Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Epistemic Operators
Author(s): Fred I. Dretske
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 67, No. 24 (Dec. 24, 1970), pp. 1007-1023
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024710 .
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 THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME LXVII, NO. 24, DECEMBER 24, I970

S
EPISTEMIC OPERATORS *

UPPOSE Q is a necessaryconsequence of P. Given only this

much,it is, of course,quite trivialthatif it is truethatP,
then it must also be true that Q. If it is a fact that P, then
it mustalso be a factthat Q.If it is necessarythatP, then it is nec-
essarythat Q; and if it is possible that P, then it must also be pos-
sible that Q.
I have just mentionedfour prefixes:'it is true that', 'it is a fact
that', 'it is necessarythat', and 'it is possible that'. In this paper I
shall referto such affixes as sententialoperatorsor simplyoperators;
when affixedto a sentenceor statement,theyoperate on it to gen-
erate another sentence or statement.The distinctivething about
the fouroperatorsI have just mentionedis that,if Q is a necessary
consequenceof P, thenthe statementwe get by operatingon Q with
one of thesefour operatorsis a necessaryconsequence of the state-
mentwe get by operatingon P with the same operator.This maybe
put more succinctlyif we let 'O' stand for the operatorin question
and 'O(P)' for the statementwe get by affixingthe operator 'O' to
the statement'P'. We can now say that the above four operators
share the followingproperty:ifP entails Q, then O(P) entails O(Q).
I shall call any operatorhavingthispropertya penetratingoperator
(or, when emphasisis required,a fullypenetratingoperator).In op-
erating on P these operators penetrate to every necessaryconse-
quence of P.
We are now in a position to ask ourselvesa preliminaryques-
tion. The answerto this question is easy enough,but it will set the
* Versionsof thispaper were read to the philosophydepartments of several
universities
in the UnitedStatesand Canada duringtheyear1969/70.I profited
greatlyfromthesediscussions.I wishespeciallyto thankPaul Dietl who helped
me to see a numberof pointsmoreclearly(perhapsstillnot clearlyenoughin
his opinion).Finally,myexchangeswithMr. Don Affeldt wereextremely useful;
I am much indebtedto him in connectionwith some of the pointsmade in
thelatterportionsof thepaper.
I007
Ioo8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

stage for more difficult questions.Are all sententialoperatorsfully

penetratingoperators?Are all operatorssuch that if P entails Q,
then O(P) entails O(Q)? If all operatorsare penetratingoperators,
then each of the followingstatementsmustbe true (when P entails
Q):
(1) You cannothave a reasonto believethatP unlessyou have a reason
to believethatQ.
(2) You cannotknowthatP unlessyouknowthatQ.
(3) You cannotexplainwhyP is thecase unlessyou can explainwhyQ
is thecase.
(4) If youassertthatP, thenyouassertthatQ.
(5) If youhopethatP, thenyouhopethatQ.
(6) If it is strange(or accidental)thatP, thenit mustbe strange(or acci-
dental)thatQ.
(7) If itwasa mistakethatP, thenit wasa mistakethatQ.
This list begins with two epistemic operators,'reason to believe
that' and 'know that'. Since I shall be concernedwith theselater in
the paper, let me skip over them now and look at those appearing
near the end of the list. They will sufficeto answer our opening
question,and theirstatusis much less problematicthan thatof some
of the otheroperators.
'She lost' entails 'Someone lost'. Yet, it may be strangethat she
lost, not at all strangethat someone lost. 'Bill and Susan married
each other' entails that Susan got married;yet,it may be quite odd
that (strange that, incredible that) Bill and Susan married each
other but quite unremarkable,not at all odd that,Susan got mar-
ried. It may have been a mistakethat theymarriedeach other,not
a mistake that Susan got married.Or finally,'I hit the bull's-eye'
entails that I eitherhit the bull's-eyeor the side of the barn; and
though I admit that it was lucky that (accidental that) I hit the
bull's-eye,I will deny that it was lucky, an accident, that I hit
eitherthebull's-eyeor theside of thebarn.
Such examples show that not all operatorsare fullypenetrating.
Indeed, such operatorsas 'it is strangethat', 'it is accidental that'
and 'it is a mistakethat' fail to penetrateto some of the most ele-
mentarylogical consequences of a proposition. Consider the en-
tailmentbetween 'P- Q' and 'Q'. Clearly,it may be strangethat P
and Q, not at all strangethat P, and not at all strangethat Q. A
concatenationof factors,no one of which is strangeor accidental,
may itselfbe strangeor accidental.Taken by itself,thereis nothing
odd or suspicious about Frank's holding a winning ticketin the
firstrace. The same could be said about any of the otherraces: there
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS 1OO9

