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Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change

Article  in  Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review · December 2017

DOI: 10.1515/lfpr-2017-0005

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Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review vol. 36 (2017)
DOI: 10.1515/lfpr-2017-0005

Securitization and Lithuania’s

National Security Change

Ieva Karpavičiūtė*

Abstract

The paper addresses the security threat perception and securitization of existential threats in
Lithuania. It focuses upon the securitization theory and its ability to explain the change of national
security agendas as affected by the changes in national identity and existential security threats. It
takes into account the internal and external factors that are shaping the objective and subjective
national threat perception. The paper applies O. Waever’s securitization theory with an aim to
explain how the national security threats are being addressed and perceived in Lithuania. Moreover,
the paper is developed against the backdrop of the most recent developments in securitization theory
and evolution of its theoretical perceptions of identity, existential threats, and legitimacy. It also
discusses the possibility of inclusion of hybrid security threats into an analysis of securitization.
The empirical part of the article assesses the most recent security challenges, provides evaluation of
changes in national security perception, and portrays the dynamics of national security threats as
defined in the National Security Strategies and the Military Doctrine. The paper focuses upon the
most recent dynamics in security policy of Lithuania. It also takes into account the hybrid nature
of security threats and the reaction to hybrid security elements such as: cyber security, information
security, and international terrorism.

Keywords

Securitization theory, national security, identity, hybrid security threats, existential threats,
change, Lithuania

* Ieva Karpavičiūtė is a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University, Department of Political Science. In

2010 Ieva has defended PhD thesis “Analysis of regional security dynamics. Internal and external
factors and their interplay“. She is an author of a number of scientific articles on Lithuanian foreign
policy, regional security, and transnational security threats. Her research is focused upon international
relations, foreign policy analysis, security studies, theories of international relations, arms control,
and public diplomacy. She also has 4 year‘s experience while working at NATO International Staff,
Arms Control and Coordinating Section. E-mail: ieva.karpaviciute@vdu.lt
© 2017 Ieva Karpavičiūtė. This is an open access article licensed under theUnauthenticated
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10 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

Introduction

‘Words matter. Words have consequences.’ — Robert Byrd, US Senator

The security concept usually marks a constant adaptation of the national

security and defence system, and its reaction to internal and external threats and
challenges. The interplay of internal and external factors determines a national
security perception and its constant adaptation and change. Internally, the most
significant factors that affect the national security threat perception and its change
are political system, national security identity, historical memories, national interests
and their shifts. Needless to say, the internal factors that mark significant changes
and help identifying the direction of a national security policy are usually closely
tied with the external impacts, determining the perception and institutionalisation
of security threats. External security dynamics in the closest neighbourhood, the
regional security and stability, the transnational processes that could easily cross
national borders, such as transnational organised crime, global pandemics, cyber
threats, and international terrorism are usually taken into account by national
decision-makers responsible for security policy.
According to the authors of the Securitisation theory (introduced by O.
Waever and B. Buzan), internal and external factors determine the securitisation
and de-securitisation process ongoing within the state, where national leaders take
decisions regarding which security threats are the most significant to be addressed
and should be included into the national security agendas or which ones are not
relevant anymore and could be taken out. Securitisation theory has three main
origins: speech act theory, a Schmittian understanding of security and exceptional
politics, and traditionalist security debates.1 This multifaceted approach builds an
analytical ground to merge the post-positivistic/discursive analysis elements with
more positivistic backbone of national security (as a classical perception of the
physical/military security of nation state and its physical survival).
The Securitization theory merges positivistic ontology with post-positivistic
epistemology, allowing taking into account different analysis levels, various types
of security threats, numerous referent objects and finally, enabling to better
understand and explain change. The securitization theory serves as a unique analysis
framework, that facilitates perception and explanation of security-related processes.
As O. Waever rightly notices, that ‘the classical Copenhagen School version of

1
B. Buzan, L. Hansen The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge University Press,
2009, p. 2013
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 11

securitization has a theory that takes the form of a model’.2 On the other side, this
theory leaves a lot of space for interpretation that leads to numerous interpretations
of the theory and ends up in almost uncontrolled diffusion of the theoretical
adaptations and sometimes even losing the initial foundation of the theory.
This article attempts to depict the most recent developments in Lithuania’s
national security by conceptually pinning together three major analytical
discussions, namely, nature, impact and effects of securitization process. It touches
upon securitization process and role of national identity as well as how identity
affects existential threats that are being perceived by nation states as crucial for
their survival and continuity of the nation state per se. Secondly, it touches upon
internal and external factors that serve as major change driving factors affecting the
national security perceptions and agendas. In particular, how internal and external
triggers direct securitization process and how the nation state, by the process of
securitization, adapts to the changing security environment. And thirdly, how
different external and internal challenges affect different types of security threats
that are securitized by the nation state. It also takes into account the hybrid nature
of the security threats and reaction to hybrid security elements, such as, cyber
security, information security, and international terrorism.
The abovementioned elements, namely, a role of national collective identity in
the process of securitization and the process of change in the context of perception
of existential threats has not been duly addressed, neither by the first, nor by the
second wave of the securitization scholars. Moreover, the hybrid nature of security
threats and how it can affect the securitization process has not been addressed
by authors focusing upon securitization and ontological security. Theoretically,
this article focuses upon the analytical possibilities to expand the securitization
theory by incorporating hybrid security concept into the analysis, as challenging
the securitization process, perception of security and in-security as well as the
relationship between referent object and subject of securitization.

Second wave of securitization theory

Since its introduction in later 1990s, the Securitization theory has evolved
and attracted significant attention from a large group of security scholars.3 As U.
2
O. Waever, The theory act: Responsibility and exactitude as seen from securitization, International
Relations, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2015, p. 125.
3
Inter alia, Balzacq, 2005, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016; Bourbeau, 2014; Côté, 2016; Croft, 2010, 2012;
Browning and Joenniemi, 2017; Donnelly, 2013; Floyd, 2011; Hansen, 2011; Hagmann, 2015;
Hayes, 2009; McDonald, 2008; Olersker, 2014; Roe, 2008, 2014; Salter,; 2008; Stritzel, 2007,
2012, 2014, 2015; Taureck, 2006; Wilhelmsen, 2017, Zimmermann, 2017.Unauthenticated
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12 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

