...

::
W 0If.I<.11U (0
/>AfJ£!<.<;.

:,.1.
Industrial Relations
.. . in Canada
'\ ' •

by
), •,

f .-1 � •
GEORGE SAUNDERS
Associate Professor
of Industrial Relations

"
· '

.
'
I •

. J . • .
.

.• 1 -
.l . J
·.� � J . ,,- '

INfuiS l·iBRARY
McMaster University
Summer, 1984 NOm�c�RCUlATING
\· -:,-

Innis
., -
'.· HB Research and Working Paper
Series No. 229
74.5
.R47
no.229
 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA

PAGE

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II . Br ief History of the Labour Movement 1

a. The Beginnings 1
b. The Second Hal f of the N ineteenth Century • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
c. The Emergence of National Federations • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4
d. Labour Disunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
e. The 1930s and Renewed Union Growth • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8
f. Drive to Labour Unity • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • e e o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9
g. International Unions and Canadian Autonomy • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12
h. Some Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

I I I. The Structure and Function of Trade Unions 17

a. The Central Federations . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . . • • • • • • • . • • 17

b. Types o f Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

IV. Labour Relations Legislation 25

a. Histor ical Overview • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • • . • • . • • • • 25

b. Labour Relations Legislation Today • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 29

1 . a) Certi fication of Bargaining Units • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 30

b) Pre-Hear ing Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
c) Decerti fi cation or Termination of Bargaining
Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
d ) Successor Rights . • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 33

2 . Unfair Labour Practices 34

3 . a) Government Intervention in Dispute Settlement 35

b) ( i ) Government Intervention in Dispute
Settlement - Some Further Notes • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 38
( i i ) Strike Votes 39

4 . Labour Relations Boards • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 39

v. The Collective Bargaining Process 41

a. The Collective Agreement • . • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • . . • • • . • • • • • • 41

b. The Negotiation Process · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • • o • o • • o o • • • • • 44
c. The Administration of the Agreement • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 49

VI . Union-management Relations in the Publ ic Sector 54

a. Introd.uction . • • • • • e . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
b. Leg islative Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Coverage of the Legislation • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 55

Certi fication of Bargai ning Units • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 56
Strike Rights • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • e 56
 ( iv) Choice o f Procedure 57
(v) Scope of Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
(vi) Wage Setting 58
(vi i ) Administrative Machinery 58

c. Non-Leg, i slati ve Differences 59

VI I . Conclus ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

References 62
 I11dustria:l, Relations in Canada

I Intrc::duction

This survey provides both a h i s torical and cu r r ent per spective on the

practice of union-management relat ions in this country. It is w r i tten

primarily for those who require an intrc::d uction to the subject. The survey is

divided into six sections. The follow ing sec t i on , Section II gives a b rief

historical overview of trade unions. Section III follows with a description

of the structure and functions of the trade union movement.

S ec t i on IV prov ides a b r i e f history of labou r re lations leg islation in

this country and follow s th i s wi th a desc ription of the maj or elements of

cur rent legislation. Sec t i on V descr ibes the collective bargaining or

negotiation process and the resulting collective ag reement. Secti on VI

reviews briefly public sector collective bargaining and Section VII concludes

the chapte r .

An important element i n the practice of union-management relations , that

i s the dec i s i ons of the courts , arbitr ation and labou r relations b oards

established under the statutes is not covered in this survey. These decisions

i nte rpret , define and explain the complex web of rules contained in the

legislation and collective agreements gove rning the relationships between

unions and management. A review of these decisions would be a natural follow­

up of th i s su rvey to complete the study of the field of union-management

relations .

II Brief History of the Labour Movement

(a) The Beginnings

The Canad ian labou r movement had its beg innings in the late 18 th and

early 19th century. Unions or groupings of employees formed to better their

cond itions of work were found as early as 1794. The first union of record was
 - 2 -

an organi z a t i on of boot and shoe workers in Mont real in 1 8 2 7 . The printe r s

are usually regarded as be i ng the f i r st occupational group t o establ i sh

permanent unions in Canada. They established a trade union in Quebec City in

1827 to regulate wages , care for their sick and provide a place for sccial and

recreational pursuits. The York Typographical Scciety (in Toronto) founded in

1 8 3 2 by pr inte r s has remained in exi stence in one form or anoth e r to the

present day .

Since few unions kept lasting records , it is difficult to trace in detail

early developments in the growth of the Canadian labour movement. The little

evidence that exists suggests that early unions were generally found in urban

ar eas in Onta r i o , Quebec and Nova Scot i a . I n the main , they w e re local

sccieties of skilled journeymen and craftsmen in the ship-building , printing ,

clothing , construction and metal industries. Much of the leadership. in these

early locals came from skilled B r i t ish immi grants. Lack of f inances , a

hosti le legal env i r onment and employer oppos i t i on kept the union m ovement

small and lccali zed .

Attempts by unions to j oin together for mutual support often ran afoul of

common law conspiracy in restraint of trade. Combinations for the purpose of

sett i ng wage s , tak ing str i ke act i on and pe rforming oth e r organ i zat i onal

activities were generally deemed unlaw ful. H oweve r , prosecuti ons w e re not

numerou s s i nce most of the employe r s who were opposed to union i sm w e re

generally successful in keeping their employees non-unionized w ithout recourse

to court action.

(b) The Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

In the 1850s and 1860s American assistance in the form of personnel and

f i nances began to appear on a w ide scale . Locals of pr inte r s and i ron

moulders , for example , af f i li ated w i th the i r counterpar ts in the U.S . In

addition , city assemblies of lccal unions were formed and for the most part
 - 3 -

were able to stay together despite an anti-union environment and the lack of

legal protection.

Union activity accelerated in the 1870s and 1880s as public opinion began

to shift in support of the struggles of the ave rage working man aga i nst the

abu ses of indu str i ali zation . Examples of these abuses can b e found i n the

report of the Royal Commission on Labour and Capital. The Commission , which

handed down its repor t in 1888 , catalogued a long list of beati ngs ,

blackli st i ng and long hou r s and told stor i es of abj ect m i se ry to w h i ch

workingmen were exposed .

Howeve r , it w as two spec i f i c events in the 187 0 ' s that finally led to

government action to free trade union organi zation from the shackles of the

law .

In 187 1 , the labour movement , particula�ly unions in Ontario and Quebec

launched a concerted d r ive for the nine-hour day. The d r i ve brought s t i f f

opposition from employers and p rosecution of union members. The printers in

Toronto, in particular bore the brunt of the opposition and the law leading to

a number of imprisonments .

The second event was passage of the Trade Union Act in the B r i t i sh

Parliament. That Act removed the conspiracy doctrine as it applied to trade

un ions in the Uni ted Kingdom . The Canad i an Parliament w as qu ick to follow

w i th its own T rade U n i on Act w h i ch per m i tted groups of w or ke r s to j oi n

toge the r to bargain for h i gher wages and better working cond i ti ons . At the

same time the federal government passed the Criminal Law Amendment Act , which ,

along w i th the Trade Union Act legali zed str i ke activity , but also prov ided

penalties for violence or intim idation dur i ng organi z ing campai gns and

strikes .
 - 4 -

(c) The Emergence of National Federations

In 1873 the first national labbour movement was founded with the

establishment of the Canadian Labour Union (CLU) , a council of some 35 unions

from di fferent cities across Ontario . Thi s was followed by the Knights of

Labour , an American movement wh ich spread into Canada in 1881 organizing

skilled and unskilled workers alike into general unions and trade assembl ies .

The Knights ' ph ilosophy of the equali ty of working men , the dignity of labour ,

and thei r pos ition against monopolies held great appeal , as did their

advocation of moderation , education and opposition to strikes except as a

desperate last resort . l They opened their assemblies without distinction of

race , sex , sk ill or occupation , " excluding only lawyers , bankers and the

liquor industry" . 2

By 1890 the Knights had organized more than 257 assemblies across the

country with a total membersh ip in excess of 16 , 00 0 , a very large number in

those days . 3

However , these national organizations were shortlived . The CLU petered

out by the end of the 1870s and the Knights , after reaching a peak in the

1890s , began a slow decline and eventually d isappeared before World War I .

In 1886 the various diverse movements including purely Canadian unions ,

the Knights of Labour , and the growing number of international unions (that

is , unions whose headquarters are in the United States) came together to form

the Trades -and Labour Congress (TLC) the same year as the Amer i can

1 However ,
that organi zation was racked by strikes , led , in the main , by
the lesser-skilled members . Most of these str ikes were lost and in the end
was a major factor in the decline of the Knights .
2o .
Morton , The History of Canadian Labour , in J . Anderson and M .
Gunderson , editors , Union-Management Relations i n Canada , Addison-Wesley, Don
�

Mills , Ontario , 1982 , page 98 .

3s .
Jamieson , Industrial Relations in Canada , MacMillan of Canada , 1973,
page 14 .
 - 5 -

Federation of Labour (AFL) was establ ished in the U.S. In both countriesthese

were the first permanent national labour federations. They were to remain

in ex istence unti l 1956.

From the very beg i nn i ng o f the TLC , intern a l tens i ons and conf l i cts

pitted the internationa l s ca:nprising, in the main, craft unions, against the

Knights of Labour and the national unions (that i s , purely canadian unions) .

A maj or source was the rivalry among the three groups of unions for organi zing

r i ghts for par t i cu l ar occupat i ons or categor i e s of wor ker s . I n order to

minimize minimize internal confl i cts that served only to weaken the labour
I
movement in a hosti l e env ironment, the international craft unions made it a

cardinal pr inciple that one union and onl y one uni on have the j ur i sd iction to

organ i ze par t i cu l ar groups of worke r s . Thus the Uni ted B rotherhood o f

Carpenters and Joiners o f Amer ica wou ld b e the s o l e un i on t o organ i ze

carpenters. Other unions that attempted to organi ze these workers would be

g:ui l ty of "dual unionism" and threatened with expul sion from the federation.

The international unions had staked out their j urisdictions but were not abl e

t o so l i c i t the agreement o f the pure l y Canad i an un i ons or the Knights o f

Labour. The resul t was constant inter-union competition and raiding to the

detr iment of the labour movement as a whol e.

The s t r ugg l es among the three groups of uni ons over r a i d i ng and other

i ssues that s eparated them continued th roughout the rema inder of the

ni neteenth century. In 1 9 0 2 the TLC unde r pressure from the AFL in the U.S.

and its international aff i l iates final ly expel led the Knights of Labour and

several of the national unions , dupl icating a simi l ar expu l s i on in the name of

d ua l un i o n i sm by the AFL in the ear l y 1 8 9 0 s . B u t th i s d id not end the

conf l ict. The ousted unions joined together to form the canadian Federation

of Labour (CFL) wh i ch , for a few year s , pos ed a threat to the TLC but
eventua l l y decl ined becoming a sma l l , insigni ficant reposi tory of unions that
 - 6 -

fina l ly petered out in the late 1 920s.

(d) Labour Disunity

In the meantime , a purely Quebec labour movement based on the culture and

language of that province began to emerge in t�1e early years of this century .

I ts influence came from church-sponsored Catholic labour federations in

France , Belgii.nn , Holland and other European countr ies.

In 1918 , the clergy in Quebec took the lead to form the National Central

Trades Counci l in Quebec City, which , i n 1921 became the Confederati on des

travailleurs cathol iques du Canada (CTCC) or , in Engl ish , the Confederation of

I
Canadian Catholic Labour ( CCCL) • This organi zation remained small through to

the 1950s never being able to attract the majority of French Canadian

unionists into i ts fold . Nevertheless it exercised a profound influence on

labour relations in Quebec in the inter-war period reflecting the Church ' s

philosophy of co-operation between labour and capital .

In sharp contrast , militant , radical unionism emerged in the West . The

most successful was the One Big Union (OBU) founded in 1919 as a reaction to

the conservatism of the TLC . The OBU , which was a conglomerate of

disenchanted locals of international and national unions , was able to r ide the

crest of the Winnipeg General Str ike of 1919 reaping large membership gains

from it. The str ike saw some 25 , 000 to 30 , 000 Winnipeggers from all walks of

work life leave their jobs on May 15 , 1919 .

The imnediate spark that started the str ike was the refusal of Winnipeg

employers to deal with a newly formed metal trades counc i l . But the scope of

the str ike reflected the general unrest following World War I. The strike

ended on June 26 after much violence , mass imprisonment , and l i ttle gain by

the labour movement . For the OBU , the strike saw its membership soar to a

peak of 40 , 000 . After the strike the OBU went j ust as quickly into a decl ine
and although it remained in existence until the early 1950s , it never regained
 - 7 -

its former stature .

The demise of the OBU did not mark the end of radical or revolutionary

unionism. This unionism did remain alive in a variety of forms dur ing the

1920s but its activi�y l ike that of the rest of the labour movement was

cons iderably reduced . The 1920s were generally prosperous years for the

Canadian economy . Gross national product increased stead i ly , pr ices remained

reasonably stable and wages rose. Despite this prosperi ty and easy

environment the labour movement failed to make much progress . Union

membership was stagnant largely because unionism was not yet ready or was
!
'unable to organize the emerging mass production industri es and because

management often with the help of government found effective ways to stave off

the spread of union organization .

In 1927 purely Canadian unionism took another large step forward when the

CFL , formed in 190 2 , was reorganized . Buttressed by remnants from the OBU ,

d issati sfied TLC unions and independent Canadian national unions such as the

Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees , the CFL became the All-Canadian

Congress of Labour (ACCL) • Its obj ective was "to achieve the complete

independence of the Canadian labour movement by removing every vestige of

foreign control and by organizing the workers of Canada in industr ial unions

covering every Canadian industry" . 1

By the end of the 1920s Canadian labour was in a weakened and disunited

posi tion. Unlike the united movement in the U.S. under the American

Federation of Labor (AFL) , labour in thi s country was fragmented among

conservative craft , catholic , nationalist and revolutionary organi zations . As

a result it exercised little influence on government and was all but

disregarded by employers .

1 staternent of
Aaron Mosher , President of the ACCL , quoted in s . Jamieson ,
ibid , page 22 .
 - 8 -

( e) The 1930s and Renewed Union Growth

The depression in the early 1930 ' s further weakened and disunited the

labour movement . Severe membership losses were experienced and a new r ival

:abour federation emerged in the form of the Workers Unity League established

by the Communist Party at the beginning of the depression . The League lasted

a few short years . When it was disbanded its members and organizing personnel

j oined , where possible , the TLC and ACCL . Although short-lived the federation

had an important and divisive influence on Canadian labour that lasted through

the 1 930's and 1940's .

The fortunes of the Canadian labour movement took a turn for the better

in 1935 as a result of developnents in the U . S . In that year the U.S.

Congress passed the Wagner Act which i n effect opened up the large mass

production industr ies in the U . S . to unioni zation . Unti l that time , labour

law tolerated unionization and work stoppages but provided no protection to

workers in their efforts to organize into unions . Wi thout the protecti on of

the law unionization made l i ttle headway in the large scale industries or

indeed in any sector except the crafts and trades . The Wagner Act helped

close thi s gap in the law by giving American workers the right to organize

into uni ons of their own choosing , protecting this right and ccrnpell ing

employers to bargain in good fai th with the exclusive representatives of their

employees .

With the passage of the Act new industry-wide unions quickly sprung up in

steel , rubber , auto , meatpacking , aluminum , and other heavy industries . On

thi s solid base these unions quickly spread into Canada and successfully

helped workers to organize in these industr ies in this country.

The TLC was initially the main beneficiary of thi s dr ive helping it to

reach new peaks of membership before the end of the decade of the 1 930s . At
the same time these new industr ial unions generated the same old tensions that
 - 9 -

had plagued the earl ier struggles between the international crafts and the

national unions and Knights of Labour in the latter nineteenth century. In

1 93 7 , the AFL in the U.S. expe l l ed these new industrial unions, which in turn

formed the r i val federation , the Congress of Industr ial Organi zations (CIO).

