Rationality and Belief in God

Author(s): James E. Gilman

Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1988), pp. 143-157
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40024802
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Philosophy of Religion 24:143-157 (1988)
©Kluwer Academic Publishers

Rationality and Belief in God

JAMES E. GILMAN

Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, VA 24401

Introduction

What is required in order for belief in God to be considered rational?

Until recently answering this question was for the most part routine:
belief in God, "classical foundationalism" (CF) assumed, requires
some sort of justification in order for it to be considered rational.
Theists and non-theists alike, from Anselm and Hume to Swinburne
and Nielsen, took for granted that justifying religious beliefs is a com-
pulsory exercise without which rationality could not be claimed.
Accordingly, belief in God was denied the status of proper basicality
because, as one proponent argues, it must be inferred.1
Recently, however, a cadre of philosophers (e.g., Wolterstorff, Plan-
tinga et al.) insist that belief in God, like certain other beliefs, is proper-
ly basic (PB) and as such its rationality requires no justification. It is a
belief which, as Plantinga puts it, "I accept but don't accept on the
basis of any other beliefs." It is a belief grounded "in certain condi-
tions" for which we claim rationality even though no evidence or
argument to support it is forthcoming.2
What I wish to establish in this paper is a third line of thought
lying somewhere between these two poles; I try do so by agreeing and
disagreeing with elements belonging to both. Specifically, I argue
with PB against CF that belief in God is indeed both properly basic
and rational. But I also argue with CF against PB that the rationality
of belief in God, like other parallel beliefs, requires and is subject
to a certain kind of justification. The key phrase here, of course, is
"a certain kind of justification;" it allows me to grasp both horns of
the dilemma without impaling myself on either. I draw on the later
philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, whose theory of absolute presupposi-

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144

tions provides, with some modification, a conceptual framework with-

in which this aim can be secured.
My procedure is as follows. (1)1 argue that belief in God is analogous
to belief in the self, and that both beliefs are properly understood as
properly basic beliefs or as, what Collingwood calls, absolute presuppo-
sitions. (2) I discuss the nature of these beliefs in their logical status as
absolute presuppositions and the "kind of justification" to which they
lend themselves. (3) I argue that our knowledge of such beliefs is a
function of both faith and reason.

Presupposing belief in God

Belief in God, as a belief about the ultimate nature of reality, is similar

in kind to other metaphysical beliefs, such as beliefs about the ulti-
mate nature of human beings (e.g., the self, freedom, immortality).
To determine whether belief in God is properly basic, we must deter-
mine whether metaphysical beliefs as a species are basic. And it is here
that some philosophers of religion are prone to commit, what Moshe
Sokol refers to as, "the fallacy of misplaced argumentation," whereby
an attempt is made to solve problems belonging to one category of be-
liefs by analyzing another category of beliefs.3 Plantinga commits this
fallacy, it seems to me, in trying to draw an analogy between the basi-
cality of first-order empirical beliefs ("I see a tree," "That person is
angry") and first-order metaphysical beliefs ("I know God loves me,"
"God is angry").4 That empirical beliefs are properly basic does not and
cannot establish the basicality of metaphysical beliefs; the argument, in
such instances, is simply misplaced; and we would do better, as Mcleod .
suggests, "to generate an analogical argument about the proper basicali-
ty of beliefs about God using second-level properly basic beliefs about
persons."5 This I intend to do by drawing an analogy between belief
in the existence of the self and belief in the existence of God.
Undertaking to reject "as absolutely false all opinion in regard to
which [he] could suppose the least ground of doubt," Descartes'
quest led to the discovery of a single belief, "I think, therefore I am,"
which "was wholly indubitable."6 Ever since, philosophers have sub-
jected Descartes' discovery to scrupulous analysis, asking, for example,
What is the logical status of "therefore"? and, What kind of certainty
belongs to this indubitable belief? Not surprisingly, a variety of inter-

