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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution

By

*Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.


osinugao@hotmail.com

Background

“…all Nigerians are expecting this Committee to perform magic and I pray that Allah should give you the
wisdom to do so because without peace we cannot develop” President Goodluck Jonathan was widely
quoted in the Nigeria media on Wednesday 24 April whilst addressing members of the
Presidential Committee on the Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the Northern part
of Nigeria.

The use of the word magic by the President is somewhat unusual in the public pronouncement
of government policy. However the President qualifies this by saying a prayer that the committee
gets the wisdom to perform its magic so that we can develop with peace in 3 months. Apart
from the strange choice of words by the President his volte-face in light of his recent remarks in
March when he was reported to have said he would not ‘declare amnesty for ghosts’ for the
crimes and atrocities suspected to have been committed by militants of the “People Committed to
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Hausa: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad)
widely known in Hausa as Boko Haram. Thus in addressing the challenges posed by Boko Haram
the foundation of this new government’s policy is incoherent, lacks clarity, lacks a sense of
purpose, is deeply flawed, hopeful at best and at worst illusory. The reality of the situation on the
ground shows that the glaring failure by the government in its abject failure to grasp the
intricacies of the conflict situation in the North of Nigeria. Furthermore despite the abundance
of huge resources in the subject area of conflict resolution including our experience from the
Civil War in 1967 – 1970, the government has displayed a monumental knowledge deficit in its
feeble attempt at tackling the challenges posed by the brutal and violent activities of Boko Haram.
Sadly the government’s track record is littered with showing little and basic understanding in
formulating policies designed to resolve conflict making it prone to repeating the same mistakes
of history. Personal narratives are virtually non-existent in government policy and have never
been an issue of concern to those in government. It’s almost as if there is no need to weigh the
human and personal angle to government policy and the government makes a good case
repeatedly in being oblivious to the concerns of its citizens. No empathy, no compassion, no
sympathy that in a nutshell sums up the government’s policy in this regard. Thus with the wave

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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260446


of the hand like a magician taking a rabbit from a hat, government reasons a thaumaturgic zeal is
apt to this situation of finding a quick and speedy antidote to conflict.

The Northern Ireland Experience ‘An Taithí Thuaisceart Éireann’

However it is obvious that the price of achieving peace after a long drawn conflict is never easy.
A failure to recognise this fundamental fact spells doom to any process aimed at achieving peace.
Over the years there have been a number of initiatives aimed at resolving conflicts and achieving
peace in a number of countries around the globe. For students of history the ‘troubles’ as the
conflict situation in Northern Ireland in the 60s, 70s and 80s was often called culminating in the
peaceful settlement reached with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998
between the governments of United Kingdom, Ireland, and eight political parties in Northern
Ireland. The 32 page agreement was a significant milestone in the search for the peace in
Northern Ireland particularly its call in paragraph 2 on Decommissioning which stated that "the
decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups." It was
recognised by all parties that this was a condition precedent to negotiations between the
governments of Ireland and the UK and the paramilitary organisations. Furthermore it
recognised the rule of law, human rights, justice and democracy as rights, safeguards and equality
of opportunity in Northern Ireland. These are fundamental principles which parties to conflict
have to share as mutually inclusive to reaching peace without any process searching for peace
remains lopsided, illusory and a mirage. Thus it is impossible to cut corners in achieving lasting
peace.

In my view the agreement provides a rich repertoire of reference material for studies in conflict
resolution. Like most it is not perfect but 13 years after the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ was signed
it continues to serve as a good model for peace. Hence the reason it has served as the template
for the proposed historic peace deal between the Philippines government and hardline Islamist
rebels who had fought a 40 years guerrilla war against the central government in Manila. It is
instructive that the path the government in Manila has strived to achieve peace through a
development programme which would underwrite the peace process. It is a process driven
approach one devoid of magic, illusions and a recognition by both parties that peace, stability,
concord and harmony has to prevail in the community (see Philippines moves close to historic peace deal
with Islamist rebels available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/13/philippines-
peace-deal-islamist-rebels).

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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260446


In borrowing heavily from the Northern Ireland peace agreement one has to evaluate its process
and consider whether it can be mirrored in Nigeria. The history of conflict in Northern Ireland
dates back at least the 17th Century however our focus should be on the period of the few years
leading to ‘Good Friday Agreement’. This started from the secret talks which occurred at
different times in the 80s and 90s between the government of the United Kingdom (UK) and the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) with the catalyst for a peace being the acceptance of historic ‘Good
Friday Agreement’ in all Ireland that is Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland when its
citizens voted unanimously to support the agreement in separate referendums on 22 May 1998.
On July 28 2005 in recognition of the change in the mood of the citizens of all Ireland both in
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the IRA announced an end to the armed struggle
and instructed its units to dump its arms and put them completely out of use. It is worthy to
note that years before reaching this decision the IRA had signified its intention to decommission
its weapons and had made moves to do so in support of the peace process. The IRA had also
previously on 16 July 2008 apologised for the deaths of civilians over more than 30 years of ‘the
troubles’.

The Northern Ireland peace process was underpinned by the success of the decommissioning of
arms by the armed paramilitary groups which was dealt with by the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) which was established on 26 August 1997. The IICD
was chaired by Retired General John de Chastelain of Canada, with Brigadier Tauno Nieminen,
of Finland, and Ambassador Donald C. Johnson of the United States of America (USA) who
served till 1999, with Andrew D. Sens (also of the USA) from 1999. The IICD appointed in 2000
appointed Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, and Cyril Ramaphosa, former Secretary
General of the South Africa’s African National Congress and Businessman as inspectors to
inspect the IRA weapons dumps and verify the decommissioning of weapons.