The TLC did the same in 1 940 under pressure from the AFL and the international

crafts. These expel l ed industrial unions were wel comed into the national istic

ACCL despite the stance of the l atter on international unions. The ACCL

found common ground with these new international s in their methods o f union

organizing and their shared r i v a l ry aga i ns t the o l d - 1 ine conse r v a t i ve

international craft unions of the TLC. Together these new international s

and the ACCL formed the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL).

( f) Dr ive to Labour Unity

Both the TLC and the new CCL exper ienced unprecedented membership gains

during the war and postwar per iods. Union membership soared from a depression

low of 281 , 000 in 1934 to 359 , 000 before the outbreak of war in 1939 to more

than 1 , 000 , 000 members in 1949. Despite these successes , conflicts and

tens ions continued to plague the labour movement. The two congresses vied

with each other for members and both experienced a signi ficant penetration of

comrnµnist-dominated unions led largely by former personnel of the now defunct

Workers Unity League. The struggles sapped the energies of the movement. It

was not unti l the corrmunists were expelled from the movement in 1949 and

membership growth of the two organization slowed that progress was made toward

uni fication of the labour movement.

The merger of the two Congresses finally occurred seven years later when

in 1956 the TLC and the CCL j oined together to form the Canadian Labour

Congress (CLC). (The same event occurred independentl y at about the same time

in the U.S. when the APL and the C I O merged to form the AFL-C I O ) . Wi th the
format i on of the CLX , the l abour movement in Eng l i sh Canada was uni ted i nto
 - 10 -

one federation for the first time since the turn of the century.

Attempts were made at the same time to merge with the CCCL in Quebec and

thereby achieve complete uni ty of Canadian labour . These attempts failed

largely because of the signi ficantly different phi losophy and approach of the

two federations and the sharp language and cul tural differences .

Nevertheless , the CLC , through its provincial affiliate , the Quebec Federation

of Labour ( QFL) , continued to enjoy majority support among French canadian

workers . At the time of the TLC-CCL merger some 340 , 000 Quebec union members

belonged to the QFL while only about 100 , 000 belonged to the CCCL .

Intense competi tion for union members in Quebec resulted in the CCCL

becoming more militant in its stance . Some of the bitterest strikes in

postwar Quebec involved this once acquiescent union federation . Three key

strikes which contributed dramatically to the evolution of the CCCL were the

Asbestos strike in 1949 , the copper mining str ike in Murdochville in 1947 , and

the str ike of the CBC French language producers in 1959 . Although the latter

two involved QFL aff i l iated unions , the CCCL played key roles to the extent

that brought it into direct confrontation with the goverrnnent and the Church .

The growing militancy of the CCCL f inally resulted in i ts break from the

Church . At its 1960 convention the CCCL dropped the last vestiges of its

identi fication with the catholic Church and changed its name to the

Confederation des syndicates nationaux (CSN) or , in English , Confederation of

National Trade Unions (CNTU) • Eventually, in 197 2 , a third federation ,

Centrale des synicats democratiques (CSD) or Center for Democratic Uni ons

broke off from the CNTU . However , this federation remains small with a

membership of about 40 , 000. To all intents and purposes , then , since 1956

most union members belong to unions affiliated with the CLC or the much

smaller CNTU . These two bodies have been the major central organi zations .
Several other , but much smaller organi zations , ·such as the CSD in Quebec and
 - 11 -

the Confederation of Canadian Unions ( CCU) also ex ist but in total represent a

miniscule proportion of union membership ( see Table 2) • In addition , several

international unions ( 13) and a fairly large number of national unions ( 86)

and independent local organizations are not affiliated with any canadian

federat1on . In total these bodies unaffiliated to any Canadian federation

represent some 1 , 000 , 00 0 union members or about 28 per cent of all union

members in Canada .

The potential of another break in trade union uni ty has occurred in the

past two years with the suspension of the building trades unions representi ng

about 350 , 000 union members from the CLC for non-payment of dues . There are a

var iety of reasons for the break , not the least of which is the fundamental

di fference between the CLC and the building trades unions over voting rights

at CLC Conventions and political support of the NDP. The numerous bui lding

trades unionists find themselves at a disadvantage over a voting structure

that favours unions with large numbers of locals . 1 Also the CLC ' s active

support of the NDP i s anathema to the conservative construction unions who

prefer to operate on the time-honoured American union tradition of "rewarding

your friends and punishing your enemies" , a principle that works well in the

U .S. system o f pol i t ics but not a s well i n the Canad ian parliamentary system

of government . However, the most irrmediate reason for the break was the

failure of the CLC to support these unions in their squabble over raiding by

the CLC affiliated QFL in Quebec . In 1982 some 1 0 of the 13 bui lding trades

unions , with a membership of some 200 , 000 , founded the Canadian Federation of

Labour. (This is the second time in canadian labour history thi s name has

been adopted by breakaway unions) •

1 For
example the canadian Union of Publ ic Employees (CUPE) has 1 , 629
locals and a membership of 267 , 00 0 ; the Public Service Alliance (PSA) has
l , �07 locals and a membership of 155 , 000 . In contrast , the bui lding trades
unions with a combined Canadian membership of approximately 350,000 has 689
locals in canada .
 - 12 -

With the emergence of thi s new federation buttressed by the growing

number of unaffiliated unions , Canadian labour i s once again moving away from

the posi tion of uni ty achieved in the 1956 merger of the TLC and CCL.

(g) International Unions and canad ian Autonomy

The current building trades dispute with the CLC and the QFL , which wants

to establ i sh its own bu ilding trade unions , may also be seen as another

chapter in the recurring battle for union autonomy from U.S. domination , a

battle that has characteri zed the history of the Canad ian labour movement

since the first international unions appeared on the scene in the 1850s. In

the past these outbreaks have often led to breakaway federations formed by

purely canadian unions ousted from the established movement. The current

Canadian Federation of Labour is a result of the reverse , formed by several

international unions who are in the process of breaking away from the

establ i shed CLC.

Canadian autonomy has progressed signi ficantly since the mid-1960s. It

has been helped by the phenomenal growth of national unions consequent upon

the granting of collective bargaining rights to publ ic sector employees in the

late 1960s and 1 970s. The emergence of these unions and other national unions

is shi fting the balance of union membership in the CLC away from the

international unions. The result is strong encouragement and support on the

part of the CLC for the establ ishment of autonomous Canadian divis ions of

international unions. 1 Many international unions have established such

divisions.

1 In1970 and again in 1974 the CLC Convention passed resolutions

establ i shing Canadian standards of self-government for Canadian branches of
international unions. These standards provide for election of Canadian
off�cers by Canadians , Canadian policy matters to be determined by Canadian
officers and members , and upgrading of canadian elected personnel
.
 - 13 -

In several international unions the Canadian sections have broken

completely away to form their own purely Canadian unions . The Canadian

Paperworkers Union formerly part of the United Paperworkers International

Union i s a good example of one such union that has been fanned in this way .

These changes in union structure have occurred peacefully sometimes at the

initiative of the international , sometimes with some opposition but almost

always with the blessing of the international union once some measure of

autonomy was achieved .

The need . or des i re for greater Canadian autonomy is now becoming

generally accepted by the international union movement . A good number of

these unions are prepared to negotiate autonomy or some form of it should

their Canadian membership desi re i t . The fact that s o many Canadians conti nue

to belong to international unions reflects their wish to remain a part of that

structure . It was the international union movement that gave substance and

strength to the Canad ian labour movement , and , for a high proporti on of

Canadian union members the benefits of belonging to an international union

outweigh the disadvantages .

(h) Some Statistics

The table below (Table 1) traces the growth of union membership since

191 1 , the first year officials statistics were collected . In that year some

133 , 000 workers belonged to trade unions . Some 7 2 years later in 1983 union

membership stood at about 3-1/2 mill ion , a more than 25 fold increase . As a

percent of the non-agricultural labour force , union membership rose from 16

per cent in 1921 to 40 per cent today.

Most of these workers belong to national and international unions

affiliated to the CLC. As of 1983 , about 2 million union members or almost 57

per cent were in these uni ons ( see Table 2) • About 200 thousand or 6 per cent
belonged to CNTU affiliated unions , another 6 per cent belonged to the new CFL
 - 14 -

Table 1

Union Membership , 1911-81

Union Membership Union Membership

Union as Percentage of as Percentage of
Membership civilian labour non-agr icultural
Year (Thousands) force paid workers

1911 133
1912 160
1913 176
1914 166
1915 143
1916 160
1917 205
1918 . 24 9
1919 378
1920 374
1921 313 9.4 16 . 0
1922 277 8.2 13 . 6
1923 278 8.1 13.2
1924 261 7.5 12. 2
1925 271 7.6 12.3
1926 275 7.5 12.0
1927 290 7.7 12.1
1928 301 7.8 12.1
1929 319 8.0 12.6
1930 322 7.9 13 . 1
1931 311 7.5 15 . 3
1932 283 6.7 15 . 3
1933 286 6.7 16.7
1934 281 6.5 14 . 6
1935 281 6.4 14 . 5
1936 323 7.2 16 . 2
1 937 383 8.5 18 . 2
1938 382 8.3 18 . 4
1939 359 7.7 17 . 3
1940 362 7.9 16 . 3
1941 462 10.3 18 . 0
1942 578 12 . 7 20 . 6
1943 665 14 . 6 22 . 7
1944 724 15 . 9 24 . 3
1945 711 15 . 7 24 . 2
1946 832 17 . 1 27 . 9
1947 912 18 . 4 29 . 1
1948 978 19. 4 30. 3
1949 l , 006 (a) 19 . 3 29 . 5
1950 - ( b) - -

1951 1 , 029 19 . 7 28 . 4
1952 1 , 146 21 . 4 30 . 2
1953 1 , 220 23.4 33 . 0
1954 1 , 26 8 24 . 2 33 . 8
19 55 1 , 268 23 . 6 33 . 7
 - 15 -

Table I ( continued)

Union Membership Union Membership

Union as Percentage of as Percentage of
Membership civilian labour non-agricultural
Year (Thousands) force paid workers

1956 1 , 35 2 24 . 5 33 . 3
1957 1 , 38 6 24 . 3 32 . 4
1958 1 , 454 24 . 7 34 . 2
1959 1 , 459 24 . 0 33 . 3
1960 1 , 459 23 . 5 32.3
1961 1 , 447 22 . 6 31 . 6
1962 1 , 423 22.2 30 . 2
1963 1 , 449 22 . 3 29 . 8
1964 1 , 493 22 . 3 29 . 4
1965 1 , 589 23 . 2 29 . 7
1966 1 , 736 24 . 5 30 . 7
1967 1 , 921 26 . 1 32 . 3
1968 2 , 010 26 . 6 33 . l
1969 2 , 075 26 . 3 32 . 5
1970 2 , 173 27 . 2 33 . 6
1971 2 , 231 26 . 8 33 . 6
1972 2 , 388 27 . 8 34 . 6
1973 2 , 591 29 . 2 36 . 1
1974 2 , 732 29 . 4 35 . 8
1975 2 , 884 29 . 8 36 . 9
1976 2 , 042 30 . 6 37 . 3
1977 3 , 149 31 . 0 38 . 2
1978 3 , 278 31 . 3 39 . 0
1980 3 , 397 30 . 5 37 . 6
1981 3 , 487 30 . 6 37 . 4
1982 3 , 617 31 . 4 39 . 0
1983 3 , 563 30 . 6 40 . 0

(a) Includes Newfoundland for the first time .

(b) Data on union membership for all years up to and including 1949 are as of
December 31 . In 1 950 the reference date was moved ahead by one day to
January 1 , 1951 . Thus , while no figure is shown for 195 0 , the annual
ser ies is , in effect , continued without interruption . The data on uni on
membership for subsequent years are also as of January .

Source: Labour Canada , Labour Organizations in Canada , 1973 and Directory of

- -
Labour Organizations in Canada , 1983 .
 - 16 -

and the remainder belonged to the AFL-ClO only or to smaller federations and

to unaffiliated national and international unions .

The notation "AFL-CIO" in Table 2 refers to the U . S . equivalent of the

CLC. Generally international unions that belong to the CLC also belong to the

AFL-CIO. There are exceptions. The International Union of United Automobi le ,

Aerospace and Agr icultural Implement Workers of America ( in short the United

Auto Workers or UAW) , for example, belongs to the CLC but not to the AFL-CIO.

The construction unions recentl y suspended from the CLC sti l l bel ong to the

AFL-CIO in the U.S. Some internationa l s bel ong to neither federation. The

best example is the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Table 3 shows that most of the international unions operating in Canada

belong to the CLC . Some 23 internationals are not affi liated with the CLC ,

leaving some 51 international unions representing j ust under 1 mill ion uni on

members who are so affiliated . In contrast some 121 of the 146 national

unions are not affil iated with the CLC. The 27 national unions which are

affil iated , account for more than one mill ion union members , marking the first

time since i ts establ ishment in 1956 that union members belonging to purely

Canadian national unions have outnumbered their international union brethren.

Also , these few affiliated national unions represent more than one-half of the

national union membership in Canada . Most of the remaining national unions

are not aff i liated with any federation . In the main, these are professional

unions and unions in the provincial publ ic sector , particularly in Ontar io and

Quebec . '·,

Table 3 also shows that international unions represent about 40 per cent

of all union members in Canada . Thi s is a complete reversal of the histor ical

pos ition of the internationals . Before the rapid growth of publ ic sector

unionism in the late 1960s and 1970s international unions invar iably compri sed
about 70 per cent of Canadians belonging to unions . This shift in the balance
 - 17 -

Table 2

Membership

Congress Aff i l iation Number Per cent

CLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 2 013 050 56. 5
AFL-ClO/CLC • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 851 341 23. 9
*Cr.£ only . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . • 1 161 709 3 2. 6
CNTU • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 213 370 ·6 . 0
AFL-ClO/CFL • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 213 301 6. 0
CSD • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 56 826 1.6
ccu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .. . ..... . . . . . . 38 684 1. 1
AFL-ClO only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 515 4.7
Unaff i liated International Unions • • • • • • • 104 268 2. 9
Unaff i l iated National Unions • • • • • • . • • • • • 654 034 18 . 4
Independent Local Organi zations • • • • • • • • • 101 751 2. 8

TOTAL 3 562 799 1 0 0. 0

* This f igure includes 46 OOO construction workers who are members of

organi zations chartered by the National Building Trades Department of the
CLC.

Source: Labour Canada , Directory of Labour Organizati ons in Canada , 1983 .

is not only the result of the emergence of home-grown unions but a

cons iderable number comes from the establishment of autonomous unions of once

formally Canadian sections of international unions . The large Canadian

Paperworkers Union with some 60 , 000 members is a case in point .

III The Structure and Functions o f Trade Unions

(a) The Central Federations

The point of departure in this survey has been the central federations

such as the CLC. In fact, these federations rarely engage in collective

bargaining , the raison d ' etre of North American unionism. Rather their major

function is to service their aff i l iated unions by providing ass istance in

organizing workers , providing research , legal and education services

particularly to those unions which are too small to prov ide these services
themselves , and to co-ordinate union activities .
 - 18 -

Table 3

Union Membership by Type of Union and Affiliation , 198 3

Membership
No . of No . of
Type of Affiliation Unions Locals
Number Per cent

International Unions •• • • • 74 3 943 1 470 433 41 . 3

AFL-ClO/CLC••• • •• • • •••• • 46 2 855 851 341 23 . 9
AFL-ClO/CFL• • • • •• • • • • • • • 10 406 213 301 6.0
CLC only • • • . • • • •• • • • •••• 5 263 134 008 3.8
AFL-ClO only • • • • •••••• • • 7 257 167 515 4.7
Unaffili ated Unions •• • • • 6 162 104 268 2.9

National Unions • • • • • • • •• • 146 11 312 1 945 982 54 . 6

**CLC • • • • • • • • • • • •••• • • • • • 27 5 670 1 018 792 28 . 6
CNTU • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 1 620 212 646 6.0
CSD • • • •••• • ••••••••• • • • 3 204 21 826 0.6
ccu • • . . • . . .•. . . . . . . • • . . 20 120 38 684 1 .1
Unaffili ated Unions •• • • 86 3 698 634 834 18 . 3

SUB-TOTAL •• • • • • ••••• • • • •• 220 15 255 3 416 415 95 . 9

Directly Chartered Unions 366 44 633 1.2

CLC • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• • 74 8 909 0.2
C�lTU • • • • • •• • • • • • • •• • • • • • 5 224 *
CSD• •• • • • • • •• • ••••• • • • • • 287 35 OOO 1.0

Independent Local Organ-

i zati ons • • •••••• • • • ••••• 240 101 75� 2.9

TOTAL 826 3 562 799 100 . 0

* Less than 0 . 1 per cent .

