METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE:

FROM THE "TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF

THE ANCIENTS" TO KANT'S NOTION OF
TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Ludger Honnefelder *
(Universitat Bonn, Germany)

The historical study of metaphysics in the early modern period - a time in

which so many philosophers self-consciously rejected the kind of
philosophy practiced up to their time and emphatically presented
themselves as offering a new approach - is beset by several difficulties.
The fact that these philosophers described themselves as developing a new
philosophical approach seems to require us only to examine the immediate
historical background that they claim to be rejecting; looking for
continuities with earlier thought seems to be superfluous and perhaps even
contradictory. When, in addition, advocates of the new philosophical
approach are used by modern historians to demarcate periods in the history
of philosophy - as is the case with Descartes and Kant - a division of
research and of researchers arises that hinders the development of
competence to deal with issues that overlap the different historical periods.
Furthermore, it is no easy matter to trace the processes by which earlier
thought might have been transmitted to the early modern period, and the
earlier thought itself is complex and in need of interpretation. Take as an
example of the difficulties involved in the historical study of early modern
metaphysics, Kant's reference to the "transcendental philosophy of the
ancients". What "ancients" does he have in mind? And did he encounter
these ancients with his teachers as intermediaries or by going to the sources
directly? When Kant links his own new approach to the "transcendental
philosophy of the ancients", what does he understand by 'transcendental
philosophy'? If we trace this concept back to the ideas developed during
the "second beginning of metaphysics"! associated with the reception of

• This paper was translated by Dr 10m MUller (University of Bonn) with the assistance
of Russell L. Friedman.
I Cf. Honnefelder 1987.

53
R.L. Friedman and L.O. Nielsen (eds.), The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal
Theory, 1400-1700, 53-74.
© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
54 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

Aristotle in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, any answer to these

questions will depend upon how accurately we understand the medieval
innovations and their later influence. This last issue has become
increasingly urgent as we have come to recognize ever more clearly that we
must distinguish between the philosophical preferences exhibited by Neo-
Scholasticism in its (meritorious) medieval research, on the one hand, and
the historical reality of medieval philosophy, on the other.2
Considering these difficulties it is not surprising that the issue of the
medieval sources of Kantian transcendental philosophy has been a
relatively late addition to the research that has resulted from the rediscovery
of Kant, and it is only recently that the outlines of a satisfactory answer
have begun to appear on the basis of corresponding research into the
history of medieval philosophy - the same can be said of Descartes. 3 In the
following, we will investigate metaphysics' status as a scientific discipline,
through an examination of the medieval sources of the approach that most
profoundly transformed modem metaphysics, i.e. Kantian transcendental
philosophy. Starting with Kant's direct sources we will trace the discussion
back to the ideas of John Duns Scotus (§ 1) and of Francisco Suarez (§ 2),
in order to demonstrate with regard to its most important features just how
Kant received (§ 3) and transformed (§ 4) these ideas. 4

1. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF KANT'S CONCEPT

OF METAPHYSICS AS "TRANSCENDENTAL
PHILOSOPHY": METAPHYSICS AS SCIENTIA
TRANSCENDENS IN THE DOCTRINE OF JOHN DUNS
SCOTUS
According to N. Hinske,5 Kant's use of the terms 'transcendental' and
'transcendental philosophy' can be traced back to at least three sources, and
these sources owe nothing to the medieval doctrine of the transcendental,
reflecting as they do a particular break with the medieval tradition. 6 These
three sources are: (a) the conception of transcendental philosophy to be
found in seventeenth century metaphysics; (b) the conception of
transcendental on which Christian Wolff bases his notion of a cosmologia
transcendentalis and to which Kant refers in his precritical writings; and

2 Cf. Honnefelder 1990. ix-xii.

3 Cf. ibid.
• In the following, §§ 1,3, and 4 relate to my paper: Honnefelder 1995.
5 Cf. Hinske 196811970; idem 1970, 40-77.

6 Cf. Hinske 1970, 52, 76. Cf. Hinske 1998.

 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 55

finally (c) the conception of transcendental which Kant adopts from

Baumgarten's compendium of metaphysics.
There can be no doubt that Kant's use of the term 'transcendental' was
influenced by several of the different conceptions that were available to
him. Nevertheless - and this is what must be proved in the following -
these meanings share a common point of origin in the Scotistic conception
of transcendental philosophy. That Kant's use of the term 'transcendental'
appears to us to be a break with medieval tradition is merely a result of the
fact that Kant does not follow the particular medieval approach that
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Neo-scholasticism considered to be
significant, i.e. the Thomistic; instead Kant used the medieval approach that
influenced early modem metaphysics most profoundly, i.e. that of Duns
Scotus. Only when the Scotistic origins of the early modem conception of
transcendental philosophy are recognized will we truly be able to
appreciate the innovations that Kant made to that conception.

1.1 Metaphysica as philosophia transcendentalis in German

Aristotelianism and the scientia transcendens of Scotus
Examining Kant's early vocabulary, it is remarkable that he identifies
metaphysica and philosophia transcendentalis. This identification is, as N.
Hinske has rightly pointed out,? typical of the German Aristotelianism, or
Schulmetaphysik, of the seventeenth century, and reveals its continuing
influence into the eighteenth century. In fact, one can already find in F.
Schmidt's study on the origins of Kant's use of 'transcendens' the accurate
remark that J.H. Alsted "copiosissime de transcendentibus agit". 8 In his
Cursus philosophici encyclopaedia of 1620,9 Alsted does indeed devote -
as later C. Scheibler would - the main part of his treatment of metaphysics
to the transcendentium theoria. Moreover, J. Scharf not only calls his
metaphysics, published in 1624, Theoria transcendentalis Primae
Philosophiae, quam vocant Metaphysicam,lO but also notes with regard to
his historical sources that "the authors" distinguish two types of
transcensus: one according to the "pre-eminence of being" (en tis
nobilitate), the other according to the "community of predication"
(praedicationis communitate). II According to Scharf, in view of how

