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The InternalExternal Security Nexus: Notes on an Emerging Research


Agenda
Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard
Cooperation and Conflict 2009; 44; 243
DOI: 10.1177/0010836709106215

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The Internal–External Security Nexus
Notes on an Emerging Research Agenda
JOHAN ERIKSSON AND MARK RHINARD

ABSTRACT
The central contention of this article holds that scholars do not adequately
assess and explain the influence of transboundary security issues on
government behaviour. Their assessment is not adequate because
they do not fully conceptualize the relationship between internal and
external security concerns. Their explanations are not adequate because
existing theories cannot fully explain how and why states respond to
transboundary security issues. To rectify these concerns, stimulate and
structure further research, and encourage scholarly dialogue, we build
an analytical framework for (a) understanding what we describe as the
‘nexus’ of internal and external security matters, and (b) explaining why
that nexus may change state behaviour on transboundary security issues.
The resulting framework encourages a strong focus on the nature of
transboundary problems before studying their implications for changes
in perceptions, policies, politics and polity.
Keywords: external security; internal security; security studies;
transboundary threats

1. Introduction

A growing number of contributions to the security studies literature address


the allegedly dissolving divide between the internal and external domains
of security. Some studies examine the changing nature of security concerns
(Foxell, 1999; Alain, 2001; Beck, 2002; Lavenex, 2004; Boin and ‘t Hart,
2004; Sundelius and Grönvall, 2004; Posthumus and Solms, 2004; Hamilton,
2005), while others examine how governments mobilize to respond to them
(Alain, 2001; Pastore, 2001; Grabbe, 2003; Lutterbeck, 2004; Duke and
Ojanen, 2006). Some articles focus on events taking place at the national
level (Stares, 1998; Michel-Kerjan, 2003), and still others examine the
impact of the dissolving divide at the international level (Steinbruner, 2000;
Bigo, 2001, 2005, 2006; Pastore, 2001; Coker, 2002; Browning, 2003; Cooper,
2003; Glasius and Kaldor, 2008; see Burgess in this special issue, p. 309ff.).
Considering the diversity of perspectives, it comes as no surprise that such
articles are found in journals oriented not only towards security studies, but

Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association


Vol. 44(3): 243–267. © NISA 2009 www.nisanet.org
SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, and Washington DC
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0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836709106215

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244 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

also those with a focus on international relations, comparative politics, policy


studies and sociology more generally. These studies share a preoccupation
with coming to grips with a particularly new, and challenging, aspect of
security: the problematic divide between ‘the internal’ and ‘the external’.
Further commonalities are difficult to find. The question of why new
security issues breach this divide, why this divide is problematic for govern-
ments, and even what constitutes this divide is not systematically explored
in an integrated way. Scholars tend to stay inside their respective disciplines
and focus on their preferred empirical field. The way complex security
threats are constructed and politicized remains the focus of many studies
(Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 2000; see also Archer in this issue, p. 329ff.),
while others give priority to how those threats are acted upon (Huysmans,
2006). Although some authors use traditional international relations theor-
ies (Brown et al., 2000), others feel compelled to turn to more specialized
literature or theories found in other disciplines in the social sciences (Beck,
2008; Spring and Brauch, 2008). This helps to explain why there appears to
be little cross-pollination taking place across these studies, thus inhibiting
dialogue, mutual scholarly learning and knowledge accumulation within
what appears to be a promising new field.
This article introduces a special issue of Cooperation and Conflict on
the nexus between internal and external security, an endeavour that brings
together established and emerging experts in their respective scholarly
fields to address this important phenomenon. Yet the article serves more
than introductory purposes: concerned with empirical ambiguity, theor-
etical fragmentation and a lack of scholarly dialogue on this issue, we hope
to provide structure to research agendas and to stimulate further inquiry.
To encourage analytical precision, we urge scholars to avoid loose claims
about a ‘dissolving divide’ (see, for example, Lutterbeck, 2005; Rees, 2008)
in favour of problem-driven empirical research that makes use of comple-
mentary theoretical approaches.
To jump-start that initiative, we suggest scholars turn their attention to the
‘nexus’, or critical connections, between the internal and external security
domains and assess how those connections condition government responses.
Five dimensions of the security nexus stand out and can be summarized as
problems, perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Problems are the secur-
ity issues confronting the world today and illustrate the most obvious nexus
between the internal and the external domains. How governments respond
to those problems, however, will depend on whether the nexus becomes
manifest across the other four dimensions. Different theoretical insights,
not only from international relations but also from other areas of political
science, can help to explain dynamics in each of these areas and assess the
nature of the nexus. By doing so, we gain analytical traction for explaining
our broader interest: government behaviour in an increasingly complex
security environment.
The article proceeds as follows. In section two, we begin by establishing
our terms of reference and by focusing on the nature of today’s security
concerns, which we argue should be the starting point for assessing the
relationship between internal and external security. In section three, we

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 245

show that existing analytical approaches associated with security studies


seem inadequate to the task of understanding how and why governments
have responded to transboundary security issues. In section four, we intro-
duce the outlines of a new approach to understanding such issues and govern-
mental responses, drawing on analytical tools from theoretical schools across
the fields of international relations and general political science. Finally, we
summarize the main points of the article and introduce the contributions in
the special issue, showing how they take us further towards an integrated
and fruitful research agenda on the nexus between internal and external
security concerns in the world today.