is nothingodd or suspiciousabout Frank'sholding a winningticket

in the nth race. Nonetheless,thereis somethingveryodd, verysus-
picious, in Frank's having a winningticketin n races.
Therefore,not onlyare theseoperatorsnot fullypenetrating,they
lie, as it were,on the otherend of the spectrum.They fail to pene-
trateto some of the mostelementaryconsequencesof a proposition.
I shall referto this class of operatorsas nonpenetratingoperators.
I do not wish to suggestby this label that such operatorsare to-
tallyimpotentin this respect(or that theyare all uniformin their
degreeof penetration).I mean it, rather,in a rough,comparative,
sense: their degree of penetrationis less than that of any of the
otheroperatorsI shall have occasion to discuss.
We have, then,two endsof the spectrumwithexamplesfromboth
ends. Anythingthat falls betweenthese two extremesI shall call a
semi-penetrating operator.And with this definitionI am, finally,
in a position to expressmy main point, the point I wish to defend
in the rest of this paper. It is, simply,that all epistemicoperators
are semi-penetrating operators.There is both a trivial and a sig-
nificantside to this claim. Let me firstdeal brieflywith the trivial
aspect.
The epistemicoperatorsI mean to be speakingabout when I say
that all epistemicoperators are semi-penetrating include the fol-
lowing:
(a) S knowsthat...
(b) S sees(orcansee) that...
(c) S hasreason(ora reason)tobelievethat...
(d) Thereis evidencetosuggestthat...
(e) S canprovethat...
(f) S learned(discovered,
foundout)that...
(g) In relationtoourevidenceit is probablethat...
Part of what needs to be establishedin showingthat these are all
semi-penetrating operatorsis that theyall possessa degreeof pene-
trationgreaterthan that of the nonpenetratingoperators.This is
the trivialside of my thesis.I say it is trivialbecause it seemsto me
fairlyobvious that if someoneknowsthatP and Q, has a reason to
believe thatP and Q, or can prove thatP and Q, he therebyknows
that Q, has a reason to believe that Q, or can prove (in the appro-
priateepistemicsenseof thisterm)that Q. Similarly,if S knowsthat
Bill and Susan marriedeach other,he (must) know that Susan got
married(marriedsomeone).If he knowsthatP is the case,he knows
thatP or Q is the case (wherethe 'or' is understoodin a sensewhich
makes 'P or Q' a necessaryconsequence of 'P'). This is not a claim
IOIO THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

about what it would be appropriate to say, what the person him-

self thinkshe knows or would say he knows. It is a question, sim-
ply, of what he knows. It may not be appropriate to say to Jim's
wife that you know it was eitherher husband,Jim,or Harold who
sentthe neighborlady an expensivegiftwhenyou knowit was Har-
old. For, although you do know this, it is misleading to say you
knowit-especially to Jim'swife.
Let me accept, therefore,without furtherargument that the
epistemicoperators are not, unlike 'lucky that', 'strangethat', 'a
mistake that', and 'accidental that', nonpenetratingoperators. I
would like to turn,then,to the more significantside of my thesis.
Before I do, however,I must make one point clear lest it convert
my entire thesis into somethingas trivial as the firsthalf of it.
When we are dealing with the epistemicoperators,it becomes cru-
cial to specifywhetherthe agent in question knows that P entails
Q. That is to say,P may entail Q, and S may know that P, but he
may not know that Q because, and perhaps only because, he fails
to appreciatethe factthat P entails Q. When Q is a simple logical
consequence of P we do not expect this to happen, but when the
propositions become very complex, or the relationship between
themverycomplex,thismighteasilyoccur.Let P be a set of axioms,
Q a theorem.S's knowingP does not entail S's knowingQ just be-
cause P entails Q; for,of course,S may not know that P entails Q,
may not know that Q is a theorem.Hence, our epistemicoperators
will turn out not to be penetratingbecause, and perhaps only be-
cause, the agentsin question are not fullycognizantof all the im-
plicationsof what theyknow to be the case, can see to be the case,
have a reason to believe is the case, and so on. Were we all ideally
astute logicians,were we all fullyapprised of all the necessarycon-
sequences (supposingthis to be a well definedclass) of everypropo-
sition,perhaps then the epistemicoperatorswould turn into fully
penetratingoperators.That is, assuming that if P entails Q, we
know that P entails Q, then every epistemic operator is a pene-
tratingoperator: the epistemicoperatorspenetrateto all the known
consequencesof a proposition.
It is this latter,slightlymodified,claim that I mean to reject.
Therefore,I shall assume throughoutthe discussionthat when Q
is a necessaryconsequence of P, everyrelevantagent knows that it
is. I shall be dealing with only the known consequences (in most
cases because theyare immediateand obvious consequences).What
I wish to show is that,even under this special restriction,the epi-
stemicoperatorsare onlysemi-penetrating.
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS IOI I

I thinkmany philosopherswould disagree with this contention.