7 Cf. n. 5 above.
8 Schmidt 1873, 12; cf. Hinske 1968,91.
9 Cf. Alsted 1620, 270 and passim; cf. Hinske 1968, 92.

10 Scharf 1624.

II Cf. Scharf 1624,261: "Notant vero autores, et recte, quod Transscensus iste contingat

duplici modo, vel Entis nobilitate, vel praedicationis communi tate. IIIo modo nimirum, ob
eminentiam et sublimitatem Entitatis, Deus dicitur Transscendens, et res divinae ...
56 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

widely they are predicated, the "most general concepts" (which are
predicated of all things) are the "transcending determinations"
(transcendentia). As late as 1714, F.A. Aepinus notes that "it is customary
to designate metaphysics as scientia transcendentalis",12 and in 1775 J.N.
Tetens mentions the "general transcendent philosophy which is called
fundamental science, ontology" and describes it in the following way: "It
has nothing to do with really existing objects, but concerns itself only with
what is possible or necessary in all kinds of things in general.,,13
Precisely this understanding of metaphysics is developed for the first
time at the turn of the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries by John Duns
Scotus, who was himself building upon Avicenna. It is transmitted to the
later period by the influential school that based itself on Scotus' works and
ideas. According to Scotus, the essence of the "first philosophy" that
Aristotle developed is given in Metaph. IV, 1-2. Here Aristotle explains
that the discipline that will later be called 'metaphysics' is concerned with
the concept of "being as such" (ens inquantum ens).14 The metaphysics that
is possible for us in this life must have an object (subiectum), and what that
object can be, depends upon how we define the object (obiectum) of our
intellect. This is - as Scotus attempts to demonstrate in a detailed critique
of reason 15 - neither the pre-eminent first being in the form of God or of
substance, nor is it the entire range of "being as such" signified by the
concept of being; rather it is the abstract concept "being" (ens) that we can
obtain, beginning with our sense experience, through a "resolution"
(resolutio) of our distinct concepts into their more basic, component
concepts. Metaphysics is not the scientia propter quid that it can be "in
itself', i.e. for an unlimited intellect like that of God, who is able to derive
all determinations of being from his comprehensive concept of being;
rather metaphysics is the scientia quia, whose purpose is to "resolve" or
break down our categorial concepts, and in this way discover the concepts
contained there which "transcend" all categories (transcendentia), like the
concepts of being and its determinations, the attribution of which is
transcategorial.
For Scotus, then, we are not to understand the transcensus of the first
philosophy as a transcending towards some pre-eminent "first", i.e. (as we

Praedicationis latitudine transscendentia sunt universalissimi conceptus, qui de omnibus

rebus praedicantur." Cf. Hinske 1970,43 and Leinsle 1985,369-93.
12 Cf. Aepinus 1714, 5: "Transnaturalia dicuntur, quae transcendunt naturalia, iisque

universaliora sunt. Inde et Metaphysica Scientia transcendentalis nuncupari solet." Cf.

Hinske 1968/1970, 94.
13 Tetens 1775,23. (17f.); cf. Hinske 1970, 3l.

14 Cf. Honnefelder 1989; see also on the object of metaphysics in Aristotle and the

medieval tradition, Biard's contribution to this volume and the literature referred to there.
15 Cf. Ord., Pro!. and Ord. I, d. 3.
 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 57

have seen Scharf will put ie 6 ) towards a "first" according to the "pre-
eminence of being" (entis nobilitate); instead we are to understand it as a
movement towards what is known first of all or - to be more exact - to a
"first" according to "community of predication" (praedicationis
communitate). The "first philosophy" is, according to Scotus - who uses
this term for the first time in the history of philosophy - "transcendental
philosophy" (scientia transcendens).

What is most knowable in the first way is what is most common, such as being qua being
and its properties .... These most common things are considered by metaphysics, according
to the Philosopher in the beginning of Bk. IV of this work: "There is a science which deals
theoretically with being qua being and with what characterizes it as such." The need for this
science can be shown in this way. From the fact that the most common things are
understood first, it follows - as Avicenna proves - that the other more particular things
cannot be known unless these more common things are first known. And the knowledge of
these more common things cannot be treated in some more particular science .... Therefore,
it is necessary that some general science exists that considers these transcendentals as such.
This we call "metaphysics", which is from "meta", which means "transcends", and "ycos",
which means "science". It is, as it were, the transcending science, because it is concerned
with the transcendentals. '7

In this way the "theoretical interpretation as a series", according to

which first philosophy understands the sense of 'being' (on) out of the first
and pre-eminent being, is rejected in favor of the "theoretical interpretation
as a whole", according to which first philosophy can only understand every
being out of the most general predicate 'being'. Aristotle and - following
him - Thomas Aquinas 1s consider the "theoretical interpretation as a
whole", but reject it in favor of the "theoretical interpretation as a series"
because the former leads into the aporia of understanding "being" to be a
genus. In contrast, Scotus thinks that the "theoretical interpretation as a

