

The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the
rules the party desires it to have notice of.

Notably, LBNI’s memorandum was filed on May 4, 2006, more than 180 days from the date of the initial
hearing on October 5, 2005 (as set in the Stay Order of August 19, 2005). Under Section 11, Rule 4 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), a petition for rehabilitation shall
be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of 180 days from the date of
initial hearing. While the Interim Rules grant extension beyond the 180-day period, no such extension was
alleged in this case; in fact, as we earlier pointed out, no mention at all was made in LBNI’s memorandum
of the rehabilitation proceedings. With the failure of LBNI to raise rehabilitation proceedings in its
memorandum, the Court had sufficient grounds to suppose that the rehabilitation petition had been
dismissed by the time the case was submitted for decision.

Given these circumstances, the existence of the Stay Order – which would generally authorize the
suspension of judicial proceedings, even those pending before the Court – could not have affected the
Court’s action on the present case. At any rate, a stay order simply suspends all actions for claims against
a corporation undergoing rehabilitation; it does not work to oust a court of its jurisdiction over a case
properly filed before it.34 Our ruling on the principal issue of the case – that de Castro had been illegally
dismissed from his employment with LBNI – thus stands.

Nevertheless, with LBNI’s manifestation that it is still undergoing rehabilitation, the Court resolves to
suspend the execution of our September 23, 2008 Decision. The suspension shall last up to the
termination of the rehabilitation proceedings, as provided in Section 11, in relation to Section 27, Rule 4 of
the Interim Rules –

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. - The stay order shall be effective from the date of its issuance until the
dismissal of the petition or the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings.

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond
this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be
rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan
exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition.

xxxx

Sec. 27. Termination of Proceedings. – In case of the failure of the debtor to submit the rehabilitation
plan, or the disapproval thereof by the court, or the failure of the rehabilitation of the debtor because of
failure to achieve the desired targets or goals as set forth therein, or the failure of the said debtor to
perform its obligations under the said plan, or a determination that the rehabilitation plan may no longer
be implemented in accordance with its terms, conditions, restrictions, or assumptions, the court shall upon
motion, motu proprio, or upon the recommendation of the Rehabilitation Receiver, terminate the
proceedings. The proceedings shall also terminate upon the successful implementation of the rehabilitation
plan.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Motion for Reconsideration; accordingly, our Decision dated September 23,
2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. The National Labor Relations Commission is, however, directed
to suspend the execution of our September 23, 2008 Decision until the Stay Order is lifted or the
corporate rehabilitation proceedings are terminated. Respondent Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. is
hereby directed to submit quarterly reports to the National Labor Relations Commission on the status of
its rehabilitation, subject to the penalty of contempt in case of noncompliance. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31408             April 22, 1991

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE, INC., respondents.

Feliberto Leonardo and Benjamin S. Rallon for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
Whether the land in dispute was formed by the action of the sea or by deposits of soil and sedimentary
matter carried by river currents is the main issue in this case, which was elevated to the Court by petition
for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.1

In October 1956 the corporation R. Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Leyte original proceedings2 for confirmation and registration of title in its favor of a parcel of land fronting
the sea in the coastal town of San Isidro, Leyte with an area of 130,537 square meters. The
application3 alleged that the land was bounded on the North, East and South by property of the applicant
and on the West by San Isidro Bay; that it had been formed by accretion of sediments carried from the
highlands by the natural action of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Rivers when these overflowed their banks
during the rainy season;4 that it had been publicly, openly, continuously and adversely possessed by the
applicant for 20 years prior to the filing of the application; and that to the applicant's knowledge there
existed no mortgage, lien or other adverse claim on the land.5

Two oppositions to the application were filed. One, filed by the Director of Lands, asserted that the land
applied for was part of the public domain, and that the applicant or its predecessors-in-interest had no
sufficient title to the land, by way of either composition of possessory information, or by virtue of open,
public, adverse and continuous possession under claim of ownership since July 26, 1894.6

The other opposition, filed by the Municipality of San Isidro, echoed the contention of the Director of Lands
that the land formed part of the public domain, alleging that it was classified as Timber Block-J, Leyte
Project No. 40; denied the applicant's claim of open, adverse, continuous and exclusive possession and
averred that the land was occupied by other parties who had waived their claims in favor of said
oppositor; and alleged, further, that it (oppositor) needed the land for municipal expansion, having in fact
adopted resolutions requesting the Government to reserve the land for that purpose, and that the
applicant had applied for, but had been denied, a lease of the land after it had been released for private
occupation by the Bureau of Forestry.7

The case was then heard. It would appear that after the applicant had presented its evidence, it sought
and was allowed to amend its application, which originally alleged that the land applied for had been
formed of alluvium deposited by the action of the sea,8 in order to allege, as said appellant's evidence had
tended to establish, that said land had been formed instead from accretions of soil and sediment carried
from higher places by the currents of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Creeks.

Thereafter, evidence for the oppositors also having been presented, the Trial Court rendered judgment
denying the application and declaring the land applied for public land formed by the action of the sea and
not of any river.9 The applicant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
Trial Court, sustained the applicant's contention as to the origin of the land, on that basis declared the
land to be private land of said applicant and decreed its registration in the applicant's name.10

The Appellate Court's judgment was in turn appealed to this Court by the Director of Lands who, in the
main, argues that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the evidence showed the land to have been
formed by the action of rivers and in not holding the applicant bound by the averment in its original
application that the land was formed by the natural action of the sea.11

The first assignment of error may be disposed of by the simple expedient of pointing out that the assailed
"conclusion" of the Court of Appeals is one of fact, not of law, and is, therefore, beyond the province of
this Court to review,12 save in certain exceptional circumstances.13

To dispel any doubts, however, and not to rely solely on what might appear to some to be a fine
distinction, particularly considering that the finding of the Court of Appeals on the crucial factual question
of how the land in dispute came into existence conflicts with that of the Trial Court, this Court has
reviewed the available record14 and finds no sound basis for ascribing any error to the Appellate Court in
its appreciation of the evidence.

The petitioner's case is anchored on evidence tending to establish that the Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers
whose currents, according to the private respondent, formed the land in question from the sediments they
carried were not natural streams, but mere canals dug as part of an irrigation system; that they had no
intrinsic water sources and in fact dried up during the summer season; that a survey commissioned by the
petitioner itself in 1949 did not indicate their existence on the plan; and that part of the land is swampy
with mangrove trees growing thereon.15

More persuasive, however, is the countervailing evidence of the private respondent which consists,
principally, of the testimony of Felix Sablado, a bridge foreman of the Bureau of Public Highways, and
Teofilo Pacana, overseer of the petitioner's lands. According to the petitioner's uncontradicted summary of
Sablado's testimony, said witness had undertaken studies of the Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers, measuring
their depth and width, the volume of water that they carried, and the size of the bridges spanning them.
He had declared the Si-ong was more than seven meters deep, while the Sinubdan had a depth of more
than three meters, that the Filemon Bridge crossing the Si-ong was seven meters long and four meters
wide and the Sinubdan Bridge had the same dimensions. And under cross-examination, he had maintained
that there is a source of water under the Filemon Bridge. 16 Pacana, for his part, testified that there is a
continuous flow of water in both rivers throughout the year, and not merely during the rainy season, as
claimed by one of the oppositors' witnesses, and that while a few mangrove trees grow in the salvage
zone which is far from the land, none are found within the boundaries of the land itself.17 This is at least
partly confirmed by photographs received in evidence18 showing rice, coconut trees and bamboo groves
growing on the land, and which apparently persuaded the Trial Court that at least a part of the land had
been . . . transformed (through cultivation by the private respondent) into a veritable first class rice
land.19

The petitioner's argument that accretion, by definition imperceptible, could hardly account for such an
area of land (more than thirteen hectares) being built up within a period of six years, hinges upon an
unwarrantedly literal advertence to the testimony of one of the private respondent's witnesses who
declared that the process took place from 1930 to 1936.20 Assuming that the witness attested to what he
sincerely believed to be the truth, the possibility of his being mistaken cannot be discounted because, the
age of the rivers in question never having been established, the process of accretion through the action of
their currents could have started much earlier than 1930. It is also entirely possible –– and reasonably
presumable, lacking any proof to the contrary –– even granting that accretion started only in 1930, for the
land to have grown to thirteen hectares in the twenty years that followed until 1956 when the application
for registration was filed.

The Court therefore finds no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the land was formed by
accretion through the action of river currents and belonged to the private respondent as riparian owner
pursuant to Art. 457 of the Civil Code.1âwphi1

The Court of Appeals also correctly overruled the petitioner's contention that the averment in the original
application for registration attributing the origin of the land to the action of the sea, which averment, with
leave of court, was later superseded by an amendment to the effect that the land was formed by the
action of rivers, was binding on the private respondent as a judicial admission. Pleadings that have been
amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions.
While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extra-judicial admissions, they must, in
order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.21 It does not appear that the original application
for registration containing the averment in question, or that particular averment itself, was offered or
received in evidence for the petitioner in the Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review is AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157847 August 25, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

(ATO), Petitioners, 
vs.
LEODIGARIO SARABIA, HERMENIGILDO DE LA CRUZ, DELIA REBUTAR, MILDRED ROSE, ANITA
DE LA CRUZ, ERLINDA LUCERIO, GEORGIE DE LA CRUZ, FELMA DE LA CRUZ, FELINO DE LA
CRUZ, TERESITA SAMSON, EVANGELINE COLOMER, Respondents.
 DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
decision1dated November 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66124, which affirmed the
November 26, 1999 decision of the Regional Trial Court at Aklan, Branch 5, in an expropriation case
thereat filed by the petitioner. The affirmed decision of the trial court dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Fixing the amount of P800.00 per square meter as just compensation to be paid by plaintiff to
defendants for the taking of the subject property indicated as Lot 6068-A in the Sketch Plan (Annex B,
complaint) containing an area of 4,901 square meters which is a portion of the bigger parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-15596. The aggregate amount shall earn legal interest of 6%
per annum commencing from November 11, 1999 until the finality of this Decision, thereafter, 12%
interest per annum from the finality of the Decision on the remaining unpaid amount until full payment.

2. Ordering the defendants to withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 deposited provisionally with the Land
Bank Kalibo Branch, Kalibo, Aklan, by the Air Transportation Office under Savings Account No. 0452-1084-
45 to be deducted therefrom the costs of P10,600.00 and balance shall be deducted from the aggregate
amount of the just compensation; and

3. Declaring the plaintiff’s lawful right to retain possession of the subject property and to appropriate it for
the public purpose it was intended for, i.e., the operations of the airport control tower, Kalibo crash fire
rescue station, airport terminal and headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security, upon full payment of the
just compensation thereat as fixed in paragraph 1 hereof.

Plaintiff is directed to pay the costs of P9,600.00 representing the Commissioners’ fees equivalent to
P800.00 per session for each commissioner, and P1,000.00 to Mr. Remegio M. Bautista as the designated
secretary of the commissioners.

SO ORDERED.2

Sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of some 4,901 square-
meter portion of Lot 6068, a 10,468 square-meter lot located at Pook Kalibo, Aklan. Lot 6068 is covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. P-15596 of the Register of Deeds of Aklan in the names of the private
respondents who are heirs of the late Segundo De la Cruz.

Initially, the ATO utilized the subject occupied portion of Lot 6068 as an airport parking area. In time,
several structures were erected thereon, including the control tower, the Kalibo crash fire rescue station,
the Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group.

In 1995, stores and restaurants made of light materials were constructed on the area outside the 4,901
square-meter portion occupied by ATO. In 1997, private respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession with Damages before the Municipal Trial Court of Kalibo. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
1644, is now pending in said court. ATO intervened in that case and alleged that the occupants of the
stores and restaurants are its lessees.

Petitioner assured private respondents that they would be paid the fair market value of the subject land.
However, the parties did not agree on the amount of compensation therefor.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Air Transportation Office, filed
with the Regional Trial Court at Aklan an action for the expropriation of the entire Lot 6068, thereat
docketed as Civil Case No. 5543.

On August 6, 1999, the trial court appointed three (3) commissioners to ascertain the just compensation
for the subject property.

Upon conduct of ocular inspection and hearing, the commissioners submitted a report to the trial court
with the following recommendation:

NOW THEREFORE, after a brief discussion and in consideration of the premises herein above presented,
the Commissioners hereby recommends (sic) and fix the value of 4,901 sq. m. at P800.00 pesos per
square meter and the remaining area of 5,567 square meters at P500.00 per square meter as offered by
the defendants.
On pre-trial, petitioner submitted a sketch plan of Lot 6068, showing the relative location of the 4,901
square-meter portion it actually occupied.

During the hearing of September 3, 1999, the trial court directed petitioner to present evidence to prove
that the remaining portion not actually and physically occupied by the government is still needed for public
purpose. However, petitioner countered that there is no need to present evidence thereon considering that
almost one-half (1/2) of the entire property subject of the case has already been in fact occupied and
devoted to public purpose.

The trial court ignored petitioner’s posturing and issued an order3 disposing, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the additional area consisting of 5,567 square meters or
Lot 6068-B (unshaded portion in Annex "B"- Complaint) is not needed by the plaintiff for public use or
purpose, but only the shaded portion, Lot 6068-A, containing an area of 4,901 square meters.

SO ORDERED.

Eventually, in a decision dated November 26, 1999,4 the trial court adopted the aforestated
commissioner’s report which fixed the just compensation for the 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068
at ₱800.00 per square meter, the current market value of the property in 1999.

In so adjudging, the trial court relied on Republic vs. Honorable Lucerito Tagle, et al.,5 and thus fixed the
just compensation for the 4,901 square-meter portion based on the current market value not at the time
of the taking which was in 1956, but at the time of the issuance of the writ of possession on November
11, 1999. To the trial court, the date of the issuance of the writ has to be considered in fixing the just
compensation because the same signified petitioner’s proper acquisition and taking of the property which
involves not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and own the same.

Unable to accept the trial court’s decision for allegedly being contrary to law and established
jurisprudence, petitioner Republic filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal, which the trial court
approved on January 18, 2000. Hence, the entire records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, whereat the Republic’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66124.

In the herein assailed decision 6 dated November 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the appealed
decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5543 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In its decision, the appellate court placed emphasis on the alleged failure of petitioner prove that the
"taking" of the occupied 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068 occurred in 1956. More specifically, it
ruled:

Granting that indeed plaintiff-appellant’s possession took place in 1956, said possession pertained to a
"portion" of said lot. The admission of plaintiff-appellant that the encroachment covered a wider and wider
area as time passed, puts into issue the character of said possession. Was it "taking" in the sense of
expropriation?

The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. The physical
entry and occupation of the property in 1956 should include all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner of the subject property. Plaintiff-appellant failed to show that it intended to acquire physical
possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property.

Disconsolately, the assailed decision reveals inaction of plaintiff-appellant in proving its present claim
which should have been done the earliest possible opportunity. It was stated that:

The plaintiff, despite receipt of copy of aforesaid report and the expiration of the prescribed period to file
any comment thereto, opted not to file any pleading relative thereto. Upon the other hand, the defendants
interposed no objection to said report.

Hence, there appears no error in the lower court’s ruling that the "taking" for the purposes of fixing just
compensation be considered on November 11, 1999, the date of the issuance of the writ of possession, as
well as the lower court’s adherence to the recommendation of the commissioners.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but its motion was denied by said
court in its resolution of April 1, 2003.

Hence, petitioner’s present recourse.

As we see it, the sole question presented herein involves the precise time at which just compensation
should be fixed: whether as of the time of actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity, as
insisted by petitioner Republic, or at the issuance of the writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation
proceedings, as maintained by the respondents and sustained by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.

Before going any further, however, we take exception to the appellate court’s finding that evidence is
wanting on the fact of petitioner’s taking possession of the disputed 4,901 square-meter portion in 1956.

Petitioner contends that contrary to what the appellate court found, the taking of the property in 1956 or
at least a wide portion thereof, was adequately established.

We agree with petitioner Republic that sufficient evidence exists to prove that the taking occurred
sometime in 1956.

As borne by the records, private respondents’ Answer and Pre-Trial Brief contain irrefutable admissions.
Thus, in their Answer,7 respondents declared, among others, as follows:

1. That they admit each and every allegation in paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 of the complaint. They admit
that the portion of the land sought to be expropriated which is indicated by the white shaded of the sketch
plan which is attached as ANNEX "B" of the complaint with an area of 4,901 square meters, more or less,
has been in the possession of the plaintiff since 1956 up to the present.

Significantly, paragraph 6 of the complaint8 which is among those admitted by the respondents, reads:

6. The subject property has been in possession and control of ATO since 1956 and was initially devoted to
parking area. At present, several structures, are erected on the area, to wit: the control tower, Kalibo
crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Aviation Security Group. Also, a part of the lot is leased to concessionaires selling local products and
souvenir items. The remaining portion is intended for the expansion and other improvement of the airport.

Besides, respondents no less averred in their Pre-Trial Brief:9

I. BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM

1. That the defendants are the owners of that certain parcel of land located at Pook, Kalibo, Aklan,
Philippines, which is covered by Original Certificate Title No. T-1559-6. A portion of the land has been
occupied by the plaintiff for many years now which portion of land is indicated on the sketch plan
which is marked Annex "B" of the complaint.

xxx xxx xxx

I1. ADMISSION

xxx xxx xxx

2. That this land has been in the possession of the plaintiff for many years now without paying any
rental to the defendants. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Surely, private respondents’ admissions in their Answer and Pre-Trial Brief are judicial admissions which
render the taking of the lot in 1956 conclusive or even immutable. And well-settled is the rule that an
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof.10 A judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter
disprove.11 Indeed, an admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not.12

This Court is thus convinced that the taking of the occupied 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068
occurred in 1956.

In the context of the State’s inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; where there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property; or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. 13 There is a
"taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but
for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.14 After all, ownership "is nothing
without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment". Where, as here, the owner is deprived
of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is
taking within the constitutional sense.15

This brings us to the issue of when the just compensation for the property taken should be reckoned.

Petitioner argues, and rightly so, that the just compensation fixed by the trial court based on the market
value of the property after the commencement of the expropriation proceedings contradicts established
jurisprudence that the value of the property as it was when the government took possession of the land
represents its true value.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that compensation for property expropriated must be
determined as of the time the expropriating authority takes possession thereof and not as of the
institution of the proceedings.16

So it is that in Republic vs. Lara, et al,17 this Court, quoting from its earlier decision in Provincial
Government vs. Caro,18 ruled:

The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of
the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the
value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon
the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the
value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic
conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual
value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly
just; i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for
it" xxx.

The instant case is akin to that of Jose Ma. Ansaldo vs. Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. and Baltazar
Aquino,19 decided 1990, where two (2) lots of private ownership were taken by the government and used
for the widening of a road more than 40 years without the benefit of any action of eminent domain or
agreement with its owners, albeit without protest by the latter. In a decision in that case, penned by then
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, this Court, citing the earlier case of Republic vs. PNB,20 wrote:

Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property
subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of the filing of the complaint. This is so
provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being
conditioned on its deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property as
provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.

There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, as in this case – although, to repeat, the case at bar is quite extraordinary in that
possession was taken by the expropriator more than 40 years prior to suit. In these instances, this Court
has ruled that the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of
filing of the action of eminent domain.

xxx xxx xxx

"… (W)hen plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value
should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter
should be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides
with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule
69, Section 3, directing that compensation ‘be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint’
would never be operative.

We are not, however, in accord with petitioner’s assertion that the just compensation for the entire Lot
6068 should be fixed in the amount based on its assessed value in 1956. There is nothing on record that
petitioner occupied the remaining 5,567 square-meter portion of Lot 6068, neither did it ever present
proof that said unoccupied portion is necessary for public use, except for its self-serving allegation that
said portion is needed for the expansion and other improvement of the airport.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The November 18, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 66124 is MODIFIED in the sense that the computation of just compensation for
the 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6860 should be based on its fair market value in 1956. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154430             June 16, 2006

Spouses JOSE N. BINARAO and PRECIOSA BINARAO, Petitioners, 

vs.
PLUS BUILDERS, INC., Respondent.
 DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 dated July 19, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68921, entitled "Sps. Jose N. Binarao and Preciosisima Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc."

The facts are:

Bahayang Pag-asa, Inc., and its sister corporation, Delfin Hermanos, Inc., are the owners and developers
of Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision in Cavite City. Plus Builders, Inc., herein respondent, is in charge of the
construction and sale of the houses therein.

On April 19, 1990, spouses Jose and Preciosisima N. Binarao, petitioners, purchased a house and lot in
Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of P327,491.95.

Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay

respondent P96,791.95 in the following manner: P5,000.00 upon signing of the contract, and the
remaining P91,791.95 within 15 days thereafter.

However, petitioners failed to comply with their undertaking, prompting respondent’s counsel to send
them a demand letter.

On July 6, 1998, petitioners paid respondent P20,000.00, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in

three installments.

On March 10, 1999, respondent’s counsel sent petitioners another demand letter, but they refused to pay.

Consequently, respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 25, Manila a complaint for
a sum of money against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 163822-CV.

On June 11, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision2 in favor of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Plus Builders, Inc.
and against defendants Spouses Jose and Preciosisima Binarao ordering the latter jointly and severally to
pay the former the sum of P65,571.75, plus interest thereon at the stipulated rate of 16% per annum
computed from March 22, 1990, and a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount due as liquidated damages
until the same is fully paid, and the sum equivalent to 25% of the unpaid balance as and by way of
attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila, rendered a Decision 3 dated November 23, 2001,
affirming in toto the MTC Decision, holding that petitioners, in their answer, did not deny respondent’s
allegation in its complaint that they have still an outstanding balance of P65,571.22.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC in an Order 4 dated January 15,
2002.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review.

On July 19, 2002, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision.

The Court of Appeals held:

x x x Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

Sec. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. – Material averment in the complaint, other
than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied
under oath.

And, Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as to the manner of making denials, provides:

Sec. 10. Specific denial. – A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall
specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in
the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

In the instant case, petitioners did not deny the allegations as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the complaint
of herein respondent corporation. In fact, petitioners even admitted the allegations thereon. xxx

Petitioners, in their answer, specifically paragraph 1 thereof, stated:

1. Defendants admit paragraphs 1 and 4 of the complaint.

While it is true that paragraph 7 of petitioners’ answer to the complaint qualified the fact that they didn’t
sign any payment plan, this qualification however neither denies nor negates the other facts, as admitted,
that were stated in paragraph 4 of the complaint which actually states three facts: (1) that petitioner paid
the amount of P20,000.00 to respondent; (2) that petitioner still has a balance of P65,571.22; and (3)
that such unpaid balance is to be paid in three (3) agreed payment plan. What is denied by petitioners in
paragraph 7 of their answer, if at all, is the fact that there is no agreed payment plan. But, as to the fact,
to repeat, that petitioners still owe P65,571.22, as balance after payment of P20,000.00, is admitted by
petitioners as this fact is never denied by them.

Such admission, being made in the pleading, is considered as judicial admission. Being so, the allegations,
statements, or admissions contained in the pleading are conclusive as against the pleader, in this case,
petitioners. By admitting therefore that petitioners still owe P65,571.22 to respondent corporation, such is
conclusive to petitioners. Petitioners, on the other hand, may be relieved, as provided for in Section 2,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, of the effects of such admission in their pleading if they can show that the
admission had been made through palpable mistake. However, petitioners failed to show any palpable
mistake on their part.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed Order dated January 15, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila, and its Decision
dated November 23, 2001 in Civil Case No. 01-101401, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition for review raising this basic issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ADMITTED ABSOLUTELY IN THEIR ANSWER THEIR LIABILITY

UNDER THE PROPOSED PAYMENT PLAN DATED 06 JULY 1998.

Petitioners contend that they did not agree to pay respondent P96,791.95 and that they did not admit in
their answer they are liable to respondent.

Respondent maintains that petitioners’ admission of liability in their answer binds them.

The petition lacks merit.

Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.5

Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondent’s complaint. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount
of P20,000.00; (b) they still have a balance of P65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in
three installments. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is
the party himself6 and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made
thru palpable mistake (as in this case) , no amount of rationalization can offset it.7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 19, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68921 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158144               July 31, 2008

ST. MARY'S FARM, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.
PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A. AGANA, JR., and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS
PIÑAS, METRO MANILA, Respondents.
 DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming in toto the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 254, Las Piñas City, which dismissed for lack of merit the complaint
for annulment of sale.

The factual antecedents of the case, as narrated by the RTC, are as follows:

[I]t appears that herein plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally twenty-five thousand five
hundred ninety-eight (25,598) square meters of land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas City under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.

In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87-42915 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XL
of Manila, plaintiff passed and approved on 27 June 1988 a board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo
A. Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision four thousand (4,000) square meters of the land covered by the
aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A). Allegedly, after the consummation of this
transaction, defendant Rodolfo A. Agana did not return to plaintiff the borrowed aforementioned title
and[,] instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of the plaintiff corporation supposedly to the effect that
plaintiff had authorized him to sell the remaining twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eight (21,598)
square meters of the subject property. A series of transactions thereafter took place between defendant
Rodolfo A. Agana and defendant Prima Real Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to the
signing on 5 September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale transferring the ownership of the subject land
from herein plaintiff to herein defendant Prima. After the consummation of the sale, defendant Prima
effected the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) in the name of plaintiff and
in lieu thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 in the name of defendant Prima was issued
by defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City.

Subsequent developments had it that on 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly purchased from T.S. Cruz
Subdivision the aforementioned four thousand (4,000) square meters portion of the subject property
which development thereafter led to the cancellation of the aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-6175 and the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City of two separate titles both in the name
of defendant Prima, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7863 covering the aforementioned four thousand
square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7864 covering the herein twenty-one thousand five
hundred ninety-eighty (21,598) square meter subject property.

In its complaint which was amended twice, the second amendment even needed the intervention of the
Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus after the same was denied admission by Hon.
N.C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the then Assisting Court of Makati, [Muntinlupa], Metro Manila, herein
plaintiff alleged inter alia that the authorization certified to by Antonio V. Agcaoili, Corporate Secretary of
the plaintiff and used by defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in selling the subject property to defendant Prima
was a forgery as the board of directors of the plaintiff never enacted a resolution authorizing herein
defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to sell herein subject property to defendant Prima or to anyone else for that
matter. Plaintiff further claimed that defendant Prima in collusion with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana acted
maliciously and in bad faith in relying on the forged authority without taking any step to verify the same
with the plaintiff as owner of the subject property. According to plaintiff, the deed of absolute sale entered
into between defendants Prima and Rodolfo A. Agana being the result of fraudulent transaction was void
thereby, among others, causing damage to the plaintiff. For canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-
1648 (11521-A) knowing fully well that the authorization to sell [to] defendant Rodolfo A. Agana was a
forgery, defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva was likewise made liable for damages.

On the other hand, defendant Prima separately with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in their respective
answers, sought and insisted constantly on the dismissal of the complaint based solidly on the ground that
Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta who filed in behalf of the plaintiff the original complaint
and the amended and the second amended complaints as well, respectively, lacked legal capacity to sue
because they were not authorized therefor by the board of directors of the plaintiff. Furthermore,
defendant Prima argued that it acted in good faith when it relied solely on the face of the purported
authorization of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and entered into the deed of absolute sale and paid in full the
purchase price of PhP2,567,760.00 of the subject property. This fact, according to defendant Prima, made
it a buyer in good faith and for value. To cap its argument, defendant Prima in adopting the defense of
defendant Rodolfo A. Agana asserted that even assuming that the authorization of defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana was forged when plaintiff, through its President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr. (brother of Rodolfo)
accepted/received part of the aforestated purchase price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds
of the sale of the subject property, plaintiff has been precluded as it is now estopped from asking for
rescission of the deed of absolute sale and reconveyance of the subject property.3

After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on April 7, 2000, dismissing the complaint for
annulment of sale with damages filed by the petitioner.4
The trial court found that the respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying on the authority
of Rodolfo A. Agana to sell the property in behalf of the petitioner company, as evidenced by a notarized
board resolution. As such, the trial court ruled that the petitioner was bound by the acts of its agent and
must necessarily bear whatever damage may have been caused by this alleged breach of trust.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following errors:

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Respondent Agana was duly authorized by Petitioner
under the Certification dated June 30, 1988 (Exhibits "D" and "3") to enter into the sale of the subject
property with Respondent Prima Real.

(A) There is no proof of the Certification’s authenticity and due execution;

(B) There is clear and convincing evidence that the Certification was forged.

(C) Even assuming that the Certification was authentic and duly executed, it was not sufficient in
form and by its terms to authorize Respondent Agana to sell the subject property or receive
payment on behalf of Petitioner.

II

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Respondent Prima Real was the author of its own
damage by not making reasonable and prudent inquiries into the fact, nature and extent of Respondent
Agana’s authority, and by causing the issuance of checks in the name of Respondent Agana.

The petition must fail.

A cursory reading of the issues reveals that these are factual matters which are not within the province of
the Court to look into, save only in exceptional circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.
Well settled is the rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law must
be raised.5 As a matter of procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial
courts, especially when, as in the case at bar, such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. This
factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall
not be disturbed on appeal. It is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence or premises supportive of the factual holding of the lower courts.6

Petitioner insists that "the sale of the realty entered into between respondent Agana, purportedly on
behalf of the petitioner, and respondent Prima is null and void for lack of authority on the part of
respondent Agana to sell the property."7 The board resolution allegedly granting Rodolfo Agana the
authority to sell in behalf of the company, as certified by Corporate Secretary Atty. Antonio V. Agcaoili, is
alleged to be a forgery. Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta, who served as assistant to Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., the
President of St. Mary’s Farm, Inc., in 1988 testified that the board of directors did not hold any meeting
on June 27, 1988; that, in fact, the signature of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili was not genuine; and that said
document was merely presented to the notary public for notarization without Atty. Agcaoili appearing
before him.

Despite this insistence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the
respondent court affirming those of the trial court on this matter. Anent the forged signature of Atty.
Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the findings of the Document Examiner of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the findings were not really conclusive. In
the first place, the procedure for the investigation of questionable handwriting was not properly followed.
There is nothing on record that will conclusively show that the alleged standard sample signatures of Atty.
Antonio Agcaoili, which were submitted to the NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the genuine
signatures of the same Atty. Antonio Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to
have variations in the standard signatures of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as passage of
time, pressure and physical condition of the writer which may have decisive influences on his
handwriting’s characteristics.8 Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular
signature appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a more
accurate comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies
in the party making the allegation.9 Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to discharge this
burden.

Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary’s Certification,
petitioner wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not appear
before a notary public for notarization. We do not agree, because in the past, we have already held that
the non-appearance of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily
nullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.10 However, the non-appearance of the party
exposes the notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact
notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of
the truthfulness of the statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, there
must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity
of the certificate.11 In the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.12

On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s
authority to sell the subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent purchaser for value
in good faith. Our pronouncement in Bautista v. Silva13 is instructive:

A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He
buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title
to the property and capacity to convey it.

To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the
title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore
beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when
the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in
possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of
some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity
to convey title to the property.14

All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough for us to
consider Prima as a buyer in good faith. Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company engaged in the buying
and selling of real properties. As borne out by the records, respondent exerted efforts to verify the true
background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented to respondent the (1) notarized board
resolution which stated that at a special meeting held on June 27, 1988, the board of directors authorized
Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. S-1648;15 (2) a separate Certification by the petitioner’s president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr.,
authorizing its Treasurer, Rodolfo Agana, to sell said property;16 and, (3) TCT No. T-1648 of the subject
property. Convinced that Rodolfo Agana had the authority to sell on behalf of the company after being
presented all these documents, the sale between the parties was thereby consummated. A deed of sale
was executed on September 5, 198817 and the full consideration of ₱2,567,760.00 for the subject property
was paid.18

It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo Agana and not to the company which,
according to the petitioner, should have alerted the respondent to inquire further into the extent of
Agana’s authority to transfer the subject property. This was no longer necessary considering that
respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell, evidenced by the notarized
Certification. As explained in the Bautista case:

When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be a
public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due
execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing and finding
out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has removed that
choice from him and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In
reality, he is deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because,
under our notarial system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of
regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of
regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has [in his] possession title to the
property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he
inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter’s capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he
relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller’s duly notarized special power of attorney. He
need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish
the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity.19

Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also relied on the confirmation and
certification of the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of the land likewise
sold by Rodolfo Agana for the petitioner, with similar authorization by the petitioner and signed by the
corporate secretary Atty. Agcaoili. Agana acted as petitioner’s authorized agent and had full authority to
bind the company in that transaction with Cruz.

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner that respondent Agana’s authority was only limited to
negotiate and not to sell the subject property, suffice it to state that the board resolution further averred
that he was "authorized and empowered to sign any and all documents, instruments, papers or writings
which may be required and necessary for this purpose to bind the Corporation in this undertaking." 20 The
certification of the President, Marcelino Agana, Jr. also attests to this fact. With this notarized board
resolution, respondent Agana, undeniably, had the authority to cede the subject property, carrying with it
all the concomitant powers necessary to implement said transaction. On the strength of the deed of
absolute sale executed pursuant to such authority, title over the land in petitioner’s name was cancelled
and a new certificate of title – TCT No. T-6175 21 – was already issued in the name of Prima Real
Properties, Inc.

Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided, notwithstanding the retraction made by Rodolfo
Agana in his Comment22 on the Petition filed with this Court. Therein, he admits that he acted solely and
without proper authority of the corporation. Agana states that he wishes to end once and for all the rift
that had occurred in the corporation; and in order to buy peace for all the parties and for himself, he is
willing to return the money paid by Prima so that ownership of the property can be returned to the
petitioner. In light of this admission that Agana had no authority, petitioner posits that there is justifiable
reason for the Court to re-visit or evaluate the facts of the case anew.

Unfortunately, the Court cannot give weight to this magnanimous gesture of Agana; neither will the Court
lend credence to Agana’s assertion that he acted solely and without proper authority from the corporation,
inasmuch as it was raised for the very first time in this Court and only after 8 years from the inception of
the case. In all the pleadings filed by respondent Agana in court, he was steadfast in his position that he
had authority to sell the subject property. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He
cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts
admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.23 In the instant case, there is no proof of
these exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the retraction was merely an afterthought on the part of
respondent Agana with the intention to end the rift in the family corporation.

Considering all the foregoing, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent Prima is an innocent purchaser in
good faith and for value. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151952               March 25, 2009

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
HERACLEO ABELLO Y FORTADA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23746,1 which affirmed
with modification the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City, in
Criminal Case Nos. 19623-MN, 19624-MN and 19625-MN.2

Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) stands convicted of one (1) count of violation of paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended;3 and two (2) counts of violation of sexual
abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Child Abuse Law). For these crimes, he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, and two reclusion perpetuas, respectively.

The following Informations (all dated July 8, 1998) were filed against the appellant:

Criminal Case No. 19623-MN

That on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA,4 with lewd design and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously putting his
penis inside the mouth of said AAA, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Criminal Case No. 19624-MN

That on or about the 30th day of June 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) years old, and
Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent.6

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 19625-MN

That on or about the 2nd day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) 21 years old,
and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent.7

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Abello, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to these charges. The cases were jointly tried
since they arose from similar incidents involving the same parties.8 The prosecution relied on testimony of
the victim, AAA, who identified Abello as the perpetrator of the rape and sexual abuses against her.
Abello’s defense was confined to his denial of the accusations.

The Background Facts

The RTC summarized the facts as follows:

The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she was seven (7)
months old. She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence, she could only read
and write her name including that of her friends.

On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in
Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly
awakened when Abello … mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again
mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation while the latter was sleeping. In
these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside which
illuminated the house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis
inside the mouth of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA
exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The
victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.

Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of denial.
In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his
room after retiring home.

The RTC found Abello guilty under the three Informations. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 19623-MN, the Court finds accused Heracleo Abello y Fortada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Paragraph 2, Article 226-A, Republic Act [No.] 8353 and
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Seven (7) Years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Thirteen (13) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum;9

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, the Court finds accused Heracleo Abello y Fortada
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act [No.]
7610 and hereby sentences him in each of the two cases to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
Years of prision correctional (sic), as minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as
maximum.10 [Emphasis theirs]

The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal but modified the penalties imposed. The dispositive portion
of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgement (sic) is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:

1.In Criminal Case No. 19623-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; Appellant is further ordered to pay complainant, AAA, moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in each of the two cases.11

The Issues

Abello contends in his Brief that:12

1. The court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crime of violation of paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

2. The court a quo has committed an error in not exculpating the accused-appellant of the crime of
violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610.13

He emphasizes that it was impossible for him to have committed these crimes considering that: (a) he is
AAA’s stepfather who has a healthy sexual relationship with her mother; (b) AAA was not alone during
these alleged incidents; and (c) AAA admitted that she was asleep when these incidents happened making
it likely that she could have just dreamed of them.

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains the correctness of Abello’s conviction on the basis of AAA’s
positive and candid narration covering the elements constituting the crimes of rape by sexual assault and
sexual abuse.

Our Ruling

We affirm Abello’s conviction on all three charges.

Determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, based solely on the victim’s testimony, is not an easy
task in reviewing convictions for rape and sexual abuse cases. For one, these crimes are usually
committed in private so that only the two direct parties can attest to what happened; thus, the
testimonies are largely uncorroborated as to the exact details of the rape, and are usually in conflict with
one another. With this in mind, we exercise utmost care in scrutinizing the parties’ testimonies to
determine who of them is believable. Oftentimes, we rely on the surrounding circumstances as shown by
the evidence, and on common human experience.

We carefully reviewed AAA’s testimony in light of the issues Abello raised in his appeal, and in light of
matters he did not raise but which materially affect his innocence or culpability. After due consideration,
we find no reason to doubt the veracity of AAA’s testimony and her version of the events that led to the
filing of the present charges.
In her testimony, AAA positively and unequivocally narrated the details of her rape and sexual abuse she
suffered in Abello’s hands, as follows:

Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on June 30, 1999, inside your mother’s house at
around 4:00 o’clock (sic)?

A: I remembered on that date that he hold (sic) my breast, sir.

Q: Who hold (sic) your breast?

A: He is the one, sir. (Witness pointed to the accused.)

Q: What else did he do to you at that time?

A: That was again repeated on July 2 more or less 3:00 o’clock (sic), sir.