The conviction is that the epistemic worth of a proposition is
hereditaryunder entailment,that whatever the epistemic worth
of P, at least the same value must be accorded the known conse-
quences of P. This convictionfindsexpressionin a varietyof ways.
Epistemiclogic: if S knowsthatP, and knowsthatP entails Q,then
S knows that Q. Probabilitytheory:if A is probable, and B is a
logical consequence of A, then B is probable (relativeto the same
evidence, of course). Confirmationtheory:if evidence e tends to
confirmhypothesish, then e indirectlyconfirmsall the logical con-
sequencesof h. But perhaps the best evidencein favorof supposing
that most philosophershave taken the epistemic operators to be
fullypenetratingis the way theyhave argued and the obvious as-
sumptionsthat structuretheirarguments.Anyone who has argued
in the followingway seemsto me to be assumingthe thesisof pene-
trability(as I shall call it): if you do not know whetherQ is true
or not, and P cannot be true unless Q is true,then you (obviously)
do not know whetherP is true or not. A slightlymore elaborate
form of the same argumentgoes like this: If S does not know
whetheror not Q is true,then for all he knows it mightbe false.
If Q is false, however,then P must also be false. Hence, for all S
knows,P may be false. Therefore,S does not know that P is true.
This pattern of argumentis sprinkled throughoutthe epistemo-
logical literature.Almost all skeptical objections trade on it. S
claims to know that thisis a tomato.A necessaryconsequenceof its
being a tomatois that it is not a cleverimitationwhich only looks
and feels (and, if you will, tastes) like a tomato. But S does not
know that it is not a cleverimitationthat only looks and feels(and
tastes)like a tomato. (I assume here that no one is prepared to ar-
gue that anythingthat looks, feels,and tasteslike a tomato to S
mustbe a tomato.)Therefore,S does not know thatthisis a tomato.
We can, of course, reply with G. E. Moore that we certainlydo
know it is a tomato (aftersuch an examination)and since tomatoes
are not imitationswe know that this is not an imitation.It is in-
terestingto note that this replypresupposesthe same principle as
does the skepticalobjection: theyboth assume that if S knows that
this is a P, and knows that everyP is a Q, then S knows that this
is a Q. The only differenceis that the skeptic performsa modus
tollens, Moore a modus ponens. Neither questions the principle
itself.
Whetherit be a question of dreamsor demons,illusionsor fakes,
the same patternof argumentemerges.If you know this is a chair,
1012 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

you must know that you are not dreaming(or being deceived by a
cunningdemon), since its being a (real) chair entails that it is not
simplya figmentof your own imagination.Such argumentsassume
that the epistemic operators,and in particular the operator 'to
know', penetrateto all the known consequencesof a proposition.
If these operatorswere not penetrating,many of these objections
mightbe irrelevant.Consider the followingexchange:
S: How strangelTherearetomatoes growing in myappletree.
K: That isn'tstrangeat all. Tomatoes,afterall, are physicalobjectsand
whatis so strangeabout physicalobjectsgrowingin yourapple tree?
What makes K's reply so silly is that he is treatingthe operator
'strangethat' as a fullypenetratingoperator: it cannot be strange
that there are tomatoesgrowingin the apple tree unless the con-
sequences of this (e.g., thereare objectsgrowingin yourapple tree)
are also strange.Similarly,it may not be at all relevantto object
to someone who claims to know that there are tomatoes in the
apple tree that he does not know, cannot be absolutelysure, that
thereare reallyany material objects. Whetheror not this is a rele-
vant objection will depend on whetheror not this particularcon-
sequence of there being tomatoesin the apple tree is one of the
consequences to which the epistemicoperatorspenetrate.What I
wish to argue in the remainderof thispaper is that the traditional
skepticalargumentsexploit preciselythose consequencesof a prop-
osition to which the epistemicoperatorsdo not penetrate,precisely
those consequenceswhich distinguishthe epistemicoperatorsfrom
thefullypenetratingoperators.
In supportof this claim let me begin with some examples which
are, I think,fairlyintuitive and then turn to some more prob-
lematiccases. I shall begin with the operator'reason to believe that'
althoughwhat I have to say could be said as well with any of them.
This particularoperatorhas the added advantage that if it can be
shown to be only semi-penetrating, then many accounts of knowl-
edge, those which interpretit as a form of justifiedtrue belief,
would also be committedto treating'knowingthat' as a semi-pene-
tratingoperator.For, presumably,'knowingthat' would not pene-
trateany deeperthan one's 'reasonsforbelievingthat'.
Suppose you have a reason to believe that the church is empty.
Must you have a reason to believe thatit is a church?I am not ask-
ing whetheryou generallyhave such a reason. I am askingwhether
one can have a reason to believe the churchemptywithouthaving
a reason to believe thatit is a churchwhichis empty.Certainlyyour
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS 1013