16 Cf. at n. 10 above.
17 Trans. from John Duns Scotus 1997b, Vo!' 1,7-8. - Cf. Scotus' Met. I, pro!., nn. 17-18
in John Duns Scotus 1997a, 8-9: "Maxime scibilia primo modo sunt communissima, ut ens
inquantum ens, et quaecumque con sequuntur ens inquantum ens .... Haec autem
communissima pertinent ad considerationem Metaphysicae secundum Philosophum in IV
huius in principio: 'Est enim scientia quaedam quae speculatur ens inquantum ens, et quae
huic insunt secundum se' etc. Cuius necessitas ostendi potest sic: ex quo communissima
primo intelliguntur, - ut probatum est per A vicennam -, sequitur quod alia specialiora non
possunt cognosci nisi ilia communi a prius cognoscantur. Et non potest istorum communium
cognitio tradi in aliqua sci entia particulari ... igitur necesse est esse aliquam scientiam
universalem, quae per se consideret ilia transcendentia. Et hanc scientiam vocamus
metaphysicam, quae dicitur a 'meta', quod est 'trans', et 'ycos' 'scientia', quasi
transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus." Regarding the term 'scientia
transcendens', cf. also Met. I, q. I, n. 155 (John Duns Scotus 1997a, 69). Cf. Honnefelder
and Mahle 1998, 1365-71.
18 Cf. Honnefelder 1987.
58 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

series" is - as Kant would call it later - "Uberschwanglich" (unwarranted)19

and does not see any alternative to the elaboration of metaphysics
according to the "theoretical interpretation as a whole". In Scotus' opinion,
first philosophy cannot be the science of the "first", but only of the first
known; it is ontology and not onto-theology.
If cognition of the being that transcends all cognition, i.e. God, is the
ultimate purpose of first philosophy, then first philosophy as a whole
depends upon how one can cognize its object. The resolutio of cognition
finally reaches the concept being, which is the first concept that is distinctly
cognized: that is to say, with regard to its content, it is the absolutely simple
concept, not defined by anything prior. The concept of being, then, is the
background against which all things, no matter how different, are
understood to be "beings".2o Because the only content attributable to being
is the absolutely minimal content that causes a contradiction in case of
simultaneous affirmation and negation, 'being' - transcending all
categories and univocal - can be predicated of everything, since it has a
twofold and complementary primacy of predicability, both quidditative and
qualitative. 'Being', as the fundamental determination that is impossible to
define, is expressed in every quidditative and qualitative predication, and
can only be elucidated in contrast to its opposite: the absolute nothing of
that which is self-contradictory and therefore not compatible with
existence. Moreover, 'being' can only be explicated with reference to its
transcategorial modes. 21 According to Scotus, then, in its most general
sense, 'being' signifies that "to which existence is not repugnant" (cui non
repugnat esse) (Scotus, Ord. IV, d. 8, q. 1, n.2; ed. Vivo VII, 35f.).
Not only the modes res, unum, verum, bonum, etc., which are
convertible with 'being' and transcend all categories, belong to the modes
of 'being' that are to be explicated by metaphysics, but also the
exhaustively disjunctive modes that appear in pairs, like contingent-
necessary, limited-unlimited, etc. "Revealing" or "uncovering" them can
only take place in the following way: in the course of a demonstratio quia,
the more noble of the two terms must be uncovered by starting with the less
noble one; thus the exhaustiveness of the disjunctive pair - transcending all
categories - is demonstrated. 22 Only this type of modal explication of
'being' leads to the complete understanding of the meaning of 'being',
since the concept of being obtained through the formal analysis of
cognition is still "empty". When the proof of God's existence is identical
with the modal explication of 'being', then the explication of the first

19 Kant, Fortschritte A 17.

20 Cf. Honnefelder 1989, 144-267.
21 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 3-119.

22 Cf. the work cited in n. 20 above.

 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 59

known and the cognition of the first coincide. Metaphysics as ontology is

then natural theology. This implies that the theory of the transcendent is
only possible as a theory of the transcendental, and that simultaneously the
theory of the transcendental finds its systematic completion in the theory of
the transcendent.
With regard to the relationship between metaphysics and the doctrine of
the transcendental, Scotus' ideas as presented above represent a crucial
break with the other conceptions of metaphysics developed within the
context of the reception of Aristotle. Whereas, for example, Aquinas'
doctrine of the transcendental is confined to the explication of the six modi
generales consequentes omne ens, the six attributes that are convertible and
transcend all categories (Thomas Aquinas, De veritate I, 1), and this
doctrine in tum comprises only one - though an important - part of
Aquinas' metaphysics, which deals with the analysis of substance and
doctrine of participation,23 Scotus' doctrine of the transcendental becomes
the whole of metaphysics. First philosophy is either possible as
transcendental science, or it is not possible at all.

1.2 Wolff's "transcendental cosmology" and the Scotistic concept of

scientia transcendens
This background also permits us to understand the origins of Kant's second
use of the term 'transcendental', which stems from Wolff s conception of a
"transcendental cosmology". If one's view is that, with respect to its
purpose, metaphysics has to do with the cognition of first and pre-eminent
beings like God, soul, or substance, while with respect to its approach it is
only possible as transcendental science, i.e. as a science of the concepts
which are first grasped on account of their being absolutely general, then
the obvious objection to the view is that there are two distinct metaphysics:
metaphysics as scientia generalis and metaphysics as scientia specialis.
Scotus responds to this objection by arguing that the explication of the
disjunctive transcendental attributes of 'being' is identical to the cognition
of the pre-eminent being - in so far as we can have such cognition. 24 The
distinction between a general and a special metaphysics found,
subsequently to Suarez' reception of Scotus, in Pererius and adopted by
Wolff, should be understood with this background in mind. 25 If first
philosophy is understood to be ontology, taken as this transcendental
science that Scotus maintains deals formally with the resolution of less
general concepts from the communissima without which "the more

23 Cf. Honnefelder 1987,171-77.

24 Cf. Met. I, q. 1, n. 155 (John Duns Scotus 1997a, 69).
25 Cf. Honnefelder 1989, 109ff.; idem, 1990, 21Off., 314ff.
60 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

particular objects cannot be cognized" (specialiora non possunt

cognosci),26 the following approach is obvious: ontology can be understood
- just as Wolff understands it - to be the discipline "in which the principles
of all human cognition are contained" (qua omnis cognition is humanae
principia continentur), in so far as it comprehends the prima principia
notionesque primae (Wolff, Ontol., prol. § 1 Anm). Thus, the treatment of
general concepts is a prerequisite for the discipline of special metaphysics
(metaphysica specialis) and for a transcendental part of cosmology,
because without these general concepts the empirical cognition of particular
objects (specialiora) is impossible. In Wolff, then, 'transcendental' obtains
the meaning: "related to the most general and fundamental concepts, which
are uncovered in the analysis of cognition" - and this is fully
comprehensible on the basis of the Scotistic idea of resolutio. Obviously
Baumgarten adopts this meaning when he designates the "entis praedicata
generaliora" as "prima cognitionis humanae principia" (Baumgarten, Met.
prol. § 5) and calls metaphysics "scientia primorum in humana cognitione
principiorum" (ibid. § 1).