2. ‘Transboundary Security Issues’

Discussions on the relationship between internal and external security


normally begin by examining the changing nature of threat perceptions since
the Cold War. The common view holds that bipolarity upheld a distinction
between the realms of ‘internal security’ (concerned with crime, civil pro-
tection, law and order inside the state) and ‘external security’ (focused on
defence and deterrence between states). The end of the Cold War ushered
in a change of perceptions as the threat of nuclear war diminished, but
the threat of crime, terrorism, breakdowns or natural disasters increased.
Based on that premise, practitioners downplayed the distinction (in the
pursuit of international security, for instance), while scholars scrambled
to reconceptualize security more holistically (in the pursuit of establishing
a preferred definition). The common view, however, may have been
both crude and hasty: crude, because it allowed for generic discussions
of threats rather than detailed assessments; hasty, because it encouraged
eradicating the conceptual line between internal and external security with-
out empirically testing the assumption. In this section, we argue that the
complexity of modern threats, and their capacity for spanning internal and
external security domains, should be understood and problematized as a
precursor to studying their effects on policies, politics, perceptions and
polities.
Some scholars argue that all threats are subjectively constructed and thus
imply that threats per se should factor little into analysis. We accept that there
is a subjective dimension to the risks and dangers that face modern societies;
indeed, later in this article we recommend additional research on security
perceptions. Yet, we believe much is lost if scholars ignore the details of
how threats are changing, the features of modern society that impact threat
complexity, and the fact that real dangers may exist even if not subjectively
placed on public agendas.1 Studying the relationship between internal and
external security should empirically assess how actual risks and dangers
bear on that relationship without becoming bogged down in the subjective–
objective threat debate. To avoid the latter, we contrast ‘transnational
security issues’ (with a fairly objective content) with ‘transnational security
threats’ (as those subjectively constructed). This distinction allows us to
investigate objectively, to the extent possible, the way that transnational

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246 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

security issues highlight key puzzles in the relationship between internal


and external security.
Scholars focused on the dynamics of transboundary security issues per se
tend to argue that what makes ‘today’s’ challenges different from ‘yester-
day’s’ challenges is a factor of both the issue itself and the way societies
are organized (Boin and Rhinard, 2008). Today’s security issues can be con-
trasted with previous ones in terms of their origin, trajectory and effect.
They originate from more clandestine and obscure sources, whether those
sources be fanatical religious organizations (Sageman, 2004), impenetrable
technical systems that can break down (or be compromised) with little warn-
ing and unknown effect, or human error (Egan, 2007). Their trajectories are
complex and can be, at least initially, too subtle to detect. The initial dif-
fusion of a dirty bomb, the release of an airborne virus or the snowballing of
a seemingly innocuous technical glitch can evade attention and ‘travel’ using
multiple vectors (Laqueur, 2003). The effects of today’s security issues are
difficult to predict or even prepare for, considering we do not always know
how pathogens will travel, which systems will be compromised, or what
objectives and resources terrorists have at any particular time.
The way societies are organized today exacerbates the dynamics of trans-
boundary security issues (Kaldor, 2006). Societies are so tightly linked,
economically, politically and socially, that the way risks travel is fluid and
unpredictable (Castells, 1996). Technical interconnections that power our
societies and speed production also create highly efficient pathways along
which potential ‘disturbances’ can travel across geographic and functional
boundaries (Fritzon et al., 2007). The impact of a security issue becomes
difficult to predict in such an environment and can impact upon different
societal systems, e.g. transport, financial, energy networks, in sequential or
simultaneous ways (Tenner, 1997). Those systems intertwine in ways that
even their ostensible ‘managers’ are not aware of and become difficult to
‘decouple’ quickly if necessary (Perrow, 1984). Because modern security
issues travel along systems that stretch across functional and geographical
boundaries, ‘transboundary security issues’ offer prima facie evidence of at
least some bridging of the internal–external security divide.
Three brief examples of transboundary security issues illustrate the point:
infectious diseases, global terrorism and cyber plagues.
Infectious diseases are often described as the archetypical example of
a threat with no borders (Barrett, 2007) and have become an increasing
security concern on national agendas (UK National Risk Register, 2008).
Whether we speak of SARS, a smallpox attack or the spread of the H5N1
virus, the transboundary aspects of this issue are revealed by how a disease
originates and how it spreads (Fidler, 2004). The ‘incubation period’ of dis-
ease can be long and drawn-out, meaning carriers can easily cross borders
without signalling a problem. The ‘basic reproductive rate’ of a disease
determines how quickly and easily it spreads. Aggressive diseases score
high on both counts and dramatically reveal the insignificance of political
borders. New strains may appear in far-away locations, but quickly emerge
‘at home’ without warning (Saker et al., 2004). Localized efforts to prevent
and control outbreaks are futile without coordinating initiatives with

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 247

geographical neighbours (Barrett, 2007). Infectious disease outbreaks also


have secondary effects which can cascade across borders (e.g. if public ser-
vices become overwhelmed, if trade stops, if cross-border infrastructures
cease operation owing to absenteeism).
Although terrorism, defined as a systematic form of violence aimed at
political coercion, has been with us for centuries, a new version has emerged
in recent years (Khan, 1987; Hoffman, 1998). Rather than directing localized
violence towards a localized cause, global terrorism displays the same types
of dynamics as a transboundary security issue. First, it employs modern com-
munication systems and globalized travel networks to plot, plan and procure
the means for attack. Loose networks operating across political boundaries
and even in different parts of the world can band together to carry out vio-
lence. Second, that violence can take place in different countries, and can
cripple different infrastructure systems, thanks to the border-free spaces
that now characterize parts of the globe. Finally, the psychological effects
of a terrorist attack are felt far away from the scene of the crime. Global
media magnifies the psychological effect of an attack and instills fear in
those ‘under attack’ while emboldening aggrieved parties. Although the
threat should not be over-stated (Mueller, 2006), and while some countries
have ‘securitized’ terrorism more than others, most observers agree that
the nature of terrorism has changed and grown more complex (Kalis, 2001).
Global terrorism stretches across boundaries and places new-found chal-
lenges on societies and governments (see Archer, this issue, p. 329ff.).
The phenomenon of ‘cyber plagues’ has been brought to light in recent
years not only by actual events but also by concerned firms, organizations
and governments. The shrinking costs of computers and the worldwide
penetration of the Internet generate two related phenomena. The first is
the ability for actors and issues to join up in different corners of the world,
building organizations and pursuing causes. The second is the dependence
of social and physical infrastructures on globally interconnected computer
networks. From financial systems to trade, travel, health care, education and
government, how we operate, survey and control our societies is now tied
together through information technology. When actors pursuing extremist
causes wish to inflict harm on perceived parties, cyber plagues can be trig-
gered to shut down the systems that deliver essential services (Eriksson and
Giacomello, 2007; Dunn-Cavelty, 2008; Dunn-Cavelty and Krishna-Hensel,
2008). The blocking of websites and servers of banks, media outlets and
government in Estonia in the spring of 2007 bears witness to such an event
(Lewis, 2007; Traynor, 2007). To be sure, national borders have not dis-
appeared in cyber space (witness China’s effort to control the Internet). But
the potential risks and dangers that can emerge through information tech-
nology, and can cripple parts of cyber space, make attacks planned and
carried out through the Internet a classic example of the boundary-spanning
traits of modern security issues. Moreover, the development of information
in society and cyber plagues have so far not been met with any substantial
international governance efforts: there is no international regime of cyber-
space control (Mathiason, 2007; Eriksson and Giacomello, 2009).