Q: What did he do to you on July 2 at 3:00 o’clock (sic)?

A: The same he mashed my breast, sir.

Q: Was that repeated?

A: On July 8 at around 2:00 o’clock in the morning, sir.

Q: What happened then?

A: He placed his penis on (sic) my mouth, sir.

Q: While his penis was inside your mouth, what else was he doing to you?

A: He suddenly entered the room of my mother because I saw him and I was sure that it was him who
was doing that to me, sir.

Q: When was that when the accused placed his penis inside your mouth?

A: I was sleeping at that time, sir.

Q: Were you awaken (sic)?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you were awakened, what did you see?

A: His organ was in my mouth while I was sleeping, I got awaken (sic) because I felt pain after he
accidentally kneeled on my right hand and because of that I cried "aray," x x x

xxx

Q: So, it cannot take one minute or thirty seconds that the penis of the accused was inserted on (sic) your
mouth open?

A: I notice that my mouth was open, Your Honor.

Q: So, you were not sure whether it lasted for one second or one minute?

A: It lasted for one second, Your Honor.

Q: And you were awakened?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How do you know that it was the penis of the accused?

A: I saw it, Your Honor.

Q: Whom did you see?

A: Him, you honor.

Q: While the penis was inside your mouth, were you sleeping or awaken already?

A: I got awaken because of the placement of his penis on (sic) my mouth, sir.

Q: Was his penis soft or hard?

A: I got hold of it, Your honor.

xxx

Q: How were you able to hold the penis?

A: I hold (sic) the penis to push it out on (sic) my mouth, Your honor.14

We note that both the RTC and CA found AAA’s testimony to be positive, direct, and categorical, while the
RTC found the defense’s version too strained to be believed for being contrary to human experience; the
RTC refused to accept the claim that Abello was prosecuted for rape and sexual abuse simply because he
stepped with his knees on her stepdaughter’s hand.15 A material point we noted is that Abello could not
say why AAA would falsely accuse him. 16 The substance and tenor of the testimony and the element of
motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward, categorical and candid narration by the victim
deserves credence if no ill motive can be shown driving her to falsely testify against the accused.17

Our consideration of Abello’s defense of denial and his other arguments lead us to reject them for the
following reasons:

First, the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice between the offended party’s positive testimony and
the denial of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically and unmistakably identified Abello as her rapist
and sexual abuser;18 the identification was positive because the scene was illuminated by a light coming
from outside the parties’ house at the time of the incidents.19 She also testified that during the rape, she
saw Abello suddenly enter the room of her mother after she yelped in pain when he stepped with his knee
on her hand.20 Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot
take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.21

Abello likewise admitted that in the wee hours of the mornings of June 30, July 2, and July 8, 1998, he
passed by the sala of their house where AAA and her companions were sleeping. 22 This admission shows
that he had the opportunity and the means to commit these crimes in terms of his location and close
proximity to AAA who, together with her companions, were then sleeping.

Second, we flatly reject Abello’s argument that his relationship with AAA insulates him from the crimes
charged. Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of cases, the relationship between
the offender and the offended party has never been an obstacle to the commission of the crime against
chastity. Although alarming to admit, this kind and degree of relationship is now quite common in these
types of crimes. Studies show a rising incidence of family and domestic violence where 98.8% of the
victims are women; an estimated 26.7% of these cases involve sexual abuse, while 33% involve incest
committed against children.23 In these cases, the male spouse, the father of the victim, or close male
relatives, have been identified as frequent abusers. 24

Third, we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained of, to be
preposterous. It is highly unlikely that a woman in her right mind would expose and declare herself a
victim of rape and sexual abuse, when she would thereby open herself to the humiliating experience of a
public trial and to the possible social stigma of being a victim of rape and sexual abuse. In the normal
course, a woman will not expose herself to these risks unless she is certain of what happened and she
seeks to obtain justice against the perpetrator. We note in this regard AAA’s categorical testimony that
she filed the criminal charges because she did not know what to do; she thus reported the incidents to her
mother and sister-in-law who thereafter sought police assistance.25

The record also shows that AAA lived a sheltered life cared for by her relatives because of her
polio.26 Unless the contrary is shown, it is highly unusual for her to have the worldly sophistication to
invent or fabricate the charges she made, particularly one made against her stepfather. A charge against
one’s stepfather, too, is unusual in our socio-cultural context because of the respect we give our elders,
and is only understandable if there is a deeply felt cause for complaint. We particularly note that no
imputation has been made at any time in the case that AAA is not normal, save for her physical disability,
or has a strained relationship with her stepfather prior to the acts charged.

Based on these considerations and in the absence of clear indications of errors in giving credence to AAA’s
testimony, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA.

Rape by sexual assault

R.A. No. 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997 introduced into the Philippine legal system the
concept of rape by sexual assault. This amendment not only reclassified rape as a crime against persons,
but also expanded the definition of rape from the traditional concept of a sexual intercourse committed by
a man against an unwilling woman.

The second paragraph of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended defines rape by sexual assault as
committed by any person who, under any of the circumstance mentioned in paragraph 1 … shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

The elements of rape by sexual assault are:

(1)That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

(2)That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:

(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or

xxx

(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(a) By using force or intimidation;

(b) When a woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

x x x27

AAA’s testimony covers the commission of the sexual assault through the insertion of Abello’s male organ
into her mouth; AAA also consistently identified Abello as the perpetrator of the sexual assault. These
statements satisfy the first and second elements of the rape.

Her testimony that she was roused from sleep with Abello’s male organ inserted in her mouth, goes into
the third element of the crime.28 In this respect, we observe that both the RTC and the CA failed to notice
the variance between the allegations in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode
of committing the offense. The Information alleges "force and intimidation" as the mode of commission,
while AAA testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find
Abello’s male organ inside her mouth.

This variance is not fatal to Abello’s conviction for rape by sexual assault. In People v. Corpuz, 29 we ruled
that a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object
to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In the
present case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the crime charged was
committed in a different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar
to Abello’s conviction of the crime charged in the Information.

Acts of lasciviousness

Abello was convicted of two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and

The essential elements of this provision are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
 3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 30

Paragraph (h), Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 761031 (implementing rules)
defines lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional touching, either directly or
through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with the intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, among others. Records
show that AAA duly established this element when she positively testified that Abello fondled her breasts
on two separate occasions while she slept.

The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. This second element requires evidence proving that: (a)
AAA was either exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse and (b) she is a child as defined
under R.A. No. 7610.

In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,32 we explained that the phrase, "other sexual abuse" in the above
provision covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious conduct
through the coercion or intimidation by an adult. In the latter case, there must be some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s will.33

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that force or coercion
attended Abello’s sexual abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was asleep at the time these crimes
happened and only awoke when she felt her breasts being fondled. Hence, she could have not resisted
Abello’s advances as she was unconscious at the time it happened. In the same manner, there was also
no evidence showing that Abello compelled her, or cowed her into silence to bear his sexual assault, after
being roused from sleep. Neither is there evidence that she had the time to manifest conscious lack of
consent or resistance to Abello’s assault.

More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which reads:

(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition; [Emphasis supplied]

The implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it defined a "child" as one who is below 18
years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, is
found to be incapable of taking care of herself fully because of a physical or mental disability or condition
or of protecting herself from abuse.

While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who filed the corresponding
Informations, considered AAA’s polio as a physical disability that rendered her incapable of normal
function, no evidence was in fact presented showing the prosecution’s compliance with the implementing
rules. Specifically, the prosecution did not present any evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any
medical evaluation or medical finding from a qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that
AAA’s physical condition rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself
against sexual abuse. Under the circumstances, we cannot consider AAA a child under Section 3(a) of R.A.
No. 7610.

In arriving at this conclusion, we consider that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law referring to a particular
class in society, the prosecution must show that the victim truly belongs to this particular class to warrant
the application of the statute’s provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve in favor of the
accused.

From another perspective, we also note that no evidence has been adduced showing that AAA’s physical
disability prevented her from resisting Abello’s attacks; the evidence only reveals that Abello took
advantage of the opportunity presented to him (i.e., that AAA and her companions who were then asleep)
to commit the sexual abuses; this inference is supported by the fact that he stopped his sexual assault
when AAA started to awaken. It can also be reasonably deduced from these circumstances that Abello
sought to commit the sexual abuses with impunity -- without AAA’s knowledge and without any
interference on her part.

In light of these conclusions, we cannot hold Abello liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still find him
liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.

In Olivarez, we emphasized that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble
of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime
committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.34 In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as
the law violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of the RPC
whose elements are:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;

 2. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and

3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.35

The presence of the first and second elements of the offense has been earlier discussed, albeit in the
consideration of a charge under R.A. No. 7610. The prosecution established these elements through AAA’s
testimony that her breasts were fondled while she was asleep. While she did not actually see Abello
fondling her (as the fondling was done while she was asleep and stopped when she awakened), she
related that she identified Abello because she saw him enter her mother’s room immediately after she felt
her breasts fondled and after he stepped with his knees on her hand.36 AAA also testified that Abello was
illuminated by a light coming from outside their house.37 Further, the perpetrator could only be Abello as
the only other occupants of the house at the time were her mother, her sister-in-law and her young
nephew who were all asleep.38 The third element was proven by her testimony that, on two occasions,
Abello mashed her breasts while she was sleeping.39

As we discussed above, the Informations alleged the element of violence and intimidation as the mode of
committing the sexual abuses, contrary to what the prosecution established during the trial that AAA was
asleep on the two occasions when the offenses were committed. Pursuant to our above discussions citing
Corpuz,40 the deficiencies in the allegations will not relieve Abello of liability under the circumstances of
this case.

The Penalty

The three Informations all alleged the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between AAA and Abello.
Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC, as amended, and is an
aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity and in rape.41 This modifying circumstance, however,
was not duly proven in the present case due to the prosecution’s failure to present the marriage contract
between Abello and AAA’s mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was via an
admission by Abello of his marriage to AAA’s mother. This admission, however, is inconclusive evidence to
prove the marriage to AAA’s mother,42 as the marriage contract still remains the best evidence to prove
the fact of marriage.43 This stricter requirement is only proper as relationship is an aggravating
circumstance that increases the imposable penalty, and hence must be proven by competent evidence.

Rape by sexual assault is penalized by prision mayor which has a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be within the full range of the penalty that is one degree lower than prision mayor, in this case,
prision correccional which has a range of penalty from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. In
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken within the medium period of prision mayor, or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years.44 Hence, Abello may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years, as maximum, for the crime of rape.

The imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is prision
correccional. Under Scale No. 1 of Article 71 of this law, one degree lower from prision correccional is
arresto mayor which has a range of penalty from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from
the full range of arresto mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the case, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision correccional or
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Accordingly, Abello
may be meted an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count of acts of lasciviousness.

The Civil Liability

A victim of rape by sexual assault is entitled to an award of ₱30,000 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000 as
moral damages.45 Civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages which is
automatically granted in rape cases.46 Moral damages are additionally awarded without need of further
pleading or proof; it is presumed that the victim necessarily suffered injury due to the odiousness of the
crime.47

For acts of lasciviousness, AAA is awarded ₱20,000 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000 as moral damages for
each count in line with existing jurisprudence.48
The Court further awards exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000 for the rape through sexual
assault committed upon AAA and ₱2,000 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. 49 Article 2230 of the Civil
Code allows an award of exemplary damages when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.

Although not alleged in the Informations (as now required by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure),50 the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was nonetheless proven
during the trial when AAA testified that she was sexually abused by Abello while she was asleep in their
house.51

Additionally, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, recognizes knowledge by the offender of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime, as a qualifying circumstance. Again, this knowledge by Abello of AAA’s polio was duly proven
during the trial; this matter was not alleged in the Information.52

These aggravating and qualifying circumstances of dwelling and Abello’s knowledge of AAA’s physical
disability may be appreciated in awarding the victim exemplary damages in line with our ruling in People
v. Catubig53 where we held that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 3, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23746 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS in that:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 19623, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada GUILTY of rape by
sexual assault defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. We sentence him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ORDERED to pay
AAA ₱30,000.00 as civil liability; ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada
GUILTY of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. For each count, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay AAA the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱2,000.00 as exemplary damages, in each case. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177361               February 1, 2010

ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky", NORBERTO BUTALON,(†) SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" and JOHN
DOES and PETER DOES, Petitioners, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A person is killed, either by reason or on occasion of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the malefactor’s main purpose and
objective, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life, but the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery.1

In the instant case, the prosecution satisfactorily proved that the crime committed by the petitioners was
robbery with homicide.

Factual Antecedents

It was early evening of April 30, 2001, when army officer, Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda (Dioneda), was brutally
murdered and valuables taken from his house located at Sitio Burabod, Barangay Poblacion, Bacon
District, Sorsogon City.

Consequently, a criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide against herein petitioners Armando Vidar @
Ricky (Vidar), Norberto Butalon (Butalon), Sonny Marbella @ Spike (Marbella), and several Does was filed
under an Information2 which reads:

The undersigned accuses ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky" of Sto. Domingo, Pto. Diaz, Sorsogon, NORBERTO
BUTALON, of Maslog, Legaspi City, and SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" of Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon and
several other JOHN DOES and PETER DOES, of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, defined and
penalized under Article 294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of April 2001, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Burabod,
Barangay Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed
with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to gain, enter the
dwelling of one Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda and once inside, took therefrom at gunpoint a Cal. 45 pistol, a wallet
containing ₱1,000.00 cash, a crash helmet and a motorcycle all belonging to the said Sgt. Julio D.
Dioneda; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and
carry away the items above mentioned with ease, herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and taking advantage of their superior
number and strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and repeatedly shot the said Sgt. Julio D.
Dioneda, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds that caused his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Sorsogon City, Sorsogon, July 8, 2002.

Petitioners, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime of Robbery with Homicide
as charged in the Information. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.

The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the prosecution witnesses Florecita Dioneda (Florecita)
and Niña Dioneda Elemanco (Niña) that led to the conviction of the petitioners are as follows:

At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of April 30, 2001, Florecita, wife of the victim, and her sister-in-law
Niña, were inside the former’s house at Burabod, Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City. They were
watching television when three armed men suddenly barged inside. One of them, later identified as
Marbella, poked a gun at Florecita while the other two ransacked the house taking a wallet, crash helmet
and a .45 caliber firearm with its magazine. These items belong to Dioneda who was then taking a bath
outside the house. Florecita and Niña followed the three men when the latter went out. At the yard, they
saw the three men together with more or less 10 other persons surrounding Dioneda who was lying facing
the ground. Despite Florecita’s pleas not to kill her husband, Marbella and Vidar still fired a volley of shots
causing Dioneda’s instantaneous death. The three then boarded Dioneda’s motorcylcle and fled the area.

Niña corroborated the material details of the robbery and the killing and testified further that she could
not forget the faces of the three malefactors as she was very sure that they were the ones who barged
inside the house and later killed her brother.

Petitioners vehemently denied the accusations against them. Marbella averred that he does not know
Dioneda and that he was in his house in Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon on April 30, 2001 while Vidar asserted
that he has no knowledge of the killing of Dioneda. Butalon, on the other hand, professed his innocence,
claiming that he also does not know Dioneda and that he was in his house at Omoroy, Legaspi City on
April 30, 2001. Collectively, they alleged that the possible motive behind the charge against them is that
they were known members of the New People’s Army (NPA).

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, relying on the credible and positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, rejected the defense interposed by the petitioners and accordingly rendered a
Decision3 on September 2, 2004 finding all of them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The
dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE-, premises considered, the Court finds accused Armando Vidar @ "Ricky", Norberto Butalon,
and Sonny Marbella @ "Spike" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, and applying the provision of Art. 63, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article
294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the further sum of ₱5,500.00 as actual damages, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of ₱3,336,768.00 as unearned income and the amount of
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.

The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court
for automatic review, and to prepare the Mittimus immediately.

The Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Sorsogon City and/or Legaspi City is
hereby ordered to deliver the accused to the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, with proper escort and
security immediately. SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioners raised the following errors:

The Honorable Court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide despite the insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution to support the same.

II

The Honorable Court a quo erred in not finding that robbery and homicide were committed in furtherance
of rebellion as admitted both by the prosecution and the defense witnesses that the victim was killed by
reason of his being a member of the Philippine Army and in the performance of his duty and the assailants
are members of the New People’s Army (NPA) of which the accused- appellants are also members even up
to the time of their arrest.

On December 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered its Decision 4 finding the appeal to be
unmeritorious. The appellate court gave credence to the eyewitnesses’ account of the victim’s death and
the identity of herein petitioners.

Accordingly, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed from Death
to reclusion perpetua. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, dated September 2,
2004 convicting the accused-appellants ARMANDO VIDAR alias "RICKY", NORBERTO BUTALON, SONNY
MARBELLA alias "SPIKE" of the crime of Robbery with Homicide is affirmed. Considering, however, the
repeal of R.A 7659 with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition
of the death penalty, in lieu of the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty, each of the accused-
appellants is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. They are further directed to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50, 000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱5,500.00 as actual damages and ₱2,224,512.00 for the victim’s loss
of earning capacity.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, this petition.

On August 8, 2007, we issued a Resolution6 treating the instant petition as petitioners’ Supplemental Brief
and notified the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that it may file a supplemental brief within 30 days
from notice thereof, if it so desires. The OSG filed a Manifestation 7 (in lieu of Supplemental Brief) that it
had already exhaustively argued all the issues relevant to the case in its Appellee’s Brief 8 dated October
17, 2005.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court despite the
absence of proof adduced before the court below establishing beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed the crime of robbery with homicide. They maintain that the delay of almost a year in filing
formal charges against them cast serious doubt on the intention and motive of the complainant. They aver
that while the incident took place on April 30, 2001, formal charges against them were filed only in
February 2002.

Respondent’s Arguments

In refuting petitioners’ contention, the OSG representing the respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
court a quo and sought the affirmation of the assailed decision.

Our Ruling

Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit. The delay did not greatly weaken the credibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we
believe that the delay in reporting to the police authorities the attendant facts of the crime for which the
petitioners have been charged is consistent with normal human behavior considering that after a tragic
incident, the last thing that the bereaved would want is to provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators
of the felonious act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous
killing of a dearly departed, personal safety takes priority as dictated by our culture. Moreover,
considering private complainant’s honest belief that petitioners are known to be members of the NPA, the
fear of reprisal from them was ever present which caused her momentary silence. After all, delay in
reporting the occurrence of a crime or other unusual event in rural areas is well known.9 Others reveal the
perpetrator of the crime only after the lapse of one year or so to make sure that the possibility of a threat
to his life or to his loved ones is already diminished if not totally avoided. In People v. Gornes10 we held
that:

It is true that the charge against the appellant was initiated only three and a half years after the
commission of the crime. However, the fact of delay alone does not work against the witness.

Thus, the fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken against them. 11 What is
important is that their testimonies regarding the incident bear the earmarks of truth and dependability.

One thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses’ credibility is the fact that they had no motive to
prevaricate against the petitioners. They were not actuated by improper motive to fabricate the facts and
to foist a very serious offense against them. Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate that
the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so
actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 12 For personal motive on the part of
a witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its presence should be
supported by satisfactory proof.13 Aside from their bare allegation, petitioners miserably failed in this
regard. On the contrary, we are not prepared to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies on their
vital points substantiating the circumstances of time and place of the offense charged against petitioners.

Petitioners likewise contend that their identification by the prosecution witnesses was attended with
irregularity considering that they were identified merely from among the four photographs presented at
Camp Escudero. They posit that this manner of identification provides an incredible suggestive procedure.

We beg to disagree.

In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted the
totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: 1) the witness’s
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time;
3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and 6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.14

We have scrutinized with great caution the witnesses’ manner of identifying petitioners vis-a-vis the
foregoing factors and we discern nothing irregular that would result in an erroneous identification.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses had an unobstructed view of the
petitioners’ appearance who were not donning masks to hide their faces when the latter barged inside the
house. There is no indication that darkness prevailed inside the house so as to have an obscure view at
the time. They even testified that one of the petitioners even poked a gun at them while the others were
ransacking the house. Thus even for a while, there was a frontal confrontation between petitioners and
the witnesses, giving the latter an opportunity to take a good look at petitioners. Nothing in the records
allows the presence of any distraction that would have disrupted the witnesses’ attention during the
occurrence of the incident. Niña even described to the policemen the physical appearance of petitioners
though no cartographic sketch was presented. 15 Experience dictates, precisely because of the unusual acts
of violence committed right before witnesses’ eyes, that they remember with a high degree of reliability
the identity of criminals.16 Though a considerable length of time had elapsed, the witnesses never wavered
in their identification of petitioners. They cannot forget their faces.

It is worth mentioning also that the identification of petitioners was effectively admitted when petitioners
failed to dispute the same before the lower courts. The in-court identification of the petitioners later on
dispels any doubt as to the correctness of their identities. As we held in People v. Rivera:17

Even assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso Rivera’s out-of-court identification was tainted with
irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. Without
hesitation, the two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and Juanito Baylon identified the appellant as
one of the assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused were identified through a show-up. The accused
assailed the process of identification because no other suspect was presented in a police line-up. We ruled
that a police line-up is not essential in identification and upheld the identification of the accused through a
show-up. We also held that even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the
defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the ‘inadmissibility of a police line-
up identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court
identification.

Moreover, the burden is on petitioners to prove that their mug shot identification was unduly suggestive.
There is no evidence that the authorities had supplied or even suggested to the witnesses that petitioners
were the suspected gunmen. We, therefore, fail to see any flaw that would invalidate the eyewitnesses’
identification. As aptly observed by the CA:

Both Florecita Dioneda and Niña Elemanco gave a credible eyewitness’ account of the victim’s x x x death
[by gunshots] in the hands of accused-appellant. Their testimony [sic] giving details of a startling and
shocking incident that cannot easily be fabricated deserves credence and full probative weight for it
indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events. Both of these witnesses had a good look at
the victim’s assailants, who did not at any time during the incident attempt to conceal their faces.
Accused-appellant MARBELLA even stood less [than] a meter from Florecita Dioneda as he pointed a gun
at her while another accused-appellant even [etched] upon her a distinct impression of his baldness as
repeatedly mentioned by her during her testimony. As there is nothing to indicate that these two principal
witnesses were moved by improper motives, their positive declarations on the witness stand deserve full
faith and credit.18

The fact that the prosecution witnesses are related to the victim will not necessarily taint their
testimonies. The weight of testimony of witnesses is neither impaired nor in any way affected by their
relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their part.19 Relationship per
se of a witness with the victim of the crime does not necessarily mean that the witness is biased. 20 These
prosecution witnesses are the most aggrieved parties, being the victim’s widow and sister. Thus, their
motive of putting the killers behind bars cannot be considered improper.21 It would be unnatural for a
relative who is interested in avenging the crime to implicate persons other than the real culprit lest the
guilty go unpunished.22

Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment
and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts – and when his findings have
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.23

Significantly, in the pleadings filed before the trial court and in the appellate court, petitioners were
steadfast in their position that the crime was committed in furtherance of rebellion, obviously to escape
criminal liability for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed committed the crime. A
judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position
contradictory to or inconsistent with his pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot
be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.24 Moreover, when a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he is not
allowed to change his theory on appeal, for to allow him to do so would not only be unfair to the other
party but would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.25

Treachery was also duly proven. The deadly and successive actions of the petitioners did not allow the
victim any opportunity to defend himself. The victim was innocently taking a bath totally unaware of the
planned attack against him. Or while he may have realized a possible danger to his person, the attack was
executed in such a manner as to make defense, not to say counter attack, impossible. The suddenness of
the assault, without the slightest provocation from him who was unarmed and with nary an opportunity to
repel the aggression or defend himself, ineluctably qualified the crime with alevosia.26

The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily fail in view of the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must
be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the
accused.27 And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.28

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was done
with animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of homicide
which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.29

As to damages, we find the amounts awarded by the trial court as modified by the CA with respect to the
amount of the loss of earning capacity to have been duly substantiated and warranted. We see no cogent
reason to reverse the same.

Finally, we take note that petitioner Butalon died before final judgment. According to the written report of
the Penal Superintendent,30 Butalon died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on October 21, 2004. Thus,
consistent with our ruling in People v. Bayotas31 that the death of an accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, we declare
the dismissal of the petition of the late Norberto Butalon.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR H.C. No. 00554 dated December 18, 2006 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petition
of Norberto Butalon is dismissed, his criminal and civil liability having been extinguished by reason of his
death. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181829               September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the November 5, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02210
which affirmed with modification the November 28, 2003 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51. The CA found appellant Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay his victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count.

Factual Antecedents:

On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed against appellant for the crime of rape. The
accusatory portions of the Informations read:

Crim. Case No. T-3157:

That on or about the 9th day of June, 2002, at dawn, x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the father of complainant,
armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," 3 a minor 12 years of age, against her
will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.4

Crim. Case No. T-3158:

That on or about the 27th day of September, 1999, in the evening, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the
father of complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9 years of
age, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudicie of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.5

Crim. Case No. T-3159:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1999, at dawn, at x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the father of
complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9 years of age,
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.6

When arraigned on November 14, 2002, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.7

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of "AAA." It was likewise agreed that
"AAA" was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents happened.8 "AAA’s" birth and medical
certificates were likewise marked as Exhibits "A" and "C," respectively.9
Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.10

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented "AAA" as its witness. "AAA" narrated that when she was about 4 years old, her
mother left her in the care of her father, herein appellant. Since then, she had been living with her father.

"AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her on September 27 and 28, 1999 and on June 9, 2002.
During her testimony, "AAA" narrated that:

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Will you please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

WITNESS:

A I am "AAA," 13 years old, out-of-school youth, presently residing at x x x11

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, do you still remember September 27, 1999?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A That was the birthday of my father and the date when he touched me, sir.

xxxx

Q Who rape[d] you?

A My papa, sir. Witness pointed to the accused.

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q You claimed that your father touched and used you. How did he begin in touching you?

A He tied me, sir.

xxxx

Q What part of your body was x x x tied by your father?

A My mouth, sir.

Q What other parts of your body, if there [are] any?

A My hands and my feet, sir.

PROS. ULANDAY:

My witness is crying, your Honor.12

xxxx

Q Now, after your father tied you on September 27, 1999, what did he do, if there’s any?

A He raped me, sir.

COURT:

Q What do you mean by x x x saying he raped you?

xxxx

A He undressed me, sir.

xxxx

COURT:

And we make of record that [witness is now] in tears.13

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, during the last hearing you uttered the word "incua na." What do you mean by
that?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q How long a time did your father [insert] his penis into your vagina?

A About two minutes, sir.

Q At early dawn of September 28, 1999, what happened if any, between you and your father?

A The same, sir.

Q What do you mean by the same?

A That he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q Before your father inserted his penis into your vagina, what did he do, if there was any?

A He first undressed me, sir.

Q While he was undressing you what were you doing, if any?

A I failed to do any, sir.

Q Why did you fail to do any?

A Because I was afraid, sir.

Q Why were you afraid at the time?

A Because he threatened me, sir.

Q How did he [threaten] you?

A That if I would report the matter to anyone he would kill the person to whom I will report, sir.

Q Do you remember June 9, 2002 at 3:00 o’clock dawn?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A Because he again raped me, sir.

Q Who raped you?

A My father, sir.

Q In what particular place [were] you raped?

A In our house, sir.

xxxx
 Q You claimed that you were raped by your father, how did he rape you?

A He undressed me, sir.

Q What else did he do aside from undressing you?

A He poked a knife at me, sir.

Q And after poking a knife at you, what happened next, if any?

A Then he touched (kinuti) me, sir.

Q What part of your body was touched by your father?

A My vagina, sir.

Q How did he touch your vagina?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q What happened when he inserted his penis into your vagina?

A I cried, sir.14

After the presentation of "AAA’s" testimony, the prosecution rested its case.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented appellant as its first witness. In his testimony, appellant admitted that "AAA" is his
daughter.15 He also admitted that on September 27 and 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, he was living in the
same house as "AAA."16 However, when asked regarding the rape charges filed against him by his
daughter, appellant denied the same. Thus:

Q And this daughter of your[s] now charge you [with] rape in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157/3158/3159
for allegedly having sexual intercourse with her against her will and consent. What can you say
against these charges by your daughter?

A [Those are] not true, sir.17

The defense next presented Marcelino Villanueva (Marcelino) who testified that he is the father of the
appellant.18He claimed that "AAA" filed the rape cases against appellant because the latter forbade her to
entertain suitors.19Marcelino also alleged that after appellant was incarcerated, "AAA" eloped with her 20-
year old boyfriend and that "AAA" only separated from her boyfriend when she was brought under the
care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. 20 When asked how old "AAA" was when she
allegedly eloped with her boyfriend, Marcelino answered that "AAA" was only 13 years old.21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA." However, it noted that although it was agreed
upon during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age, the fact remains that "AAA" was
12 years, six months and 19 days when she was ravished by the appellant on June 9, 2002.22 The court
below also observed that "AAA has always been a pathetic child of oppression, abuse and neglect" and
that "[h]er innocence, tender age, dependence [on appellant] for survival, and her virtual orphanhood
sufficed to qualify every sexual molestation perpetrated by her father as rape x x x."23

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused SATURNINO VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
counts of rape, defined and penalized by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, perpetrated against
[his] daughter on September 27, 1999, September 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, x x x and as mandated by
Article 266-B, same Code, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each
offense, to indemnify the complainant "AAA" for damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 per [count], and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.24

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his brief filed before the appellate court, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to present
evidence that would overcome the presumption of his innocence. Appellant also alleged that the trial court
erred in lending credence to the unrealistic and unnatural testimony of "AAA."25 He claimed that it was
unusual for "AAA" not to offer any resistance to the advances allegedly made by him considering that he
was unarmed. According to the appellant, "AAA" should have struggled or at least offered some resistance
because she was not completely helpless.26Appellant also suggested that "AAA" must have been coached
because initially, she did not know the acts which constitute rape. However, during the succeeding
hearings, "AAA" allegedly testified in detail the bestial acts committed against her.27

Moreover, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to formally offer in evidence the medical certificate
and to present the doctor who conducted the medical examination to testify on his findings. 28 Likewise,
"AAA’s" birth certificate was not formally offered. Neither did the Municipal Civil Registrar who allegedly
prepared the same take the witness stand. Thus appellant claimed that assuming he was indeed guilty of
the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for simple rape and not qualified rape because the
minority of the victim was not duly established. 29Further, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,
appellant should not be sentenced to death.30

On the other hand, appellee maintained that "AAA’s" credibility was beyond doubt 31 and that it was
unnecessary to offer proof of resistance where the assailant exercised moral ascendancy against his
victim, as in this case.32Appellee insisted that the crimes committed were three counts of qualified, and
not simple, rape considering that "AAA" was a minor and the offender was her father, 33 and that the
parties had already stipulated during pre-trial as regards the age of the victim.34

On November 5, 2007, the appellate court rendered its Decision disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 28 November 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51 in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157, T-3158 and T-3159 finding accused-appellant
Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of qualified rape under Articles
266-A and 266-B is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the
penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified rape,
without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103, as amended. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the private complainant/victim ["AAA"], for each count of qualified rape, the amounts of Php 75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, Php 75,000.00 as moral damages and Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.35

The appellate court found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
"AAA."36 Although there were occasions when "AAA" would not immediately answer the questions
propounded to her, the CA opined that it was because she was either distressed in recounting her horrible
experiences or in tears.37 The appellate court likewise considered the fact that "AAA" was only 13 years old
when she testified on her harrowing experiences.38

The appellate court likewise brushed aside appellant’s contention that "AAA" did not offer any resistance.
According to the CA, appellant’s moral ascendancy over "AAA" substitutes for violence or intimidation.39

The CA also concluded that even without the medical certificate, appellant could still be held liable for
three counts of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on the credible testimony of "AAA" and the
medical certificate would only be corroborative evidence.40 Anent the birth certificate, the CA recalled that
during pre-trial, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the appellant had already been
stipulated upon. Hence, the said elements have been sufficiently alleged in the Informations and proven
during trial.41

Finally, the CA held that appellant’s denial is intrinsically weak and self-serving especially considering
"AAA’s" credible and straightforward testimony.42

Our Ruling

Both the appellant and the appellee opted not to file their supplemental briefs.43

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we must state that we entertain no doubt that appellant thrice raped his daughter, "AAA."
We examined the records and we find "AAA’s" testimony convincing and straightforward. We therefore
have no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the victim’s
testimony, more so in this case where the said findings were affirmed by the CA.

We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court that appellant could be convicted of rape even without
the medical certificate. "In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
victim, provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things."44 As stated above, "AAA’s" testimony was credible and convincing. As such,
appellant’s conviction could rest solely on it. The medical certificate would only serve as corroborative
evidence.

We, however, agree with the appellant that both the medical certificate and "AAA’s" birth certificate,
although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have been considered by the trial court and
the CA because they were not formally offered in evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."

In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not
formally offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the prosecution rested its
case after presenting the testimony of "AAA" without formally offering any documentary exhibit at all.

Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha45 is instructive, thus:

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any
evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

xxxx

The Rules of Court [provide] that ‘the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.’ A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On
the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility.
Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court.

xxxx

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-
trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence.
Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed
that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer.
The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence
as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of
the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.46ten.lihpwal

We reiterated the above ruling in Dizon v. Court of Tax Appeals 47 where one of the issues presented was
whether the Court of Tax Appeals and the CA gravely abused their discretion "in allowing the admission of
the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered" by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 48 In finding
the case impressed with merit, the Court held that:

Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it
are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no
evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary
evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA. x x x

xxxx

x x x [T]he presentation of the BIR’s evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be
disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of
BIR’s claims against the Estate. The BIR’s failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA’s
directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was
advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.49

We are not unaware that there is an exception to the above-stated rule. In People v. Mate, 50 Silvestre
Mate (Mate) was charged with the crime of "Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder and Frustrated
Murder."51 During arraignment, he entered a plea of "guilty." The court then propounded clarificatory
questions to determine whether the accused understood the consequences of his plea. Immediately
thereafter, the trial court promulgated its decision finding the accused guilty as charged and sentenced
him to death.52 It was only after the rendition of the judgment that the trial court conducted hearings for
the reception of the prosecution’s evidence.53

From the prosecution’s evidence, it would appear that during the investigation, Mate voluntarily made
extra-judicial statements as contained in Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." Also, after his conviction, he appeared
as witness for the prosecution against his co-accused where he affirmed his extra-judicial statements in
Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." However, the state prosecutor failed to formally offer said exhibits.

In debunking the defense’s contentions that the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of conviction on
Mate even before the prosecution could present its evidence, and in considering the exhibits which were
not formally offered, the Court held thus:

The defense contends that the trial court committed a serious error in rendering judgment of conviction
immediately after Mate had pleaded guilty to the crime charged on the basis of his plea of guilty and
before receiving any evidence. While the trial court committed an error in rendering judgment
immediately after the accused had pleaded guilty, and, thereafter, conducted hearings for the reception of
the evidence for the prosecution, such an irregularity, is insufficient to justify the setting aside of the
judgment of conviction, considering that it is supported by the judicial and extra-judicial confessions of the
accused and by other evidence. x x x

xxxx

The defense questions also the failure of the state prosecutor Cornelio Melendres to make a formal offer of
his exhibits, although they have been marked and identified. Such an oversight appears trivial because
the entire evidence for the prosecution is recorded. Even without the exhibits which have been
incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution can still establish the case because the
witnesses properly identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded.

Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against Mate because it appears with clarity that he voluntarily
and spontaneously gave those narrations without compulsion from anybody. In fact, . . . when he testified
against Ben Bohol he affirmed those narrations again.54

In Mato v. Court of Appeals,55 we concretized the above ruling by holding that evidence, although not
formally offered in evidence, may be "admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case." 56 In Ramos v. Dizon,57 we
deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into the records because they had been "presented and
marked during the pre-trial of the case."58Likewise, the first requisite was deemed satisfied because one of
the parties therein explained the contents of the exhibits when interrogated by the respondents’ counsel.59

In the instant case, we find the rulings espoused in People v. Mate, 60 Mato v. Court of Appeals,61 and
Ramos v. Dizon62 not applicable. Thus, we find that both the trial court and the CA erred in allowing the
admission of "AAA’s" medical certificate and birth certificate. The records would show that the lone witness
for the prosecution did not identify the said exhibits or explain their contents. When "AAA" was placed on
the witness stand, she merely stated that she was 13 years old. No reference was ever made to her birth
certificate. The same is true with the medical certificate. After the marking during the pre-trial, the
prosecution did not refer to it in any stage of the proceedings. Neither did it present the doctor who
prepared the same.

Moreover, appellant’s admission during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age 63 would
not help the prosecution’s case. First, the trial court found this admission inaccurate as in fact, "AAA" was
already above 12 years of age when the rape incident transpired on June 9, 2002. Second and more
important, appellant’s admission during pre-trial is not admissible as it violates Section 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court which explicitly provides that: "All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel, otherwise they
cannot be used against the accused. x x x." In People v. Chua Uy,64 we held that:

Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits "D" to "D-
4", inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in
evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule
118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by his
counsel.

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but his counsel
as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against
improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered into without
his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on
the conformity of the accused of the facts agreed upon.

In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial Order was not signed by both appellant and his counsel.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence to prove
"AAA’s" minority. "In the prosecution of criminal cases, x x x, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established.
Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a
qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship
to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt."65

In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty only of three counts of simple rape 66 the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua for each count. Accordingly, the awards of civil indemnity must be reduced to
₱50,000.00 and moral damages to ₱50,000.00. Finally, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
"Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code is considered aggravating in the crime of rape." 67 In this case, the aggravating
circumstance of relationship was duly established. Appellant himself admitted when he testified in open
court that he is "AAA’s" father. However, the award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages must be
increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.68

WHEREFORE, we find appellant Saturnino Villanueva GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and
accordingly sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim "AAA" the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count. SO ORDERED.
 CIRSE FRANCISCO CHOY   G. R. No. 153699
TORRALBA,  
P e t i t i o n e r,  
  Promulgated:
    
- versus  August 22, 2005
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
R e s p o n d e n t.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 

DECISION
 
 
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with modification, the trial courts [2] decision finding

petitioner Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called Tug-Ani ang Lungsod which was aired over the

radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September 1994, an information for libel was filed before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information states:
 
 
The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses CIRSE
FRANCISCO CHOY TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as follows:
 
That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and malicious intent of maligning,
impeaching and discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late
CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and a
man of good reputation and social standing in the community and for the purpose of
exposing him to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio program TUG-
ANI AND LUNGSOD (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station DYFX, openly, publicly and
repeatedly announce[d] the following: KINING MGA HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS
UG CASTOR HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA ATO PA,
TRAYDOR SA YUTANG NATAWHAN. X X X. DUNAY DUGO NGA PAGKATRAYDOR ANG
AMAHAN NI MANOLING HONTANOSAS, which in English means: THESE HONTANOSAS,
AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR HONTANOSAS, ARE COLLABORATORS DURING THE
WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE TRAITORS TO THE LAND OF THEIR BIRTH. X X X. THE
FATHER OF MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD TREACHEROUS BLOOD, and other words of
similar import, thereby maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito
Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas,[3] one of the legitimate children of [the]
 late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor, discredit, contempt and
ridicule causing the latter to suffer social humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and
mental anguish, to the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas in the
amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
 
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 355 of the same Code.
 
