CASE DIGEST FOR CRIMINAL LAW II

DUSTIN P. FORMALEJO

1. SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. VERSUS HON. JUDGE FRANK LOBRIGO, G.R. NO.
226679, AUGUST 15, 2017.

FACTS: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality of
Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002," which provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs).

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view
of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of
powers among the three equal branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the
motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the
Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a
Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the
accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph
3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.]
9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the
accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.

ISSUE: Is Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court and no longer shared
with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The trias politica principle prevents Congress from promulgating rules regarding pleading,
practice and procedure. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of
Our institutional independence.

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend,
or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former
should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions."

It is towards the aim of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important,"
"essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice.

Plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution
and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and
finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying
him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.
Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but
depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent
to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his
duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining
or compromise for the convenience of the accused.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
 court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of
discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it
arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the
defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.

2. PEOPLE VERSUS MARILOU HILARIO, ET AL., G.R. NO. 210610, JANUARY 11, 2018.

FACTS: This is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario (Hilario) of the Decision
dated July 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05244, affirming with
modification the Decision dated August 23, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lemery,
Batangas, Branch 5 in Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 10-2008, 11-2008, and 13-2008.

On January 25, 2008, three Information’s were filed before the RTC against Hilario and
Guadayo, to wit:

Docket No. Accused Charge Crim. Case No. 10-2008 Hilario Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
(Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165) Crim. Case No. 11-2008 Hilario Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs (Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165) Crim. Case No. 13-2008 Guadayo
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs (Article II, Section II of R.A. No. 9165).

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 2008, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Maguihan, Municipality of Lemery, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully sell, deliver and give away one (1) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as
"shabu", weighing 0.04 gram, referred to as specimen A (NBS-1) in Chemistry Report No. BD-
012-08, a dangerous drug.

When arraigned on April 29, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo pleaded not guilty to the charges against
them.

PO1 de Sagun further recounted that during the buy-bust operation, Guadayo ran away, so PO2
Magpantay had to chase after her. When PO2 Magpantay subsequently caught up with Guadayo,
he recovered and confiscated from her another sachet of shabu.

When PO1 de Sagun was subjected to cross-examination, he reiterated that he had marked the
P500.00-bill used in the buy-bust operation as "NBS 1" and the sachet of shabu bought from
 Hilario as "NBS-2."... on January 22, 2008 based on information gathered from concerned
citizens that sale of dangerous drugs was rampant in the area; they prepared a pre-operation report
but he did not have a copy of the same with him at the trial; they did not know nor did they
conduct a surveillance of Hilario and Guadayo prior to January 22, 2008; and when they went to
Brgy. Maguihan, they were not certain of the subject of their buy-bust operation.

According to the combined narrative of Hilario and Guadayo, on January 22, 2008, at about 10:00
in the evening, they were both at Hilario's house. Hilario was tending to her sick 12-year-old
daughter, and Guadayo was there to help Hilario with the laundry.

On August 23, 2011, the RTC promulgated its Decision, finding Hilario and Guadayo guilty of
all the charges against them.

The Motion for Reconsideration of Hilario and Guadayo was denied for lack of merit by the RTC
in an Order dated September 26, 2011.

In its Decision dated July 18, 20I3... the Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questions were raised by Hilario as accused-appellant and whether
they are questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.

HELD: Accused-appellant Marilou D. Hilario is ACQUITTED of the charge of illegal sale of

dangerous drugs, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. She is ORDERED immediately RELEASED from detention unless she
is confined for another lawful cause.

3. PEOPLE VERSUS DR. ROGER R. POSADAS, ET AL., G.R. NOS. 168951 & 169000,
JULY 17, 2013.

FACTS: Dr. Roger Posadas was appointed by the Board of Regents (BOR) of the University of
the Philippines System as UP Diliman Chancellor for a three-year term starting November 1,
1993 and ending October 31, 1996.

During his term Dr. Posadas is one of the leading figures in the emerging inter-disciplinary field
of technology management in the Philippines. Upon recommendation of the UP Diliman Task
Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and Planning composed of deans
and professors from the various colleges in UP Diliman, the BOR on February 23, 1995 approved
the establishment of the Technology Management Center (TMC) under the direct supervision of
the Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman. TMC was to be funded by a grant from the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA). When TMC became operational in June 1995, Dr.
Posadas was nominated for the TMC Director but for unknown reason he declined the
nomination.