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248 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

When we speak of pandemic diseases, global terrorism or cyber plagues,


we speak of emblematic types of ‘transboundary security issues’. They
originate from opaque locations, cross political and functional boundaries
with ease and can affect a wide variety of referent objects. They hold the
potential to violate ‘security’ as defined by the absence of threat to acquired
values, human lives or critical infrastructures (Wolfers, 1952; Sundelius,
2005; see Burgess, this issue, p. 309ff.). Most importantly, we find such issues
fascinating because they throw the relationship between the internal and
external security domains into sharp relief and generate a rich number of
research questions.2 For that reason, we encourage scholars to problematize,
not assume, the transboundary dynamics of any particular issue. By coming
to grips with the nature of the issue before examining its effects, scholars
can assess the nexus, or critical connections, between internal and external
security rather than simply assuming a ‘dissolving’ or ‘blurring’ line. Below,
we set out four categories in which transboundary security issues are likely
to have an impact on that relationship: in the areas of how security politics
plays out, how security perceptions are formed, how policies are altered
and how polities are restructured. Whether those effects are actually taking
place is an empirical question and can be most richly understood only
after assessing the transboundary nature of the security issue itself. Before
setting out those categories, we review in the next section security-related
literature to gauge its utility in understanding the nexus between internal
and external security.

3. The ‘Security Studies’ Approach to the Internal–External


Security Nexus

How well equipped are existing analytical approaches, particularly those


found in the security studies literature, for shedding light on the ‘nexus’ of
internal–external and its implications? The few studies that explicitly address
this relationship tend to emphasize the overlap of external and internal secu-
rity as a result of the transnationalization of issues (cf. Pastore, 2001; Alain,
2001; Browning, 2003; Grabbe, 2003; Rees, 2008; Lutterbeck, 2004, 2005;
Bigo, 2005, 2006; Wolff et al., 2009). This is a useful start, and one in line
with our thinking. Many authors, however, tend to gloss over the dynamics
and nature of the issue itself in an effort to move on to other questions.
Didier Bigo (2001), for instance, sees the relationship between internal and
external security issues as driving a type of ‘möbius ribbon’, reflecting not
just the transnationalization of issues, people, goods and ideas, but also the
clash between cosmopolitan norms of human rights and territorially based
identities and interests. Thus, while Bigo seems to suggest the distinction
between external and internal security might be analytically (and perhaps
politically) useful, he emphasizes another distinction that to him seems
much more important, which is between government and society. The mes-
sage here is that given the development of international, supranational and
multi-level political systems (of which the European Union (EU) is one
obvious example; see Burgess, this issue, p. 309ff.), a distinction between

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 249

government and society is useful regardless of whether security issues are


contained within the domestic realm, have a clear external nature or if they
perforate the external–internal boundary.
There are several other approaches that need to be considered, and while
they address the internal–external security relationship only implicitly, they
may nevertheless provide useful concepts and insights. The remainder of
this section reviews several of those approaches.
Since the relationship between external and internal security in terms of
a ‘nexus’ implies connection, bond, joining point or a process of joining, our
attention is directed first to the literature on transnationalization (Kaiser,
1971; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Rosenau, 1997, 2003; Keohane and Nye, 2001).
While emphasizing linkages across the external and the internal, these con-
ceptions do not disregard the significance of nation-states, of boundaries
and of sovereignty. Indeed, a term such as ‘transnational’ presupposes the
existence of nation-states, and that they and their boundaries are signifi-
cant, yet perforated. It should be noted that the transnational relations
and global interdependence literature is not primarily concerned about
security questions. The vast majority of contributions within this literature
distinguish issues of transnationalization from those of national security,
thus enforcing an enduring distinction between the ‘low politics’ of trade,
transport and other economic transactions from the ‘high politics’ of security
and war (cf. Goldmann, 1989). This is the case in for instance Keohane and
Nye’s (2001) ‘complex interdependence’, and in Rosenau’s (1997, 2003)
distinction between ‘sovereignty-bound’ and ‘sovereignty-free’ actors, i.e.
states preoccupied with power and security as opposed to non-state actors
who, according to Rosenau, operate without resorting to the Realist logic
of power and security. John Burton’s (1972) ideas about a world society
focusing on ‘human needs’ rather than on the security and power of states
follow a logic similar to Rosenau’s. While these approaches address
the significance of transnationalization (of ‘low politics’), their critique of the
state-centric ‘obsession’ with power and security means they neglect the
transnationalization of security, and thus of the intermingling of ‘high’ and
‘low’ politics.
With the emergence of a widened security concept (Ullman, 1983), and
with the burgeoning literature on globalization, the distinction between
security and non-security issues, or between high politics and low politics,
has become less critical to understanding international relations (Cooper,
2003). The challenge to using this literature, in view of the internal–external
security nexus and its myriad of implications, is to clarify whether theoretical
concepts and empirical orientations apply to both ‘low’ and ‘high’ issues
associated with security in today’s globalized world. If that can be done
effectively, the transnational and broadly Liberal approach to understanding
the full range of actors involved in perforating sovereign boundaries can
be a useful starting point for exploring the implications of transboundary
security issues.
In contrast to the ‘nexus’ perspective, the relationship between external
and internal security can be considered as a ‘divide’ or ‘gap’. This per-
spective largely reaffirms a state-centric understanding of world affairs,