Gad and K. Petersen highlighted, ‘it was not until the 2000’s that the concept of
securitization became widely used to describe the articles published in international
relations journals; this development reflects the increasing popularity of the term
and increasing theoretical significance from 2000 onwards’.4 Notably, some authors
focus upon further improvement of the theory, while the others just focus upon the
concept of securitization. Recently, ‘securitization’ has become a catchy word that
is sometimes being overused. Sometimes authors apply the securitization concept
without any significant meaning behind using it.
Notwithstanding, there is a significant group of authors who attempt to
improve the theory itself. They can be grouped into two major categories, firstly,
those who attempt to pursue more philosophical, sociological studies getting into
meta-theoretical analysis and focusing upon the ontological and epistemological
perceptions of securitization (for instance, Balzacq, 2005, 2011, 2014, 2015,
2016; Croft, 2010, 2012; Floyd, 2011; Hansen, 2011; Stritzel, 2007, 2012;
McDonald, 2008), and secondly, those who prioritize a more practical application
of securitization for the case studies and focus upon the distinctive theory-related
elements, for instance, democratic peace (Hayes, 2009), legitimacy (Wilhelmsen,
2017; Olesker, 2014, Floyed, 2011), legitimacy and authority (Balzaq, 2015) de-
securitization of minority (Olesker, 2014), routinized practices (Bourbeau, 2014),
counter-securitization (Stritzel, Chang, 2015), positive security (Roe, 2012),
human security (Roe, 2012), politics of mnemonical security (Malksoo, 2015),
and audience (Côté, 2016; Zimmermann, 2017; Wilhelmsen, 2017). Obviously, a
great variety of analytical directions indicate different analytical preferences. Some
authors prioritize positivistic ontology while distinctively focusing on national
level securitization process, while the others get deeper into the post-positivistic
ontology and discourse analysis of security.
The second wave of securitization studies lays the ground for deeper and more
complexed analysis of security, including the newly emerging security studies such
as ontological security and theorization of security practices. Moreover, all the above
mentioned approaches that represent this wave of securitization can be grouped
into three different strands, namely, revisionists (such as Balzacq, Floyed, Stritzel),
universalists (Hayes), and ones who distinctively focus upon the practices of the
speech act (McDonald). The first strand of scholars aims to revise the theory in
order to produce more analytically operational criteria for successful securitization;
another group of scholars focuses upon the theory beyond the West; the third

4
Ulrik Pram Gad, Karn Lund Petersen, Concepts of politics in securitization studies, Security
Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 4—5, 2011, p. 316.
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 13

group of scholars analyse how the security speech act and practices of state elite
combine to erase the distinction between ‘the exception’ and ‘the normal’.5
Notwithstanding, the very essence/nature of the securitization theory is quite
general and gives a lot of space for interpretation, that is why authors usually adapt/
adjust securitization theory to their distinctive case studies (be it territorial, focused
upon particular nation-states or functional, focused upon distinctive security
challenges or analytical issues (for instance, security practices, audiences, agency,
(de)securitization, legitimization process, etc.)). Evidently, the second wave research
brought new impetus and rejuvenated the securitization theory; it also expanded
the concept of securitization itself; at the same time, it challenged the securitization
theory with a great variety of different and sometimes incommensurable approaches
and research designs.
Against the abovementioned background, there are some elements that
prevent analysis from further dilution and help retaining the major cornerstones
of the analysis. To this end, Thierry Balzacq depicts three main advantages of
securitization as an analytical tool ‘in recasting securitization as an ideal type. The
first is that it improves understanding of the internal coherence of securitization,
without which, the concept might be indefinitely stretched out. Second, it
enables researchers to gauge the extent to which alternative readings and uses of
securitization are commensurable or not. Third, following Max Weber’s account,
capturing securitization through the lens of ideal type makes it possible to blend
interpretative understanding and causal explanation.’6 In addition to that, a
securitization is perceived as complete only if the warning/promise made in the
speech act is followed up by a change in relevant behaviour by a relevant agent
(the securitizing actor or someone instructed by the same) that is justified by this
agent with reference to the declared threat.7 The perception of an ideal type and the
process of securitization itself (speech act, process of justification and changes of
security agendas) are the main foundational elements that usually remain accepted
by the most of securitization authors.

5
Ulrik Pram Gad, Karn Lund Petersen, Concepts of politics in securitization studies, Security
Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 4—5, 2011, p. 316—317.
6
Tierry Balzacq, The ‘Essence’ of securitization: Theory, ideal type, and a sociological science of
security, International Relations, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2015, p. 103.
7
Rita Floyd, Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization
theory, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 4—5, 2011, p. 428—429.
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14 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

Identity and process of securitization

The Copenhagen School has greatly contributed to the development of

research that introduces identity as a referent object of security policy through
the concept of societal security.8 As B. Buzan, while explaining the process of
securitisation, highlighted, ‘if by means of an argument about the priority and
urgency of an existential threat, the securitising actor has managed to break free
the procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing
a case of securitization’. 9 This explanation accurately depicts the essence of the
securitization concept as crafted by B. Buzan and O. Waever, and provides the
essential elements embedded in their analytical framework, namely, existential
threats, state of urgency, securitizing actors, speech acts and adaptation/adjustment
of rules and procedures, with a particular focus on national security agendas.
National identity is perceived by B. Buzan and O. Waever as closely tied with the
securitization process.
For B. Buzan and O. Waever, identity becomes the defining point regarding
existential threats for a society,10 so all major changes in national identity will be
reflected in national security agendas and, in particular, they will affect and reflect
the set of existential threats. Moreover, collective identity and preservation of major
collective values can be explained by the perception of societal security, whereas
‘societal insecurity exists when members of a community view a development as
posing a threat to their survival as a community’.11 As Maria Mälksoo creatively
paraphrased G. Stein’s poem,12 ‘existential politics is security politics is identity
politics’.13
Notably, the founders of securitization theory focused upon identity in
relation to existential threats, whereas the representatives of the second wave of
securitization, usually remain distant from this relationship. Moreover, the role of
identity in the context of securitization process has never been comprehensively
addressed. McDonald observes that ‘by designing a universal framework for the
8
Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol.14, No. 3, 2014, p.
373. (Buzan et al., 1998: 119–120; Waever et al., 1993: 21)
9
B. Buzan, O. Waver, J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boudler, co: Lynner
Rienner, 1998, p. 25.
10
(Buzan and Waever, 1997: 242 in Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel,
Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014, p. 373.
11
Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014,
p. 373.
12
Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.
13
Maria Mälksoo, From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged
Europe, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2006, p. 278.
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 15