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 145

pretations have been offered. Detractors, such as Gassiendi, Arnauld,

and Reid, fastened on the term "therefore" and thought that they de-
tected a step of deductive inference.7 Kant insisted that the Cogito
is tautological, that "I am" or "I exist" adds nothing new to "I think."
Descartes, in replying to his critics, tried to clarify exactly what
kind of indubitability belonged to his argument. "But when we become
aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge
derived from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says "I think, hence I
am or exist" does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism,
but, by a simple act of mental vision recognizes it as if it were a thing
that is known per se." Descartes goes on to argue that if the indubi-
tability of the self's existence were a matter of deductive inference,
"the major premise, 'that everything that thinks is, or exists,' would
have to be known previously; but yet that has rather been learned from
the experience of the individual - that unless he exists he cannot
think."8 Obviously, Descartes is more decided about what kind of
indubitability does not belong to his argument than clear about what
kind does. Nonetheless, he is correct in rejecting an inferential under-
standing of "therefore;" "I am" is indeed a precondition of, and not a
deduction from, "I think."
But what kind of indubitability, then, belongs to this "primitive
act of knowledge"? How are we to interpret Descartes' metaphor,
"by a simple act of mental vision recognizes it as if it were a thing
that is known per se "? I submit that the indubitability of the self's
existence is of a kind of certainty belonging to, what Collingwood
calls, absolute presuppositions.9 Absolute presuppositions, as I show
in the next section, are basic beliefs upon which all human practice
and thought are conditioned. Of the indubitability of the self's exis-
tence in particular Collingwood states, "Its certainty does not depend
on proof, not even, like that of the Aristotelian first principles, on
indirect proof, but on the fact that it cannot be denied," that it must
be presupposed.10 "I am," in other words, is the logical and ontological
precondition for declaring "I think." Hume's attempt to verify empiri-
cally the existence of the self, for example, not only leads to scepti-
cism, but, ironically, requires that we presuppose from the start a
unified self capable of carrying out such an inquiry, a self capable of
questioning its own existence. We are compelled to conclude that our
knowledge of "I am," even when unconsciously held or internalized,
is a necessary epistemological presupposition without which "I think"

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146

is impossible. Before proceeding to a discussion of the nature of pre-

suppositional thinking, however, I want to show how belief in God is
analogous to belief in of the self's existence.
Descartes' Cogito, Collingwood suggests, indicates a path which, if
followed, would lead to a new understanding of the kind of belief
that belief in God is. Descartes himself did not pursue this path; he
still felt compelled, as did many of his successors, to invent a proof
by which God's existence is inferred. Kant, however, was able at
least partly to follow this path; he understood better than most that
the true nature of metaphysical beliefs renders irrelevant the task of
inventing proofs of God's existence. For Kant three objects of meta-
physical belief - God, freedom, and immortality - are compelling,
not because of any proof or evidence, but because they establish the
possibility of rational, normative thought. Collingwood's view is that
Kant was rightly "trying to treat God, freedom, and immortality as
certainties of the same kind as Descartes's cogito ergo sum: that is,
as universal and necessary, and so far rational, but indemonstrable
[and directly intuitive], and so far matters of faith".11 Whether this
was indeed what Kant was attempting to do is unimportant. What is
important is whether the claim is compelling: whether belief in God is
analogous to belief in the self; whether it is a properly basic belief
whose indubitability is of the same sort as "I think, therefore I am."
Consider a recent attempt by Stewart Goetz to show that belief in
God's existence is inferred and thus not properly basic. Goetz argues
that from two propositions, "I exist" and "I am a contingent being",
we make an inference to a third, "A necessary being exists;"12 in short
"I am a contingent being, therefore a necessary being (God) exists."
Goetz goes on to argue that "One can only maintain that belief in
God is properly basic by ignoring one's own contingency. I contend
that anyone who believes in God must acknowledge his contingency
and that his knowledge of his contingent nature enables him to infer
the existence of a necessary being or beings."13 Now, is it true that we
actually infer "a necessary being exists" from "I am a contingent
being." What is the status of "therefore" in this argument and what
kind of certainty does it entail?
Goetz, and mutatis mutandis with all attempts to infer the existence
of God, commits the same mistake Descartes' critics commit in trying
to interpret the "therefore" of his Cogito. The use of "therefore"
lures one into thinking a deduction has occurred. But to say "I am a