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250 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

thus defending the traditional position of the endurance rather than the
irrelevance of the state system, of international boundaries, and thus of
the distinction between external and internal security (Waltz, 1979; Brown
et al., 2000; Mearsheimer, 2003). Some of the contributions in this special issue
approach the relationship in this way and provide arguments and examples
supporting this perspective. The core argument is that even for problems
which undeniably have a transboundary impact, they are not necessarily
managed more effectively by developing transboundary institutions. There
are political costs and obstacles involved in creating transboundary security
management systems, which are related to issues of jurisdiction and popular
legitimacy (cf. Anderson, 2007). According to this perspective, these costs
tend to overshadow the potential benefits of transboundary approaches,
especially if they take on supranational features. Hence, this state-centric
perspective represents an essentially Realist view of the international system
as largely unaffected by the ‘liberal’ forces of trade, travel and international
institution-building. Advocates of this perspective hold that, at the end of
the day, forces of transnationalization are overshadowed by the prevailing
dominance of states and intergovernmental relations, in effect maintaining
a distinctive divide between internal and external security issues.
In addition to Liberal and Realist views of the external–internal security
relationship, two quite different and original views have emerged in what
might be called the ‘European’ variant of security studies. These views reflect
more or less constructivist and post-structuralist perspectives, respectively.
The notion of security complex, originally coined by Buzan, captures how
geographically proximate states intentionally or unintentionally affect each
other’s security (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2004).
This includes not only the classical security dilemma of spiralling arms races
in neighbouring states wary of one other, but also how a secessionist rebellion
in one state may cause concerns for spillover effects in the neighbouring
state, for instance. Thus, the concept of security complex highlights regional
constellations of states, or sometimes even parts of different states whose
security is defined as strongly interdependent. The Middle East is considered
as a security complex, and so is the EU/Europe, as well as several other
regions of the world (Buzan and Wæver, 2004). Importantly, the concept
of security complex clearly brings the internal–external security nexus into
focus by emphasizing that domestic developments in one country, whether
real or imagined, may impact on threat perceptions and actions across
multiple countries, which in turn shape intergovernmental as well as trans-
national relations in the region.3
It remains to be clarified, however, how interdependencies in security
complexes can unfold more specifically, or what the patterns of trans-
national and intergovernmental relations may be. For example, it would be
fruitful to draw more on theory and research on the significance of domestic
politics and institutions in the shaping of security policy and on how such
factors are specifically interconnected with developments in neighbouring
states. Despite more recent emphasis on the social construction of threats

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 251

and the application of a wider understanding of what constitutes a security


issue, security complex theory boils down to a classical geopolitical view
of security relations: the security of some states is more interdependent
than that of others, first and foremost because of geographical proximity.
Geographical proximity is an important factor shaping policy; yet, if we are
fully to understand the intricate interconnections of external and internal
security, we need to draw on a richer body of theory and research, a point
we return to in the subsequent section.
Also of relevance is the much debated concept of securitization, origin-
ally developed by Ole Wæver (1995; see Buzan et al., 1998). By placing
emphasis on the politics of how security language and agendas are being
formed, securitization has made a major contribution to security studies,
which has been followed by a large number of attempts to apply, improve
and critique it (for overviews, see Williams, 2003; Guzzini and Jung, 2004;
Balzacq, 2005; Smith, 2005: 32–7; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald, 2008). While not
explicitly addressing the internal–external security nexus, some of the issues
that have been studied using securitization theory are implicitly about how
the boundary between domestic and international security is transcended,
such as how international migration, infectious diseases and transnational
pollution have been securitized (cf. Bigo, 2006; Sjöstedt, 2009). However, it
remains to be clarified in what ways the transnationalization of perceived
threats impact on the nature and political consequences of securitization.
There are also some poststructuralist contributions to security studies,
which, partly inspired by the securitization approach, try to dig deeper into
the politics and linguistics of security (Campbell, 1998; Bigo, 2005, 2006;
Huysmans, 2006; Huysmans et al., 2006). Not primarily concerned with
elaborating the internal–external security nexus, those contributions focus
on how, and with what consequences, issues such as migration are being
managed through a distinctive ‘security logic’. The fact that migrants are
crossing the internal–external boundary is not the point in these studies.
A typical focus is on how the EU has handled immigration as an internal
security issue, rather than as a human rights issue or as anything else but a
security issue. Useful post-structuralist studies have also been made regard-
ing the alleged collapse of established boundaries and spaces (Albert, 2001;
Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Bonditti, 2004). Such approaches offer
insights into the forms and consequences of security discourse, and gen-
erally on ‘boundaries in flux’, yet it remains to be studied what role and im-
pact security discourse has on the internal–external security nexus and how
government behaviour shapes and reflects this problematique.
In conclusion, while there are many useful bits and pieces in contemporary
security studies that help us explore the external–internal security nexus,
this particular problematique is very rarely the explicit focus. We find it
necessary to open up a broader framework for analysis which highlights
explicitly the various connections and divides between the internal and
external security domains.