reason for believing that the churchis emptyis not itselfa reason
to believe it is a church; or it need not be. Your reason for believ-
ing the churchto be emptymay be that you just made a thorough
inspectionof it withoutfindinganyone. That is a good reason to
believe the church empty.Justas clearly,however,it is not a rea-
son, much less a good reason, to believe that what is emptyis a
church.The factis, or so it seems to me, I do not have to have any
reason to believe it is a church.Of course, I would never say the
churchwas empty,or that I had a reason to believe that the church
was empty,unless I believed, and presumablyhad a reason for so
believing,that it was a churchwhich was empty,but this is a pre-
sumed condition of my saying something,not of my having a rea-
son to believe something.Suppose I had simplyassumed (correctly
as it turnsout) that the building was a church.Would this show
that I had no reason to believe that the churchwas empty?
Suppose I am describingto you the "adventures"of my brother
Harold. Harold is visitingNew York for the firsttime,and he de-
cides to take a bus tour. He boards a crowdedbus and immediately
takesthe last remainingseat. The littleold lady he shoulderedaside
in reaching his seat stands over him glowering.Minutes pass. Fi-
nally,realizingthat mybrotheris not going to move,she sighsand
movesresignedlyto the back of the bus. Not much of an adventure,
but enough, I hope, to make my point. I said that the little old
lady realized thatmybrotherwould not move. Does thisimplythat
she realized that,or knew that, it was my brotherwho refusedto
move? Clearly not. We can say that S knows that X is Y without
implyingthat S knows that it is X which is Y. We do not have to
describeour little old lady as knowingthat the man or the person
would not move. We can say that she realized that, or knew that,
my brotherwould not move (minus,of course,this patternof em-
phasis), and we can say thisbecause sayingthisdoes not entail that
the little old lady knew that, or realized that, it was my brother
who refusedto move. She knew that my brotherwould not move,
and she knew this despitethe factthat she did not know something
that was necessarilyimplied by what she did know-viz., that the
personwho refusedto movewas mybrother.
I have argued elsewherethat to see thatA is B, that the rosesare
wilted for example, is not to see, not even to be able to see, that
theyare roses which are wilted.' To see that the widow is limping
is not to see that it is a widow who is limping.I am now arguing
1 Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: UniversityPress, 1969), pp. 93-112, and also
"Reasons and Consequences,"Analysis (April 1968).
104 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

that this same featureholds for all epistemicoperators.I can know

thatthe rosesare wiltingwithoutknowingthat theyare roses,know
that the water is boiling without knowing that it is water, and
prove that the square root of 2 is smaller than the square root of
3 and, yet,be unable to prove what is entailed by this-viz., that
the number2 has a square root.
The generalpoint may be put thisway: thereare certainpresup-
positions associated with a statement.These presuppositions,al-
thoughtheirtruthis entailed by the truthof the statement,are not
part of what is operated on when we operate on the statementwith
one of our epistemic operators.The epistemic operators do not
penetrateto these presuppositions.For example, in sayingthat the
coffeeis boiling I assertthat the coffeeis boiling, but in asserting
this I do not assertthat it is coffeewhich is boiling. Rather,this is
taken forgranted,assumed,presupposed,or what have you. Hence,
when I say that I have a reason to believe that the coffeeis boiling,
I am not sayingthat thisreason applies to the fact that it is coffee
which is boiling. This is still presupposed.I may have such a rea-
son, of course,and chances are good that I do have such a reason
or I would not have referredto what I believe to be boiling as
coffee,but to have a reason to believe the coffeeis boiling is not,
thereby,to have a reason to believe it is coffeewhich is boiling.
One would expect that if this is true of the semi-penetrating op-
erators,then it should also be trueof the nonpenetratingoperators.
They also should fail to reach the presuppositions.This is exactly
what we find.It may be accidental that the two truckscollided,but
not at all accidental that it was two trucksthat collided. Trucks
were the only vehiclesallowed on the road that day, and so it was
not at all accidental or a matterof chance that the accident took
place between two trucks.Still, it was an accident that the two
truckscollided. Or suppose Mrs. Murphymistakenlygives her cat
some dog food. It need not be a mistakethat she gave the food to
her cat, or some food to a cat. This was intentional.What was a
mistakewas thatit was dog food thatshe gave to her cat.
Hence, the firstclass of consequences that differentiate the epi-
stemicoperatorsfromthe fullypenetratingoperatorsis the class of
consequencesassociated with the presuppositionsof a proposition.
The fact that the epistemicoperatorsdo not penetrateto thesepre-
suppositionsis what helps to make themsemi-penetrating. And this
is an extremelyimportantfact. For it would appear that if this is
true,then to know thatthe flowersare wiltedI do not have to know
that theyare flowers(which are wilted) and, therefore, do not have
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS 1015