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 147

contingent being, therefore a necessary being exists" does not infer

necessary being from contingent being any more than Descartes' Cogito
infers "I am" from "I think." Rather "a necessary being exists" holds
logical and ontological priority over "I am a contingent being." Just as
"I am" is a precondition for my being aware of "I think," so also "the
existence of a necessary being," however internalized and unconscious
my awareness of it may be, is a precondition for, and not a deduction
from, my awareness of my own existence as contingent. The indubi-
tability of "therefore" in Goetz's argument is precisely of the same
kind as "therefore" in Descartes' "I think, therefore I am." Unless "a
necessary being exist" there is no "I am a contingent being;" unless I
first have an idea of a necessary being, I can have no idea of contingent
being. Just as "I exist" is a presupposition of "I think;" so also "the
existence of a necessary being" is a presupposition of "I am a contin-
gent being," and similarly functions as a properly basic belief. Under-
standing "therefore" in this way permits Collingwood to reinterpret
Anselm's argument, insisting that what it demonstrates "is not that
because our idea of God is an idea of id quo maius cogitari nequit
therefore God exists, but that because our idea of God is an idea of
id quo maius cogitari nequit we stand commited [already] to belief in
God's existence."14 The classical arguments, then, are not attempts
to prove that God exists by establishing something not previously
known. Rather, as David Burrell argues, they are "concerned to show
that the coherent exercise of reason - to understand whatever presents
itself to be understood - itself presupposes a [belief in a ] first prin-
ciple, which is what Jesus and Christians affirm to be God."15 When
once it is recognized that the "proofs" of the existence of God are
instances of presuppositional thinking, it can no longer be regarded as
a weakness that the existence of God cannot be proven.

Belief in God as absolute presupposition

But what does it mean to call a belief an absolute presupposition? Since

Collingwood's theory of absolute presuppositions is fairly well known,
I summarize only elements pertinent to this discussion.
Every statement of science or history or ordinary conversation
rests upon other statements and beliefs ("relative presuppositions")
which may or may not be articulated. These beliefs in turn are based

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148

on other beliefs, so that they too assume the acceptance of yet other
presupposed statements and beliefs which in turn operate as presuppo-
sitions relative to other statements and beliefs, and so on. Hence,
the acceptance of any statement or belief can be shown to imply a
rather lengthy procession of beliefs about the world. Philosophy helps
analyze and organize this vast train of relative presuppositions so
that our understanding of them will be coherent and life meaningful.
Collingwood insists, however, that this procession of relative presuppo-
sitions does not recede ad infinitum. Ultimately our inquiry will en-
counter a terminus a quo, a "constellation" of absolute presuppositions
(metaphysical propositions) of which, in contrast to relative presuppo-
sitions, it is impossible to ask what prior beliefs they presuppose;
for absolute presuppositions are basic and provide the ultimate hori-
zon within which, and only within which, the beliefs and principles
of all the sciences and of ordinary life arise and make sense.16
What exactly is the force of "presupposition" and of "absolute,"
in Collingwood 's theory?
"Presuppositions" must be distinguished from assumptions and
hypotheses. The latter are suppositions which are optional and belong
to the sphere of scientific propositions. One who makes a supposition
is aware that he might, if he likes, make instead another one.17 He
can assume that X = 9 but can just as easily assume that X = 1 7 or
nothing at all. A scientist may assume the existence of Euclidean
space or of Newtonian space and carry out his investigation. Absolute
presuppositions are not optional in this sense; they cannot be merely
supposed but must be pre-supposed. For example, although interpre-
tations of them may differ, we cannot presuppose that there are no
laws of nature if rational inquiry is to continue. Similarly, the exis-
tence of the self cannot be a hypothesis to be tested; as indicated
above, even the attempt to empirically verify the existence of the self
not only leads to a Humean scepticism but requires that we presuppose
from the start a unified self capable of carrying out such an inquiry
and of drawing a sceptical conclusion. Nor can the existence of God
be treated as a hypothesis; for the very attempt to verify hypotheses,
argues Collingwood, presupposes a belief that there belongs to the
world of experience an absolute objective unity of reality, a "totum in
toto et totum in qualibet parte," and the whole performing a function
for the parts without which the parts simply would cease to exist.18
This then is what "presuppose" means here: that, as Burrell states it,