The governments of Ireland and the UK set in place a legal framework to govern the
decommissioning process including the establishment of the IICD through the Ireland
Decommissioning Act 1997, the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997 in the United
Kingdom

Recent reports state that Imam Abubakar Muhammad Abubakar bin Mohammed who also goes
by the nom de guerre Abubakar Shekau the leader of Boko Haram is quoted by Agence France Presse as
saying, “Surprisingly, the Nigerian government is talking about granting amnesty. What wrong have we done?
On the contrary, it is we that should grant you (Federal Government) (a) pardon” (see Nigeria's Boko Haram

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rejects Jonathan's amnesty idea available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22105476)
given Abubakar Shekau stance then any pretence of a mutual path to peace is clearly and
evidently non-existent. The peace process should be based on negotiations in which there is a
degree of equality on the path of both parties. But before we get to that stage we need to
ascertain and establish, what exactly are the features of Boko Haram as an armed militant
insurgent group? Do they see themselves as victims of those repressed by agents of the state and
on whose behalf are they fighting for? Invariably the many innocent victims of Boko Haram
insurgent activities see themselves as victims of a brutal, ruthless extremist rebel organisation
who have been deliberately targeted for no other reason than the fact they do not share the
beliefs and values of Boko Haram. It is possible that some in the community in which Boko Haram
strive would have empathy towards Boko Haram’s goals. More so it seems Boko Haram see itself in
its structures, units, factions, sects sees itself as a kind of social movement fighting the
government in order to establish its quasi state within the boundaries of the Federal Republic. But
do we understand their organisational structures, cells, its faceless upper eschelons, chain of
command in order to negotiate lasting and sustainable peace with them? Who are those we are
engaging with to faciliate peace? Boko Haram is as much a political organisation which claims
legitimacy from its religious roots. Social, technological, educational and political factors impinge
on the survival of Boko Haram in areas where it is in armed theatre, the areas of conflict. The
weaning away of Boko Haram from violence into a legitimate social movement is unlikely if its
members see it as there right to perpetuate violence to achieve their aims and goals. Boko Haram
simply cannot bomb its way as a means to achieving its ends. The peace process if indeed Boko
Haram is committed to it offers the movement an avenue to address its grievances with the
government. It should be recognised by government that within Boko Haram there would be
those who could be classed as extreme hawks who will never be committed to achieving peace
because they remain dogmatic and are unwilling to accept any compromise for peace. Such
actors should be marginalised and initiatives for peace through social, educational and political
means should be facilitated with moderate doves within the group. The danger is if the extreme hawks
who carry authority within the group hijack the peace process then the reality of the situation is
that the government should accept that no one should be placed in a position to derail the
commitment to peace and security in our country.

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The Rule of Law

It is trite that in a democratic society respect and adherence to the rule of law is a fundamental
principle in ensuring peace, order and justice for all. The Northern Ireland peace process
provides evidence of this. Thus any peace process must have in place, a legal framework shaped
by both chambers of the National Assembly namely the House of Representatives and the
Senate. In fact it is the House of Representatives and the Senate have a constitutional duty to do
so.

It will be recalled that the federal government had in June 2009 approved an offer of
unconditional amnesty for members of the Niger Delta militants; the offer of amnesty was
effective from 6 August 2009 to 4 October however it lacked any form of legal framework. The
amnesty program for the Niger Delta militants had three objectives and deliverables which were
as follows: disarmament phase to take place between 6 August 2009 and 4 October 2009 and to
include the collection of biometric data, a demobilization and rehabilitation phase to last 6 to 12
months and to include the provision of, among other things, counselling and career guidance for
the participants. Furthermore a reintegration phase to last up to five years and to include the
provision of, among other things, training and microcredits for the participants. Almost four
years after the Niger Delta Amnesty there has been no independent monitoring and verification
of the demobilisation and decommissioning of arms thus the amnesty process has to all intents
and purposes not been a roaring success. More so it has lacked the buy-in from the community
through a lack of a formal consultation through dialogue with the community or a plebiscite.
Thus whilst the President has also inaugurated the small arms and light weapons committee to
work with ‘similar institutions and other agencies’ help to build capacity, enhance information
sharing and develop multi-level international support relationship as well as strengthen regional
cooperation’ including calling on the UN to develop a comprehensive approach to small arms
and light weapons both committees set up by the President have been greatly handicapped from
their inception because they have no express mandate to specify a timetable to do the following:
1) verifiable the quantity of weapons and arms of Boko Haram and its off shoots, 2) full
decommissioning of arms and weapons by Boko Haram and its off shoots. In addition there is no
express strategy as seen in Northern Ireland that militants should deactivate, dump its arms and
weapons and then put them completely out of use.

Reports indicate that the price of amnesty in the Niger Delta has also not been cheap and has
been a failure. According to reports,

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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.
"With billions of naira spent, the amnesty and reintegration program ... is an obvious failure, given that
the initial program objective was overlooked for political ambitions and personal interests." (qtd. in
PANA 3 Apr. 2011)

In addition, Human Rights Watch points out in a May 2011 article that despite the government's
amnesty towards armed groups, some criminal groups and militants operating in the Niger Delta have
carried out "kidnappings, bombings and attacks on oil facilities" (28 May 2011). In his comments on a
bombing attributed to MEND, which occurred in March 2010 in the city of Warri, Delta State, near a
meeting by authorities to debate the amnesty program, a human rights defender told IRIN that these
attacks [translation] "are enough to inform the whole world that the post-amnesty rehabilitation program
is not working" (UN 26 Apr. 2010). (see Nigeria: Government amnesty program for Niger Delta
militants, particularly with respect to the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
(2009-August 2011) available at
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=country&category=&publisher=IRBC&type=&coi=NGA
&rid=&docid=50740a192&skip=0 ).

That we seem to be used to cutting corners in achieving state policies and flagrantly flouting the
established constitutional order should indeed be confined to the dustbin of history and be a
thing of the past. Such conduct is not only illegal but it serves to reward criminality and allows
those who have committed crimes to get away with impunity. A peace process is flawed when
those responsible for committing atrocities do not offer any form of apology (either
unconditional or conditional), contriteness and recompense to the victims of the conflict. Thus
encouraging criminal activities in form of extortion, blackmail, organised crimes, illegal
bunkering, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in weapons, piracy, kidnapping to thrive as
there is no deterrent in perpetrators from committing these crimes having seen that crime indeed
does pay.