designation or construction of threat through speech acts, the Copenhagen School

ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors — such as dominant
narratives of identity — that condition both patterns of securitization and the
broader construction of security.’14 Evidently, the second wave securitization
scholars’ attention to identity and its role in securitization process is even more
limited if compared with the works of their predecessors.
Interestingly, scholars who are focusing upon philosophical and sociological
aspects of securitization tend to ignore identity (for instance, Balzacq, Floyd,
Stritzel); the authors pursuing functional or geographical case studies seem to be
more flexible with their approaches and sometimes touching upon identity in the
context of analysis of the securitization process (Mc Donald, 2008; Hayes, 200915;
Vultee, 2011), also securitization of identity itself (Mälksoo, 2015) or insecuritization
of identity (Croft, 2012) and securitization of citizenship through the identity
management process (Muller, 2010). But none of them touch upon identity as a
part of the nation-state building process and as a facilitator of change.
Some scholars highlight the significance of analysis level in the context of
securitization; for instance, B. Muller16 and M. Mälksoo17 focus upon identity
at the individual analysis level and connections with societal and nation-state
analysis levels by securitization process. The most significant level is societal and its
relations with individual and national analysis levels might facilitate the perception
of securitization process. R. Olesker defines societal security as being reflected
‘in the group’s ability to protect its identity as manifested in language, cultural,
and religious practices, and group beliefs.’18 F. Vultee19 observes securitization as a
media process and takes into account the societal as well as national identity impact
on the securitization process. F. Vultee, against the backdrop of media studies and
securitization, draws some identity-related insights, focused upon relationship

14
Matt McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 571.
15
Jarrod Hayes, Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the
Divergence of Response to India and Iran’s Nuclear Programs, International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 53, 2009, pp. 977—999.
16
Benjamir J. Muller, (Dis)qualified bodies: securitization, citizenship and ‘identity management’,
Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2010, pp. 279—294.
17
Maria Mälksoo, ‘Memory must be defended’: Beyond the politics of mnemonical security, Security
Dialogue 2015, Vol. 46, No. 3, 221–237.
18
Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol.14, No. 3, 2014,
p. 373.
19
Fred Vultee, Securitization as a Media Frame. What Happens When the Media Speak Security/in ed.
Tierry Balzacq (ed.), Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge,
2011, p. 77—93.
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16 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

between authorities, media and audience, and identity that might facilitate the
threat perception process. F. Vultee highlights the following:

‘Securitization will seem like a better choice when it seems like the natural
choice: the referential scheme that the right authorities (even, in many cases, the
appropriately official opposition) are saying in a way that makes contextual sense
in the newsroom and in the audience. The more closely they are bound by identity,
the more readily is a perceived threat to that identity passed along.’20

Scholars agree upon significance of identity of the context of legitimization

of the securitization process. For instance, M. Mälksoo (2015), similarly as
J. Wilhelmsen (2017, 2012) and R. Floyd (2011), touch upon legitimization
and legitimacy processes. While M. Mälksoo addresses public remembrances
(historical memory), J. Wilhelmsen gets into the legitimization of use of force. The
general thrust of the argument underlying this description of the securitization
process is in many respects in line with post-structuralist ideas of how policies
are constituted by identities and rely on accounts that make sense of them and
legitimize them as they are launched (Campbell, 1992; Hansen, 2006).21 B.
Muller underscores that ‘knowledge of one’s identity is critical, the question of
“authorizing access”’.22 Similarly, J. Wilhelmsen acknowledges that ‘references
to identities are necessary to represent and legitimize policies, but at the same
time these identities are constituted and reproduced through the formulation of
policies.’23 R. Floyd brings into play the moral, normative argument and highlights
‘the moral rightness of securitization is in part a function of the legitimacy of the
referent object, and legitimacy in turn is a function of the referent object being
conducive to human well-being.’24
P. Roe underscored the significance of legitimacy in the context of emergency
measures, ‘the argument has to be framed in such a way as to achieve the level

20
Fred Vultee, Securitization as a Media Frame. What Happens When the Media Speak Security/in ed.
Tierry Balzacq (ed.), Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge,
2011, p. 77—93.
21
Julie Wilhelmsen, How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist
foundation of securitization theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017, p. 169.
22
Benjamir J. Muller, (Dis)qualified bodies: securitization, citizenship and ‘identity management’,
Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2010, pp. 279—294.
23
Julie Wilhelmsen, How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist
foundation of securitization theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017, p. 169
24
Rita Floyd, Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization
theory, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 4—5, 2011, p. 432.
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 17

of resonance required to legitimize emergency measures.’25 Here, the emergency

measures can be tied to existential threats and identity as facilitating the legitimization
of emergency measures in the preservation of the core national interests and in
response to existential threats. The general thrust of the argument underlying
this description of the securitization process is in many respects in line with post-
structuralist notions of how policies are co-constituted by identities and rely on
accounts that make sense of them and legitimize them as they are launched.26 J.
Wilhelmsen aims at ‘broadening the focus of study to how referent object identity
and actor-hood are (re-)produced through securitization, and how the putative
“audience” contributes to this process.27’
Identity is also addressed not only in relation level analysis but also focusing
upon securitizing agents and ‘taking the level of agent, the investigator using
process-tracing could then decide to test, for instance, the effect of the securitizing
agent’s personal identity on the likely outcome of a securitizing move. This is not
out of reach as one may think. In a compelling study, Abdelal et al.28 have developed
the different ways in which identity could be treated as a “variable”.’29 However,
despite all the attempts, the conceptualisation and incorporation of identity into
securitization analysis models is rather limited, the second wave scholars remain
mainly ignorant and restrictive to identity-related issues.

Existential threats and identity

Some authors (as J. Nye) make a distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security
challenges and threats, but the recent trends reveal the strong convergence between
the two categories. ‘Soft security implicitly assumes that the state is not exposed
to existential, in particular, military threats from outside. Semi-soft security is
defined as being provided by well-functioning administration, police, customs
and border guards. Hard security is mainly of external significance. It is provided
by capabilities of a state to deter any external threats to the country and should
25
Paul Roe, Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization, Security Dialogue,
Vol. 35, No. 3, 2004, p. 281.
26
Julie Wilhelmsen, A post-structuralist reading of securitization theory, 2012.
27
Julie Wilhelmsen, How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist
foundation of securitization theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017, p.168.
28
Abdelal, W., Herrera,Y. M., Johnston, A. L, and McDermott, R. (eds) (2009) Measuring identity:
A guide for social scientists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.// in Tierry Balzacq (ed.),
Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge, 2011, p. 50.
29
Tierry Balzacq (ed.), Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge,
2011, p. 50
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18 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