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252 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

4. Exploring the Nexus: A Framework for Analysis

With the complexities of transboundary security issues in mind, and having


revealed the fragmented and incomplete nature of existing security studies
approaches in unpacking these complexities, we now turn to building a
more fruitful framework for analysis. Importantly, we consider the relation-
ship between external and internal security to be multifaceted. That is,
we must go beyond the often exaggerated and diametrically opposed per-
spectives in which a distinction between the external and the internal is
either seen as increasingly irrelevant (e.g. Lutterbeck, 2004, 2005), or the
‘Realist’ perspective in which external and internal security are considered
as essentially separate domains, and that the linkage between the two can be
assumed rather than analysed. By contrast, we maintain external and internal
security as analytical terms but emphasize the need to problematize the
relationship between the two. Not all security problems or all governmental
responses to them have a transboundary reach, but some do, and there is a
complex pattern of problems and responses which partially implies a nexus
or a divide between the external and the internal domains of security.
In order to unpack this complexity we suggest a framework of analysis
based on five dimensions: problems, perceptions, policies, politics and
polities. This ‘5P’ framework draws inspiration from John Kingdon’s ‘paral-
lel streams’ approach: the ‘problem stream’, the ‘political stream’ and the
‘policy stream’ (1995). We have added a cognitive dimension (perceptions)
in order to bring the individual into the analysis (cf. Gross Stein, 2002),
and also the polity dimension in order to elaborate institutional contexts.
This framework allows researchers systematically to analyse gaps between
and linkages across the domains of external and internal security. For
example, this should make it easier to detect and analyse how, when and
why decision-makers and institutions respond to threats and crises that
perforate geographical boundaries.
Analysing each of these dimensions and their interconnections is unlikely
to be accomplished through a single theory or paradigm. Single-factor
explanations or universal theories are unlikely to illuminate complexity
(George and Bennett, 2005). Our approach is pragmatic, using middle-range
approaches regardless of what subdiscipline they fit within. We thus draw
upon different theories and approaches, ranging from those in international
relations and security studies to those in comparative politics and public
administration. Directing each of these approaches towards explaining clear
empirical puzzles should generate cross-fertilization and learning across the
subdisciplines.4
The first dimension, problems, has already been addressed in section two.
Thus, following Kingdon, our framework is problem-oriented in the sense
that we suggest analytical endeavours start by looking at the particular
policy problems at hand — which may reveal intrinsic dynamics irrespective
of how they are perceived and managed. These dynamics include whether
and how issues can be characterized as having an internal, external or
transboundary nature. We now turn to the other four dimensions, each
of which represents a set of key questions confronting governments and

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 253

encompassing a set of dynamics likely to condition government responses


to security-related problems.

Perceptions

Categorizing security issues as strictly internal or external has particular


cognitive effects. One is to perpetuate a distinction between the known/con-
trollable versus the unknown/uncontrollable; in other words, between what
is safe and what is dangerous. According to research in social psychology,
when such distinctions cannot be maintained, cognitive dissonance occurs
in ways that make individuals react with anxiety (Johnson, 1997). Indeed,
the distinction between the internal and the external in terms of safe versus
dangerous is captured in standard definitions of ‘national security’, which
essentially state that the goal of national security policy is to preserve
freedom of action even in cases of ‘external threat’ (Buzan, 1991: 16–17).
Hence, by accepting the transboundary nature of issues — how they per-
forate sovereign boundaries — one is essentially admitting loss of govern-
mental control, which in turn implies a threat to national security. In this
sense, the transboundary nature of issues may serve as a cognitive threat
amplifier. This can help explain why governments sometimes either ignore
or downplay the transboundary nature of issues, and more generally why
events are cognitively filtered through the prism of the external versus the
internal. By defining all perceived threats as either external or internal, a
feeling of control, and thus a lower level of fear, is maintained.
At a more fundamental level, the behaviour of people is not determined
by the world around them, but by how they perceive the world (Boulding,
1959; Gross Stein, 2002). When explaining how people perceive and react to
events, one cannot dismiss the significance of pre-existing perceptions (cog-
nitive prisms) and other ‘intervening factors’ — factors such as the reputation
and manoeuvring of political entrepreneurs trying to make their case. It
is also because of such factors, as well as the fact that events and condi-
tions are often plagued with a great deal of uncertainty, that the possibility
of purely imaginary threats or seriously misperceived security issues must
be taken into account (Jervis, 1976). The significance of framing — how
people communicate a particular and limited perception of reality — cannot
be underestimated (Schön and Rein, 1994). Framing issues in terms of
‘national security’ obviously has potentially far-reaching implications, such
as the legitimation of the use of secrecy, violence and other ‘extraordinary
measures’ (Buzan et al., 1998; Eriksson, 2001; Huysmans, 2006). Issues
framed as a threat, a crisis, or linked to security in some other explicit way,
demand to be handled with greater force, gravity and haste than other issues
(Keeler, 1993: 436; Kingdon, 1995; Boin et al., 2005).
A focus on perceptions and framing raises important questions with regard
to transnational security issues; for example, under what conditions will cog-
nitively entrenched distinctions between external and internal security shift
or change? What factors can lead to ‘frame shifts’ (Schön and Rein, 1994) or
the merging of cognitive frameworks (Snow and Benford, 1992) that move

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254 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

the security ‘divide’ towards a ‘nexus’, and vice-versa? There is a critical need
for more theory and research on this and other questions, including how
perceptions are related to other crucial factors and how a clear perception
of the significance of the transboundary nature of security issues translates
into effective management of such issues (Sundelius, 2005).