1.3 Baumgarten's concept of metaphysics and the Scotistic tradition

Also the third meaning of 'transcendental' , which Kant finds in
Baumgarten, can only be understood, both in itself and in its relationship to
metaphysics as "transcendental science", by taking into account the use of
'transcendental' made by Scotus. If the actual existence of some being -
ignoring the possibility of an intuitive cognition - can only be stated but
not understood, then the most general meaning of 'being' can only be
comprehended by the relationship of some quiddity or essence to actual or
possible existence, i.e. as a quid which possesses or at least can possess
actual existence. If it is assumed that the absolute nothing is what is self-
contradictory and therefore cannot exist (and Kant still makes use of this
language in his "Tafel vom Nichts": Critique of Pure Reason A 2901B
347), actual existence can only be possessed by something when the
essential internal contents of that something - the discrete internal elements
that together make up its essence - are not contradictory.27 A simple
example of this can serve to illustrate: a "Goat-Stag" is self-contradictory
because the internal contents of that quiddity, goat and stag, are
incompatible in one essence. Since these internal contents are what they are
"formally on their own account" lformaliter ex se ),28 their intrinsic
possibility, and hence the possibility of existence following from this, is
necessary, whereas their actual existence remains totally contingent. The

26 Cf. n. 17 above.
27 Cf. Honnefelder 1990,45-56,421-29.
28 Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, q. un., n. 50 (John Duns Scotus 1950-, vol. VI, 291).
 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 61

sense of 'being', then, which is most general and transcends all the
categories can be characterized by non repugnantia ad esse, which in tum
can be elucidated by the non repugnantia of the internal contents that make
up each and every essence.
This is the background to Baumgarten's identifying essential
(essential is) with transcendental (transcendentalis) and to his calling those
properties that follow from the combination of the essential predicates
"transcendentally" true, united, and perfect. 29 Only if Baumgarten holds
that the non repugnantia ad esse (and hence the meaning of 'being' that
transcends all categories and is most general) results from the non
repugnantia of the internal essential contents, can we explain why
Baumgarten in § 63 of his Metaphysica states that "with the essence
undone, the being disappears" and further "the essence, and thus the being
itself, disappears, with the contents of the essence undone.,,3o It is the
"determinatio possibilis interna" (ibid. § 56), as Wolff also called it, which
constitutes the possibility not only of essence, but also of existence. When
Angelelli misinterpreted this use of 'transcendental' as an identification of
ens and essentia,31 this was only possible because he ignored the Scotistic
doctrine and took the Thomistic one to be governing.

2. THE MEDIATION OF THE SCOTISTIC CONCEPT

OF METAPHYSICS AS SCIENTIA TRANSCENDENS BY
FRANCISCO SUAREZ' DISPUTATIONES
METAPHYSICAE
Without doubt Kant had hardly any direct acquaintance with Scholastic
sources. What was known to him was the Scholastic tradition as Wolff,
Baumgarten, Crusius, and others had passed it on. As careful examination
shows,32 Wolff systematically relied upon the Scotistic conception of
metaphysics, more precisely the form given to it by Francisco Suarez
(1548-1617) in his Disputationes metaphysicae. 33 While this was not the
only work through which the Scholastic heritage was kept alive and
transmitted further, nevertheless its influence on the German

29 Cf. Baumgarten 1779, §§ 89, 98; Cf. Hinske 1968, 10; AngelelJi 1972, 119-22; Hinske
1973, 57ff.
30 Cf. Baumgarten 1779, § 63: "Sublata essentia, tolJitur ens. Sublato essentiali, tolJitur

essentia, hinc ens ipsum."

31 Cf. AngelelJi 1972, 122.

32 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 295-381.

33 Cf. ibid. 200-94.
62 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

Schulmetaphysik cannot be overstated. Although in this work Suarez

explicitly cites Thomas Aquinas most frequently, thorough analysis reveals
that Suarez follows the Scotistic approach in the most important respects. 34
As was also the case with Scotus, Suarez' use of metaphysics is
theologically motivated. Indeed, it is differences internal to the Christian
faith (rather than the challenge of Greek and Arabic metaphysics) that led
Suarez to attempt to solve those differences by turning to something first
and fundamental, which is beyond dispute and as such can be
systematically and methodically explicated. In Suarez' monumental
Disputationes metaphysicae, published in 1597, this attempt yields a
combination of an historical exposition of the many different approaches to
individual issues found in the scholastic tradition and a problem-oriented
"will to systematize".
To what extent Suarez, despite his token references to Thomas Aquinas,
follows Scotus' approach is evident from the definition of the subject
matter of metaphysics in the first of the 54 disputations. Here he discusses
six possible solutions to the problem, but dismisses all of them as either too
comprehensive or too restrictive. The subject matter of metaphysics is
neither everything that is knowable nor the "supreme real being" (Suarez,
Disp.Met. 1.1.9), i.e. God or the immaterial being; nor is it the finite being
that is the subject matter of physics. Rather, the subject matter of
metaphysics is "being as such" (ens inquantum ens), i.e. a common
determination (ibid. 1.1.23 and 26) that is grasped in a concept that
abstracts from all categorial determinations as well as from being
finite/infinite, being caused/uncaused, and being material/immaterial.
Metaphysics is, therefore, the "most general science" (ibid. 1.5.14), because
it treats of the "rationes universales transcendentales" (ibid. 1.2.27). That is
to say, metaphysics is a scientia transcendens in the Scotistic sense.
Because the immaterial being (God) cannot be known except through
previously known transcategorial attributes of being, metaphysics as
transcendental science and metaphysics as theology coincide.
According to Suarez, metaphysics deals with the "formal" as well as the
"objective" concept of being. By the formal concept of being, Suarez
understands the act of knowing, which "ex unica et prima impositione"
(ibid. 2.2.24) yields an intentional representation of the object; by the
objective concept he designates that which is intentionally represented by
that act. In other words, Suarez does not assume a theory of concepts
characterized by a noetic-noematic parallelism of res and conceptus; rather
he accepts Ockham's critical approach towards a strictly realistic
interpretation of universal concepts. Since Scotus himself does not rely on