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 149

"the activities ingredient to rational inquiry can be shown [to be based

already on] an operative belief in some overarching unity."19 That the
traditional name for this "unity" or "whole" is God does not mean,
of course, that God's existence is a presupposition we are compelled
to make; but only that those who hold such a belief must treat it as a
presupposition.
By "absolute" Collingwood refers to that aspect of presuppositions
which transcends distinctions ordinarily drawn between justifiable and
unjustifiable, between truth and falsity. "Absolute" usually means
"subject to no conditions." It is the term Collingwood employs to indi-
cate that certain kinds of second-level beliefs are not subject to ordi-
nary conditions of justification, but reflect "knowledge of ultimate
truth which, owing to its intuitive or imaginative form, cannot justify
itself under criticism."20 That is, "unless we have them [these absolute
beliefs] already arguing is impossible for us. Nor can we change them
by arguing; unless they remained constant all our arguments would
fall to pieces;" "it is proof that depends on them, not they on proof."21
Further, an absolute presupposition is neither "derived from expe-
rience" nor is it "undermined" by it; it is, rather, "the yard-stick by
which experience is judged".22 A.J. Ayer's principle of verification
- that only those propositions are meaningful which can be empirically
verified - sustained critical blows for being a belief which by its own
standard is unverifiable and therefore meaningless. But this is not sur-
prising; for such second-level metaphysical beliefs, Collingwood is in-
sisting, are not subject to conditions of verification or justification,
but transcend those conditions as a precondition of their possibili-
ty. Accordingly, we must treat "the existence of God [as] a pre-
supposition, and an absolute one, of all the thinking done by Chris-
tians," including thinking about what counts as justifiable and ra-
tional.23
Take as an example the question of the miraculous. Why and how is
belief in the miraculous perfectly rational for the theist, while for the
non-theist it is irrational superstition? The answer, I contend must be
in terms of what one permits to count as rational; and what one permits
to count as rational is a direct function of one's set of absolute pre-
suppositions. Properly understood, Hume's conclusion, in Essay on
Miracles - that it could never be reasonable to believe in a miracle -
is based not merely on the fact that a miracle is something which
violates a law of nature, but more fundamentally on an absolute bel
which he presupposes, namely that all rationally possible events wi

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150

always without exception conform to laws of nature as we know them.

This basic belief determines the patterns of thought which will and will
not count as rational. Thus, evidence of two thousand miracles no more
than one will convince Hume of the activity of a supernatural being;
from the start, they are inadmissable, because the set of absolute beliefs
which he presupposes compels him a fortiori to regard miracles as
irrational and superstitious. Nor will any argument, no matter how con-
vincing, compel the theist to jettison his belief in the miraculous,
so long as his set of basic beliefs presuppose a being for whom "all
things are possible." The evidence of miracles can be compelling only
to one whose set of presuppositions already allows or is in the process
of allowing the miraculous to count as rational. The point to which
Collingwood wants to draw attention is that the absolute beliefs (e.g.,
belief in God, or not) by which a person determines what will and will
not count as rational (e.g., the miraculous, or not) are rational beliefs
which nevertheless transcend the distinction between rationality and
irrationality and thereby also the way in which rationality of beliefs
is justified.
Now my promise to grasp one horn of the dilemma - that belief in
God is properly basic and rational - has been fulfilled; absolute pre-
suppositions, such as the existence of the self and of God, are both
rational and properly basic beliefs. My promise to grasp the other horn
of the dilemma - that belief in God is a properly basic belief whose
rationality nevertheless lends itself "to a certain kind of justification"
- is yet unfulfilled.