In a letter dated July 30, 1995, the President of Hua Qiao University in Fujian Province, China
invited Dr. Posadas and a delegation from UP Diliman to visit on October 30 to November 6,
1995. A travel order was issued to Dr. Posadas and his delegation. Dr. Posadas through an
Administrative Order (AO) then designated petitioner Dr. Rolando Dayco, Vice-Chancellor, as
OIC of UP Diliman from October 30, 1995 until November 6, 1995, and extended by another AO
until November 7, 1995.
 On November 7, 1995, Dr. Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as Project Director of UP TMC
effective September 18, 1995 up to September 17, 1996. In another undated "Contract for
Consultancy Services" signed by Dr. Dayco, Dr. Posadas was hired as Consultant for the TMC
Project for the same period. As evidenced by disbursement vouchers and admitted by Dr.
Posadas, the latter received his "honoraria" (P30,000.00 per month) and consultancy fees (totaling
P100,000.00) as Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until May 1996 when the
Commission on Audit (COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees.

4. PEOPLE VERSUS RAMON BONG REVILLA, JR. G.R. NO. 218232, JULY 24, 2018

FACTS: An Information dated 5 June 2014 filed by the Office of the Ombudsman in the
Sandiganbayan charged Revilla, Cambe and Napoles, among others, with the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended.

In a Resolution dated 19 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles. On the same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) and filed a Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his
detention at the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame. On 20 June 2014, Cambe also voluntarily
surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and filed an Urgent Motion to Commit Accused to Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) pending trial of the case.

Revilla filed a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam dated 20 June 2014; Cambe filed an Application for
Bail dated 23 June 2014; and Napoles filed a Joint Petition for Bail dated 25 June 2014, together
with co-accused Ronald John Lim (Lim) and John Raymund De Asis (De Asis).

The Sandiganbayan denied the separate applications for bail filed by Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles. The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution duly established with strong evidence that
Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, in conspiracy with one another, committed the crime of plunder
defined and penalized under RA 7080; thus, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to bail.

In a Resolution dated 26 March 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit: (a) Napoles'
Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 December 2014; (b) Revilla's Omnibus Motion: (1) for
Reconsideration, and (2) To Adduce Additional Evidence dated 17 December 2014; and (c)
Cambe's: (1) Motion for Reconsideration dated 15 December 2014, and (2) Motion to Adduce
Additional Evidence and Request for Subpoena embodied in his Reply dated 28 January 2015.

Meanwhile, on 14 July 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed a Motion to Transfer the Place of Detention of Accused Revilla, Cambe, and
Napoles to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) facility in Camp Bagong Diwa
or other similar facilities of the BJMP. The motion states that the PNP Custodial Center is not a
detention facility within the supervision of BJMP under RA 6975 and their continued detention in
a non-BJMP facility affords them special treatment.

In a Resolution dated 4 September 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for failure to
advance justifiable grounds for Revilla and Cambe's transfer. The Sandiganbayan held that
detention in facilities other than a jail is sanctioned in our jurisdiction and there is no law
mandating that detention prisoners shall only be detained in a jail supervised by the BJMP. The
Sandiganbayan also found that it was not shown that Revilla and Cambe were granted benefits
above the standards set for other detention prisoners.
In a Manifestation (Re: Unauthorized Movement of Accused Revilla on 14 February 2015) with
Motion (For the Issuance of an Order Directing the Concerned PNP Officials to Explain) dated 27
February 2015, the prosecution alleged that Revilla was allowed to attend the birthday celebration
of Juan Ponce Enrile in the PNP General Hospital under the guise of a medical emergency on 14
February 2015, bolstering its argument that Revilla's detention in the PNP Custodial Center is
improper.

In a Resolution dated 20 May 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of
the prosecution for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan did not consider as sufficient reason the
reported unauthorized visit of Revilla to the hospital room of Enrile to justify his transfer to
Camp Bagong Diwa, since the concerned PNP officials have already been admonished for failure
to comply with the Sandiganbayan's Order.

On 27 October 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment/Gamishment against the
monies and properties of Revilla to serve as security for the satisfaction of the amount of
P224,512,500.00 alleged as ill-gotten wealth, in the event that a judgment is rendered against him
for plunder. The motion states that there is an imminent need for the issuance of the ex parte writ
to prevent the disappearance of Revilla's monies and properties found to be prima facie
unlawfully acquired, considering that the AMLC reported that many investment and bank
accounts of Revilla were "terminated immediately before and after the PDAF scandal circulated
in [the] media," and Revilla himself publicly confirmed that he closed several bank accounts
when the PDAF scam was exposed.