this fail, to defend the country’s territorial integrity successfully. The notion of
hard security of course assumes the possibility not necessarily the probability of
a serious risk.’30 Usually, the ‘hard’ security issues are being prioritized, as they
are directly related to the existence/survival of the nation state, maintaining of its
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Notably, a concept of hybrid security, hybrid
war and hybrid threats blur the lines not only between war and peace, but also
between hard and soft, traditional and transnational/asymmetrical, existential and
non-existential security threats.
The perception of existential threats has been incorporated into the securitisation
theory by O. Waever and B. Buzan (1998, 1997, 2009) and addressed by R. Olesker
(2014), R. Floyd (2011), J. Wilhelmsen (2017), Bourbeau (2014), Hansen (2011),
and others. J. Wilhelmsen introduced few meaningful adjustments to the theory
by focusing upon the operationalisation of the existential threat, referent object
identity, legitimization certain material practices (such as war), and emergency
measures that are enabled in a discourse of existential threat.30 R. Floyd (2011)
focused upon the objectivity of existential threats; she defined objective existential
threats as ‘the threats to the existence of actors and orders regardless of whether
anyone has realized this’.31
B. Buzan, highlighted, ‘the invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing
the use of force, but more generally, it has opened the way for the state to mobilize,
or to take special powers, to handle existential threats’.32 Moreover, ‘by declaring a
moment of existential threat, the authority may take decisive exceptional actions
to address that threat’.33 R. Olesker underscores that security is not an objective
or material condition but rather an articulation by elites to reproduce hierarchical
conditions that characterize the political system and maintain the current power
position’.34 The case of Lithuania reveals quite an opposite, notably objective
existence/emergence of external threats may mobilize and unify all political actors
to act together ensuring the preservation and survival of a political system and
state-hood itself.

30
Julie Wilhelmsen, How does war become a legitimate undertaking? Re-engaging the post-structuralist
foundation of securitization theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017, p. 166.
31
R. Floyed, Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization
theory, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 4—5, 2011, p. 430.
32
B. Buzan, O. Waver, J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boudler, co: Lynner
Rienner, 1998, p. 21.
33
B. Buzan, O. Waver, J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boudler, co: Lynner
Rienner, 1998, p. 21.
34
Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014,
p. 374.
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 19

For securitization to be successful, the targeted audience of the speech-

act must accept that something is indeed an existential threat, thus requiring
exceptional measures to be adopted (Buzan et al., 1998: 17, 31, 34).35 In the same
vein, Julie Wilhelmsen rightly points out ‘based on understanding how policies are
produced and legitimized, <…> securitization [is perceived] as a process through
which a representation of something as an existential threat becomes dominant
at the expense of other representations and uncovering, the changing boundary
between this identity and that given to “referent object”’.36 She also highlights,
that “the undertaking of emergency measures against something that is said to be
threatening and in defence of the referent object would confirm and reinforce the
new identity boundaries that were drawn up and legitimize the undertaking of
emergency measures.’37
In addition, Roe defines this stage as the mobilization stage in which the
response to the threat is established (Roe, 2008: 620),38 but this process is much
more than just mobilization; it is about the process of adaptation of the political
system (nation state) to the new security realities. Securitization is thus a kind
of ‘call and response’ process: an actor makes a call that something is a matter
of ‘security’, and the audience must then respond with their acceptance of it as
such. The argument has to be framed in such a way as to achieve the level of
resonance required to legitimize emergency measures.39 In sum, securitization of
existential threats is about continuous adaptation, mobilization and legitimization
process, namely, continuous process of change and constant adaptation in reaction
to change.
Moreover, not only identity boundaries and legitimization of ‘emergency
measures’ are to be accounted, but also the identity change itself (as a system of
national values and norms), and how changing identities might directly affect
the securitization process that instigates the adaptation to new realities, changing
35
Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in Israel, Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014,
p. 374.
36
Julie Wilhelmsen, How Does War Become a Legitimate Undertaking? Re-Engaging the Post-
Structuralist Foundation Of Securitization Theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017,
p. 169.
37
Julie Wilhelmsen, How Does War Become a Legitimate Undertaking? Re-Engaging the Post-
Structuralist Foundation Of Securitization Theory, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2017,
p. 169.
38
Paul Roe, Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization, Security Dialogue,
Vol. 35, No.3, 2004, p. 281 // citation by Ronnie Olesker, National Identity and Securitisation in
Israel, Ethnicities, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014, p. 374.
39
Paul Roe, Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization, Security Dialogue,
Vol. 35, No. 3, 2004, p. 281
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20 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

threat perception and even national interests. Similarly, P. Roe notices, that ‘the
security speech act thus has the power to enable emergency measures and to (re)
order socio-political relations (friend/enemy, us/them)’,40 so a speech act is a part of
constantly ongoing national identity (re)building process: friend-enemy definition
and redefinition. The success of securitization move depends on the ability to
specify a threat to a collectively and mobilize a ‘we’ against a supposedly threatening
‘them’.41
‘The general presupposition of most of the literature that actors prefer stability
to change, which is seen as generating anxieties and therefore best avoided; actors
are therefore to reassert established patterns of behaviour, routines and identities,
rather than embrace change precisely because of the perceived need and value of
maintaining stable self-concepts’.42 Usually, actors pursuing the peaceful expectation
of change, in this context, the perception of existential threats are closely tied with
the core values and principles of the nation-state.
Identity is supposed to have an exceptional role when it comes to securitization
of existential security threats and threats that in any way can affect the survival
of the nation state. In this case, the mobilisation process should be essential, as
decision making authorities aim to ensure public support to major changes to
national security agendas. ‘Us’ versus ‘them’ definition and redefinition is relatively
easy when it comes to traditional security challenges as military threats stemming
from the state actors, but it is getting more complicated when existential security
elements are being undermined by transnational/ asymmetric/ hybrid security
challenges.

Securitization of hybrid security threats and sense of existential

Notably, the perception of hybrid war has not yet been addressed, neither by
the first wave of securitization scholars nor by the second one. Despite the fact that
numerous studies and academic articles have been published to address the concepts
of hybrid war, hybrid security and hybrid security threats (for instance, Schroefl,
Kaufman, 2014; Dalton, 2017; Chivvis, 2017; Charap, 2015; Galeotti, 2016).
Notably, those studies are limited to the case studies and usually do not provide
40
Paul Roe, Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus
extraordinary politics, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2012, p. 254.
41
Georgios Karyotis, Stratos Patrikios, Religion, securitization and ant-immigration attitudes: the case
of Greece, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2010, p. 44
42
Christopher Browning, Pertti Joenniemi, Ontologicl security, self-articulation and the securitization
of identity, Cooperation and Coinflictm Vol. 59, No. 1, 2017, p. 31—32.
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 21