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.
 
 
(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES
City Prosecutor II
 
APPROVED:
 
(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS
City Prosecutor[4]
 
 
 

Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to the crime he was charged

with.[5]

On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City, where Crim. Case No.

9107 was raffled off, a motion for consolidation[6] alleging therein that private complainant Atty. Manuel

Hontanosas (Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4) criminal cases for libel against petitioner Torralba,

three of which Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 were then pending with the RTC, Branch

III, Tagbilaran City. As the evidence for the prosecution as well as the defense were substantially the

same, petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be consolidated with the three other cases so

as to save time, effort, and to facilitate the early disposition of these cases.

In its order dated 25 May 1998,[7] the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner Torralba was granted by

the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.

During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as witnesses Segundo

Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento.

Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI) and

was at that time the assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime during

the Marcos administration, petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program. This

request was approved by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI.

During the existence of said sponsorship agreement, the management of TMSI noticed that petitioner

Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and

his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was

behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI decided to cease sponsoring

petitioner Torralbas radio show. In effect, the TMSI sponsored Tug-Ani ang Lungsod for only a month at

the cost of P500.00.

 

Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim testified that petitioner

Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage law and that said corporation was charging

higher handling rates than what it was supposed to collect.

On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in petitioner Torralbas

radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said incident, however, petitioner Torralba

resumed his assault on TMSI and its management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of

TMSI which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts. Three of the tape

recordings were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit:

 
 
Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 1994[8]
Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 1994[9]
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 1994[10]
 
 
 

During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and that

he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record petitioner Torralbas radio

program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and had

actually heard petitioner Torralbas radio program while it was being taped. This prompted petitioner

Torralba to pose a continuing objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper

authentication by the person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the subject tape recordings,

Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court provisionally admitted the tape

recordings subject to the presentation by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of

said pieces of evidence. Despite petitioner Torralbas objection to the formal offer of these pieces of

evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the three tape recordings into evidence.[11]

It was revealed during Lims cross-examination[12] that petitioner Torralba previously instituted a

criminal action for libel[13] against the former arising from an article published in the Sunday Post, a

newspaper of general circulation in the provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found guilty as

charged by the trial court[14] and this decision was subsequently affirmed, with modification, by the Court

of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 entitled, People of the

Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing.[15] In our resolution of 04 December 1996, we denied

Lims petition for review on certiorari.[16]

 
 For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the chairman

and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape recording of petitioner

Torralbas radio program aired on 18 January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him

and stated that he was a person who could not be trusted; that in his radio show on 25 January 1994,

petitioner Torralba mentioned that he was now [wary] to interview any one because he had a sad

experience with someone who betrayed him and this someone was like his father who was a collaborator;

that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program of

11 April 1994 during which petitioner Torralba averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the land of

their birth; that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were collaborators during the Japanese

occupation; and that after he informed his siblings regarding this, they asked him to institute a case

against petitioner Torralba.[17]

When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralbas counsel, private complainant Atty.

Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely

relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine.[18]

Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC, Branch 3,

Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the tape recordings in 1994 upon the request of

private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.

The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself. Petitioner Torralba

maintained that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and other civic

organizations in Cebu. In the course of his profession as a radio broadcaster, he allegedly received

complaints regarding the services of TMSI particularly with respect to the laborers low pay and exhorbitant

rates being charged for the arrastre services. As he was in favor of balanced programming, petitioner

Torralba requested TMSI to send a representative to his radio show in order to give the corporation an

opportunity to address the issues leveled against it; thus, the radio interview of private complainant Atty.

Hontanosas on 

17 December 1993.

 
 When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas,[19] he

denied having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor during his 11 April 1994 radio broadcast.

Petitioner Torralba admitted, though, that during the 17 December 1993 appearance of private

complainant Atty. Hontanosas in his radio program, he did ask the latter if he was in any way related to

the late CFI Judge Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as mere

backgrounder on his interviewee.

On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision [20] acquitting petitioner Torralba in

Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 but holding him guilty of the crime of libel in Crim. Case

No. 9107. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

 
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from criminal liability
herein accused Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded in Criminal Cases Nos.
8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of legitimate self-defense, as afore-discussed.
Consequently, the corresponding cash bonds of the accused in said cases as shown by OR
No. 5301156, No. 5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated February 23, 2000, issued by the
Clerk of Court of Multiple Salas in the amount of P4,200.00 each representing cash deposits
therefore are hereby cancelled and released.
 
However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case
No. 9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late Hon. CFI Judge Agapito
Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his radio program resulting to the dishonor and
wounded feelings of his children, grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close associates. For
this, the Court hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of FOUR MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision Correccional medium period
pursuant to Art. 353 in relation to Art. 354 and Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under
which the instant case falls. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late
Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering their good reputation and high social
standing in the community and the gravity of the dishonor and public humiliation caused.[21]
 

Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which, in the challenged

decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a quo, thus:

 
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional and to pay moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.[22]
 

Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following issues:
 
I
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS SPECIAL FIFTEENTH
DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT A
QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE
CRIME OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES 353 AND 355 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED TESTIMONY OF SEGUNDO LIM . . .
AS BORNE OUT BY THE STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY PETITIONER-
APPELLANT [TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107. 
 
 II

 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN ERROR IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE AN UNAUTHENTICATED AND SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A RADIO BROADCAST
(EXHIBIT D) ALLEGEDLY BY HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] ON THE BASIS
OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL.
 
III
 
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] MADE
UTTERANCES CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD MARKED AS EXHIBIT D, THE HONORABLE
COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE OF HIS
ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE TO THE LANDMARK DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 (JAN. 14, 1999).

 
IV
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AWARDING DAMAGES
AGAINST THE PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD FAITH ON THE PART
OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] WHO ACTED WITH UBERIMA
FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENSHRINED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW CIVIL CODE).[23]

 
 

This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the lower courts admission in

evidence of the 11 April 1994 tape recording. Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office

of the Solicitor General in its comment.

Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given considerable weight on

the tape recording in question as it was not duly authenticated by Lims adopted daughter, Shirly Lim.

Without said authentication, petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is incompetent and

inadmissible evidence. We agree.

It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form[24] where a proper

foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording.[25] In our jurisdiction, it is a

rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative

value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:

 
 
(1)              a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2)              a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3)              establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4)              a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5)              a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6)              identification of the speakers; and
(7)              a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of
inducement.[26]

In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards its

operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the persons

speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings. [27] Likewise, a witness declaration

that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the
requirement of authentication.[28] The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears

the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate reproduction of

the conversation recorded.[29]

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of

tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a

recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the

recording and for its protection against tampering.[30]

In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the

tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand

that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape recording [31] and that he had to instruct his adopted

daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts, thus:

 
ATTY. HONTANOSAS:
 
q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?
 
a Yes, sir.
 
q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?
 
a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio program of Choy
Torralba.[32]
 
 
 

Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas radio show on 11 April 1994,

should have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of

the purported tape recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no basis for the

trial court to admit the tape recording Exhibit D in evidence.

In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are constrained to examine the

records of this case in order to determine the sufficiency of evidence stacked against petitioner Torralba,

bearing in mind that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon proof beyond

reasonable doubt.

In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco, wrote that

[e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when the

identity of the speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his

message or speech, or by the witness recognition of the voice of the speaker.[33]

The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba broadcast the

alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that while petitioner Torralbas radio
program on that date was being tape recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio that he

could even touch the same.[34] In effect, Lim was implying that he was listening to Tug-Ani ang Lungsod at

that time. In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any other

evidence, fails to meet the standard that a witness must be able to recognize the voice of the speaker.

Being near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of the

speaker is another. Indeed, a person may be in close proximity to said device without necessarily listening

to the contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio commentator is saying over the airwaves.

What further undermines the credibility of Lims testimony is the fact that he had an ax to grind against

petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused by the latter with the crime of libel and for which he was

found guilty as charged by the court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an uninterested

witness whose testimony merits significance from this Court.

Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private complainant Atty.

Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that he did not listen to petitioner Torralbas radio

show subject of this petition. He simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption of

innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt -- one which requires

moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act

upon it.[35] As we have so stated in the past

 
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution
must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the
State, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that
the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test
should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.[36]
 

Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against petitioner Torralba, this

Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence

meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court

of Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24 August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,

Tagbilaran City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is

entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the crime of libel. The cash bond posted
by said petitioner is ordered released to him subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures. No

costs. SO ORDERED.

 
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO,  G.R. No. 164815
Petitioner,

- versus – 

 
THE PEOPLE OF THE  Promulgated:
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.  February 22, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
 
REYES, R.T., J.:
 

THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective,
not retroactive, effect.[1] However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal,
shall be given retroactive effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on
effectivity of laws.

Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong

batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.

We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon
City, finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.

The Facts
 

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation
Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch order [2] from the desk officer.[3] The order
directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest[4] issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom.[5]

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts
in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.[6] Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP)
Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.
[7]
 SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.[8] They put him under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. [9] Found tucked in his waist[10] was a Charter Arms, bearing
Serial Number 52315[11] with five (5) live ammunition.[12]

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.[13] 

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that
it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[14]Epifanio
Deriquito, the records verifier, presented a certification [15] to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief
records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.[16] 

Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,[17] as amended. The Information read:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control

One (1) cal. 38 Charter Arms revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5)
live ammo.

without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 

Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.

(Sgd.)

GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP

Assistant City Prosecutor[18]

With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty
when arraigned on October 9, 1996.[19] Trial on the merits ensued.

SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated above.

Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined testimonies of petitioner
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.

Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his children
located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City.[20] He was roused from his slumber when four
(4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. [21] They trained their guns at him[22] and pulled
him out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet.[23] The raiding team went
back inside and searched and ransacked the room.[24] SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him.
[25]
 Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa
loob![26] 

Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that we are authorized to shoot you because theres a shoot to kill
order against you, so if you are planning do so something, do it right now.[27] He was also told that there
was a standing warrant for his arrest.[28] However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for it.
[29]
 Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.[30] 

According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from him
was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present the
documentation relative to the firearm because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented
that when he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. Neither was he
allowed to see or talk to his family.[31]

Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the Narcotics
Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation
involving friends of the said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the unit that conducted the
search in his boarding house.[32]

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt
dated July 1, 1993[33] covering the subject firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal
instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature[34] on the said receipt.[35]

Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that
on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for school. [36] They
grabbed his shoulder and led him out.[37] During all those times, a gun was poked at him. [38] He was asked
where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioners room.[39]

Four (4) policemen then entered the room.[40] He witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner,
who was clad only in his underwear.[41] He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner out of his
room.[42] While a policeman remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back
inside the room.[43] They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,[44] which
yielded the subject firearm.[45]

RTC and CA Dispositions
 

On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows: 

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay
the fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). 
 The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP. SO
ORDERED.[46] 

 
 
Petitioner moved to reconsider[47] but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.[48] He appealed to
the CA.
 
On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition. The fallo of the
CA decision reads:
 
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified
to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
 
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED.[49]
 
His motion for reconsideration[50] having been denied through a Resolution dated August 3, 2004,
[51]
 petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.

Issues
 
Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:

 
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW

IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE
VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE
OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT

UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).[52] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling
 

In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the twin
elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.[53]

The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.

The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony
of SPO2 Disuanco.[54] Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.[55] Its existence was likewise
admitted by no less than petitioner himself.[56]
 

As for petitioners lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of
the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp
Crame revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[57] As proof, Deriquito presented a certification
signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same office.[58]

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person
is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.

The certification is outside the scope of the hearsay rule.

The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. [60] Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable
for being hearsay.[61]

On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception to the
hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance

of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
 

It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of the facts
stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the presumption
unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.
 
Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.

The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court. 

First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The search was conducted
after his arrest and after he was taken out of the room he was occupying.[62]

This contention deserves scant consideration.

Petitioners version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual findings made by the trial
court and its calibration of the credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago
in People v. Rivera:[63] 

x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness

stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched
 opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the
various indicia  available but not reflected on record. The demeanor of the person on the
stand can draw the line between fact and fancy or evince if the witness is telling the truth or
lying through his teeth. We have consistently ruled that when the question arises as to
which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the
assessment of the trial courts are generally viewed as correct and entitled to great
weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of the accused
depends on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies,
findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect if not finality.
[64]
 (Underscoring supplied)

The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find no compelling
reason not to accept its observation on this score.

Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only claims to be highly
decorated,[65] but have effected a number of successful arrests[66] as well. Common sense would dictate
that he must necessarily be authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition. Had the arresting officers
really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner by framing him up, they could have easily planted a
more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme easier,
assuming that there indeed was one.

The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is not legally authorized to possess the subject
firearm and its five (5) ammunition.

Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its
ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the PNP Narcotics Command.[67]

Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties, [68] it is only a presumption; it may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it
proved that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular.

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal
instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.[69] However, a reading of Timbols testimony on cross-
examination[70] would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to
petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued
to petitioner under questionable circumstances.

Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is not fatal provided there is competent
testimony as to its existence.

Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have been excluded as
evidence because they were not formally offered by the prosecution [71] in violation of Section 34, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.[72]
 

We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the Memorandum
Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its
ammunition.Petitioners act may result to an absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared
valid, while the subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the Memorandum
Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the Memorandum Receipt useless.

In any case, petitioners contention has no leg to stand on.

Contrary to petitioners claim, the subject firearm[73] and its five (5) live ammunition[74] were offered
in evidence by the prosecution. [75] Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioners stance
must still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without its
presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,[76] the non-presentation of the pistol did not prevent the
conviction of the accused.

The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.[77]

As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were
established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.[78] Yuson also identified said firearm.[79] Petitioner
even admitted its existence.[80]

We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented
during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not
offered in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its existence.

Penal and civil liabilities

 

Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the
first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that [t]he penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.

P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense
on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,[81] during the
pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now states:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a
fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered
 firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed. (Underscoring supplied)

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law.[82] An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous
to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a right of the offender, but founded on
the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are
based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on
principles of strict justice.[83] 

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its
maximum period[84] from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua[85] under P.D.
No. 1866.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which
is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4]
years and two [2] months).[86] Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Court of
Appeals[87] and Barredo v. Vinarao.[88]

As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition should be made
under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code[89] which provides, among others, that the proceeds and
instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full. SO

ORDERED.
 JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO,   G.R. No. 180870
Petitioner,    
     
   
   
   
- versus -  
   
   
   
     
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,   Promulgated:
Respondent.   January 22, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
 
In order to safeguard its citizenry from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-
being, the State pursued an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs
and other similar substances.[1] However, in our desire to totally eradicate this social ill, we must adhere to the
constitutional pronouncement that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.[2] This case illustrates once more our faithful adherence to said constitutional requirement.
 
Factual Antecedents
 
 
For review is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 dated November 25, 2005 finding herein petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto
(Cacao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 12 years and one day to 15 years and ordering him to pay a fine of P400,000.00. Also assailed is the
Resolution[5] of the CA dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration.
 
On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit [6] and Cacao[7] indicting
them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City. Insofar as pertinent to this
petition, we shall quote the information only against Cacao in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 which reads:
That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic sachet of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu containing a total of 1.6 grams including plastic sachets
[sic] without any license or authority, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
 
When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not guilty.[9] Thereafter trial on the merits followed.
 
The inculpatory facts, as unveiled by the prosecution in its evidence given during the trial, were briefly synthesized
by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the
Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an
informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay
5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.
 
Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to
the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight
Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.
 
The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was about to
deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and
PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door
and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers
to look inside.
 
PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph
Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass
tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.
 
PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing shabu.
 
After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit
brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty
while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.
 
The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen
recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for shabu.[10]
 
Cacao professed his innocence and presented his defense in this wise:
 
In the afternoon of 14 October 2004, petitioner was waiting for a ride going home along
the National Road at the rotunda of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Joseph Canlas [who was on his way
to] Laoag City aboard his motorcycle x x x pulled over and asked the petitioner if the latter could
spare a moment to estimate a work he wanted to be done in his house. Admittedly, the petitioner is
a contractor. Petitioner agreed and they both boarded Canlas motorcycle for Laoag City.
 
While in Laoag City, petitioner and Canlas stopped at the public market for the latter to collect [loan
payment] as he is also a money lender. Petitioner stayed [by] Canlas motorcycle. When Canlas
returned, it was then that they decided to have chicks (or womanize). They then proceeded to
Starlight Hotel located along Ablan Ave., Laoag City on board Canlas motorcycle.
 
x x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given] Room 5 x x x. Thereafter,
Canlas stayed inside Room 5 while petitioner went out to the hotels counter to wait for the woman
they [had] contacted. Present at the counter at the time was the lady cashier [named] Cherry
Corpuz.
 
In about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a woman on board as
passengers. The tricycle went inside the hotel and stopped right in front of the counter where the
petitioner and the lady cashier were. After alighting from the tricycle, the woman companion
inquired where Room 5 is [and was directed] by the lady cashier. The woman [who] alighted from
the tricycle in the company of another male person was later on identified to be Mylene
Daquioag. Thereafter, Mylene Daquioag proceeded to Room 5 while the male companion stayed
 behind with the petitioner at the hotels counter. When petitioner could not wait [any] longer
because there was only one woman who arrived, he x x x asked the male companion of Mylene
Daquioag if another woman is coming. The male companion answered in the negative. A couple of
minutes [later], petitioner followed to Room 5 so he could [sic] go home instead because it was
then getting late.
 
Upon entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas seated at the table inside the
room. He also saw Mylene Daquioag offer something contained in plastic x x x to Canlas. The latter
refused as he said it is a woman that he was asking [for].
 
Barely a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock on the door from the
outside. Mylene Daquiaog immediately stood up and told the petitioner and Canlas that they are
(her) companions.
 
As soon as the door was unlocked by Mylene Daquioag, several policemen barged inside the room
with their guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by one of the police. He was later
bodily searched but nothing was found from [sic] him except his wallet containing cash of
about P 7,000.00. The wallet was later turned over to the petitioners wife at the Police Station of
Laoag, City. The P7,000.00 was never seen again.
 
As petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers pointed to a plastic sachet
on the floor. It was about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the police
pointing [to] it. The same police then explained that the plastic sachet belongs to the
petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion.
 
Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice what the other
police did to Canlas.
 
Without much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended, handcuffed and brought to the
Laoag City Police Station. Charges were later on filed against them.[11]
 
 
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
 
 
On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of the offense charged and
sentenced him accordingly, viz:
 
WHEREFORE x x x
 
The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987 grams in Criminal Case No. 11489
and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to pay the fine of Four hundred thousand
(P400,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency.
 
The sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused are all confiscated in favor of the Government,
the same to be disposed as the law prescribes. Cost de oficio.
 
SO ORDERED.[12]
 
 
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
 
Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. On July 27, 2007, the appellate
court rendered judgment affirming Cacaos conviction. It held that the circumstances obtaining in this case validly
cloaked the arresting officers with the authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited material which
may be used as proof of the offense of which Cacao is charged. It also ruled that there is no proof that the police
officers compelled Cacao to admit a crime. As to the alleged contradictory statements, the appellate court ruled
that they refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to overthrow the probative value accorded them by the
trial court.
 
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[13] but the motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution [14] dated
on December 11, 2007.
 
 Issues
 
In this petition, Cacao ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
 
I.                                        The lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused
was proven beyond reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies,
discrepancies, and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence.[15]
 
II.                                   The lower court gravely erred in failing to lend credence to the critical
testimony of Benedict Villanueva.[16]
 
III.                              The lower court erred in not finding that the crucial first link in the chain of
custody of the specimen subjected for examination was not proven.[17]
 
IV.                             The lower court gravely erred in declaring that the defense of frame-up
cannot be given weight.[18]
 
V.                                  The lower court gravely erred in relying on the weakness of the defense.
[19]

 
VI.                             The lower court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of
innocence of the petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.[20]
 
Our Ruling
 
We find merit in the petition.
 
As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked
certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case,[21] we will not hesitate to
review the same. In this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of
certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points.
Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution
must establish with moral certainty the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact
that such possession is not authorized by law. Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the
dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt.[22] Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction, [23] it behooves upon the
prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against
the accused is the same item recovered from his possession.
 
We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found not only glaring
inconsistencies on material points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug
allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
 
The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the
prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.
 
 
PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought
the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). Thus:
 
Q: What about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the possession of the accused Joseph
and the one plastic sachet which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from the possession of Julius
Cacao as well as the drug paraphernalia you mentioned, what did you do with them?
A: We turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I confiscated to the evidence
custodian, SP03 Loreto Ancheta and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit was also turned
over by him to the evidence custodian, sir.
Q: Who was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit turned over the items you said?
A: SPO3 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[24]
 
Mangapit corroborated Pang-ags testimony that it was he who delivered to Ancheta the item he seized from Cacao.
Thus:
 
Q: How about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from the right front pocket of
accused Cacao, what did you do?
A: I turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir.
 
Q: Who was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that plastic sachet?
A: SP02 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[25]
 
The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter
denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and
categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu.
 
Q: Who delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the possession of Cacao?
A: SP03 Balolong, Sir.[26]
 
During his cross-examination, Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and definitely not
Mangapit who handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu. Ancheta testified thus:
 
Q: You said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu which was
allegedly taken from the possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I hear you right?
A: Julius Cacao, yes sir.
 
Q: It was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu?
A: Balolong, sir.
 
Q: It was not Mangapit?
A: No sir.[27]
When confronted with the afore-quoted testimony of Ancheta, Mangapit cannot explain the variance. He just gave
a sweeping answer I do not know.[28]
 
We cannot understand why the courts below did not doubt or suspect the patently inconsistent and contradictory
testimonies of the principal witnesses of the prosecution. Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, we are of
the considered view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on
substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses.
 
The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item
confiscated from Cacao.
 
 
The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of
Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the
same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed,
then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit,
who is the most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the item
from Cacao, never actually identified the same:
 
Q: If shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put markings would you be able to
recognize and identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
 
Q: Giving to you an already opened brown envelope with several contents, will you please sort out
[the] contents and bring out that big plastic sachet you claimed you confiscated from the
custody of accused Cacao?
A: (Witness sorting out the contents of the plastic bag containing several items). (Witness
examining the plastic sachet mounted on the bond paper marked as Exhibit B-1).
 
Q: Are the markings you claimed which were placed in the plastic sachet still visible and readable?
A: Yes, sir.
 
Q: Will you please read for record purposes the markings?
 A: Initial JPC and my signature, sir.
(Witness pointing to the initials and signature written on a darker masking tape on the plastic
sachet).[29]
 
Verily, there was no actual and effective identification of the subject specimen. After sorting out the contents of the
plastic bag, witness Mangapit merely pointed to the initial and signature written on a masking tape attached to the
plastic sachet. At no instance did he make a categorical and accurate declaration that the sachet contained
the shabu allegedly confiscated from Cacao.
 
The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, we cannot lend credence to
his supposed identification, the same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing
that this witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even
incompetent to make the identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it.
 
Be that as it may, any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from petitioner is
rendered meaningless and bereft of probative value in view of the categorical denial of the evidence custodian that
he received the same from Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which the
evidence custodian received, marked and submitted for examination and later presented in court is not the same
sachet of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have confiscated from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the
evidence custodian.
 
Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It is quite strange
that Ancheta would point to Balolong as the sender of the seized items if he had no basis in saying so.However, our
own scrutiny of the records failed to show the role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only lawmen
who participated therein were Mangapit and Pang-ag. In fact, as testified to by Mangapit, Balolong proceeded to
the hotel after the operation.[30] How then was Balolong able to get hold of the confiscated substance when he was
neither a party to nor present during the operation? Who entrusted the substance to him assuming that somebody
requested him to submit it for safekeeping? These are only some of the lingering questions which must be
answered convincingly and satisfactorily so as to ensure that there had been no substitution, contamination or
tampering with the sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It must be noted that Balolong was never
presented to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence
custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure
to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecutions case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a
prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined
and established to be the prohibited drug.[31] In People v. Casimiro,[32] citing People v. Mapa,[33] we acquitted the
accused for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus
delicti. Equally true in Zarraga v. People,[34] we also acquitted the accused in view of the prosecutions failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
 
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug
itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[35]
 
Likewise, our ruling in People v. Gutierrez[36] on chain of custody rule is instructive. Thus:
 
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the presentation of the
seized prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally cover the testimony
about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was
delivered to the next in the chain.
 
Finally, petitioners defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak and commonly used in drug-
related cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.
 
Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the prosecution. While as a rule we desist
from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses,
we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29985
dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal
Case No. 11489-13, and its Resolution dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178757               March 13, 2009

RONALD CARINO and ROSANA ANDES, Petitioners, 

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, 1 petitioners Ronald Carino and Rosana Andes assail the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29867 dated 13 March 2007, which affirmed the joint
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103,4 finding petitioners Ronald Carino and
Rosana Andes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug locally known as shabu.

Petitioners Carino and Andes were apprehended on two separate but related incidents on 20 June 2003 at
the corner of G. Araneta and E. Rodriguez Avenues in Quezon City. The apprehending officers were
allegedly members of the Central Police District (CPD)-Galas Police Station 11 and were part of the eight-
man team5 that was dispatched by the police district authorities to conduct the "Oplan Sita"—an operation
which had for its object the suppression of rampant robbery in the vicinity. It was in the course of this
operation that both petitioners were arrested without a warrant for allegedly having in their possession
plastic sachets containing shabu.

After the arrest and investigation, petitioners were charged in two separate informations6 with violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165).7 Both of them entered a negative plea on
arraignment.8 The cases were thereafter jointly tried.

The prosecution offered the testimony of PO1 Joseph Tayaban (Tayaban) and PO1 Arnold Eugenio
(Eugenio) to prove the charges against petitioners. Tayaban and Eugenio professed that they were the
ones who arrested both petitioners.

Tayaban testified that the members of "Oplan Sita," on 20 June 2003, had started patrolling the area of
coverage as early as 9:00 o’clock in the morning of that day. At around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, his
colleague, Eugenio, spotted Carino, about a meter away from their location and holding a plastic sachet in
his hand. Right there and then, they placed Carino under arrest and Eugenio immediately seized the
plastic sachet.9 They asked Carino who the source of the plastic sachet was and the latter immediately
identified petitioner Andes. They approached Andes, and she allegedly became hysterical when the
policemen introduced themselves to her. It was then that Tayaban noticed the woman inserting something
inside the pocket of her 5-year old male child. Tayaban was suspicious so he inspected the right pocket of
the child and found a plastic sachet inside it containing shabu. 10 Petitioners were immediately brought to
the Galas Police Station. The plastic sachets were allegedly submitted to the desk officer and then to the
station investigator who in the presence of Tayaban marked each of the specimens with the initials "JT-
RA" and "AE-RC."11 The markings purportedly represented the initials of Eugenio and Tayaban and the
initials of petitioners from whom they were seized.1avvphi1

Eugenio corroborated the testimony of Tayaban in its material respects. He admitted that he was the one
who grabbed Carino when he noticed that the latter was holding a plastic sachet in his hand. He suspected
the sachet to be containing shabu and he immediately told Carino of his offense. At that point Carino
allegedly dropped the plastic sachet, so he (Eugenio) picked it up and after examining the same concluded
that it indeed contained shabu.12 He and his companions brought Carino to their team leader just across
the street. The latter asked Carino who the source of the shabu was, and he was told that it was a certain
woman.13 Some members of the team, including Tayaban, left Araneta Avenue and went to Banawe
Avenue to the place where the woman allegedly could be found, but Eugenio was not able to catch up with
them because he received a phone message moments later that the woman had already been arrested.
He instead proceeded to the police station for the investigation.14

The prosecution also submitted the results of the qualitative examination administered on the contents of
the two plastic sachets seized from petitioners. The chemistry report signed by Engineer Leonard M.
Jabonillo (Jabonillo), chemist and forensic analyst at the CPD Crime Laboratory Office, revealed that the
specimens submitted for analysis yielded positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride content.15

Both petitioners denied the charges. It was revealed during their testimony, however, that they had
previously known each other as Carino was employed as a "latero" at the automobile repair shop owned
by Andes’s "kumpare."16

Carino testified that he was on his way to work when he was arrested along E. Rodriguez Avenue. He was
allegedly grabbed by the hand by one of the policemen and asked him to come with them to the police
station. He denied having been frisked at any time between his arrest and conveyance to the police
station.17 Quite boldly, he asserted that Tayaban was the source of the plastic sachet allegedly recovered
from him as he in fact saw the said officer pull the sachet out of his own pocket at the time the arrest was
taking place. At that point, Carino was asked who the source of the drug was, but when he replied that it
was not his, one of the officers retorted, "Nagmamaang-maangan ka pa." At the police station, he was
allegedly mauled by Tayaban because he again denied ownership of the plastic sachet.18 When he was
brought to the prosecutor’s office for inquest proceedings, Carino continued, the fiscal allegedly told the
police, "Bakit hindi na lang natin i-further investigation ito? Wala namang ebidensiya sa kanya,"
suggesting that the police escort including Tayaban and Eugenio did not bring the supposed sachet of
shabu seized from petitioners.19

Petitioner Andes, for her part, narrated that she and her 5-year old son were on their way home from the
bakeshop when suddenly, Tayaban and a certain police officer Prado approached them and asked her
whether she could identify the man inside the police car;20 that she obliged, so she proceeded to the
where the car was parked and seeing petitioner Carino inside with his hands cuffed told the officers that
the man was familiar to her because he was an employee at his "kumpare’s" shop but she could not place
his name;21 that she was then invited to come to the police station and once there, she saw Carino being
frisked and the officers found nothing on him; and that she was also frisked by Tayaban but found nothing
on her either.22 She also claimed that Tayaban and his companions demanded from her and Carino
₱10,000.00 for their release but they were detained because they could not and did not pay.23

On 9 December 2005, the trial court rendered its joint decision 24 in these cases finding both petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It sentenced
petitioners to suffer the prison term of twelve years and one day as minimum to thirteen years as
maximum as well as to pay the fine of ₱300,000.00.25

Petitioners interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, 26 but in its 13 March 2007 Decision the
appellate court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial court.27 Petitioners moved for
reconsideration28 but the same was denied.29

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,30 petitioners once again bid to establish that their guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. They capitalize on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of
police officers Tayaban and Eugenio,31 as well as on the inadmissibility, for failure to establish the chain of
custody, of the drug specimens supposedly seized from them on account of the failure of the forensic
chemist who signed the chemistry report to testify in court.32

The OSG, for its part, advances that the evidence was sufficient to prove the petitioners’ guilt in this case
especially considering that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in
this case can no longer be challenged because they had already been accorded credibility by the trial
court.33 Besides, the OSG points out, petitioners advance no better defense than their self-serving claim of
frame-up which must be dismissed in light of the presumption that the police officers involved in their
apprehension have regularly performed their duty.34 As to the claim that the evidence should not be
admitted for failure of the forensic chemist to testify, the OSG points out that the parties had already
agreed at the pre-trial to dispense with such testimony inasmuch as they had already stipulated that the
drug specimens were actually submitted to the laboratory for analysis and that the results thereof were
then reduced in written report.35

The Court grants the petition.

To begin with, prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. 36 In these cases, it is therefore essential
that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.37

The mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also
be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain
of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.38

Chain of custody is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.39 As a method of authenticating evidence, it requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be.40 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.41 It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which
a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that
seized from the accused.

In the case at bar, however, the prosecution evidence is insufficient to provide that assurance, for all the
people who made contact with the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioners, only Tayaban and
Eugenio were able to testify in court as to the identity of the evidence. The desk officer at the police
station to whom the specimens were purportedly surrendered by Tayaban and Eugenio was not even
presented in court to observe the identity and uniqueness of the evidence. Even more to the point is the
fact that the testimony of the investigator, who had taken custody of the plastic sachets after the same
were reported to the desk officer, was likewise not offered in court to directly observe the evidence and
admit the specific markings thereon as his own. The same is true with respect to Jabonillo, the forensic
chemist at the crime laboratory who administered the chemical examination on the specimens and who
could have testified on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for
analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on the
specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and custody.

Aside from that, the prosecution has not in fact reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not
able to testify in court. While indeed the OSG claims that the testimony of Jabonillo has already been
dispensed with by the parties at the pre-trial stage, there however seems to be not a single hint in the
pre-trial order which implies that the parties indeed dispensed with said testimony.42

In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably concluded that
the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to obliterate
the hypothesis of petitioners’ guiltlessness.

Be that as it may, while a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of
testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.43 The same standard
likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination 44 and even
substitution and exchange.45 In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or
tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are
subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Hence, the risk of tampering, loss
or mistake with respect to an exhibit of this nature is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that
has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their
daily lives.46 The danger, according to Graham v. State,47 is real. In that case, a substance later analyzed
as heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence because it was previously handled by two police
officers prior to examination who, however, did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of
the exhibit at the time it was in their possession. The court pointed out that the white powder seized could
have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can
show by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came
into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible.481awphi1.zw+

Indeed, the Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any
of the links in the chain of custody over a narcotic specimen there could have been tampering, alteration
or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was
seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the
same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another
or been contaminated or tampered with.

Our drugs laws in fact establish reasonable safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of
narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21 49 of
R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
to, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The same requirements are also found in Section 2150of its implementing rules51 as well as in
Section 252 of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 series of 2002.53

The members of the arresting team in this case, however, do not seem to have complied with these
guidelines. The prosecution has not even shown that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with
the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. From the testimonies of Tayaban and Eugenio, it is
clear that after the arrest of petitioners they immediately seized the plastic sachets, took custody thereof
and brought the same to the police station together with petitioners. It was at the police station—and not
at the place where the item was seized from appellant—where, according to Tayaban and Eugenio, the
unnamed police investigator had placed the markings on the specimens. What is more telling is the
admission made by Tayaban to the effect that the markings were placed on the plastic sachet in his
presence and not in the presence of petitioners as required by law.

These flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from
petitioners, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the
whereabouts of the exhibits before they were offered in evidence in court, militate against the
prosecution’s cause because they not only cast doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tend to
negate, if not totally discredit, the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police operation advanced
by the OSG. Indeed, we cannot give much weight to the contention that the arresting officers in this case
were not trained to apprehend and arrest drug offenders, because as agents of the government in law
enforcement they are reasonably presumed to know the laws and the rules they are tasked to enforce.

We take this occasion to reiterate, albeit not needlessly, that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing
the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The
presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the
law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. 54 But
where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of
course.55

All told, in view of the deviation of the apprehending officers from the mandated conduct of taking post-
seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case, there is no way to presume that the members thereof
had performed their duties regularly. And even assuming that we can confidently rely on the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses in this case, the evidence would still fall short of satisfying the quantum of
evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence chain failed
to conclusively connect petitioners with the seized drugs in a way that would establish that the specimens
are one and the same as that seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence.

In Mallillin v. People,56 People v. Obmiranis57 and People v. Garcia,58 we declared that the failure of the
prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of
a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the
same was finally offered in court, fatally conflict with every proposition relative to the culpability of the
accused. It is this same reason that now moves us to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present
case.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29867 dated 13 March 2007,
affirming the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-03-118301 and Q-03-118302 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Ronald Carino y Asunzion and
Rosana Andes y Nobelo are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and are accordingly ordered immediately
released from custody unless they are lawfully held for another offense.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court
the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174198

Plaintiff-Appellee,  

  .

-   versus -   

  Promulgated:

ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING, January 19, 2010

Accused-Appellant.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- x
DECISION
 

BRION, J.:

We review the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 which

affirmed in toto the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Paraaque City[4] in Criminal

Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida[5] Kamad y Ambing (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal possession

of shabu, the accused-appellant was charged under an Information[6] that reads:

 
 The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give away, distribute and sell to a customer for P300.00
pesos one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance
(shabu) weighing 0.20 gram, which when examined were found positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecutions version of events is summarized below. 

On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern

Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information from an asset that a certain

Zaida was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Purok IV, Silverio Compound in Paraaque City. The

Taguig police formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Antonio Parillas, [7] PO3 Christopher

Maulit[8] (PO3 Maulit), PO1 Manfoste,[9] SPO2 Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto Sanchez [10] (SPO2

Sanchez), as members. SPO2 Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso

bills for use as marked money. 

After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around 10:00

p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the target area where they immediately saw the accused-appellant and Leo.

The asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two while the rest of the buy-bust team watched from a

distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer of shabu and the accused-appellant asked him

how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked for P300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked money;

the accused-appellant thereafter handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to

be shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to

approach. SPO2 Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the P300.00 marked

money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet also

suspected to contain shabu.

The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to their

office for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets, marked as ES-1-161009 and ES-2-161002, were

then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination; the tests yielded positive results

for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[11]

The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.

The accused-appellant[12] denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up. At

around 2:30 p.m. of October 16, 2002, the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leos cousins house. Since
Leos cousin was not yet at home, she and Leo waited. After waiting for an hour, four (4) men wearing

civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers. The

accused-appellant and Leo were frisked, but nothing was found in their possession. The police officers

asked the accused-appellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling shabu.

Afterwards, she and Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again frisked and asked

the same question to which they gave the same response. The police detained Leo and the accused-

appellant for about a day and later brought them to the Prosecutors Office for inquest without showing

them any shabu.