34 Cf. ibid.
 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 63

that parallelism when it comes to the concept of being, Suarez can

substantially follow Scotus and apply 'being' to a first and unified formal
concept which, in virtue of its imposition, represents a first and unified
objective concept of absolutely simple content that grasps all different
beings in an indeterminate way, i.e. as being.

To the formal concept of being there corresponds an appropriate and immediate objective
concept, which is explicitly neither substance nor accident, neither God nor creature, but
which designates these in a unified way, i.e. inasmuch as they are similar and agree in being.
(ibid. 2.2.8)

What does the objective concept that corresponds to the formal concept
of being mean? According to Suarez, it is a determination that transcends
the generality of the genus; this determination cannot be defined, but only
explicated through its relationship to actual existence. 'Being' means "that
which can exist" (id quod aptum est esse seu realiter existere: ibid. 2.4.7);35
the possibility of existence is grounded in an ontological disposition which
(as we have seen before) appears in the non-contradiction of the internal
contents constituting essences.
Because entity in the sense of being(ness) - which in a concrete being is
identical with the entity or being(ness) of that being - is grasped
indeterminately by the concept of being, that concept has an "illimitability
and transcendence" (ibid.2.6.10) on account of which it precedes all more
determinate modes. First among those more determinate modes, according
to both Suarez and Scotus, is the classification "finite/infinite", which
Suarez understands in terms of "intensity"; this allows him to interpret
finite being as a non-determinate mode of an intensive quantity and infinite
being as the "totally indivisible infinity of perfection which in itself is most
real and complete" (ibid. 30.2.25).
While Aquinas explicates the meaning of 'being' by appealing to the
ontological composition of finite beings, Suarez, like Scotus, explicates it
by way of distinguishing between two orders. Within the order of actual
reality, 'being' signifies only the individual thing that actually exists apart
from its cause. Yet this only explicates the meaning of 'being'
"extrinsically",36 since the originating power is a merely extrinsic reason
why something can be created. The intrinsic reason is the ontological
disposition of the internal contents of the essence of the thing in question,
since those contents are what they are "on their own account" (ex se: ibid.
31.1.2) - here we see again the use of the "de se" or "ex se" formula as it

35 Cf. in detail ibid. 235-47.

36 Cf. ibid. 272-82.
64 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

appeared in A vicenna and ScotuS. 37 Thus, in this order of logical

possibility, 'being' taken in the broadest sense is distinguished from 'non-
being' taken in the broadest sense. As such they are prior even to divine
knowledge.
Considering all this, it is not surprising that Suarez does not know
Aquinas' "actus essendi" and that he interprets actual existence as the
actual "esse extra causas" of an essence. 38 Like Scotus, Suarez affirms the
analogy of being for the order of the more determinate beings, i.e. actual
reality; the unity of meaning (univocitas) that he claims for the concept of
being, however, is substantially equivalent to Scotus' transcategorial
uni vocity of the concept of being.39
Constraints of space do not allow a consideration of the extent to which
Christian Wolff (1679-1754) follows the outlines offered by Suarez (and
ScotuS).40 It is important to remark, however, that Wolff tries to follow the
methodological ideal of mos geometricus as it had been employed by
Descartes. This leads him to understand the resolutio of more general
concepts into simple ones as an a priori cognition of a complex of
conceptual elements, and on this basis to re-establish metaphysics as a
scientia propter quid - thus countering Scotus' criticism of this
understanding of metaphysics. 41

3. KANT'S CONCEPT OF "TRANSCENDENTAL

PHILOSOPHY"

In the following it will be shown that the Scotistic view described above
forms the background to Kant's development of his new conception of
transcendental philosophy. This is not to say that Kant had first-hand
knowledge of Scotus' ideas; the Scotistic view was transmitted to him in a
complex fashion, mainly through Suarez and Wolff.
In the Monadologia physica,42 the Critique of Pure Reason,43 and in
Refl. 4852 and 5738,44 Kant finds it self-evident that both metaphysics and

37Cf. ibid. 266-72.

38Cf. loc cit. in n. 33 above.
39 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 282-94.

40 Cf. ibid. 295-381.

41 Cf. ibid. 426ff., 439ff. For Scotus' rejection of metaphysics as a scientia propter quid,

see above at and around n. 15.

42 Cf. Kant, Monadologia physica, Ak. Ausg. 1475.

43 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 290/B 346; A 424f.1B 452f.; cf. Martin 1949,

248f.; Hinske 1970, 50.