Justifying belief in God

Although not demonstrated by any particular argument of evidence,

the temptation remains great to regard belief in God, and other second-
order beliefs, as subject to conditions of justification and rationality.
This is a temptation to which I think we should yield. For although
not subject to any particular deductive proof or empirical evidence, as
Collingwood and Plantinga rightly argue, still all absolute presupposi-
tions are subject to "a certain kind of justification," namely, a critical
discussion about the Tightness or truthfulness of the "world-version"24
which they have the power to produce. There are at least two ways in
which beliefs of this sort are justifiable - functionally and retrospec-
tively.

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 151

The first way in which we determine the justifiability of beliefs,

such as belief in God, is analogous to the way in which we determine
the justifiability of truth-functional propositions: by the relative jus-
tifiability of their component parts - of the beliefs, propositions,
facts and interpretation of facts for which they function as absolute
presuppositions; in short, by all possible knowledge which a person
determines a belief to yield. Put differently, the justifiability and
rationality of properly basic second-order beliefs are determined by
the relative "reliability" of the world-version which they produce.
The extent to which a world-version is reliable is determined by the
extent to which the interdependence of its ideas, beliefs, and values
measure up to the totality of ways of making critical judgements:
including, its coherence, its correspondance to reality, its practicality,
its comprehensiveness, its resilience and elasticity as well as its preci-
sion and clarity, and its explanatory, predictive, edifying and existential
power. No one of these ways or any combination short of all of them is
capable of providing justification for a belief as basic as belief in God.
Nor can any one world-version, whether religious or secular, yield total
and complete justification; for the reliability of any world-version is
always in process of being worked out, of being reassessed and revised,
in light of new discoveries and in competition with other world-ver-
sions.
This fact will surely be a source of great disappointment for those
occupied with mathematical precision or those searching for short and
concise ways of justifying metaphysical beliefs. But there are no short
cuts, it seems to me, and no point at which absolute justifiability is
achieved. We must be satisfied with the prospect that one interpreta-
tion of belief in God is more reliable than other interpretations (or
more reliable than an interpretation of dialectical materialism) only
when it is judged to measure up to the totality of ways of making
critical judgements better than the others. Belief in God, and all second-
order beliefs, in short, is subject to no single proof or evidence that,
once understood, settles the matter pro or con. Instead, it is and
should be a matter of seemingly interminable critical attention, dis-
cussion, and revision.
Second, justification of belief in God is akin to what David Burrell
calls, "retrospective," as distinguished from "prospective," justifica-
tion. Prospective justification "seeks to answer: "Why should I under-
take this activity? [Retrospective justification] queries: What am I

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152

doing engaged in it?"25 Because of human appetite for beliefs which

have persuasive force, classical foundationalism has always sought
prospective justification for belief in God. I have already argued that
I do not think belief in God is justifiable prospectively. But that does
not mean we must resign ourselves to the view that belief in God, if
not justifiable prospectively, is not justifiable at all. If we take retro-
spective justification as paradigmatic for second-level beliefs we have
a way in which belief in God "earns" a certain persuaisve force: "earns,"
because the persuasive force of which it is capable is something won by
the hard work of explanatory reason cultivating as far as is possible at
the time the complex patterns of a world-version to which we already
stand committed. So, since usually we find ourselves already engaged,
at least in part, [we must] then look back to determine how the [be-
lief] extends our own past coherently as well as opens us into a prom-
ising future."26 This sense of justification is perhaps analogous to
lovers whose initial intuition of love is or is not vindicated by its power
to grow and mature through the engagements of daily life. Likewise,
justifying belief in God retrospectively is an open and on-going process
of explaining the extent to which that belief's interpretive power is
able to account for the great diversity of human experience - past,
present, and future.
That belief in God is justifiable in these ways (functionally and
retrospectively) will of course be disagreeable to those predisposed
to foundationalism, to the quest for a particular inference or set of
evidences on which to justify second-order beliefs. Nor will it be
agreeable to those who nurture the hope of exempting belief in God
from critical discussions of its justifiability. Nevertheless, this is the
challenge with which I think we are faced: to grasp both horns of
this dilemma and to argue a way between them.
But my promise to do so is not entirely fulfilled. Further questions
arise: How does a person know or come to a knowledge of second-
order beliefs? What is the role of faith and reason in a person coming
to belief in God?