to know all thoseconsequenceswhich followfromthe factthatthey

are flowers, real flowers,whichI know to be wilted.
Rather than pursue this line, however,I would like to turn to
what I considerto be a moresignificant set of consequences-"more
significant"because theyare the consequencesthat are directlyin-
volved in most skepticalarguments.Suppose we assertthat x is A.
Consider some predicate,'B', which is incompatiblewith A, such
that nothing can be both A and B. It then followsfromthe fact
that x is A that x is not B. Furthermore,if we conjoin B with any
otherpredicate,Q, it followsfromthe factthat x is A that x is not-
(B and Q). I shall call this type of consequence a contrastconse-
quence, and I am interestedin a particularsubset of these; for I
believe the most tellingskepticalobjectionsto our ordinaryknowl-
edge claims exploit a particularset of these contrastconsequences.
The exploitation proceeds as follows: someone purportsto know
that x is A, that the wall is red, say. The skepticnow findsa predi-
cate 'B' that is incompatiblewith 'A'. In this particular example
we may let 'B' stand forthe predicate'is white'. Since 'x is red' en-
tails 'x is not white' it also entailsthatx is not-(whiteand Q)where
'Q' is any predicatewe care to select.Therefore,the skepticselects
a 'Q' that gives expressionto a condition or circumstanceunder
which a white wall would appear exactly the same as a red wall.
For simplicitywe may let 'Q' stand for: 'cleverlyilluminated to
look red'. We now have this chain of implications:'x is red' entails
'x is not white' entails 'x is not white cleverlyilluminatedto look
red'. If 'knowing that' is a penetratingoperator,then if anyone
knows that the wall is red he must know that it is not white clev-
erlyilluminatedto look red. (I assumehere that the relevantparties
know thatif x is red, it cannot be whitemade to look red.) He must
know that this particular contrastconsequence is true. The ques-
tion is: do we, generallyspeaking,know anythingof the sort?Nor-
mally we never take the trouble to check the lighting.We seldom
acquire any special reasons for believing the lightingnormal al-
thoughwe can talk vaguely about therebeing no reason to think
it unusual. The fact is that we habitually take such mattersfor
granted,and although we normallyhave good reasons for making
such routine assumptions,I do not think these reasons are suffi-
cientlygood, not withoutspecial precautionarychecks in the par-
ticular case, to say of the particular situation we are in that we
know conditionsare normal.To illustrate,let me give you another
example-a silly one, but no more silly than a great number of
skepticalargumentswith which we are all familiar.You take your
Ioi6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

son to the zoo, see several zebras, and, when questioned by your
son, tell him theyare zebras. Do you know theyare zebras?Well,
most of us would have little hesitationin sayingthat we did know
this. We know what zebras look like, and, besides, this is the city
zoo and the animals are in a pen clearly marked "Zebras." Yet,
something'sbeing a zebra implies that it is not a mule and, in par-
ticular, not a mule cleverlydisguised by the zoo authorities to
look like a zebra. Do you know that these animals are not mules
cleverlydisguisedby the zoo authoritiesto look like zebras?If you
are temptedto say "Yes" to this question, think a moment about
what reasons you have, what evidence you can produce in favor
of this claim. The evidence you had for thinking them zebras
has been effectively neutralized,since it does not count toward
their not being mules cleverlydisguised to look like zebras. Have
you checked with the zoo authorities? Did you examine the
animals closely enough to detect such a fraud? You might do
this,of course,but in most cases you do nothingof the kind. You
have some general uniformitieson which you rely,regularitiesto
which you give expressionby such remarksas, "That isn't very
likely" or "Why should the zoo authoritiesdo that?" Granted,the
hypothesis(if we may call it that) is not veryplausible, givenwhat
we know about people and zoos. But the question here is not
whetherthis alternativeis plausible, not whetherit is more or less
plausible than that there are real zebras in the pen, but whether
you know that thisalternativehypothesisis false. I don't thinkyou
do. In this I agree with the skeptic.I part companywith the skep-
tic only when he concludes from this that, therefore,you do not
know that the animals in the pen are zebras. I part with him be-
cause I rejectthe principlehe uses in reachingthis conclusion-the
principle that if you do not know that Q is true,when it is known
thatP entails Q, thenyou do not knowthatP is true.
What I am suggestingis that we simply admit that we do not
know that some of thesecontrasting"skepticalalternatives"are not
the case, but refuseto admit that we do not know what we orig-
inally said we knew. My knowingthat the wall is red certainlyen-
tails that the wall is red; it also entails that the wall is not white
and, in particular,it entails that the wall is not white cleverlyillu-
minated to look red. But it does not follow fromthe fact that I
know that the wall is red that I know that it is not white cleverly
illuminated to look red. Nor does it follow from the fact that I
know that those animals are zebras that I know that theyare not
mules cleverlydisguisedto look like zebras. These are some of the
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS IOI7

contrast consequences to which the epistemic operators do not

penetrate.
Aside fromassertingthis,what argumentscan be produced to sup-
port it? I could proceed by multiplyingexamples, but I do not
thinkthat examples alone will supportthe full weightof thisview.
The thesis itself is sufficientlycounterintuitiveto render contro-
versial most of the crucial examples. Anyone who is already con-
vinced thatskepticismis wrongand who is yettroubledby the sorts
of skepticalargumentsI have mentionedwill, no doubt, take this
itselfas an argumentin favorof my claim that the epistemicoper-
ators are only semi-penetrating. This, however,hardly constitutes
an argument against skepticism. For this we need independent
groundsfor thinking that the epistemic operatorsdo not penetrate
to the contrastconsequences. So I shall proceed in a more systematic
manner. I shall offeran analogy with three other operatorsand
condude by making some general remarksabout what I thinkcan
be learned fromthis analogy. The firstoperator is 'explains why'
or,moresuggestively (forthepurposesof thisanalogy):
reason)that(orwhy)...
(A) R is thereason(explanatory
For example, the reasonwhyS quit smokingwas thathe was afraid
of gettingcancer.The second operatorhas to do withreasonsagain,
but in this case it is a reason which tends to justifyone in doing
something:
(B) R is a reasonfor... (S to do Y).2
For example, the fact that theyare selling the verysame (type of)
car here much more cheaply than elsewhereis a reason to buy it
here ratherthan elsewhere.The status of this as a reason will, of
course, depend on a varietyof circumstances,but situations can
easilybe imagined in which thiswould be a reason forsomeone to
buy the car here. Finally, thereis a particularmodal relationship
whichmaybe construedas a sententialoperator:
(C) R wouldnotbe thecaseunless. . .
For example, he would not have bid seven no-trumpunless he had
all four aces. I shall abbreviatethis operator as 'R ->. . .'; hence,
our example could be written'he bid seven no-trump-> he had all
fouraces'.
2 Unlike our other operators, this one does not have a propositional op-