In building the peace process on the foundation of a legal framework any commission
established by the government should be duly set up under an act of the National Assembly
exclusively legislated for that purpose in conjunction with powers derived from the Tribunal of
Inquiry Act. The Northern Ireland experience has shown us that mechanisms seeking peace and
reconciliation following conflict should be based on the rule of law and institutions set up
specifically for that purpose. The Good Friday Agreement was an international treaty between
two states. In addition we have seen that apart from the political settlement reached through a
referendum in both countries, new legislations was enacted by the parliaments of both countries

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for decommissioning as well as the reform of the Police service in Northern Ireland.
Furthermore state institutions responsible for dealing with victims and implementing a partial
amnesty was done through new domestic legislation in both Ireland and the UK.

Unfortunately Boko Haram has not shown an indication that they are not willing to commit to
peace through their glaring failure (or declared intention) to call a truce or ceasefire in hostilities
with the Nigerian authorities consisting mainly of the government’s Joint Task Forces (JTFs)
established on 12 June 2011 by the President under the mandate named ‘Operation Restore Order’
composed of elements of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Nigeria Police, the State Security
Service, the Nigerian Immigration Service and the Defence Intelligence Agencies.

As recent as Saturday 20 April 2013, local and international media reported that in the market
town of Baga, on the shores of the Lake Chad in Bornu state, Nigeria following intense fighting
in which Islamic extremists militants (Boko Haram) used rocket-propelled grenades and soldiers
of multi-national force of Nigeria’s JTF, and troops from the neighbouring countries of Niger
and Chad using machine-gun fire which left at least 185 people – indicates that Boko Haram is
not committed to peace notwithstanding the intentions of the government. The battle left a lot
of people displaced from their homes with houses, business and vehicles destroyed in the attack
(see ‘At least 185 people killed in hours of fighting between Nigeria’s military and Islamic extremists’ available
at http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/21/fighting-between-nigerias-military-and-boko-
haram-kills-at-least-185/). According to the Red Cross this is the single worst incident since the
insurgents (Boko Haram) started their campaign over 3 years ago with the death of 187 people,
another 77 people requiring medical care and approximately 300 homes were destroyed and
burned down (see Nigerian Red Cross: At least 187 people killed when military, Islamic extremists fought
available at
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Nigerian+Cross+least+people+killed+when+military+Isl
amic/8277346/story.html#ixzz2Rq3nHx7I).

The United States (US) Department of State April 2013 report on Nigeria states,

The most serious human rights problems during the year involved abuses committed by the militant sect
“People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Hausa: Jama’atu Ahlis
Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad)--better known by its Hausa name Boko Haram(“Western education is
anathema”)--which conducted killings, bombings, kidnappings, and other attacks throughout the country,
resulting in numerous deaths, injuries, and widespread destruction of property; abuses committed by the
security services with impunity, including killings, beatings, arbitrary detention, and destruction of

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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.
property; and societal violence, including ethnic, regional, and religious violence (See United States
(US) Department of State April 2013 Nigeria Human Rights Report 2012 available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204365.pdf, page 1).

The US State Department report further states that Boko Haram has been active in perpetrating
violence mainly in the states of Borno, Bauchi, and Yobe as well as in the states of Adamawa,
Kano, Kaduna, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, and Taraba.

Furthermore the group modus operandi has been to attack government, religious, traditional figures
and infrastructure and have also attacked citizens of southern Nigerian extraction who have been
deliberately targeted and brutally murdered by Boko Haram using improvised explosive devices,
suicide bombs, prison breaks, kidnappings and cold blooded killings. It is evident that Boko
Haram and its affiliates have created a climate of fear, cycle of violence and bloodletting in the
areas of conflict. Ordinary law abiding citizens have been subjected to violations of their basic
fundamental human rights, have been displaced, lost their homes, livelihood under guise of a
brutal campaign by a lawless brutal group.

Boko Haram campaign of fear, intimidation and lawlessness has also been extended through the
sacking and bombing of the United Nations (UN) office in Abuja the Federal Capital Territory,
police stations, border crossing points, local government offices, schools, churches, mosques,
motor parks, markets, hotels and armed robbery of banks and vehicles carrying bank cash in
transit no doubt to facilitate their violent militant campaign. Boko Haram have also deliberately
attacked Newspaper offices and have also killed journalists. On several occasions Journalists
have also been threatened with violence by Boko Haram.

It is apparent there is a degree of collusion, infiltration and collaboration by members of Boko


Haram and agents of the state in all branches of government, political appointees, the law
enforcement agents and the judiciary. Though at best the evidence in this regard remains
inconclusive it is of significant coincidence that to date no trial has been concluded following the
arrests of suspects involved in Boko Haram criminal activities. Furthermore the ease at which
Boko Haram sacks prisons and police stations holding suspects believed to be members of Boko
Haram and have been allowed to escape and remain at large also provides compelling
circumstantial evidence in this regard.

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Applicable Principles of International Law

Respect and adherence to the rule of law applies not only to the recognition of the authority of
the established judicial organs of Nigeria but also a respect for the principles of international law
including human rights and humanitarian law. These are basic rights set out in the Constitution
outlined in the Fundamental Rights provisions Chapter IV in section 33 Right to life, section 34 Right
to dignity of human persons, section 35 Right to personal liberty, section 36 Right to fair hearing, section 37
Right to private and family life, section 38 Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, section 39
Right to freedom of expression and the press, section 40 Right to peaceful assembly and association, section 41
Right to freedom of movement, section 42 Right to freedom from discrimination, section 43 Right to acquire
and own immovable property. The named constitutional provisions are pari materia as well as
supplementary to the following International legal instruments: International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965, Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 1984, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power, 1985 and African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. These are basic
mandatory rights which citizens in the areas of the conflict let alone in all Nigeria are entitled to
enjoy without any restrictions unless subject to law as to them enjoying these rights. If these
guarantees are not made by Boko Haram then the road to a peaceful resolution of the conflict
cannot be safeguarded.