Faith and reason

Whatever role faith may play in practicing religion, the foundationalist

assumes that reason is sufficient to establish at least a primitive belief

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 153

in God's existence. And whatever explanatory role reason may play in

understanding belief in God, those advocating the proper basicality
position assume that faith, independent of justification, is sufficient
for apprehending God's existence. The position argued above, in con-
trast, requires a different treatment of faith and reason, a treatment
in which both are simultaneously engaged in the act of believing in
God's existence.
Anselm's search for a PROOF of God's existence indicates, on the
one hand, a priority of reason over faith. Yet, on the other hand, when
Gaunilo pointed out to him that his proof was persuasive only to som
one who already believed in God, Anselm, seeming not in the least
perturbed, replied that his argument was an instance of "faith seekin
understanding," thereby indicating a priority of faith over reason
So, is it by faith or reason that we apprehend God's existence? An-
selm seems to submit two incompatible answers. But, if what I hav
argued above is correct, Anselm's ambivalence should not surprise us
for it implies that somehow second- order beliefs will be apprehende
in a way which involves the activity of both faith and reason.
How so? Collingwood provides several clues. In his earlier essays on
faith and reason, for example, he says of second-order beliefs, and
specifically of belief in the self's and God's existence, that they estab
lish "a common point in the spheres of faith and reason," "a cer-
tainty transcending the distinction of faith and reason"27 "a point a
which faith and reason absolutely coincide."28 How are we to grasp
these rather slippery claims?
Partly, by recognizing that the "common point" at which faith an
reason "absolutely coincide" entails the unique kind of beliefs dis-
cussed above, absolute presuppositions. Partly by conceiving of the
activities of faith and reason in a certain way. Collingwood conceive
of them as "habits of mind" and "attitudes which we take toward
reality." His guiding premise is that "Faith is our attitude toward
ty as a whole, reason our attitude toward its details as distinct an
separate from each other".29
First, the object of faith is "everything in the collective sense
everything as whole," and the activity of faith is the habit whe
the mind immediately and intuitively apprehends this whole as t
infinite horizon of all reality, a horizon within which the totali
of finite things are distinguished.30 Faith's conviction is of a cer
way in which the world as a whole is rational and meaningful, whe

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154

that way be theistic or materialistic. It is only because he has this con-

viction, for example, that the scientist treats facts as possible objects
of inquiry. "The scientist may be unconscious that the experiment he
is making rests upon his certainty that the universe as a whole is ra-
tional; but his unconsciousness of the fact does not alter the fact.
Without an absolute confidence in the 'uniformity of nature,' or what-
ever name he gives to the rationality of the universe, he would never
try any experiments at all."31 Religious world-versions name this be-
lief in the rationality of the universe "God," while non-religious world-
version name it any number of things: absolute mind, world soul,
matter, energy, and so on. In any case, "our use of reason to explain,"
as Burrell notes, "takes its impetus from a unity more comprehensive
than any scheme can account for, much as a particular discussion of
justice invariably reflects a cosmic sense of justice. Since that more
comprehensive unity cannot be forced into an explanatory scheme,
one can only believe it to be the case. Yet our continued use of par-
ticular explanatory frameworks would be pointless without such a
belief."32 Faith, in short, is that habit of mind by which a person
presupposes the specific way in which the world as a whole is rational
and meaningful.
In contrast, the object of reason, states Collingwood, is "everything
in the distributive sense - every separate thing" and the interrelation-
ships of these separate things. As the scientific habit of mind, reason
"is the attitude which we take up toward things as parts of a whole,
as finite things distinct from one another and connected with one
another by a network of relations which it is the business of thought
to trace out in detail.... There is no fact or class of facts which can be
withdrawn from its analysis or spared its criticism".33 Yet, the dis-
coveries of reason always fall within the horizon marked off by the
absolute beliefs which faith presupposes.
How, then, do these two habits of mind "coincide" in beliefs like
the existence of the self and of God? Although Collingwood's explana-
tion sometimes lacks clarity and detail at this point, I think an answer
is forthcoming.
Since reason's role in relation to the beliefs of faith is explanatory,
reason is always implicit in the act of faith in that faith, as Colling-
wood insists, is not a completed act "unless it develops into a rational
and self-explanatory system of thought";34 that is, "by reason we are
making explicit the steps by which faith leaps intuitively to its be-