erand. Despite the rather obvious differencesbetween this case and the others,
I still thinkit useful to call attentionto its analogous features.
ioi8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Each of these operatorshas featuressimilar to those of our epi-

stemic operators.If one retracesthe ground we have already cov-
ered,one will find,I think,thattheseoperatorsall penetratedeeper
than the typicalnonpenetratingoperator.If R explains why (or is
the reason that) P and Q are the case, then it explains why (is the
reason that) Q is the case.3 If I can explain why Bill and Harold
are always invited to every party, I can explain why Harold is
always invited to everyparty.From the fact that it was a mistake
for me to quit my job it does not follow that it was a mistakefor
me to do something,but if I had a reason to quit my job, it does
follow that I had a reason to do something.And if the grasswould
not be green unless it had plentyof sunshineand water,it follows
thatit would not be greenunlessit had water.
Furthermore,the similaritiespersistwhen one considersthe pre-
suppositional consequences.I argued that the epistemicoperators
fail to penetrateto the presuppositions;the above threeoperators
display the same feature.In explaining why he takes his lunch to
work,I do not (or need not) explain why he goes to work or why
he worksat all. The explanation may be obvious in some cases, of
course,but the fact is I need not be able to explain why he works
(he is so wealthy)to explain why he takes his lunch to work (the
cafeteriafood is so bad). The reason why the elms on Main Street
are dyingis not the reason thereare elms on Main Street.I have a
reason to feed my cat, no reason (not, at least, the same reason) to
have a cat. And although it is quite true that he would not have
known about our plans if the secretaryhad not told him, it does
not follow thathe would not have known about our plans if some-
one otherthan thesecretaryhad told him. That is, (He knew about
our plans) -- (The secretarytold him) even though it is not true
that (He knew about our plans) -- (It was the secretarywho told
him). Yet, the fact that it was the secretarywho told him is (I take
it) a presuppositionalconsequenceof the factthat thesecretarytold
him. Similarly,if George is out to set fireto the firstemptybuild-
ing he finds,it may be true to say that George would not have set
fireto the churchunless it (the church)was empty,yet false to say
3 One must be careful not to confuse sentential conjunction with similar-
sounding expressionsinvolving a relationship between two things. For example,
to say Bill and Susan got married (if it is intended to mean that they married
each other), although it entails that Susan got married, does not do so by sim-
plification.'Reason why' penetrates through logical simplification,not through
the type of entailment representedby these two propositions.That is, the rea-
son they got married is that they loved each oher; that they loved each other
is not the reason Susan got married.
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS 10I9

that George would not have set fireto the churchunless it was a
church.
I now wish to argue thatthesethreeoperatorsdo not penetrateto
a certainset of contrastconsequences.To the extent that the epi-
stemicoperatorsare similar to these operators,we may then infer,
by analogy,that theyalso fail to penetrateto certaincontrastcon-
sequences. This is, admittedly,a weak formof argument,depend-
ing as it does on the groundsthereare for thinkingthat the above
threeoperatorsand the epistemicoperatorsshare the same logic in
this respect.Nonetheless,the analogy is revealing.Some may even
findit persuasive.4
(A) The pink walls in my living room clash with my old green
couch. Recognizingthis,I proceed to paint the walls a compatible
shade of green.This is the reason I have, and give,forpaintingthe
walls green.Now, in having thisexplanation forwhyI painted the
walls green, I do not think I have an explanation for two other
things,both of whichare entailedby what I do have an explanation
for. I have not explained why I did not, instead of painting the
walls green,buy a new couch or cover the old one with a suitable
slip cover.Nor have I explained why,instead of painting the walls
green,I did not paint themwhite and illuminatethemwith green
light.The same effectwould have been achieved,the same purpose
would have been served,albeit at much greaterexpense.
I expect someone to object as follows: although the explanation
given for painting the walls green does not, by itself,explain why
the couch was not changed instead, it nonethelesssucceeds as an
explanation forwhy the walls were painted green only in so far as
thereis an explanation forwhythe couch was not changed instead.
If thereis no explanation for why I did not change the couch in-
stead, there has been no real, no complete,examination for why
thewalls werepainted green.
I thinkthis objection wrong.I may,of course,have an explana-
tion forwhyI did not buy a new couch: I love the old one or it has
sentimentalvalue. But then again I may not. It just neveroccurred
to me to change the couch; or (if someone thinksthat its not oc-
4I think that those who are inclined to give a causal account of knowledge
should be particularly interestedin the operator 'R ->. . .' since, presumably,
it will be involved in many instancesof knowledge ("many" not "all," since one
might wish to except some form of immediate knowledge-knowledge of one's
own psychologicalstate-from the causal account). If this operator is only semi-
penetrating,then any account of knowledge that relies on the relationship ex-
pressed by this operator (as I believe causal accounts must) will be very close
to givinga "semi-penetrating"account of 'knowing that'.
I020 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

curringto me is an explanation of whyI did not change the couch)