A number of observers of the conflict are of the view that the level of violence in the areas
where Boko Haram operates does not constitute a state of an armed conflict at the present time.
With all due respect they are wrong as the breakdown of law and order, scale, gravity and
intensity of the conflict ipso facto are at now at the stage of an internal armed conflict. Militants of
Boko Haram reportedly founded in 2003 and its off shoot Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan
(Supporters of Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa), also known as Ansaru founded in 2012 with their
well-established international links according to intelligence sources with other extremist violent
Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabaab (see Fight against al Shabaab
instructive model for future: U.S. general available http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/03/us-
usa-defense-africa-idUSBRE8B21GY20121203 and Boko Haram’s International Connections available
at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-harams-international-connections) have not only
committed offences under Nigerian Criminal and Penal laws but have also committed war crimes

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and genocide under international law. The activities of both Boko Haram and Ansaru present
existential threats to the Nigerian state and the Western African sub region through their
terrorism, facts which are also acknowledged by international bodies such as the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the European Union's (EU) law enforcement agency European
Police Office - Europol (see UNODC February 2013 report, ‘Transnational Organized Crime in
West Africa: A Threat Assessment’ and Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), April
2013).

The systematic and targeted killing of groups of the population by Boko Haram in which the
group has gone on record to declare as the organisational objectives and goals of theirs amounts
to war crimes and crimes contrary to international law. Its leader Abubakar Shekau is reported to
have said:

“...our war is with the Government that is fighting Islam with the Christian Association of Nigeria
(CAN) that are killing Muslims ... and those who helped them to fight us even if they are Muslims.
Anyone who is instrumental to the arrest of our members is assured that their own is coming.” (see
Amnesty International report Nigeria: Trapped in The cycle of violence available at
http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/nigeriareport1november12.pdf page 12)

The JTF being a component of the Security apparatus of the government is under a positive duty
as part of its laid down rules of engagement to observe Nigerian law, human rights and
international law. The government has a positive duty under to ensure that any process leading
to peace must conform to the principles of International law and consistent with the
constitution.

Generally the serious crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity; war crimes and the crime of aggression
are not crimes that generally occur in other parts of Nigeria. The level of hostilities committed as
a consequence of the insurgency by the extremist Islamists militants in Boko Haram mainly in the
North Eastern and other parts of Northern Nigeria ipso facto constitutes crimes against humanity,
genocide and war crimes. Apart from the prevailing situation in areas where Boko Haram are active
situations involving sectarian violent conflicts have recently been focus of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) which in November 2010 initiated
preliminary investigations in Nigeria in respect of the killings in Jos, Plateau state. The OTP also
expanded their investigations to include alleged crimes of sexual violence and abductions in the
Niger Delta (see The Office of the Prosecutor Report on Preliminary Examination activities (ICC, 13
December 2011) 12 – 13). The practice and procedure of the ICC also offers a best model and

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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.
framework for incorporating legislative framework for victim participation in criminal
proceedings as shall be discuss later. In addition the principle of complementarity as envisaged in
the Rome Statute the governing treaty establishing the ICC, the practice and procedure of the ICC
and the ICC’s Office of Prosecutor envisages that that our domestic national jurisdiction
implement, apply and practice international criminal justice as stipulated in the provisions of the
Rome Statute. Thus in principle the practice and procedure of the ICC should be applied in
Nigerian courts if a defendant is being tried for offences defined in Articles 5 to 8 (crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) of the Rome Statute. The
jurisdiction of courts in Nigeria in adhering to the complementarity principles ensures that national
administration of justice institutions including law enforcement agencies, police, the courts and
prosecution cannot solely on their own decide or fail to act in investigating and prosecuting
crimes under the Rome Statute.

The combined application of international human rights, international criminal law and of
international humanitarian law by their very nature, scope and relevance given the recent course
of events in Northern Nigeria in the areas of conflict which indicate that principles of
international law are applicable in these areas. The targeted attacks by militant groups such as
Boko Haram have created a mass exodus of victims forced to flee their homes and properties.
Under international humanitarian law the internal displacement of population (Internal
Displaced Persons - IDPs) often targeted at groups of vulnerable people is a crime. Rule 129 of
Customary International Humanitarian Law defines the Act of Displacement as follows:

A. Parties to an international armed conflict may not deport or forcibly transfer the civilian population of
an occupied territory, in whole or in part, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative
military reasons so demand.

B. Parties to a non-international armed conflict may not order the displacement of the civilian population,
in whole or in part, for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand.

In view of our obligation under international law a new crime of the Act of Displacement should be
enacted in Nigeria tailored to reflect a non-international armed conflict as the B part limb of
customary international law satisfies the mens rea mental elements of intent, motive, aggravating
features of ‘Hate Crimes’ (where persons have been targeted because of their tribe, ethnicity,
religious, political affiliation, sexual orientation, gender or because of they have suffered
perceived or actual discriminatory bias) as well as actus reus criminal acts of prohibited conduct

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and behaviour which causes victims to flee their homes, properties and business as a
consequence of the intentional actions by groups designed to create a climate, environment of
fear. That this occurs during internal domestic social unrests, violent riots and conflict and not in
a declared war situation but armed conflict should not obscure the evils, gravity and scale of
these crimes. Hence akin to the suggested new crimes above, the international humanitarian law
provisions on the act of displacement of population it is imperative that this should be made a
criminal offence under Nigerian law. The criminal acts which lead to the forcibly transfer and
displacement of a group of persons should be included as new criminal offences in Nigeria.

The rights of Victims’

One of the fundamental issues that have been included in the terms of reference of the
Presidential Committee on the peaceful resolution of security challenges in the northern part of
Nigeria is to develop a comprehensive support programme for the victims of the excesses of the
group. Whilst this is laudable the approach adopted to look into in this issue is not thematic,
holistic and lacking a comprehensive methodology in addressing the issue. A support programme
for victims is not one that should be included as only part of the terms of reference for a
presidential committee but one that lies at the core and heart of reforming our arcane and
antiquated criminal justice system. The rights of victims including the right to compensation,
reparation and restitution are rights guaranteed under our constitution as well as under
international law. Thus what exactly is the need for this to be included as a specific term of
reference for the Committee? The record of government including the present and past regimes
when it comes to the rights of victims is far from glorious, again good on paper, white papers,
commissions and committee reports but in terms of implementation through specific legislation
which should be a mandatory right for victims the government’s record is a big fat ZERO!