** Thi s figure includes 4 6 OOO construction workers who are members of
organ i zati ons chartered by the National Building Trades Department of the
CLC.

Source : Labour Canada , Directory of Labour Organi zations in Canada , 198 3 .

This latter function includes settling di sputes among aff i l iated unions ,

co-ordinating the views of affiliates on issues of concern to the labour

movement , representing labour on government and non-government comnissions ,

boards , agencies , etc . , and act ing as labour spokesmen in internat ional forums
and international union centres .
 - 19 -

With the heavy involvement of government in the economic and soci al

affairs of society , central federations like the CLC play an important role

lobbying and making known to the government of the day the views and desi res

of the labour movement . The var ious federations , as well as the larger

individual unaffiliated unions annually present briefs to governments on every

conceivable economic , social and poli tical i ssue in which labour has an

interest . This includes not only issues related to labour legi slation but

also economic and monetary policies , housing programs , international trade and

Canadian relations with other countr ies . An examination of recent briefs of

the CLC indicate that there is virtually no maj or i ssue which escapes the

attention of that organi zation .

In the last few years these federations have also played a key role

representing labour in tripartite discussions wi th the Prime Minister and

Members of his Cabinet , along with representatives of the business corrmuni ty .

Co-ordination of union activities also means regulating inter-union

relationships . The most important of these functions is to ensure that

affiliates do not engage in union organi zing drives which encroach upon one

another's territory. The CLC, for example , has an elaborate procedure to

police these activities and is empowered to suspend or expel affiliates found

guilty of raiding .

As noted earlier union raiding is contrary to the major philosophical

basis of North American unionism. Yet such raiding is comnon . Much of thi s

raiding is a result o f the blurring o f occupetional lines that come with

economic advance , the spread of industrial-type unions and the growth of

purely Canadian unions . It is not uncommon to find one group of electr ical

workers belonging to the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and

another broup belonging to an industrial union such as the United Automobile

Workers . The develoµnent of national unionism, especi ally in Quebec has
 - 20 -

promoted endless conflicts between these unions and the internationals over

the same group of workers . The current conflict between the international

bui lding trades unions and the Quebec Federati on of Labour i s a prime example

of this conflict .

Inter-union raiding is also promoted by vaguely worded consti tutions

which give unions their mandates to organize groups of workers . The

International Brotherhood of Teamsters was originally established to organi ze

drivers and warehousemen but its consti tution provides it with the mandate to

organize "related workers" . This kind o f wording i s not uncommon in union

constitutions and in the case of the Teamsters has been interpreted by that

union as a mandate to organize all types of workers . The Teamsters

aggressiveness in thi s respect was the pr incipal reason for its expuls ion not

only from the CLC in Canada but also from the AFL-ClO in the U . S .

In situations on which matters o f j urisdiction cannot be decided or in

which none of the affiliates are interested in organi zing a particular group

of workers , the CLC, for example , may step in and unionize these workers into

local organi zations directly affil iated to it . The CLC will handle the

affairs of these local organizations , much as its aff iliated unions conduct

their own affairs , until j ur i sdiction can be decided . Once j ur i sdiction has

been settled , these local organi zations become part of the structure of an

affiliated union . In thi s sense , the CLC and most other federations perform a

holding operation ensuring the organi zation of workers who wish to be

represented by unions .

Table 3 shows that in 1983 about one per cent of union membership was in

directly chartered local unions .

How much influence federations can exercise in all of the various

activities for which they are responsible is very much dependent on the power
their affiliated unions are prepared to give to them and the personal i ty and
 - 21 -

style of the federation leadership. George Meany, former pres ident of the

AFL-CIO in the U . S . , ruled that organization with an iron hand for many years .

Although his power and influence were derived from the aff i l i ated unions of

that federation , few within the labour movement questioned his decisions and

few without ignored his pronouncements . Few labour leaders i n Canada have

achieved thi s stature although there have been wide var iations among them in

the power and influence they have wielded .

The mandate of the federations is derived from annual or biennial

conventions attended by representatives of the aff i l i ated unions . At these

conventions resolutions are passed which prescribe the pol icies and programs

that will guide the federation between conventions . An executive is elected

at these conventions to implement the resolutions and to administer the

affai rs of the federation .

The CLC is represented at the provincial level by provincial federations

of labour . Generally, the unions affiliated with the CLC are also affil iated

to these provincial federations . Provincial federations perform much the same

tasks at the provincial level as the CLC does at the national level including

representing affil iated unions in relations with provincial governments . At

the local level , performing similar functions at the c i ty and municipal

levels , are local labour counc i l s comprising the local branches of CLC­

affi l iated unions .

Since the CNTU has few members outside Quebec , it acts as both the

national and provincial federation on behalf of its affi liated unions .

( b) Types of Unions

In general , there are two types of unions , industrial and craft . The

industrial union includes all workers in a particular canpany or industry

regardless of skill or occupation . The United Steelworkers o f America or the

Uni ted Auto Workers are examples of the industr ial type of uni on . These
 - 22 -

unions include all workers in steel , auto and related industr i es regardless of

occupation.

Craft unions include workers belonging to one craft or to a closely

related group of occupations. Craft unions , unlike industrial unions cut

across many industry lines. Examples are the International Association of

Mach inists and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.

Several unions such as the International Brotherhood of Electr ical

Workers ( IBEW) organize on both occupational and industrial lines. Depending

on the type of union organi z ing thei r workers , companies could be faced with

anywhere from one union , an industr ial union , to many unions ( 1 5 to 20 unions

would not be unusual) i f the craft type of organi zation prevai ls. Deal ing

with many unions presents problems since should one of them strike and set up

a picket l ine the remaining unions , following time-honoured traditions , will ,

in all l ikel ihood , respect that picket l ine effectively closing down the

company. Industrial and craft-type unions are found among both national and

international unions.

Unions are of varying si zes , ranging from a few members to many

thousands . The smallest union listed in Labour Canada's Directory of Labour

Organi zati ons in Canada is the International Association of Siderographers

(AFL-CIO/CLC) with a membership in Canada of 4 . Table 4 below lists unions

with 50 , 00 0 or more Canadian members. In 1983 there were 16 unions which fell

in this s i ze category. The largest is the Canadian Union of Public Employees

(CUPE) wi th a membership of 281 , 242 . It can be seen that of the five largest

unions , three are national all in the public sector . Before the growth of

these relatively new unions the largest individual unions in Canada were the

Canadian branches of internationals such as the steelworkers and auto workers.

Unions are found in virtually every Canadian industry. In some

industries , for example , the railways or government , unioni zation is near
 - 23 -

canplete . Among major industry groups union membership ranges between less

than one per cent of employees in agr iculture and finance, insurance and real

estate to more than two-thirds of employees in public administration,

transportation and comnunications, transportation equipment, pulp and paper

and rubber . Most blue collar workers are organi zed but only a minority of all

whi te collar workers in the (4nadian economy belong to unions .

The bas ic bui ld ing block of the individual union is the local . I t is the

local that is responsible for the day-to-day relationships with employers and,

in most unions , for negotiat ing the collective agreement . Locals may canpri se

workers in one plant or in several plants of the same employer or of different

employers in the same local ity.

There are more than 1 5 , 000 locals in Canada . The number of locals per

union varies . Some 36 unions have less than 1 0 locals and another 25 have

more than 100 locals . The steelworkers has 853 locals, the Publ ic Service

Alliance, 1 , 407 locals and CUPE, 1 , 629 locals .

In addition to these locals of unions there are some 213 independent

locals organizations with a membership of about 100 , 000 that do not belong to

any union or central federation . These are usually organi zations based in one

enterpr ise. For example, many faculty associations in universi ties are

recogni zed unions that are not part of a larger or national organi zation .

Like unions themselves , locals are of varying s i zes ranging from a few

members to many thousands . Two of the largest are the auto workers local in

Oshawa with about 1 2 , 000 members and the steelworkers local in Sudbury with

more than 11 , 000 members .

Despite the longevity of some union leaders the typical Canad ian labour

union is in fact a very democratic organi zation . Policy is made at

conventions, and most union officers whether at the local or union

headquarters, whether at the local council, provincial federation or nati onal
 - 24 -

Table 4

Unions with 50 OOO or More Members , 1983

Membership

1. Canadian Union of Publ ic Employees (CLC) ••••••••••••••••• 281 242

2. National Union of Provincial Government Elnployees (CLC) •• 242 321
3. Publ ic Service All iance of Canada (CLC) ••••••••••••••••• 1 59 646
4. United Steelworkers of Amer ica (AFL-ClO/CLC) ••••••••••••• 148 OOO
5. United Food and Comme rcial Workers (AFL-ClO/CLC) ••••••••• 141 400
6. International Union , United Automobile , Aerospace and
Agr icultural Implement Workers of American (CLC) ••••••• 98 OOO
7. International Brotherhood of Teamster , Chauffeurs ,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America ( Ind . ) ••••••••••••• 91 500
8. Centrale de l'enseignement du Quebec ( Ind . ) •••••••••••••• 86 615
9. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America (AFL-ClO) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 5 OOO
10. Federation des affaires sociales (CSN) ••••••••••••••••••• 83 246
11. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(AFL-Cl O/CFL) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 71 OOO
1 2. Service Elnployees International Union (AFL-ClO/CLC) •••••• 65 OOO
13 . International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (AFL-ClO/CLC) •••••••••••••••••••••••• 63 317
14. Canadian Paperworkers Union (CLC) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 63 180
1 5. Labourers' International Union of North America
(AFL-ClO) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • ••••••• • •••••• 61 315
16. International Woodworkers o f America· (AFL-ClO/CLC) ••••••• 59 600

Source : Directory of Labour Organi zations in Canada , 1983

federation level are elected to their posi tions . For most unions , elections

are held annually , generally by secret ballot .

Fai lure of union officers to respond to the wishes of their members could

spell certain defeat at the ballot box . This has been the fate of many union

leaders especially at the local level during the past ten years because they

have not been mil itant or aggressive enough for the rank and file .

The militancy often ascribed by the press to union leadership has in fact

its roots in rank and file restlessness . Two factors have contr ibuted to this

restlessness : a gradual eros ion of living standards brought on by high

inflation and high interest rates and r i s ing aspirations for more . Turnover

of union officers has been one symptom of this restlessness . Another has been
 - 25 -

contract rejection. In most unions rank and file approval of contracts

negotiated by their elected officials is required before collective agreements

can be s igned . Contract rejection has been a major industri al relations

problem of the 1970s .

IV Labour Relations Legislation

(a) Historical Overview

The Trade Union Act of 1872 is generally regarded as Canada ' s first piece

of labour relations legis lation. That Act permi tted workers to form unions to

better thei r wages and working conditions without fear of being subjected to

criminal charges of restraint of trade .

In 1900 in response to growing industrial unrest at the turn of the

century, the Federal Parliament passed the Conc i liation Act . The Act

authorized the Minister of Labour to appoint conciliation boards to help

settle di sputes . The procedure was voluntary , that i s , it was dependent upon

the request of one or other of the parties to the Minister to establish a

board to assist them in reaching a settlement , and the acceptance of the

procedure by the other party . Boards , when established would bring the

parties together to resolve their di fferences . Failure to resolve the dispute

was generally followed by a Board report recorrunending a poss ible settlement

which the parties were free to accept or rej ect . The pressure of public

opinion gave Board reports some force and was at times an effective mechanism

in inducing settlement .

In 1903 , the federal government passed the Rai lway Disputes Act , which

made the conc i liation procedure ccxnpulsory. The procedure could be set in

motion on application by either party , or a municipal government or the

Minister himself could act on his own motion .

In 1907 , the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act ( IDIAct) was passed

extending the 1903 Act to a larger coverage of industr ies . That Act
 - 26 -

specifically introduced the notion of restraint on work stoppages until the

conciliation process was completed . Previously either party could str ike or

lockout before conciliation procedures were ccxnpleted . The IDI Act remained

in force until 1948 when replaced by a broader labour disputes act , which will

be described below.

In 1925 the j ur i sdiction of the IDI Act was success fully challenged in a

case involving the Toronto Electric Street Railway Canpany. The challenge

resulted in the jurisdiction of the Act being restr icted to undertakings

specifically defined as in the federal sphere including interprov incial

transportation , corrunu nications , shipping and certain mining operations .

However , all provinces except Pr ince Edward Island passed enabling legislation

extending the IDI Act to thei r j urisdiction .

Although the IDI Act was a unique piece of legislation in the western

world in its compulsory conciliation and compulsory prevention of work

stoppage provisions , it did not protect workers ' rights to organize nor did it

compel employers to bargain with unions . Employers were free to thwart union

organizing efforts . They could threaten , dismiss , or blackmail employees

belonging to unions or engaging in union activity . They could refuse to

bargain with unions with major i ty support of the employees and they could

enter into "sweetheart" agreements with unions of their own choos ing .

These activities on the part of employers reached a peak in the depressed

thirties resulting in an outbreak of bi tter and costly "recognition" str ikes .

In the U .S . this conflict became particularly violence-r idden leading in 1935

to the passage of the Wagner Act by the U .S . Congress . By protecting workers

r ights to j oin unions , ccxnpelling employers to bargain with unions

representing the majority of their employees and preventing employers from

engaging in unfair labour practices , the Act removed · a maj or source of

conflict between labour and management . These same principles spread to

 - 27 -

Canada and were adopted by several provinces in new leg islation passed in

these j urisdictions in the second half of the 1930s.

The federal government itself did not move in this di rection until 1944

when , under its emergency wartime powers , it passed P.C. 1003 , a Wagner-type

law made to apply to all industr ies whether under federal or provincial

j ur i sdiction. P . C. 1003 , which replaced the IDI Act during hositili ties , in

addition to incorporating Wagner Act-type clauses , also retained IDI Act

compulsory concil iation procedures. In fact , it expanded these procedures

from a one step to a two" step procedure. Previously the conciliation process

involved a Conciliation Board stage only. P.C. 1003 introduced a conciliation

officer stage to be followed by a Board stage. Both stages had to be observed

by the parties before the right to str ike or lockout was granted to them.

P.C. 1003 also banned str ikes and lockouts during the term of collective

agreements . Impasses over the interpretation of the terms of collective

agreements had to be settled by arbitration.

After the war , labour relations leg islation again reverted to provincial

j urisdiction. In 1948 , the federal government repealed the IDI Act replacing

it with the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act ( IRDI Act) .

This Act incorporated the pr inciples of P.C. 1 00 3 including the two stage

conciliation procedure , the ban on str ikes or lockout during the term of a

collective agreement , the protection of the right to organize , the canpuls ion

on employers to bargain collectively with the representatives of thei r

employees and the listing of both union and employer unfair labour practices.

The various provinces passed similar leg islation modeled after the IRDI Act.

In the 1950s the provinces began to move away from the IRDI Act model

introducing features into their own labour relations leg islation to meet the

special needs of their j urisdiction. Ontario, wi th the largest j urisdiction ,

Quebec and British Columbia assumed leadership roles i n breaking new ground in
 - 28 -

Canadian labour relations pol icy.

Perhaps the most radical departure from the IRDI Act model was the

retreat fran the rigid two-stage canpulsory conciliation procedure to

procedures that included greater flexibi l i ty , greater degree of voluntari sm ,

and more options avai lable to goverrnnents to settle disputes.