I may have thoughtof it but decided, for what reasons (if any) I
cannot remember,to keep the couch and paint the walls. That is to
say,I cannot explain whyI did not change the couch. I thoughtof
it but I did not do it. I do not know why.Still, I can tell you why
I painted thewalls green.They clashedwiththecouch.
(B) The fact that theyare sellingXs so much more cheaplyhere
than elsewheremaybe a reason to buy yourXs here,but it certainly
need not be a reason to do what is a necessaryconsequenceof buy-
ing your Xs here-viz., not stealing your Xs here.
(C) Let us suppose that S is operating in perfectlynormal cir-
cumstances,a set of circumstancesin which it is true to say that
the wall he sees would not (now) look green to him unless it was
green (if it were any other color it would look differentto him).
Althoughwe can easily imagine situationsin which this is true,it
does not follow that the wall would not (now) look green to S if it
werewhitecleverlyilluminatedto look green.That is,
(i) The walllooksgreen(toS) -> thewallis green.
to
illuminated
(ii) The wall is greenentailsthewall is notwhitecleverly
lookgreen(toS).
are both true;yet,it is not truethat
(iii) The wall looks green(to S) -> the wall is not whitecleverlyillu-
minatedtolookgreen(toS).
There are dozens of examples that illustratethe relative impene-
trabilityof this operator.We can trulysay that A and B would
not have collided if B had not swervedat the last momentand yet
concede that theywould have collided withoutany swerveon the
part of B if the directionin whichA was movinghad been suitably
alteredin thebeginning.5
5 The explanation for why the modal relationship between R and P (R > P)
fails to carry over (penetrate) to the logical consequences of P (i.e., R Q
where Q is a logical consequence of P) is to be found in the set of circumstances
that are taken as given, or held fixed, in subjunctive conditionals. There are
certain logical consequences of P which, by bringing in a referenceto circum-
stances tacitly held fixed in the original subjunctive (R -> P), introduce a pos-
sible variation in these circumstancesand, hence, lead to a differentframework
of fixed conditions under which to assess the truth of R -> Q. For instance, in
the last example in the text, when it is said that A and B would not have col-
lided if B had not swerved at the last moment, the truth of this conditional
clearly takes it as given that A and B possessed the prior trajectoriesthey in
fact had on the occasion in question. Given certain facts, including the fact
that they were traveling in the direction they were, they would not have col-
lided if B had not swerved. Some of the logical consequences of the statement
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS I02I

The structureof thesecases is virtuallyidenticalwith thatwhich

appeared in the case of the epistemicoperators,and I thinkby look-
ing just a little more closely at this structurewe can learn some-
thingveryfundamentalabout our class of epistemicoperatorsand,
in particular,about what it means to know something.If I may
put it this way,within the contextof these operatorsno fact is an
island. If we are simplyrehearsingthe facts,then we can say that
it is a fact that Brenda did not take any dessert(though it was in-
cluded in the meal). We can say thiswithouta thoughtabout what
sort of person Brenda is or what she mighthave done had she or-
dered dessert.However,if we put thisfactinto,say,an explanatory
context,if we tryto explain thisfact,it suddenlyappears withina
networkof related facts,a networkof possible alternativeswhich
serveto definewhat it is that is being explained. What is being ex-
plained is a functionof two things-not only the fact (Brenda did
not orderany dessert),but also the range of relevantalternatives.A
relevantalternativeis an alternativethat mighthave been realized
in the existingcircumstancesif the actual state of affairshad not
materialized.6When I explain whyBrenda did not orderany dessert
by sayingthat she was full (was on a diet, did not like anythingon
thedessertmenu), I explain whyshe did not orderany dessertrather
than,as opposed to, or instead of orderingsome dessertand eating
it. It is this competingpossibilitywhich helps to definewhat it is
thatI am explainingwhen I explain whyBrenda did not order any
dessert.Change this contrast,introducea differentset of relevant
alternatives,and you change what it is that is being explained and,
therefore, what counts as an explanation,even though (as it were)
the same fact is being explained. Consider the followingcontrasts:
orderingsome dessertand throwingit at the waiter; orderingsome

that B swerved do not, however, leave these conditions unaltered-e.g., B did

not move in a perfectlystraightline in a direction 2? counterclockwiseto the
direction it actually moved. This consequence "tinkers" with the circumstances
originally taken as given (held fixed), and a failure of penetration will usually
arise when this occurs. It need not be true that A and B would not have col-
lided if B had moved in a perfectlystraightline in a direction 20 counterclock-
wise to the directionit actually moved.
6 I am aware that this characterizationof "a relevant alternative" is not, as it
stands,very illuminating. I am not sure I can make it more precise. What I am
after can be expressed this way: if Brenda had ordered dessert,she would not
have thrownit at the waiter, stuffedit in her shoes, or taken it home to a sick
friend (she has no sick friend).These are not alternativesthat might have been
realized in the existing circumstancesif the actual state of affairshad not ma-
terialized. Hence, they are not relevant alternatives.In other words, the 'might
have been' in my characterizationof a relevant alternativewill have to be un-
packed in termsof counterfactuals.
I022 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