any theoretical background that could help explaining the hybrid security effects
and implications to national or regional security. Moreover, the representatives of
both waves of the securitization theory also remain ignorant and do not provide
any analytical reasoning regarding how hybrid elements might be addressed by the
theoretical perspective of securitization. How to study security challenges of hybrid
nature and how their securitization could look like?
The concept of hybrid security and warfare is slightly evolving. There are several
definitions of hybrid security provided, for instance ‘hybrid warfare is a tool that
Russia is using to change the existing world order and to remind everyone once again of
its regional and global ambitions, and thus revealing a much greater political challenge
on the international level.’43 Another definition of hybrid warfare is provided in
the introduction to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ authoritative
Military Balance, Russia’s hybrid warfare is described as ‘including the use of military
and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize
the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilising diplomatic
means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and
occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure.’44
There might be distinguished several reasons why securitization theory
overlooks the concept of hybrid warfare and security challenges. Firstly, it is a
relatively new concept, introduced by IR scholars in early 2014, as a result of Russia’s
actions in Ukraine and Russia’s military doctrine and political rhetoric. Secondly,
introduction of this concept might undermine the pivotal theoretical assumptions
of securitization, as the hybrid nature of the threat might be constantly changing,
it might contain several different security threats (for instance, cyber, energy and
information threats), so it is hard to perceive what should be securitized, what
shouldn’t be.
Moreover, in terms of agency, a referent object and subject of the threat is getting
more obscure and hardly recognizable, this complicates the ordinary traditional
securitization process. Hybrid security threats are related to mixed/ambiguous
attribution and mixed origins of the threat, which complicates and slows down
the securitization process, in a way leaving a country unprepared to provide an
adequate and timely response. Thirdly, securitization scholars might not see hybrid
security issues as significant to be addressed theoretically. Scholars might not see

43
Andris Kudors, Hybrid War – a New Security Challenge for Europe, 2015, Backgroud Notes.
http://www.parleu2015.lv/files/cfsp-csdp/wg3-hybrid-war-background-notes-en.pdf (access, 2017-
09-02)
44
IISS Military Ballance, 2016. // Citation in Mark Galeoti, Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How
new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’? Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27:2, p. 288.
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22 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

any added-value to start theorizing something that has already existed for quite
some time, but was called differently, as for instance transnational/asymmetric/new
warfare or threats.
Nevertheless, the concept of hybrid war, hybrid threats, and hybrid security has
not been addressed by the securitization experts, this article argues that there is an
added value to start considering possible theoretical analysis which could expand the
analytical capabilities of a theory and identify its ability to reflect the most recent
political reality, and explain the widely occurring changes in security perception.
Andersson and Tardy claim that the concept of hybrid threats is neither new
nor original in terms of substance or reliance on compound and multifaceted
solutions involving conventional and unconventional methods.45 Hybrid war,
hybrid security threats and other catchy and trendy concepts are highly criticised
by scholars of International Relation. Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud & Patrick Cullen
highlighted the most significant criticism: ‘Like many new terms that become widely
used, hybrid warfare has received a substantial amount of criticism. Largely because the
concept was deduced from looking at the enemy, thus shifting its definition and meaning
according to the subject of analysis, hybrid warfare lacks conceptual clarity. It has been
attacked for being a catch-all phrase or a buzzword with limited analytical value that
does not contain anything distinctly new.’46
Moreover, Andersson and Tardy provide the definition of hybrid threats that
are characterised by: ‘ (1) the combination of conventional and unconventional,
military and non-military, overt and covert actions; (2) the aim of creating
ambiguity and confusion on the nature, the origin and the objective of the threat;
(3) the ability to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities of the targets; (4) the
capacity to keep the level of hostility below the “threshold” of conventional war.’47
Nevertheless, the inclusion of hybrid into the securitization theory could help to
modify the concept of existential threat and the perception of securitization itself,
as boundaries between existential and non-existential elements might blur and it
is getting harder for securitizing actors to predict which challenge or danger can
at a certain point of time turn into the existential threat. Moreover, the major
change drivers are usually hardly identifiable and predictable, as well as ambiguous.
Hybrid security indicates the limits between internal and external, national and
global, object and subject.

45
Jan Joel Andersson and Thierry Tardy, Hybrid: What’s in a Name? Brief, EUISS, October 2015.
46
Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud & Patrick Cullen, What is Hybrid Warfare? Policy Brief, No.1, 2016,
NUPI, p. 1.
47
Jan Joel Andersson and Thierry Tardy, Hybrid: What’s in a Name? Brief, EUISS, October 2015,
p. 2.
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 23

Securitization process in Lithuania

The security threats, risks and dangers are addressed in a number of Lithuanian
strategic documents, such as the Basics of National Security of Lithuania, the National
Security Strategy, and the Military Strategy. The National Security Strategies (2002,
2005, 2012, 2017) and the Military Strategy (2000, 2004, 2012, 2016) are being
consistently reissued to reflect the changing security environment and to adapt the
national security and defence system accordingly. The most relevant and dominant
threats and challenges can be also observed in the rhetoric of Lithuanian officials.
The National Security Strategy and the Military Strategy do not make a distinction
between threats, dangers and risks; they are taken as one integral group without
separating, defining them, and grouping into certain subcategories (see Table 1).
All those documents illustrate the continuous securitization process and national
adaptation to changing security realities.
The existential threats in Lithuania have been securitized as threats that
might undermine the vital interests of Lithuania. Lithuanian National security
strategies (from 2002 to 2017, NSS) define the following vital national interests:
sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order; civil society,
respect for humans and citizen’s rights and freedoms, and their protection; peace
and welfare in the State. Vital national interests reflect the major principles of
national identity. An existential threat to national security of Lithuania would be
perceived as a threat that is intended to undermine those vital interests. Notably,
the group of vital national interests remain the same since the first NSS has been
adopted.
The National Security Strategy (2012) divides the internal and external threats,
risks and dangers and makes a certain prioritization act by grouping them into sub-
categories of primary importance/particular attention and the other threats, risks, and
dangers. The list is complex and comprehensive; it addresses a wide range of security
threats and challenges (economic, energy security, nuclear safety, cyber-attacks,
information security, high emigration rates, and corruption) and clearly prioritizes
the non-military, transnational/asymmetric security threats. Whereas, the Military
Strategy (2004, 2012, 2016) (see Table 1) keeps the traditional military security
threats in the first place on the security threat priority list.

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24 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

Table 1: The National Security Strategy of Lithuania 2012, internal and external threats, dangers and risks.

Internal risks, dangers and threats
Particular attention:
• Uneven social and economic
development
• Corruption
• High rates of emigration
External risks, dangers and threats
Particular attention:
• Economic and energy dependence
• Development of nuclear energy in the region
disregarding the international nuclear energy
safety standards
• Activities of other states against the Republic of
Lithuania
• Information attacks
• Cyber attacks

Other:
- Insufficient defence financing
- Political radicalism and extremism
- Economic vulnerability
- Crime and shadow economy
- Loss and/or disclosure of classified
information
- Value crisis
- Deterioration of the public health
condition
- State-level natural, technical, ecological
or social emergencies
Other:
- Traditional manifestations of power politics
- Weakening of the Euro-Atlantic community
- Non-transparent, undemocratic integration
projects in the neighbouring countries not based
on the free will of citizens of those states
- Long-term impact of the global economic and
financial crisis
- Global and regional instability
- International terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(including their components and production
technologies)
- International organised crime and other cross-
border crimes;
- Adverse effects of climate change

Created by the author, based on the Lithuanian National Security strategy, 2012.

