Seminar Paper Allies and Adversaries: The Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the Grand

Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in
World War II
by
LTC Abdel Aziz BIO DJIBRIL
BENIN National Gendarmerie

Under the Direction of:

Colonel Stephen Van Riper

United States Army War College

Class of 2018

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army
War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the
Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional
accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the
Council for Higher Education Accreditation .
 Information

Title: Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance,
and U.S. Strategy in World War II

Author: LTC Abdel Aziz BIO DJIBRIL

BENIN National Gendarmerie

FI: Colonel Stephen Van Riper

Seminar 2

Page Count: 6 Word Count: 1598

 Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S.
Strategy in World War II

Author: Mark A. Stoler

Allies and Adversaries: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S.

Strategy in World War II (WW II) is a masterpiece that I would strongly recommend to

any strategic thinker, strategic leader, as well as students of strategic studies. From

multiple primary sources, Mark Stoler develops a critical analysis of what he calls the

wartime rise of military influence in the United States foreign policy. He also expresses

his opinion about the great debate that preceded U.S. strategy and coalition building

with its major allies— Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The book shows how military

leaders, military planners, and civil authorities interacted in times of war. It also reveals

U.S. strategy during that war. As a turning point in the history of the United States, the

year 1942, drove the country into one of the bloodiest conflict of the contemporary

world. The U.S. officially declared war on Japan and its allies and entered WW II after

the Pearl Harbor attack. During the war and contrary to the responsibility they had

traditionally assumed devoted to the nation’s military forces, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

played a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of U.S. national policy,

foreign policy and strategy. Right after the Pearl Harbor disaster, the military leadership

created the Joint Chiefs of Staff and established a powerful instrument that controlled

both the formulation of the policies and the military strategies. Stoler’s book depicts the

influence of military leaders during the Second World War, as well as the debate in the

course of the development of U.S. and allies’ strategy to defeat the Axis powers.

Through thorough evidence and analysis, the book offers a great opportunity to
scrutinize U.S. military strategy and allies’ policy. The book also provides an exceptional

case study for Theory of War and Strategy (TWS), as well as for National Security

Policy and Strategy (NSPS). Throughout this piece, the author illustrates how the

strategy formulation framework evolved.

Stoler reveals how special events could reverse the Clausewitz’s principle of

subordination of the military to civil authority. Policy usually comes from politics, but in

that total war, military planners found themselves drafting not only strategies, but also

policies. The success of this double role gave birth to the current Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Albeit weakened to restore deference of military to civilian authority, the JCS is still

relevant today. The author also highlights the great strategic debates that arose during

the strategy development, peculiarly over differences with Great Britain. Inspired by the

U.S. experience in World War I concerning their relationship with Britain, U.S. Army

planners objected to a direct alliance with Britain and advocated for indirect logistic

support for future relationship. This attitude generated disputes between army and navy

leaders who sought cooperation between the British Navy and the U.S. Navy to

dominate the Pacific. This point reminds us of the rivalry between the Army and the

Navy in that period, not only in U.S., but also in Japan and with other great powers. To

deal with that tension and counter British tendency to outmaneuver the Americans, the

U.S. opted for a global strategy that would take into account its own interests. Thus,

Americans moved from the German-centric battles imposed by British and other

European powers interests to Pacific-centric efforts to defend U.S. interests.

By emphasizing these events, Stoler pinpoints one of the critical elements of

strategy formulation. In addition to respecting and applying its enduring values and

2
beliefs, each nation develops its strategy based on its interests, mainly of survival and

promotion of its vital interests. With regard to this consideration, U.S. planners found it

more relevant to build a solid alliance with the Soviet Union that would help them to

defeat not only the Japanese, but also to obtain victory in Europe. First reluctant on that

proposal, President Franklin Roosevelt finally adopted that strategic approach in 1943.