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 155

liefs".35 "A faith unaccompanied by reason, therefore, is no true faith.

The spirit of faith is shown to be a real spirit by embodying itself in
reason....". Conversely, the attitude of reason toward reality presup-
poses at all times the attitude of faith. "Reason builds on a foundation
of faith, and moves within a system whose general nature must be
determined by faith before reason can deal with it in detail".36 Rea-
son's role is not to produce an attitude of faith, but to cultivate pat-
terns of rationality which it finds telescoped within the presupposi-
tions of faith.
In retrieving rationality for the sphere of religious beliefs, I am in
agreement with John Smith's view that there is but one avenue of
approach: namely, "a revised and strengthened form of the ancient
enterprise which went by the name of 'faith seeking understand-
ing'."37 Hence, belief in God, and all beliefs of its kind, should be
seen as playing two roles simultaneously: as a terminus ad quo, an
ultimate horizon of reality TO WHICH all acts of faith intuitively
leap; and as a terminus a quo, an ultimate, epistemological ground
FROM WHICH all possible acts of reason proceed. Accordingly, in
apprehending God's existence, faith, on the one hand, is the explicit,
dominant habit of mind, while reason is implicit and recessive. As a
"conviction of things not seen" and the assurance of things hoped for,"
faith is itself incapable of pursuing the rational implications of what it
grasps intuitively. On the other hand, in pursuing as best it can a
pattern of ideas implied by God's existence, reason is the explicit,
dominant habit of mind; faith, in turn, is now implicit and recessive
but always an activity presupposed in and underwrting all rational
activity. In this way, I think, sense can be made of Collingwood's
claim that belief in the self and in God are beliefs in which faith and
reason "absolutely coincide."
From recent philosophical discussion about belief in God it should
be clear that there is something to be said for foundationalism and for
proper basicality. It should be equally clear, if only from this paper,
that neither approach by itself is adequate. My hope is that there is
indicated by my argument a path of possible progress which avoids
the pitfalls and advances the strengths of both. That belief in God is
properly basic and rational, that the proofs of God's existence as
stepping stones to belief must be retrieved as stepping stones laid
down by belief, that belief in God is nonetheless justifiable, are all
facts of a single process that is never complete. Moreover, it seems to

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156

me that the line of thought I have taken in this paper provides, in a

peculiarly expansive way, all the ingredients of an intellectual and
practical process which is analogous to the ongoing process of growing
up: there is always room for improvement in my appreciation of the
ideas of others, in my awareness of reality, and indeed always room for
improvement in coming to understand more fully the extent to which
my world-version does or does not justify the theistic beliefs presup-
posed by it.