However, as M. Šešelgytė pointed out ‘the Lithuanian National Security strategy,

the Lithuanian Military Strategy, and the Lithuanian Defence Policy White Paper
stated that, in the contemporary security environment, there was an observable
decrease of inter-state conflicts and increase of non-traditional threats (terrorism,
WMD)’.48 Traditional military threats, risks and dangers were not securitized and
included into national security agendas (namely, NSS) by Lithuanian authorities
as security challenges for a long period of time. However, despite the fact that they
remained on the top priority list of the Military Strategy, but political attention to
military security threats and to national defence system was decreasing; moreover,
the funding of military and defence sector from 2004 till 2014 was gradually

48
M.Šešelgytė, Security Culture of Lithuania, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 2005, p. 31.
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 25

shrinking. For instance, NATO estimated Lithuanian defence spending at 0.8%

of GDP in 2013, compared to 1.2% in 2007. Insufficient defence financing was
perceived by Lithuanian decision makers (Table 2, 2012, NSS) as an internal ‘threat/
risk/danger to national security’. Parliament adopted the provision in 2012 NSS,
but at the same time, the political will to increase the defence spending occurred
only after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
served as a wake-up call to increase the spending and rejuvenate the Lithuanian
national defence.
The security priorities as of 2012 were energy security, nuclear safety,
information attacks, and cyber-attacks. Interestingly, international terrorism,
traditional manifestations of power politics (that could mean military build-ups,
intensified military activities, or the closed neighbourhood already ongoing at
that time) were not on the priority list and were securitized and categorized as
‘the other’ threats. The NSS (2002, 2005, 2012) and the Military Strategy (2004,
2012) ‘state that the contemporary security environment inter-state conflicts are
decreasing while non-traditional threats are on the rise, including economic, social,
environmental and technological aspects of security’.49 Those strategies became
only partly relevant, as Lithuanian government in addition to non-traditional
threats, started paying more attention to possible military threats and challenges.
Military threats were securitized as existential ones, which could undermine the
vital interests of Lithuania, and national identity served as a facilitating factor
during the securitization process.
In 2017, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted a new version of NSS. It aimed
to address the new realities in the European security. The Strategy shifted the focus
from purely ‘soft’ security to ‘hard’ security issues; it also focussed upon the hybrid
security elements. Notably, with the newest editions, the NSS was getting closer
to the Military Strategy of Lithuania. The securitization process addressed the set
of existential hybrid and conventional threats. Obviously, the existential threats
and securitization process in this context is bringing NSS and Military Strategies
together. This happens in response to the security challenges that correspond with
existential threats to vital interests of Lithuania, and as the vital interests of the
nation-state are at stake, the national security and national defence systems are
getting closer. This leads to closer cooperation and co-ordination between the
national defence and security institutions.

49
M.Šešelgyte. Lithaunia, in: H. Biehl, B. Giegerich, A. Jonas(eds.), Strategic Cultures in Europe:
Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent, Sringer VS, 2013. p. 221.
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26 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

The process of change in Lithuanian national security

One year before the 2017 NSS update, the new version of the Military Strategy
came out (2016 m.; see Table No.2). It underscores the following challenges and
security threats: (1) conventional military threats in relation with the growth of
Russia’s military power and intention to use it in the future; (2) irregular military
formations; (3) regional crises; (4) information attacks; (5) Activities of foreign
intelligence services; (6) cyber-attacks; (7) challenges related to energy security;
(8) terrorism; (9) natural disasters and industrial accidents. The Military Strategy
brings Russia back to the ‘other’ category and securitizes it as posing a potential
military threat to the Lithuanian security. Moreover, the conventional military
threats are at the top of the security threat play-list and have stayed there from
the very earliest version of the Military Strategy (of 2000). The newest strategy
introduces and addresses ‘irregular military formations’ (as a priority no. 2) as a
hybrid warfare element that is currently conceived as that of utmost importance
to the national security and defence. The other threats on the list are identical as
those in the previous strategy of 2012; they have just been moved one position
down the list.

Table 2: Risks, dangers and threats in Lithuanian Military Strategies of 2016, 2012 and 2004.

Military Strategy,
Military Strategy, 2012 Military Strategy, 2004
2016
Conventional military
1. Conventional military threats Conventional military threats
threats
Irregular military Provocations, demonstration of
2. Local and regional crises
formations military force and threat to use force
3. Regional crises Information attacks Regional conflicts
4. Information attacks Cyber-attacks Terrorism
Activities of foreign Proliferation of weapons of massive
5. Energy security challenges
intelligence services destruction
Activities of foreign intelligence Activities of foreign intelligence
6. Cyber-attacks
services services
Energy security Industrial accidents and ecological
7. Terrorism
challenges catastrophes
Climate change, natural disasters
8. Terrorism Uncontrolled migration
and industrial accidents
Natural disasters and
9.
industrial accidents

Created by the author

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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 27

The most recent trends in the security environment indicate that it is getting
harder to identify the sources of security threats, and to make a clear distinction
between internal and external, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’, traditional and transnational
security threats. The line between war and peace, internal and external, national
and transnational is blurring. It is getting more complicated to distinguish, perceive
and predict (objectively and subjectively) the emergence of the threat, its nature
and possible change; to identify its sources, to assess the possible impacts on the
national security, and adequately respond. The threat or challenge to the national
security can easily be overviewed, misinterpreted, misconceived by the national
security institutions and governments, leaving the state in a security void.
Hybrid threats — ‘posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously
employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of
their objectives’51 —are of an asymmetrical nature, complex, hardly predictable
and identifiable. ‘In many instances, the armed force may employ a variety of
capabilities while achieving little actual effect from any of them, for example, an
insurgent group may launch cyber-attacks, engage in acts of terrorism, or take part
in organized criminal activities.’50 The negative impact of hybrid security threats is
enhanced by the progress in technology, intensified spread of information via social
networks that can disseminate the contradicting news, misleading information or
disinformation.
Notably, Lithuania’s defence and security, as underscored numerous times
by decision makers, was facing the challenge of insufficient defence financing for
defence for years. In 2014, as a reaction to Russia’s aggressive activities in and around
Ukraine, increased military build-ups in Kaliningrad region, and military activities
close to Lithuanian borders, the Lithuanian Parliamentary Parties committed
themselves to increase defence spending and to comprehensively upgrade national
defence system. The Parliamentary Agreement on the Strategic Guidelines for
the 2014–2020 Foreign, Security and Defence Policies states ‘in response to the
changing geopolitical and security situation in Europe after Russia’s aggression in
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, a part of the territory of Ukraine, fulfilment of
the commitments of membership of NATO and other international organisations
by consistently and annually increasing the allocations for national defence for
them to reach 2% of GDP by 2020.’51 This pledge was instantly followed by the
50
Ch. O. Bowers, Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries, Parametres, 2012, vol.42, no. 4, pp. 39-50,
p. 40.
51
An accord between the political parties represented in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on
strategic guidelines for the foreign, security and defence policy of the Republic of Lithuania for
2014–2020, Vilnius, 29 March 2014, available online http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_
r=4030&p_d=146141&p_k=2 (14.3.2016)
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28 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