Nevertheless, as the end of the war approached, Americans realized the postwar

ambitions of the Russians and quickly readjusted their policy and strategy for their best

interests. After all, as mentioned Lord Palmerston (John Henry Temple), “In

international relations, there are no permanent friends, or permanent enemies, only

permanent interests.”1 The new U.S. nuclear capability also reduced the need for a

future alliance with the Soviet Union, which for the sake of its own interest continuously

violated the Yalta agreement. The game of thrones had soon started for the future world

order. The U.S. made up its mind to strengthen its position with the support of the

British and other European powers against the Soviet Union, which appeared to be the

future U.S. peer competitor in the new bipolar world order. The open mindedness and

flexibility of the military planners led them to a “paradigm shift”. 2 British and Americans

had seen in their ally of the moment a potential future enemy. They assumed that the

Soviet Union control over Europe and Asia would be as devastating as the Axis powers

dominating the world. From that assumption, President Roosevelt deducted that the

U.S. long-term security would soon depend on Europe’s security situation. The U.S.

then agreed to build a solid alliance with Western European States to stop the spread of

Communism.

3
 As Stoler correctly notes, a new war began even before the end of World War II.

Allies became enemies and enemies became friends to fight their common threat

showing the rightness of Kautilya’s postulate: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Considering the new situation, U.S. strategy evolved. The U.S. strategic leaders knew

that atomic weapons altered the character of warfare and that U.S. homeland security

would soon depend upon overseas bases, as well as first-strike capability and capacity

with a performant global intelligence collecting and analyzing system. Nevertheless,

they remained cognizant that a direct confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet

Union could be catastrophic for both superpowers. Managing to avoid that, they drew a

wartime plan to cover Soviet co-operation or hostility. 3

Without a doubt, the book draws attention to systematic events that occurred

right before, in the course of, and right after the Second World War. It gives insightful

comments and analyses on U.S. policy and strategy, as well as some disagreements

between the top brass and with young officers concerning some important strategic

decisions mainly about Great Britain and Soviet Union; this is a sign of critical thinking.

Stoler’s book true value resides in the analysis of the tremendous effort done by

U.S. Generals in terms of policy and strategy formulation during World War II. Their

actions led to the coalition victory and the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

Crucial to the victory was their ability not only to leverage the military instrument of

power, but also economic power in the formulation and implementation of their strategy

was vitally important. They did an exceptional job in aligning Ends, Ways, and Means to

reach the desired end state; the unconditional surrender of Germany, Japan, and Italy.

U.S. military planners also succeeded in achieving political goals and mitigating risks

4
pertaining to the strategies that they developed. As the author mentions, “Total victory

over the Axis and its accomplishment as quickly as possible and with a minimum of U.S.

casualties were political goals.”4 U.S. military planners and leaders shaped and paved

the way for a long-term perspective for the U.S. to become a great nation. Both U.S.

allies and adversaries noticed, "The era of American globalism and the national security

state had begun".5 More poignant and deserving appreciation is Stoler’s comment

about the remarkable handing over of U.S. security issue to well-prepared “Young

officers who possessed a global vision of U.S. security, a belief in alliance with England

against Russia, and, thanks to their wartime predecessors, extensive input into the

planning process.”6

However, it is important to mention that at the national and international levels,

not only policies and strategies deserve attention, but also grand strategy, which war

theorists consider as the use of all instruments of power to reach and achieve political

goals. Stoler’s book does not mention that point and fails to tell us whether the military

planners and leaders succeeded in developing U.S. grand strategy for the Second

World War. Unlike National Security Council 68 (NSC 68), the U.S. grand strategy

conceived to defeat the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold

War, readers of Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance,

and U.S. Strategy in World War II learned very little about U.S. grand strategy to defeat

Nazism and Fascism in mid-forties. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this shortfall

does not affect the quality of that strategic book. The relevance of the analyses and the

pertinence of the comments make Stoler’s work a very good reference in terms of policy

and strategy making. It is definitely a good example of development and implementation

5
of wartime strategy. Many lessons learned erupted from the ashes of that world-armed

conflict and inspired not only the successors of the Second World War combatants, but

also present-day soldiers and war strategists.

Endnotes

6
 1
Lord Palmerston quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/nations-have-no-permanent-friends-or-
allies-they/771609.html (accessed April 15, 2018).
2
Pg 268.
3
Pg 136.
4
Pg 269.
5
Pg 270.
6
Ibid.