The federal goverrnnent waited unti l 1972 before it too finally changed

its approach , which brought it closer to developnents in the provinces. In

the new Canada Labour Code , Part v, passed in that year , an "arsenal of

weapons" type approach was introduced to give the Minister of Labour

flex ibi l i ty in settling disputes. When an impasse develops between the

parties negotiating a new agreement , the Minister may do nothing , or he may

follow one of several procedures set out in the Act , including appointing a

conc i l iation officer , a conciliation carmissioner or a conc i liation board or

he may follow a combination of these steps. I f he chooses to do nothing , the

parties are free to strike or lockout provided the termination date of the old

agreement has passed and provided the minister was informed of the impasse .

If he does make an appo i ntment , the same ru l e s appl y as in the past and

strike or lockout action is i l l egal unti l the procedure has been compl eted.

In practice, the conc i l iation officer stage is sti l l used whi l e the

conc i l iation board stage has fal len into disuse. The practice in the various

prov inces is more or less s imi lar, that is, wide use of the conci l iation

officer stage as required and l i tt l e use of conc i l iation boards. In add ition ,

several provinces have introduced a mediation stage which can be used as a

substi tute for the conc i l iation officer or conci l iation board. For example in

Ontario, the parties may sel ect a mediator and request his appointment. Once

selected the Ontar io l aw gi ves the med iator extensi ve powers of inquiry to

ass ist in the settlement of the dispute.

 - 29 -

(b) Labour Relations Legislation To-day

Cur rently the body of labou r relations legi slat i on i n th i s country

compr i ses the 1 1 gene ral acts ( 1 0 provinc i al and one fede ral) and numerous

specific acts applying to particular sectors such as the p.Jblic sector or to

par t i cular occupati ons such as pol i ce , f i r e f i ghte r s and teach e r s . I n some

jurisdictions these cccupations or sectors may be covered by separate clauses

in the gene ral acts. I n total the r e are about 45 separ ate acts not count ing

the special or separate sections of some of the general acts.

All j urisdictions have made important changes to their legislation during

the 1970 ' s. M os t such c h a n g e s f ollow or were i n f lu e n c e d by the

recommendations of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Labour Relations , which

reported in 1 9 6 9 after two years i nvestigati ng and studyi ng the Canad i an

industrial relations scene.

I t would be much too complicated and lengthy to attempt to describe , even

i n summary form , the contents of the labour relations legi slati on in each

j u r i sd icti on . I nstead , a cur sory review w ill be provided of the gene r al

p r i vate sector legi slati on using the fede ral and Onta r i o j u r i sd ic t i ons as

parti cular examples and w i th references to important departures i n the

legi slati on of other j u r i sd i ct i ons. A separ ate sect i on is devoted to a

discussion of public sector labour relations legislation.

The r e are certain important features common to vi rtually all labour

relati ons leg i slat i on in all j u r i sd ict i ons , whethe r gener al or spec i f i c .

These include the follaving :

1. Procedures for the certification of a union to represent the employees

in a parti cular unit a nd p r oc ed u r e s f o r the d e ce r t i f i c a t i on o r

replacement of an existing union.

2. Listing of unfair labour practices. These are practices which , otherw ise

legal under common law , are illegal in a labour relations context. For
 - 30 -

example , it is generally illegal for employers to change unilaterally the

terms and conditions of employment while certification procedings are in

process. Labour relations legi slati on list practices that cannot be

committed by employers and unions.

3. Procedures that must be followed before strike or lockout action can be

taken .

4. Declaration that str ikes or lockouts dur i ng the closed pe r i od when an

agreement is in force is illegal and prov i s i ons for the arb itration of

disp.ltes over matters concerning the interpretation of the agreement .

5. Prov i s i on for the adm i n i st ration and enfor cement of the legi slat i on .

Each Act prov i des for a labour relat i ons board o r equ ivalent to

administer and enforce the provisions of the legislation .

Each of these matters will be discussed in turn except for 4 which w ill

be discussed in the follo.ving Section (VI ) .

1. (a) Certification of Bargaining Units

Under Canadian legislation an employer may voluntarily recogni ze a union

and negoti ate a collective agreement specifying the terms and conditions of

work affecti ng a group of h i s employees. I n cases where such voluntary

recogni t i on is not forthcom i ng , application may be made by the uni on to the

labour relat i ons board for ce r t i f i cation to represent the employees of an

employer for purposes of collect i ve barga i ni ng. Once ce rt i f icati on i s

granted , the employer i s canpelled to negotiate with the representative union .

T h e law s e t s dow n a num b e r of r u l e s a n d p r oc e d u r e s c o nc e r n i n g

certification. Up::>n receipt of an application for c e r t i f i cation , the board

determ i nes the leg i t imacy of the uni on , the approp r i ateness of the uni t of

employees for which representation is being sought , and the extent of supp::> r t

the union has. In making these determinations , boards generally provide the

parties with the full opp::>rtunity to present evidence and make submissions .
 - 31 -

On the quest i on of leg i ti m acy of the union , employer- i nfluenced ,

dom i nated or controlled organi zations are not cons idered uni ons under

v i r t u a lly a ll le g i s l at i on . App l i c a t i on s f or c e r t i f i c a t i on b y such

organi zations are rej ected .

Determination of the unit appropriate for collective bargaining is one of

the more i mportant functions of the boa rd . Boards may accept the uni t

described i n the union' s application or it may alter i t usually by adding or

substracting employees. Units may cover all plant workers of one employer ,

plant workers of several employers in the same area , workers in more than one

plant of the same employe r , parts of a plant , and par t icular occupati ons or

c r afts . Mos t legi slat i on provide some gu idelines on the matter of the

approp r i ate unit. F or example , the a8ts m ay suggest that prof e s s i onal

employees would constitute one unit or that particular crafts or occupations

such as carpenters , watchmen , supervisors , etc. may each be included in their

ONn bargaining units .

Most acts also specify certain categories of workers who are not covered

by the legislation. Generally management and personnel employees working in a

confidential capacity as well as doctors , dentists , lawyers and certain other

prof ess ionals are not covered. Th i s means that these employees do not have
.
the protec t i on of the leg i slat i on should they w i sh to establi sh un i ons to

represent them in negotiations w ith their employers.

I n establi shing the approp r i ate uni t , boards generally pay close

attention to the wishes of the employees , the history of bargaining in similar

un its , type of uni on organi zat i on ( industr i al or craft union) and the

employees involved (plant , office , technical, professional, and craft) . Most

determ i na t i ons involve a s i ngle plant and thi s i s a pr inc i pal reason why

collective bargaining operates on a local plant basis.

 - 32 -

W ith respect to the extent of employee support for the application , the

various acts spell out the steps that must be followed for this determination.

For example , in the Canada Labour Cede , Part V, if the board is satisfied that

more than 50 per cent of the employees in the unit are union members in gocd

stand i ng or are suppor t i ve of the applicat i on , it may i s sue a cer t i f ication

order without further action .

I f such support is found to be less than 50 per cent but more than 35 per

cent a representation vote is ordered. In this vote , a minimum 35 per cent of

the con s t ituency must cast ballot s . A maj or i ty o f those vot i ng dec i de the

matter. I n e a r l i e r leg i slation and cur rently in several of the prov i nc i al

acts deter m i nati on i s based on the maj or i ty of employees in the uni t . In

these instances , employees who d o not cast ballots are in e ffect vot ing

aga inst representation.

The var i ous provinc ial acts follow s i m i lar procedures but d i ff e r i n

detail. For example , i n Ontario i f the board is satisfied that more than 5 5

pe r cent o f the employee s in the uni t a r e membe r s of the appl i cant union ,

cer t i f icat i on may be granted w i thout a vote. I f less than 55 pe r cent but

more than 45 per cent are union members a representation vote may be ordered.

I n a vote , a maj or ity of those voting dete rm i nes the outcom e . The re i s no

minimum p:rcentage requirements of those in the unit who must cast ballots

before a vote is considered valid as in the federal legislation.

(b) Pre-Hearing Votes

Considerable time may elapse between an application for certification and

the dete rmination by the labour relations board of the need for a vote .

Dur i ng thi s pe r i od , employees could be swayed against the ce r t i f i cation or

lose interest for one reason or another , for example , because of inac t i on

brought on by the de lay . S ince these de lays have l i ttle t o d o w i th the

appl i cant uni on , sever al of the acts provide for pre-he a r i ng votes. Under
 - 33 -

this provision in the act , the labour relations board will conduct a vote , if

requested , upon receipt of ��e application. In Ontario, for example , a pre­

hear i ng vote w i ll be held upon request of the union and if the board i s

s at i s f i ed t h a t at l e a s t 3 5 pe r c e n t of t h e e m pl oyee s i n the vot i ng

cons t ituency are member s of the trade union . A pre- hear i ng vote usually

covers the unit specified in the application, although it may be modified by

the board on the bas is of an exam i nation of i ts records. The resulting

ball ot s are sealed unt i l the certi f icat i on proceedings have been completed.

Depending on the outcome of these proceedings the ballots w ill then be counted

to determi ne if ��e union is to be certified.

(c) Decerti fication � Termination of Bargaining Rights

All acts provide orderly procedures for decertifying unions. Generally

appli cation for dece r t i f i cation can be m ade i f , once cert i f i ed , the union

f a i ls to barga i n or , after a certa i n lapsed pe r i od , e i ther another union

claims majority support o� the employees or the majority of employees indicate

that they do not want to be repre sented by a uni on . Whe re a n agreement has

been signed , application for decertification or for a new certification can be

made only at specified periods , generally within the last two months of the

term of the agreement. The employer can also apply for decertification of the

union particularly in instances where the union fails to bargain.

(d) Successor Rights

A part i cular thorny i ssue in labour relat i ons i s what happens should

there be a change in the company or the union . Basically , in the case o f a

business which is sold , most of the statutes provide that the certification

and existing collective bargaining agreements go w ith the business to the new

owne r s . The same gene r ally holds if par t of the bus i ness is sold or i f the

business is leased or transferred in some other fashion. Purchase of assets

which are then p.lt to another use may not be considered a sale of the business
 - 34 -

and bargaining rights and the collective agreement could be terminated.

Sales of businesses may lead to amalgamation of functions and consequent

changes in the barga i n i ng uni t . I n these i nstances , the labour relations

board will decide on the new bargaining unit and its implications for existing

collective agreements. S imilarly, in the case of union mergers or other union

changes the board may be i nvolved in sor t i ng out the effects on barga in ing

units and collective agreements .

2. Unfair Labour Practices

There are certain practices committed by either the company or the union

which are considered unfair and which are subj ect to enforcement by the labour

relat i ons boards or the court s . Most commonly li sted practi ces affect i ng

employers are interference with the rights of employees to select the union of

the i r choice for collec t i ve barga i n i ng pu rposes or d i sc r i m i nation against

employees for union acti v i ty. This gener ally means that employe rs cannot

d i sm i s s , d i sc i pline or threaten employees in the exe r c i se of the i r r i ghts

under the legislation. They cannot invoke promises which will influence an

employee's choice of a union , for example promising ''better benefits " should

the employee select one union rather than another or vote for no union. These

prov i s i ons , howeve r , do not pr event employe r s f r om mak i ng the i r case i n

support of one union o r anothe r or for no uni on . What the employer can say

unde r these c i r cumstances , the manner in which he says i t , and the for um he

uses are matters which are susceptible to review by the labour relations

boards .

I n addition , it is generally considered an unfair labour practice for an

employer to participate in the formation , selection or support , financial or

otherwise , of unions representing his employees .

Finally, employers are prohibited from changing the terms of collective

agreements unilaterally or to change the wages and working conditions during

 - 35 -

certification proceedings or during collective b arga i n i ng before s t r i ke and

lockout r i ghts have been acqu i red i f the purpose i s to unde rm i ne the union .

They a r e compelled , a s a r e uni ons , t o b a r ga i n i n good faith o r demonstrate

serious bargaining .

Unions cannot comm i t unf a i r labour p�ac t i ces by inte r f er i ng w ith or

pa r t i c i pa t i ng in the f o r m a t i on or adm i n i s t r a t i on of an e m p l oy e r ' s

organ i zation , interfer i ng w i th the barga i n i ng r i ghts of a cer t i f ied uni on ,

disciminating against union members or employees in the bargaining unit and

intimidating or coercing employees to remain or become members of the union.

Nor can unions force employers to discriminate against , dismiss or discipline

union members. Unions are compelled to provide fair representation for all

employees i n the barga i n i ng unit whether in collective barga in i ng or i n

grievance procedure cases.

Other unfair practices include striking or locking out or threatening a

s t r i k e or lock out dur i ng cert i f i cation , dur ing the term of a collective

agreement or during collective bargaining before procedures in the legislation

have been exhausted.

Labour re lati ons boards are empowe red to stop such pr actices and to

enf orce appropr i ate r emedi e s . B y tabling i ts rulings i n the approp r i ate

cou r t , board rulings become in eff ect cou r t orde r s . Dur ing the t e r m o f a

collective agreement , the parties may resort to the grievance procedure and

eventual arbitration to resolve unfair labour practices .

3 . (a) Government Intervention in Dispute Settlement

Collective barga i n i ng d i sputes can ar i se du r ing the negot iat i on of a

f i rs t contr act or a new contr act ( i nterest d i sputes) and negot i ations on

matters ar i s i ng over the interpretat i on and appl ication of an exi st i ng

contract (rights d i sputes ) .

 - 36 -

I n all Canad ian j ur i sd ict i ons str i k es or lockouts are forb idden as a

m eans of settl i ng rights d i sputes , that i s di sputes ar i s ing over the

interpretat i on of the agreement. The par t i e s are obl i ged to settle these

impasses by arbitrat i on . Thi s prov i s i on is unique to Canad i an labour

relations. In the United States there is no ban on work stoppages during the

term of the agreement but the vast maj or i ty of collective agreements (more

than 90 per cent of them) provide for a system of arbitration , which in effect

eliminates this type of industrial conflict.

The most interesting form of gove r nment intervention occu r s dur i ng

negoti ations of a f i rst agreement or negotiations replac i ng an exi s ti ng

agreemen t . We have already d i scussed b r iefly the h i s tory o f gove rnment

intervention and the evolution of the two-stage conciliation system to resolve

i ndu s t r i al con fl i ct . Th i s secti on prov ides some pe r t i nent deta i l� o n the

conciliation process as it works in the various j urisdictions.

Histor ically Canad ian jurisdictions provided for a two stage conciliation

procedure to which the parties must abide before being in a legal position to

call a work stoppage. These procedures were generally implemented after the

te rmination of the old agreement (or after noti ce to bargain a f i rst

agreement) . They could , however , be implemented at any time once bargaining

has carnnenced even though the old agreement is still in force .

Depending on the length of time to complete the procedures the right to

strike or lockout cculd be postponed for months and , in some cases , one year

or longe r . This contrasts w i th the s i tuat i on in othe r count r i e s . For

example , in the U.S. the part i es have the r i ght to strike or lockout on the

te r m i nati on date of the agreement unless the P res ident of the U . S . declar es

such action to be a national emergency, in whi ch case the right is postponed

for 80 days .

The procedures in Canada call for a conciliation officer stage in which

 - 37 -

the government at the request of either or both part i es or on its own

i n i t i ative ( the spec i f i c prac t i ce var i es from j urisdiction to j urisdiction)

appoi nts a conc i l i at i on off i ce r to try and settle an impass e . Should the

off i ce r , who is generally a full- time c ivil servant , fail to effect a

settlement , he must report back after a certain per i od , usually 1 4 days , as

specified either in the legislation or in his terms of reference , informing

the government of the status of the dispute and making his recommendation for

the appointment of a conciliation board. The officer stage may be prolonged

on the agreement of both parties. Since conciliation can be requested at any

time once bargaining has begun it is not uncommon to have this stage completed

before the termination date of the old agreement.