Governmental decision to update the National Security Strategy to better reflect

the existing security threats and challenges as well as to better adapt to the most
recent changes in the security environment. The new strategy was expected to
provide an updated security threat list, the assessment of security environment as
well as ‘more specific on a means in reaction to security threats and challenges.’52
The most recent changes and challenges in the European security that
resulted in major shifts in the NATO defence and deterrence had a direct impact
on Lithuania’s organisation of national defence. In 2016, the NATO Summit in
Warsaw took a decision to establish an enhanced Forward Presence in three Baltic
States and Poland. Namely, 4 battalion sized battle-groups in Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. The deployment started in early spring 2017, the multinational
battle-group that is located in Lithuania is led by Germany as a framework nation.
‘“In the period of 2017-2018, the battlegroup will be manned by Germany and
contributing nations: Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Croatia,
and France, in total, roughly 1,200 soldiers.’53 ‘The eFP multinational battalion is
based in Rukla; it is assigned to and falls under [the] command of the Mechanised
Infantry Brigade Iron Wolf of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, and train alongside its
soldiers in its military training cycle.’54 This deployment also served as a significant
element of Lithuania’s national security and defence, and demonstrated the
cohesion of the Alliance.
A new version of the Lithuanian National Security Strategy (NSS) that was
adopted in reaction to the current security environment and its changes, the
NSS focuses upon the most worrisome security processes and sheds light on the
complex nature of security threats and challenges. The new NSS version provides
an updated list of threats, dangers and risks to the National Security. It singles
out the following: conventional military threats, covert military and intelligence
threats, threats to the unity of the Euro-Atlantic community, regional and global
instability, terrorism, information threats, cyber threats, economic and energy
dependence and economic vulnerability, development of unsafe nuclear energy
projects nearby the borders of the Republic of Lithuania, social and regional
exclusion, poverty, demographic crisis, corruption, social and regional exclusion,
poverty, and crisis of values.

52
R. Remelienė, Vyriausybė peržiūrėjo nacionalinio saugumo grėsmės, lzinios.lt, available online http://
lzinios.lt/lzinios/Lietuva/vyriausybe-perziurejo-nacionalinio-saugumo-gresmes/222229 (14.3.2016)
53
NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Lithuania https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html
(14.6.2017)
54
NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Lithuania https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html
(14.6.2017)
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 29

The strategy includes conventional military threats that are stemming from
the Russian Federation’s preparedness and intention to use military force in order
to achieve its interests, particularly the military build-up and expansion in a close
neighbourhood of the Republic of Lithuania as well as activities that are lacking
transparency and demonstrating force along the borders of the Republic of Lithuania
and other NATO member-states.’55 The strategy highlights that ‘in the current
period, the main threat for the security of the Republic of Lithuania is posed by
aggressive actions of the Russian Federation violating the security architecture based
on universal rules and principles of international law and peaceful co-existence.’56
The new version of the Lithuanian National Security Strategy shifts the focus
from purely ‘soft’ security issues to ‘hard’ security as well as to address the hybrid
security elements. The cyber security, information security, and international
terrorism are stressed and remain high on the priority list of the strategy. The
greatest challenge for the decision-makers is how to address ‘the little green men’
and hybrid challenges in the context of national security and transfer it to national
strategic document with a realistic ambition to prevent it. Whether, when and
how it should be moved to the ‘existential threat’ category, and which institutions
should be responsible for this?
Looking back to 2014, Lithuania learned that traditional/military threats
stemming from Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine and willingness to use force
against its neighbours, calls for boosting the national defence and increasing the
prudence and resilience of the society. Lithuanian Parliamentary parties signed
‘An Agreement on the Strategic Guidelines for the 2014–2020 Foreign, Security and
Defence Policies’, the strategic guidelines define (securitize), the existential challenges
and threats, provide with possible options for adaptation in the context of new
security realities. Guidelines are securitizing Russia as a threat (an existential threat)
to national security of Lithuania. This decision was driven by external dynamics,
concrete steps taken by Russia that served as a wake-up call for Lithuania’s security.
Identity-wise, by this speech act (formal, institutionalised speech act), Russia has
been brought from the sector ‘we’ to the sector ‘the other’. In this context, one
good example of the speech act is an interview by A. Paulauskas, a chairman of the
parliamentary National Security and Defence Committee, before the new NSS was
adopted, he stressed out: ‘In the current version of our National Security Strategy,
which was updated in 2012, we expressed confidence in the Russian Federation
55
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, (version of Resolution No XIII-202 of
the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 January 2017).
56
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, (version of Resolution No XIII-202 of
the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 January 2017).
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30 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

