CASE 1

G.R. Nos. 221103 October 16, 2018

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondents

Constitutional Law; Constituting quorum; Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules
requires the presence of at least one Justice and four members of the
Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices
are present, at least two members of the House of Representatives need to
be present to constitute a quorum. Without this rule, it would be possible
for five members of the House of Representatives to convene and have a
quorum even when no Justice is present. This would render ineffective the
rationale contemplated by the framers of 1935 and 1987 Constitution. The
rule does not make Justices indispensable members to constitute a quorum
but rather ensure that representatives from both the Judicial and
Legislative departments are present to constitute a quorum. Members from
both the Judicial and Legislative departments become indispensable to
constitute a quorum.

CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: In November 2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET Rules).
Petitioner alleges that she has two pending cases before the HRET
and the application of the 2015 HRET Rules to all pending cases could
prejudice her cases before the HRET.
It is the contention of the petitioner that Rule 6 of the HRET Rules
which requires the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a
quorum is unconstitutional for it grants more powers to the Justices
individually than the legislators because even when all six legislators are
present, they cannot constitute themselves as a body and cannot act as an
Executive Committee without the presence of any of the Justices thereby
making the latter an indispensable members thereof. Petitioner alleges that
the rule violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by
conferring the privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices.
On February 2, 2016, HRET filed its comment maintaining that it has
the power to promulgate its own rules that would govern the proceedings
before it. It points out that under Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules, a quorum
requires the presence of at least one Justice-member and four members of
the Tribunal for the purpose of maintaining judicial equilibrium in deciding
election contests and because the duty to decide election cases is a judicial
function.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of 2015 HRET Rules specifically
Rule 6 (a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to
constitute a quorum is constitutional.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court elucidated the composition of HRET
which is expressly provided on Section 17, Article VI of the 1987“…Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
all the remaining six shall be Members of the House of Representatives….”
Thus, it is clear that the HRET is a collegial body with members from two
separate departments of the government: the Judicial and the Legislative
departments. Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional
powers to the Justices but rather maintains the balance of power between
the members from the Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by
the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices or even
at least one is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved
and do away with the impression that party interests play a part in the
decision making process. In the case at bar, while it is true that in
constituting a quorum, legislators cannot act without Justices, it does not in
any manner make an indispensable privilege upon Justices nor it violates
the equal protection clause for there is a valid classification to ensure the
presence from both Judicial and Legislative branches to constitute a
quorum. Thus, Rule 6 (a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in
order to constitute a quorum is constitutional.
CASE 2

G.R. Nos. 176549 October 10, 2018

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY & PABLO
MENDOZA, Petitioner v. ROMEO C. CARRIEDO, Respondents

Constitutional Law; Right of retention; Both the Constitution and

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) underscore the underlying
principle of agrarian reform program, that is, to endeavor a more equitable
and just distribution of agricultural lands taking into account, among
others, equity considerations.

JARDELEZA, J.:
FACTS: In June 1990, Romeo C. Carriedo unilaterally sold his landholdings
to People’s Livelihood Foundation (PLFI) his agricultural landholdings with
approximately 58.3723 hectares.
It now becomes a dispute whether Carriedos’s previous sale of his
landholdings to PLFI can be treated as the exercise of his retention rights,
such that he cannot lawfully claim the subject landholding as his retained
area anymore.
On January 20, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
adjudging Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as ultra vires for providing terms which
appear to expand or modify some provisions of the CARL.
Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as applied to this case, petitioner DAR submits
that the subject landholding cannot be considered as the retained area of
Carriedo anymore because he has already exercised his right of retention
when he previously sold his landholdings without DAR clearance. Therefore,
Carriedo’s act of disposing his landholdings is tantamount to the exercise of
his retention right under the law. It further contends that the ruling of CA
sets back the CARL by upsetting its established substantive and procedural
components and disregarded the long-standing procedure where the DAR
treats a sale (without its clearance) as valid based on the doctrine of
estoppel, and that the sold portion is treated as the landowner’s retained
area.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) being a government agency
legally mandated to implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) and the primary agency vested with the expertise on technicalities
of the CARL assails the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 5 Series of
2006 (AO 05-06).

ISSUE: Whether or not the DAR Administrative Order No. 5 Series of

2006 (AO 05-06) is valid.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. It is mandated by Constitution specifically under
Section 4, Article XIII thereof, there must be a just distribution of all
agricultural lands subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe. CARL, giving life to the said Constitutional
provision provided in its Declaration of Principles and Policies that a more
equitable distribution and ownership of land with due regard to the rights of
landowners to just compensation shall be undertaken. The Court elucidated
that in order to ensure the effective implementation of the CARL, previous
sales of landholding (without DAR clearance) should be treated as the
exercise of retention rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item No.4 of
AO 05-06, hence, the objective is equitable. It is held that equity in this
policy of AO 05-06 is apparent and easily discernible. By selling his
landholdings, it is reasonable presumed that the landowner already
received an amount (as purchase price) commensurate to the just
compensation conformable with the constitutional and statutory
requirement. In the case at bar, equity dictates that he cannot claim
anymore, either in the guise of his retention area or otherwise, that which
he already received in the previous sale of his land.