The issue of victim compensation is an issue I had written on in my paper of 9 May 2011 titled
‘In the Midst of Nigeria’s Legal Order Playing Catch Up to Social Unrest and Conflict, Recognising the Rights
of Victims and Enforcing Their Fundamental Human Rights’ available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1836788 and whilst I shall examine the
need for a legislative framework in this regard, I shall not repeat in detail the arguments I set out
in that paper.

Recently there has been a trend by the Nigerian government and its institutions in making ex-
gratia payments to victims of violent clashes often on an ad-hoc basis and with no set and
discernible criteria in assessing whether those receiving the payments are qualified for such

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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.
awards. A significant handicap in addressing the issue of victim rights is that there are no
available official information in the government gazette or bulletin about these donations to
victims other than the announcements in the press (see reports of the Federal government of
Nigeria donation to families members of the one year compulsory national service the National
Youth Service Corps who were killed during post-election violence that occurred in parts of
Northern Nigeria in April 2011 'FG gives murdered corpers’ families N5m each' available at
http://www.edostate.gov.ng/news/fg-gives-murdered-corpers%E2%80%99-families-n5m-each
and the donation by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to victims of the Boko Haram
fundamentalist Islamic sect church bombing on Christmas day last year (2011) 'CBN donates
N25m to Madalla blast victims' available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/cbn-
donates-n25m-to-madalla-blast-victims). Hence the present system by government of
compensating victims of crime has no legal clarity, is administratively unworkable, inconsistent,
and open to abuse and fraud as it is not subject to oversight, scrutiny and accountability by any
government institution in the disbursement and allocation of public funds.

Similarly there are no official reliable, verifiable and accurate data on the number of victims killed
by Boko Haram. The data available are those from the media as well as that from international
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which are likely to be understated. The Human Rights
Watch (HRW) in its report stated that since July 2009 more than 935 people have been killed in
some 164 suspected attacks by Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria (see ‘Nigeria: Boko Haram Widens
Terror Campaign Bring Attackers to Justice, Step up Security’ available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/nigeria-boko-haram-widens-terror-campaign).
Furthermore post-presidential election riots and sectarian killings in Northern Nigeria which are
often interwoven with atrocities claimed by Boko Haram in April 2011 resulted in the deaths of
more 800 people (‘World Report Chapter: Nigeria’ available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2012/world-report-2012-nigeria). It is also reported that there have been 1,725 deaths as a
consequence of the acts of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram from 17 July 2011 to February
2013, with Borno State accounting for 1,307 deaths and Kano State with 539 deaths (see
http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483?cid=otr-marketing_use-
nigeria_security_tracker). Since 2010 it is also estimated that Boko Haram has been responsible
for the death of more than 1,000 people including 400 who were not members of the Security
forces (see Amnesty International 2012 report titled ‘Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence’, page
11). Furthermore victims of the conflict who have been internally displaced otherwise known as
IDPs have been widely neglected because other than the reports of international NGOs there are
no official available data and statistics of victims that have been displaced during these conflicts.

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However even data from NGOs are usually not easily verifiable but only provide at best
estimates. Hence it is incumbent on the President in seeking peace that mechanisms are put in
place to verify the number of causalities of this conflict as well the monetary losses suffered by
victims of the conflict. Furthermore the number of internally displaced persons as a consequence
should be established.

The government in Nigeria has only paid lip service to a victim compensatory scheme. As far
back as 1990 the then Attorney General of the Federation, Prince Bola Ajibola a Senior
Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) wrote in the foreword to the 1990 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria of
the need to formulate a victim compensation regime in Nigeria and announced that a committee
headed by Honourable Babasanya Craig, a Justice of the Supreme Court was already at work. It
is not clear whether that committee ever finished its report or what became of it (see Chudi N
Ojukwu and Omini E Briggs, ‘Developing Justice in Developing States - The Nigerian Experience’
http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2005/Briggs.pdf, page 20). Furthermore in the National Action Plan
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria 2009 – 2013 the government states one of
its policies as the provision of ‘restitution and compensation for victims of crime’ (see National
Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria 2009 – 2013, p. 18 available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/.../National_Action_Plan_Nigeria09-13.doc ). However to date
no reforms have taken place in this regard. The right of victims should be readily available to
them de jure ‘in law’ and not de facto as a consequence of what occurs ‘in practice as a fact’. These
are principles that I shall subsequently discuss in relation to victim’s compensatory rights.

The sea change and emergence of providing assistance to victims in form of compensation,
redress and restitution has been largely influenced by the principles of international law binding
on Nigeria particularly the guidelines of the UN Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Authority, the Guide for Practitioners Regarding the Implementation of the Declaration
and the UN Economic and Social Council resolution 1990/22 of 24 May 1990, which mandated the
Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and states to broaden the
application of the Declaration. Thus in providing assistance to victims, a statutory victim
compensation commission should be established with a core mandate to administer a
compensatory scheme for the payments and redress of victims of crime. The convention
pioneers the focus in achieving the balancing of the rights of victims often neglected as it is
under our current legal system against the rights of defendants including in cases where the
offender has not been apprehended or identified including the victims of violence perpetrated by
Boko Haram.

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This key impetus of the UN Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime are the
reasons for the unprecedented growth of interest in crime victims around the world are not
totally clear, but its primary causes are related to public reactions against increasing crime rates,
combined with increasingly impersonal, uncaring, and ineffective criminal justice systems and
growing awareness of the serious impact of crime on people (see Alan N Young, The Role of the
Victim in the Criminal Process: A Literature Review 1989 1999, (Victim of Crime Research Series,
Osgoode Hall Law School Policy Centre Research and for Victims Issues Statistics Division
August 2001, page 48).

The UN Declaration on victims provides a framework for compensating victims in Nigeria that
should be in incorporated into the statutory framework for victim compensation. The UN
Declaration on victims envisages that a victim compensation commission as well as championing the
rights of victims should have administrative and judicial powers in the exercise of its mandate
with powers to inquire information in respect of its duties to seeking redress for victims of
crime. The commission should also be responsible for training law enforcement agents (such as
members of the JTF operating in the Boko Haram theatre of conflict) in dealing with victims of
crime. This role of the Commission is buttressed in paragraph 13 of the UN Victims Declaration,
which calls for the establishment, strengthening, and expansion of National funds for
compensation to victims and those funds should be established for this purpose. The said
paragraph reads,

“The establishment, strengthening and expansion of national funds for compensation to victims should be
encouraged. Where appropriate, other funds may also be established for this purpose, including those
cases where the State of which the victim is a national is not in a position to compensate the victim for the
harm.”