THE RTC RULING

After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding both accused GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 SO ORDERED.[13]

The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTCs reliance on the

presumption of regularity that the RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation by

the police. She argued that no presumption of regularity could arise considering that the police violated

NAPOLCOM rules by using an asset; the rules prohibit the deputation of private persons as PNP civilian

agents.[14] The accused-appellant also pointed out the material inconsistencies in the testimony of the

prosecution witnesses that cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of SPO2 Sanchez

regarding the time the buy-bust team was dispatched to the target area; (b) the confusion of PO3 Maulit

on the identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c) the admitted mistake of PO3 Maulit that only

the recovered plastic sachet was marked ES (standing for the initials of SPO2 Sanchez), while the marked

money was marked MF (standing for the initials of P/Insp. Mariano F. Fegarido as commanding officer);

and (d) the contradictory statements of PO3 Maulit who testified that it was Leo who sold the shabu and

that of SPO2 Sanchez who testified that it was the accused-appellant who sold him the shabu.

THE CA RULING

The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA ruled that

the prosecution satisfactorily established the accused-appellants guilt based on the positive testimony of

SPO2 Sanchez on the conduct of the buy-bust operation; his testimony bore badges of truth. Accordingly,

the CA found the accused-appellants uncorroborated denial undeserving of any weight. The CA brushed

aside as a minor inconsistency the uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust

operation took place. The CA also brushed aside the violation of the NAPOLCOM rules on the ground that

the accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu committed in the presence

of the prosecution witnesses who were police officers. Moreover, the CA held that the use of assets to aid
police officers in buy-bust operations has been judicially recognized. The CA found that while the asset

brokered the shabu transaction, he had no role in the apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the

search and seizure of the shabu from the accused-appellant.

THE ISSUE

The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation

of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for  the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.

THE COURTS RULING 

We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the appeal throws

the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate

errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.[15] We find the present appeal

meritorious on the basis of such review.

As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled

to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and does not

apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the

case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[16] After due consideration of the records of

this case, the evidence adduced, and the applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation from

the general rule is warranted.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly

established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of

the corpus delictior the illicit drug as evidence.[17] Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation

requires evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs

seized and examined are the same drugs presented in court. This is a condition sine qua non for

conviction as the drugs are the main subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence

and identification must be proven for the crime to exist. As we discuss below, the special characteristics of

prohibited drugs necessitate their strict identification by the prosecution.[18]

Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the testimony

of SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant took place, we find that

both the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following infirmities in the prosecutions case: (1) the

serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the buy-bust team in handling the seized shabu;

and (2) the failure of the police to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling the seized shabu,
resulting in the prosecutions failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the

same shabu seized from the accused-appellant on October 16, 2002.

Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 

In People v. Garcia,[19] we emphasized the prosecutions duty to adduce evidence proving

compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedure laid down under paragraph 1, Section 21,

Article II of RA 9165. This provision reads: 

1)      The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. [emphasis supplied]

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides further details on

how RA 9165 is to be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism in case no strict compliance with

the requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drugs unique

characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or

substitution either by accident or otherwise.[20] Hence, the rules on the measures to be observed during

and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of the drugs for examination, and at all times up to

their presentation in court.

In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu. The

records show that his testimony and the identification he made in court constitute the totality of the

prosecutions evidence on how the police handled and preserved the integrity of the

seized shabu. Significantly, SPO2 Sanchez merely stated in his testimony that:

Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the poseur
buyer, gave the money to Zaida? 

A: We brought them to our office.

xxxx
  

Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance? 

A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.[21]

Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although the

evidence shows that the shabu was marked as ES-1-161009 before it was sent to a forensic

laboratory. His testimony also failed to state whether the marking of the shabu was done immediately

after its seizure (as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the investigation. His testimony likewise

failed to disclose if a physical inventory and photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they

had, whether these were undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative

from the media and the Department of Justice, and of an elective official.

In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary value of the item

seized had been preserved; no explanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to justify the non-

compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedures. In fact, the records clearly

reveal that the prosecution did not even acknowledge the procedural lapses committed by the

buy-bust team in the handling of the seized shabu.

The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution under the

rule that penal laws, such as RA 9165, are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor

of the accused.[22] One consequence is to produce doubts on the origins of the illegal drug presented in

court,[23] thus leading to the prosecutions failure to establish the corpus delicti.[24] Unless excused by the

saving mechanism, the acquittal of the accused must follow.

The non-compliance with the chain of custody rule 

Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an

unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is simply incomplete in establishing

the necessary links in the handling of the seized prohibited drug from the time of its seizure until its

presentation in court.

In Mallillin v. People,[25] we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient

compliance with this rule: 

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time
it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witnesses' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
 had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same. [emphasis supplied][26]

We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,[27] People v. Gum-Oyen,[28] People v.

Denoman[29] and People v. Coreche[30] where we recognized the following links that must be established in

the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal

drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug

seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating

officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and

submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

(a)  The first link in the chain of custody

We observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was handled

immediately after the accused-appellants arrest. Although the records show that SPO2 Sanchez testified

that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the accused-appellant, he never disclosed the identity

of the person/s who had custody and possession of the shabu after its seizure, nor that he retained

possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest until they reached the police station.

SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s who

made the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu seized from the

accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.

(b) The second link in the chain of custody 

We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony regarding the post-arrest police investigation failed

to provide particulars on whether the shabu was turned over to the investigator. The records only identify

the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro before whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed

a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated October 17, 2002.[31] Thus, a big gap exists on who had custody and

possession of the shabu prior to, during and immediately after the police investigation, and how

the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt by

the forensic laboratory.

(c)  The third link in the chain of custody 

The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence adduced by

the prosecution consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002[32] of Police Superintendent

Mariano F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug Enforcement Group and the Physical

Science Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the forensic chemist.[33] 

These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings ES-1-

161002 and ES-2-161002 were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1) small brown envelope

bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP Crime Laboratory received this letter-request
along with the submitted specimens. The specimens were then subjected to qualitative examination which

yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the

seized shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person who received

the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated October 17, 2002, and who

exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was examined and before it was presented in court.

Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how the seized shabu was handled, stored and

safeguarded pending its presentation in court.

(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody 

The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecutions evidence in this case.

Although the forensic chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered testimony related to a

shabu specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of October 16, 2002. Specifically, his

testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on October 12, 2002. This is borne by the following

exchanges:

FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the
one who cause [sic] the examination of the physical evidence subject of this case
containing with white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet
weighing 0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I
reduced findings after the examination conducted.

xxxx

Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to receive a letter
request relevant to this case specifically a drug test request, dated October
12, 2002 from PS/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the letter request with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October 12,
2002 for purposes of identification, respectfully request that it be marked in evidence
as Exhibit A. In this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you able to receive the evidence
submitted specifically a small brown stapled wire envelope with signature
containing with white crystalline substance inside and with markings EBC-
12/10/02 and EBC-1 12/10/02. After you received this specimen what action did
you take or do?

A Upon receiving, I read and understand the content of the letter request after which, I
stamped and marked the letter request and then record it on the logbook and after
recording it on the logbook, I performed the test for determination of the presence of
dangerous drug on the specimen. 

Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?

 
A It gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise known as shabu,
a dangerous drug. 

Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a brown
envelope with markings D-1487-02, and the signature and the date 12 October 02,
now Mr. Witness tell us who placed these markings on this brown envelope?

A I am the one who personally made the markings, sir.

Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin Plopinio and
the signature and the date 12 October 2002. Do you know who placed who placed
those markings?

A I have no idea.

Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown envelope.
May I respectfully request that this brown envelope be marked in evidence as Exhibit
B. And inside this brown envelope are three pieces of plastic sachets inside which are
white crystalline substance with markings EPC 12 October 02 and EPC-1 12 October
02. May I respectfully request that these plastic sachets with white substance inside
be marked in evidence as Exhibit B-1 and B-2. And in these plastic sachets with white
crystalline inside is a masking tape with the signature and letters are RAM, do you
know who placed those letters?

A I am the one who placed that markings sir.

Q And what RAM stands for?

A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.

Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the official finding
with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science report
no. D-1487-2 for purposes of identification respectfully request that this specimen
be marked in evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C, there is a signature above
the typewritten name Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do you whose signature is
this Mr. Witness? [34] [Emphasis supplied]

A That is my signature sir.

Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in evidence as

Exhibit C-1. You stated earlier that you cause the weight of the white crystalline
substance in this plastic sachet, what the weights of this white crystalline substance?

A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.

 
 Q May I respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science report now
mark in evidence as Exhibit C-2. I have no further questions to the witness your
Honor.

xxxx

Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented in court

as evidence through the testimony of the forensic chemist, showed characteristics distinct from

the shabu from the buy-bust sale of October 16, 2002:

First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu recovered on October

12, 2002. As testified to, one plastic sachet of shabu was marked, EBC 12 October 02, while the other

plastic sachet of shabu was marked, EBC-1 12 October 02;[35]

Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name and signature of

one PO1 Edwin Plopino and the date 12 October 2002 were written; [36]

Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made pursuant to a different

letter-request for examination dated October 12, 2002 written by one P/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon;[37]and

Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was contained in a

different forensic laboratory report known as Physical Science Report No. D-1487-2.[38]

We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary evidence the

prosecution formally offered[39] consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002[40] and the Physical

Science Report No. D-1502-02.[41] The testimonies of SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit as well as the

submitted documentary evidence referred to the plastic sachets of shabu through their markings of ES-1-

161002 and ES-2-161002.[42]

From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the presentation of

the prosecutions evidence. The prosecution, however, left the discrepancies fully unexplained. To

reiterate, the forensic chemist testified to a specimen dated October 12, 2002, or one secured way before

the buy-bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence documents relating to the specimen of October

16, 2002. Strangely, even the defense disregarded the discrepancies. In his comment on the offer of

evidence, the defense simply stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that the forensic chemical

officer only conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen he examined and not the quantitative

examination.[43] Coming immediately after the offer of evidence that mentioned the plastic sachets

containing white crystalline substances with markings ES-1 16/10/02 and ES-2 16/10/02, and the Physical
Science Report No. D-1502-02,[44] the defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it reacted to the

prosecutions offer of evidence.

But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony for the

prosecution and the offered evidence, as both the RTC and CA also failed to notice the glaring flaws in the

prosecutions evidence. Apparently, because the parties did not point out these discrepancies while the

appellate court did not closely review the records of the proceedings, the discrepancies were not taken

into account in the decision now under review.

These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Courts ruling on the kind

and extent of review that an appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the appeal opens the whole

case for review, with the appellate court charged with the duty to cite and appreciate the errors it may

find in the appealed judgment, whether these errors are assigned or unassigned. This is one such instance

where we are duty bound to rectify errors that, although unnoticed below and unassigned by the parties,

are clearly reflected in the records of the case.

The Conclusion 

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the

obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of

duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made

in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or

prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record

suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where

the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.[45] In light of the flagrant lapses we

noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and

examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins

of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody immediately affect

proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.

From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecutions failure to establish with moral

certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed
to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal

prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the

defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the March 28, 2006

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the decision of conviction dated
October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Paraaque City in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7
for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellant ZAIDA
KAMAD y AMBING is hereby declared ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.
 

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,   G.R. No. 186497

Plaintiff-Appellee,  
 
  Promulgated:
- versus - September 17, 2009
 
 
HASANADDIN GUIARA y BANSIL,
Accused-Appellant.
 
.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 
 

The Case

This is an appeal from the September 19, 2008 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02958 entitled People of the Philippines v. Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil which affirmed the July
18, 2007 Joint Decision[2] of Branch 267 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Criminal Case
Nos. 14272-D-TG and 14273-D-TG, finding accused-appellant Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil guilty of
violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
 The Facts

The charge against the accused-appellant stemmed from the following Information:

Criminal Case No. 14272-D-TG

(Violation of Section 5 [Sale], Article II of R.A. 9165)
 
That on or about the 24th day of August, 2005, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Rolly B.
Concepcion, who acted as poseur-buyer, a total of 0.17 gram of white crystalline substance,
which substance was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
known as Shabu, a dangerous drug.
 
Contrary to law.[3]
 
 
Criminal Case No. 14273-D-TG
(Violation of Section 11 [Possession], Article II of R.A. 9165)
 
That on or about the 24th day of August, 2005, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly possesses and under his custody and control .23 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet, which substance was
found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as Shabu, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
 
Contrary to law.[4]
 
 
On November 29, 2005, accused-appellant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges against him.

At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on: (1) the identity of
accused-appellant; (2) the jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of accused-appellant and the
subject matter of the cases; (3) the date, place, and fact of the arrest; (4) the authority of the police
officers as members of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the
Taguig City Police Station; (5) the existence of the subject specimens; (6) the fact that a request has
been made by the arresting officers for the examination of the confiscated items; (7) the fact that the
Forensic Chemist, Police Senior Inspector Maridel Rodis, examined the specimens and issued a laboratory
report thereon; (8) the fact that the examining forensic chemist had no knowledge from whom the alleged
specimens were taken; and (9) the fact that the subject specimens tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Hence, after the stipulations were made, the testimony of the Forensic
Chemist was dispensed with.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion and PO2
Ronnie L. Fabroa. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses accused-appellant, Normina
Piang, and Abdul Pattah.

Version of the Prosecution

The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:

 On August 24, 2005, at about 3 oclock in the afternoon, a confidential informant arrived at the
Taguig City Police Station and reported the illegal drug peddling activities of one alias Mads on Zamboanga
Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig City. Accordingly, the information was relayed to their Chief P/Insp.
Ronaldo Pamor who then conducted a briefing.

During the briefing, PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion was designated as the poseur-buyer. He was given a
five hundred peso (PhP 500) bill, which he marked with his initials, RBC, and photocopied for record
purposes, to be used as the buy-bust money during the entrapment.

After making the necessary coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the police
team, which was composed of P/Insp. Pamor, PO2 Concepcion, PO3 Arnulfo Vicua, PO3 Danilo Arago, PO3
Santiago Cordova, PO3 Felipe Metrillo, PO2 Ronnie L. Fabroa, PO2 Remegio Aguinaldo, PO3 Antonio Reyes,
and SPO1 Angelito Galang, with the informant, proceeded to their target area. Upon arriving at the target
area, the team members positioned themselves strategically to observe the transaction, while PO2
Concepcion and the informant proceeded to the location of the shabu peddler where the informant
introduced PO2 Concepcion to alias Mads. He told Mads that his friend wanted to buy PhP 500 worth
of shabu. Mads then replied, Limang-daang piso lang ba? Meron pa ako dito. He then pulled out two (2)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and gave the smaller packet to PO2 Concepcion. In
turn, PO2 Concepcion gave the marked money to Mads. Thereafter, Mads handed a plastic sachet
containing shabu to PO2 Concepcion, who upon receiving the same, executed the pre-arranged signal, by
removing his ballcap, signifying that the transaction was already consummated. This prompted his team to
rush to their position to assist in the arrest.

After the apprehension of Mads, who was later identified as accused-appellant, the buy-bust money
was recovered from the possession of accused-appellant, as well as another plastic sachet
containing shabu. PO2 Concepcion then marked the confiscated pieces of evidence for future identification
purposes. After marking, accused-appellant was brought to the police station.

Upon arrival at the police station, PO2 Concepcion turned over the confiscated items to the police
investigator for the preparation of the necessary request for examination at the crime laboratory.
Subsequently, the specimens subject of the buy-bust operation were forwarded to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Police Senior Inspector Maridel C. Rodis,
Forensic Chemical Officer conducted a qualitative examination on the said specimens. The specimens gave
positive result to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. He issued Chemistry
Report No. D-959-05 dated August 25, 2005, which showed the following results:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance
having the following markings and net weights:
A (HBG-1 8-24-05) 0.17 gram
B (HBG-2 8-24-05) 0.23 gram
xxxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any dangerous drugs. x x x
FINDINGS:
 Qualitative examination conducted on specimen A and B gave POSITIVE result to the tests
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[5] x x x
 
 

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, accused-appellant interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.

He recounted that on August 24, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, while he was on his way
to a billiard hall, a white motor vehicle suddenly stopped in front of him on Zamboanga
Street, MaharlikaVillage, Taguig City. Immediately, three armed men with guns went out of the vehicle
and approached him. After they introduced themselves as policemen, they held him and forced him to get
inside their vehicle. He was then taken to the SAID-SOTF office at the Taguig police station.

While at the police station, accused-appellant inquired as to the reason why he was being detained.
The police officers did not respond, instead they told him to call his parents or relatives and to tell them
that he was caught by the police. PO2 Concepcion extorted him and told him to produce PhP 20,000 or
else they would file a case against him for violation of the dangerous drugs law.

After having failed to produce the amount that the police were asking, accused-appellant was taken
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame for drug testing. He was then taken back to Taguig Cityand
presented for inquest.

The testimony of accused-appellant was corroborated by the testimonies of Normina Piang and
Abdul Pattah to the extent of the manner in which the arrest of the accused-appellant was made by the
police.

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused

HASANADDIN GUIARA y Bansil in Criminal Case No. 14272-D-TG for Violation of Section 5,
1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, accused Hasanaddin Guiara y
Bansil is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and ordered to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500,000.00).
Moreover, accused HASANADDIN GUIARA y Bansil is also found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 14273-D-TG for Violation of Section 11,
2nd paragraph, No. 3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. And since the quantity of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) found in the possession of the accused is only .23 gram, accused
Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging
from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum -to- FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and
TWENTY ONE (21) DAYS as maximum. Accused Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil is further
penalized to pay a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP300,000.00).
Accordingly, the Jail Warden of Taguig city Jail where accused Hasanaddin Guiara y
Bansil is presently detained is hereby ordered to forthwith commit the person of convicted
 Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil to the New Bilibid Prisons (NBP), Bureau of Corrections
in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
Upon the other hand, the shabu contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets with a total weight of 0.40 gram which are the subject matter of the above-
captioned cases, are hereby ordered transmitted and/or submitted to the custody of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) subject and/or pursuant to existing Rules and
Regulations promulgated thereto for its proper disposition.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[6]

 
On appeal to the CA, accused-appellant disputed the lower courts decision finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He raised the issue that the police officers failed to
conduct a legitimate and valid buy-bust operation. He also questioned whether the chain of custody of
the shabu allegedly recovered from him was properly established arguing that the police officers failed to
follow the established rules governing custodial procedures in drug cases without any justification for
doing so.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On September 19, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court. It ruled that all the
elements of the crimes charged were aptly established by the prosecution, including the chain of custody,
to wit:

The foregoing testimony indubitably shows that a transaction

involving shabu between appellant and the poseur-buyer actually took place. This is
important because in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material
is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The corpus delicti in this case was sufficiently
established with the presentation of the specimen HBG-1 in court and the Chemistry Report
No. D-959-05 which clearly states that the contents thereof were shabu.
xxxx
In the case at bar, appellant was caught in actual possession of prohibited drugs
without any showing that he was duly authorized by law to possess the same. Having been
caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore a prima facie evidence of animus
possidendi on appellants part.
xxxx
On this aspect, [w]e find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not
broken and that the prosecution was able to properly identify the same. The confiscated
items were marked by PO2 Concepcion immediately after he arrested appellant. Moreover,
said marked items were the same items which were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for analysis and examination, and which was later on found to be positive for shabu.[7]

 
The CA also dismissed the allegation of frame-up saying that the defense failed to establish any
ulterior motive on the part of the arresting officers in deviation from the legitimate performance of their
duties.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267, in Criminal Case Nos. 14272-D-TG &
14273-D-TG, promulgated on July 18, 2007, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
 With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[8]

Accused-appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the CA Decision.

 
The Issue
 
 
 
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our Ruling
 
 
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
 
 
Buy-Bust Operation was Legitimate and Valid

Accused-appellant attacks the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation. He argues that the contradictory testimonies of the police show that no buy-bust operation was
actually carried out and that it was merely fabricated or concocted by the police officers to maliciously
charge accused-appellant.

We disagree.

In our jurisprudence, a buy-bust operation is a recognized means of entrapment using such ways

and means devised by peace officers for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. [9] It is legal
and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[10]

In the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu, the essential elements have to be established, to wit:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[11] What is material is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The
delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish these elements beyond moral
certainty. Accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP 500 to PO2 Concepcion posing as buyer;
the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence;
there was actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally, accused-appellant was fully
aware that he was selling and delivering a prohibited drug. In fact, PO2 Concepcion testified thus:

PROSEC. SANTOS: What time did your team arrive at Maharlika?

A: 5:45 p.m., sir.
 PROSEC. SANTOS: In what particular place in Maharlika did your team go?
A: At Zamboanga Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig City.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Upon arrival thereat, tell us what[,] if any[,] did you observe or see?
A: Upon arrival, sir, we walk towards the basketball court together with the confidential
informant and readily saw alias mads, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, your confidential informant readily saw alias mads?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, when you[r] CI saw this mads, what did you do?
A: He talked to alias mads and he introduced me as [a] buyer of shabu.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Will you please repeat to us if possible[,] in verbatim[,] what your
informant told alias mads about you?
A: They talked, sir, and he told him that Im his friend and Im going to buy shabu worth five
hundred pesos and alias mads uttered limang-daang piso lang ba?
Meron pa ko dito.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after that exchange [of] words, limang-daan piso lang ba? Meron
pa ko dito, what happened, Officer?
A: He asked for the five hundred pesos and he brought out two (2) plastic sachets, he
chooses [one] and [gives] me the plastic sachet with a lesser
contents.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And how many sachets did this alias mads give you during that time?
A: Only one (1) plastic sachet, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after that exchange of that money and commodity has already taken
place, what if any did you do then?
A: I gave the pre-arrange and I saw the immediate approach of PO2 Ronnie Fabroa, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what happened?
A: We arrested alias mads and I ask for his personal circumstances and I told him to bring
out the contents of his pockets.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Did this alias mads obey your instructions to bring out the contents of
his pockets?
A: Yes, sir, and I recovered the buy-bust money and another plastic sachet containing
suspected shabu.[12]
 
 

The foregoing testimony indubitably shows that a transaction involving shabu actually took place
between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer. What is more, the corpus delicti in this case was
sufficiently established with the presentation of the specimen HBG-1 in court and Chemistry Report No. D-
959-05 which clearly states that the contents were shabu.

Likewise, the foregoing testimony also establishes that accused-appellant was indeed found in
possession of illegal drugs aside from what he sold to the poseur-buyer, without showing that accused-
appellant had any authority to possess them.

On the other hand, in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be proved with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object
identified as a prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[13]

It bears stressing that this crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. Further, possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of
the accused. Constructive possession, on the other hand, exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found.[14]

Also, the prosecution must prove that the accused had animus possidendi or the intent to possess
the drugs. In U.S. v. Bandoc,[15] the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within
the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and
is enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.[16]

In the case at bar, accused-appellant was caught in actual possession of prohibited drugs without
any showing that he was duly authorized by law to possess the same. Having been caught in flagrante
delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on accused-appellants part.

As a matter of fact, the trial court, in disposing the case, said:

The substance of the prosecutions evidence is to the effect that accused Hasanaddin
Guiara y Bansil was arrested by the police because of the existence of the shabu he sold to
PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion as well as the recovery of the buy-bust money from his possession,
and the presence of another plastic sachet containing shabu that was also recovered from
his person.
 
To emphasize, the prosecution witnesses in the person of PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion
and PO2 Ronnie L. Fabroa positively identified accused Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil as the
person they apprehended on August 24, 2005 at Zamboanga
Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig City. [They] arrested accused Hasanaddin B. Guiara
because their team was able to procure shabu from him during the buy-bust operation they
purposely conducted against the aforementioned accused.
 
The buy-bust money recovered by the arresting officers from the possession of the
accused Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil as well as the shabu they were able to purchase from
the accused sufficiently constitute as the very corpus delicti of the crime of Violation of
Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and the other plastic sachet
containing shabu that was recovered from the accused Guiara similarly constitute as
the corpus delicti of the crime of Violation of Section 11, 2nd paragraph, No. 3, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.[17] x x x
 
 
Clearly, the trial court found that the testimonies of both PO2 Concepcion and PO2 Ronnie L.
Fabroa established the existence of a valid and legitimate buy-bust operation and all the essential
elements of the crimes charged against accused-appellant.

Furthermore, contrary to accused-appellants contentions, the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of

the police officers are too insufficient or insubstantial to overturn the judgment of conviction against him,
since those testimonies are consistent on material points. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that
the witnesses testimonies need only to corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual
commission of the crime.[18] Questions as to the exact street where the illegal sale was consummated do
not in any way impair the credibility of the witnesses. To secure a reversal of the appealed judgment, such
inconsistencies should pertain to that crucial moment when the accused was caught selling shabu, not to
peripheral matters.[19]

It should be noted that in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court generally
yields to the judgment of the trial courts since they are in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
[20]
 Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
 Chain of Custody Was Properly Established

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
the corpus delicti, as evidence in court is material.[21] In fact, the existence of the dangerous drug is
crucial to a judgment of conviction. It is, therefore, indispensable that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the fact that the
substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The
chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed.[22]

To ensure that the chain of custody is established, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165 provide:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
 
(a)    The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.[23] x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
 
 
A close reading of the law reveals that it allows certain exceptions. Thus, contrary to the assertions
of accused-appellant, Section 21 need not be followed with pedantic rigor. Non-compliance with Sec. 21
does not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. [24] What
is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[25]

In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs
seized from accused-appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the
case was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that the confiscated items
were marked by PO2 Concepcion immediately after he arrested accused-appellant. Then, the said marked
items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis and examination, and which was later on
found to be positive for shabu. PO2 Concepcion testified thus:

PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, you were telling us that your immediate back up, you saw him
rushing to your place, what[,] if any[,] did your immediate backup
do when he was already near you?
A: We arrested him and I [asked] for his personal circumstances and marked the evidence I
confiscated from him and the shabu I bought, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: You said you marked the shabu that you bought from him and the shabu
that was confiscated from his possession, tell us, what kind of
 marking did you put on the plastic sachet containing the shabu that
you bought from him during that time?
A: HBG-1, the subject of the sale and HBG-2 the evidence confiscated from his possession.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked the shabu or these plastic sachets
containing the shabu that you bought and confiscated from him,
what happened?
A: My companions [approached] us and we brought alias mads to the police station.
xxxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now after you have brought him to your station, what happened to the
shabu that you bought and confiscated from him during that time?
A: We [turned] it over to the investigator and after that he prepared a request for
laboratory examination.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So there was already a request for laboratory examination?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, you said you [turned] it over to the investigator, who among you
transported these specimen to the crime laboratory for
examination?
A: I and the investigator, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you said that together with the investigator, you brought the
specimens to the crime lab?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened at the crime lab?
A: They received the request for laboratory examination.
PROSEC. SANTOS: The request, how about the specimens?
A: Together with the specimens, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you have any proof to show that the crime lab received the request
and the specimens?
A: There was, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What is that?
A: The stamp received, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: If you will see that document again, will you be able to identify it?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Im showing to you Exhibit B, this is a request for laboratory
examination, will you please examine the same and tell us the
proof of the receipt of the request and the specimens?
A: It was recorded by PO1 Calimag, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: For the record, your Honor, the witness is referring to Exhibit B-2, your
Honor. Now, Officer, if you will see again the shabu that you
bought and confiscated from the accused, will you be able to
identify it?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Why do you say that you could identify the same?
A: Because there are my initials, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: I have here with me two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu, will you
please carefully examine the same and point us the plastic sachet
containing the shabu that you bought and the plastic sachet
containing the shabu that you confiscated from the possession of
the accused during that time? For the record, your Honor, the two
(2) plastic sachets are contained in [a] small plastic bag. Im
showing to you these two (2) plastic sachets, Officer, and please
[examine] it and tell us, which one of them is the subject of the
sale and the confiscated shabu?
A: This one is the subject of the sale, HBG-1.
INTERPRETER: Witness is referring to Exhibit D-1.
A: And HBG-2, this is the plastic sachet confiscated from the accused.
INTERPRETER: Witness is referring to Exhibit D-2.[26]
  

Moreover, this Court held in Malillin v. People[27] that the testimonies of all persons who handled the
specimen are important to establish the chain of custody. Thus, the prosecution offered the testimony of
PO2 Concepcion, the police officer who first handled the dangerous drug. The testimony of Police Senior
Inspector Maridel C. Rodis, who handled the dangerous drug after PO2 Concepcion, was, however,
dispensed with after the stipulations made by both the prosecution and the defense.

Undoubtedly, therefore, there was an unbroken chain in the custody of the illicit drug purchased
from accused-appellant.

Defenses of Denial and Frame-Up Are Weak

Denial, as a defense, is an inherently weak one[28] and has been viewed by this Court with disdain, for it
can easily be concocted and is a very common line of defense in prosecutions arising from violations of RA
9165.[29] Similarly, the defense of frame-up is also easily fabricated and commonly used in buy-bust cases.
[30]

 
In order for the Court to appreciate such defenses, there must be clear and convincing evidence to
prove such defense because in the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely
impute such crime against accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
stands.

In the case at bar, the defense failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police
officers. Even accused-appellant himself declared that he did not know any of the police officers who
arrested him. During his direct examination, he testified, thus:
 
Q : While walking along Zamboanga Street going to the billiard hall, what happened?
A : A white Adventure blocked my way, sir.
Q : And after this vehicle blocked your way, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A : Three men in civilian clothes alighted from the vehicle and approached me. They held
me and forced me to board their vehicle.
Q : Do you know any of the three individuals who got out and tried to force you inside the
vehicle?
A : None, sir.
 
ATTY. GARLITOS : Did they tell you the reason why you are being forcibly taken inside the
vehicle?
A : No sir.
Q : Did they introduce themselves to you?
A : They introduced themselves as policemen, sir.[31]
 
Likewise, the trial court held:
 
The testimony of PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion that was corroborated by PO2 Ronnie L.
Fabroa, who have not shown and displayed any ill motive to arrest the accused is sufficient
enough to convict the accused of the crimes charged against him. x x x As law enforcers,
their narration of the incident is worthy of belief and as such they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
To stress x x x testimony of arresting officers, with no motive or reason to falsely impute a
serious charge against the accused is credible.[32]
 
 
Thus, the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses must prevail over the bare denials of
the accused.[33] Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving
evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of the credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[34]
  
Therefore, this Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
and finds that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
 
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02958 finding
accused-appellant Hasanaddin Guiara guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO, accused-

appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged
with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means
of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing her
panty, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner
portion of the vagina of the undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and without
her consent.[1]

Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[2]

From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,[3] her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr.
Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the following facts:
 On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in Quezon City,
Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at
sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.
Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes house boy, who was sometimes left
with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to which she
answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May indicated
the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Glorias husband Col. Buenafe,
[4]
 she waited until their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on an errand
and informed her husband about their daughters plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May who
repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May had
told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November
17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant several
times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring accused-
appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him, on account of which he was
detained. Glorias sworn statement[5] was then taken.[6]
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: Sinaksak nya
ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga, thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added
that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Crya May, came up with her report dated
November 21, 1995,[7] containing the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS:

GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is
flat and soft.

GENITAL:

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with congested and abraded
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an abraded posterior
fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the
examining index finger.

xxx

CONCLUSION:

Subject is in virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of examination.
(Emphasis supplied.)
By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by friction with
an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.[8]
The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he took the
witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mays
genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra
May who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer Glorias queries if her
husband Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the house, was womanizing,
Gloria would always find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the
complaint. Thus:
q- According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?
a- That is not true, sir.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent to Crame
to buy medicine for the daughter because she had difficulty in urinating.
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
 a- No, I do not know, sir.
q- And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by the mother of
the victim?
a- I did not do it, sir.
q- What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against you?
a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was going with
her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband with a former marriage.[9]
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.

The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Costs to be paid by the accused.[10] (Italics in the original.)

Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the trial court:
I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

ADMISSION.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SILENCE DURING TRIAL
AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)

Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of its decision
shows, of his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May:

In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]s complaint during the
confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, the admission was even
expressly qualified by Rullepas insistence that he had committed the sexual assault only once, specifying
the time thereof as 4:00 pm of November 17, 1995. That qualification proved that the admission was
voluntary and true. An uncoerced and truthful admission like this should be absolutely admissible and
competent.

xxx

Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his freedom to deny it if
untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon him.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were made out of
fear, having been elicited only after Cyra Mays parents bullied and questioned him. He thus submits that it
was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements during the trial as an admission of
guilt.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his admission merely as
an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the
implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of
her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus she testified on direct
examination:
q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
 a- Yes, sir.
q- What did he do to you?
a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga
q- How many times did he do that to you?
a- Twice, sir.
xxx
q- Do you remember when he did these things to you?
a- Opo.
q- When was that?
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his penis inside my
vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
a- Yes.
q- What part of your body hurt?
a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ, sir.[13]
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting details of her
ordeal:
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on November 17,
1995?
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your mouth, and
into your anus, would you describe what his penis?
a- It is a round object, sir.
C o u r t:
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
a- Opo.
q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
a- No, sir.
q- Which part of his body that titi located?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
C o u r t:
Continue
xxx
q- Why were you in that room?
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
q- And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing any clothing?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.
q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
xxx
 q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help?
a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from sleep.
q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a- Matagal po.
q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q- You did not complain and you did not shout?
a- I cried, sir.[14]
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in the house on
November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her testimony:
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house, he [was]
usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a- Opo.
q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when you father left the house at that time, on
November 17?
a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya Ronnie [was]
always with your Papa?
a- Yes, sir.[15]
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father Col. Buenafe left
their house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and, thus, does not preclude accused-
appellants commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a young child is vulnerable to suggestion,
hence, her affirmative response to the defense counsels above-quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria having
testified that she learned of it on November 20, 1995[16] while Cyra May said that immediately after the
incident, she awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and reported it:[17] This is a minor
matter that does not detract from Cyra Mays categorical, material testimony that accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the following portion of her
testimony:
q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo, where did you get that phrase?
a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.[18]
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that of
hearing her mother utter sinira niya ang buhay mo.
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is accused,
perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is true that the ordinary child is a
great weaver of romances, and her imagination may induce (her) to relate something she has heard or
read in a story as personal experience.[19] But Cyra Mays account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy
tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma of public trial.[20]
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in
her labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court regarding the
competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:

Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the necessary
intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the competence to testify about her
experience. She might have been an impressionable child as all others of her age are but her narration
of Kuya Ronnies placing his titi in her pepe was certainly one which could not be considered as a common
childs tale. Her responses during the examination of counsel and of the Court established her
consciousness of the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable for her to describe a
bad act of the accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she described the act of the
accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness manifested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and
plain responses to questions further enhanced her claim to credit and trustworthiness. [21] (Italics in the
original.)
 In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged incident Cyra
May was already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have scratched herself which
caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out this possibility. She stated categorically
that that part of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful. [22] The abrasions
could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at
the time of the examination does not preclude accused-appellants conviction since the infliction of force is
immaterial in statutory rape.[23]
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony that
accused-appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is possible that
accused-appellants penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina, the former being
more resistant to extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right
mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if
she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the childs
defilement.[24] Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to subject her
daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt
feelings.[25]
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape,
apparently on the basis of the following testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely scrubbed
his penis against her vagina:
q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.[26]
Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath the labia majora,
[27]
 proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing of the
penis against its surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory
rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and
(2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. [28] As shown in the previous discussion, the first
element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The same is true with respect
to the second element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[29] provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:

x x x.

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.

x x x.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

x x x.

Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of
the death sentence. The same Article states:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.

 Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age
in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna,[30] established a set of guidelines
in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother
or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant
could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:

x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE,
was presented to prove her age. x x x.

x x x.

However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of
LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was
presented to establish LIZETTEs age.Her mother, Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old
at the time of the commission of the crime).

xxx

Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5
years old. However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the
time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born,
she could not answer.

For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must
be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature
once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting
rules of procedure and evidence.

In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the
qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of
objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to
testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3
January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death
penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs mother that
she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA
liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph of Article
335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal
knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be
imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.)

Several cases[31] suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in
determining her age. For example, the Court, in People v. Tipay,[32] qualified the ruling in People v. Javier,
[33]
 which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape victims age, with the following
pronouncement:

This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to
prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest
and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen
where minority may seem to be dubitable due to ones physical appearance. In this situation, the
prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age
when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited
provision. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, a handful of cases[34] holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,[35] cannot take judicial notice of the victims age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta probanda, or propositions in a partys case, as to
which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without the
need of evidence.[36] Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover some
other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently referred
to in terms of judicial notice.[37]
The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance cannot be
categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it would
certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in the
ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts.[38] As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of
certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them.
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing judicial notice are found, is entitled What
Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her
age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the
evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very
concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A
persons appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the
senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:

SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When
an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

To be sure, one author writes, this practice of inspection by the court of objects, things
or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure. [39] The author
proceeds to quote from another authority:

Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the submission to the
senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects which furnish evidence. The view of the land
by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of
one alleged to be an infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the
examination of writings, to determine whether they are ()blemished,() the implements with which a crime
was committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another, are few
illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries
past.[40](Emphasis supplied.)

A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under the age of

consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly observe
the person brought before it.[41] Experience teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an index
of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such
evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular,
the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a contrary
rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious. [42] Consequently, the jury or the court
trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by observation of such
persons.[43] The formal offer of the person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-
examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of
such person as an exhibit is properly refused. [44]
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an aliens age from his appearance. In Braca v.
Collector of Customs,[45] this Court ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the immigrant what his age
is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an
investigation by the board of special inquiry to determine his right to enter; and such body may take into
consideration his appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the applicant
is not a minor based upon such appearance is not without evidence to support it.

This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus, in United States v.
Agadas,[46] this Court held:

Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never purchased a cedula; and that
he was going to purchase a cedula the following january. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these
questions: You are a pretty big boy for seventeen. Answer: I cannot tell exactly because I do not
remember when I was born, but 17 years is my guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that
excuse, you had better get some positive evidence to that effect. Answer: I do not remember, as I already
stated on what date and in what year I was born. The court, in determining the question of the age of the
defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:

The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was about 17 years of age,
but judging by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He has shown that he has no positive
information on the subject and no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact that he is entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be
incumbent upon the defense to establish by satisfactory evidence in order to enable the court to give an
accused person the benefit of the mitigating circumstance.