44 Cf. Refl. 4852 and 5738, Ak. Ausg. XVIII 10 and 340; cf. also Refl. 4236a, Ak. Ausg.

XVII 471.
 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 65

ontology are identical with the "transcendental philosophy" of the

seventeenth century Schulmetaphysik, which was itself an offshoot of the
Scotistic approach. Thus, Kant notes in the famous passage from the first
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason: "I call transcendental all cognition
that concerns itself not so much with objects as a priori with our concepts
of objects in general.,,45 His work On The Prize Question Concerning
Progress in Metaphysics shows that he refers here to the traditional
understanding of the "Schule": ontology, which deals with "the system of
all rational concepts and principles", is called 'transcendental philosophy',
"because it contains the conditions and first elements of all our cognition a
priori" (Kant, Fortschritte A 10). Kant explicitly remarks that this
"resolution (Auflosung) of cognition into concepts that lie a priori in reason
and have their use in experience" goes back to Aristotle and was continued
with merit by Wolff, Kant mentioning "the clarity and precision of
[Wolff's] analysis of this capacity" (ibid. A 11f.).
As was shown above, the same tradition which forms the background to
Kant's use of the term 'transcendental philosophy' provides the explanation
for his distinction between transcendental and metaphysical, a distinction
he draws, following Baumgarten, in Refl. 4025, 4027, and 4402. Only if we
accept - as Scotus does - that the meaning of 'being', as it transcends all
categories, is based on the non-contradictory character of the essentialia
(i.e. inner essential contents), can we explain why in Refl. 4025 Kant claims
that something is called 'transcendental', "if it is regarded as a consequence
of its essence",46 or why in Refl. 4402 he claims that we consider something
"transcendental iter" when we consider that its "essence is the consequence
of the essentialium".47 If we take metaphysics to be metaphysica specialis,
it is then consistent to call a point of view 'metaphysical', "if the essence,
with respect to what follows from it, is regarded as cause".48 On this view,
transcendental sentences like "Being is that to which esse is not repugnant"

45 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 11-12/B 25: "Ich nenne aBe Erkenntnis

transzendentaI, die sich nicht so wohl mit GegensUinden, sondem mit unsem Begriffen a
priori von GegensUinden iiberhaupt beschaftigt." All English translations from Critique of
Pure Reason are modified from Kant 1929.
46 Refl. 4025, Ak. Ausg. XVII 389: "Transscendentaliter wird etwas betrachtet, wenn es

beziehungsweise auf sein Wesen aIs die Folge erwogen wird; metaphysice, wenn das Wesen
in Ansehung seiner Folgen als ein Grund betrachtet wird."
47 Refl. 4402, Ak. Ausg. XVII 533: "Alles, was transscendentaliter betrachtet wird, wird

respective aufs Wesen erwogen, im metaphysischen Verstande, aber absolute und

universaliter. Bei jenem ist das We sen die Folge der essentiaIium, bei diesem das Wesen mit
seinen essentialibus der Grund der Folgen im indefinitum. Daher sind jene Satze
tautologisch, diese aber pragnant. Denn bei jenen sind die essentialia nur durchs Wesen
gegeben und sind wieder Bestandteile desselben."
48 Cf. n. 46 above.
66 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

can sensibly be called "tautological", whereas "metaphysical" sentences

give precise meaning (they are "priignant,,).49
With this in mind, Kant's reference to the "transcendental philosophy of
the ancients" in § 12 of the Critique of Pure Reason, a text added in the
second edition (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B 113), becomes less
mysterious. Since Kant holds that his table of categories is exhaustive, he
must deny that the convertible transcendental concepts of the scholastic
tradition - he mentions unum, verum, bonum - can in any way be
considered categories; instead Kant interprets these concepts in a way that
clearly shows that they are to be regarded as pure concepts of reason, the
sense of which lies outside the table of categories. As Kant himself puts it,
the doctrine concerning this group of transcendental concepts is a "major
part" of "the transcendental philosophy of the ancients" (ibid.); in this way,
Kant denies that it is a major part of metaphysics - which it would have to
be if Kant had the Thomistic tradition in mind here. Kant's criticism of the
doctrine shows in an unambiguous way how much his new transcendental
philosophy and the old one share, and how much they differ. Kant does not
take exception to considering these transcendental attributes as "logical
requirements and criteria of all cognition of things in general" (ibid. B
114), as he alleges the old transcendental philosophy understood them.
What must be criticized is that at the hands of the old transcendental
philosophy these transcendental attributes were also "incautiously
converted from being criteria of thought to be properties of things in
themselves" (ibid.). This interpretation is confirmed by the emendation
Kant makes in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason to his
conception of transcendental philosophy: "I call transcendental all
cognition that concerns itself not so much with objects as with the mode of
our cognition of objects in so far as this is to be possible a priori" (ibid. B
25). In comparison to the first edition (see n. 45 above), the stress is shifted
in the second edition from "objects in general" to "the mode of our
cognition of objects in so far as this mode of cognition is to be possible a
priori." Thus, in On The Prize Question Concerning Progress in
Metaphysics the definition of ontology as "the system of all rational
concepts and principles" is supplemented by: "but only in so far as they are
concerned with objects which are given to the senses and can therefore be
substantiated through experience" (Kant, Fortschritte A 10). Any attempt
to go beyond this would be "acquisition of unwarranted (uberschwiinglich)
cognition" (ibid. A 17).
Thus, Kant's criticism of the transcendental philosophy of the ancients
is neither aimed at the analysis of cognition found in it nor at the function

49 Cf. n. 47 above.
 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 67

ascribed to the transcategorial concepts in it; rather his criticism is focused

on the connection between cognition and the reality cognized. This noetic-
noematic parallelism is present from Scotus via Suarez to Wolff. Whereas
Scotus is aware of the special status of the concept of being in this
respect,50 Wolff's use of the mos geometricus leads him to identify the
resolution of concepts with the results of abstractive cognition. Thus Wolff
takes the order of concepts established through resolution to be an
expression of the "fundamental order of things" (Grundgesetzlichkeit der
Dinge),51 and, on account of this, metaphysics - at least with regard to its
procedure - is a scientia propter quid, something Scotus said was
impossible for US. 52 If our concepts cannot represent reality in the way in
which the Scotistic metaphysical tradition claims they can, then we must
indeed distinguish between analytic and synthetic judgments a priori,53 and
the system of conceptual cognition cannot be considered as given - as it is
by Wolff - but must be considered the field of inquiry.