In addition the declaration states that the public should also be made aware of the existence of
the compensatory scheme. The Commission should assess the impact, effect of crime on
violations of fundamental human rights have on victims. The principles of the UN Victims
Declaration mirror and replicate the Principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance
in Africa.

Principle M.1 of the Principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa
provide that,

States shall ensure, including by the enactment of legal provisions and adoption of procedures, that anyone
who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention is enabled to claim compensation.

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Principle M (j) States shall ensure, including by the enactment of legal provisions and adoption of
procedures, that anyone who has been the victim of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment is enabled to claim compensation.

The Principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa in principle N a)
reiterates that states should ensure that victims have access to seek redress in accordance with
national and international law for the harm they have suffered. Furthermore in principle N d) of
the same states are required to establish and strengthen where necessary to enable victims seek
redress through informal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and
accessible. Victims should be informed of their rights in seeking redress through such
mechanisms. The principles also states that there should be unnecessary delay in the awarding
compensation to victims (N e)]. The principles states that financial compensation should be
provided by state to victims of crimes in the following cases:

1. Victims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical or mental health as a
result of serious crimes;

2. The family, in particular dependants of persons who have died or become physically or mentally
incapacitated.

The principles also provide that in addition to compensation victims should also receive access
to material, medical, psychological and social assistance from the state. Furthermore the police,
justice, health, social service and other personnel should be trained to sensitize them to the needs
of victims, and that guidelines are adopted to ensure proper and prompt aid to victims.
Paragraph 14 of the UN Victims Declaration states that, “Victims should receive the necessary
material, medical, psychological and social assistance through governmental, voluntary,
community-based and indigenous means.” .

The UN Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Principles and guidelines on the
right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa derive their principles from the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR). According to Article 8 of the UDHR, ‘everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.’ Whilst the provisions of the UDHR is not strictly legally binding it is
persuasive and taken in consideration as it constitutes a basis customary international law which
has been instrumental to further developments in international human rights treaties law. Hence
it is reason why the international human rights instruments cited in this discourse recognises that
victims have an inalieanable the right to be compensated.

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In recognising compensation as a Restitution to the victim paragraph 8 of the UN Victims
Declaration states,

“Offenders or third parties responsible for their behaviour should, where appropriate, make fair
restitution to victims, their families or dependants. Such restitution should include the return of property
or payment for the harm or loss suffered, reimbursement of expenses incurred as a result of the
victimization, the provision of services and the restoration of rights.”

Furthermore paragraph 9 of said declarations states further when defining the duties of states,
that

“Governments should review their practices, regulations and laws to consider restitution as an available
sentencing option in criminal cases, in addition to other criminal sanctions.”

Restitution within the meaning of the provisions of the UN Victims Declaration refers to the
restoration of rights of the victim of crimes violated by the criminal act committed by the
defendant, suspect, accused or perpetrator. However this is only applicable when the crime
involves objects of a monetary value or property and is not a viable measure in respect of violent
crimes and the serious crimes under Nigerian Criminal and Penal codes. The victim of crimes
should not be in a position where he or she is out of pocket because of the commission of
criminal act as such restitution as a measure should compensate the victim for the harm and loss
as well as entitling them to expenses which they have incurred.

Victims of crimes such that committed by Boko Haram particularly very serious violent sexual
offences, serious bodily harm and those involving children often require immediate assistance
apart from the compensation this would include measures to provide care such as medical
assistance to rehabilitate the victim and schemes where victim is assisted with education, social
and health programs. The need for rehabilitation given recent victims of grave crimes including
those described earlier but also that involving social unrest and violent internal conflict. Hence
under International law notably the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General
Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 which entered into force on 26 June 1987
which Nigeria signed on 28 July 1988 and ratified on 28 June 2001, Article 14 of this convention
expressly states a positive duty for states to ensure that victims of crime have,

1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress
and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full

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rehabilitation as possible (emphasis mine). In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an
act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.

2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensation which may
exist under national law.

Victims of crimes are by the status invariably and effectively victims of Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which is also contrary Section 34 of the Constitution
Right to dignity of human persons (1) (a) “no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment”.

Compensation in form financial compensation to the victim of crimes whether compensation is


available from the state for the physical or psychological injuries or other harm suffered by the
victim of crime is necessary as compensation in this form “is seen to be a recognition of the
hurt done to the victim by the offender” (see UN, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice:
A Manual on Human Right for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, (UN, 2003), page 766). In cases where
this is an order of the court usually made post-conviction in criminal cases or in cases where the
defendant has not been convicted but the victim has clearly suffered injury and loss, the order of
the court, “is also a symbol of the State’s concern for the victim” (see UN, Human Rights in the
Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Right for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers). It is said that
this kind of recognition may have an important healing effect on the victim concerned and may
also increase his or her confidence in the criminal justice system (see UN, Human Rights in the
Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Right for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers).

The approach of the ICC in awarding reparations to victim is remarkable given that this was a
pioneering feat in an International Court was provided with the authority, at its own discretion,
to award reparations in favour of victims. Article 75 of its Statute states that:

The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation [...] 2. The Court may make an order directly
against a convicted person specifying reparations [...] Where appropriate, the Court may order
that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in article 79.

The mention in Article 75(1) of the establishment of “principles relating to reparations” can be
contrued as an indirect impact and consideration given to the principles enshrined in the UN

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Victim Declaration. The ICC Statute does not provide a definition of who is a victim, however
the provisions of Article 75 nevertheless speaks of “reparations to, or in respect of, victims”.
This ipso facto refers to family members and their next of kin and is consistent with with the
principles of international law. Furthermore Rule 85 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence
defines victims as “natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”. In this vein, Organisations or institutions dedicated
to religion, art, science, charitable or humanitarian purposes as well as historic monuments and
hospitals can also be considered as victims.