In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified, when the case was tried in
the court below, that he then was only 16 years of age. There was no other testimony in the record with
reference to his age. But the trial judge said: The accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving
his age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20. This court, in passing upon the age of
Estavillo, held:

We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to the age of Estavillo from the
latters personal appearance. There is no proof in the record, as we have said, which even tends to
establish the assertion that this appellant understated his age. * * * It is true that the trial court had an
opportunity to note the personal appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so
doing reached the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over 18.This appellant testified that
he was only 16, and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked difference
in the penalties to be imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude (resolving all doubts in favor
of the appellants) that the appellants ages were 16 and 14 respectively.

While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age, yet the trial court
reached the conclusion, judging from the personal appearance of Rosario, that he is a youth 18 or 19
years old. Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must conclude that there exists a
reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at
the time the robbery was committed. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is,
therefore, sentenced to six months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day
of presidio mayor. x x x.

There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a persons appearance in determining

his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down
guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is
sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the
disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from
the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives
testimony.
 As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance, as object
evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and,
following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere physical appearance is not
enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the
minority of the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as
the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age in the present case spells the
difference between life and death.[47]

In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or similar
authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only three
years old at the time of the rape. Cyra Mays testimony goes:
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And you are 3 years old?
a- Yes, sir.[48]
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.[49]
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be
proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age from
her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e.,
that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt
exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year
old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and,
following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased
to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00.[50]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of
Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May
Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO
ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-
Appellant.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987, convicting Mario
Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, is before us on appeal.
The information against the accused-appellant read as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering
tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which
are prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.

Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero
rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which declared:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4,
Art. II, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and cost.: nad

The marijuana confiscated in this case is declared confiscated and forfeited and ordered turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal. SO ORDERED.

The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:

1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite
lack of evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.

2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a
xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.

The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:

On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de
la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines,
Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay
Singkamas, Makati.

The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone
near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said
without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and
there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-
Narcotics Unit).

The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the
accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana
and crushed leaves.: nad

The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for
investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having been
informed of his constitutional rights.

These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic, chemical and
chromotographic examination was performed on the confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified that the findings were positive. The
marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2

As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His testimony was that from 1:30 to
4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other persons along Solchuaga St.
when somebody suddenly said that policemen were making arrests. The players grabbed the bet money
and scampered. However, he and a certain Danny (another "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken to
the Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati. There they were mauled and warned that if they did not
point to their fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he had sold marijuana to
Singayan and insisted the bills taken from him were the bet money he had grabbed at the "cara y cruz"
game. 3

The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their
respective testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Applying the
presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's
uncorroborated allegation that he had been manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient
evidence of his charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he
had met only on the day of his arrest.

In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:

When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated
by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.

Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another who is a total stranger until the
seller is certain of the identity of the buyer."

The conjecture must be rejected.: nad

In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:

Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the
illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the
presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these
factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug
pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142
SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store
(People vs. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22,
1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).

As the Court has also held, "What matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller
but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves." 6

Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the
admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:

This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A)
which, according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary document falling under
Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence
except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)

Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing
its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of
the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of
the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as
an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.

We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his
guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge of drug
addiction upon our people.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 55691 May 21, 1992

ESPERANZA BORILLO, in her behalf and in behalf of her children, petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA BORILLO, respondents.

Crisostomo F. Pariñas for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed on 24 November 1980,
petitioner urges this Court to review and reverse the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (Third Division) in
C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R, promulgated on 3 September 1980, which reversed and set aside the 3 June 1978
decision of Branch II of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Abra in Civil Case
No. 1043.

On 10 February 1977, petitioner, for herself and on behalf of her children, filed before the
abovementioned trial court a complaint against private respondent and Marcos Borillo for the recovery of
several parcels of land located at Bugbuguis, Quillat, Langiden, Abra particularly described in said
complaint, under the first cause of action, as follows:

(a) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr. and pastureland) . . . with an area of 1231 sq. m.; with
assessed value in the sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6319 in the name of
Esperanza Borillo, et al.;

(b) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 980 sq. m.; with an assessed value
in the sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6320 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et
al.;

(c) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 698 sq. m.; with assessed value in
the sum of P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6321 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al.;

(d) A parcel of land (Cornland) . . . with an area of 570 sq. m.; with an assessed value of
P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6322 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al. 2

and one-fifth (1/5) undivided portion of two (2) parcels of land, also located in the same place as
the above four (4) parcels, particularly described under the second cause of action, thus:

(e) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 1440 sq. m.; with an assessed
value of P60.00; under Tax Declaration No. 1745 in the name of Venancio Borillo;

(f) A parcel of land (Cornland) . . . with an area of 684 sq. m.; with an assessed value of
P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 0746 in the name of Venancio Borillo.3

The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1043.

In the complaint, petitioner alleges that the abovementioned parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d) were originally
owned by her late husband, Elpidio Borillo, with whom she had four (4) children, namely: Patricia,
Melecio, Bonifacia and Quirino. Although said parcels of land were unregistered, they were declared in
1948 in the name of Elpidio under Tax Declaration Nos. 0731, 0732, 0733 and 0734,
respectively. 4 Elpidio had been in peaceful, public, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in
concept of owner even before his marriage to petitioner and until his death in 1970. After his death,
petitioner continued to possess and cultivate said parcels of land and enjoy the fruits thereof until
sometime in 1971-1972 when private respondent and Marcos Borillo, Elpidio's siblings, forcibly and
unlawfully dispossessed her of the property. Despite repeated demands, Marcos and the private
respondent refused to return the property to the petitioner and her children. In 1974, new Tax
Declarations, namely Nos. 6319, 6320, 6321 and 6322 5 for parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d), respectively,
were issued in her name. Upon the other hand, parcels (e) and (f), also unregistered, were inherited by
Elpidio, his brother Marcos and sisters Catalina, Aurelia and Rosita, from their father, Venancio Borillo.
Elpidio's 1/5 pro-indiviso share therein was unlawfully taken by private respondent sometime in 1971; the
latter refused to return it to petitioner and her children, who are Elpidio's heirs, despite repeated
demands.

Petitioner then prays that judgment be rendered declaring her and her children owners of parcels (a), (b),
(c) and (d), as well as the 1/5 pro-indiviso portion of parcels (e) and (f), and ordering the private
respondent and Marcos Borillo to pay actual and moral damages plus costs.

In their Answer filed on 14 March 1977, private respondent claims that parcels (a), (c) and (d) were sold
to her by her late brother Elpidio in 1935, while Marcos Borillo claims that parcel (b) was sold to him by
Elpidio sometime in 1937, long before Elpidio's marriage to petitioner. Although they did not declare these
parcels for taxation purposes in their respective names, they immediately took possession and occupied
the same as owners thereof. Private respondent had been paying the realty taxes on parcels (a), (c) and
(d) since 1948 6 and explains her failure to secure in her name tax declarations for said parcels during
Elpidio's lifetime by alleging that she trusted him because he was her brother and he had assured her that
she could transfer in her favor the title thereto anytime. After the Second World War, Elpidio and Rosita,
another sibling, sold to her their respective undivided shares in parcels (e) and (f).

On 15 March 1977, private respondent alone filed an Amended Answer. On the other hand, on 5 April
1977, Patricia and Melencio Borillo filed a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiffs on the ground that they did
not authorize their inclusion as such and that the private respondent is the true and lawful owner of the
land in question. 7

At the trial, private respondent relied heavily on Exhibit "3", a private document purportedly showing that
Elpidio sold to her all his property for P40.00, and Exhibit "4", which she claims to be a deed of sale of
parcels (a), (c) and (d) allegedly executed by Elpidio Borillo in 1935. Upon the other hand, Marcos Borillo
claimed that the deed of sale evidencing the sale to him of parcel (b) was lost during the Second World
War. Both parties claim actual possession of the property. Private respondent and Marcos Borillo even
claimed possession for more than thirty (30) years.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered on 3 June 1978 a decision in favor of herein petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs
as the true owners of parcels A, B, C and D described in par. 4 of the complaint and as co-
owners of parcels E and F described in par. 6 of the complaint with Rosita Borillo, Aurelia
Borillo and the defendants Catalina Borillo and Marcos Borillo. With costs against the
defendants. 8

The trial court arrived at this decision on the basis of the following findings of fact:

The claim of ownership by the plaintiffs with respect to the four parcels of land described in
par. 4 of the complaint is preponderantly established by Tax Declaration Nos. 731, 732, 733
and 734, Exhibits, "A, A-1, A-2 and A-3" for the plaintiffs. These tax declarations covering
the four parcels of land in question are tax declarations issued in 1948 and is (sic) in the
name of Elpidio Borillo, husband of plaintiff Esperanza Borillo. Defendants never declared it
(sic) in their name (sic) and no action or attempt whatsoever was made by the defendants
to declare it (sic) in their name (sic) during the lifetime of Elpidio Borillo. It was only after
the death of Elpidio Borillo and the institution of this action by the plaintiffs that defendants
took action and strangely declared it (sic) in their names.

Obviously, the bulk of evidence for the plaintiffs are (sic) the tax declarations in the name of
Elpidio Borillo which do not absolutely prove their ownership. But the circumstances
obtaining in this case renders (sic) the tax declarations — Exhibits "A, A-1, A-2 and A-3",
reliable and predominantly point that plaintiffs are owners of the four parcels of land
described in par. 4 of the complaint as against the plaintiffs (sic). First, it will be noted that
Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 were prepared and issued long before the death of Elpidio
Borillo. He was then a bachelor having married the plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950.
Defendant Catalina Borillo married long before the 2nd World War. Defendant Marcos Borillo
likewise married before World War II. Defendants have properties declared in their names.
Marcos Borillo accompanied the Assessors who measured the four parcels of land according
to him (sic). Despite the status of the parties and the Assessors having been accompanied
by defendant Marcos Borillo, still the four parcels of land were declared in the name of
Elpidio Borillo. It is unconceivable (sic) why it was (sic) declared in the name of Elpidio
Borillo, if it does (sic) not belong to him. True, that tax declarations are not conclusive proof
of ownership, but it cannot be gainsaid especially in rural areas like Langiden, Abra where
lands are not surveyed and titled, that tax declarations are strong evidence of possession
and ownership.

Secondly, the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of the complaint were declared in the
name of Elpidio Borillo for 29 years and no action whatsoever was taken by the defendants
to have the tax declarations (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3) be (sic) cancelled and declared
the lands (sic) in their names during the lifetime of the declared owner Elpidio Borillo and
immediately after his death. It was only in 1977 after the filing of the complaint and after
the plaintiffs caused the cancellation of Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 and declared the lands
in their names when defendants attempted to declare it (sic) also in their names. The
unfathomable tolerance of the defendants of having the four (4) parcels of land be (sic)
declared in the name of their deceased brother, Elpidio Borillo in 1948 and remained (sic) in
his name after his marriage with (sic) the plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950 even (sic) after
his death in 1971, is fatal and strongly negate their (sic) defendants' claim of ownership. No
person like the defendants will ever allow his/her property be (sic) declared in the name of
another for twenty-nine (29) years. The fact that the lands were declared in the name of
Elpidio Borillo for twenty-nine (29) years coupled by (sic) his actual possession during his
lifetime until his death in 1971 as testified to by Esperanza Borillo and Clemente Llaneza
who is an uninterested witness strongly outweighed the evidence for the defendants and
convincingly indicate that the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of the complaint really
belong to Elpidio Borillo. The claim of defendants that they are (sic) in actual possession
before World War II up to the present is persuasively belied by Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3
and the testimony of Clemente Llaneza.

The claim of defendant Catalina Borillo that she purchased parcels A, C and D described in
par. 4 of the complaint from her deceased brother Elpidio Borillo before World War II as
evidence (sic) by Exhibits "3" and "4" appears unreliable and incredible. Exhibit "3" which is
an acknowledgment receipt dated May 12, 1946 made no mention of what property has
been sold. There is no evidence of any transfer of ownership. In fact, there is nothing clear
from the evidence as to what land of Elpidio Borillo is referred to in Exhibit "3". From the
terms of Exhibit "3" and the alleged consideration thereof, it thus becomes obvious that it is
only a receipt evidencing a loan of P40.00.

Exhibit "4" (receipt) which is the main basis of the claim of ownership by defendant Catalina
Borillo with respect to parcels A, C and D in par. 4 of the complaint, appears unreliable and
cannot prevail against the evidence for the plaintiffs. This Exhibit "4" for defendant Catalina
 Borillo is undated and unsigned. Defendant Catalina Borillo testified that she does not know
the contends of Exhibit "4". Elpidio Borillo as shown by Exhibit "3" for defendant Catalina
Borillo and Exhibits E and F for the plaintiffs knows how to write his name. Yet, Exhibit "4"
was not signed by him. Aside from the patent defects of Exhibit "4" on its face which
renders it unreliable, it will be noted that during the pre-trial proceedings, defendant
Catalina Borillo presented Exhibit "4" to support her claim as alleged in her answer of having
purchased parcels A, C and D from Elpidio Borillo in 1935. Clearly embodied, however, in
Exhibit "4" are tax declarations Nos. 0732, 0731 and 0734 which are indeed tax declarations
in 1948 in the name of Elpidio Borillo. Considering that Exhibit "4" is a document executed
in 1935 according to the defendant Catalina Borillo, why are Tax Declarations Nos. 731, 732
and 734 which were issued only in 1948 incorporated? The inclusion of non-existent
document (sic) in Exhibit "4" at the time of its alleged execution absolutely renders Exhibit
"4" wholly unworthy and undeserving of any credence. 9

Private respondent appealed from the adverse decision to the respondent Court. Her co-defendant, Marcos
Borillo, did not.

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R. In her Appellant's Brief, private respondent assigns
the following errors:

THAT THE FACTS RELIED UPON IS (sic) NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

II

THAT THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

On 3 September 1980, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 10 reversing the decision of the trial
court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby rendered declaring defendant Catalina Borillo as the owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d)
and of the one-fifth portion of Elpidio Borillo in parcels (e) and (f); that defendant Marcos
Borillo is the owner of parcel (b); with costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.

The respondent Court made the following disquisitions to support its decision:

We are convinced that the preponderance of the evidence tilt (sic) heavily in favor of
defendant. Defendant established she has been in possession in the concept of owner of
said three parcels of land (a), (c) and (d) since her purchase of the same long before the
war and she cultivated the same in the concept of owner, paying the real estate taxes and
thereafter declaring it in her name while Marcos Borillo acquired parcel (b) from Elpidio
since 1938 of which he took possession in the concept of owner, and declared the same in
his name paying the real estate taxes. No less than Melecio Borillo, son of plaintiff
Esperanza, not only withdrew as party plaintiff with his sister Patricia but he even testified
that he knew from the very mouth of his father Elpidio while he was still alive that he sold
the property in question to defendant Catalina Borillo. It has also been shown that Elpidio
Borillo sold his 1/5 portion of parcels (e) and (f) also before the war to defendant and she
had been in continuous possession since then in the concept of owner.

Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, such uninterrupted, adverse, open possession for thirty
(30) years by defendants regardless of their title or good faith upholds said defendants'
right over the property. (Parcotillo vs. Parcotillo, 12 SCRA 435, 440).

In finding for the plaintiffs the trial court relied on the tax declarations in the name of
Elpidio as proof that plaintiffs are the owners of the questioned property since the property
is untitled; that for 29 years no action was taken by defendants to declare the property in
their name (sic) and it was only in 1977 after the filing of the complaint that defendants so
declared the properties in their name (sic); that Exhibit 4 is unreliable being unsigned by
Elpidio when there is evidence that he could sign his name; that Exhibit 3 did not mention
the property sold; that Exhibit 4 was made in 1935 as alleged in the answer but surprisingly
it embodied Tax Declarations 731, 732 and 734 which were issued only in 1948; and that
the alleged sale of the right of Elpidio over parcels (e) and (f) are without receipts.

We disagree. Declaration of ownership for taxation purposes, or assessment declaration and

tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership. They are only prima facie evidence of
possession. (Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562)
However, if the holder of a (sic) land presents a deed of conveyance in his favor from the
 former owner thereof to support his claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and
tax receipts relative to the property may be used to prove good faith on his part in
occupying and possessing the same. (Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phi. 384) And while it
is true that tax receipts do not prove titled (sic) to a land, nevertheless when considered
with the actual possession of the property by the applicant, they constitute evidence of
great weight in support of the claim of title of ownership by prescription. (Viernes vs.
Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286; Land Registration and Mortgages by Ventura, pp. 125-126)

Plaintiffs admitted that defendants are in possession of the lands in question and the
records show that even during the lifetime of Elpidio, the defendant had been paying the
real property taxes of the property (Exhs. 1 to 1-I). The sale of parcels (a), (c) and (d) to
defendant is evidenced by Exhibits 3 and 4. Although Exhibit 3 does not indicate the
property subject of the sale, such deficiency can be attributed to the fact that this was a
document executed between brother and sister without the assistance of a lawyer but
testimonial evidence has been adduced that cured this defect. True it is that Exhibit 4
appears not to have been signed by Elpidio and he merely imprinted a cross over his name
when it appears that he knew how to sign. However, defendants Catalina and Marcos Borillo
categorically testified that Elpidio signed his name only by copying a sample. Hence, it is
understandable if Elpidio did not sign Exhibit 4 for he must not have been furnished a (sic)
guide to be copied. No evidence was adduced that Exhibit 4 was actually executed in 1935.
What was established is that Elpidio sold said three parcels to defendant Catalina before the
war. In confirmation of said sale, Exhibit 4 must have been executed on or before 1948 that
is why it reflects the Tax Declarations of said property to be effective in the same year.

On the other hand, outside of the fact that the property remained to be declared in the
name of Elpidio plaintiffs have not adduced any other evidence to buttress their claim of
ownership. Plaintiff Esperanza paid for the real property taxes of the property only on June
22, 1977 after the complaint was filed in court. (Exhibit C) It is not improbable that the
reason why the properties remained in the name of Elpidio inspite of the fact that it has long
been sold to defendants is because this is a sale between brother and sister where mutual
trust and confidence is to be expected. Indeed, during the lifetime of Elpidio he never
questioned the acts of ownership exercised by the defendants over the property and even
after his death in 1970, plaintiff Esperanza only remembered to assert their alleged right in
1976 when she attempted to talk to defendant who told her it was already sold to them and
yet it was only in 1977 that the complaint was filed.

Petitioner took this present recourse asking Us to review the respondent Court's findings of facts and
reverse its decision on the ground that the same is based solely on "speculation, surmise and conjecture,"
and that it committed a "misapprehension of facts."

After private respondent filed her Comment and the petitioner submitted a Reply, this Court gave due
course to the petition 11 and required the petitioner to submit her Brief within thirty (30) days from
notice, 12 which she complied with. 13 Private respondent subsequently filed her Brief. 14

The petition is meritorious.

To begin with, the respondent Court committed a grave error in reversing the trial court's judgment
insofar as it concerns defendant Marcos Borillo. As earlier stated, the latter did not appeal from the trial
court's decision. As against him, and more particularly with respect to parcel (b), the decision has long
become final and the respondent Court is without jurisdiction to review the same. 15 Otherwise stated,
beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the scope of the power of review of any
court. 16 The appeal interposed by private respondent did not benefit Marcos Borillo because the former
does not have anything to do with parcel (b) and the defense in respect thereto is exclusive to the latter.

The respondent Court likewise erred in reversing the trial court and ruling that private respondent is the
owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d) and Elpidio Borillo's 1/5 pro-indiviso share in parcels (e) and (f).

It is of course settled that the appellate court's findings of fact are binding and must be respected by this
Court. 17 There are, however, recognized exceptions thereto, 18 among which are when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting, 19 when they are totally devoid of
support in the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 20

These exceptions obtain in the present case.

The fact that parcels (a), (c) and (d) were originally owned by Elpidio Borillo is not disputed by private
respondent. In fact, she claims to have derived her title over the same from the former through a sale in
1935. Thus, the question to be resolved is whether or not Elpidio Borillo did in fact sell the said parcels of
land to the private respondent.

To substantiate her claim, private respondent presented two (2) documents, Exhibits "3" and "4". The trial
court in its judgment described Exhibit "3", dated 12 May 1946, as a mere acknowledgment receipt of a
loan of P40.00 and not a sale for it does not mention any property sold and is not acknowledged before a
notary public. It then concluded that said instrument is a mere receipt evidencing a loan. On the other
hand, Exhibit ''4'' is an undated and unsigned document written in lead pencil on simple grade paper. The
instrument has no witnesses, is not acknowledged before a notary public and has a mere cross over the
written name of Elpidio Borillo. It was duly proven that Elpidio knew how to write and sign his name.
Although Exhibit "4" was purportedly executed in 1935, the same mentions Tax Declaration Nos. 0731,
0732, 0733 and 0734 issued in 1948 in the name of Elpidio Borillo. Private respondent herself testified
that she had no knowledge of the contents of said instrument. The trial court ruled Exhibit "4" as "wholly
unworthy and undeserving of any credence."

In reversing the foregoing findings, the respondent Court tried to justify the deficiencies and discrepancies
in Exhibit "3" by saying that the absence of specifications as to what property was sold is understandable
because the transaction was between brother and sister. It added that this defect was cured by
testimonial evidence. It made no attempt, however, to explain the variance in the date of the alleged sale
(1935) and the date of the instrument (1946).

As to Exhibit "4", the respondent Court accepted private respondent's explanation for the absence of the
signature of Elpidio Borillo on the purported deed of sale saying that contrary to petitioner's assertion,
Elpidio did not really know how to write his name. Private respondent and Marcos Borillo testified that
Elpidio's signature appeared on his voter's registration record and voter's ID card 21 only because he was
given a sample to copy. They declared that unlike those occasions, at the time of the sale, Elpidio was not
given any sample to copy; this explains why he just printed a cross over his name. As to why it mentions
tax declarations issued in 1948, although it is claimed to have been executed in 1935, the respondent
Court theorizes and speculates that:

. . . In confirmation of said sale, Exhibit 4 must have been executed on or before 1948 that
is why it reflects the Tax Declarations of said property to be effective in the same year. 22

It is thus clear that what was originally submitted by private respondent as the original deed of sale was
later accepted by the respondent Court as a deed of confirmation of sale.

Both Exhibits "3" and "4" are private documents. Hence, before they may be received in evidence, their
due execution and authenticity must first be proven by the party presenting them. 23 At the hearing of
this case before the trial court, the controlling rule on this point was Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which provided:

Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private
writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:

(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

(c) By a subscribing witness. 24

Private respondent did not present anyone who actually saw the execution of Exhibits "3" and "4",
witnessed Elpidio affix his signature on Exhibit "3" or make the cross over his written name in Exhibit "4".
There are no subscribing witnesses. The due execution then of Exhibits "3" and "4", as the alleged deeds
of sale transferring title over said parcels of land to private respondent, was not satisfactorily proven;
thus, the same can not be received in evidence.

Even if We are to assume that Exhibits "3" and "4" are admissible in evidence, they still do not
satisfactorily prove the transfers of titles over the subject parcels to the private respondent. As earlier
pointed out, Exhibit "3" makes no mention of any property sold. Hence, it hardly qualifies as a deed of
sale. It suffers from a patent and not just an intrinsic ambiguity. The respondent Court then committed an
error by giving credence to the testimonies offered to cure such ambiguity. It disregarded the parol
evidence rule then applicable, namely, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provided as
follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreement. — When the terms of an agreement have been

reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express

the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement
is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

 The term "agreement" includes wills. 25

Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or define the subject matter of a
writing, it must first be shown that the writing itself already contains a description sufficient to serve as a
foundation for the admission of such parol evidence; the evidence should also be consistent with the
writing. Otherwise stated, in order to admit parol evidence to aid in the description of the subject matter
of a deed or other writing, there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence;
the writing must at least give some data from which the description may be found and made certain. Parol
evidence is not admissible to identify the property where the description thereof is so vague as to amount
to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description, but only to
apply it. 26

In his Commentary on the Rules of Court, 27 former Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran explains the rule in the
evident of patent ambiguity, as is the case in Exhibit "3":

. . . The rule is that "if the words of a document are so defective or ambiguous as to be
unmeaning, no evidence can be given to show what the author of the document intended to
say." (Steph, Evidence, Art. 91) The reason for the rule, in the language of Mr. Justice
Story, is that "if the language be too doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission
of parol evidence you create and do not merely construe the contract. You attempt to do
that for the party which he has not chosen to do for himself; and the law very property
denies such an authority to courts of Justice." (Peisch v. Dickson, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 911, 1
Mason, 9.) As Lord Bacon said, "Ambiguitas patens cannot be holpen by averment." (Bacon,
Max., 23) A case of patent ambiguity is that of a deed wherein "a parcel of land" without
description is donated. The donation is void. The uncertainty cannot be explained by parol
evidence. (Wigmore on Evidence, 2d. ed., p. 414.) The following appears to be the most
accurate and most comprehensive statement of the rule regarding patent ambiguity: "In
other words and more generally, if the court, placing itself in the situation in which the
testator or contracting party stood at the time of executing the instrument, and with a full
understanding of the force and import of the words, cannot ascertain his meaning and
intention from the language of the instrument, then it is a case of incurable, hopeless
uncertainty and the instrument is, therefore, so far inoperative and void." (Palmer v. Albee,
50 Ia., 429, 432, quoting 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, par. 300.)

As to Exhibit "4", We agree with the trial court that it could not have been prepared in 1935, as contended
by private respondent, because it makes reference to Tax Declarations issued in 1948, thirteen (13) years
later. Common sense and logic reject such contention. Unfortunately, the respondent Court belabored the
explanation that Exhibit "4" must have been executed on or before 1948 to confirm the prior sale. This is
unacceptable as it is purely conjectural. Absent any evidence that it was signed by Elpidio Borillo, it is not
difficult to conclude that this document does not proceed from any legitimate source. It is one which could
easily be fabricated. The trial court did not then err when it considered Exhibit "4" as "wholly unworthy
and undeserving of any credence."

It is not also true, as was held by the respondent Court, that the conclusion of the trial court that Elpidio
Borillo was in possession of the property in concept of owner until his death, is based solely on the tax
declarations in his name. As shown earlier, the court considered the testimonies of the petitioner and one
Clemente Llaneza whom the trial court described as "an uninterested witness." Thus:

. . . The fact that the lands were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo for twenty-nine (29)
years coupled by his actual possession during his lifetime until his death in 1971 as testified
to by Esperanza Borillo and Clemente Llaneza who is an uninterested witness strongly
outweighed the evidence for the defendants and convincingly indicate that the four parcels
of land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint really belong to Elpidio Borillo. . . .

It is thus clear that the authorities cited by the respondent Court on the probative value of the tax
declarations favor the herein petitioner and not the private respondent. For indeed, while tax declarations
and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are prima facie evidence of possession.
Accordingly, since Elpidio Borillo, during his lifetime, and then the petitioner, after his death, secured and
were issued tax declarations for the parcels of land in question, and were in fact in possession thereof, the
excuse offered by private respondent as to her failure to obtain the tax declarations deserves no
consideration at all. The flimsiness or implausibility of the excuse becomes more apparent when We
consider the findings of the trial court that private respondent has other properties declared in her name
for taxation purposes and that neither she nor Marcos objected to the measurement by the assessors of
the four (4) parcels for Elpidio Borillo.

The conclusion then is inevitable that the late Elpidio Borillo did not sell and alienate parcels (a), (c) and
(d) to private respondent.

As to parcels (e) (f), private respondent presented no deed of sale in her favor.
Private respondent can not likewise seek refuge under a claim of ownership by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion requires that there be public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession
in the concept of owner 28 for a period of ten (10) years, in case of ordinary prescription, 29 and thirty
(30) years, in case of extraordinary prescription. 30

After reviewing the evidence presented before it, the trial court concluded that Elpidio Borillo had actual,
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land during his lifetime and until his death in
1970. The respondent Court reversed this finding and ruled that it was private respondent who had the
possession since her purchase thereof in 1935.

It is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court's findings of facts with the highest respect and not
to disturb the same on appeal unless there are strong and impelling reasons to do so. 31 The reason for
this is that trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to examine factual matters than appellate
courts. 32 They are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses, not only by the nature of
their testimonies, but also by their demeanor on the stand. 33

In Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 34 We ruled:

Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled
to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons.
(Vda. de Alberto, et al. vs. CA, et al., 173 SCRA 436 [1989]) Absent any substantial proof,
therefore, that the trial court's decision was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures, the same must be accorded full consideration and respect. This should be so
because the trial court is, after all, in a much better position to observe and correctly
appreciate the respective parties' evidence as they were presented. (Matabuena vs. CA, et
al., 173 SCRA 170 [1989])

We find no impelling, compelling or cogent reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Abra dated 3 June 1978 in Civil
Case No. 1043 is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.

ADELA G. RAYMUNDO, EDGARDO R. G.R. No. 171036

RAYMUNDO, LOURDES R. RAYMUNDO,  
TERESITA N. RAYMUNDO, EVELYN R. SANTOS,
 
ZENAIDA N. RAYMUNDO, LUIS N. RAYMUNDO,
JR. and LUCITA R. DELOS REYES,

Petitioners,

- versus -  

 
 ERNESTO LUNARIA, ROSALINDA RAMOS and Promulgated:
HELEN MENDOZA,
 
Respondents.
October 17, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
 

QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review are the Court of Appeals Decision [1] dated October 10, 2005 and the
Resolution[2] dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593.

The facts in this case are as follows:

Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer for their
property situated at Marilao, Bulacan with an area of 12,126 square meters for the amount of P60,630,000.
Respondent Lunaria was promised a 5% agents commission in the event that he finds a buyer. After
respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an Exclusive Authority to Sell[3] was executed embodying the
agreement made by the parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property [4] was
registered in the Registry of Deeds, a copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was
then holding in escrow the amount of P50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total consideration or
price of the property.

On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go to the
bank to receive the amount of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents
were instructed to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission due them.

On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance
of their commission was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative
of the petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners, however, they were told that
there is nothing more due them by way of commission as they have already divided and distributed the
balance of the commissions among their nephews and nieces.

For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the
parties after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agents
commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer,
Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help she would extend in the
processing of documents of sale of the property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and in securing an order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand,
will be used by him for the payment of realty taxes.

Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agents commission, they filed an
action for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172.
On January 22, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision[5] in favor of the respondents. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 
 1) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P1,834,900.00, representing the unpaid commission, plus interest thereon at the legal
rate from the filing of this case until fully paid;

2) Ordering the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and

3) Ordering the defendants [to], jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P150,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed. In a Decision dated October 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the modification that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded
to respondents shall be reduced. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 22, 2002 is affirmed, subject to

the modification that the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages to P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On October 28, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [8] However, it was denied in a
Resolution dated January 10, 2006. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE IN
THIS CASE (DECISION, PAGE 7, PARAGRAPH 1). THIS PRINCIPLE HAS NO APPLICATION TO
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.

II.

FURTHER, IT ERRED IN REQUIRING, ALBEIT IMPLICITLY, THE PETITIONERS TO ESTABLISH

THE VERBAL AGREEMENT MODIFYING THE EARLIER WRITTEN AGREEMENT (THE EXCLUSIVE
AUTHORITY TO SELL) BY MORE THAN A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (DECISION, PAGE
8). THIS IS PLAINLY CONTRARY TO LAW THAT MERELY REQUIRES PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES.

III.

FINALLY, EVEN CONCEDING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONERS STILL OWE
THE RESPONDENTS THE BALANCE OF THEIR COMMISSION, THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN RULING THE PETITIONERS ARE EACH JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY [LIABLE] FOR
THE PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE BROKERS FEES. THIS RULING HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND IS
CONTRARY TO ART. 1207 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.[9]

Plainly stated, the issues for resolution are: Did the Court of Appeals err (1) in applying the parol
evidence rule; (2) in requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a preponderance of
evidence; and (3) in holding petitioners jointly and severally liable for the payment of the entire brokers
fees?
 Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the parol
evidence rule to the facts of the case because the verbal agreement was entered into subsequent to the
written agreement. Further, they aver that there is no rule that requires an agreement modifying an
earlier agreement to be in the same form as the earlier agreement in order for such modification or
amendment to be valid.

Conversely, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not apply the parol evidence rule in
this case. Although the appellate court stated and emphasized the general legal principle and rule on parol
evidence, it did not apply the parol evidence rule with regard to the evidence adduced by the petitioners.

We rule for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners claim that the parol evidence
rule does not apply to the facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show
that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.[10] Notably, the claimed verbal agreement
was agreed upon not prior to but subsequent to the written agreement. Second, the validity of the written
agreement is not the matter which is being put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the
claim that a subsequent verbal agreement was agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the
written agreement which substantially modified their earlier written agreement.

Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented by the
petitioners fell short in proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into by the
parties. We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the evidence
presented by petitioners did not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent verbal agreement. As
pointed out by the trial court:

Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to show that the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] agreed to the above-sharing of the commission. The fact is
that the plaintiffs are denying having ever entered into such sharing agreement. For if the
plaintiffs as sales agents indeed agreed to share the commission they are entitled to receive
by virtue of the Exclusive Authority to Sell with Lourdes G. Raymundo and Hipolito, it passes
understanding why no written agreement to that effect was ever made. The absence of such
written agreement is mute but telling testimony that no such sharing arrangement was ever
made.[11]

As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them to
prove the existence of the subsequent verbal agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence
since no rule of evidence requires them to do so. In support of this allegation, petitioners presented
petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to
the verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the payment of the capital gains tax, the preparation
of the documents of sale and of securing an authority from the court to sell the property.

For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the
existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the
appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.

Petitioners abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the

evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. [12] It refers to the weight, credit
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[13]

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not
sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the parties.
In fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of
the agents commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria in the documentation requirement,
then why did the petitioners not present any written court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales
document to support her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the
commission sharing was unilaterally prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that
respondents participated in the preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged
payment of 1/5 of the commission to the buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be
given credence since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the
buyer. Lastly, if the said sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he
should have been presented as witness to corroborate the claim of the petitioners. However, he was not.

As to the third issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioners were each jointly and severally liable for the payment of the brokers fees. They contend that
the Civil Code provides that unless the parties have expressly agreed to be jointly and severally liable for
the entire brokers fees, each of the petitioners should only be held liable to the extent of their pro-
indiviso share in the property sold.

For their part, respondents argue that the appellate court did not err in affirming the joint and
several liability of the petitioners. They aver that if there was error on the part of the trial court, it was not
raised or assigned as error by petitioners in their appeal. It was also not included in the Statement of
Issues in their brief which they submitted for resolution by the Court of Appeals. In fact, the same was
never mentioned, much less questioned, by petitioners in their brief.

On this score, we agree with respondents. The general rule is that once an issue has been adjudicated in a
valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to
rest.[14] In this case, petitioners failed to address the issue on their solidary liability when they appealed to
the Court of Appeals. They are now estopped to question that ruling. As to them, the issue on their liability
is already valid and binding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 10, 2005 and
the Resolution dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES WILFREDO  G.R. No. 171707

and ANGELA AMONCIO,

Petitioners, 

- v e r s u s - 

AARON GO BENEDICTO,

Respondent.  Promulgated:

July 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 

D E C I S I O N 

CORONA, J.: 

At bar is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79341[1] which, in turn, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 82 of Quezon City.

The facts follow.

On July 15, 1997, petitioners Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered into a contract of lease with a

certain Ernesto Garcia over a 120 sq. m. portion of their 600 sq. m. property in Quezon City.

On August 20, 1997, petitioners entered into another contract of lease, this time with respondent

Aaron Go Benedicto over a 240 sq. m. portion of the same property. The contract read:

WHEREAS, the Lessor is the absolute owner of a parcel of land with an area of (600)
[sq. m.] situated in Neopolitan, Quezon City covered by T.C. T. No. 50473 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, 240 [sq. m.] of which is being leased to the lessee;

That for and in consideration of the amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P19,200.00), Philippines Currency, monthly rental[,] the Lessor herein lease a
portion of said parcel of land with an area of 240 sq. m. to the lessee, subject to the
following terms and conditions: 

1.                            That the term of the lease is for [f]ive (5) years renewable
annually for a maximum of five (5) years from the execution of this
contract;

2.                            The Lessee shall pay in advance the monthly rental for the land
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P115,200.00) Philippines Currency equivalent to three (3) months
deposit and three (3) months advance rental; commencing November,
1997;

3.                            The [Lessee] shall issue postdated checks for the succeeding

rentals to the Lessor;
 4.                            That in the event of failure to complete the term of the lease,
the lessee is still liable to answer for the rentals of the remaining period;

5.                            That all the improvement on the land leased shall automatically

become the property of the Lessor after the expiration of the term of the
lease;

6.                  That the leased parcel of land shall be devoted exclusively for the
construction supply business of the [Lessee];[2]

xxx xxx xxx

10. Design specification needs final approval by the Lessor[,] while structural

improvements would have to conform to local government specification,
taxes on structural improvement will be for the account of the Lessee.[3]

In December 1997, Garcia and respondent took possession of their respective leased portions.

In July 1999, Garcia pre-terminated his contract with petitioners. Respondent, on the other hand,

stayed on until June 8, 2000. According to petitioners, respondent stopped paying his monthly rentals in

December 1999. Shortly thereafter, petitioners claimed they discovered respondent putting up

improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of their property which was never leased to him nor to

Garcia. They added he had also occupied Garcias portion immediately after the latter left.[4]

Petitioners asked respondent to pay his arrears and desist from continuing with his construction but

he took no heed. Because of respondents failure to meet petitioners demands, they asked him to vacate

the property. On January 27, 2000, they rescinded the lease contract.

On June 23, 2000, petitioners filed in the RTC of Quezon City a case [5] for recovery of possession of

real property against respondent. In the complaint, petitioners asked respondent to pay the following: (1)

rent from January 27, 2000 or from the time his lease contract was rescinded until he vacated the

property; (2) rent for Garcias portion from August 1999 until he vacated it and (3) rent for the remaining

120 sq. m. which was not covered by his or Garcias contract. Petitioners likewise insisted that respondent

was liable to pay his arrears from December 1999 until the expiration of his lease contract in August 2002.