and we have sought to strengthen ties with it. Today, we can identify this country
as the aggressor (we must specifically define our approach to the occupation of
the Crimea, escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine), posing a threat to our
national security. We need to decide what direction to evolve in our relations with
this neighbouring country.’57 He highlights the intention to move Russia from
the ‘we’ category to ‘the other’ category, due to Russia’s unacceptable behaviour,
namely, ‘the occupation of the Crimea and escalation of the conflict in eastern
Ukraine’. The new version of National Security Strategy retains this approach.
Naturally, Russia’s aggressive posture and military activities in and around
Ukraine have been taken into account. The ambition for friendly relations and
cooperation with Russia is not very high, and the level of trust has significantly
decreased. This shift has already been made in an Agreement on the Strategic
Guidelines for the 2014–2020 Foreign, Security and Defence Policies, signed by
all Lithuanian Parliament parties in March 2014. The document addresses the
security challenges related to Russia’s aggression in and around Ukraine, annexation
of Crimea, and stresses that Russia’s activities are perceived as a challenge to the
national security of Lithuania.58 Similarly, the significant changes came out in
2016, in the updated version of the Military strategy address changes in security
environment and mentions, that Russia’s actions are diminishing the security of
Lithuania. So, all security and defence related institutions acted in synch during
this securitization process; this indicated the efficient institutional mobilization
process in addressing the security environmental changes and adapting national
security agenda in reaction to existential threats.
Evidently, the strategic documents haven’t addressed a long list of internal
and external threats comprehensively by linking them together and evaluating the
security environment. The new 2017 version of NSS attempts to perceive and
highlight the interlinkages between different security risk/threats/dangers, but
in its own way. The updated version of the document merge together internal
and external threats. Notably, some threats are being taken out of the national
security agenda (de-securitized), some are being requalified as more significant;
for instance, cyber-attacks and information attacks are being called cyber threats
and information threats, in a way to expand the concept and to leave more
57
A.Paulauskas: atnaujintoje Nacionalinio Saugumo strategijoje naujos grėsmės ir priemonės joms
neutraliuzoti, delfi.lt, 18 Januray 2016, available online http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/politics/a-
paulauskas-atnaujintoje-nacionalinio-saugumo-strategijoje-naujos-gresmes-ir-priemones-joms-
neutralizuoti.d?id=70143694 (14.5.2016)
58
LR Parlamente atstovaujamų politinių partijų susitarimas dėl 2014-2020 Lietuvos užsienio, saugumo
ir gynybos politikos strateginių gairių, 2014-03-29, available online: (http://www3.lrs.lt/docs2/
RIGVVKWU.PDF (15.3.2016)
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 31

Table 3: The National Security Strategy of Lithuania 2017 (January 2017) Treats, Dangers and Risks of
Particular Attention.

Threats, dangers and risks, NSS 2017 In comparison with NSS 2012

Conventional military threats caused by RF

1. newly introduced
capacity and will to use military force
2. Covert military and intelligence threats newly introduced
Threats to the unity of the Euro-Atlantic
3. other, external
community
4. Regional and global instability other, external
other external: terrorism;
5. Terrorism, extremism, radicalization
other internal: extremism/radicalisation
particular, external (4) as information
6. Information threats
attacks
7. Cyber threats particular, external (5) as cyber attacks
Economic and energy dependence, economic
8. particular, external, (1)
vulnerability
Development of unsafe nuclear energy projects
9. particular, external (2)
nearby the borders of the Republic of Lithuania
10. Social and regional exclusion, poverty particular, internal (1)
newly introduced // instead of 2012, high
11. Demographic crisis
emigration rates - particular, internal (3)
12. Corruption particular, internal (2)
13. Organised crime (internal) other, internal
Emergency situations at national or
14. other, internal
international level
15. Crisis of values other, internal

Source: created by the author on the basis of NSS 2012 and 2017.

space for interpretation. In the 2012 NSS, the term ‘attack’ was more precisely
defined, focused and provided better guidelines to identify the action and develop
prevention mechanisms. The attack was qualified as a risk/danger/threat. Now in
2017, the cyber and information threats are leaving more space for interpretation
at the implementation level — not only the attacks would be qualified as objects of
national insecurity but everything around those concepts as well.

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32 Ieva Karpavičiūtė

On 27 March 2017, the Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in an

interview to the Foreign Policy said, ‘Russia is a threat not only to Lithuania but to
the whole region and to all of Europe. We see how Russia is behaving in Kaliningrad,
a Russian enclave on our border. There they have deployed nuclear-capable missiles
that can reach European capitals. It is not just about the Baltic region anymore.’59
She also underscored that ‘[the] Russian aggression threatens not only Ukraine,
but also Belarus’.60 At the Annual State of the Nation Address, the President
highlighted, ‘today, the democratic world understands very clearly that it is our
region where major threats to transatlantic security are accumulating: military
build-up in the Kaliningrad enclave, aggressive offensive exercise ZAPAD17, the
Astravyets nuclear power plant that has become a geopolitical weapon.’61 Those
speech acts are reflecting the national security agenda and via the identity building
process, are ensuring the continuity of existential threat securitization process and
at the same time consolidating the national institutions and mobilizing the societal
support. They are significant, knowing the fact that the Lithuanian society strongly
supports the President, so her interventions are to be regarded as significant speech
acts.

Conclusion

Historical overview of national security, national identity and existential

values reveals that core national values are equally protected by all the governments
(despite the political parties they represent) and national security agencies. Those
speech acts and the development of security agendas reflect the attempts to
ensure the continuity of existential threat securitization process and at the same
time consolidating the national institutions and mobilizing the societal support.
Evidently, facing an existential threat, the nation state becomes more than an entity
as simply composed of separate political parts, but a unified homogeneous system,
willing and able to design the mechanisms that help the nation state to respond to
various challenges and threats, and to adapt to the changing political environment.
Ensuring national defence, strengthening national security, especially while facing
59
Foreign Policy, Interview with D.Grybauskaite, ‘Russia is a Threat to all of Europe’ http://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/24/russia-lithuania-nato-grybauskaite-putin-trump-interview/ (27
March 2017)
60
http://world.24-my.info/grybauskaite-said-russia-is-a-major-threat-to-eastern-europe-2/
61
State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of Lithuania,
8 June 2017, https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/state-of-the-nation-address-by-h.e.-
dalia-grybauskaite-president-of-the-republic-of-lithuania/27752
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 Securitization and Lithuania’s National Security Change 33

traditional/military threats, becomes more than a simple protection of ‘a current

power position’.
Notably, the traditional security threats (as existential ones) are at the top
of the list of Lithuania’s security agenda that has been changed since 2014. The
2017 NSS is merging internal and external threats into one group. Moreover, the
most significant change is an emerging perception of hybrid nature of security
challenges, that is being securitized in relation to the existential threats. ‘Propaganda
and information attacks are [a] part of [the Russian] hybrid warfare. They seek to
provoke social and ethnic tensions, promote mistrust in government, discredit our
history, independence, and statehood, and demonstrate that Western democracy is
functioning on dual standards,’ said the Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite62
in March 2017. Russia’s capacity and will to use military force is securitized as a
challenge to national security of Lithuania. In parallel, Belarus is being securitized
together with Russia: economic and energy dependency; and nuclear safety and
environmental protection in particular, with regard to the nuclear plant project
in Astravyets. Lithuanian government is underscoring the distinctive focus on the
transatlantic link and the cohesion of NATO and its collective defence system,
the deployment of the NATO eFP Battalion that demonstrates the cohesion of
Alliance, the commitment to prioritize improvement of national defence system
(quality and quantity, budget, procurement, training, and capability) and to retain
2 per cent GDP for defence spending.

62
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/07/russia-threat-baltic-states-160707054916449.
html
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