The European Convention on the compensation of victims of violent crimes influenced by the UN Victims
Declaration is a convention that provides clear, coherent and one of the most far reaching
international treaty provisions for the compensation of victims of violent crimes (see European
Convention on the compensation of victims of violent crimes available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/116.htm). Under article 1 of the
Convention, States parties, “undertake to take the necessary steps to give effect to the principles
set out in Part I of this Convention”.

This means that “when compensation is not fully available from other sources the State shall contribute to
compensate:

a. those who have sustained serious bodily injury or impairment of health directly attributable to an
intentional crime of violence;

b. the dependents of persons who have died as a result of such crime”

(art. 2(1)).

Hence a victim is eligible for compensation from the state if he or she has being a victim of
offences which are “intentional”; “violent”; or “the direct cause of serious bodily injury or damage to health”.

Article 2 of the convention states as follows:

1. When compensation is not fully available from other sources the State shall contribute to compensate:
a. those who have sustained serious bodily injury or impairment of health directly attributable to an
intentional crime of violence;
b. the dependants of persons who have died as a result of such crime.
c. Compensation shall be awarded in the above cases even if the offender cannot be
prosecuted or punished.

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The European Convention strikes a balance in the usual conflict occasioned by the act of crime
against the victim ensuring that a rational approach in the effectiveness of criminal justice policy
which is positively encapsulated in the third paragraph of the preamble to the convention,

“Considering that for reasons of equity and social solidarity it is necessary to deal with the situation of
victims of intentional crimes of violence who have suffered bodily injury or impairment of health and of
dependants of persons who have died as a result of such crimes” (see European Convention on the
compensation of victims of violent crimes preamble para 2).

Victims of crimes have through their loss, pain and suffering have also had their fundamental
human rights violated causing them suffering, health impairment, financial and economic loss,
displacement from homes, trauma, psychological, emotional distress anguish, stress, distress and
pain of relatives of deceased victims of the social unrests which should as matter of right be
entitled in law to compensation by the state. Victim compensation should be available to all
classes of crimes particularly those identified as violent, grave and serious crimes, crimes where
vulnerable persons children, women but not limited only these class of offences but also to
victims of traffic and industrial accidents and injuries. Compensation to victims should be
available as legal right whether the perpetrator is identified apprehended, prosecuted and
convicted or not should not be a hindrance to victims’ entitlement to compensation.

Thus any victim compensation scheme to an extent can as has been suggested in some quarters
be a social welfare scheme but the reality of this is such that victims of crimes more often than
not do not have a choice with their predicament. The view in some quarters is that
compensation as social welfare schemes, provincial crime compensation schemes have been
attacked as “radically under inclusive and under siege” (Roach, 1999a:300), but in the 1990s little was
written on this topic and the available literature is generally more descriptive than prescriptive.
Faieta (1989), and Bailey (1989), provide general outlines of the operation of various
compensation schemes with emphasis on Ontario. Burns (1992) provides a detailed guide to the
operation of all the provincial schemes and his overall assessment of their operation is
encouraging (see Alan N Young (2001), page 33).

It is imperative that the compensation scheme should be operated as a statutory scheme and also
should be actively publicised in the print and electronic media to ensure that victims and the
public are aware of their rights. The appropriation of funds by the government to the
compensatory scheme which is accessible to the public should be with clear rules on the
eligibility criteria and assessment of awards. This should be similar to the provisions of Section 2

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of the UK Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 which sets out Basis on which compensation is to be
Calculated, including the standard amount of compensation and how the tariffs for the type of
injuries claimed for is to be calculated. Furthermore the government should also encourage the
private sector to make contributions to a state compensatory scheme through a special insurance
fund set up specifically for this purpose. The awards and payments to victims of crime are
facilitated through this scheme. Interestingly the Borno High Court, Borno State, Nigeria website
posts information about victim compensation but other than the general information about the
rights to compensation of victim no other information is provided in respect of the procedure
for obtaining compensation (See www.bornohighcourt.org).

The protection of victims is required to safeguard their security, privacy and dignity during the
course of the court proceedings. These principles of these rights are established in international
human rights and in the Nigerian constitution particularly those discussed earlier such as
Principle 6 of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and
Sections 33 Right to life, 34 Right to dignity of human person, 35 Right to personal liberty and 37 Right to
private and family life. Rule 87 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows the victim or the
Prosecution or court suo moto (on its motion) may grant a protective measure to a victim to
protect a victim or any person at risk on account of his testimony to the court. The protective
measures shall include the use of special measures such as use of electronic means, technical
means enabling the alteration of pictures or voice, audio-visual, technology, videoconferencing
and closed-circuit television, and the exclusive use of the sound media. A pseudonym may also
be used for the victim. Similar measures are also provided in Rule 75 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the Sierra Leone Tribunal, Articles 19 and 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Rules 40 (A) (iii), 69, 75, 80 and 92 of the ICTR Rules of Evidence.

Furthermore the protective measures envisaged for victims are set out in Principle A 2 (d) of the
Principles and guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa enjoins,

respect for the respect for the inherent dignity of the human persons, especially of women who participate in
legal proceedings as complainants, witnesses, victims or accused Victim protection, intimidated and
vulnerable victims.

(f) The public and the media may not be excluded from hearings before judicial bodies except if it is
determined to be in the interest of justice for the protection of children, witnesses or the identity of victims
of sexual violence

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(a) Judicial bodies may take steps or order measures to be taken to protect the identity and dignity of
victims of sexual violence, and the identity of witnesses and complainants who may be put at risk by
reason of their participation in judicial proceedings.

(b) Judicial bodies may take steps to protect the identity of accused persons, witnesses or complainants
where it is in the best interest of a child.