CASE 3

G.R. Nos. 202678 October 12, 2018

ERNESTINA A. PAGDANGANAN, RODERICK APACIBLE
PAGDANGANAN, MARIA ROSARIO LOTA represented by her
Attorney-inFact, ERNESTINA A. PAGDANGANAN, and SANDA
APACIBLE PAGDANGANAN, as the heirs and substitutes of deceased
ISAURO J. PAGDANGANAN, ALFONSO ORTIGAS OLONDRIZ, and
CITIBANK N.A. HONGKONG, Petitioners v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and MA. SUSANA A.S. MADRIGAL, MA. ROSA A.S.
MADRIGAL, MATHILDA S. OLONDRIZ, VICENTE A.S. MADRIGAL.
ROSEMARIE OPIS-MALASIG, MARIA TERESA S. UBANO, EDUARDO
E. DELA CRUZ and GUILLER B. ASIDO , Respondents

Constitutional Law; Speedy disposition of cases: The Constitution specifies

specific time periods when court may resolve cases. The Court of Appeals is
given a 12-month period to resolve any case that has already been
submitted for decision. Any case pending 12 months after submission for
decision may be considered as delay. The parties may file the necessary
action, such as petition for mandamus, to protect their constitutional right
to speedy disposition of cases.

LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: Solid Guaranty, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
insurance business. In November 23, 2007, Solid Guaranty, through its
minority stockholder, Pagdanganan, filed a complaint before RTC Manila
due to the alleged conflicting claims between respondents Madrigals and
Citibank over the shares of stock previously held by the late Antonio P.
Madrigal.
On November 26, 2007, while the case was pending, Special
Stockholders’ Meeting was called to elect new members of Board of
Directors. Petitioners Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan seeks to amend the
complaint and to nullify the stockholders’ meeting and election of the
directors and officers. An Urgent Motion for Permission to Take Custody of
Stock Transfer Book and Other Corporate Records of Solid Guaranty was
filed by Corporate Secretary Urbano before the RTC. Six months later,
another motion was filed by Urbano.
On June 2008, RTC granted Urbano’s second motion, considering that
the shares of stock to be transferred were not subject of the interpleader
suit. Urbano then called for the holding of a Special Stockholders’ Meeting.
On the contrary, petitioners Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan filed a motion
with RTC to prevent the holding of the meeting. The RTC authorized the
holding of the meeting so the Special Annual Stockholders’ Meeting was
held and new members of the Board of Directors were elected.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court
of Appeals alleging that RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the holding of June 30, 2008 meeting despite the pendency of
interpleader suit. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition was
likewise filed by petitioners.
On August 2008, comments to the petition were filed by both parties. In
October 2008, CA received Motion to Admit Second Supplemental Petition
filed by petitioners and granted the same. CA directed the submission of
comments on the petition. All the parties submitted their respective
memoranda by the 27th of October 2008. Moreover, a Motion for Leave to
File Third Supplemental Petition was filed on December on the same year.
On October 22, 2009, CA acknowledged that the case could have already
been submitted for a decision but was deferred because of the subsequent
filing of the Second and Third Supplemental Petitions. However, filing of
comments on the Third Supplemental Petition were directed. Thus, a
Comment dated November 12, 2009 was filed.
On October 6, 2010, CA issued a resolution expunging from the record
the Second and Third Supplemental Petitions. The case is submitted for
decision. On October 9, 2010, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the October 6, 2010 Resolution.
On March 24, 2011, petitioner Pagdanganan passed away; thus, counsel
moved for the substitution of parties.
On January 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for Mediation with the Court
of Appeals. On March 1, 2012, they likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. While the Motions were pending with the Court of
Appeals, or on August 2, 2012, petitioners filed Petition for Mandamus
against respondents. They alleged that CA committed inordinate delay in
resolving their Petition filed on July 11, 2008. They claimed that the Court
of Appeals, “continued inaction on the case is clearly a neglect of its judicial
duties.” CA denied the Motion for Mediation as it was unilaterally made.
Motion for Reconsideration of its October 6, 2010 Resolution was likewise
denied.
On February 8, 2013, CA dismissed the petition for the questioned
orders of the RTC were not rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed inordinate delay in

resolving the petition.

HELD: NEGATIVE. The Court of Appeals did not delay in resolving the
petition. All persons have the constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases which is expressly enshrined under Section 15 of the Constitution. In
the case at bar, it was only December 14, 2012 that the Court of Appeals
declared with finality that the petition was submitted for decision. CA finally
resolved the Petition on February 8, 2008 or less than 2 months from its
final pronouncement submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals
has resolved the petition in a timely manner within the period provided by
law, thus, petitioners’ invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases
is misplaced.
It was, thus, inaccurate for petitioners to accuse the Court of Appeals of
delay in resolving their petition filed in 2008 without taking into account the
numerous pleadings they had filed while the petition was pending. The case
is dismissed.