4. KANT'S TRANSFORMATION OF FUNDAMENTAL

CONCEPTS OF THE SCOTISTIC SCIENTIA
TRANSCENDENS
Several examples can be adduced to show how closely linked Kant's new
transcendental philosophy is to Scotus' scientia transcendens - and this
even when the critique of cognition connected with the "Kopemikanische
Wende" of the Critique of Pure Reason is taken into consideration.
Structural elements in the systems provide a number of instances of this,
e.g. that the ontological properties of objects follow the critique of the
faculty of reason and that the determination of these objects takes place
through a combination of formal analysis and disjunctive modal
explanation - or, as Kant puts it, of analytic and dialectic. Moreover,
several examples appear with regard to the modifications made by Kant to
fundamental concepts of the transcendental tradition like (a) transcendental
object and (b) objective reality; and further with regard to the use Kant
makes of non repugnantia ad esse, and related issues in the
conceptualization of modal and qualitative categories, particularly (c)
Sachheit and Dingheit, (d) the definition of existence, and (e) the

50 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 413-16.

51 Arndt 1965,7-102,253-75.
52 Cf. Honnefelder 1990,416-20; cf. also above at n. 41.

53 Cf. Kant, Fortschritte A 23f.

68 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

systematic connection between ens inquantum ens, ens realissimum, and

omnitudo realitatis. Let us examine each of these last five issues in turn.

(a) How much Kant's approach owes to the conception going back to
Scotus, can be seen in the formal determination both of the concept of the
transcendental object and of the concept of objective reality. In the
Critique of Pure Reason Kant maintains that, if our thoughts are to relate to
an object, they must relate to something that is, as object of perception in
general, a "transcendental object". It is "something = X, of which we can
know nothing whatsoever", but which we must understand to be "correlate
of the unity of apperception" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 250). "The
object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object,
that is, the completely indeterminate thought of something in general"
(ibid. A 253). The choice of words in the first edition of the Critique of
Pure Reason is less cautious and reveals the connection with tradition in a
more obvious way: "The pure concept of this transcendental object, which
in reality throughout all our cognition is always one and the same = X, is
what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to
an object, that is, objective reality" (ibid. A 109).
What Kant describes here is precisely the concept ens that reveals itself
ultimately through the resolution of concepts developed by Scotus: it can
be predicated in its absolute indetermination in a manner transcending all
categories, and it states about that of which it is predicated nothing other
than the fundamental ratio obiecti, i.e. the formal ratitudo of being a
concept of something in general. 54

(b) Of course, the concept of the transcendental object can only be thought,
not understood, because it represents the thing-in-itself only as a
"noumenon in the negative sense" (ibid. B 307). According to Kant, our
understanding "cannot know these noumena through any of the categories
... it must therefore think them only under the name of an unknown
something" (ibid. B 31255). As was the case with the concept of res a reor
reris in Scotus, i.e. the res as correlate of simple belief (res opinabilis),56 so
for Kant "the concept of an object in general, taken problematically,
without its having been decided whether it is something or nothing" (ibid.
A 2901B 34657) is ontologically irrelevant. The ontologically relevant
question is whether, and in what way, reality can be ascribed to it. Since
true intellectual acquaintance with the fully determinate res cannot be

54 Cf. Honnefelder 1990,432-36.

55 Cf. also A 252.
56 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 33, 46ff.
57 Cf. also Kant, Rejl. 5726, Ak. Ausg. XVIII 336ff.
 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 69

obtained, the reality of the res must be determined according to its

possibility. But both for Kant and for Scotus the logical possibility of bare
conceptibilitas is not sufficient. In addition to the formal moment that
conceptibilitas represents, a material moment is necessarily required.
Whereas the precritical Kant - like the Scotistic tradition - simply assumes
this material moment (whether on the basis of the essential internal contents
that exist on their own account or on the basis of God as the foundation of
all reality),58 the critical Kant demands an examination or a proof. This
proof holds because "the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes
of cognition from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them
a priori in some definite fashion" (ibid. A 104), which means that all our
cognition follows the general rules laid down by the unity of consciousness
and relates to an object no matter how it is given. But this means that "the
possibility of experience is, then, what gives objective reality to all our
modes of cognition a priori" (A 156/B 195).
In this way, the critical Kant also follows Scotus' approach with regard
to the determination of objective reality. Because we cannot have
intellectual acquaintance with the fully determinate res, the most general
sense of being or reality is grasped as non repugnantia, i.e. as possibility,
namely in the double sense of the internal possibility of the essential
contents and of the possibility of actual existence following from that. 59 But
for Kant the inner possibility is no longer based on the objectively given
essential contents being what they are formally on their own account
(jormaliter ex se) - as was the case with Scotus - rather it is based on the
subjectively given pure concepts of reason being what they are formally on
their own account. The possibility of existence is replaced by the
"possibility of experience", according to the principle that the possibility of
existence manifests itself in the possibility of appearing in the field of
experience. Correspondingly, an object is regarded as real not - as in the
older tradition - because it is determined by formal essential elements,
which exist on their own account and from which follows the possibility of
actual existence, but because it is subject to the conditions under which it
can be an object of experience in general. That there is a formal structure to
the determination is true in both cases, since reality is determined according
to its non repugnantia - to its "compatibility with" - in both cases.
Nevertheless, in Scotus' case the non repugnantia is of a quid with respect
to actual existence; in Kant's case it has to do with the compatibility of a
conceivable quid with the principles of experience. As G. Martin has
pointed out, Kant can thus use the concept of objective reality (and we may

58 Cf. Honnefelder 1990,443-47.

59 Cf. Honnefelder 1990. 451-56.
70 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

note: in the same way that Scotus uses the concept of being) as the "most
general ontological term,,60 in transcendental philosophy, because,
according to Kant; it can be predicated - though in different ways - of
appearances, pure forms of perception, intellectual concepts, principles, and
pure concepts of reason.