I f the d i spute i s still not settled a conc i l iat i on board compr i s ing

appointees of the parties and a neutral chairman may be appointed. The board

w i ll also try to obtain a settlement but , fai l ing that , w i ll report to the

government its recommendations for a settlement. Again , the term of the board

i s set down i n the leg i slat i on (usua lly 3 0 days) and may be extended by the

parti es� Once the board report is made most legi slation call for another

seven to fou rteen days before the parties acqu i re the r i ght to strike or

lockout , should they not accept the board recommendations or reach an

agreement in the meantime.

Change s in labour relat i ons leg i slat i on dur i ng the pas t 15 years have

reduced the scope and time of gover nment i ntervention and , in some cases ,

changed its nature. The conc i l iation board stage no longe r appears in some

legi slation and wher e it does appear it is not often used in pr i vate sector

bargaining. As a substitute , conciliation commissioners or mediation is now

provided for but the i r implem entati on often rests on the i n i tiative of the

parties .
 - 38 -

The conciliation officer stage is still widely used when impasses develop

but i n some j ur i sd i c t i ons the law re garding i t s implementati on has been

re laxed . Unless reques ted by the par t ie s , the gove rnment m ay choose not to

implement it thereby giving the parties the i mmedi ate r i ght to s t r i k e or

loc k out after the t e r m i na t i on date of the old agreement should they not be

able to settle the i r d ifferences peacefully. In other j ur i sd ic ti ons (for

example , the Atlantic Provinces and the federal j urisdiction) the legislation

gives the government the option of not appointing a conciliation officer even

though the parties have requested one. However , this option is rarely used.

Concili ation officers are invariably appointed if an impasse develops be�ween

the parties.

Overall , it is estimated that about two-fifths of collective agreements

are signed after the intervention of a thi rd party. This proportion is down

from about me-half that prevailed in the 1960s indicating less recourse to

government i ntervention for the settlement of i ndu st r i al d i sputes. The

pe rcentage of agreements s i gned after a work stoppage has occur red var ie s

between 5 and 10 per cent with no clear trend over time .

(b ) (i) Government Intervention in Dispute Settlement = Sane Further Notes

Negotiations for a first agreement are subj ect to the same provisions in

the leg i s l at ion as negoti at ions for a new agr eement. Howeve r , the r e is one

important difference , which is becom i ng i ncreasingly prevalent in Canad i an

law . I n ce rtain j ur i sd ict i ons , i nclud ing the fede ral , B r i ti sh Columb i a ,

Manitoba and Quebec , i f the parties are unsuccessful in reaching an agreement ,

usually after a ce rtain pe r i od has elapsed , the labour relat i ons board i s

empow ered t o impose a one year agreement. Such an agreement i s based upon

presentat i ons by the par t i e s and by collec t i ve barga i n i ng prac t i ce in

canparable situations.
 - 39 -

( i i ) Strike Votes

A final form of government intervention involves strike votes and notice

to strike or lcckout. Stril<e votes are required by law in New Brunswick , Nova

Scot i a , P r i nce Edward I sland , Quebec , S as katche w an , Albe rta and B r i t i sh

Columbia. The provinces of Ontario, Manitoba and Newfoundland , and federal

leg i s l at i on do not requ i re a s t r i k e vote before str i ke act i on i s allow ed .

Gene r ally s t r i ke votes must be taken after regular compulsory d i spute

settlement prccedures have been follCJNed and exhausted .

Strike votes may or may not be governmment supervised but must always be

by secret ballot. Only Alberta and British columbia provide for government

supervised strike votes. In some j urisdictions the voting constituency is the

employees in the bargaining unit (Prince Edward Island , Nova Scotia , Alberta

and B r i t i sh Columb ia ) , in othe r s , membe rs of the trade unions affected

(Quebec) or either one or the other (New Brunswick) . Except for New Brunswick

the maj ority of those voting decide the issue. In New Brunswick the maj ority

pr i nc iple appli e s to the employee s in the un i t regardless of the vot i ng

constituency .

Lcckoot votes are also required in some j urisdictions , where more than
.
one employer make up the employer barga i n i ng unit. these j u r i sd i c t i ons

i nc l ud e N e w B ru n s w i c k , Albe r t a , B r i t i sh Colum b i a and S as k a tc h ew an

(construction industry only) •

Should a vote support strike or lcckout action the parties are required ,

in add i ti on , in some j ur i sd i c t i ons , to give noti ce of i ntent to s t r i k e or

lcckoot. This provision is present in New Brunsw ick , Nova Scotia, Alberta and

British Columbia and the notice peria:l varies between one to three days.

4. Labour Relations Boards

Eve ry act provides for an adm in i s t rative body to adm i n i ster the

leg i slation . Th i s body is known as the labour relat i ons or i ndust r i al

 - 40 -

relati ons board . Quebec abol i shed its labou r relations board in 1 9 6 9 ,

establishing in its place a Labour C01rt and administrative machinery within

the Department of Labour and Manpcwer .

I n the smaller prov i nces labour relations boards are part-time and

tr i pa r t i te compr i s i ng repr esentati ves of labou r , m anagement and a neutral

chai rman. The federal j urisdiction provides for a full-time bcdy and is the

only j ur i sd i ction in w h i ch all of i ts members i nclud ing the chai rman are

neutral .

LabOJr relations boards or thei r equivalent are involved in a var iety of

matters concerning collective bargaining and union-management relations. The

boards in Alberta and Man i toba have , i n add i t i on , respon s ib i l i ty in the

labou r standards area such as m i n i mum w ages , hou r s of w ork , equal pay and

industrial standards.

Dec i s i ons of boards are gener ally f i na l . Appeals can b e made to the

courts but only on matters related to the j urisdiction of a board or whether a

board has acted illegally .

The maj or respon s i b i l i ties of labour relat i ons boards include the

a c qu i s i t i on and t r a n s f e r of b a r ga i n i ng r i gh t s , c e r t i f i c a t i on and

decertification of bargaining agents , determination of appropriate bargaining

units , dete r m ination of whether there has been a failure to bargain as

required by the Act , and determination and control of unfair labour practices.

S ome boards (for example Ontar i o and B r i t i sh Columb ia) under ce rtain

c i rcumstances , arb i trate collect i ve agreement disp..ites and some boards can

impose first agreements on the parties .

Although boards possess w ide statutory pow e r s to remedy violation of

collective bargaining legislation , their maj or difference from the courts , is

their accomcdative function. Boards will first try to cbtain a settlement of

a d i spute or confl i ct before proceeding to apply remed i e s . I ndeed , most

 - 41 -

conflicts that cane to the boards are settled in this accamncdative manner .

v. The Collective Bargaining Prcx:: ess

(a) The Collective Agreement

The negoti at i on and the sign i ng of a collecti ve agr eement between

management and labour is the principal end cbj ective of the labour movement.

It is the maj or raison d ' etre for its existence .

The collective agreement is a document regulating the relations between

the employer and his employees on most matters affecting conditions of work.

Agreements are co- si gned by both par t i es and gover n the i r relations for

per iod s ranging from one to five years or mor e . The m i n i mum term of

agreements is one year . There i s no set m aximum term , the te rm of the

agreement be i ng dependent on the outcome of the negot i a t i ons between the

parties .

Most collective agreements run for two years with a number having a three

year term and smaller numbers running four or five years .

Terms of agreement s va ry depend ing on a range of factors. Long-term

agreements are advantageous to both parties s i nce they ensure peace and

stability in the relationship and result in savings in time and money that are

incurred by frequent negotiations and possible strikes and lcx::kouts.

Short-term agreements have the advantage of ensu r ing that w ages and

working conditions do not get out of line with those prevailing elsewhere in

the community, in competing companies or in the country as a whole. This is

particularly important in times of rapid inflati on and this explains why

short-term agreements pred om inated dur ing much of the 19 7 0 s , compared to

earlier pericds .

There is no typical si ze of an agreement. Agreements can vary from two

or three pages to several hundred. Some agreements simply state that current

w ages and work i ng cond i t i ons in the uni t cove red by the agreement w i ll be
 - 42 -

changed by a certain amount and the new w ages and w or k i ng cond i ti ons w i ll

remain in force for the duration of that agreement .

At the other extreme are agreements that spell out in meticulous detail

the wage rates of each occupation , the conditions of work including hours of

wor k , pens i ons , vacations , group insu.r ance , paid holidays , sen i o r i ty

a r r angements , handl ing of gr i evance s and the hundr eds of other i tems that

determine the working conditions and relations between the parties .

The range of items that may be found in collective agreements is so vast

that it wou ld take m any pages to l i st them all . A recent analys i s by the

Canada Depar tm ent of Labour summar i zes the mos t important i tems typ i cally

found in agreements. The list includes some 1 6 4 i terns clas s i f ied under 26

main head ings . 'rhe most prevalent items are those deal i ng w i th w ages and

cond i tions of work. These are the most l i kely prov i s i ons to be found i n

collecti ve agreements . But typica l agreements now cont a i n a var iety of

clauses once considered the exclusive preserve of management. These include

restr ictions on management' s right to contract a.it work , rules governing the

hiring, classification , promotion , transfer , lay off , discipline and discharge

of employee s and matters related to the schedul i ng of work and the

introJ.uction of new methoJ.s and machines .

There are no formal or legal rules governing the issues that are subj ect

to barga in i ng , except in certain publ i c sector bargaining i n w hich the law

limits the issues that can be negotiated and included in an agreement. In all

other s i tuati ons , what i s di scussed depends on what the union wants i n the

agreement , the power of the union to back up its demands , the receptiveness of

management to these demands and the power and influence management can w ield

to resist discussions of them. Traditionally, unions have had little interest

in becoming involved in management functions for fear of compromising their

rol e . H ow e ve r , they w i ll not hes i tate to negot i ate on those management

 - 43 -

functions that are perceived to threaten the wages and working conditions of

the ir members. Substanti al inroads have been made on these functions during

the past 2 0 years and further inroads can be expected in the future reflecting

the increasing complexity and interrelationship of the employment function and

the management of t�e enterprise.

To slow the pace of this encroachment , most collective agreements contain

a management rights clause. There are various types of these clauses. Some

spell out management rights. A typical clause of this sort is one that states

that management has the exclu s i ve right to m anage the bus i ness , control

prcrluction and maintain order and efficiency. Such clauses may go further and

spell out what this means , for example to determine the number and location of

plants , the produc t s to be produced , the methods of manufac tu r i ng , the

schedules of prcrluction , the machines and tools to be used and the processes

of manufacturing and assembling. Still further , these clauses may spell out

spec i f i c management ri ghts conce rning the employment funct i on such as the

righ t to d i sc ipl i ne or d i scharge for j ust cause , to transfer ; promote and

demote and to h i re , classify and lay off employees , providing these r i ghts

have not already been reli nqu i shed by spec if i c clauses elsewhe r e i n the

agreement. In many collective agreements management rights clauses may simply

state that managements' rights are subject to provisions of the agreement , or

that management exercises all rights that are not specifically taken away by

the agreement.

Which type o� clause provides the best protection for management remains

a moot point. N e i ther the dec i s ions of arb i t rators nor the courts have

entirely settled the issue. One interpretation of these clauses follows the

"residual rights" theory, to the effect that all rights remain with management

except those taken away by the collective agreement. Another interpretation

is that the agreement represents an understanding that all issues affecting

 - 44 -

the employment relat i onship are subj ect to negot iation or challenge even

though there may not be a specific clause on the issue. Thus , even though the

agreement itself may be silent on a particular employment matter , it could be

held that this is not an exclusive management prerogative. To protect against

thi s i nterpretat i on an incr eas i ng numbe r of agreements provide a detailed

wording of the management rights clause as in the example above.

In the end , however , it is really not the clause itself that is important

but the qua l i ty of the labou r-management relat i onsh ip. I n mature , stable

relationships what may appear to be union encroachment is real ly a mutual

acceptance on the part of both parties that these matter s should be j oi ntly

determined. Both sides have an equally important stake in how a particular

function is administered. Management may see particular benefits in including

the union in decisions involving its labour �orce .

(b) The Negotiation Process

Negotiating a collective agreement can take anywhere from a few days to

two or three yea r s . The latter are rare but neve rtheless have occu r red

especially in some plblic sector negotiations.

The length of negotiations depends on many factors including the number

of i ssues to be settled , the m i l i tancy of the union , the feel ings of the

employees , public opinion , the economic position of the company, the kind of

c o l l ec t i ve ag r e e m e n t s be i n g s i gned e l s e w he r e , the w i l l i ngne s s ( o r

unwillingness) of the union, the wor�ers and the company to strike or lockout

and the length of time involved i n sat i s fying legal requ i rements for

conciliation .

The negot iation process has been l i kened to a poke r game whe r e bluffs ,

counter bluffs, eye movements , baJ.y gestures , words used in the conversation

all car ry mean i ng as one s ide or the othe r attempts to get the upper hand .

The process also involves knowing when to assist your opponent out of corners
 - 45 -

in order to help him save face so that a mutually acceptable agreement can be

facilitated .

A var i ety of theor i e s have been developed to expla i n the negot iation

process and its culmination in a collective agreement. But the nature of the

process i s such that no theory i s capable of pinpo i n t i ng the point of

agreement. There are j us t too many constantly changing factors to b e

accommodated i n a theoretica l explanation . S i mple changes in the external

e nv i r onment , in the negoti at ing pe rsonnel or in the company' s fortunes are

imponderables t.�at do not lend themeselves to easy quantification or predicted

outcanes .

The negoti at i on process begins w i th a not i ce by e i th e r s ide , but most

often by the union, of intent to negotiate a new agreement. Most legislation

requ i r e that a reasonab le notice pe r i od be given ( for example 3 0 to 9 0 days

before termination of the old agreement) . The usual practice in larger more

mature relationships where the issues to be negotiated are habitually numerous

and complex is for long noti ce pe r i od s . I n these cases i t i s not unusual to

f i nd the par t i es beg i nn i ng the i r negotiations many months before the

termination date of the old agreement. The timing gives both par t i e s an

opportunity to d i scus s fully the i tems on the bargai ning table and to reach

agreement on them before the expiry date.

The termination date of the old agreement is one date the parties try to

meet in negotiating a new agreement. A more important date is the strike or

lock01t deadline. Once the legal requirements have been met , the parties are

free to set a date for a s t r i ke or a lockout anyti me after the term ination

date of the agreement. The threat of a work stoppage is a strong catalyst

that produce s agreements , s i nce both par ti e s , in most case s , want to avoid

th i s extreme econom ic act i on . These ar e the s i tu at i ons that produce the

eleventh hour agreements in the small hours of the morning that we often read
 - 46 -

about in the newspapers.

Although it is the negotiation process between the parties that grabs the

headlines in the media , there are often much more difficult negotiations that

go on w ithin the organi zations of t.J-ie two sides to formulate the demands and

positions that they will take at the bargaining table .

On the management s ide , dependi ng on the s i z e , scope and natu re of the

canpany, the formulation of demands or responses to union demands may involve

the personnel department , the labour relations specialist , line managers (for

example , the plant manager) , foremen and other supervisory personnel , the top

execut i ve s of the company and , i n the case pf multi-nati onal compan i es ,

personnel from headquarters of the parent company. Each level or category of

management has its own position on a particular union demand or its own demand

• that it wa.ild like presented at the bargaining table. The vice-president of

finance w ill be concerned about costs , foremen w ill be concerned about thei r

r i ghts i n w or k schedu l i ng , the parent company located in , say , N e w York , may

want to ensure uniformity of particular clauses across the company, and the

personnel department and various others will be alerted to correcting prcblems

that emerged between the parties during the term of the previous agreement.

All of these different , sometimes conflicting , sometimes imposs ible i ssues

(for example , negotiating a pension clause based on U.S. law ) must be sifted ,

co-ordinated and brought together into a meaningful package which can be used

by the management negotiators in their sessions w ith the unions. The prcblem

of organiz ing this package to sati sfy the varied needs and requirements of not

only the different levels of the company but also different individuals is no

mean feat and often requ i res as much tact , sk i ll and d iplomacy as does the

actual negoti ations with the union.