Notes

1. Stewart C. Goetz, "Belief in God is not Properly Basic," Religious Studies

19, p. 475.
2. Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," in Philo-
sophical Knowledge, Vol. 54 of the Proceedings of the American Catholic
Association, eds. J.B. Brough, D.O. Dahlstrom, and H.B. Veatch.
3. Moshe Z. Sokol, "The Autonomy of Reason, Revealed Morality, and Jewish
Law," Religious Studies 22(3-4), p. 423.
4. See Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?", in Rationality and Re-
ligious Belief, ed. C.F. Delaney (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), pp. 7-27; "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?", Nous XV (1981):
41-51.
5. Mark McLeod, "The Analogy Argument for the Proper Basicality of Bel
God ," International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987), p. 1
6. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. John Veitch (La Salle, IL: Op
Court Pub., 1962), p. 34.
7. M. Arnauld, Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. II, trans. E.S. Haldane
G.R.T. Ross (NY: Dover Pub., 1934), p. 84. Arnauld says, for example, "A
certainly, some one will say that it is no marvel if, in deducing my exist
from the fact that I think, the idea that I form of the self, which is in
way an object of thought, represents me to my mind as merely a think
being, since it has been derived from my thinking alone."
8. Ibid., p. 38.
9. In attributing this view to Collingwood, I take the liberty of interpreti
earlier essays on faith and reason (1927 and 1928) in terms of his more
developed theory of absolute presuppositions set forth in An Essay on M
physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). The two earlier essays are: "Rea
is Faith Cultivating Itself," Hibbert Journal XXVI. Reprinted in Faith an
Reason: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion by R.G. Collingwood, pp. 10
121, ed. Lionel Rubinoff (Chicago: Quadrangle Books); and Faith and Reas
A pamphlet in the Affirmation Series. (London: Ernest Benn. Reprinted
Faith and Reason: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion by R.G. Collingw
pp. 122-147, ed. Lionel Rubinoff (Chicago: Quadrangle Books).

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 157

10. R.G. Collingwood, "Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself," p. 114.

11. R.G. Collingwood, Faith and Reason, p. 137. Following Kant, Collingwood
explains how these three beliefs are presuppositions of human experience:
"God, because God stands for the rationality, the trustworthiness, of the
objective world; freedom, because freedom means our own power of deter-
mining our own actions, which certainly cannot be tested by scientific inquiry
into this or that type of action, but must be found, if anywhere, in our actions
taken as a whole; immortality, because immortality means the ultimate har-
mony between human purposes and the destiny of the universe" (pp. 139-
140).
12. Goetz,p. 482.
13. Ibid., p. 484.
14. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, p. 190.
15. David Burrell, "Religious Belief and Rationality," in Rationality and Religious
Belief, ed. C.F. Delaney (Notre Dame, IN; University of Notre Dame Press,
1979), p. 98.
16. See Part I of An Essay on Metaphysics where Collingwood discusses the details
of this theory.
17. Ibid., pp. 27-28, 155-161. See also Collingwood's Religion and Philosophy
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1916), p. 138.
18. R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 300.
19. Burrell, p. 101.
20. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 132.
21. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 173. See also, "Reason is Faith
Cultivating Itself," p. 115.
22. Ibid., pp. 193-194.
23. Ibid., p. 186.
24. The phrase "world-version" is borrowed from Nelson Goodman and is used
throughout this paper to mean roughly what Goodman means: symbol systems
which attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the world. They
are formed, he tells us, through the transformation of previous symbol systems
and are subject to critical discussions of their Tightness. See especially Good-
man's Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Pub. Co., 1978), Ch. 1,
Sec. 4.
25. Burrell, pp. 107-112.
26. Ibid., p. 108.
27. Collingwood, Faith and Reason, pp. 137-138.
28. Collingwood, "Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself," p. 1 14.
29. Collingwood, Faith and Reason, p. 140.
30. Ibid., p. 142.
31. Ibid., p. 141.
32. Burrell, p. 98.
33. Collingwood, Faith and Reason, p. 142.
34. Collingwood, "Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself," pp. 118-119.
35. Collingwood, Religion and Philosophy, p. 67.
36. Collingwood, FtfzY/z and Reason, p. 143.
37. John Smith, "Faith, Belief, and the Problem of Rationality," in Rationality
and Religious Belief, ed. C.F. Delaney (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1979), p. 59.

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