dessertand takingit home to a sickfriend.With thesecontrastsnone

of the above explanations are any longer explanations of why
Brenda did not orderdessert.Anyonewho reallywantsto know why
Brenda did not orderdessertand throwit at the waiterwill not be
helped by being told that she was full or on a diet. This is only to
say that,withinthe contextof explanation and withinthe context
of our other operators,the propositionon which we operate must
be understoodas embeddedwithina matrixof relevantalternatives.
We explain whyP, but we do so withina frameworkof competing
alternativesA, B, and C. Moreover,if the possibilityD is not within
thiscontrastingset,not withinthisnetworkof relevantalternatives,
then even thoughnot-D followsnecessarilyfromthe fact,P, which
we do explain, we do not explain whynot-D. Though the fact that
Brenda did not orderdessertand throwit at the waiterfollowsnec-
essarilyfromthe factthat she did not order dessert(the fact that is
explained), this necessaryconsequence is not explained by the ex-
planation given. The only contrastconsequencesto which this op-
eratorpenetratesare thosewhichfiguredin the originalexplanation
as relevantalternatives.
So it is with our epistemicoperators.To know that x is A is to
know that x is A withina frameworkof relevantalternatives,B, C,
and D. This set of contrasts,togetherwith the factthatx is A, serve
to definewhat it is that is knownwhen one knowsthat x is A. One
cannot change thisset of contrastswithoutchangingwhat a person
is said to know when he is said to know thatx is A. We have subtle
ways of shiftingthesecontrastsand, hence, changingwhat a person
is said to know withoutchangingthesentencethatwe use to express
what he knows.Take the fact that Leftykilled Otto. By changing
the emphasispatternwe can invoke a different set of contrastsand,
hence,alterwhat it is thatS is said to know when he is said to know
that Leftykilled Otto. We can say, for instance,that S knows that
Leftykilled Otto. In this case (and I thinkthis is the way we usu-
ally hear the sentencewhen there is no special emphasis) we are
being told that S knows the identityof Otto's killer, that it was
Leftywho killed Otto. Hence, we expect S's reasons for believing
that Leftykilled Otto to consist in facts that single out Lefty as
the assailant rather than George, Mike, or someone else. On the
otherhand, we can say that S knows that Leftykilled Otto. In this
case we are being told that S knows what Lefty did to Otto; he
killed him ratherthan merelyinjuringhim, killed him ratherthan
merelythreateninghim, etc. A good reason forbelievingthatLefty
killed Otto (ratherthan merelyinjuringhim) is that Otto is dead,
 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS I 023

but thisis not much of a reason,if it is a reason at all, forbelieving

that Leftykilled Otto. Changing the set of contrasts(from 'Lefty
ratherthan Georgeor Mike' to 'killed ratherthan injured or threat-
ened') by shiftingthe emphasispatternchangeswhat it is that one
is alleged to know when one is said to know thatLeftykilled Otto.7
The same point can be made here as we made in the case of explana-
tion: the operatorwill penetrateonly to thosecontrastconsequences
which formpart of the networkof relevantalternativesstructuring
the originalcontextin which a knowledgeclaim was advanced. Just
as we have not explained why Brenda did not order some dessert
and throwit at the waiterwhen we explained whyshe did not order
some dessert(although what we have explained-her not ordering
any dessert-entails this),so also in knowingthat Leftykilled Otto
(knowingthat what Leftydid to Otto was kill him) we do not nec-
essarily(althoughwe may) know that Leftykilled Otto (know that
it was Leftywho killed Otto). Recall the example of the little old
lady who knew that my brotherwould not move withoutknowing
thatit was mybrotherwho would not move.
The conclusionsto be drawn are the same as thosein the case of
explanation. Just as we can say that within the original setting,
withinthe original frameworkof alternativesthat definedwhat we
were tryingto explain, we did explain why Brenda did not order
any dessert,so also within the original setting,within the set of
contraststhatdefinedwhat it was we were claimingto know,we did
know that the wall was red and did know that it was a zebra in the
pen.
To introducea novel and enlargedset of alternatives,as the skep-
tic is inclined to do with our epistemicclaims,is to exhibit conse-
quences of what we know,or have reason to believe,which we may
not know,may not have a reason to believe; but it does not show
thatwe did not know,did not have a reason to believe,whateverit
is that has theseconsequences.To argue in thisway is, I submit,as
much a mistakeas arguingthatwe have not explained whyBrenda
did not order dessert(withinthe original,normal,setting)because
we did not explain why she did not order some and throwit at
thewaiter.
FRED I. DRETSKE

UniversityofWisconsin
7 The same example works nicely with the operator 'R .. .'. It may be true
to say that Otto would not be dead unless Lefty killed him (unless what Lefty
did to him was kill him) without its being true that Otto would not be dead
unless Leftykilled him (unless it was Leftywho killed him).