The s i tuation w i thi n a uni on can even be m.o re d i f f icu l t . O n the

management side , if an impasse develops within the company over the management
 - 47 -

package , the company president can quickly resolve the matter. The union , on

the other hand , is a democratic organi zation and this is not always conducive

to quick resolutions of prcblems .

In most unions , demands are formulated at the local union level mainly by

a conference , general meeting or some other arrangement involving the local

membe r s . Union headquarters may request the local to include par t i cular

demands that are being negotiated union-wide. In other unions the process of

formulating demands may involve more than one local and indeed may involve all

the locals of the union . These s i tuations a r e common whe re b ar gain i ng

involves a pattern-settipg company for the industry (for example, the United

Auto Workers and one of the big three auto companies) , area-wide bargaining as

in West Coast p.ilp and paper and industry-wide bargaining as in the railways.

I n a few cases uni on demands may originate f rom the U.S . Canad i an locals

would be included in the process but would be outnumbered by thei r American

b r e t h r e n w h en i t c a m e to a f i na l dec i s i on on the l i s t of d e m a nd s .

Negoti at i ons i n the auto or can manufactu r i ng industries may be of th i s

character reflecting the North Ame r ican market for the products of these

indust r i e s . I n these latter multi -local s itua t i ons , how eve r , the union

bargaining package will invariably include locally-oriented issues reflecting

the needs and requ i r ements at the plant level . The latter a r e essenti al to

satisfy the local membership for , if they are not included , there is a danger

that the resulting agreement will not be ratified by the local rank and file.

Th i s i s not the end of the story. The union demands must also reflect

the var iety of issues of par t i cular conce rns to d i ffe rent segments of the

union mem be r ship. For example , older w or k e rs w i ll want prov i s i ons that

empha s i z e pen s i ons , younge r workers would prefer to see demands focus on

wages , low seniority workers will be interested in j cb security provisions and

skilled workers will want to ensure that the wage differential between them
 - 48 -

and unsk illed workers is w idened or at least not narrowed. These conflicting

claims are not easily resolved. Collective bargaining history is replete w ith

examples of revolts on the part of particular groups of workers whose demands

have not been m e t . Well- known examples o f such revolts a r e t h e sk illed

workers in industrial-type unions. These workers , being outnumbered by their

unsk illed and semi-skilled brethren , often find themselves forced to accept

agreements not to their liking. In time , their accumulated grievances have

resulted in their refusal to accept agreements ratified by the majority of the

membership. Given their key position in the production process they are able

to take effecti ve s t r i k e act i on and close down ope r at i ons forc i ng both
j
'

employe r and union to recogn i ze the i r special s i tuati on and to develop

solu t i ons s u i ted to the i r need s . The Uni ted Auto Wor k e r s and the Uni ted

Steelworkers are gocd examples of industrial unions plagued by this problem.

Once the par t i e s have formulated the i r pos i t i on and demands , ser i otls

negoti ations begin between them. At this point , an important question is who

hand les the barga i n i n g . Thi s i s less a problem for the uni on than for

management . Depend i ng on the scope and structu re of the bargaining

relationship, representatives from the union side are the local union officers

often assisted by a specialist from union headquarters. In larger bargaining

s i tuat i ons or key barga i i ng s i tuat i ons , the national or international union

president , or other high-ranking officers , may be involved. The negotiators

on the uni on s ide can be expected to be h i ghly exper i enced or s k i lled in the

art of negotiation since it is their livelihocd. Unless management is well

represented it stands to lose cons ide rably. A poor management negot i ator ,

face- to-face w i th expe r ienced and s k i lled union negotiators , cannot only

qu ickly undo the w ork , energy and expense that went into develop i ng the

manage�ent pos i ti on , but can also be very costly in terms of allow ing the

union to make unforeseen gains at the bargaining table .

 - 49 -

In the larger companies negotiators come from the personnel or industrial

relations department generally with the assistance of other staff departments,

for example , finance , or certain line management. Employer organi zations may

provide the expertise on behalf of a member company. Smaller companies that

do not belong to an employer organi zat ion that provides thi s service are

usually well advi sed to obtain the services of specialists such as labou r

relations lawye r s or consultants who spec i a l i ze in labour-management

negotiations .

(c } The Administration of the Agreement

The signing of a collective agreement does not signal the end of union­

m anagement negotiations or d i scuss i ons until the next round of collective

barga i n i ng one , two , three or more years down the road , depend i ng on the

expiry date of the agreement.

Even the most carefully-worded agreement cannot cover all the possible

situations that may arise in the employment relationship; and many agreements

having been signed under the pressure of a deadline are far from this ideal.

Many clauses are the result of compromises made during the final stages of the

bargaining pro::::e ss. Further , clauses may be J?OOrly-worded in an effort to get

the agreement signed before a strike or 1o::::kout deadline. Other clauses may

be purpos e ly vaguely-worded to cover new areas in which the r e i s l i ttle

experience to deal with the particular issues at hand. And still others may

s imply prov ide for a mechani s m for the two parties to continue d i scussing

particular i s sues after the agreement has been signed. The result i s a

continuous day-to-day relationship between the parties to make the agreement

w or k . The most important d imension of thi s continu i ng relationshi p i s the

procedures for resolving problems that a r i se out of the inte rpr etation and

application of the agreement .

 - 50 -

Management daily initiates actions that will inevitably confl ict with the

agreement . For example , a foreman may promote one employee when another feels

he should have · been promoted accord ing to the terms of the agreement .

Management may assign an employee to some work wi thout a change in pay which

the union believes calls for a higher rate of pay . Certain employees may be

denied a paid hol iday to which they believe they are entitled . The examples

are endless . In most cases these actions are taken in ignorance of the

agreement . Not all managers read the agreement and even the personnel

department may not be fully conversant with all the clauses and the i r nuances .

In other instances changing conditions call for new methods and management may

be forced to undertake an action in confl ict with the agreement . In still

other instances , either party may deliberately do something to test or clar i fy

the meaning of a particular clause in the agreement .

To meet these day-to-day s i tuations , most agreements provide for a

grievance procedure with arbi tration by an impart ial outside arbitrator or

arbitration tribunal as the f inal step . In all j urisdictions , the parties

cannot strike or lockout over matters ari sing out of the application and

interpretation of the collective agreement . Arbitration must be provided for

in the resolution of impasses . In the view of some observers , the grievance

procedure represents the most important clause in the agreement . A well-run

grievance procedure ensures the orderly and j ust processing and resolution of

comp l a i nts and other d i fferences between the par t ies. It ensures , for

example, that enployees recei ve a fai r hear ing of their grievances right on

up to an impartial outside arbitrator, that management wi l l not suffer work

stoppages in protest over its act i ons , that the r i ghts of al l three

parties, the employee, the ccrnpany, and the union, are protected and that the

three parties have a channel of corrnu

n nication for the airing of thei r day-to­
day prob lems.
 - 51 -

There are many types of grievance procedures . Some are informal in which

the parties attempt to resolve problems orally at whatever level of management

a particular issue can be hendled . Most procedures , particularly in the

larger companies , provide for formal steps with time limits between each step •

. .

Three or four steps may be provided for in these procedures with both the

gr ievance and the response recorded .

In a typical grievance procedure , an aggrieved employee may bring his

problem directly to his irrmediate supervisor or to his uni on steward . The

latter is an employee elected by the union membership in the plant to

represent employees in the administration of the agreement and related

matters . Most grievances are generally settled quickly and informally between

the employee or his steward and the supervisor . However , i f a grievance is

not solved to the satisfaction of the employee , and the union steward believes

there is a legitimate case , a formal complaint in wr i ting would be lodged and

the grievance processed to the next stage .

Thi s step may be the next level of supervision and the procedure may

involve a formal meeting between management , the union steward or officer from

the uni on local , and the employee . If still not resolved , a third step may

involve the company ' s top management and an officer fran union headquarters .

At each step of the procedure , the parties are usually free to call in outside

expertise especially if the particular problem involves a technical matter .

Seven to fourteen days are usually allowed between steps .

If settlement is still not reached , the case then goes to f inal and

binding arbitration . Arbitration may be handled by a single arbi trator who

may or may not be named in the agreement or by an arbitration tr ibunal

comprising a representative of the union , a representative of management and

an impartial chairman selected by the parties . Should the parties not be able
to agree upon an arbitrator the Minister of Labour or the labour relations
 - 52 -

board will name a person .

Experience has shown that only a very small fraction of grievances

actually reach arbitration. Experience has also shown arbitration to be a

bottleneck in many s ituations because of the time i t takes to appoint the

. .

arbitrator , set the date for the hear ings and present all the evidence . Most

arbitrators are part-time , for example , they may be lawyers , professors or

other professionally recogni zed persons doing arbi tration as a s ideline .

Since the parties tend to use the same arbitrator for thei r cases , scheduling

of hearings within a reasonable timeframe becomes difficult . I f the number of

grievances going to arbitration i s large , the ensuing log j am may threaten the

whole gr ievance procedure and ser iously undermine the collective bargaining

relationship.

The potential for overloading of the procedure ex ists in a climate of

poor labour-manangement relations . Given the nature of the collective

agreement , it is a fairly easy matter for either party to flood the system and

prevent i t from operating effectively and efficiently . The need for a good

labour-management relationship i s as important as a well-organized and well-

structured grievance procedure i f the mechani sm is to work. One is not a

substi tute for the other .

Apart from thi s , overloading of the procedure can result from poorly-

worded collective agreements that lend themselves to challenge at virtually

every turn , from rapid economic and social change that forces the company

unintentionally to take actions that are in conflict with the agreement or

from newly established labour-management relationships where there is little

exper ience to assist the parties in administer ing the agreement . To meet the

problem of overloading some j urisdictions have introduced measures to enable

the parties to speed up the arbitration process . Ontario , for example , at the
request of either party , now provides for the establi shment of arbitration to
 - 53 -

hear and reply to cases within a specified period . This expedited procedure

is particularly important in cases of discharge and related cases of harsh

discipline where swift attention to the matter is essent ial for continued

harmonious relations between the parties .

Both the law and court decisions have given the arbitration function

considerable power and freedom. The substance or content of arbitration

decisions cannot be appealed to the courts except under certain stringent

circumstances . For example , an appeal could be entertained i f i t could be

shown that an arbitrator went beyond the terms of his reference or did not

provide a fair hearing of the d i spute . Arbi trators can apply remedies , assess

and award damages and change or modify an action . The latter has become a

particularly thorny i ssue in discharge cases . In these cases arbi trators have

not hesitated to impose their own j udgment on the severi ty of the penalty .

Discharge i s the ultimate di scipline weapon and its sometime capr icous use by

certain employers has · resulted in arbi trators departing from the strict

language of the contract to make thei r award . I f in the opinion of an

arbitrator a particular discharge is unwarranted he can reinstate the employee

wi th damages for loss of pay or change the penalty to s imple suspension wi th

or without pay or with or wihout continuation of benefits . Decisions of

arbitrators can become orders of the court and therefore legally enforceable .

During the last 10 or 1 5 years , in some Canadian j ur i sdictions there has

been some loosening of the legal requirement to settle r ights disputes by

arbitration . For example , under certa in circumstances in some j ur i sdictions

for example , the federal , the union may negotiate the effects of technolog ical

change introduced during the term of the agreement . I f a settlement is not

reached , str ike or lockout action can be taken provided that the parties have

met the legal requirements for concil iation . Similarly , the parties may
introduce "re-opener" clauses into the agreement . These clauses allow the
 - 54 -

parties to re-negotiate an issue dur ing the term of the agreement wi th the

right to strike or lockout under certain circumstances , subject to the usual

concil iation requirements . A corrmon example i s the wage re-opener clause .

Such a clause provides the parties with the right to re-negotiate wages dur ing

the term of the agreement . These clauses are important in per iods of rapidly

r i sing wages and allows the parties to sign a long-term agreement on other

issues but gives them the flex ibility of dealing with the wage issue at

regular intervals . Usually the parties have to observe a per iod of one year

before these re-opener clauses becane operational .

VI Union-Management Relati ons in the l?ublic Sector

(a) Introduction

The preceding sections of th is chapter discussed in the main , union-

management relations in the private sector . Collective bargaining for certain

public sector workers such as municipal workers , pol ice and firefighters is as

old as collective bargaining in the private sector . Except for Saskatchewan

the extension of bargaining rights to other publ ic sectors including the civil

service and certain sectors of education and health care did not occur until

the 1960s . Saskatchewan granted bargaining rights to all workers , public and

pr ivate sector alike , in 1944 .

Ontario granted its civil servants bargaining rights but not strike

rights in 1962 and Quebec followed in 1965 giving both bargaining and strike

rights to all public sector workers . The landmark legislation on thi s

continent is generally considered to be the Public Service Staff Relat ions Act

(PSSRA) of 1967 giving federal civil servants both bargaining and strike

rights . Other provinces quickly followed and by 1973 all political

jurisdictions in Canada had legislation giving their civil servants bargaining

rights . Only some , (New Brunswick , Newfoundland and Bri tish Columbia in
addi tion to Saskatchewan , Quebec and Federal ) give their employees strike
 - 55 -

rights as well . The others provide arbitration for the settlement of

impasses . Only British Columbia gives the government the right to lockout .

In a l l other jur i sdictions this r ight i s not ava i l able to governments. In the

U.S., strike rights are not ava i l able to most publ ic sector workers including

civ i l servants at the federal level and most states. Col lective bargaining

rights in these situations are available but often in a restricted form.

As in private sector legislation , public sector acts in Canada provide

for the certification of bargaining units , mandatory conciliation procedures

before strike r ights are acquired ( in those j ur i sdictions which provide for

these rights) , l.i stings of unfair labour practices which are illegal under the

acts , prohibition of strikes during the term of the agreement , and provision

of machinery to administer the legislation . These are major legislative

similari t ies between the two sectors . However , differences are much more

important and interesting . Maj or leg islative differences between the publ ic

and private sectors are discussed in the next section followed by a bri ef

discussion of non-legislative differences .

(b) Legislative Differences

(i) Coverage o f the legislation

In some jurisdictions , one public sector act covers all public sector

workers , other than those covered by the pr ivate sector act . At the Federal

level , the Canada Labour Code applies to the pr ivate sector plus certain crown

canpanies such as Canada Post , CNR and Air Canada . The Public Service Staff

Relations Act covers civil servants and other public sector snployees . In

other j ur i sdictions , there are several public sector acts . Ontar io is an

extreme example with separate acts for pol ice , firefighters , civil servants ,

teachers and hospitals . At the other extreme i s Quebec where the Labour Code

applies equally to all workers public and pr ivate al ike . However , special
prov isions within the Code apply to different categories of worker ' s including
 - 56 -

certain categor ies of public sector workers as well as certain categori es of

private sector workers such as construction workers .

( i i ) Certi fication of Bargaining Units

Unlike the private sector , most public sector acts pre-determine these

uni ts in the legislation . For example the Federal and New Brunswick statutes

provide that bargaining units must be determined along occupational lines .

Thus separate bargaining uni ts must be formed to represent clerical employees ,

administrative employees , secretaries , economists , etc . In the federal

j urisdict ion there are more than 100 bargaining units each representing a

di fferent occupational . group .

Ontario and other j urisdictions provide for a small number of very broad

province-wide bargaining units for their civil servants . Some j urisdict ions

for example , Ontario and Alberta also grant statutory recogni tion to the

association or union representing civil servants , that i s the association to

which civil servants must belong is named in the statute . In other respects ,

certi fication procedures in the public sector in the various j urisdictions

parallel those in the private sector .

( iii) Strike Rights

As already noted strike r ights are available to some public sector

workers but not to others . These rights are not found consistently. For

example , in Ontari o , civil servants do not have strike rights but teachers

do . In British Columbia the reverse is found .

