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ABSTRACT
The central contention of this article holds that scholars do not adequately
assess and explain the influence of transboundary security issues on
government behaviour. Their assessment is not adequate because
they do not fully conceptualize the relationship between internal and
external security concerns. Their explanations are not adequate because
existing theories cannot fully explain how and why states respond to
transboundary security issues. To rectify these concerns, stimulate and
structure further research, and encourage scholarly dialogue, we build
an analytical framework for (a) understanding what we describe as the
‘nexus’ of internal and external security matters, and (b) explaining why
that nexus may change state behaviour on transboundary security issues.
The resulting framework encourages a strong focus on the nature of
transboundary problems before studying their implications for changes
in perceptions, policies, politics and polity.
Keywords: external security; internal security; security studies;
transboundary threats
1. Introduction
thus defending the traditional position of the endurance rather than the
irrelevance of the state system, of international boundaries, and thus of
the distinction between external and internal security (Waltz, 1979; Brown
et al., 2000; Mearsheimer, 2003). Some of the contributions in this special issue
approach the relationship in this way and provide arguments and examples
supporting this perspective. The core argument is that even for problems
which undeniably have a transboundary impact, they are not necessarily
managed more effectively by developing transboundary institutions. There
are political costs and obstacles involved in creating transboundary security
management systems, which are related to issues of jurisdiction and popular
legitimacy (cf. Anderson, 2007). According to this perspective, these costs
tend to overshadow the potential benefits of transboundary approaches,
especially if they take on supranational features. Hence, this state-centric
perspective represents an essentially Realist view of the international system
as largely unaffected by the ‘liberal’ forces of trade, travel and international
institution-building. Advocates of this perspective hold that, at the end of
the day, forces of transnationalization are overshadowed by the prevailing
dominance of states and intergovernmental relations, in effect maintaining
a distinctive divide between internal and external security issues.
In addition to Liberal and Realist views of the external–internal security
relationship, two quite different and original views have emerged in what
might be called the ‘European’ variant of security studies. These views reflect
more or less constructivist and post-structuralist perspectives, respectively.
The notion of security complex, originally coined by Buzan, captures how
geographically proximate states intentionally or unintentionally affect each
other’s security (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2004).
This includes not only the classical security dilemma of spiralling arms races
in neighbouring states wary of one other, but also how a secessionist rebellion
in one state may cause concerns for spillover effects in the neighbouring
state, for instance. Thus, the concept of security complex highlights regional
constellations of states, or sometimes even parts of different states whose
security is defined as strongly interdependent. The Middle East is considered
as a security complex, and so is the EU/Europe, as well as several other
regions of the world (Buzan and Wæver, 2004). Importantly, the concept
of security complex clearly brings the internal–external security nexus into
focus by emphasizing that domestic developments in one country, whether
real or imagined, may impact on threat perceptions and actions across
multiple countries, which in turn shape intergovernmental as well as trans-
national relations in the region.3
It remains to be clarified, however, how interdependencies in security
complexes can unfold more specifically, or what the patterns of trans-
national and intergovernmental relations may be. For example, it would be
fruitful to draw more on theory and research on the significance of domestic
politics and institutions in the shaping of security policy and on how such
factors are specifically interconnected with developments in neighbouring
states. Despite more recent emphasis on the social construction of threats
Perceptions
the security ‘divide’ towards a ‘nexus’, and vice-versa? There is a critical need
for more theory and research on this and other questions, including how
perceptions are related to other crucial factors and how a clear perception
of the significance of the transboundary nature of security issues translates
into effective management of such issues (Sundelius, 2005).
Policies
plan of action that downplays the policy distinction between the ‘internal’
and ‘external’. In critiquing the convergence of internal and external secur-
ity policies through processes of ‘securitization’, Bigo (2006) argues that
policy convergence has resulted not from new threats but from political
opportunism.
The contradictory findings described above suggest the need for further
research. We recommend focusing on the key drivers behind either diverg-
ence or convergence in security policy change. For instance, a long-standing
strand of public policy research shows that institutional resistance (in terms
of existing processes, routines and venues that privilege certain interests)
can inhibit policy change (see, for example, Jackson, 1976; Wildavsky, 1979;
Peters, 2005). We need to know under what conditions institutional resist-
ance will or will not inhibit policy convergence (see Bremberg and Britz,
this issue, p. 288ff., for such research). This relates to the issues covered
elsewhere in this section under ‘polity’ (see below) and highlights the inter-
connections between structures and policies. Another strand of research
found in both international relations and comparative politics highlights the
converging effects of new perceptions (e.g. ‘ideas’) on policy outcomes (see
Hall, 1993; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). This is an intriguing empirical
question in cases of converging security ‘perceptions’ (see above) and their
implications for policy. Another potential driver of convergence is the inter-
nationalization of security policy, a process by which supranational venues
are used to tackle security problems in new ways and outside the view of
domestic politics (Schmitter, 2000). Here, policy convergence remains a
strong possibility (as some evidence suggests in the case of the EU), but this
is a hypothesis requiring empirical testing.
Politics
In this article, the concept of politics is used in a traditional sense to
explore the process of ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1990).
While rather commodious, this classical definition expresses a perspective
of politics in which interests and conflicts are dominant features. Inspired
by Kingdon’s analysis of the policy-making process, we reserve the term
‘politics’ for a particular type of behaviour characterized by efforts to win,
persuade and use power-based arguments rather than to persuade by using
ideas and knowledge-based arguments (1995). Understood in this way,
political behaviour is shaped inter alia by the majority position in legislative
assemblies, alliances and coalitions within and across the governmental
and non-governmental boundary, negotiations, and the preferences and
ideologies of leading decision-makers.