Policies

Another set of research questions prompted by the rise of transboundary


security threats concerns the realm of policies. Policies are generically
defined as plans of action (based on a certain line of argument) designed to
guide decisions and achieve certain outcomes (Lowi, 1972; Parsons, 1995).
It is in the formulation of security policies and their implementation that
the relationship between the internal and the external security domains
is thrown into sharp relief. In some cases, policy outcomes may reflect an
enduring divide of those two domains (see Weiss and Dalferth, this issue,
p. 268ff.), while in others policies may represent an effective crossing of the
boundary. Since existing scholarly findings are inconclusive, we encourage
further research into the main forces driving security policy divergence on
the one hand and security policy convergence on the other.
Some scholars investigating the relationship between internal and ex-
ternal security policies reveal that policy incoherence remains the norm.
Pastore (2001) bases his study on the idea that, increasingly, transboundary
security issues at the international level suggest that EU security policies
should encompass the internal–external divide. Yet, in practice, he finds that
the many challenges to reconciling ‘the Prince’s two arms’, a reference to
Machiavelli’s conception of the state’s main security responsibilities, prevent
policy convergence (cf. the articles by Bremberg and Britz and by Weiss and
Dalferth, this issue, p. 288ff. and p. 268 ff., respectively). Duke and Ojanen
(2006) outline several arguments for merging policies related to internal
and external security, again at the EU level, yet also find only partial
convergence in their study. In this special issue, Archer shows the difficulty,
even the ‘uneasiness’, of reconciling policies focused respectively on
external security and internal relations with the UK Muslim community and
highlights the incoherence of policies (p. 329ff.).
Other scholars find evidence of policy convergence, noting the growing
number of policies at the national and supranational level focused on ‘hol-
istic’ security goals. Lavenex (2004) argues that new security conceptions are
driving new actors to tackle transboundary security issues, with the result
being new policy processes and policy outcomes reflecting a crossing of the
internal–external divide. Ekengren (2008) notes that international security
policy, including the civilian forms of crisis management, increasingly applies
to ‘internal’ matters. Consequently, policy-makers are now in the process of
devising encompassing plans of action for managing transboundary security
threats. Duke and Ojanen (2006), although showing persistent difficulties
in bringing together most security policies, nevertheless do make frequent
reference to the success of the ‘European Security Strategy’ in setting out a

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 255

plan of action that downplays the policy distinction between the ‘internal’
and ‘external’. In critiquing the convergence of internal and external secur-
ity policies through processes of ‘securitization’, Bigo (2006) argues that
policy convergence has resulted not from new threats but from political
opportunism.
The contradictory findings described above suggest the need for further
research. We recommend focusing on the key drivers behind either diverg-
ence or convergence in security policy change. For instance, a long-standing
strand of public policy research shows that institutional resistance (in terms
of existing processes, routines and venues that privilege certain interests)
can inhibit policy change (see, for example, Jackson, 1976; Wildavsky, 1979;
Peters, 2005). We need to know under what conditions institutional resist-
ance will or will not inhibit policy convergence (see Bremberg and Britz,
this issue, p. 288ff., for such research). This relates to the issues covered
elsewhere in this section under ‘polity’ (see below) and highlights the inter-
connections between structures and policies. Another strand of research
found in both international relations and comparative politics highlights the
converging effects of new perceptions (e.g. ‘ideas’) on policy outcomes (see
Hall, 1993; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). This is an intriguing empirical
question in cases of converging security ‘perceptions’ (see above) and their
implications for policy. Another potential driver of convergence is the inter-
nationalization of security policy, a process by which supranational venues
are used to tackle security problems in new ways and outside the view of
domestic politics (Schmitter, 2000). Here, policy convergence remains a
strong possibility (as some evidence suggests in the case of the EU), but this
is a hypothesis requiring empirical testing.

Politics
In this article, the concept of politics is used in a traditional sense to
explore the process of ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1990).
While rather commodious, this classical definition expresses a perspective
of politics in which interests and conflicts are dominant features. Inspired
by Kingdon’s analysis of the policy-making process, we reserve the term
‘politics’ for a particular type of behaviour characterized by efforts to win,
persuade and use power-based arguments rather than to persuade by using
ideas and knowledge-based arguments (1995). Understood in this way,
political behaviour is shaped inter alia by the majority position in legislative
assemblies, alliances and coalitions within and across the governmental
and non-governmental boundary, negotiations, and the preferences and
ideologies of leading decision-makers.
This includes bureaucratic politics, which has been defined as follows:

[S]trategic behavior by subordinates — bargaining, coalition formation, and


the dissemination of supposedly secret information — [enabling] them to
circumvent constraints placed on them by their positions and jurisdictions,
thereby making the structure largely irrelevant. (Hammond, 1986: 416; cf.
Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Michaud, 2002)

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256 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

The fact that transnational terrorism first achieved the kind of salience it
now has on the US agenda after the events of 11 September 2001 can be
explained partly by bureaucratic politics. While some intelligence on these
attacks was collected, it never reached key decision-makers before it was
too late (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
2004; Stern and Parker, 2005). An issue may quite simply be downplayed or,
in the worst case, pushed to the side in the bureaucratic process. Issues may
also fall victim to bureaucratic rivalry, in effect preventing or postponing
effective decisions to deal with it.
The interest-based actions which we define as politics can shape govern-
mental behaviour towards transboundary security issues in many ways. With
regard to three particular factors — party politics, bureaucratic politics and
public expectations — governments may experience a push for particular
policies such as international cooperation or isolationistic behaviour, or
even reward ignorance and non-decisions. If political parties are split on
the saliency of a security issue, the political cost of addressing them must be
balanced against the potential rewards in terms of effectively dealing with
the perceived security threat.
Moreover, the traditional agencies and ministries of the nation-state have
entrenched interests that can prevent policy-making from addressing the
transboundary nature of security issues. For example, in many countries
the military has shown an increasing interest in taking on responsibility for
counter-terrorism, which has often met with considerable resistance from
the national police, the latter normally enjoying a monopoly on operative
counter-terrorism (cf. Alain, 2001; Lutterbeck, 2004, 2005; Bigo, 2005,
2006). If political support is faltering, it might be the case that the technically
most effective policies are impeded. Moreover, as demonstrated by public
perceptions of decision-making within the EU, citizens tend to underestimate
the extent to which EU legislation, or internationalization more generally,
influences domestic affairs (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). This perception lag
can be politically exploited by actors who wish to maintain the impression
that the there is still a distinctive divide between the domestic and the
European domain.
In sum, research on transnational security issues and the resulting govern-
mental responses will most certainly have to take into account such political
processes, including the significance of public expectations and party politics
and the impact of bureaucratic rivalry. Here, the domestic politics approach
in foreign policy analysis provides many useful tools and insights (Hagan,
1993; Fearon, 1998; Allison and Zelikow, 1999), although it needs to be
updated to deal more explicitly with transboundary security issues.