The serious risk to the victim includes a clear, present and imminent fear of danger to their life,
physical or mental health or property of the victim or their family member as an anticipated
consequence of giving evidence during an examination or testimony in court. An order for
anonymity may also be granted by court to prevent information of the victim being revealed and
their whereabouts as well as that of persons known to them who may reveal information the
victim. This order may be applied at any stage of the proceedings to the court by the victim if
there is a serious risk or harm exists for the victim and the court shall make a decision to grant
the type of protective measure it deems fit in line with that type of protective measures outlined
above in Rule 87 of the ICC Rules of Evidence and Procedure and the Principles and guidelines on
the right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa. Similarly the Palermo Protocol requires states to take,
among others, the following protective measures: “to protect the privacy and identity of
victims,” to ensure that victims are adequately informed about relevant proceedings and that
their concerns and views are presented in such proceedings; to provide victims with needed care
and assistance (see Pati Roza, ‘States’ Positive Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The
European Court of Human Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev V. Russia and Cyprus’ in Boston
University International Law Journal (Vol. 29:79) 117, page 81).

Given the severity, nature and type of atrocities committed by Boko Haram urgent reforms of
existing provisions of Nigerian Criminal law in which these protective measures should be made
applicable are required. According to Amnesty International,

The lack of an adequate witness protection system is a powerful deterrent to potential witnesses in court.
In a meeting with Amnesty International in 2011, the then Federal Director of Public Prosecutions
confirmed that the reluctance of witnesses to testify for fear of retaliation was hindering prosecution of
Boko Haram cases. (see Amnesty International 2012 report titled ‘Nigeria: Trapped in the
Cycle of Violence’, pages 51 - 53).
The protection of the victim may also involve a measure to conceal the identity of the victim as
part of a much wider victim protection and rehabilitation programme. This may occur at any
stage of the proceedings but the secrecy and confidentiality of such measures mean in effect that

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they are beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the court and exist outside the sphere of the
criminal proceedings. However legislation governing such a programme shall define the role of
the Police, Prosecution and the Court as the circumstances of the case, its significance
determines if the victim or in some cases are suitable for the programme following a risk
assessment of the Police, Prosecution, medical professionals including Medical Doctor,
Psychologist, Psychiatrist. The assessments of the victim and injured may also consider nature of
the threats to the victim, who may undertake the threat and how the threat may be undertaken.

Conclusion

Whilst I do not question the integrity, independence, professional competence and expertise of
the Presidential Committees to prevent an appearance of perceived bias in the independence,
neutrality and impartiality of the committees as well as to gain the trust and confidence of parties
to negotiations as part of the peace process is it a smart move and indeed prudent for the
Chairman of the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the
North to be a serving government Minister in Mallam Kabiru Turaki, SAN and a Minister of
special duties in the Office of the President? The appointment of members of the Committee
should not in my view be drawn from persons serving in government or from the rank of
executive members of the ruling party. The Committee’s geographical and territorial terms of
reference is specified as ‘the North’ presumably North of the River Niger but which of the states
North of River Niger given that Boko Haram theatres of conflict are restricted to the named parts
of Northern Nigeria. The activities of Boko Haram have shown that theirs are transnational
criminal and terrorist activities spanning across the borders of Nigeria’s neighbouring countries
particularly Niger, Chad and Cameroun thus any peace initiative should encompass contributions
from these countries.

Experience is said to be a great teacher which is why in drawing on the success of peace
initiatives across the globe it is essential that when preparing the ground work for any peace
process as illustrated by the examples of Northern Ireland and the Philippines who involved
foreign nationals of influential countries respected by all parties are included by the government
to be part of the negotiations and bodies which facilitated the peace process in their countries.

It is indicative that the peace process in Northern Ireland consisted of a whole series of
initiatives which lasted close to a decade including the early secret talks by the Irish and British
government with the IRA and paramilitaries, the IRA and other paramilitaries cease fire as well
as their statements apologising to the victims and people of Ireland, the commission and peace

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negotiations between the parties in Northern Ireland chaired by Senator George Mitchell, States
Special Envoy for Northern Ireland appointed by then President Bill Clinton (USA), the IICD
by Retired General de Chastelain, the referendum in all Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement and
the use of International independent experts and statesmen. Thus the President should involve
the governments of Chad, Niger, Cameroun and Benin as well as Independent International
Experts from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and international organisations such
as the Arab league, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation or the Non-Aligned Movement.

Unfortunately for reasons best known to the government and taking into cognisance our
unflattering record in this regard it is rather surprising that this is not a model we chosen to
adopt – for a conflict with an international dimension there are no contributions from foreign
nationals. Perhaps we know best given our disposition to the prowess of the government’s
committees’ magic wand to accomplish its task in 3 months, no doubt a tall order given that the
North Ireland experience lasted close to a decade or even over a decade depending on what
measure is used to assess the duration of the peace process. As we have seen from what can now
be aptly described as the botched Niger Delta Amnesty, to embark on a sustainable peace
process must be done properly, borrowing heavily on past initiatives for peace across the globe
particularly the Northern Ireland peace process I have enunciated in this discourse. Furthermore
the peace process must be anchored on an acceptance by the citizens of those in the affected
areas of the conflict through a referendum, affirming the rule of law and a legislative framework
derived from existing Domestic (Nigerian law) and International law as well as enacting new laws
by the National Assembly specifically to purposes outlined above. This also means that the
optional protocols to nine major international human rights treaties (see Amnesty International
2012 report ‘Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence, page 54) to which Nigeria is a signatory party
but has not ratified should be ratified and incorporated pronto into domestic Nigeria law. History
tells us the road to peace is never smooth, is bumpy and cannot be done by cutting corners.
Peace is preferable to violence and the cost of curbing terrorist attacks as well crimes associated
with it not only high but sustainable peace is much cheaper on the longer through negotiation
and compromise by the parties. For the mourning families of the many innocent and helpless
victims killed by Boko Haram as well as those maimed, injured, displaced, forced to leave their
homes, businesses destroyed who I deeply sympathise with and share their pain, indeed all
Nigerians the least we deserve from the government is that its proposals and initiatives leading to
lasting sustainable peace is not just worth doing but worth doing well. This is the price Nigerians

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are willing to pay for lasting peace, harmony, concord, tolerance and tranquillity of which the
value of these are inestimable.

© *Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq. Solicitor and Advocate Supreme Court of Nigeria, International

Criminal Lawyer works in the Mission of a leading International Governmental Organisation in

Europe writes from Dagenham, Essex UK.

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Nigeria, Boko Haram - Cutting Corners and the Illusion of Speedy Conflict Resolution By Omoba Oladele Osinuga Esq.

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