According to them, the lease contract provided:

 
in the event of [respondents] failure to complete the term of the lease, [he would]
still be liable to answer for the rentals of the remaining period.[6]
 
 

In his answer with counterclaim, respondent denied petitioners accusations and alleged that it was them

who owed him money. According to him, he and petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio agreed to construct five

commercial buildings on petitioners property. One of the buildings was to go to Garcia, two to petitioners

and the last two to him. They also agreed that he was to finance the construction and petitioners were to

pay him for the two buildings assigned to them.

 
 Respondent added he was to pay the rentals for five years and surrender the buildings (on his

leased portion) to petitioners after the lapse of said period. However, in June 2000, he vacated the

premises after he and petitioners could no longer settle things amicably.

Respondent asked to be paid: (1) P600,000 for the construction cost of the two buildings that went

to petitioners[7]; (2) P300,000 as adjusted cost of the portion leased to him and (3) P10,000 as attorneys

fees.

After trial, the RTC gave credence to respondents version and dismissed petitioners case for lack of factual

and legal basis. It also granted respondents counterclaim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

[respondent] and against [petitioners] DISMISSING the latters complaint for lack of factual
and legal basis.

On the counterclaim, [petitioners] are hereby ordered to pay [respondent] as

follows:

a.                               The sum of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P600,000) PESOS

representing the cost of the two improvements constructed on the remaining portion
of the [petitioners] lot.

b.                              The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000)

PESOS representing the adjusted cost of the two improvements likewise constructed
by [respondent][,] possession of which was terminated two and a half years before
the stipulated term of five (5) years.

c.                               The sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000) PESOS as and by way of

attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. There, petitioners argued that the RTC erred in (1) denying

their claim for payment of rentals both for the unexpired period of the lease and for the portions of the

property used by respondent which was not covered by his lease contract and (2) granting respondents

counterclaim although they did not allow the construction of the buildings. Petitioners likewise contended

the trial court disregarded the parol evidence rule [9] which disallowed the court from looking into any other

evidence relating to the agreement of the parties outside the written contract between them.

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision and dismissed petitioners appeal. It held that:

(1) petitioners did not adduce evidence to prove that respondent had actually occupied portions of

their property not covered by his contract;

 (2) petitioners could not insist that respondent pay the remaining period under the contract since

they were the ones who demanded that respondent vacate the premises and

(3) the rule on parol evidence could no longer apply after they failed to object to respondents

testimony (in the lower court) about their agreement regarding the construction of the

buildings.[10]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.[11] Hence, this petition.[12]

In support of this petition, petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in ruling that: (1) they

consented to the construction of the buildings by respondent; (2) they waived their right to respondents

assertion of facts that were not embodied in the lease contract and (3) respondent was not a builder in

bad faith.[13]

PETITIONERS ALLOWED THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BUILDINGS 

Petitioners first argument necessitates a review of the facts of the case which, as a general rule, is not the

task of this Court. Under Rule 45 of the Rules, this Court shall not pass upon the findings of fact by lower

courts unless they ignored salient points that would otherwise affect the outcome of the case. [14] There is

no reason for us to overturn the factual conclusions of the lower courts.

Moreover, the lower courts findings of fact were supported by the records of the case which indubitably

showed petitioners acquiescence to the construction of the buildings on their property. Petitioners denial

cannot negate the overwhelming proof that it was petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio himself who secured the

building permit for the project. He also required that all design specifications were to be approved by him.
[15]

APPLICATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of the agreement have

been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
  
 

The so-called parol evidence forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written

instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other terms

were orally agreed on by the parties.[16] Under the aforecited rule, the terms of the written contract are
conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to vary an enforceable agreement

embodied in the document. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx
 
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
 
(a)                An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
 
(b)               The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
 
(c)                The validity of the written agreement; or
 
(d)               The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
 
The term agreement shall include wills.
 

The first exception applies when the ambiguity or uncertainty is readily apparent from reading the

contract. The wordings are so defective that what the author of the document intended to say cannot be

deciphered.[17] It also covers cases where the parties commit a mutual mistake of fact, [18] or where the

document is manifestly incomplete as the parties do not intend to exhibit the whole agreement but only to

define some of its terms.[19]

The second exception includes instances where the contract is so obscure that the contractual

intention of the parties cannot be understood by mere inspection of the instrument.[20] Thus, extrinsic

proof of its subject matter, of the relation of the parties and of the circumstances surrounding them when

they entered into the contract may be received as evidence.[21]

Under the third exception, the parol evidence rule does not apply where the purpose of introducing

the evidence is to show the invalidity of the contract.[22] This includes cases where a party alleges that no

written contract ever existed, or the parties fail to agree on the terms of the contract, or there is no

consideration for such agreement.[23]

The fourth exception involves a situation where the due execution of the contract or document is in

issue.[24]

The present case does not appear to fall under any of the given exceptions. However, a party to a

contract may prove the existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter which is not

inconsistent with its terms.[25] This may be done if, from the circumstances of the case, the court believes

that the document does not convey entirely the whole of the parties transaction.[26]
  

In this case, there are tell-tale signs that petitioners and respondent had other agreements aside

from those established by the lease contract. And we find it difficult to ignore them. We agree with the

trial court: 

[T]hat [respondent], indeed, undertook the construction subject hereof, is not disputed by
[petitioners]. [Respondent] testified that two units thereof were intended for [petitioners],
another two units for him and one for Garcia at the cost of P300,000.00 per unit or for a
total budget of P1.5 million. 

Evidence further disclosed that the [b]uilding [p]ermit issued therefor by the Building
Official bore the signature of [petitioner] Wilfredo Amoncio 

the Court cannot be unmindful of [petitioner Wilfredo Amoncios denial by any

knowledge of the whole construction undertaken by herein [respondent.] But it is evident
that [petitioners] have chosen to adopt inconsistent positions which, by applicable
jurisprudence, [are] barred. Said the Court in this regard: 

The doctrine of estoppel prohibits a party from assuming inconsistent

position based on the principle of election, and precludes him from
repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed after having accepted benefits
therefrom. To countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity and
would put a premium on fraud and misrepresentation[27]

Moreover, petitioners also failed to make a timely objection against respondents assertion of their

prior agreement on the construction of the buildings. Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol

evidence rule allows such evidence to be received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed

and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the judgment.
[28]
 Hence, by failing to object to respondents testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the protection

of the parol evidence rule.[29]

PAYMENT OF RENTAL 

Petitioners demand the payment of the following: (1) rent from December 19, 1999 to June 8, 2000;
[30]
 (2) rent for the unexpired period of the lease or until August 2002[31] and (3) rent corresponding to the

portions of the property used by respondent which, according to petitioners, were not covered by his lease

contract.[32]

Pursuant to the lease agreement, respondent paid three months advance and three months deposit

(at the inception of the lease contract), in effect already settling his rentals for six months from December

1999 to June 8, 2000. The CA correctly ruled: 

While [respondent] stopped paying rentals in December 1999 and left before June 8, 2000, a
period covering six (6) months, [respondent], nonetheless, had already paid [petitioners]
the amount equivalent to six (6) months rentals [advance payment equivalent to three (3)
monthly rentals plus deposit equivalent to [another] three (3) monthly rentals] [33] (emphasis
supplied)

 
 Regarding petitioners second claim (rent for the unexpired period of lease), we agree with the

lower courts that they (petitioners) are not entitled to it.

Without doubt, petitioners already benefited immensely from the construction of the five buildings

on their property. The amount of their claim is a pittance compared to the increase in value of their

property over the years. It would unjustly enrich them if we were to rule in their favor considering that

they did not spend a single centavo for the construction of the buildings. It was respondent who financed

the entire project which, however, was taken over completely by petitioners.

As a rule, the contract is the law between the parties that must be enforced in sensu strictione.

However, it cannot be done under the circumstances of this case. To do so would result in a patently

unjust juridical situation. We, as a court not only of justice but of equity as well, may exercise our equitas

jurisdictio to refine the rough edges of the rule and avoid injustice.[34]

Lastly, petitioners claim for rental payment for the portions (not covered by respondents lease

contract) must be dismissed. This claim was never substantiated.

PETITIONERS LIABILITY TO RESPONDENT

What remains to be resolved is petitioners liability to respondent, as held by both the RTC and the CA.

Were petitioners indeed liable to respondent for the cost of the buildings constructed on their property?

Yes.

Since the trial court allowed respondents testimony as evidence of the parties prior agreement (regarding

the construction of the buildings and the cost thereof), petitioners should pay respondent. Petitioners

never disputed the construction of the two buildings given to them. If one of the contracting parties

derived some benefit but did not give anything for it to the other, it is only fair that he should return the

amount by which he was unjustly enriched.[35] Equity dictates that petitioners be held liable for the

expenses incurred by respondent in constructing the buildings that went to them. No man ought to be

enriched by anothers injury.[36] Nemo ex alterius incommonde debet lecupletari.

Finally, following our ruling that petitioners knew of the construction of the buildings, any discussion on

the issue of whether respondent was a builder in bad faith is no longer necessary.

 
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79341 is

hereby AFFIRMED.

Treble costs against petitioners.  

SO ORDERED.

ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO  G.R. No. 145736

and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, in her capacity as (a) Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A.
Llenado and (b) Judicial Guardian of the Minor children of Orlando A. Llenado, and (c) in

her Own behalf as the Surviving Spouse and Legal Heir of Orlando A. Llenado,

Petitioners, 

- versus – 

EDUARDO LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA. DE LLENADO and REGISTER

OF DEEDS of Valenzuela City,  Promulgated:

Metro Manila,

Respondents.  March 4, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x 

DECISION 
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 

This petition for review on certiorari assails the May 30, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58911 which reversed the May 5, 1997 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 4248-V-93, and the October 6, 2000 Resolution [3] which
denied the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court dismissed for lack of merit the complaint for
annulment of deed of conveyance, title and damages filed by petitioner against herein respondents.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land denominated as Lot 249-D-1 (subject lot)
consisting of 1,554 square meters located in Barrio Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and registered in the
names of Eduardo Llenado (Eduardo) and Jorge Llenado (Jorge) under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. V-1689.[4] The subject lot once formed part of Lot 249-D owned by and registered in the name of their
father, Cornelio Llenado (Cornelio), under TCT No. T-16810.

On December 2, 1975, Cornelio leased Lot 249-D-1 to his nephew, Romeo Llenado (Romeo), for a
period of five years, renewable for another five years at the option of Cornelio. On March 31, 1978,
Cornelio, Romeo and the latters cousin Orlando Llenado (Orlando) executed an Agreement[5] whereby
Romeo assigned all his rights to Orlando over the unexpired portion of the aforesaid lease contract. The
parties further agreed that Orlando shall have the option to renew the lease contract for another three
years commencing from December 3, 1980, up to December 2, 1983, renewable for another four years or
up to December 2, 1987, and that during the period that [this agreement] is enforced, the x x x property
cannot be sold, transferred, alienated or conveyed in whatever manner to any third party.
  

Shortly thereafter or on June 24, 1978, Cornelio and Orlando entered into a Supplementary
Agreement[6] amending the March 31, 1978 Agreement. Under the Supplementary
Agreement, Orlando was given an additional option to renew the lease contract for an aggregate period of
10 years at five-year intervals, that is, from December 3, 1987 to December 2, 1992 and from December
3, 1992 to December 2, 1997. The said provision was inserted in order to comply with the requirements of
Mobil Philippines, Inc. for the operation of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on the subject
lot.

Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda Llenado (Wenifreda), took
over the operation of the gasoline station. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1987, Cornelio sold Lot 249-D to his
children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia and Cornelio, Jr., through a deed of sale, denominated as
Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan,[7] for the sum of P160,000.00. As stated earlier, the subject lot, which
forms part of Lot 249-D, was sold to Eduardo and Jorge, and titled in their names under TCT No. V-
1689. Several months thereafter or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio passed away.

Sometime in 1993, Eduardo informed Wenifreda of his desire to take over the subject lot. However,
the latter refused to vacate the premises despite repeated demands. Thus, on September 24, 1993,
Eduardo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila against Wenifreda, which was docketed as Civil Civil Case No. 6074.

On July 22, 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered its Decision in favor of Eduardo and
ordered Wenifreda to: (1) vacate the leased premises; (2) pay Eduardo reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises plus attorneys fees, and (3) pay the costs of the suit.

Wenifreda appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, which reversed the
decision of the court a quo. Thus, Eduardo appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
Decision[8] on March 31, 1998 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstating the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. It also increased the amount of reasonable compensation awarded
to Eduardo for the use of the leased premises. Wenifredas appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
135001, was dismissed in a Resolution [9] dated December 2, 1998. Accordingly, an Entry of
[10]
Judgment was made in due course on July 8, 1999.

Previously, after Eduardo instituted the aforesaid unlawful detainer case on September 24, 1993,
herein petitioner Wenifreda, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Orlando Llenado, judicial
guardian of their minor children, and surviving spouse and legal heir of Orlando, commenced the subject
Complaint,[11] later amended, on November 10, 1993 for annulment of deed of conveyance, title and
damages against herein respondents Eduardo, Jorge, Feliza Llenado (mother of the Llenado brothers), and
the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4248-V-93
and raffled to Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioner alleged that the transfer and conveyance of the subject lot by Cornelio in favor of
respondents Eduardo and Jorge, was fraudulent and in bad faith considering that the March 31, 1978
Agreement provided that while the lease is in force, the subject lot cannot be sold, transferred or
conveyed to any third party; that the period of the lease was until December 3, 1987 with the option to
renew granted to Orlando; that the subject lot was transferred and conveyed to respondents Eduardo and
Jorge on January 29, 1987 when the lease was in full force and effect making the sale null and void; that
Cornelio verbally promised Orlando that in case he (Cornelio) decides to sell the subject lot, Orlando or his
heirs shall have first priority or option to buy the subject lot so as not to prejudice Orlandos business and
because Orlando is the owner of the property adjacent to the subject lot; and that this promise was
wantonly disregarded when Cornelio sold the said lot to respondents Jorge and Eduardo.

In their Answer,[12] respondents Eduardo and Jorge claimed that they bought the subject lot from
their father, Cornelio, for value and in good faith; that the lease agreement and its supplement were not
annotated at the back of the mother title of the subject lot and do not bind them; that said agreements
are personal only to Cornelio and Orlando; that the lease expired upon the death of Orlando on November
7, 1983; that they were not aware of any verbal promise to sell the subject lot granted by Cornelio to
Orlando and, even if there was, said option to buy is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.

After the parties presented their respective evidence, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment
on May 5, 1997 in favor of petitioner, viz:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds the [petitioners] civil action
duly established by preponderance of evidence, renders judgment (adjudicates) in favor of
the [petitioner], Estate of Orlando Llenado represented by Wenifreda Llenado, and against
[respondents] e.g. Jorge, Eduardo, Felisa Gallardo, all surnamed Llenado, and the Register
of Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, as follows:

1) It hereby judicially declare as non-existence (sic) and null and void, the following:

a) The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Kasunduan or Deed of Sale;

b) TCT- Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-9440, in the name of [respondent]

Eduardo Llenado, TCT- Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-1689, in the name of Jorge
Llenado, and Eduardo Llenado, and all deeds, documents or proceedings leading to
the issuance of said title, and all subsequent title issued therefrom and likewise
whatever deeds, documents or proceedings leading to the issuance of said
subsequent titles;

2) It hereby orders the reconveyance of the said properties embraced in the said
TCTs-Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. V-9440 and V-1689 to the [petitioner] for the same
consideration, or purchase price, paid by [respondents] Eduardo Llenado and Jorge Llenado
for the same properties;

3) It hereby orders [respondent], Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to

cause the issuance of new transfer certificates of title over the said property in the name of
the [petitioner];

4) And, because this Court is not only a court of law, but of equity, it hereby
rendered the following damages to be paid by the [respondents], as the [respondents]
litigated under bonafide assertions that they have meritorious defense, viz: 

a)                  P400,000.00 as moral damages;

 b)                  10,000.00 as nominal damages;

c)                  10,000.00 as temperate damages;

d)                  10,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e)                  10,000.00 attorneys fees on the basis of quantum merit; and

f)                    costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[13] 

The Regional Trial Court found that upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his rights under the
lease contract were transmitted to his heirs; that since the lease was in full force and effect at the time
the subject lot was sold by Cornelio to his sons, the sale violated the prohibitory clause in the said lease
contract. Further, Cornelios promise to sell the subject lot to Orlando may be established by parole
evidence since an option to buy is not covered by the statute of frauds. Hence, the same is binding on
Cornelio and his heirs.

Respondents appealed before the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed May 30,
2000 Decision reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing the Complaint. The
appellate court held that the death of Orlando did not extinguish the lease agreement and had the effect
of transmitting his lease rights to his heirs. However, the breach of the non-alienation clause of the said
agreement did not nullify the sale between Cornelio and his sons because the heirs of Orlando are mere
lessees on the subject lot and can never claim a superior right of ownership over said lot as against the
registered owners thereof. It further ruled that petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of
evidence that Cornelio made a verbal promise to Orlando granting the latter the right of first refusal if and
when the subject lot was sold.

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner is now before this Court on the
following assignment of errors: 

[T]he Court of Appeals erred: 

1.- In finding and concluding that there is no legal basis to annul the deed of conveyance
involved in the case and in not applying R.A. No. 3516, further amending R.A. No. 1162;
and 

2.- In not finding and holding as null and void the subject deed of conveyance, the same
having been executed in direct violation of an expressed covenant in said deed and in total
disregard of the pre-emptive, or preferential rights of the herein petitioners to buy the
property subject of their lease contract under said R.A. No. 3516, further amending R.A. No.
1162.[14]

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner contends that the heirs of Orlando are entitled to the rights of a tenant under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1162,[15] as amended by R.A. No. 3516.[16] The right of first refusal or preferential right to
buy the leased premises is invoked pursuant to Section 5[17] of said law and this Courts ruling in Mataas
Na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga.[18]

This issue is being raised for the first time on appeal. True, in Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Association,
Inc., the Court explained that Section 1 of R.A. No. 1162, as amended by R.A. No. 3516, authorizes the
expropriation of any piece of land in the City of Manila, Quezon City and suburbs which have been and are
actually being leased to tenants for at least 10 years, provided said lands have at least 40 families of
tenants thereon.[19] Prior to and pending the expropriation, the tenant shall have a right of first refusal or
preferential right to buy the leased premises should the landowner sell the same. However, compliance
with the conditions for the application of the aforesaid law as well as the qualifications of the heirs of
Orlando to be beneficiaries thereunder were never raised before the trial court, or even the Court of
Appeals, because petitioner solely anchored its claim of ownership over the subject lot on the alleged
violation of the prohibitory clause in the lease contract between Cornelio and Orlando, and the alleged
non-performance of the right of first refusal given by Cornelio to Orlando. The rule is settled, impelled by
basic requirements of due process, that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[20] As the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1162, as
amended, was neither averred in the pleadings nor raised during the trial below, the same cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.

At any rate, the allegations in the Complaint and the evidence presented during the trial below do
not establish that Orlando or his heirs are covered by R.A. No. 1162, as amended. It was not alleged nor
shown that the subject lot is part of the landed estate or haciendas in the City of Manila which were
authorized to be expropriated under said law; that the Solicitor General has instituted the requisite
expropriation proceedings pursuant to Section 2[21] thereof; that the subject lot has been actually leased
for a period of at least ten (10) years; and that the subject lot has at least forty (40) families of tenants
thereon. Instead, what was merely established during the trial is that the subject lot was leased by
Cornelio to Orlando for the operation of a gasoline station, thus, negating petitioners claim that the
subject lot is covered by the aforesaid law. In Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc., the Court further
explained that R.A. No. 1162, as amended, has been superseded by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1517[22] entitled Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing
Machinery Thereof.[23] However, as held in Tagbilaran Integrated Settlers Association Incorporated
v. Court of Appeals,[24] P.D. No. 1517 is applicable only in specific areas declared, through presidential
proclamation,[25] to be located within the so-called urban zones.[26] Further, only legitimate tenants who
have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who
have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years, are given the right of first
refusal to purchase the land within a reasonable time. [27] Consequently, those lease contracts entered into
for commercial use are not covered by said law.[28] Thus, considering that petitioner failed to prove that a
proclamation has been issued by the President declaring the subject lot as within the urban land reform
zone and considering further that the subject lot was leased for the commercial purpose of operating a
gasoline station, P.D. No. 1517 cannot be applied to this case.

In fine, the only issue for our determination is whether the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to his
sons, respondents Eduardo and Jorge, is invalid for (1) violating the prohibitory clause in the lease
agreement between Cornelio, as lessor-owner, and Orlando, as lessee; and (2) contravening the right of
first refusal of Orlando over the subject lot.

It is not disputed that the lease agreement contained an option to renew and a prohibition on the
sale of the subject lot in favor of third persons while the lease is in force. Petitioner claims that when
Cornelio sold the subject lot to respondents Eduardo and Jorge the lease was in full force and effect, thus,
the sale violated the prohibitory clause rendering it invalid. In resolving this issue, it is necessary to
determine whether the lease agreement was in force at the time of the subject sale and, if it was in force,
whether the violation of the prohibitory clause invalidated the sale.
  

Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations therein are not transmissible by their
nature, by stipulation or by provision of law. A contract of lease is, therefore, generally transmissible to
the heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property right and, as such, the death of a party does not
excuse non-performance of the contract.[29] The rights and obligations pass to the heirs of the deceased
and the heir of the deceased lessor is bound to respect the period of the lease. [30] The same principle
applies to the option to renew the lease. As a general rule, covenants to renew a lease are not personal
but will run with the land.[31] Consequently, the successors-in-interest of the lessee are entitled to the
benefits, while that of the lessor are burdened with the duties and obligations, which said covenants
conferred and imposed on the original parties.

The foregoing principles apply with greater force in this case because the parties expressly
stipulated in the March 31, 1978 Agreement that Romeo, as lessee, shall transfer all his rights and
interests under the lease contract with option to renew in favor of the party of the Third Part
(Orlando), the latters heirs, successors and assigns [32] indicating the clear intent to allow the
transmissibility of all the rights and interests of Orlando under the lease contract unto his heirs,
successors or assigns. Accordingly, the rights and obligations under the lease contract with option to
renew were transmitted from Orlando to his heirs upon his death on November 7, 1983.

It does not follow, however, that the lease subsisted at the time of the sale of the subject lot
on January 29, 1987. When Orlando died on November 7, 1983, the lease contract was set to expire 26
days later or on December 3, 1983, unless renewed by Orlandos heirs for another four years. While the
option to renew is an enforceable right, it must necessarily be first exercised to be given effect.[33] As the
Court explained in Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[34]

A clause found in an agreement relative to the renewal of the lease agreement at

the option of the lessee gives the latter an enforceable right to renew the contract in
which the clause is found for such time as provided for.The agreement is understood as
being in favor of the lessee, and the latter is authorized to renew the contract and to
continue to occupy the leased property after notifying the lessor to that effect. A lessors
covenant or agreement to renew gives a privilege to the tenant, but is nevertheless an
executory contract, and until the tenant has exercised the privilege by way of some
affirmative act, he cannot be held for the additional term. In the absence of a stipulation
in the lease requiring notice of the exercise of an option or an election to renew to be
given within a certain time before the expiration of the lease, which of course, the lessee
must comply with, the general rule is that a lessee must exercise an option or election to
renew his lease and notify the lessor thereof before, or at least at the time of the
expiration of his original term, unless there is a waiver or special circumstances
warranting equitable relief.

There is no dispute that in the instant case, the lessees (private respondents) were
granted the option to renew the lease for another five (5) years after the termination of
the original period of fifteen years. Yet, there was never any positive act on the part of
private respondents before or after the termination of the original period to show their
exercise of such option. The silence of the lessees after the termination of the original
period cannot be taken to mean that they opted to renew the contract by virtue of the
promise by the lessor, as stated in the original contract of lease, to allow them to renew.
Neither can the exercise of the option to renew be inferred from their persistence to
remain in the premises despite petitioners demand for them to vacate. x x x.[35]
 
 
Similarly, the election of the option to renew the lease in this case cannot be inferred from petitioner
Wenifredas continued possession of the subject lot and operation of the gasoline station even after the
death of Orlando on November 7, 1983 and the expiration of the lease contract on December 3, 1983. In
the unlawful detainer case against petitioner Wenifreda and in the subject complaint for annulment of
conveyance, respondents consistently maintained that after the death of Orlando, the lease was
terminated and that they permitted petitioner Wenifreda and her children to remain in possession of the
subject property out of tolerance and respect for the close blood relationship between Cornelio and
Orlando. It was incumbent, therefore, upon petitioner as the plaintiff with the burden of proof during the
trial below to establish by some positive act that Orlando or his heirs exercised the option to renew the
lease. After going over the records of this case, we find no evidence, testimonial or documentary, of such
nature was presented before the trial court to prove that Orlando or his heirs exercised the option to
renew prior to or at the time of the expiration of the lease on December 3, 1983. In particular, the
testimony of petitioner Wenifreda is wanting in detail as to the events surrounding the implementation of
the subject lease agreement after the death of Orlando and any overt acts to establish the renewal of said
lease.

Given the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the issue on whether the violation of the
prohibitory clause invalidated the sale and conferred ownership over the subject lot to Orlandos heirs, who
are mere lessees, considering that at the time of said sale on January 29, 1987 the lease agreement had
long been terminated for failure of Orlando or his heirs to validly renew the same. As a result, there was
no obstacle to the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to respondents Eduardo and Jorge as the prohibitory
clause under the lease contract was no longer in force.

Petitioner also anchors its claim over the subject lot on the alleged verbal promise of Cornelio
to Orlando that should he (Cornelio) sell the same, Orlando would be given the first opportunity to
purchase said property. According to petitioner, this amounted to a right of first refusal in favor
of Orlando which may be proved by parole evidence because it is not one of the contracts covered by the
statute of frauds. Considering that Cornelio sold the subject lot to respondents Eduardo and Jorge without
first offering the same to Orlandos heirs, petitioner argues that the sale is in violation of the latters right
of first refusal and is, thus, rescissible.

The question as to whether a right of first refusal may be proved by parole evidence has been
answered in the affirmative by this Court in Rosencor Development Corporation v. Inquing:[36]

We have previously held that not all agreements affecting land must be put into
writing to attain enforceability. Thus, we have held that the setting up of boundaries, the
oral partition of real property, and an agreement creating a right of way are not covered by
the provisions of the statute of frauds. The reason simply is that these agreements are not
among those enumerated in Article 1403 of the New Civil Code.

A right of first refusal is not among those listed as unenforceable under the statute of
frauds. Furthermore, the application of Article 1403, par. 2(e) of the New Civil Code
presupposes the existence of a perfected, albeit unwritten, contract of sale. A right of first
refusal, such as the one involved in the instant case, is not by any means a perfected
contract of sale of real property. At best, it is a contractual grant, not of the sale of the real
property involved, but of the right of first refusal over the property sought to be sold.

 
 It is thus evident that the statute of frauds does not contemplate cases involving a
right of first refusal. As such, a right of first refusal need not be written to be enforceable
and may be proven by oral evidence.[37]

In the instant case, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the right of first refusal was proved by oral
evidence while the Court of Appeals disagreed by ruling that petitioner merely relied on the allegations in
its Complaint to establish said right. We have reviewed the records and find that no testimonial evidence
was presented to prove the existence of said right. The testimony of petitioner Wenifreda made no
mention of the alleged verbal promise given by Cornelio to Orlando. The two remaining witnesses for the
plaintiff, Michael Goco and Renato Malindog, were representatives from the Register of Deeds of Caloocan
City who naturally were not privy to this alleged promise. Neither was it established that respondents
Eduardo and Jorge were aware of said promise prior to or at the time of the sale of the subject lot. On the
contrary, in their answer to the Complaint, respondents denied the existence of said promise for lack of
knowledge thereof.[38] Within these parameters, petitioners allegations in its Complaint cannot substitute
for competent proof on such a crucial factual issue. Necessarily, petitioners claims based on this alleged
right of first refusal cannot be sustained for its existence has not been duly established.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 30, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 58911 dismissing the complaint for annulment of deed of conveyance, title and damages, and
the October 6, 2000 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
 SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR   G.R. No. 168387
DELA CRUZ,
Petitioners,    
   
- versus -  
 
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO,    
EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, Promulgated:
OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO,
OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO
and NEMI FERNANDEZ,
Respondents.   August 25, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
DEL CASTILLO, J.
 
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately
and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these
instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent.
 
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the
intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold
otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of
agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,[2] as well as the May 11, 2005
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
Decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated 17
January 2001, rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
of Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
 
SO ORDERED.[4]
 
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following dispositive portion:
 
Accordingly, judgment is rendered:
 
 1.                  Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the Murong
property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);
 
2.                  Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s] of
Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are disqualified to become
tenants of the Lantap property;
 
3.                  Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful beneficiary,
herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and conditions;
 
4.                  Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at; and ordering
the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto [respondents] plus
such accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly accounted for with the
assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also
hereby instructed to assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts and;
 
 
5.                  The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed until
otherwise modified or dissolved by the appellate body.  
SO ORDERED.[5] 
 
Factual Antecedents
 
 
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land, with an area of two
hectares each. One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the other
is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the
parties that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the husband[7] of
respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez
(Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).[8]
 
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain
loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI
eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of
RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the following
description:
 
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more or less from
B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on the southeast, and
southwest by public land; and on the northwest by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia
and Santos Navarrete. Bearings true. Declination 0131 E. Points referred to are marked on plan H-
176292. Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] December 1912-
March 1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No. 159
of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.[9]
 
 
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property and contained the
following description:
 
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 W., 1150.21 m. from BLLM No.
122, Irrigation project,
thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an area of 2.0000
hectares. Bounded on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by Public land; and on the
northwest by Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31E., points referred to are
marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority of Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in
accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor,
 [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No.
225 of Bagabag Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.[10]
 
 
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any reference to
either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
 
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of
Sale[11] described the property sold as follows:
 
x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally x x x that certain
parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and more
particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:
 
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan x x x x Containing an area of 2.000
hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by Public Land; and on
the NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos
Navarrete. Bearing true. Declination 013 B. Points referred to are marked on plan
H-176292.
 
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee simple in
accordance with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto being evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-62096 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
 
 
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was
located but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong
property.There is no evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the Murong property, or demanded
lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised
acts of ownership over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita
and brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap property --
without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on
TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994.[12]
 
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,
[15]
 executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the
tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an agricultural land located
in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap
property).[16]
 
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on
September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated
in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5,
1991.
 
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and almost seven
years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the
deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land
transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on respondents theory that the Murong
property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as
documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No.
62096, which pertains to the Murong property.
 
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries
thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became
the owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest belief that they were buying the
Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also argued
that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by
their continued occupation and possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.
 
RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction with
respondents Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the
disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules and regulations.
 
OIC-RARAD Decision[23]
 
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No.
T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD
concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs
referred to TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners
CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular description contained in the VLTs that the
subject thereof is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-
RARAD declared that they were disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the cancellation
of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property,
Nemi.
 
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong property is to remain as
the tenants thereof after the execution of leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to
respondents.
 
DARAB Decision[24]
 
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity
of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the
respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were remiss in the performance of their official
duties when they issued the corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance
of duty prevails. This conclusion is made more imperative by the respondents admission that petitioners are the
actual tillers of the Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
 
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they
failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs claim that respondents
repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property. Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were
ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of
the Lantap property.
 
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
 
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the CLOAs issued to
appellants as they are by operation of law qualified beneficiaries over the landholdings; there is
nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded in conformity with the CARP program implementation;
and finally, the Board declares that all controverted claims to or against the subject landholding
must be completely and finally laid to rest.
 
 WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed decision is
ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby rendered, declaring:
 
1.              Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona fide tenant-
tillers over the Murong property and therefore they are the qualified beneficiaries thereof;
 
2.              Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued in the
name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz respectively, covered
formerly by TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong property as valid and legal;
 
3.              Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold contract with
bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the latter] being the subject
matter of the buy back arrangement entered into between [respondents] and Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Incorporated, and other incidental matters are deemed resolved.
 
SO ORDERED.[25]
 
 
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap
property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers
indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in determining the subjects thereof. Since
respondents Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to
them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover the property
with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property. Respondents
added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to
their lack of qualification.
 
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held
that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the
object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the
Murong property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the
subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is
located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical
description contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same particularly
describes the properties metes and bounds.
 
Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were separately denied.
[28]

 
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this
Court.[29] RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean
hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also
asked that they be declared free from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyones
expense. RBBIs petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:
 
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari,
the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of
its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.[30]
 
 
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality. [31] Entry of judgment was made in that case on
December 15, 2004.[32]
 
On July 27, 2005,[33] petitioners filed the instant petition.
 
Issues
 
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts determination:
 
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review on Certiorari, which assailed the same
CA Decision
 
II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts
 
III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
 
 

Our Ruling
 
 
Propriety of the Petition
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are beyond the province of
Rule 45.[34]
 
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts rejection of their evidence
(as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility
of evidence is a legal question that is within the Courts authority to review.[35]
 
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The rule that a petition
for review should raise only questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[36]
 
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the appellate court
misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be
discussed below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are sufficient for the Court to
exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 45.
 
First Issue
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal
 
 
Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition
for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the appellate courts decision
in favor of the respondents.[37]
 
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to
convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and
errors in the appellate courts decision but simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the respondents for
allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not
tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court with clean hands.
 
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts Decision. It is the
appellants responsibility to point out the perceived errors in the appealed decision. When a party merely raises
equitable considerations such as the clean hands doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to
support his claim, there should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and
the appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily mean that the
appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellants inadequate discussion, ineffectual
arguments, or even procedural lapses.
 
RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners who were not parties
to RBBIs appeal, especially because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately and
effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just
because another party had already appealed ahead of him,[38] or just because the other partys separate appeal had
already been dismissed.[39]
 
There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer
(VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of
CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two properties involved. Under the rule on res
judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action.[40] Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already
transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any judgment which may
be rendered against the vendor.[41]
 
Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
 
 
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between respondents and
RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale
stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property then the property
repurchased by the respondents was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between
petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap property then the property transferred to
petitioners was the Lantap property.
 
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the subject of the Deed
of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of
the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then
argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.
 
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no
other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is
preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42]
 
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute
regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred
to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-
62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
 
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-
62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
 
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap property)
reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong was a typographical
error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong reflects their true intention,
while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the
contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the
parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
 
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence
that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule,
it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
 
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[43]
 
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or
subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in
its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the
Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit
any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
 
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place,
respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written
contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties
and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.[44]
 
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
 
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
 
(1)                       An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
 
(2)                       The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
 
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as covered by
TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being located in Barangay
Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT
No. T-62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short,
it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.
 
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties respective
parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it
is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, [45] not its wording
which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
 
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation of
contracts:
 
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
 
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail
over the former.
 
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
 
 
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening:
 
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an
instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of
those whose language he is to interpret.
 
 
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property
to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be
seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
 
Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties regarding the subjects of their contracts
 
 
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap
property, and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not
exercise acts of ownership that could show that they indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong
property. They did not take possession of the Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property
was in the possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the
respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the
respondents.
 
Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property, there is one other
circumstance that convinces us that what respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent
Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap property, without turning over the
supposed landowners share to RBBI. This strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not
RBBI) as the owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly
believed that RBBI retained ownership of the Lantap property, how come they never complied with their obligations
as supposed tenants of RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory
propounded by the respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners
was the Murong property, and not the Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were
already the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is
therefore natural that the Murong property and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI
with the execution of the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs, petitioners remained in possession of the
Murong property, enjoying and tilling it without any opposition from anybody. Subsequently, after the petitioners
completed their payment of the total purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) officials conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, did not reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the
Murong property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR officials issued CLOAs in petitioners
favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to the land in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession
of the Murong property, undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until respondents started the controversy in
1997.
 
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their position that the
subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no
contrary evidence of the parties actuations to indicate that they intended the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it
appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken
belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched considering that TCT No. T-
62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the
particular barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public
land. Hence, were it not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were intrinsically ambiguous and failed
to express their true intention by asking why petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their contract.
[46]
 A cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises when one of the contracting parties manifests an
intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the parties.[47] It seems fairly obvious that
petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any
dispute as to the interpretation and application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong
property (and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a
different interpretation, that the issue became relevant for the first time.
 
All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap
property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-
396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. In consequence, the CAs ruling against
RBBI should not be executed as such execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein.Although the CAs
decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R.
No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the
CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
 
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as well
as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981
are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED.
The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers the
Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and
CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva
Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this
Decision. Costs against respondents. SO ORDERED.
 ROMULO L. NERI, G.R. No. 180643
Petitioner,  

   

- versus - Promulgated:

   

  March 25, 2008

SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show

cause Letter[1] dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order[2] dated January 30, 2008 concurrently
issued by respondent
Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,[3] Trade and Commerce,
[4]
 and National Defense and Security[5] against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
 
The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:
 
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16
Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
 
In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as follows:
(1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO
THE APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE
OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN GETTING IT CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE COURTS OF LAW THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
ANY ANOMALY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF ANY IN THE
BOT LAW AND OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATIONS.
 
(2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled RESOLUTION URGING
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE
CONTRACT
 
(3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
AWARDING THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM
ZHONG XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE CORPORATION)
WITH THE END IN VIEW OF PROVIDING REMEDIAL LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROTECT OUR
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
 
(4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN
AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL
BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
 
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending
bills in the Senate, to wit:
 
1.      Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT
SUBJECTING TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING
FUNDING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, GOODS, AND
CONSULTING SERVICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF
PHILIPPINE PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9184, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES;
 
2.      Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT IMPOSING
SAFEGUARDS IN CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; and
 
3.      Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled AN
ACT MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS.
 
 
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to
appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the
September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates.
 
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but,
on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be
financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.
 
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,[6] (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
[7] [8]
 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
 
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
 
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The
pertinent portion of the letter reads:
 
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear
and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be
recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN
project, including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007.
 
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time
to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
 
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on
the following questions, to wit:
 
a)      Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b)      Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c)      Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after
being told about the alleged bribe?
 
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations
and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered
executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R.
133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is
necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The
expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences,
like the value which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling
effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and
responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
 
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed
to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
 
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine
of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly.
 
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an
unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him
except the foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his
testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.
 