Polity

Transboundary security issues impact upon the polity, too, a term that
refers to the institutional structures that shape how governments act. Those
institutional structures are found at the domestic level, in terms of the juris-
dictions of different units in national bureaucracies, and at the international

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 257

level, in terms of how cooperative arrangements have been designed. In


most cases, the institutional structures that organize a polity are ‘sticky’ and
historically embedded, constraining how actors behave on a day-to-day level
and shaping how they respond to new problems. Studying those structures
thus tells us much about why political and policy outcomes look the way they
do (North, 1990; Pierson, 1996) and whether the relationship between the
internal and external security domains reflects a divide or a nexus.
One potentially powerful source of a divide between internal and external
security is the institutional division between national and international
administrative structures. Justice ministries, for instance, tend to have few
ongoing and institutionalized relationships in the international sphere,
a sphere which tends to be dominated by foreign affairs ministries. Since
transnational security issues cast the relationship between national and
international structures into the spotlight, understanding the incongruence
between those structures and how governments’ responses are affected
deserves more scrutiny. Weiss and Dalferth (this issue, p. 268ff.) show
how different ‘rule systems’ affect the behaviour of actors cooperating on
internal compared to external security matters. Other scholars, however,
show how structural divisions on security matters can be overcome. Pawlak
(2009) demonstrates the ‘cross pillarization’ of security policy regimes in the
EU, while Di Puppo (2009) suggests that apparent institutional convergence
does not always result in changes ‘on the ground’, thus leaving a significant
gap in the relationship between internal and external security.
A set of analytical approaches useful for assessing the potential for polity
change in security matters is based on Gourevitch’s ‘second-order reversed’
thesis about the impact of international politics on domestic institutions
(1986). Focused on what domestic factors inhibit coherent international
outcomes, some scholars use theories of comparative politics to come to an
understanding of the relationship between national and international policy
structures (for a review, see Caporaso, 1997). Other scholars, particularly
those focused on Europe, have taken such approaches quite far in the form
of ‘Europeanization’ research — an agenda that aims at understanding how
the EU has impacted upon national administrative structures and whether
change has taken place as a result (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Few studies,
however, have applied the framework to transboundary security issues (cf.
Britz, 2006). Bremberg and Britz (this issue, p. 288ff.) show how different
national ‘institutional logics’ (some rooted in police issues, others in
military issues) stubbornly persist despite Europeanization, thus hampering
agreement on a single, European logic for civil protection cooperation.
More research could usefully take place in this vein.
In addition to the ‘vertical’ divide (domestic–international) exposed by
transboundary security issues, we should also direct attention to ‘horizontal’
divides in a polity. Transboundary security issues place a premium on the
ability of domestic agencies and ministries to work together to address prob-
lems. From reading the classic works on organizational theory by Selznick
(1947), we know that government units are more than task-oriented organ-
izations; they embody ideals, values and norms and generate a specific iden-
tity. Once developed, those identities tend to clash with others, especially

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258 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

those built on different values and pursuing different norms (Fligstein, 2001;
see also Burgess, this issue, p. 309ff.). If organizational identities cannot be
reconciled, then a government response requiring the cooperation and inte-
gration of multiple governmental organizations is not likely to take place.5
Future research could draw upon theories of institutional change as a
means to discovering whether a gap or nexus characterizes the internal–
external security relationship at the polity level. The body of literature on
‘new institutionalism’ offers a useful way to explore not only the presence
and impact of institutions on behaviour, but also the forces driving insti-
tutional change (Martin and Simmons, 1998). A variety of factors lie behind
institutional change, and are not easily summarized here (see Peters, 2005
for an overview). Yet, some factors tend to stand out and deserve further
scholarly attention. The role of external shocks (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1993), leadership (Selznick, 1947), changing goal perceptions (Parsons,
1995) and outdated identities (Douglas, 1986) in effecting structural change
could usefully explain how the events of 11 September, the sweeping goals
of the European Security Strategy or the internationalization of security
actors may (or may not) prompt polity change.

How Dimensions Interact

Although we make an analytical distinction between perceptions, policies,


politics and polity, these dimensions are interrelated in how they affect
government responses to transboundary security issues. There is a wide
variety of dynamics that characterizes these interrelationships and we cannot
here explore all the causal mechanisms and processes at play. However,
we can point to two areas for future research. The first concerns how each
dimension interacts with its other counterparts. For instance, we know that
perceptions of a security situation are closely bound to politics, in so far
as certain constructions of a threat are encouraged for politically strategic
reasons. And we know that different government structures (polity) embed
different framings (perspectives) on security problems, leading to path
dependence and militating against frame change. Furthermore, policies
tend to reify both politics and polities by supporting vested interest and
reinforcing organizational boundaries. These direct relationships between
dimensions require further exploration if we are to untangle the complicated
and subtle explanations of how governments respond to transnational
security issues.
A second area for research should focus on the aggregate effect of the
four dimensions on the behaviour of governments towards international
cooperation. Depending on the dynamics unfolding in perceptions, policies,
politics and polity, state behaviour may take on several forms. First, govern-
ments may perceive and even develop policies focused on addressing the
transboundary nature of security issues, yet fail to turn these into effective
action. This form of ‘inertia’ characterizes international cooperation on
threats such as cyber security, for which no international regimes have yet

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 259

emerged. Second, because of certain dynamics in perceptions and politics,


some states may fail to recognize a problem from the outset. This form of
behaviour could be called ‘ignorance’. Third, governments may overreact
to some transboundary security issues, failing to understand contingencies
and variations. This form of behaviour could be called ‘exaggeration’, an
outcome that some might argue characterizes current approaches to global
terrorism. Finally, governments may not only perceive the transboundary
nature of security issues and develop policies for handling them, they may
also overcome political and institutional obstacles for effectively respond-
ing to them in practice. This form of behaviour would be called ‘coherence’.
Although other outcomes are undoubtedly possible, explaining what
dynamics lead to each of these four ‘ideal-types’ could take us a long way
towards integrated, systematic research on international responses to
transboundary security issues.