Where str ike rights are available thi rd party intervention procedures

( conciliation , mediation , fact finding) must be observed as in the private

sector before these rights can be exercised . However , these procedures are

applied much more rigidly in the public than in the pr ivate sector . Strike

rights in the public sector are subject to other restraints as well . Publ ic
sector acts usually designate certain employees in bargaining units that have
 - 57 -

strike r ights to remain on the j ob during a str ike . Thi s ensures continuation

of emergency and essential services while a strike is in progress . In some

j urisdictions , for example the federal , designated employees are a matter of

negotiations between the parties , in others , designated employees are

determined uni laterally by the government and in still others , as in Quebec ,

the affected union determines who will stay behind on the job in the event of

a str ike . Further dimunition of str ike rights i s also found in special acts .

For example , in British Columbia most publ ic sector workers are subject to the

Essential Services Disputes Act which provides for government intervention in

a str ike should Cabinet feel there is an emergency .

( iv) Choice of Procedures

In two j urisdictions , the Federal and New Brunswick , the leg islation

provides public sector workers str ike r ights in a novel manner . In both

j urisdictions , bargaining uni ts have a choice of electing to strike or going

to arbitration to settle the i r impasses . Thi s cho ice is not avai lable to

government , which must abide by the wishes of their employees on this matter .

Further , bargaining uni ts can change thei r choice . For example in the Federal

jur isdict ion bargaining uni ts make thei r choice before the comnencement of

bargaining for a new collective agreement. I f arbitration i s selected , then

strike r ights are renounced for that set of negotiations . If an impasse

develops , either party may request arbitration . The award of the arbitration

tribunal i s final and binding . In the next round of bargaining the bargaining

unit may request that bargaining be conducted in the str ike route . In thi s

route th e bargaining uni t has the right t o strike to back up its demands

provided the impasse has been first considered by a conciliation board .

(v) Scope of Bargaining

Most publ ic sector acts put restrictions on bargainable i tems . For

example under the PSSRA pensions is not a bargainable item nor are matter s
 - 58 -

related to certain personnel functions such as hiring , promotions ,

classification and layoffs . Similar restrictions are found in the provincial

j urisdictions . Under private sector legislation , there are no such

restrictions ; the parties are free to bargain over and to include in thei r

agr�ements any matter o r issue o f concern t o them.

(vi) Wage Setting

A characteristic feature of the PSSRA and of other publ ic sector acts i s

the l i sting of cri teria for wage setting purposes . The PSSRA, for example ,

sets down five cri teria which are to be taken into account in determining the

level of wage and salary increases . These include wages for canparable

categories or occupations in outside sectors , internal wage relativities , the

needs of the public service , wages that are considered fai r for the work to be

done and the qual i fications required , and any other factor that appears

relevant in the particular dispute . Similar cri teria are found in other public

sector legislation . Recently in some j ur isdictions cr i teria related to the

goverrnnent ' s fi scal position and goverrnnent econanic policy have been added to

the list . Criteri a have thei r major impact in arbitration where i t is usually

incumbent upon arbitrators to adhere to them in making their awards .

(vi i ) Administrative Machinery

As in private sector legislation , publ ic sector acts provide for the

establishment of boards or other similar arrangements to administer the

legislati on . The PSSRA , for example , provides for the establishment of the

Public Service Staff Relations Board , an independent agency reporting directly

to Parliament .

In some j ur isdictions , the pr ivate sector labour relations board i s given

the function of administering public sector legislation .

The boards have functions similar to those in the pr ivate sector . In

addition , they generally handle the administration of the conc i liat ion ,
 - 59 -

mediation and arbitration machinery, a matter left to Mini sters of Labour in

the private sector . Quebec and Saskatchewan are important exceptions . There ,

the Ministers of Labour administer these procedures in the public as well as

in the private sector .

(c) Non-Legi slative Differences

Although the general obj �tives and nature of labour relations in private

and public sectors are generally similar there are important differences that

are worth noting .

First , unions in the publ ic sector are dominated by whi te collar workers

as opposed to blue collar in the private sector . Only a small fraction of

whi te collar workers in the private sector are organized . Thi s has

implications among other things for str ike proneness , which tends to be less

in the publ ic sector , and the nature of bargaining demands , which tends to be

of a higher order in the public than in the private sector . For example

demands in the publ ic sector reflect the unique needs of professio�al workers

- teaching and nursing loads , attendance at conventions , f inancing of

research , etc . Monetary issues are important but relatively less so compared

to bargaining in the private sector .

Second , almost all public sector workers , which have the protection of

the legislation for purposes of collective bargaining , have in fact joined

unions for that purpose . In contrast , i n the pr ivate sector , large chunks of

workers such as those in trade , banking and insurance have yet to exercise

thei r r ights in this respect .

Thi rd , management in the public sector i s more diverse than in the

private sector . In hospital , teacher and municipal collective bargaining , in

particular , it is often d ifficult to know who , on the management s ide has

final decision-making authority . In large part thi s is because the real

decisions often lie with the various responsible provincial minis tr ie$ who
 - 60 -

control the purse str ings . The result is often a type of bargaining not found

in the pr ivate sector . Thus , terms such as ''multi lateral " bargaining

11phantan11 bargaining or " end runs" have emerged in the lexicon to describe

bargaining taking place simultaneously on several fronts . For example while

the union bargaining team may be going through the motions with the employer

team, it is also bargaining with the responsible provincial ministry, the

provincial minister , relevant MPPs , mayor or aldermen in order to change the

employer ' s position or to loosen the purse string to allow the employer to

accede to union demands . In an increasing number of provinces , governments

are now including their own officials on the employer hospital or education

bargaining team, reflecting a recognition of their financial involvement in

final settlements .

Fourth , most unions in the public sector are national or "home grown" ,

whereas in the private sector international unions comnand the major i ty of

union members .

Fifth , most publ ic sector unions have not joined one of the central

federations . These unions , in particular those representing nurses , teachers

and other professional workers , have chosen vol untari l y to remain outside

the ma i ns tream l abour movement in th i s country. In cer t a i n cases the

legislation prevents aff i l iation with the central federations. This is the

s i tuation in most j urisdicti ons with respect to pol ice and fire-fighters.

These are just some of the major differences between the two sectors .

Recent developnents highlight another , and perhaps , the most important

di fference , the lawmkaing powers of the government employer . What the

government as employer cannot achieve , the government as lawmaker (perhaps}

can . For example , in recent years governments have found or felt themselves

relatively powerless to control the rate of wage increase won by their

employees through collective bargaining . To sl9w thi s rate both federal and
 - 61 -

provincial goverrnnents have passed restraint legislation temporar ily lim i ting

bargaining and str ike r ights and imposing wage ceilings on civil servants and

other public sector workers . The legislation has been reasonably successful

in keeping wage increases under control but its future is in doubt . The

labour movement i s challenging the legislation , particularly those sections

that restrict barga ining and strike rights on the grounds , that they are in

conf l ict with the new Charter of Rights. A successful resul t not only would

reduce goverrnnents' powers to tamper with the r ights of their employees but

a l so could conceivabl y force legis lative changes to put pub l ic sector workers

bargaining and strike rights on a footing approaching that of the pri vate

sector. Recent court decisions in Ontario point in this direction.

VI I Conclusion

This chapter has reviewd the union-management relations system and

collective bargaining in thi s country. Experts generally agree that it is not

the bes t sys tem �or the res o l uti on of conf 1 i c t between l abour and

management. But g i ven the nature of our free m i xed enterpr i s e economy we

would be hard-pressed to find a better system. Thi s does not mean we cannot

improve it. We have and have now brought i t to the point where there

is cons iderab l e agreement tha t i t represents an impo r tant examp l e of

s ucces s fu l indust r i a l r e l a t i ons. The system g i ves the par t i es the

opportunity to resol ve major differences once every one , two, three or more

years wi th the fu l 1 use of the i r econom i c power o r the use o f a thi rd par ty

neutral . Once an agreement has been signed , the system then prov ides for the

f l exible, peaceful and equitable hand l i ng o f d i f ferences thereby reduc i ng

indus t r i a l conf l i ct. I t has fac i l i tated , gener a l l y , the management

function whi le at the same time ensuri ng an effecti ve and orderl y outl et

for emp l oyee d i s sa t i s fact i on and frustrat i on , wh i ch otherw i s e cou l d

adversel y affect output and productivity.
 - 62 -

References

Anderson , J. and M. Gunderson , eds . , Union-Management Relati ons in Canada ,

Addi son-Wesley, Don Mills , Canada , 198 2 .

Arthurs , H .W. , D . D . Carter and J . J . Glasbeek , Canada , i n Internati onal

Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industr ial Relations , Kluwer , The Netherlands ,
-- --

Vol ume 3 , 1980:-

Craig , Alton , W. J . , The System of Industrial Relations in Canada , Prentice­

Hall inc . , Scarborough , Ontario , 1983.

Cr ispo , John , The Canadian Industrial Relations System, McGraw-Hi l l Ryerson ,

Ltd . , Toronto , i978 .

Hameed , S .M . A . ed . , Canadian Industrial Relations : A Book of Readings ,

Butterworth and Co . , Toronto , 1 9 7 5 .

Government of Ontar io , The Labour Relations Act . , Office Consolidation , 1979 .

Industr ial Relations Research Association , Public Sector Collective

Bargaining , ed s . Aaron , B . , James L . Stern and Joseph R. Grodin , Mad i son ,
Wise . , 1979 .

Jain , H . C . , ed . , Canadian Labour and Industrial Relations : Public and Private

Sectors , McGraw-Hill Ryerson , Toronto , 1 97 5 .

Jamieson , s . , Industrial Relations in Canada , Macmillan o f Canada , 1973 .

Labour Canada , Coding Manual for the Analysi s of Co l lective Agreanents , May
1979 .

------- ' Directory of Labour Organi zations in Canada , Annual .

Miller , Richard and Fraser Isbester , eds . , Canadian Labour in Transition ,

Prentice-Hall of Canada , Scarborough , Ontario , 1971 .

Minister of Supply and . Services , Canada Labour Code , Part y_, Office
Consol idation , May 1981 .

Peach , David A. and David Kuechle , The Practice of Industrial Relations ,

--
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd . , Toronto , 1975 .

Stati stics Canada , Corporations and Labour Union Returns Act , Catalogue 71-202
Annual and 71-202S , various yearS:-

Wood , W . D . and P . Kumar , eds . , The Current Industr ial Relations Scene in
Canada , Industrial Relations Centre , Queen ' s Univers i ty , Kingston , Annual .

Woods , H . D . , Labour Policy in Canada , MacMillan of Canada , Toronto , 197 3 .

- - , A .W.R. Carrothers , J . Cri spo and G . Dion , Canadian Industrial

Relations , Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations , Pr � vy Council Office ,
- - --

Government of Canada ,-r9°6�

ref
!
I

Faculty of Bus iness

McMas t er Univers i ty

WORKING. PAPER SERIES

101 . Torrance , George W . , "A Generalized Cos t-effectivenes s Mod el for the
Evaluation of Heal th Programs , " Novemb er , 1 9 ? 0 .

102 . Isbes t e r , A . Fras er and S andra C . Cas tle , " Teachers and Co llective
Bargaining in Ontario : A Means to What End ? " . November , 1 9 71 .

103 . Thomas , Arthur L . , "Trans fer Pri ces o f the Multinational Firm : When
Will They b e Arbi trary ? " (.Reprinted from : Abacus , Vol . 7 , No . 1 ,
June , 1 9 71) .

10 4 , S z endrovits , Andrew Z . , "An Economic Production Quanti ty Mo del wi th

Holding Time and Cos ts o f Wo rk-in-process Inven t o ry , " March , 1 9 7 4 .

111 . Basu , . S . , "Inves tment Performance of Common S t ocks in Relation to

their Price-earnings Ratios : A Text of the E f fi cien t Market
Hypo thesis , " March ," 1 9 7 5 .

112 . Trus co tt , William G . , "Some Dynami c Ext ens ions of a Dis crete Location­
Allocation Problem , " March , 1 9 7 6 .

113 . . Basu, S . and J . R . Hanna , "Accoun t ing for Changes in the General
.
Purchasing Power of Money : The Impact on Financial S ta t ements o f
Canadian Corp orations for the P eriod 196 7- 74 , " April 19 7 6 .
( Reprinted from Cos t and Mana gemen t , January- February , 1 9 7 6 ) .

114 . Dea l , K . R . , "Verification o f the Theoreti cal Consi s t ency o f a

Dif ferential Game in Advertising , " March, 1 9 7 6 .

114a. Deal , K . R . , " Op timizing Advertising Expendi tures in a Dynamic Duopoly , "
Mar ch , 1 9 7 6 .

115 . Adams , Roy J . , "The Canada-Uni ted S tates Labour Link Under S tres s , "
( 1976 ] .

116 . Thomas , Arthur L . , "The Ext ended Approach to Joint - Cos t Allocation :
Relaxation of Simplifying Ass ump tions , " June , 1 9 7 6 .

11 7 . Adams , Roy J . and C . H . Rummel , ''Worker ' s P articipation in Management

in Wes t Germany : Impact on the Work , the En t erpris e and the Trade
Unions , " Sep t emb er , 1 9 7 6 .

118 . Sz endrovi ts , Andrew z . , "A Comment on ' Op timal and Sys t em Myopic
Policies for Multi-echelon Produc tion/ Inventory As s emb ly Sys t ems ' , "
(1976 ] .

119 . Meadows , Ian S . G . , "Organic S truc ture and Innovation in Small Work
Groups , " October , 19 76 .

Continued on Page 2 . . .
 - 2 -

120. Basu, S . , "The Effect o f Earnings Yield on As s es sments o f the

Ass o ciation Between Annual Accounting Income Numb ers and Securi ty
Prices , " October , 1 9 7 6 .

121 . Agarwal , Naresh C . , "Labour Supply Behaviour o f Married Women - A

Model with P ermanent and Transitory Variables , " October , 19 7 6 .

12 2 . Meadows , Ian S . G . , " Organic S trui!ture , Satis faction and P ersonali ty , "
October , 1 9 7 6 .

12 3 . Ban t ing , P e ter M. , "Cus tomer S ervi ce in Indus trial Marketin g : A

Comparative .S tudy , " October , 19 7 6 . ( Reprint ed from : European
Journal of Marke ting , Vol . 10 , No . 3 , S ummer , 1 9 7 6 ) .

12 4 . Aivazian , V . , "On the Comparative-S tatics o f As s e t Demand , "

Augus t , 1 9 7 6 .

125 . · Aivazian , V . , " Contamination by .R:i,s k Recons idered , " October , 1 9 7 6 .

12 6 . Szend:rovits , Andrew z . and George 0 . Wes o lows ky , "Variation in

Optimizing Serial Mul ti-S tate Produc tion / Inventory S ys t ems ,
March , 1 9 7 7 .

12 7 . Agarwal , Naresh C . , " S i ze-S tructure Relati onship : A Further

Elaboration , " March , 1 9 7 7 .

128. .
Jain , Ha:rish C . , "Minority Workers , the S tructure o f Labour Markets
and Anti-Dis crimination Legis lation , " March , 1 9 7 7 .

12 9 . Adams , Roy J . , "Employer S o lidari ty , " March , 1 9 7 7 .

130 • . · Gould , �awrence L and S tanley N . Laiken , "The Effect o f Income

Taxation and Inves tment Priori ties : The RRSP , " March , 1 9 7 7 .

131 . Callen , Jef frey L . , "Financial Cos t Allocations : A Game-Theoretic

Approach , " March , 1 9 7 7 .

132 . Jain , Harish C . , "Race and Sex Dis crimination Legislati on in North
America and Britain : S ome Lessons for Canada , " May , 19 7 7 .

133 . Hayashi , Kichiro . " Corporate Planning Practi ces in Japanese

Mul tinationals . " Accep t ed for publicati on in the Academy o f
Management Journal in 19 7 8 .

134 . Jain , Harish C. , Neil Hood and Steve Youq.g , " Cross- Cul tural Aspects o f
Personnel Policies in Mul ti-Nationals : A Cas e S tudy o f Chrys ler UK" ,
June , 1 9 7 7 .