 
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22,
2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. The Letter reads:
 
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense
and Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt under
Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon).
 
The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.
 
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not
his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus:
 
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated
with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11
hours stay during the hearing on 26 September 2007.During said hearing, I answered all
the questions that were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by
executive privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15
November 2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what
remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executive
privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be dispensed with.
 
Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up during
the 26 September 2007 hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to what else I need to
clarify, so that as a resource person, I may adequately prepare myself.
 
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating,
among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his
conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible
loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of
petitioners request that he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may
adequately prepare for the hearing.
In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
 
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his
request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January
30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The
said Order states:
 
ORDER
 
For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on Tuesday, September
18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday,
November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and
received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed,
impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure
to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November
2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic)
Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his testimony.
 
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and
make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. [9] He insisted that
he has not shown any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest. He emphasized his willingness
to testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance
notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According
to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter through the
issuance of declaration of contempt and arrest.
 
In view of respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1,
2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction),seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order.
 
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees
from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing
priorto the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment.
 
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show cause Letter and
contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He
stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are candid discussions meant to explore
options in making policy decisions. According to him, these discussions dwelt on the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials on the countrys diplomatic relations and
economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and
lenders in the Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of
the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita[10] and United States v. Reynolds.
[11]
 Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made
to him in official confidence under Section 7[12] of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section
24[13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
 
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioners testimony is material
and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for
petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioners arrest;
and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
 
In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were ventilated:

1.      What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the
principle of executive privilege?

1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege,
by order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in the exercise
of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China?

1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his

conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said
conversations dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v.
Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?

1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of
the Constitution:

Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest)

Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern)

Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)

Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed)

 
 and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?

2.      What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?

3.      Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of
petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?

After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court within twenty-four (24)
hours if they are amenable to the Courts proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his
testimony before the Senate Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators without prejudice
to the decision on the merits of this pending petition. It was understood that petitioner may invoke
executive privilege in the course of the Senate Committees proceedings, and if the respondent
Committees disagree thereto, the unanswered questions will be the subject of a supplemental pleading to
be resolved along with the three (3) questions subject of the present petition.[14] At the same time,
respondent Committees were directed to submit several pertinent documents.[15]

The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the Manifestation dated March
5, 2008. As to the required documents, the Senate and respondent Committees manifested that they
would not be able to submit the latters Minutes of all meetings and the Minute Book because it has never
been the historical and traditional legislative practice to keep them. [16] They instead submitted the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of respondent Committees joint public hearings.

On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on the following arguments:

(1)   The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the principle
of executive privilege.

(2)   Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance with

the law-making bodys power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.

(3)   Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-
compliance with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007.

The Court granted the OSGs motion the next day, March 18, 2008.

As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive
Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow
and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case
of Senate v. Ermita[17] when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:
 
 First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
 

And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the

contempt Order?
 

We grant the petition.

 

At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[18] becomes

imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers

of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to

wit:
 

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of

its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its

duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such

inquiries shall be respected.

SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of

the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall

provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their

departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the

Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled

appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters

related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires and the

President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each

other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to

the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for

legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective

of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. [19] Simply stated, while both

powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
 

This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process.

Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The

Courts pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita[20] is clear:

 
 When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are

implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as

imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads

must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22,

in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their

appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is

in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons

stated in Arnault. 

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory

process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.  This is

consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials

under section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of

separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it

cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands

for information. (Emphasis supplied.)

The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in this case has also

been settled in Senate v. Ermita, when it held:

 

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era,

however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less

susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial

review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the

Constitution.

 
 

Hence, this decision.

 

The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered

by Executive Privilege 

We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.
 

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the

proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. [21] Inevitably, adjunct

thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid,

it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure

and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
 

The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through

a valid claim of executive privilege.[22] This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a

recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?

 

A-      There is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege Despite the Revocation of E.O. 464 

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our

concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike

the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom

of Information Act[23] and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,[24] the Philippines has retained its

constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of

these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of

E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermitas Letter dated November 15,

2007 limits its bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,
[25]
 and Chavez v. PEA.[26] There was never a mention of E.O. 464.

While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[27] have comprehensively discussed the concept of

executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to

clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege.

 

The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential

communications privilege.[28] In United States v. Nixon,[29] the U.S. Court recognized a great public

interest in preserving the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the Presidents

performance of his official duties. It thus considered presidential communications as presumptively

privileged. Apparently, the presumption is founded on the Presidents generalized interest in

confidentiality. The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors

and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in

the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be

unwilling to express except privately.

 

In In Re: Sealed Case,[30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2)

kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is

the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or other

materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President

believes should remain confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions, recommendations and

deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are

formulated.
 Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications

privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege,

to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of

separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional

role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process

privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and

covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones [31] As a consequence,

congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to

greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re: Sealed

Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has operational proximity to direct presidential

decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of

presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as quintessential and non-delegable

Presidential power, such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to

grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the

power to negotiate treaties, etc.[32]

 

The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice [33] tested the In Re: Sealed Case principles.

There, while the presidential decision involved is the exercise of the Presidents pardon power, a non-

delegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were deemed

to be too remote from the President and his

senior White House advisors to be protected. The Court conceded that

functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the Presidents pardon power, but

concluded that an organizational test was more appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that

would result from the In Re: Sealed Cases functional test. The majority concluded that, the lesser

protections of the deliberative process privilege would suffice. That privilege was, however, found

insufficient to justify the confidentiality of the 4,341 withheld documents.

 

But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive privilege are made in older

cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military

or state secrets,[34] identity of government informers in some circumstances, ,[35] and information

related to pending investigations.[36] An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign

relations. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. [37] the U.S. Court, citing President George

Washington, pronounced:
 

The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often

depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the

measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or

contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on

future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in

 relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason

for vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the

Senate, the principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of

members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have

as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be

to establish a dangerous precedent.

Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v.

PCGG[38], this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to

state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. In Chavez v. PEA,[39] there is also a

recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-

door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is

fully discussed.
 

As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized

in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the

President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the

repository of the commander-in-chief,[40] appointing,[41] pardoning,[42] and diplomatic[43] powers. Consistent

with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater

confidentiality than others.

 

The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the

elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.

2)    The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the

President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in

operational proximity with the President.

3)    The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely

contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by

an appropriate investigating authority.[44]

 
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
 
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
[45]
 Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.

United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against

other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the

Constitution. The U.S. Court held:

 

[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level

communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of

immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.

The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46] where it was held that presidential

communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere

showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve

the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the manner that preserves the

essential functions of each Branch.[47] Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from

respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in

the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight

function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v.

Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory

process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is conceded that it is

difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight

function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the

inquiry is conducted.
 

Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible

disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v.

Nixon[48] that demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the

Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present cases distinction with

the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is

requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that

the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to limit the scope of its

decision. It stressed that it is not concerned here with the balance between the Presidents

generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information. Unlike

in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this

regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on

the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is

made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military,

diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita

categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in

relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
 

The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of matters which may

present a conflict of interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry

if later on an impeachment proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the present Senate

inquiry. Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,[49] it was

held that since an impeachment proceeding had been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate Select

Committees immediate oversight need for five presidential tapes should give way to the House Judiciary

Committee which has the constitutional authority to inquire into presidential impeachment. The Court

expounded on this issue in this wise:

 

It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of
government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees
from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing. The Congress learned this as to its own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as
did the judicial branch, in a sense, in Clark v. United States, and the executive branch itself
in Nixon v. Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome the
presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential
conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal,but, instead, on the nature and
appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the material was
sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment. Here
also our task requires and our decision implies no judgment whatever concerning
possible presidential involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think
the sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend solely on whether the
subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the
Committee's functions.

In its initial briefs here, the Committee argued that it has shown exactly this. It
contended that resolution, on the basis of the subpoenaed tapes, of the conflicts in the
testimony before it would aid in a determination whether legislative involvement in political
campaigns is necessary and could help engender the public support needed for basic
reforms in our electoral system. Moreover, Congress has, according to the Committee,
power to oversee the operations of the executive branch, to investigate instances of
possible corruption and malfeasance in office, and to expose the results of its investigations
to public view. The Committee says that with respect to Watergate-related matters, this
power has been delegated to it by the Senate, and that to exercise its power responsibly, it
must have access to the subpoenaed tapes.

We turn first to the latter contention. In the circumstances of this case, we need
neither deny that the Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a
general oversight power, nor explore what the lawful reach of that power might be under
the Committee's constituent resolution. Since passage of that resolution, the House
Committee on the Judiciary has begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment. The
investigative authority of the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct has
an express constitutional source. x x x We have been shown no evidence indicating
 that Congress itself attaches any particular value to this interest. In these
circumstances, we think the need for the tapes premised solely on an asserted
power to investigate and inform cannot justify enforcement of the Committee's
subpoena.

The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore,

entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its

legislative functions. There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the

responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-

finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative

judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed

legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction

of past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information

provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its

ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain named

individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one

of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's

need for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their

original form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process, at

least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once

have been in the Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its

legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis

supplied)

 
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.[50] We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from
the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
 
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
 
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
 
 
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[51] Article 229[52] of
the Revised Penal Code,Section 3 (k)[53] of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e)[54] of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential [55] and what our
Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of
this case belonging to such kind.
 
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in
aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public information. The former cannot claim
that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information. The distinction between
such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
 
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant
to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen.
 
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does
not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
 
 
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a
right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they
do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be
balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those
pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of
careful review by numerous decided cases.

 
B-   The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked

 
We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the
President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim
of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. [56] A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their
confidentiality.[57]
 

The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary
Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough
compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
 
With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an
allegation be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even
intended to be comprehensive.[58] The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
 
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed
to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
 
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [59] the Congress must not require the executive to state
the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
 

II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in

Issuing the Contempt Order

 
 

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or

despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to

amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in

contemplation of law.[60]
 

It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated
November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed
to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautistas letter, stating that
his non-appearance was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations
with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an
expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he be furnished in advance copies of the
questions. Without responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees
issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing
respondent Committees that he had filed the present petition for certiorari.
 

Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in view of

five (5) reasons.

 

First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers

from constitutional infirmity.

Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that

the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along

with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance

thereof. Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the

Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such

inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section

22. Unfortunately, despite petitioners repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an

advance list of questions.

Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that

only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation.
[61]
 Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:

 
 The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt

any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to

testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.

Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who

did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a

cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. We quote the pertinent

portion of the transcript, thus:

 

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A). For clarification. x x x The Chair will

call either a caucus or will ask the Committee on Rules if there is a problem.
Meaning, if we do not have the sufficient numbers. But if we have a sufficient
number, we will just hold a caucus to be able to implement that right away
becauseAgain, our Rules provide that any one held in contempt and ordered
arrested, need the concurrence of a majority of all members of the said committee
and we have three committees conducting this.

So thank you very much to the members

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A). May I recognize the Minority Leader

and give him the floor, Senator Pimentel.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is no problem, I think, with consulting

the other committees. But I am of the opinion that the Blue Ribbon Committee is
the lead committee, and therefore, it should have preference in enforcing its own
decisions. Meaning to say, it is not something that is subject to consultation with
other committees. I am not sure that is the right interpretation. I think that once
we decide here, we enforce what we decide, because otherwise, before we know
it, our determination is watered down by delay and, you know, the so-called
consultation that inevitably will have to take place if we follow the premise that
has been explained.

So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Ribbon Committee should not forget its
the lead committee here, and therefore, the will of the lead committee prevails over all the
other, you, know reservations that other committees might have who are only secondary or
even tertiary committees, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) Thank you very much to the Minority
Leader. And I agree with the wisdom of his statements. I was merely mentioning that under
Section 6 of the Rules of the Committee and under Section 6, The Committee by a vote of a
majority of all its members may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any
order of the Committee.

So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than willing to take that responsibility. But we only
have six members here today, I am the seventh as chair and so we have not met
that number. So I am merely stating that, sir, that when we will prepare the
documentation, if a majority of all members sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon
rule wherein I do believe, if I am not mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the
documentation and then either in caucus or in session asked the other members to
sign. And once the signatures are obtained, solely for the purpose that Secretary Neri or Mr.
 Lozada will not be able to legally question our subpoena as being insufficient in accordance
with law.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution that the chair is suggesting is very well-
taken. But Id like to advert to the fact that the quorum of the committee is only two as far
as I remember. Any two-member senators attending a Senate committee hearing provide
that quorum, and therefore there is more than a quorum demanded by our Rules as far as
we are concerned now, and acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as Senator Enrile pointed
out. In any event, the signatures that will follow by the additional members will only tend to
strengthen the determination of this Committee to put its foot forward put down on what is
happening in this country, Mr. Chairman, because it really looks terrible if the primary
Committee of the Senate, which is the Blue Ribbon Committee, cannot even sanction people
who openly defy, you know, the summons of this Committee. I know that the Chair is going
through an agonizing moment here. I know that. But nonetheless, I think we have to
uphold, you know, the institution that we are representing because the alternative will be a
disaster for all of us, Mr. Chairman. So having said that, Id like to reiterate my point.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent with the
intentions of the Minority Leader. But let me very respectfully disagree with the legal
requirements. Because, yes, we can have a hearing if we are only two but both
under Section 18 of the Rules of the Senate and under Section 6 of the Rules of the
Blue Ribbon Committee, there is a need for a majority of all members if it is a case
of contempt and arrest. So, I am simply trying to avoid the court rebuking the
Committee, which will instead of strengthening will weaken us. But I do agree, Mr. Minority
Leader, that we should push for this and show the executive branch that the well-decided
the issue has been decided upon the Sabio versus Gordon case. And its very clear that we
are all allowed to call witnesses. And if they refure or they disobey not only can we cite
them in contempt and have them arrested. x x x [62]

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section

21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published

rules of procedure. We quote the OSGs explanation:

The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to

publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate

is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three

(3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also

changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it

may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in

aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and

precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of

executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as

unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate

arrest and detention.

 
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his

readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because

he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first

rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of

peremptorily dismissing his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, respondent Committees actions

constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The

same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioners motion for reconsideration

alleging that he had filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioners repeated

request for an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he

claimed to be covered by executive privilege. 

Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly

with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the

dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. [63] Respondent Committees should have exercised

the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high position in a co-

equal branch of government.

 

In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been

avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of

separation of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the government.
 

One last word.

 

The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required the parties to

consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise. The accusation is far from the truth. The

Court did so, only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases,

to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to avert a constitutional crisis between

the executive and legislative branches of government.

 

In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co., [64] the court refrained from deciding the case because

of its desire to avoid a resolution that might disturb the balance of power between the two branches and

inaccurately reflect their true needs. Instead, it remanded the record to the District Court for

further proceedings during which the parties are required to negotiate a settlement. In the subsequent

case of United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co., [65] it was held that much of this spirit of compromise is

reflected in the generality of language found in the Constitution. It proceeded to state:

 

Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary

relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather each branch

should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal

accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the

particular fact situation. 

 

It thereafter concluded that: The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of

dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power

of government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of

powers.
 
 
In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes once more that the basic principles of constitutional
law cannot be subordinated to the needs of a particular situation. As magistrates, our mandate is to rule
objectively and dispassionately, always mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes warning on the dangers inherent in
cases of this nature, thus:
 
some accident of immediate and overwhelming interestappeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled
principles of law will bend.[66]
 
 
In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles
which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary
interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-
equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and
balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve
these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within
constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the
search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and
uphold the Rule of Law.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is
hereby nullified. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002]

TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME,

namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME,
and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-
BACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October 20,
1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386.
The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square
meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of land situated on the
corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno
Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition,[3] written in the Spanish
language was executed, describing said parcel of land as
2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con la Calle Mabini
y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades
de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con
todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ------------------------------------------------
P1,050.00.[4]

and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:

1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent
Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed
Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo
Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;

2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and

3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jaymes house, which his family
occupied since 1945.
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioners mother, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration [5] of the lot described with the
following boundaries:

N - Fruelana Jayme & Road

S - Felicitas de Latonio

E - Agustin de Jayme

W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land
owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of
said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot
for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition[6] contending that said
application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application [7] dated January
10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her
mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:

North: Froilan Jayme and Road

East: Agustin Jayme
South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila
West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa[8]

On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.[9] Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision and titling
of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,[10] as well as the disposition of two parcels thereof, thus:

1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771
(FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;

2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in the name of Teresita
P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;

3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the name of Teresita P.
Bordalba;

4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the name of Teresita
Bordalba;

5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the name of Teresita P.
Bordalba;

6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 in the name of
Teresita P. Bordalba.
 Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving the lot
subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch
28, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita
Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-
571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Private respondents
also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug
and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith,
respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them actual, compensatory, and moral damages
plus attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through
purchase from her mother,[11] who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. In
her answer, petitioner traced her mothers ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial
partition presented by private respondents,[12] and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores
occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination,
petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were
partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature
of her mother.[13]
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free
Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its
cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural
Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as
valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses Genaro
U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of
the Rural Bank of Mandaue.The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs by:

1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-57 (FP) and all
subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as
null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;

2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in good faith and are the
legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);

3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage lien in its favor
be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued under the names of the
plaintiffs;

4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the issuance of the
certificate of title in their names;

5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the defendant Rural Bank of
Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;

6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:

(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;

(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and,

7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private respondents are
entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot
No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of the respondent court's decision states:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of the subject
land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of Title issued and their
declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters
occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same
violated the dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit
from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot
and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule,
petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.[16]
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to
fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioners application, insofar as her
declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is
belied by the extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mothers aborted attempt to have the
lot registered, private respondents predecessors-in-interests opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of
a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does
not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself
at the expense of others.[17]
As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute, [18] suffice it to state that said rule finds no
application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness
as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with
the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.[19]
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is
based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings
and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial
court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor
Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard
evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may
assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.[20]
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis--vis the
boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by the fact
that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-
indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioners mother, second, to the predecessors-
in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their boundaries
will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-
in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc,
Mandaue City. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to
their predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother
acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
was the source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now
known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the
extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, where one
derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the
title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private respondents
predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when
she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private
respondents predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in
upholding the right of private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of
the lot in question to them.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No. 1242
(799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private respondents did not show
the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition in relation to Lot No.
1242 (799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:

North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme

East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua
South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme
West: Calle Plaridel

they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of Lot No.
1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, which they claim Lot
No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to which the lot now known as Lot
No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan
Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed. With only
one reference point, however, the south, east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be
established with certainty to be within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
In Beo v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of possession
may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not only his ownership but
also the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So that
when the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action has been exactly determined,
the action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear
satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent of their
1/3 pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their claim over the
said lot.Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v. Malpaya,[22] the prudent recourse would be to
remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private
respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court in order to
determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998]

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA

EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S.
ABAD, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19,
1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners
extra-judicial partition of the decedents estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the
then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792,
petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a
bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972,
petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,
and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the
true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late
mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad,
TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad
Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs.
Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings
No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during these
period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad
Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly
fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to
the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with
deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to
the estate of Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu
thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of
Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as
administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of
Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,
and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mothers estate. Accordingly, on
October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by
petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said
properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and
Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and
as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of
Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that may
have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they lived
together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedents collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M.
Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from
participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties,
monies and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as
administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked.[1]
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latters motion for
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious
and accordingly

1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all
registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores
de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in
the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo
Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa,
executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the
 notarial book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be
inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in
lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad;
TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-
Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title in the
name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages
executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc.
No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco,
identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa
Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of
the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the
Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from the back of
the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender
to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial
court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of
time. Because of this ruling, petitioners instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of
Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the appellate court granted
petitioners petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latters appeal. The trial court,
however, again dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was filed out of
time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling
of the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed
out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and mandamus
proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court. On July
9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to petitioners appeal from the order of
November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated
November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19,
1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of
the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:

1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all
surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of the
deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land
described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the
extra-judicial partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is
inexistent and void from the beginning; the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and
void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of
Title in the name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs
against petitioner-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY
THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF
PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
 We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abads filiation, submits the startling theory
that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were
born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the
birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners
claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunaos death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was
legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo
Abads children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable
provision of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[4]

To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua
Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:

Fathers Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: engineer (mining)

Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[5]

as well as Cesar Libunaos 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology, which
states:

Fathers Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: none

Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[6]

Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were
accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the case, they
conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos [7] stating
that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and
that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas,[8] Ricardo Abads physician, declaring
that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the
latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial courts finding of
facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. [9] Petitioners, however,
argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the
record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.[10]
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the
least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not
necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished.
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose
Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latters death at that time, being merely
secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunaos death certificate would have been the best evidence as to
when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is
no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose
Libunaos death. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain
Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria
Empaynados first husband, the latters name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is
different. Jose Bautista Libunaos wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was
Honoria Empaynado.
 As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [11] The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient
existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and
e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.[12]
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that
the finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
conveniently forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be
sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And
the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the
trial court:

In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The
privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It
is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be
promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and
disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are
not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and
disclosures made under the seal of the statute.

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim
by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We
quote with approval the trial courts decision, thus:

In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his
individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared
therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia,
Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).

x x x x x x x x x

In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and Marian,
then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and
paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).

In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund acount of P100,000.00 with the Peoples
Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of
death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the
same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister
Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of
their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC
Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income
of the trust fund intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-
36). Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of
his daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a
balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B)

With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003. If there are noillegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Italics supplied)

As to petitioners claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother
Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private
respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of
fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a
better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case.[13] In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that
they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
 Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July
9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum
that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar
de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

MAXIMO ALVAREZ, G.R. No. 143439

Petitioner,  

- versus -   

   

SUSAN RAMIREZ, Promulgated:

Respondent.  

  October 14, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x 

D E C I S I O N
 

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: 

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated May

31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled SUSAN RAMIREZ, petitioner, versus, HON. BENJAMIN M.

AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC, MALABON, MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ, respondents.

Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for

arson[3] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez,

herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first

witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.

Esperanza testified as follows:

ATTY. ALCANTARA: 

We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.

COURT: 

Swear in the witness. 

xxx

ATTY. MESIAH: (sic) 

Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving
that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged
particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house
located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned
by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline
on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the
time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied
by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the
estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of the accused in successfully
setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and
together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.

COURT: 

You may proceed. 

DIRECT EXAMINATION 

ATTY. ALCANTARA: 

xxx

 
 Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?

A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my
sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room).

Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?

A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.

Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?

A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave his
name as Maximo Alvarez.[4] 

In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed uncontrolled

emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.

On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion[5] to disqualify Esperanza from testifying

against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

Respondent filed an opposition[6] to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed

the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.

On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from

further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.[7] The prosecution filed a motion for

reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999.[8]

This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-

MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[9] with application for preliminary injunction

and temporary restraining order.[10]

On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders

issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in

Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.
  

The reasons given for the rule are:

1.     There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2.     If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3.     The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk

of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4.     Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through

the hostile testimony of the other.[11]

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil

actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like

the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those

in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that

there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason

based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the

consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the

security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which

through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.[12] 

In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid
down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly
affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The
better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation

between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him,

eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues

the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of
injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation
 which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the
marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme
Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security
and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271
SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the

relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de

facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the

preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to

protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts

so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct

testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court

in Francisco[14]), it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72,

Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal

Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO

A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S.
ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of
the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity of fiduciary
duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the
law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In
this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before
the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33
(Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."[1]
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja
G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law
Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and
incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering
said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted
in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.[2]
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred
to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended
Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
party-defendant.[3] Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant
on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.[4]
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of
the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed. conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the
coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other
coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares
and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest
stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as
of February, 1984.[5]
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are charged, was
in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers,
Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of
shares of stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex A of the expanded
Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any
proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.
4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing
Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the
expanded Amended Complaint.However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the shares appearing in his name in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint
are his assets.[6]

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying
the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.[7]
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October
8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion
as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.[8] The Counter-Motion for dropping
petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.[9]
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG
Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated
March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and
(c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent
PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination
of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.[10]
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had
he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.[11]
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG. It held:
x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to
be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed
the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in
relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November
4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the
same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty.
Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
merit.[12]

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who
undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of
agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the
classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in
violation of the equal protection clause.
III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of
this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of
their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration
to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially
the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33
grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his
client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law
firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private
respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained
during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of
the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.[13]
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him
as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss
Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal,'"[14] and he has
undertaken to identify his principal.[15]
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the bigger fish as
they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with
petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of
the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to
be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein. (Underscoring ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government respondent PCGG, through counsel
Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA that their so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex
A of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of
assignment, some in the name of particular persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one,
their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all
the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the petitioners in this
case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in
blank. Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held
by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some
of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the
shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are
really just paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no
fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not
only that, they have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses
now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the
principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves.[16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the
course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint
is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against
petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may
be compensated by honorarium or for hire,[17] and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on
whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the
contract to the person who requested him.[18] But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the
principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. [19] A
lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and
superior to those of an ordinary agent.[20] Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as
a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court [21] and exercises his judgment in the
choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, [22] that is required by reason
of necessity and public interest[23] based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.[24]
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable
tradition.[25] In Stockton v. Ford,[26] the U.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney
and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously
guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the
court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that
confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party
bestowing it.[27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel, without
authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon
in the course of professional employment. [28] Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the
attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can
an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.[29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client,
and to accept no compensation in connection with his clients business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity
should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect
his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney
does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud
or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between
legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his
secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the
judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self
incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed
innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a
fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a
dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain
effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of
duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. [30] Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke
the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.[31]
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.[32] He cannot be obliged to grope
in the dark against unknown forces.[33]
 Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor,[34] a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge
the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to
the issue of the clients identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified
client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate
election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she
had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her
client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his clients
identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courts contempt orders, the state supreme court held
that under the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of
the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the
client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the Sandino
Gang, a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law
partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and
Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on
behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the
case, held:
A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would
implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects
federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client
privilege. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of
compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such
disclosure except on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this
policy, the clients identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as
confidential communications.[36]
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance,
the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, [37] prompted the
New York Supreme Court to allow alawyers claim to the effect that he could not reveal the
name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought
action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information
only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the
second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to
him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the
man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to
the lawyer in his professional capacity.The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to
defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the
policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be
used in an action or claim against him.[38]
x x x xxx xxx.
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or
assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter
proper for such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so
connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of
the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. xxx.
It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this
case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot
be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the summons on
him has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained.[39]
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, [40] the lawyer involved was required by a lower
court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the courts
request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the
purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State
Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented
certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such
evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel
him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications
made to him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in
certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the
nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client.[41]
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the
clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
In Baird vs Korner,[42] a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable
position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought
advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird
the sum of $12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of
money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in
Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS
demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the
ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants because
this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS
summons. For Bairds repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income
taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that clients income tax liability
pending. The court emphasized the exception that a clients name is privileged when so much has been
revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the clients identity exposes him to
possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount
in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may
check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a
belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney
here involved was employed - to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.[43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. [44] Moreover,
where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is
the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged,
since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.[45]
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit
of the privilege when the clients name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences.[46]
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which
is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions
laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted
the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework
and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form
of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as
lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in
the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the
words of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a...
crime."[47]
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing
illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal
and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same
cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not
the act for which the advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure
leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against
him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield
for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in
the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the
latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give
advice on the commission of a crime.[48] The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above
discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general,
exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit against his client. [49] "Communications made to an
attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which
may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other,
are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged communications."[50] Where the
communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity
but there would be not much in the information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge
except that revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which would
substantiate the prosecutions suspicions, then the clients identity is so inextricably linked to the subject
matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is
consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings [51] and Tillotson v.
Boughner.[52] What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what
may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend
on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the
building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as
the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors
and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be
revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege.[53] It
follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to
disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by
them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or
may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case
that it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much
"communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication
which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.
 The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,[54] the US
Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its
client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled
that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen
normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v.
Scheller[55] requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was
fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work
done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client
into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client
found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was
originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v.
Salmon[56] famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer
involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.[57]
Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, [58] "xxx is an exacting goddess,
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to
accept respondents position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous
energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life - so share its passions
its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? x x x But that is not all. What a subject is
this in which we are united - this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see
reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic
theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a
mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely passion - only to be won by straining all the faculties by
which man is likened to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain
of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall
within recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on
them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners
and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds
the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and
others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and
authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the
PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a
crime.
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent
was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but
also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may
require, which includes... the identity of the principal."[59]
 First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a
statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have
likewise made the same claim not merely out-of- court but also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded
Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate
lawyering.[60] Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other
conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from
petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to
sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the
identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show - and absolutely nothing
exists in the records of the case at bar - that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his
client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement
between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special
treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have
required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did
indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were
submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed
certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to
whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at
ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned
transactions.[61]
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the
respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as
a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial
distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at
bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven
application of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment.[62] Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to
privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.

x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that
all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed.As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding the rest.[63]

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. [64] It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant
from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not
only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the
suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at
the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called
to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their
objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-
incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of
coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them
when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a
proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and
subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo
J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, *Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta
and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.". SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  G.R. No. 149576

represented by the Land
Registration Authority,
Petitioner, 

- v e r s u s – 

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,

Respondent.  Promulgated:

August 8, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 

DECISION

CORONA, J.: 

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision [1] and August 20, 2001 resolution of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete

perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air

Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters

of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which

allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
 

ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On

May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his

report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT

No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base

(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a

complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to

Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre

Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.

  

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered

the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial,

postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other

procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and

Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In

particular, the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how

respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.

During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty.

Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and transmitted

an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was

not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998

to declare respondent in default,[2] predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued

that, since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to

him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
[3]
 it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics motion.[4] It found

respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court

ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to

present its evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its

evidence.

Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial

court denied it.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for

certiorari[5] seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended

that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.
  

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos

statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination.

The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts after the filing of the answer[6] and concluded that

he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever

defect the answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It

directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial

with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared respondent in default

for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement.[7] Where it appears

that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of

those statements is admissible against him.[8] This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is

reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other

person.[9] By adoptive admission, a third persons statement becomes the admission of the party

embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party: 

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;[10]

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;[11]

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;[12]

(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points

which he or she has heard the other make[13] or

(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.[14]

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no

instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to great lengths to explain

Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its implications, as follows:

1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence,

the pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that

the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by

him was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a signature.
 2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it

does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the

answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the

pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another.

This was similar to addressing an authorization letter to whom it may concern such that any

person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he

resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances

show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial

courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in

the comment[15] and memorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents

adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party

himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must

be signed by the party or counsel representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a

pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.

Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just

any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to

the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not

interposed for delay.[16] Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can

certify to these matters.

 
 The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is

reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of

a pleading to another lawyer[17] but cannot do so

in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, [18] something the

law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was

void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been

cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos

consented to the signing of the answer by another as long as it conformed to his draft. We give no value

whatsoever to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the

answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was

an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to

present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its

answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have

their own valid raison d etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may

result in arbitrariness and injustice.[19]

The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals[20] is relevant: 

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts
and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and
 under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,

they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his

thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. [21] In this case, respondent failed to show

any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the

ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001

resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the

February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in

default is hereby REINSTATED.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his

possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157221             March 30, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
CESAR GALVEZ, Appellant.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

For review before this Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated
March 30, 2001, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Isabela, Basilan finding the
accused-appellant Cesar Galvez (Galvez), guilty of Murder, but modifying the penalty of the RTC from a
sentence of "seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum" to reclusion perpetua.

The facts are as follows:

At around 11 o’clock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal, Ricardo
Francisco and Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from making copra to eat leftover dinner inside the copra kiln
in the farm of Perez in Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up from the circle where they
were eating to drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the ground shouting "Dan ya tupa comigo"
(Dan, I am hit). The rest of the group took cover, crawling to different directions. After the attack, Rellios
reported the incident to the barangay captain and they brought Enojarda’s dead body to his family.3

On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) for Murder, which reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz. at
Matarling, Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, armed
with an M16 armalite rifle, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rosalio Enojarda with the said M16
armalite rifle, thereby inflicting gunshot wound on the body of the latter which caused his death.4

The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Enojarda fell, the rest of the group took cover and
Rellios while in a crawling position, saw Galvez about 5 meters away holding an armalite rifle and firing at
their direction; Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize them as well as the
firearms they carried because they were approximately nine meters away; 5 Perez, also crawled and hid in
the bushes about 5 meters away; when the firing stopped, one of the attackers passed by about two
meters from where Perez was hiding and because the moon was bright, he recognized Galvez, his cousin,
who was wearing a fatigue uniform and armed with an armalite rifle; he also saw that Galvez had three
armed companions but did not recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying because they were
about nine meters from Galvez.6

Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified that he was staying at his father-in-law’s house
on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around 10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. He went home and slept with his
wife soon after.7To corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo Ramillano, a visitor at his father-
in-law’s house and Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store owner. 8 He also presented Athena Elisa
Anderson, Document Examiner and Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Region 9, Zamboanga
City, who testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his hands showed that there was no nitrate
present;9 and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the
scene of the crime were not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.10

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27, 1995 with the following findings:

From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this case, this Court finds the following facts to be
undisputable, to wit:

1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio Enojarda, while making copra in the coconut land
of Danilo Perez at Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan, was shot to death by one of the four (4) men. How
many gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of his body was hit by the gunfire, the evidence is
found wanting.

2) That a day before the incident and on the date of the incident which was July 27, 1991, the
accused Cesar Galvez has not fired any firearms.

xxx

3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite rifle…allegedly found by Barangay Captain Inocente
Manicap from the scene of the crime and later turned over to PFC Samuel Omoso, the Police
Investigator of this case, did not come from the M16 armalite rifle with Serial No. 117460, the gun
issued to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations omitted).11

Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Rellios and Perez, were
credible and trustworthy as there was no motive to perjure themselves; that the testimony of defense
witness SPO2 Ramillano was full of loopholes; and that the testimony of the store owner was insufficient
to disprove the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime.12

The RTC concluded:

xxx since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired his M16 armalite rifle on that night of July 27, 1991,
and those five (5) empty shells were not fired from his armalite, then xxx the bullet that hit and
instantly killed Rosalio Enojarda on that night of July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo Perez
came from the gun fired by any of the three (3) unidentified persons who were the companions
of the accused, Cesar Galvez at the night of the incident xxx.13 (emphasis supplied)

Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still convicted Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since Galvez
was seen by two witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his unidentified
armed companions.14 The trial court also held that the offer of Galvez to have the case settled out of court
is an indication of his guilt.15

The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial matters surrounding the commission of the crime, being
carefully and meticulously examined and studied, this Court finds the accused SPO2 Cesar Galvez, a
member of the Philippine National Police GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in committing the
crime of Murder as alleged in the Information and which crime is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, but considering his good military records after the commission of the crime,
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum, which is the minimum period of Reclusion
Temporal in its maximum period to death. And to indemnify the heirs of the late Rosalio Enojarda, the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the Court the amount of P500.00 as judicial costs
and other accessory penalties attached to the penalty of Reclusion Temporal.

And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the military ranks he now hold [sic] in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.

And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused shall immediately be committed to the Provincial
Jail where the Provincial Warden is directed to immediately transfer him to the National Penitentiary at
San Ramon Penal Colony at Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.

And the property bail bond he has posted for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and its
pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the bondsman.16

Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18255, which rendered its Decision on
March 30, 2001 affirming his guilt but modifying the penalty to be imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CESAR GALVEZ is hereby sentenced to reclusion

perpetua, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.17

The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally liable based on conspiracy when such fact was
not alleged in the Information. However, it still found Galvez guilty of Murder. 18 The CA reasoned that: the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that Galvez used another
gun in shooting the victim; the eyewitnesses of the prosecution identified Galvez as the perpetrator if not
one of the perpetrators of the crime; alibi, which was offered by Galvez, is the weakest of all defenses and
cannot prevail over positive identification; the offer of Galvez to the wife of the victim to have the case
settled is also a strong indication of Galvez’s culpability; and treachery was adequately established as the
attack was sudden, unexpected and did not accord the victim an opportunity to defend himself. 19 The CA
further held that since there was no mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty should be reclusion
perpetua.20

Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration 21 which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 21, 2001,
stating that it was a mere rehash of the arguments already addressed in the decision.22

The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution 23 accepting the case; committing
the accused to the Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the accused and the Solicitor General that
they may file additional briefs with this Court.24

In his Appellant’s Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court erred:

… IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER FOR THE DEATH OF
ROSALIO ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991 DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDINGS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DID NOT FIRE HIS RIFLE ON THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE BULLET THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO
ENOJARDA COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES BELONGING TO ANY OF THE
THREE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WHO WERE NOT CHARGED NOR INDICTED TOGETHER WITH THE
ACCUSED IN THE SAME CRIMINAL INFORMATION IN QUESTION.
 II

… IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO RELLIOS, WHILE IN CRAWLING POSITION WHOSE
CHESTS WERE ALMOST TOUCHING THE GROUND AND UNDER CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD
SEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH M16 ARMALITE RIFLE IN THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991
DESPITE DANILO PEREZ’ [sic] POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN COURT IN THE MANNER AND
CIRCUMSTANCE NARRATED BY HIM.25

In his Supplemental Appellant’s Brief, Galvez further claims that it was seriously erroneous:

I.

…TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE OTHER
MALEFACTORS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

…TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION, MORE SO THE
THEORY OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THERE BEING NO OTHER PERSONS CHARGED
IN THE PRESENT CASE.

III.

…TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FAR DIFFERENT
FROM THE INFORMATION, IN EFFECT DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANT [THE] RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.

IV.

…TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO ALLEGED EYE WITNESSES WHOSE
DECLARATIONS WERE CLEARLY BELIED DURING THEIR CROSS EXAMINATION.

V.

…NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

VI.

…TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED, BASELESS PRESUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE

WHERE THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS PRESUMED.26

Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental Appellant’s Brief adding that:

VII

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RESULTS OF THE
PARAFFIN AND BALLISTIC TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOT THE
DECEASED USING AN M16 RIFLE OTHER THAN THE ONE ISSUED TO HIM.27

Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt
because an accused is always presumed to be innocent unless proven otherwise;28 when circumstances
yield two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other
compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must side with that which will acquit the accused; in this
case, the RTC found undisputed the fact that he did not shoot the victim on the night of July 27, 1991 and
the firearm that was used in killing the victim was owned and possessed by another man, as shown by the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests; the statement of Danilo Perez that he saw the accused
on the night of July 27, 1991 is not credible since Perez was in a crawling position with his chest almost
touching the ground at the time he allegedly saw the accused; Judge Memoracion, who penned the
decision could not have assessed the demeanor of the prosecution witnesses while testifying as it was
another judge who heard and received their testimonies; 29 the two defense witnesses, who corroborated
his (Galvez’s) alibi are unbiased and unrelated to him; while alibi is the weakest defense, it is the only
defense if it is the truth and it assumes importance where the prosecution evidence is weak; the
statement of the trial court that the offer of the accused to have the case extra-judicially settled is a tacit
admission of guilt is also unsubstantiated as there is nothing in the records that shows that the accused
made an offer to settle the case out of court.30

For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General argued that: the paraffin test and the ballistic examination
are not conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident; in this case, the paraffin test
was conducted on Galvez two days from the date of the incident; Galvez was also positively identified by
the prosecution witnesses as one of four armed men who attacked them during the incident; Perez
clarified that while he was in a crawling position, he was looking upward, thus, he was able to identify
Galvez; between Galvez’s alibi and the positive declarations of witnesses whose testimonies have not been
assailed nor discredited by improper motive, the latter deserves greater credence; the trial court correctly
convicted Galvez of murder as there was treachery since the victim was not in a position to defend himself
from the attack of the accused; the proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as there was no mitigating circumstance;31 Galvez is also liable for temperate
damages of ₱25,000.00 since pecuniary loss has been suffered although its exact amount could not be
determined, and exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 due to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery; the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim
together with the ₱50,000.00 awarded by the trial court for moral damages.32

After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court resolves to acquit Galvez.

Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may be held liable for the acts of
his co-accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be
made liable for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and not
collective.33

As explained in People v. Tampis,34

The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the information. Absence of a
particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act
constituting conspiracy renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts
of his co-accused. Thus, each of them would be held accountable only for their respective participation in
the commission of the offense.35

The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v. Quitlong, the Court explained:

Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not
enough for an accused to bear and respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that
such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and
procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no
person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. x x x

xxx

x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to
during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or
one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in
order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with
the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act
of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he
faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.36

Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is imperative that the prosecution
prove Galvez’s direct participation in the killing of the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do.

The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
Rellios and Perez that they saw Galvez fire an armalite rifle in their direction on the night in question. The
positive identification of these witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the negative results of the
paraffin and ballistic tests.37

We disagree.

The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. While this Court does not ordinarily
interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appears on
the records, however, facts and circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked or
misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to render the law and apply justice.38

During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows:

Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening on July 27, 1991 what
happened?

A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine where it came from and one of our
companion was hit.
Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who was hit?

A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.

xxx

Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion Rosalio Enojarda, what did you do?

A: I dropped and crawled, sir.

xxx

Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself among the grasses?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you were already hiding among the grasses?

A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where I was hiding about two meters from me.

Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by where you were hiding, who was that culprit?

A: Cesar Galvez, sir.

xxx

COURT:

After you heard the shots how long after you saw him passed by?

xxx

Q: Was it 30 minutes after?

xxx

A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.

Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused) passed by together with his companions around 20
to 25 minutes after you heard the shots, is that what you want to impress this Court?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxx

Q: Did you see him really shoot?

A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied)

During his cross-examination, Perez further testified:

Q: So, when you said the explosions came from different directions, was not true?

A: We heard shots but we do not know where it came from, what we did was to drop and crawl.

COURT: (To the witness)

You did not see the one firing?

Yes, your Honor, because I crawled.

Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings you saw this accused and companions pass by?

A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time but I think it has about 20 to 25 minutes.40

xxx

Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at Mr. Enojarda?
A: No sir.41 (Emphasis supplied).

Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination the following:

Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr. Enojarda?

A: No sir.

COURT: (To the witness)

In other words you were only presuming that it was him.

A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.

ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing)

Did you understand the question when you were asked by the Court. Since you did not actually
see Mr. Galvez shoot at the victim, and reportedly you saw him only five minutes thereafter,
you only presume Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. Enojarda?

A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the above testimonies, the following circumstances appear to have been established: (1) at
around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their two companions were eating merienda near the copra
kiln when they were sprayed with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the ground; (3) Rellios,
Perez and their two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover; (4) about five minutes after the first
burst of gunfire, Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing at Rellios, Perez and their two
companions as well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5) about 20 to 25 minutes after the first
burst of gunfire, Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an M16 armalite rifle along
with three armed companions, after which, their group left the scene of the crime.

However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.

It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be observed in assaying the probative value of
circumstantial evidence:

x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and,
(d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable
doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the
series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt
of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more
like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the
accused is the author of the crime.43

as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable
doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused;44 and that every circumstance or doubt
favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account.45

The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are mainly based on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said testimonies reveals, however, other circumstances that
should be appreciated in favor of Galvez, to wit:

(a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez with three other armed companions
minutes after Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that they saw him in the
vicinity before the shooting of Enojarda.46

(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.47

(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at Enojarda and that he merely assumed that
Galvez was the one who shot the victim when the latter passed by him. 48 Rellios testified that he
only presumed that Galvez shot at Enojarda.49

(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with Galvez50 and that he does not know any
motive why Enojarda was killed.51

In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances for or against Galvez, the following must
always be borne in mind: that the Information charged Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime of
Murder; that the three other armed men were not included as John Does; and that there was no allegation
of conspiracy in the Information.
Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Galvez was the sole author of the shot
that killed Enojarda. The "incriminating circumstances" do not point to Galvez as the sole perpetrator of
the crime. The presence of the three armed men raises the probability that any one of those men inflicted
the fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses merely presumed that it was Galvez who
shot Enojarda.

Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently establish
that Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no evidence that Galvez was seen or was together
with the three other armed men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that precludes the Court
from concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.52 It cannot be said therefore that there was
positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial evidence.

In People v. Comendador,53 the Court held:

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a
given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt . The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty
person.54 (Emphasis supplied)

And in Dela Cruz v. People,55 the Court stressed, thus:

To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the
prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond the point of
moral certainty – certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to
act upon it. It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence,
as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal based
on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s innocence may be doubted, for a
criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction, and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be
considered.56 (Emphasis supplied).

And when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive, motive is
vital. As held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,57

Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the crime. However, motive
becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or
inconclusive. Motive is thus vital in this case.58

In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that he did not know of any motive on the part of Galvez
to kill Enojarda.59 This is a circumstance that should be taken in favor of Galvez.

In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v. People,60 to wit:

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption of
innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt – one which requires
moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act
upon it. As we have so stated in the past –

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this
standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment.61 (Emphasis supplied)

There could not be any doubt that the facts, as established by the circumstantial evidence, failed to
exclude the possibility that another person shot Enojarda. There were three other armed men, any one of
whom could be the culprit.

When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the commission of the crime is
established.62Indeed, the State, aside from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden of correctly
identifying the author of such crime.63 Both facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt
on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.64

Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental brief before this Court that it was erroneous for the CA to
have affirmed the RTC ruling that Galvez’s offer to the victim’s wife to settle the case is a tacit admission
of guilt.65

While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt,66 such principle is not applicable in this case.

The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made on offer of compromise,67 is the March 3, 1993
Order of the RTC which reads as follows:

Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in Court
together with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and manifested that there is a possibility of
understanding and settlement between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for new
assignment.68

Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted as evidence during the trial.
The victim’s widow or any prosecution witness did not testify on any offer of compromise made by Galvez.
We have held that when the evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is amorphous, the same shall
not benefit the prosecution in its case against the accused.69

The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of compromise will not amount to an
admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,70 the Court pronounced that:

…In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making
it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the
matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered
into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim
by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.71(Emphasis
supplied).

As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed made
such an offer under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that it was
given for some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt or an attempt
to avoid its legal consequences.

In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged implied admission of guilt.
In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the accused, explained that:

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the
presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In
such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or social
basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more important
and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating his guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Until the defendant’s guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.72

xxx

The presumption of innocence, x x x is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form
but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the
defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to
balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted
against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the
authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot
be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence
must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do
so.73

Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in favor of Galvez, there could not be a moral certainty as
to the guilt of Galvez. The prosecution has not proven the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.

It may be pointed out that the following circumstances support the conviction of Galvez as charged:
 (a) the negative findings of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not prove that Galvez did not fire a
gun;

(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the crime with
a lawful purpose, yet he put up alibi which is inherently weak;

(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he
was at their house on the night in question; and

(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer.

These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the discharge of its duty to prove the guilt of Galvez
beyond reasonable doubt.

It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun, as
held by this Court in People v. Pagal74 and People v. Teehankee75 which were cited by the CA in its
Decision, since it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as
when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.76 Such principle, however, has no
bearing in the present case. In the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court concluded that a negative
finding does not prove that the accused therein had not fired a gun because the accused were positively
identified by witnesses as having shot their victims, unlike in the case at hand where Galvez is not
positively identified by direct or circumstantial evidence that he shot Enojarda. If the principle should be
given any weight at all, it should be in favor of Galvez, that is, considering that he is not positively
identified, then, the negative results of the paraffin test bolster his claim that he did not shoot Enojarda,
and not the other way around.

The argument that the negative result of the ballistic examination does not prove that Galvez did not fire a
gun during the incident as it was possible that he used another gun, should also be struck down. It is the
prosecution which has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other than the one issued to him
and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the one that killed the victim. It is not for Galvez to prove
the opposite of the possibility adverted to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his innocence.

Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not conclusively prove
that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same negative results cannot be used as circumstantial evidence
against Galvez to prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the basic precepts of
criminal law which presumes the innocence of the accused. Every circumstance favoring an accused’s
innocence must be duly taken into account, the proof against him must survive the test of reason, and the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.77

That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the crime with a
lawful purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present his wife
and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in question,
pertain to the weakness of Galvez’s alibi which may cast doubt on his innocence. However, these
circumstances do not prove beyond reasonable doubt Galvez’s guilt. Although an accused must
satisfactorily prove his alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the prosecution to prove the
accused’s guilt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of
innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the presumption remains.78 Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and
not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions.79

That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer is a prerogative
given to the accused and should not be given evidentiary value to establish his guilt. In People v.
Saavedra,80 the Court held that an accused has the right to remain silent and his silence should not be
construed as an admission of guilt.

Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability.81 Conviction must be based on the
strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation is upon the
shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not the accused to prove his
innocence.82 The prosecution’s job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.83 Thus,
when the evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the
accused absolved and released at once.84

Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to
send people to jail but to render justice.85 Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration
is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.86
It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the Prosecution, justice could not be rendered in this
case for the untimely death of Enojarda. Justice, however, would also not be served with the conviction of
the herein accused. It is well to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:

In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be
dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of
this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by
the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color,
creed, gender or political persuasion – whether privileged or less privileged – to be invoked
without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not
called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved.87 (Emphasis supplied)

As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its burden of proving Galvez’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court has no choice but to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case No.
1816 dated February 2, 1995 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated
March 30, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant Cesar Galvez is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless he is being
lawfully held for another crime and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168071             December 18, 2006

LUCIANO TAN, petitioner, 
vs.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated 21 October 2002 and the
Resolution2 dated 12 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, which set aside the 18
June 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 01-99797.
The RTC reversed the 6 October 2000 Decision 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch
13 in Civil Case No. 166584, and dismissed the Complaint filed by respondent Rodil Enterprises against
petitioner Luciano Tan for utter lack of merit.

This case has its origin from the Complaint5 for Unlawful Detainer filed on 13 March 2000 by Rodil
Enterprises against Luciano Tan with the MeTC of Manila, Branch 13, docketed as Civil Case No. 166584.

The factual antecedents to the filing of the Complaint show that Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject
premises, the Ides O’Racca Building since 1959. The Ides O’Racca Building, located at the corner of M. de
Santos and Folgueras Streets in Binondo, Manila, is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On 18 May
1992, Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), entered into a Renewal of a Contract of Lease over the Ides O’Racca Building. A subsequent
Supplementary Contract dated 25 May 1992 was similarly entered into, thus, extending the lease
agreement until 1 September 1997.

The validity of the 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992 contracts was placed in question in several actions
involving Rodil Enterprises, the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc., and other tenants. This
Court upheld the validity of the aforesaid contracts in a Decision rendered on 29 November 2001, in the
consolidated cases of Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto,
Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides O’Racca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).6

Prior thereto, the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968 entitled, Spouses Saturnino B. Alvarez and
Epifania Binay Alvarez v. Rodil Enterprises Company, Inc. rendered a Decision7 dated 8 February 1994,
declaring the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplementary Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and 25
May 1992, respectively, of no force and effect.

It appears that Rodil Enterprises appealed the 8 February 1994 Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 which was dismissed by the appellate court for non-compliance with procedural
requirements. The dismissal was appealed by Rodil Enterprises to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 119711 which was also dismissed. Subsequently, the Office of the President issued an Order of
Execution of its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968. Thereafter, Rodil Enterprises filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the Order of Execution, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No 79157. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision therein dated 28 March 2005 which annulled the
Order of Execution, and enjoined the Office of the President from enforcing its 8 February 1994 Decision in
OP Case No. 4968. Likewise, the Court of Appeals ordered the Office of the President to abide by the 29
November 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No.
135537, upholding the validity of the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplemental Contract, dated
18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992, respectively. Finally, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79157 was brought on certiorari by the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. to the
Supreme Court, and docketed as G.R. No. 169892. On 25 January 2006, the Court, in G.R. No. 169892,
issued a Resolution denying the Petition. On 20 March 2006, a Resolution was rendered in the same case
denying with finality the amended Motion for Reconsideration.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the preceding cases, on 18 October 1999, a subsequent Contract of
Lease was drawn between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, the same to be effective retroactively from
1 September 1997 to 21 August 2012 at a monthly rental of P65,206.67, subject to adjustment upon the
approval of a new appraisal covering the Ides O’Racca Building. Rodil Enterprises subleased various units
of the property to members of the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. A space thereof, known
as Botica Divisoria was subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.

In Rodil Enterprises’ Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, the former alleged that
Luciano Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease, the amount of P13,750.00 as monthly
rentals, representing the reasonable use and occupancy of the said premises. However, Luciano Tan
unjustifiably and unreasonably refused to pay the rentals from September 1997 up to the time of the filing
of the Complaint, and despite repeated oral and written demands, refused to vacate the premises and to
pay the rents due. Rodil Enterprises prayed that Luciano Tan and those claiming rights under him be
ordered to vacate the leased premises. A payment of rentals in arrears, amounting to P385,000.00 was
similarly sought, including attorney’s fees and litigation costs, as well as, subsequent monthly rentals in
the amount of P13,750.00 until Luciano Tan vacates Botica Divisoria.

In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides
O’Racca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has the right to lease the said premises pending
the disposition and sale of the building. He based his claim on the fact that on 8 February 1994, the Office
of the President in OP Case No. 4968, had declared the Renewal of Contract of Lease dated 18 May 1992
and the Supplemental Contract dated 25 May 1992 between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic to be
without force and effect. Accordingly, the DENR was directed to award the lease contract in favor of the
Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. of which Luciano Tan is a member. He, thus, prayed for
the dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had collected
from 1987 to 1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.

On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by
Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:

On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to
put an end to this civil case for ejectment between them:

1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the
present, which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June
30, 2000; and

2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of
each month after June 30, 2000.8

On 14 August 2000, Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals,9 averring therein
that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly
rentals as they fall due; that the rentals in arrears from September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and
in line with his good faith in dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit the aforesaid amount,
and the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be allowed to deposit the
Manager’s Check for the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer of Manila. However,
on 15 August 2000, the MeTC denied the Motion on the rationalization that Luciano Tan’s prayer to deposit
the specified sum with the City Treasurer of Manila contravenes Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Subsequently, the issues for the resolution of the MeTC were synthesized by the court in its Order, dated
25 July 2000, to wit:

[T]he issue insofar as [Rodil Enterprises], revolved on:

"Whether [Rodil Enterprises] is legally entitled to collect from [Luciano Tan] the amount of
rentals and interest thereon as prayed for in the complaint and to ask for the ejectment of
the defendant from the leased premises."

On the other hand, [Luciano Tan]’s counsel formulated the issues of the case in the
following manner[,] to wit:

1) Whether or not under the circumstances[,][Luciano Tan] could be ejected from the
premises in question;

2) Whether or not under the circumstances[,] [Rodil Enterprises] should be made to return
the amounts collected from [Luciano Tan] from 1987 to 1997 amounting to P988,650.00.11

On 6 October 2000, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The court said that
Luciano Tan did not contest the sublease on a monthly basis, and in fact admitted in judicio, viz:

1.) That [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September 1997 up to the
present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000, on or before June
30, 2000; and

2) [[Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00, on or before the 5th day of
each month after June 30, 2000.

(Order dated June 27, 2000)12

According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of compromise is
not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot
overlook the frank representations by Luciano Tan’s counsel of the former’s liability in the form of rentals,
coupled with a proposal to liquidate.13 The foregoing gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to
an admission of a fact, like the existence of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus,
admissible.14 The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the
periodic consideration for the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from
disavowing the fact of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears. 15 The MeTC,
explained further:

Prescinding from the foregoing discourse, it ineluctably follows that [Luciano Tan]’s indifference to
heed the two demand letters, the cognition of which were recognized (paragraphs VII and IX,
Complaint; paragraph 2, Answer), rendered him a deforciant (1 Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 6th Revised Edition, 1997, page 770, citing Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44), and was
thus vulnerable to the special civil action under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, especially so when non-payment of rentals is an accepted prelude to, and a secondary
matrix for, a tenant’s eviction (Article 1673 (2), New Civil Code).

From a different plane, [Luciano Tan]’s quest at this juncture for recovery of the rentals he paid to
the plaintiff from 1987 to 1997 will not merit the desired result since, in a manner of speaking, it
will place the cart ahead of the horse, when juxtaposed with another pending controversy between
the parties before the Supreme Court (Annex "1," Position Paper for the Defendant; Annex "B,"
Answer to Counterclaim).

The decretal portion of the Decision, states, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Rodil
Enterprises], ordering:

1. Defendant Luciano Tan, and all persons claiming rights under him, to vacate the subject realty,
and to peacefully deliver possession to the plaintiff’s representative;

2. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P440,000.00) as recognized unpaid rentals from September, 1997 up to June 30, 2000;

3. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (P13,750.00) as agreed rental per month, starting July, 2000, and every month thereafter,
until possession is delivered to the plaintiff’s representative;

4. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as reasonable
attorney’s fees; and

5. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the cost of suit.

For want of merit, defendant’s counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.16

Aggrieved thereby, Luciano Tan appealed the Decision to the RTC. Meanwhile, Rodil Enterprises filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,17 which was subsequently denied by the MeTC in the Order18 of
15 December 2000.

On 18 June 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment appealed from and dismissing the
Complaint. It found that the MeTC erred in holding that the offer to compromise by Luciano Tan’s counsel
was akin to an admission of fact, the same being contrary to Section 27,19 Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. As reasoned by the RTC:

During the pre-trial conference held in the lower court, proposals and counter-proposals emanated
from the parties’ counsels, which was normally inspired by the desire to "buy peace", nay, to put
an end to the troubles of litigation, and to promote settlement of disputes as a matter of public
policy. The act of defendant/appellant’s (sic) in the midst of pre-trial is not an admission of any
liability and therefore, should not be considered admissible evidence against him.20

Proceeding to the issue of the right of Rodil Enterprises to collect rentals and eject Luciano Tan based on
the contracts, dated 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992, the RTC ruled that the controversy is still pending
before the Supreme Court. It, thus, held that the prayer for recovery of rentals from 1987 to 1997 is
premature.

The RTC, disposed, as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new
judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 166584 for utter lack of
merit.21
Subsequently, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review with the appellate court, which, in a Decision
dated 21 October 2002 set aside the judgment of the RTC, and affirmed and reinstated the 6 October
2000 Decision of the MeTC.

According to the appellate court, there is, between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic of the Philippines, a
valid and subsisting Contract of Lease executed on 18 October 1999, the same for a period of fifteen (15)
years.22 The period of the lease, under the 18 October 1999 contract is from 1 September 1997 to 31
August 2012. The Court of Appeals gave credence to the fact that the existence of the aforesaid contract
was not denied nor controverted by Luciano Tan. What Luciano Tan, instead, impugned was the validity of
the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, which was upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases
of Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear
and Chua Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides O’Racca Building Tenants
Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).23

Ruling on the more important question of whether Luciano Tan made a judicial admission anent his liability
as a sublessee of Rodil Enterprises, the Court of Appeals held that the former made an implied admission
of the existence of a contract of sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises on the subject premises; and
that he had reneged in the payment of rentals since 1 September 1997. Moreover, it deemed Luciano
Tan’s Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals as another admission in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The
appellate court elucidated, thus:

The evidence on record indubitably shows that respondent [Luciano Tan] is a sublessee of
petitioner [Rodil Enterprises] who failed to pay rentals from 01 September 1997 and even until the
case was filed before the [M]etropolitan [T]rial [C]ourt, when respondent [Luciano Tan] "agreed in
principle in open court" to the following terms:

1) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from
September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as
of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and

2) defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or
before the 5thday of each month after June 30, 2000.

at the hearing on 27 June 2000 though no settlement was eventually reached between the parties,
respondent [Luciano Tan] in effect made an implied judicial admission that there was a subsisting
contract of sublease between him and petitioner, and that he was remiss in the payment of rentals
from 01 September 1997 up to that day (Rollo, Annex "9" of petition). Respondent [Luciano Tan]’s
admission was further bolstered by the fact that he filed a "Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit
Rentals" (Rollo, p. 3 of Annex "15" of petition). By such acts, respondent [Luciano Tan] accepted
the truth of petitioner [Rodil Enterprises’] allegation of the existence of a contract of sublease
between them and of his non-payment of the rentals from 01 September 1997. A judicial
admission is an admission made in the course of the proceedings in the same case, verbal or
written, by a party accepting for the purposes of the suit the truth of some alleged fact, which said
party cannot thereafter disprove (Remedial Law by Herrera, Oscar M. citing Section 4, Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence and Evidence by Salonga).24

The decretal portion of the 21 October 2002 Court of Appeals’ Decision, states, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the petition for review is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The
Decision dated 18 June 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26 is hereby SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated 06 October 2000 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13 is
AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.25

The appellate court denied Luciano Tan’s Motion for Reconsideration thereon, in a Resolution, 26 dated 12
May 2005.

Thus, petitioner comes before us, raising the following grounds, to wit:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ISSUED
ITS RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION BY
RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE MARCH 28, 2005 DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.

II

RESPONDENT RODIL ENTERPRISES IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING WHEN IT FILED THE

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP. NO. 79517
SEEKING TO NULLIFY THE ORDER OF EXECUTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF ITS 8
 FEBRUARY 1994 DECISION IN OP CASE NO. 4968, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS PREVIOUS
PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE SAME DECISION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1994 HAD BEEN DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 17, 1994 DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
PROCEDURAL RULES.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER IS A SUBLESSEE OF RESPONDENT AND THAT PETITIONER WAS REMISS IN THE
PAYMENT OF HIS RENTALS OVER THE PREMISES.27

The Petition is without merit.

We shall address the first ground raised by petitioner with regard to the alleged reliance of the Court of
Appeals on the Decision of the Tenth Division of the same court, dated 28 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79157, entitled, Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. The Office of the President and Ides O’Racca Building Tenants
Association, Inc.28

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do not find that the Court of Appeals was in error when it took
notice of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 in resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. As
respondent Rodil Enterprises asseverated, for the appellate court to ignore a decision rendered by a
division thereof would be to turn a blind eye on a valid judgment rendered by the same appellate body.
Neither can we give merit to petitioner’s submission that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on its
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 is premature and misplaced. More significantly, the contention of the
petitioner that the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has not attained finality has become mute when
viewed within recent factual developments. The ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has long reached finality.
This Court in a Resolution29 dated 25 January 2006 denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the
Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. thereon. On 20 March 2006, this Court denied with finality
the Motion for Reconsideration of the 25 January 2006 Resolution for lack of compelling reason or
substantial argument.30

Moreover, on 12 April 2004, the appellate court issued a Resolution, 31 granting petitioner a hearing on its
Motion for Reconsideration as the grounds cited therein needed further clarification. This belies petitioner’s
claim that the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration was based solely on the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517.

We come to the second ground raised by the petitioner. Petitioner argues that Rodil Enterprises is guilty of
forum shopping when it filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 79157,32after it filed an Appeal with the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 34586.33 Forum shopping is
the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another
and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari.34

The question of forum shopping is not even material to the instant petition.

It must be emphasized that neither CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 nor CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 is before this Court
for consideration. These cases are separate and distinct from CA-G.R. SP No. 67201 now before us.

What are assailed in the instant Petition are the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21 October 2002
and the Resolution, dated 12 May 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 67201, which reversed the ruling of the RTC,
and affirmed the MeTC, ordering Luciano Tan to vacate the premises and peacefully deliver possession to
Rodil Enterprises. The matter in controversy is the refusal of Luciano Tan to pay the monthly rentals over
Botica Divisoria under the contract of sublease between the parties.

On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify
the Order of Execution of the Office of the President of its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968
finding the Renewal of Contract of Lease, and the Supplemental Contract of no force and effect. CA-G.R.
SP No. 34586 was an appeal on the Decision in O.P. Case No. 4968, which was the basis of the Order of
Execution. If there has indeed been forum shopping when CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 was instituted during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 34586, such question should have been raised by petitioner, at first instance,
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517. It should be noted that the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79517 was already given due course by the Court of Appeals and its ruling therein has long attained
finality when, on appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 169892, we denied the said appeal with
finality in our Resolutions dated 25 January 2000 and dated 20 March 2006. Whatever matters concerning
the said case is now beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to resolve.

We proceed to the final ground raised by the petitioner for the allowance of the instant Petition. Petitioner
assails the factual findings of the Court of Appeals when it ruled that there was a judicial admission as to
petitioner’s liability under a contract of sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises.
To resolve this issue, a reading of the significant orders of the MeTC and the pleadings filed by petitioner
is warranted.

The MeTC issued an Order, dated 27 June 2000 of the following import, to wit:

On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to
put an end to this civil case for ejectment between them:

1.) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from
September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as
of June, 2000 on or before June 30, 2000; and

2.) the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or
before the 5th day of each month after June 30, 2000.35

On 14 August 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals with the MeTC, praying
that he be allowed to deposit the rentals due as of August 2000, in the amount of P467,500.00, and the
subsequent monthly rentals as it falls due.

Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,36 which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not
a tacit admission of liability.

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.

The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial
Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,37 to wit:

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of

the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies
the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding
litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the
offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim
amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.]); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.]
citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L. ed., 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an
effective admission of a borrower’s loan balance (L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]. x x x.38

Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co.39 the Court applied the exception to the
general rule. In Varadero¸ there was neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the
course of the abortive negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff.
Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the
amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.

In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioner’s admission as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the
existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the former’s liability in the
form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow
Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioner’s
liability on the subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the existence of
the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The contracts that were
assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld
by this Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537.

Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but also, as to
the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was
clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of P440,000.00, representing petitioner’s
unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals
computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioner’s
judicial admission in open court, as found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds
particular significance when viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals,
wherein petitioner stated that the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the
present amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to
reject the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not. 40 A judicial
admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for
purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove.41
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 21 October 2002 and the Resolution dated 12
May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, affirming and reinstating the 6 October 2000 Decision of the MeTC in
Civil Case No. 166584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146161             July 17, 2006

PEPITO CAPILA Y YRUMA, petitioner, 

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 dated November 10, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18903, entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Pepito Capila y
Yruma."

On August 24, 1993, an Information for robbery was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 148,
Makati City, against Pepito Capila y Yruma, herein petitioner, his brother Bonifacio Capila y Yruma,
Deogenio Caparoso y Porfero, and Dimas dela Cruz y Lorena.

The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-7117, is quoted as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of August 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with alias Jose and alias Gil, whose true identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to P1.3 million and
three (3) caliber paltik firearms in the total amount of P18,000.00, belonging to Pilipinas Bank
represented by Juan Iglesia y Orgil and Lanting Security Agency represented by Edgar Lucero y
Iribayen, respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants in the aforementioned
amount of P1.3 million and P18,000.00, respectively.

Upon being arraigned, all the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced
thereafter.

The evidence for the prosecution, as culled from the testimonies of Edgardo Irigayen, Ariel Arellano, SPO2
Dioscorro Asinas, Jr., and SPO4 Romualdo Maximo, is summarized as follows:2

Petitioner Pepito Capila was a security guard of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency assigned in
the Meralco Collection Office on J.P. Rizal Street, Makati City.

On May 9, 1992, Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, both employees of the Pilipinas Bank, Libertad Branch in
Pasay City, went to the Meralco Collection Office to receive and deposit cash collections from Meralco's 27
collectors. The total collection for that day amounted to P1,292,991.12. They then placed the money
inside a duffle bag table and had it padlocked. Then they waited for the Pilipinas Bank's armored car to
arrive. The security guard posted at the Meralco Collection Office at the time was Dimas dela Cruz, also
from the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency.

Before the armored car could arrive, two armed men suddenly entered the Meralco Collection Office. They
hit Dimas on the nape with a handgun. Then they ordered Ariel and Lani to lie on the floor face down and
immediately took the duffle bag containing Meralco's cash collections. They also seized three .38 caliber
revolvers, valued at P6,000.00 each, owned by the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency, including the
service handgun issued to Dimas.

After the malefactors fled, Dimas told Ariel that petitioner was one of those who robbed the office. Then
Dimas called the Makati Police Sub-Station 9, the Meralco Security Division, and the Lanting Security and
Watchman Agency to report the incident. The Makati Police dispatched SPO4 Romualdo Maximo to
investigate the robbery, while the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency instructed its intelligence
officer, Edgardo Irigayen, to talk to the guard on duty.

SPO4 Maximo, accompanied by a police photographer, a fingerprint technician, and another policeman,
arrived within ten minutes at the Meralco Collection Office. He questioned Ariel and Lani, but they could
not identify the robbers as they were lying face down on the floor. Upon inquiry by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas
told him that one of the robbers is petitioner, also a security guard of the Lanting Security and Watchman
Agency assigned in the Meralco Collection Office. Thereafter, SPO4 Maximo invited Dimas, Lani and Ariel
to the police station for the purpose of taking their sworn statements.

Irigayen, the intelligence officer of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency, also questioned Dimas.
The latter reported that Pepito Capila is one of the robbers.
After the incident, petitioner fled to his hometown in Palapag, Northern Samar. The Lanting Security and
Watchman Agency then requested SPO4 Maximo and his team to go to Northern Samar to apprehend
Capila.

In Northern Samar, the police operatives, with the assistance of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit, arrested petitioner, his brother Bonifacio Capila, and Deogenio Caparoso. The police found P5,000.00
in possession of petitioner allegedly part of the loot. All the suspects were arrested without warrants.

SPO4 Maximo interrogated petitioner who admitted that he participated in the commission of the crime;
that his share of the loot is P45,000.00; and that Dimas is the mastermind.

After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused, through counsel, filed a Demurrer to Evidence
but it was denied by the trial court.

When the case was called for the continuation of the hearing on November 15, 1994, the accused waived
their right to present their evidence, opting to submit their respective memoranda instead.

On January 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision acquitting all the accused, except petitioner,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

1. And finding that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused Bonifacio Capila, Deogenes
Caparoso, and Dimas dela Cruz beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby acquitted.

2. And finding Pepito Capila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery defined under
Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, with the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, use of a firearm, and betrayal of trust, he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prision term of from EIGHT (8) years as minimum to TEN
(10) years as maximum.

Pepito Capila is also ordered to pay:

1. Lanting Security Agency the sum of P18,000 for the value of the three firearms not
recovered and belonging to said agency;

2. The sum of P1,292,991.12 to Pilipinas Bank, the amount taken and not recovered.

With costs against accused Pepito Capila.

In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
the statement of Dimas that he (petitioner) is one of the robbers. He was denied due process because he
was not able to cross-examine Dimas as the latter did not testify.

On November 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the assailed judgment of
the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated January 3, 1995) of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 148) in Makati, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 93-7217 is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition for Review on Certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of herein
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of SPO4
Maximo that immediately after the incident, Dimas reported to him that one of the robbers is petitioner.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the court a quo's judgment convicting petitioner, ruled that Dimas'
statement is part of the res gestae.

In the appellee's brief, the Solicitor General reiterated the appellate court's ruling.

Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means "things done." As an exception to the hearsay rule, it
refers to those exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of
the occasion, and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false
statement.3 The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been shown that under certain external
circumstances of physical or mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator
may produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by
the external shock. As the statements or utterances are made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, such statements or utterances may be taken
as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts he just observed. The spontaneity of the
declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the
declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself.4

The rule on res gestae is provided under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.

For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be met: (1) that the
principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or
immediately or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.5

The Court of Appeals found that all the above requisites are present, thus:

First. The principal act is a startling occurrence which is the robbery in question.

Second. Dimas Dela Cruz informed the investigating officers that it was appellant who robbed the
Meralco office immediately after the incident occurred and before he had the time to contrive a
story.

The robbery happened at around eight o'clock in the evening of August 9, 1993 (p. 4, TSN,
February 24, 1994). Immediately after the incident, dela Cruz called up the police station (p. 17,
TSN, January 31, 1994). In ten minutes, SPO4 Maximo and his companion were in the Meralco
office where they immediately conducted an investigation (pp. 3-9, TSN, February 24, 1994).
During this investigation, DELA Cruz pointed to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

Further, immediately after the robbers fled, dela Cruz informed Ariel Arellano (the bank
representative detailed at the Meralco office) that appellant was one of those who robbed the office
(pp. 15-17, TSN, January 31, 1994).

In other words, statement of dela Cruz was spontaneous as correctly observed by the trial court.

Third. The statement of dela Cruz refers to the robbery or incident subject matter of this case.

We are in accord with the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that all the requisites of the rule on Res
gestae are present. The principal act, which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling occurrence, is the
robbery of which petitioner is being charged. Immediately after the robbery, Dimas dela Cruz, the security
guard then on duty, informed Ariel that one of the perpetrators is herein petitioner. Dimas likewise
reported at once the incident to the police and to the security agency. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo,
Dimas, who was still shocked, named petitioner herein as one of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and
SPO4 Maximo were made before he had the time and opportunity to concoct and contrive a false story.
We note that Dimas personally knows petitioner considering that both worked in the same security agency
and assigned in the same office.

Petitioner contends that since Dimas dela Cruz did not take the witness stand, he (petitioner) was
deprived of his right to cross-examine him. Thus, the Court of Appeals should not have considered Dimas'
statement as part of the Res gestae. Our ruling in Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals 6 is
relevant.

In this case, it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, a strong
typhoon (Gening) occurred in Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding. While one Isabel
Lao Juan was wading in waist-deep flood along Guerrero Street, Laoag City, suddenly she screamed, "Ay"
and quickly sank into the water. Her two companions, Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo, shouted for help.
Ernesto dela Cruz arrived and tried to approach Isabel who was electrocuted. But at four meters away
from her, Ernesto turned back shouting, "the water is grounded." This Court ruled that the Court of
Appeals properly applied the principle of Res gestae. The testimonies of Aida and Linda that Ernesto dela
Cruz tried to approach the victim, but he turned back and shouted, "the water is grounded," are not
hearsay although he (Ernesto) was not presented as a witness. His declaration is part of the Res gestae.
Applying the above ruling on the instant case, we cannot consider the testimony of SPO4 Maximo as
hearsay since the statement of Dimas that petitioner is one of the robbers is part of the Res gestae.

Moreover, despite the damaging testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, petitioner did not testify
to rebut them. Such posture is admission in silence.

Section 32, Rule 130 of the New Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 32. Admission by silence. – An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing
or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally
to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be
given in evidence against him.

Another factor that militates against petitioner's innocence is his flight to Samar after the commission of
the crime. Obviously, such flight is an indication of guilt.

Verily, we hold that the prosecution, by its evidence, has established the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
18903 finding petitioner PEPITO CAPILA y YRUMA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery is AFFIRMED. With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION  G.R. No. 177861

AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,

 
EMMA K. LEE, 
Petitioner,

- versus – 

COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG,

JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY

LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE,

and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by  Promulgated:

RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,

Respondents.  July 13, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x 

                        DECISION
 

ABAD, J.: 

This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parents right not to
testify in a case against his children. 

The Facts and the Case 

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants
from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin
K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and
Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into
another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee
(collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted
the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After
conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:

 
 [I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK
CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further
evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing
the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making
his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status
of his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this
complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his second family
kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK
CHENG.[1] 

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lees other children,
Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother,
when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born
of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the
hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when
she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of
them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City [2] in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the
deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name
Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC
granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees
stepmother.[3] On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to
badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lees mother.

Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil
action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA
rendered a decision,[4] setting aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a
subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tius
advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena
for that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that
petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

Since the CA denied Emma Lees motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007, [5] she
filed the present petition with this Court.

The Question Presented 

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court
may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the
correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter.

 
 The Ruling of the Court 

Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued
against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter
would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory that she had illicit
relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children. 

But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressiveare proper for
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness,
a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides: 

SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces

tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time
specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the
books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the
subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals [6] that the Lee-
Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees
other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to
establish the fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus: 

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined

under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the
correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish
that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng
to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower
courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn
as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
[7]
 (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously, they would want
Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh
had died and so could not give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children
have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive
them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify:
a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional
stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were
compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this
claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh
children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to
update itself and determine if Tius current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of
coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her. 
 Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse
counsel. The trial courts duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and
this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.[8]

2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner
Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads: 

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to

testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only
in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma
Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by
her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the
head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person
with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. WHEREFORE, the
Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP 92555. SO ORDERED.