The relationship between Hitler and Mussolini

1930-1940

Ardeleanu Alina-Andrea RISE (RI) II

Introduction
Both Mussolini and Hitler are important historical figures, especially when it comes to the
period between World War I and World War II. The two leaders had different personalities, but
they were both strong and ambitious and their bigger desire was to make their countries the most
powerful in Europe. Their regimes had a lot of things in common, especially if we understand
that nazism is also a form of fascism. This is one of the reasons why Hitler saw Mussolini as an
idol and a role model during his time spent in prison and until reaching power in 1933. The
relations between them are important because many of the inter-war events had them as the main
actors and they together, as well as separate. decided the course of the next years.

The relation between Hitler and Mussolini between 1933-1936

Reaching power in 1922, Mussolini did not take Hitler seriously until the German elections in
1933. The relationship between the two leaders will become more tense because of the problem
of Austria. In other words, Mussolini feared the possibility of the new German regime to extend
its control to Austria.
When Hitler assumed power, he soon manifested his willingness to implement the plan
exhibited in Mein Kampf and to approach Italy. Mussolini will respond to these manifestations
with courtesy, but will remain cautious and reserved.
The two will met in person only in the summer of 1934 in Venice. Poorly advised, Hitler
landed dressed up in civil clothes, while Mussolini was wearing an uniform adorned with golden
yarns and decorations. The Duke took advantage of this situation during their meeting, forcing
Hitler to accept the second role. In the Piazza San Marco, Mussolini gave a speech from the
balcony in front of the crowd gathered, while his guest listened to him from another balcony 1.
During the meeting, the two leaders agreed on their aversion to France and Soviet Russia, but
they did not talk about Austria. That is why Hitler did nothing to try to calm the Austrian Nazis
and on 25 July 1934 the Vienna Nazis occupied the Republic's chancellery and killed Engelbert
Dollfus, the Chancellor of Austria and one of Mussolini’s closest friends 2. In response to this
action, Mussolini sent troops to the Austrian border. Hitler had to assist helplessly to the action
of Schuschnigg, the successor of Dollfus, which restored the order under Mussolini's protection3.
In March 1935 Nazi Germany declared the existence of an air force, the "Luftwaffe". Violating
the Treaty of Versailles, he also announced the introduction of compulsory military service in
order to create an army five times bigger than he was allowed according to the treaty. In this

1
https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/hitler-si-mussolini-in-1938-doi-dictatori-vazuti-de-un-diploma

2
A.J.V. Taylor, The Origins of World War II, Iaşi, Ed. Polirom, 1999, p.73

3
Ibidem, p. 74
situation, Mussolini agreed to meet with representatives of Great Britain and France in April
1935, in the Italian city of Stresa, to organise a common front to the visible German threat4.
The Stresa front was a deal between France's minister Pierre Laval, Prime Minister of Great
Britain, Ramsay Macdonald, and prime Minister of Italy, Benito Mussolini. They were trying to
work together to prevent any further insecurity of the treaties that could threat the European
peace and balance of power. The declarant aim of the pact was to reaffirming the Locarno Treaty
and was a form of protest to Hitler's decisions.
Mussolini took full advantage of this agreement, understanding that France and Britain were
willing to make different concessions to avoid a possible alliance between Germany and Italy,
which showed more understanding of Italy's expansionist ambitions outside the continent. As a
consequence, the Duke used this circumstance to expand his colonial empire with minimal risks,
and the area chosen for expansion was Abisinia5.
The conquest of Abisinia by Italian troops was the result of Mussolini's desire to consolidate its
position by creating an Italian empire in East Africa. The Ethiopian episode represented the
turning point of the fascist regime, convincing Mussolini of his infallibility and the necessity of a
policy of force towards hesitant and divided democracies. Last but not least, this event led him to
gather ties with Hitler's Germany6.

The relation between Hitler and Mussolini between 1936-1939

Relations between the Italian and German leader are improving considerably in the period
1936-1939, with the Duke starting to see a necessary ally in Germany. Sympathy for Hitler came
on one side of the fact that Germany had not been involved in the issue of the sanctions and, on
the other hand, from the fact that both states had common enemies, dating back to the 1919
peace Conference: Great Britain and France. The reconciliation began in January 1936, when
Hitler declared to give up on Anschluss (annexing Austria to Germany). As a reward, Mussolini
accepted that Austria would be Germany's satellite. But the events in which the two totalitarian
states collaborated have multiplied over the next few years.
The Spanish Civil War began on 17 July 1936, when the military garrison in Morocco, under
the command of general Francisco Franco rebelled against the legitimate republican government
in Madrid. In this conflict, the Republicans enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union and Mexico,
while the nationalists were supported by Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Portugal.
The response of the international community to the conflict was significant. France, located at
the border, was directly interested in the actions in Spain, as the prospect of the takeover of the
power by Franco put Paris in the position where it would have been circled by fascist powers.