This includes bureaucratic politics, which has been defined as follows:
The fact that transnational terrorism first achieved the kind of salience it
now has on the US agenda after the events of 11 September 2001 can be
explained partly by bureaucratic politics. While some intelligence on these
attacks was collected, it never reached key decision-makers before it was
too late (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
2004; Stern and Parker, 2005). An issue may quite simply be downplayed or,
in the worst case, pushed to the side in the bureaucratic process. Issues may
also fall victim to bureaucratic rivalry, in effect preventing or postponing
effective decisions to deal with it.
The interest-based actions which we define as politics can shape govern-
mental behaviour towards transboundary security issues in many ways. With
regard to three particular factors — party politics, bureaucratic politics and
public expectations — governments may experience a push for particular
policies such as international cooperation or isolationistic behaviour, or
even reward ignorance and non-decisions. If political parties are split on
the saliency of a security issue, the political cost of addressing them must be
balanced against the potential rewards in terms of effectively dealing with
the perceived security threat.
Moreover, the traditional agencies and ministries of the nation-state have
entrenched interests that can prevent policy-making from addressing the
transboundary nature of security issues. For example, in many countries
the military has shown an increasing interest in taking on responsibility for
counter-terrorism, which has often met with considerable resistance from
the national police, the latter normally enjoying a monopoly on operative
counter-terrorism (cf. Alain, 2001; Lutterbeck, 2004, 2005; Bigo, 2005,
2006). If political support is faltering, it might be the case that the technically
most effective policies are impeded. Moreover, as demonstrated by public
perceptions of decision-making within the EU, citizens tend to underestimate
the extent to which EU legislation, or internationalization more generally,
influences domestic affairs (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). This perception lag
can be politically exploited by actors who wish to maintain the impression
that the there is still a distinctive divide between the domestic and the
European domain.
In sum, research on transnational security issues and the resulting govern-
mental responses will most certainly have to take into account such political
processes, including the significance of public expectations and party politics
and the impact of bureaucratic rivalry. Here, the domestic politics approach
in foreign policy analysis provides many useful tools and insights (Hagan,
1993; Fearon, 1998; Allison and Zelikow, 1999), although it needs to be
updated to deal more explicitly with transboundary security issues.
Polity
Transboundary security issues impact upon the polity, too, a term that
refers to the institutional structures that shape how governments act. Those
institutional structures are found at the domestic level, in terms of the juris-
dictions of different units in national bureaucracies, and at the international
those built on different values and pursuing different norms (Fligstein, 2001;
see also Burgess, this issue, p. 309ff.). If organizational identities cannot be
reconciled, then a government response requiring the cooperation and inte-
gration of multiple governmental organizations is not likely to take place.5
Future research could draw upon theories of institutional change as a
means to discovering whether a gap or nexus characterizes the internal–
external security relationship at the polity level. The body of literature on
‘new institutionalism’ offers a useful way to explore not only the presence
and impact of institutions on behaviour, but also the forces driving insti-
tutional change (Martin and Simmons, 1998). A variety of factors lie behind
institutional change, and are not easily summarized here (see Peters, 2005
for an overview). Yet, some factors tend to stand out and deserve further
scholarly attention. The role of external shocks (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1993), leadership (Selznick, 1947), changing goal perceptions (Parsons,
1995) and outdated identities (Douglas, 1986) in effecting structural change
could usefully explain how the events of 11 September, the sweeping goals
of the European Security Strategy or the internationalization of security
actors may (or may not) prompt polity change.
5. Conclusions
Notes
We express our gratitude for the invaluable research assistance and editorial help of
Åsa Fritzon of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
1. This is known as the ‘silent mermaid’ problem (Hansen, 2000) or the ‘dog that
did not bark in the night’ (Stern and Parker, 2005). Kingdon (1995: 109) makes
the important point that, as scholars, we should be able to speak of fairly objective
‘conditions’ that exist regardless of whether they are on the subjectively derived
policy agenda.
2. Domains can be viewed as discrete sets of binding rules, actors and informal
understandings that guide action over a certain issue (Laumann and Knoke, 1989).
Domains are generally distinguished by different types of behaviours and actions
depending on the policy involved.
3. Karl Deutsch’s notion of ‘security community’, which Emanuel Adler and
Michael Barnett updated in a constructivist fashion (Adler and Barnett, 1998),
differs from the security complex concept in that it is only about friendly relations
and resembles the security complex concept in at least one respect: that the (internal
and external) security of states affect each other. Yet, like the notion of security
complex, it does not deal explicitly with the external–internal nexus, not at least in
any deeper sense than observing that common identity and shared conceptions of
threat are at the core of a security community.
4. Successful cross-fertilization requires in-depth knowledge of the fields you are
drawing on. As the two authors are trained mainly in international relations and
security studies, on the one hand, and in comparative politics and public adminis-
tration, on the other, we are drawing on contributions within and across those
particular fields.
5. It should be noted, too, that governments have been specifically designed to
separate task-specific functions in order to improve accountability and rationalization
of work (Weber, 1948). Those basic and widely accepted precepts, however, are
tested when we call for improved coherence and even mergers of government
bodies.
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