135 . Aivazian , V . and J . L . Callen , " Inves tment , Marke t S tructure and the
Co s t of Capi tal" , July , 1 9 1 7 .

Cont inued on Page 3 . • .

 - 3 -

13 6 . Adams , R. J . , " Canadian Indus trial Relations and the German Example " ,
O c t o b er , 1977 .

13 7 . Callen , J .L . , "Production , Efficiency and Welfare in the U . S . Natural

Gas Transmission Indus try" , Octob er , 1977 .

138 . Richards on ,A . W . and Wesolowsky , G . O . , " Co s t-Volume-Pro f i t ·Analysis

and the Value of Information " , · November , 1 9 7 7 .

139 . Jain , Haris h C . , "Labour Market Problems o f Native Peo p le in Ontario " ,
December , 1977 .

140 . Go rdon , M.J . and L . I . Gould , "The Co s t of Equi ty Cap i tal : A Recons id­
eration " , January , 1978.

141 . Gordon , M.J. and L . I . Gould , "The Cos t o f Equi ty Cap i t al with Pers onal
Income Taxes and Flo tation Co s ts " , January , 1978.

142 . Adams , R.J . , "Dunlop Af t er Two Decades : Sys t ems Theory as a Framework
For Organizing the Field o f Indus trial Relations " , January , 19 7 8 .

143 . Agarwal , N . C. an d Jain , H. C. , " P ay Dis crimination Ag�in s t Women in

Canad a : Issue s and Po li cies " , February , 1978 .

144 . Jain , H. C. and S loane , P .J. , "Rac e , S e x and Minority Group Dis crimination
Legis lat i on in North America and Britain " , March , 1978.

14 5 . Agarwal , N . C. , " A Labour Marke t Analys is o f Executive Earnings " ,

June , 1978.

146 . Jai.n , H. C. and Young , A. , "Racial Dis crimination in the U .K . Labour

Marke t : Theory and Evidenc e " , June , 1978 .

147 . Yagil , J . , "On Alternative Methods o f Treating Ris k , " S ep t emb er , 1 9 7 8 .

148 . Jain , H.C. , " At t i tudes toward Communication Sys tem : A Comparison o f
Anglophone and Fran cophone Hosp i tal Emp loyees , " S ep temb er , 1978 .

14 9 . Ros s , R. , "Marketing Through the Japanes e Dis tribution Sys t em" ,

Novemb e r , 1978 .

15 0 . Gould , Lawrenc e I . and S tanley N . Laiken , " Dividends vs . Cap ital Gains
Under Share Redemp tions , " De cemb er , 1978 .

15 1 . Goul d , Lawrence I . and S tanley N . Laiken , "The Impac t of General

Averaging on Income Realization Decis ions : A Caveat on Tax
Def erral , " Decemb er , 19 7 8 .

152 . Jain , Hari s h C . , Jacques Normand and Rab indra N . Kanun go , "Job Mo_tivat ion
of Canadian Anglophone and Francophone Hospi tal Employees , Ap ril , 1979 .

15 3 . S tidsen , Ben t , " Communi cat ions Relations " , Ap ri l , 1979 .

154 . S z end rovi ts , A . Z . and Drezner , Zvi , "Op timizing N- S tage P roduc tion /
Inven t o ry Systems b y Transpo rting Dif ferent Numb ers o f Equal-S i z ed
Ba tches at Various S tages " , April , 1979 .
Continued on Page 4 . . .
 - 4 -

155 . Trus co tt , W . G . , "Allocation Analys is of a Dynamic Dis tribution

Prob lem" , June , 1979 .

156 . Hanna , J.R. , "Measuring Capital and Income " , November , 1979 .

15 7 . Deal , K.R. , "Numerical So lution and Multiple S c enario Inves tigation o f

Linear Quadratic Differential Games " , November , 1979 .

15 8 . Hanna , J .R . , "Profess ional Accounting Education in Canada : Problems

and Prospec ts " , Novemb er , 1979 .

15 9 . Adams , R. J . , "Towards a More Comp e t en t Labo r Forc e : A Training Levy

S cheme for Canada" , Decemb e r , 1979 .

160. Jain , H. C . , "Management o f Human Resources and P roductivity 1 1 ,

February ,. 1 9 8 0 .

161 . Wensley , A . , "The Ef f iciency of Canadian Foreign Exchange Marke t s 1 1 ,

February , 1980 . ·

1 62 . Tihany i , E. , "The Market Val�ation o f Deferred Taxes " , March , 1 9 80 .

163 . Meadows , I .S . , " Quality o f Working Lif e : Progres s , P roblems and

Prospects " , March , 1980 .

164 . S z endrovits , A. Z . , "The E f f e c t o f Numbers of S tages on Mul ti- S tage

Produc tion/Invent o ry Models - An Empirical S tudy" , April , 1980 .

165 . taiken , S .N. , " Current Action to Lower Fu ture Taxes : General Averaging
and Anti cip ated Income Models 11 , April , 1980 .

166 . Love , R. F . , "Hull Properties in Lo cation Prob lems " , Apri l , . 1 9 8 0_.

16 7 . Jain , H. C. , " Disadvantaged Group s on the Labour Marke t " , May , 1980 .

168 . Adams , R. J . , " Training in Canadian Industry : Res earch Theo ry and
Policy Implica tions 11 , June , 1980 .

169 . Joyner , R.C. , "App lication of Process Theories to Teaching Uns tructured
Managerial Decision Making " , �
Augus t ' 1 9 8 0 .

1 70 . Love , R.F . , " A S t opping Rul e for Facili ties Lo cation Algori thms " ,
September, 1980.

171. Abad , Praka s h L . , " An Op timal Con trol Approach to Marketing - Production
P lanning" , Octob er , 1980.

172 . Abad , Prakash L . , " De centralized Planning With An ln t erdep endent

Marketing-Production Sys t em11 , O c t o b er , 1980 .

173 . Adams , R.J� , " Indus trial Relati ons S y s t ems in Europe and No rth America 1 1 ,
October , 1980 .
 ,.

!1
Ii
lj

- 5 -

174. Gaa , James C. , " The Role o f Central Rulemaking In Corp o rate Financial
Reportin g " , February , 1981 .

175 . Adams , Roy J . , y

"A Theo ry of Emplo er Atti tudes and B ehaviour Towards
Trade Unions In Wes t ern Europe and North Americ � " , Feb ruary , 1981.

176 . Love , Robert F . and Js un Y . Won g , "A 0-1 Linear P rogram To Minimize
Interac tion Cos t In S cheduling" , May ,1981 .

177 . Jain , Ha r i s h , " Employment and Pay Dis crimination in Canada : Theories ,
Evidence and P o l i cies " , June , 198 1 .

178. Bas u ,S . , "Marke t Rea c t i on to Accoun ting P o li c y Delib era tion : The
Infla tion Accounting Cas e Revis i ted" , June , 1 9 8 1 .

179 . Basu , s . , "Risk Information and Fina�cial Leas e Disclosures : S om e

Empiri.cal Eviden c e " , June , 1981 . ·

180 . Basu , S . , "The Relat i onship b e tween Earnings ' Yield , Marke t Value and
Return for NYSE Common S t o cks : Further Evi dence" , Septemb e r , 19 81

18 1 . Jain , H.C. , "Rac e and Sex Dis crimination in Emp loyment in Canada :
Theorie s , evidence and p o li cies " , . July 19 8 1 .

182 . Jain , H . C . , " Cro s s Cultural Management o f Human Res ources and the
Multinati onal Corpo r ations " , Oct ob e r 1981 .

18 3 . Meadows , Ian , "Work Sys tem Characteris t i cs and Emp loyee Response s :
An Exp loratory S tudy " , O c t obe r , 1981 .

184 . Zvi Drezner , .S zendrovi t s , Andrew Z . , We s o l owsky , George 0 . 1'Multi-s t ag e

Produ c t i on wi th V ariab le L o t S iz e s and T ransp o rt at i on o f P ar t i al L o t s 1' ,
January , 1982 .

185 . Basu , S. , TfRes idual Risk , Firm S i z e and Returns for NY S E Common S to cks :
Some Emp i rical Evidence 1 1 , February , 1 9 82 .

186 . Jain , Har i s h C . and Muthuchidambram, S. " The Ontario Human Ri gh ts Code :
An Analys is o f t he Public Policy Through S elec t ed Cas e s o f
Dis criminat i on In Employment " , March , 1982 .

187 . L o ve Robert F . , Dowling , Paul D . , 1 10n t imal Wei ghted Q, Norm Parame ters
P
· F o r Facili t i e s Layout Distance Characterizations " , Apri l , 1982 ,

188 . S teiner :
G . , "S ingle Machine S c heduli ng wi th Precedence Con s traint
s
o f Dimen sion 2 " , June , 19 8 2 . ,

189 . To rranc e , G.W. 1 1 Ap plicat i on Of Mul ti-At trib ute Utility Theory To
Measure S o cial Preferenc e s For Heal th S tates 1' , June , 1982 .
 - 6 -

190 . Adams , Roy J . , " Comp e ting Paradigms in Indus trial Relations " ,
April , 1982 .

191 . Callen , J.L. , Kwan , C . C .Y . , and Yip , P . C .Y . , "Efficiency o f Foreign

Exchange Markets : An Empirical S tudy Us ing Maximum Entropy
S p e c tral Analysis . " July , 1982 .

19 2 . Kwan , C . C .Y . , "Portfolio Analysis Using S ingl e Index , Mul t i-Index ,

and Const ant Correlation Models : A Unified Treatment . " July , 19 8 2

19 3 . Ros e , Joseph B . , "The Building Trades - Canadian Lab our Congress

Dispute" , S ep temb er , 19 82

194 . Gould , Lawrence I . , and Laiken , S tanley N . , "Inves tment Cons iderations
in a D ep reciat ion-B as e d Tax Shelter : A Comparative Approach " .
Novemb e r 19 8 2 .

195 . Gould , Lawrence I . , an d L aiken , S tanley N . , "An Analysis o f

Multi-Period After-Tax Rates o f Return o n Investment 11 •
Novemb er 1982 .

196 . Gould , Lawrence I . , and Laiken , S tanley N . , "Effects of the

Inves tment Income D eduction on the Comparis on of Inves tment
Returns " . Novemb e r 19 8 2 .

19 7 . G. John Mil t enb ur g , "Allo c a t ing a Replenishment Order Among a Family

of I t ems " , January 1 9 8 3·.

19 8 . Elko J . Kleins chmidt and Robert G . Coop er , "The Imp a c t of Expo rt

S trategy on Export S ales P erfo rmance " . January 19 83 .

19 9 . Elko J . Kleins chmidt , "Explanato ry Fact o rs in the Exp o rt P e rformance

o f Canadian Electronics Firms : An Empirical Analysis " . January 19 83 .

200 . Joseph B . Ros e , "Growth Pat t erns o f Public S e c to r Unions " , February 1983 .

201 . Adams , R. J . , " "Th e Un.or gani z e d : A Ris ing Force ? " , Ap ril 19 8 3 .

20 2 . Jack S . K . Chan g , "Op t i on Pricing - Valuing D e rived Claims in

Incomp l ete S ecurity Marke t s " , April 19 8 3 .

20 3 . N . P . Archer , "Efficiency , Effec tivenes'S and Profi tab ili ty : An

Int eraction Model " , May 1 9 8 3 .

20 4 . Harish Jain and Victor Murray , "Why The Human Resources Management
Func tion Fails " , June 1983 .

205 . Harish C . Jain and P e ter J . S lo ane , "The Imp act o f Recess ion on Equal
Oppo rtuni ties for Minori ties & Women in The Uni ted S tates , Canada
,

and Britain" t June 19 83 .

206 . Jos eph B . Ros e , "Employer Accre di t ation : A Re tro s p e ctive " ,
June 19 83 .
 - 7 -

20 7 . Min Bas adur and Carl T . Finkb eine r , " I dentifying At t i t udinal Fac t o rs
Related to I de ation in Creativ e Prob lem S o lving " , June 19 83 .

20 8 . Min B as adur and Carl T . Finkb eine r , "Measuring P reference f o r

I de ation in Creat ive P rob lem S o lving " , June 1 9 83 .

209 . Geo r ge S te ine r , "S equencing on S ingle Machine with General P re ce dence
Cons t raints - The Job Module Algori thm" , June 1983 .

2 10 . Varouj A. Aivazi an , Je f f rey L . Callen , I t zh ak Krinsky and

Cl arence C . Y . Kwan , " Th e Demand f o r Risky Financial As s e t s b y
the U . S . Hous ehold S e c to r " , July _19 83 .

211 . Cl arenc e C . Y . Kwan and P at r i ck C . Y . Yip , " O p t imal P o rt folio S el e c tion

wi th Upp e r B o unds for Individual S e curities " , July 19 83 .

212 . Min B a s adur and Ron Thomp s on , "Us e fulnes s o f the I de a tion P rinciple of
Extended Effort in Real World Profes s ional and Managerial Cre ative
P rob lem S o lvin g " , October 19 8 3 .

�13 . Geo r ge S teine r , " On a De comp o s i tion Al go ri thm f o r S equencing

P rob l ems wi t h P r e cedence Cons t r aints " , Novemb e r 19 8 3 .

214 . Rob e rt G. C o o p e r and Ulrike De B rent ani , " C ri t eri a f o r S creening

Indus trial New Pro du c t Venture s " , Novemb e r 19 83 .

215 . Hari s h C . Jai n , "Union , Management and Gove rnmen t Res pons e to
Te chnolo gi c al Change in Canad a " , D e cemb e r 19 83 .
_

216 . Z. Drezne r , G. S teine r , G . O . Wes o l owsky , "Facility L o c at ion with

Rec tilinear Tour Dis tances " , March 1 9 84 .

21 7 . Latha Shanker and Jack S . K . Ch an g , "The Hed ging Performan c e o f

Fore i gn Currency Op t i ons and Foreign Currency Futur e s : A
Compariso n " , March 19 84 .

218 . Ulrike de B rentani and Rob e r t G . Coop e r , "New Produ c t S creening

De cis ions in H i gh Techno l o gy Firms : An Emp irical S tudy " ,
March 19 84 .

219 . Paul D . Dowling and Rob e r t F . Love , "Bounding Me thods f o r Facilities

Lo c a t ion Algorithms " , March 19 84 .

220 . Geo r ge S t einer , "A Decomp os i tion App ro ach f o r Finding th e S e tup
Numb e r of a Partial O rde r " , Ap ril 1984 .

221 . Jos eph B . Ros e and Gary N . Chais on , "The S t a te of the Unions : Uni t e d
S t at es and Canada" , April 19 84 .

222 . Nares h C . Agarwal , " E conomi c Co s t s o f Emp loyment Dis crimi nation " ,
May , 19 84 .

223 . R.J . Adams , "Es timating the Extent o f Co lle c tive Bargaining in
Canad a" , May , 19 84 .
 - 8 -
..
'
)

· 224 , Robe r t G . Cooper , " New P roduct S t r ategies : What Dis tinguishes
The Top P e rformers " , May 1 9 84 .

225 . No rman P . Archer , " S el e ction o f a S imulation Language f o r an MBA

Modeling and S imulation Cours e " , June 19 84 .

2 26 . Rob ert F . Love , William G . Trus co t t , John H. Walker , "A Facility

Lo cation D e cis ion : Thib o de au-Finch Transp ort L td . " , June 19 84 .

22 7 . R . J . Adams , " Two P o l i cy App roach es to Lab o ur-Mana gement :Deci sion
Making at the Level of the Enterp ri s e : A comparis on o f the
Wagner Model and S tatut ory Works Councils " , July 19 84 ,

228. Geo rge S aunders , "Emp loyment and th e P ro ductivi ty S lowdown 1 9 5 8

t o 19 80 " , S ep tembe r 1 9 84 .
J t\ {\l s
R. E t=
H�
1 4 ·S
r � l\ �
!\ (} . �2q