5. Conclusions

This article responds to the increasing number of studies emerging in


scholarly journals on the relationship between the domains of internal and
external security. We aim to spur future research on what happens when
problems — transboundary security issues — generate tensions and affect
governmental responses in four areas — perceptions, polity, policies and
politics. We elaborated potential implications, highlighted possible tensions
and set out research agendas in each area. Our hope is that this article will
provide a framework for future research in the interests of stimulating
further, cumulative understanding of this new empirical phenomenon
across disciplines.
The contributions in this special issue tackle some of the difficult ques-
tions associated with understanding and explaining the relationship between
internal and external security in today’s world. In the following article,
Moritz Weiss and Simon Dalferth argue that despite the transnationalization
of security problems, a divide prevails between the domains of external and
internal security in the EU — an observation which contradicts past studies
(Browning, 2003; Lutterbeck, 2004, 2005; Duke and Ojanen, 2006; Wolff
et al., 2009). Weiss and Dalferth look specifically at what we call the ‘polity’
dimension, which in their case is the institutional separation between the EU’s
ESDP and Justice and Home Affairs domains, respectively. Next, Niklas
Bremberg and Malena Britz scrutinize a cooperative effort underway at the
European level in the area of civil protection, aimed at improving govern-
ment responses to security issues both inside and outside the EU. With a
focus on the impact of security issues on the ‘policy’ relationship of internal
and external security domains, the authors argue that ‘polity’ complications
stand in the way of future coherence. Different structures, belief systems
and perceptions have generated different, and conflicting, institutional fields
within the emerging EU security space, with a requisite impact on policy
developments. Then, Peter Burgess brings attention to culture and values

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260 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 44(3)

as core concepts in understanding internal–external security dynamics, with


an empirical focus on European counter-terrorism policies. In terms of our
framework, Burgess deals with ‘perceptions’ and ‘policies’. His contention
is that there is a general trend towards increasing overlap in external and
internal security and thus a growing nexus between the domains. In the con-
cluding article, Toby Archer, too, addresses an issue related to culture and
values, in his case that of state policies towards Muslims in Britain. Archer
shows how the UK government has avoided a straightforward securitization
of Muslim citizens, but by doing so has instead forged what he calls a ‘politics
of unease’. This implies not only a nexus of external and internal security
(given the transnational dimension of some Muslim communities), but also
a new linkage between security policy and social integration policies.
Like many of the previous studies of the relationship between the domains
of internal and external security, the subsequent articles in this special issue
focus primarily on the European empirical setting. This contributes to a small
but growing body of literature and an increasingly useful debate between
scholars engaged on the topic. By way of conclusion, we call on scholars to
study other areas of the world by using the insights, or by improving the
analytical parameters, of the studies presented here. Comparative studies
are needed to explore how the internal–external relationship is manifested
in other parts of the world. We hope that this special issue will encourage
and promote additional, systematic study into the conditions under which a
nexus, or a divide, might emerge between the two domains of internal and
external security.

Notes

We express our gratitude for the invaluable research assistance and editorial help of
Åsa Fritzon of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

1. This is known as the ‘silent mermaid’ problem (Hansen, 2000) or the ‘dog that
did not bark in the night’ (Stern and Parker, 2005). Kingdon (1995: 109) makes
the important point that, as scholars, we should be able to speak of fairly objective
‘conditions’ that exist regardless of whether they are on the subjectively derived
policy agenda.
2. Domains can be viewed as discrete sets of binding rules, actors and informal
understandings that guide action over a certain issue (Laumann and Knoke, 1989).
Domains are generally distinguished by different types of behaviours and actions
depending on the policy involved.
3. Karl Deutsch’s notion of ‘security community’, which Emanuel Adler and
Michael Barnett updated in a constructivist fashion (Adler and Barnett, 1998),
differs from the security complex concept in that it is only about friendly relations
and resembles the security complex concept in at least one respect: that the (internal
and external) security of states affect each other. Yet, like the notion of security
complex, it does not deal explicitly with the external–internal nexus, not at least in
any deeper sense than observing that common identity and shared conceptions of
threat are at the core of a security community.
4. Successful cross-fertilization requires in-depth knowledge of the fields you are
drawing on. As the two authors are trained mainly in international relations and

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 261

security studies, on the one hand, and in comparative politics and public adminis-
tration, on the other, we are drawing on contributions within and across those
particular fields.
5. It should be noted, too, that governments have been specifically designed to
separate task-specific functions in order to improve accountability and rationalization
of work (Weber, 1948). Those basic and widely accepted precepts, however, are
tested when we call for improved coherence and even mergers of government
bodies.

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ERIKSSON AND RHINARD: THE INTERNAL–EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS 267

JOHAN ERIKSSON is Associate Professor of Political Science at


Södertörn University, Stockholm, and a researcher at the Swedish
Institute of International Affairs. His research interests are foreign
policy analysis, security studies, the politics of expertise and ethno-
politics. Eriksson is a member of the Steering Committee of the ECPR’s
Standing Group of International Relations.
Address: Södertörn University, SE-141 89, Huddinge, Sweden.
[email: johan.eriksson@sh.se]

MARK RHINARD is Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute


of International Affairs, Stockholm, where he coordinates the Europe
Research Program. His research focuses on European Union politics,
integration theory and the collective action problems associated with
transboundary security threats.
Address: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Box 27035,
SE-10251 Stockholm, Sweden. [email: mark.rhinard@ui.se]

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