In a Resolution dated 5 February 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's motion upon
finding of its sufficiency both in form and substance. The Sandiganbayan held that the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment is properly anchored on Sections I and 2 of Rule 57, and
Sections 1 and 2 (b) and (c) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Writ of Attachment directed to the Acting Chief, Sheriff and Security Services of the
Sandiganbayan. On 10 July 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's amendatory
motion and issued an Alias Writ of Preliminary Attachment, which included the properties under
the known aliases or other names of Revilla and his spouse, Lani Mercado.

Revilla filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in a Resolution dated
28 May 2015. The Sandiganbayan held that the writ of preliminary attachment is not the penalty
of forfeiture envisioned under Section 2 of RA 7080, contrary to Revilla's argument. The
Sandiganbayan further elucidated that the issuance of the writ is an ancillary remedy which can
be availed of during the pendency of the criminal case of plunder, and it is not necessary to await
the final resolution of the bail petition before it can be issued.

ISSUE: Wheter or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of
Revilla and Cambe from the PNP Custodial Center to a BJMP-operated facility.

HELD: NO. However, both Section 3 of Rule 113 and Section 63 of RA 6975 are inapplicable in
the present case. It must be noted that Revilla and Cambe voluntarily surrendered to the
Sandiganbayan, and there is no opportunity for the arresting officer to execute the warrants of
arrest against them. Moreover, the said rule merely refers to the duty of the arresting officer to
deliver the arrested person to the nearest police station or jail. The rule did not state about the
duty "to detain" the arrested person to the nearest police station or jail. There is nothing in the
rule referring to the place of detention of the arrested person. In the same manner, there is nothing
 in Section 63 of RA 6975 which expressly mandates and limits the place of detention in BJMP-
controlled facilities. On the other hand, it merely provides that: "there shall be established and
maintained in every district, city and municipality a secured, clean, adequately equipped and
sanitary jail x x x." When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application.

5. PEOPLE VERSUS JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, G.R. NOS. 142369-70, APRIL 13, 2007

FACTS: On 13 Sept 1995, Lucit Estollore went to BIR to ask for the computation of taxes due
on the sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a Certificate
Authorizing Registration (CAR). She was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who
computed the documentary stamp tax (P37,500) and capital gains tax (P125,000) which was
approved by petitioner Juanito Merencillo, a Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR. Fuentes
advised Estillore that the CAR would be released after 7 days.

At around 10am of the same day, upon a call from Fuentes, Maria Angles Ramasola went to see
Merencillo who demanded P20,000 in exchange for the approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that
she needed to confer with her 2 business associates.

The CAR was approved by Revenue District Officer Galahad Balagon on 19 Sept 1995 and was
ready for release but the releasing clerk Susan Cabangon told her that she was still waiting for the
go signal to release the same. Hence, on 22 Sept, Cesar complained to Balaganon about
Merencillo’s refusal to release.

Subsequently Cesar received a call from Merencillo again following up his demand. Fed up,
Cesar sought the help of the Provincial Director of PNP, Sr. Supt. Dionaid Baraguer who referred
the complaint to the Chief of Police of Tagbilaran City who latter coordinated for the entrapment
of Merencillo. Cesar was instructed to prepare 2 bundles of bogus money by putting one P100
bill on each side of each 2 bundles.

Merencillo was entertaining the visitor when Cesar arrived. On seeing Cesar, Merencillo handed
the CAR to her and was cued to follow him downstairs. Cesar handed the envelope and was
asked, “why is this thick?” Before she could answer, a member of the PNP photographed them.
The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves to petitioner and invited him to go with
them to their headquarters. He was charged in violation of RA 3019 and Art. 210.

Merencillo denied the charges during trial and that the allegations only existed in Cesar’s mind
after she was told that there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be
paid. The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer 8 years and 1
month to 15 years of imprisonment.

Merencillo appealed to Sandiganbayan but was denied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in refusing to believe Merencillo’s evidence over that of
the prosecution.

Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in failing to recognize that Merencillo was placed in double
jeopardy.
HELD:

No. The Court ruled that both the RTC and Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the
prosecution sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction. Questions of fact cannot
generally be raised for the consideration of this Court. The calibration of evidence and the relative
weight thereof belongs to the appellate court. Its findings and conclusions cannot be set aside by
this Court unless there is no evidence on record to support them. Moreover, findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts
because trial courts have the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they
testify.

The Court ruled that the inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from
the truth of the prosecution’s testimonial evidence. Witnesses testifying on the same event do not
have to be consistent in each and every detail. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony.

Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s
evidence as a whole or reflect on the witness’s honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree
on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with
each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies
in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked as
grounds for acquittal.

No, petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy. Sec 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following
statement, “In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law…” One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under
the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to
being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy if a
person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the
Revised Penal Code.

The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to
commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the other. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of crime penalized under Sec 3(b) of RA 3019

1. The offender is a public officer;
2. He requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;
3. He made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person;
4. The request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government;
5. He has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a
contract or transaction.

Elements of direct bribery:

1. The offender is a public officer;
 2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with
a view to:
a. committing some crime;
b. in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but
the act must be unjust;
c. refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do.
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

6. PEOPLE VERSUS HERMINIO T. DISINI, G.R. NOS. 169823-24, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013.

FACTS:

During 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, accused Herminio Disini, conspiring together with then
President of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos for the award of contract to Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation for the engineering and architectural design and to construct
the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project. In exchange for the award of contract, Disini gave
Marcos several shares of stocks. Eventually, Marcos awarded the contract to Westinghouse.
These acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).

On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form.
The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then entered
a plea of not guilty to both informations.

As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed
resolution denying the motion to quash.

Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second
assailed resolution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over the offenses charged.

HELD:
 Yes, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the offenses charged because
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section
4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed
by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the
appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.

7. PEOPLE VERSUS CECILIA U. LEGRAMA, G.R. NO. 178626, JUNE 13, 2012

FACTS:

Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), Zambales directed an Audit
Team to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia Legrama, the
Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales.

The COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of petitioner
which contained the findings that petitioners cash accountability has a shortage in the amount of
P1,152,900.75. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to restitute the initial
amount of P60,000.00.

Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal Mayor were
charged in an Informationwith the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Both petitioner and
Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds.

Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision acquitting Lonzanida (lack of proof that is conspired with
petitioner). However, the tribunal concluded that petitioner malversed the total amount of
P1,131,595.05 and found her guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.

The amount involved in the instant case is more than Php22,000.00. Hence, pursuant to
the provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, viz., accused Legramas voluntary surrender and partial
restitution of the amount involved in the instant case, and being entitled to the provisions
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

Further, she is ordered to pay the amount of Php299,204.65, representing the balance of
her incurred shortage after deducting therein the restituted amount of Php832,390.40 and
the Php200.00 covered by an Official Receipt dated August 18, 1996 issued in the name
of the Municipality of San Antonio (Exhibit 22). She is also ordered to pay a fine equal to
the amount malversed which is Php1,131,595.05 and likewise suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and to pay costs.

ISSUES:

Whether Petitioner is guilty of Malversation of Public funds?

Whether Petitioner is entitled of 2 mitigating circumstances? YES (voluntary surrender and
restitution)

HELD:

Petitioner is guilty of Malversation

Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. First, it is undisputed
that petitioner was the municipal treasurer at the time material to this case. Second, it is the
inherent function of petitioner, being the municipal treasurer, to take custody of and exercise
proper management of the local governments funds. Third, the parties have stipulated during the
pre-trial of the case that petitioner received the subject amount as public funds and that petitioner
is accountable for the same. Fourth, petitioner failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that she
has put such missing funds to her personal use.

Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is proof
that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for the said
funds upon demand without offering sufficient explanation why there was a shortage. In fine,
petitioners failure to present competent and credible evidence that would exculpate her and rebut
the prima facie presumption of malversation clearly warranted a verdict of conviction.

Petitioner is entitled to 2 mitigating circumstances:

Voluntary surrender and Restitution

As for the appropriate penalty, since the amount involved is more than P22,000.00, pursuant to
the provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

However, as aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner enjoys the mitigating

circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution. Although restitution is akin to voluntary
surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same
Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should be treated as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present in a case, which is
similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even though the
two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the
accused, it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of petitioner.

Taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two
mitigating circumstance, i.e., petitioners voluntary surrender and partial restitution of the amount
malversed, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, which has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months. In accordance with paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code.] and considering that there are no other mitigating circumstance present, the maximum
term should now be the medium period of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum term should be anywhere within the period of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor medium. Hence, the penalty imposed needs modification. Accordingly, petitioner
 is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

8. PEOPLE VERSUS OSCAR P. PARUNGAO, G.R. NO. 96025, MAY 15, 1991.

FACTS:

That on or about the month of September, 1980, or sometime subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Porac, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, OSCAR PARUNGAO, Municipal Treasurer of Porac, Pampanga, hence a
public officer having been appointed and qualified as such, having custody or control of and
accountable for the public funds collected and received by him by reason of the duties of his
office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with abuse of confidence, take,
appropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P 185,200.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount

The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. During the pretrial conference, he admitted that on
September 29, 1980, as municipal treasurer of Porac, Pampanga, he received from the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways the amount of P185,250 known as the fund for construction,
rehabilitation, betterment and improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road
located in Porac, Pampanga.

The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. During the pretrial conference, he admitted that on
September 29, 1980, as municipal treasurer of Porac, Pampanga, he received from the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways the amount of P185,250 known as the fund for construction,
rehabilitation, betterment and improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road
located in Porac, Pampanga.

9. EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, ET AL., VERSUS HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.,

G.R. NO. L-31839 JUNE 30, 1980.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Judge directing
petitioners to amend the information filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the CFI of Camarines Sur
entitled, “People of the Philippines versus Eligio Orbita”, so as to include as defendants Governor
Armando Cledera and Assistant Provincial Warden Jose Esmeralda of Camarines Sur. In said
case, Orbita, a provincial guard, was prosecuted for infidelity in the custody of a prisoner for the
escape of detention prisoner, Pablo Denaque. In the course of the trial, the defense alleged that
Esmeralda received a written note from Gov. Cledera asking him to send in five prisoners which
party included Denaque, who was then under the custody of Orbita, to his house in Taculod,
Canaman, Camarines Sur to work in the construction which made Denaque’s escape possible, and
thus, Esmeralda and Gov. Cledera should be equally guilty of the offense with Orbita.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge erred in equally incriminating Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda with
Orbita for the escape of Pablo Denaque.
 HELD:

YES. Respondent Judge erred in equally incriminating Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda with Orbita
for the escape of Pablo Denaque. Decision annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge directed to
proceed with the trial of the case.

10. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION VERSUS YUN KWAN

BYUNG, G.R. NO. 163553, DECEMBER 11, 2009

FACTS:

PAGCOR launched its Foreign Highroller Marketing Program (Program). The Program aims to
invite patrons from foreign countries to play at the dollar pit of designated PAGCOR-operated
casinos under specified terms and conditions and in accordance with industry practice.

25 April 1996 (Junket Agreement), ABS Corporation agreed to bring in foreign players to play at
the five designated gaming tables of the Casino Filipino Silahis at the Grand Boulevard Hotel in
Manila... action against PAGCOR seeking the redemption of gambling chips valued at US$2.1
million.

GAMING ROOM is exclusively operated by ABS under arrangement with PAGCOR

ISSUE:

Doctrine of implied agency, or agency by estoppel;... using intent of the contracting parties as the
test for creation of agency,... that PAGCOR ratified, or at least adopted, the acts of the agent,
ABS Corporation.

HELD:

PAGCOR has the sole and exclusive authority to operate a gambling activity.

PAGCOR is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise. PAGCOR
cannot delegate... its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non
potest,... PAGCOR, by taking only a percentage of the earnings of ABS Corporation from its
foreign currency collection, allowed ABS Corporation to operate gaming tables in the dollar pit.
The Junket Agreement is in direct violation of PAGCOR's charter and is... therefore void.

Since the Junket Agreement violates PAGCOR's charter, gambling between the junket player and
the junket operator under such agreement is illegal and may not be enforced by the courts.

RA 9487 cannot be applied to the present case. The Junket Agreement was entered into between
PAGCOR and ABS Corporation on 25 April 1996 when the PAGCOR charter then prevailing
(PD 1869) prohibited PAGCOR from entering into any arrangement with a... third party

There is no implied agency in this case because PAGCOR did not hold out to the public as the
principal of ABS Corporation.

Junket Agreement was merely a contract of lease of facilities and services.

The Court of Appeals correctly used the intent of the contracting parties in determining whether
an agency by estoppel existed