(c) The link to the formal conception of the older scientia transcendens also
reveals itself in the relationship between transcendental object and
objective reality, on the one hand, and the qualitative and modal categories,
on the other. 61 If we keep in mind the formal determination of reality
through possibility, as the older tradition maintained, we can explain why
Kant, in the section of the Critique of Pure Reason concerning the
postulates of empirical thought in general, holds that 'possibility' means
agreement with the formal conditions of experience, and accepts that it -
precisely parallel to Scotus' view of the possibility linked to non
repugnantia ad esse - is an overarching term that includes the modal
categories of reality and necessity.62 As was the case with non repugnantia
ad esse in Scotus, the category of possibility in Kant's view explains
objective reality as it relates to our conceptual cognition of objects.
The use of the terms Sachheit (quiddity) and Dingheit (reality)63 shows
clearly that also in his discussion of reality as a qualitative category Kant
makes use of language that stems from the older scientia transcendens,
which understood realitas to be the quidditative determination of the res
and thus related realitas to a formal kind of being specific to the
quidditative determination. This is the only way to comprehend why Kant,
in his chapter on "Schematism" in the Critique of Pure Reason,
understands reality as "that the concept of which in itself points to being"
(ibid. A 143/ B 18264 ) and interprets it as an intensive quantity. Likewise
with this background we can understand why reality can appear once as
modal and once as qualitative category. If - as Scotus explains in Quodl. q.
3 - ens or res is to be understood as that which differs from the nothing of
the self-contradictory, and is therefore determined on its own account in
such a way that it cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied and hence
is not incompatible with existence, then it is intrinsic to every quidditative
determination not to be nothing but something, although it does not on this
account possess actual reality.65 Insofar as the quid is determined on its own

60 Martin 1969,228.
61 Cf. Honnefelder 1990,456-59.
62 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 218ff.JB 265ff.

63 Cf. ibid. B 602; Kant, Metaphysik L2 547, 560; cf. Maier 1930, 9ff.; Heimsoeth 1967,

53.
64 Cf. also Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 175/8 217.
65 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 3-10, 458.
 METAPHYSICS AS A DISCIPLINE 71

account, it can be called res; insofar as the quid is not incompatible with
existence, it can be called ens. Now, the Sachheit (quiddity) establishes
Dingheit (reality); the possibility of existence establishes entity (i.e.,
being). Thus also in Kant, the transcendental object, which, as something, is
the correlate of the unity of consciousness and of its synthesis, is that in
relation to which reality is determined. The transcendental object is
determined in its reality both by the qualitative category of reality in its
Sachheit as Dingheit and by the modal category of its existence as object of
experience; the emphasis shifts from the contrast between something and
nothing to the contrast between to be in reality and to be in thought.

(d) It is on this basis that Kant can draw from the older tradition the thesis
that 'being', used as an existential marker, is not a "real predicate" (ibid. A
598/ B 626).66 The esse existentiae, as Scotus points out,67 stands outside of
the coordinatio praedicamentalis, i.e. the constitution in actual existence of
a thing's quiditas, and it indicates an actus ultimus of a special kind: "it is",
in Kant's words, "merely the positing of a thing, or of a certain
determination, as existing in themselves" (ibid.).

(e) One last aspect of the formal structure of Kant's transcendental

philosophy that shows clearly its roots in the older scientia transcendens
must be mentioned. This is the systematic relationship between the
concepts of something in general, of the omnitudo realitatis, and of the ens
realissimum in Kant, to which corresponds the systematic connection
between the abstract concept of being as first object of metaphysics, the
concept of being as first object of the intellect, and the concept of the
infinite being.68 Like Scotus, Kant begins with the concept of something in
general as something that can be determined; when it is completely
determined, the result is the concept of an omnitudo realitatis; this latter
concept, when thought as fully determined, in tum leads to the concept of
ens realissimum, i.e. the being that does not lack anything that can be
related to it as determination a priori. 69 The corresponding idea in Scotus is
as follows: the concept of being that contains all realities in itself in a
virtual manner can only be posited to be the first object of metaphysics
insofar as its entire range is the object of the human intellect; but the human
intellect can only attain the abstract, quasi-empty concept of being (which
retains the absolutely minimal content that causes a contradiction in case of

66 Cf. Wagner 1980; Hintikka 1986.

67 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 14lff., 466ff.
68 Cf. Honnefelder 1990, 472-86; idem 1994, 319-50.
69 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 567-591/8 595-619.
72 LUDGER HONNEFELDER

simultaneous affirmation and negation); however, the sense of this quasi-

empty concept of being can be fully realized in the concept of the
intensively infinite being (God), as can be proved through the elucidation
of the disjunctive transcendental determinations.

***
Finally, the very idea of a critique shows clearly Kant's historical debt to
the older understanding of transcendental philosophy. If we are to show
that metaphysics, as cognition of the "first", is a legitimate enterprise, then
we must critically explain how we can attain that cognition while taking
into consideration the cognitive restrictions imposed upon us in this life. If
acquisition of this cognition is only possible through a trans census towards
the most general concepts which form the basis upon which all else is
known, then the content of the concepts that govern our cognition of the
world and of God, i.e. the concepts of being and of reality, cannot be
determined positively, but only through a formal resolution and a modal
explication. Like Scotus - who was confronted with Augustine's and
Avicenna's overestimation of metaphysics 70 as well as with the
Aristotelian-Averroistic underestimation of it - Kant finds two radically
opposed views concerning the viability of metaphysics: on the one hand,
Wolff's attempt to build up metaphysics as a scientia propter quid (i.e.
from a God's-eye view), on the other, Hume's destruction of every kind of
metaphysics. In this situation, Kant adopts the Scotistic way of showing the
possibility of metaphysics: metaphysics is the scientia transcendens that
proceeds in a formal and modal way.

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