4
Mark Robson, Italy: liberalism and fascism, Bucharest, Ed. All, 1997, p.148
5
Andrew Roberts– A history of the english speaking people since 1900, London, Ed. Weindenfeld and Nicolson,
2006
6
Jan Palmowski, A Dictionary of Contemporary World History: From 1900 to the Present, vol I, Bucharest, Ed BIC
ALL, 2005,
However, France and Britain initiated the non-interventionist policy, as these two great powers
feared that conflict involvement could attract a war with Germany and Italy. A declaration of
non-intervention was signed, but it did not really work. Thus, Hitler and Mussolini continued to
support Franco with both weaponry and armies of volunteers, while the Soviet Union was the
main supporter of the republicans7.
After the annexation of Austria to the third Reich on 12 March 1938, German foreign policy
reoriented almost immediately to the destruction of the Czechoslovak state. In 1938 the German
pressure became stronger, and the meetings between Chamberlain and Hitler failed to remedy the
crisis8.
Thus, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain begged Mussolini to mediate an
understanding with Hitler in order to avoid war. The result was the Munich conference (28-29
September 1938), attended by representatives of Italy (Mussolini), Germany (Hitler), Britain
(Chamberlain) and France (Daladier).
In March 1939, Hitler occupied what remained of Czechoslovakia. The Czech side became
German protectorate, and Slovakia was declared an independent state, in reality it was a German
satellite. Mussolini was disturbed by the fact that Hitler had not told him of his ongoing plan. But
as Germany demonstrated with every gesture that the odds are favourable to it, he would remain
on the side he considered to be the winner’s side. Consequently, the Duke publicly supported
Hitler's actions.
In early May 1939, Maxim Litvinov was replaced by Molotov. The removal of a minister of
Jewish origin, very favourable to the idea of collective security, represented a signal which was
not missed by the Nazi leadership. Thus, on 22 May 1939, Germany and Italy concluded the
Steel Pact9. It provided that: ' If the common interests of the Contracting Parties were threatened
by international events of any kind, they would immediately begin consultations and will take
action in order to safeguard those interests. If the security or other vital interests of one of the
Contracting Parties were threatened from the external authorities, the other Contracting Party
will give its full political and diplomatic support to the sides in order to eliminate this threat. If,
despite the wishes and hopes of the Contracting Parties, it would be to happen that one of them is
engaged in war complications with other or other powers, the other contracting Party will
immediately come as an ally and will support it with all military forces, on the ground, sea and
air "10. Unfortunately, Mussolini probably understood too late the implications of signing such a
deal with Germany and attempted to find ways to dodge it.
In August 1939, Germany was already ready for the invasion of Poland, but the Italian
government communicated to the Germans that, although there was no restraint on the part of
Italy to participate in a war, it must be postponed for another three years because Italy was not
7
https://ro.historylapse.org/razboiul-civil-spaniol
8
Bogdan Antoniu, Alin Matei, Policy and Society in the 20 th Century, Ministerul Educaţiei şi Cercetării. Proiectul
pentru învăţământul rural, 2007, p.121

9
Ibidem, p. 124
10
https://www.mzv.cz/file/198473/MunichAgreement.pdf
yet prepared. This message, however, has never received an answer from Hitler. At the end of
August, when the attack was imminent, Mussolini repeated Italy's request to benefit from several
years of peace, but this time also Hitler ignored him and asked Italy to comply with the terms of
the Steel Pact. In these circumstances, the Duke argued that he would only enter the war if Italy
were to be endowed with enormous unrealistic amounts of war material. When Germany entered
the war with Western democracies following the invasion of Poland, Mussolini declared that his
ally was "not loyal"11.
After the signing of the Steel Pact, the next foreign policy event attended by Mussolini’s Italy
and Hitler's Germany was the Second World War. The participation of the two states in the
second world conflagration will mean the disintegration of their regimes and lead to the final
failure of the fascist experiment12.
Conclusion
In conclusion, both the Duke and the Fuhrer pursued to transform their states into great
European powers during a period when the European system was extremely unstable as a result
of World War I. Their external policy was extremely ambitious. I think that it is important to
mention that there is a great ambiguity in the Italian policy: Mussolini saw Hitler as a “mugger”,
but at the same time he needed the support of Germany because Italy was not a power of
stability, but a power that attempted to change borders and the order in Europe. In other words,
Mussolini didn't like Hitler, but he needed German revisionism. There is also a great ideological
affinity between the 2 regimes. The last attempt of the two to meet their foreign policy objectives
was the involvement of Italy and Germany in World War II, but the two leaders would end up
tragically. In the year 1943 Mussolini was assassinated by a group of partisans, and his body was
hanged by the feet in the center of Milan, while around Hitler's death there is a certain dose of
mistery; the official version would be that the Fuhrer committed suicide in his bunker in
Berlin, at the end of World War II . However, there is no concrete evidence in this regard13.

Bibliography
11
Mark Robson, Italy: liberalism and fascism, Bucharest, Ed. All, 1997, p.159
12
Bogdan Antoniu, Alin Matei, Policy and Society in the 20 th Century, Ministerul Educaţiei şi Cercetării. Proiectul
pentru învăţământul rural, 2007, p.144
13
https://www.wattpad.com/601065966-hitler-si-evreii-lui-hitler-nu-a-murit-in-buncar
 1. Mark Robson, Italy: liberalism and fascism, Bucharest, Ed. All, 1997
2. Bogdan Antoniu, Alin Matei, Policy and Society in the 20th Century, Ministerul
Educaţiei şi Cercetării. Proiectul pentru învăţământul rural, 2007
3. Andrew Roberts, A history of the english speaking people since 1900, London, Ed.
Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 2006
4. Jan Palmowski, A Dictionary of Contemporary World History: from 1900 to the present,
vol. I, Bucharest, Ed. BIC ALL, 2005,
5. A.J.V. Taylor, The Origins of World War II, Iaşi, Ed. Polirom, 1999

Webography
1. https://ro.historylapse.org/razboiul-civil-spaniol
2. https://www.wattpad.com/601065966-hitler-si-evreii-lui-hitler-nu-a-murit-in-buncar
3. https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/hitler-si-mussolini-in-1938-doi-dictatori-
vazuti-de-un-diploma
4. https://www.mzv.cz/file/198473/MunichAgreement.pdf