Leading Your Safety Culture Toward Best Practice PDF

This Paper was presented, upon invitation, at
th th
SAFETY IN ACTION 2006, Melbourne Exhibition Centre, AUSTRALIA, 16 – 18 May 2006
Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice;

Integrating the Transformational Safety® Culture
Improvement System within Traditional BBS Programs
David G Broadbent
Safety Psychologist
TransformationalSafety.Com
PO Box 250
MAITLAND NSW 2320
AUSTRALIA
Safety is known by the ABSENCE of events, which makes it a difficult challenge to achieve. We
know that essentially all major safety events have their roots deep into the past practices of the
organisations involved and grow out of long causal chains involving the way that people work. In
most cases the pre-cursors of events were there to see, but the organisations were seemingly
unable to recognise them.
Safety requires people to adopt a set of habits and ways of thinking that are often difficult and
unnatural (e.g. reporting one's own mistakes, stopping a job in the middle, etc.). As such,
building a strong safety culture is a specific challenge of leadership. Safety never sleeps and
organisations cannot achieve exceptional performance without a deep-rooted set of beliefs,
practices and behaviours that guide people's decisions and action at all times.
I believe that the culture of an organisation embraces everything it does. It includes the policies,
procedures and standards. It includes the housekeeping, the procedures and tools. A strong
culture is one that is widely shared and based on a common and well-understood identity. A
weak culture is diverse and differs from area to area in the organisation. But a strong culture is
not necessarily an effective culture (i.e. it may not achieve the required results) and it will also
be resistant to change. Safety culture is becoming more and more recognised as a fundamental
foundation of effective and sustained safety outcomes1. For an explanation of some of the
factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of safety culture refer to “The
Structure of Culture” at Attachment1.
Optimal safety cultures typically provide the necessary support for employees to strive beyond
minimal efforts. Organisations relying on conventional safety and leadership approaches often
fail to inspire the necessary safety-related behaviours and attitudes in their employees. In
addition, these organisations have difficulty identifying, and then removing barriers to safety
excellence. Although most individuals possess the necessary values and intentions, their actual
behaviours may not support an effective safety culture. The Transformational Safety® Culture
Improvement System has as its prime objective, one of assisting organisations gain an
understanding and appreciation of their own unique safety culture along with providing proven
insights toward strategies which enable employees to close the gap between their values,
intentions, and actual behaviours. The state-of-the-art application of a survey protocol targeting
safety leadership behaviours, which have a foundation within transformational leadership
theory, is instrumental in developing a culture which shall maximise the sustainability of effective
safety behaviours within the workforce.
1 th
Broadbent, D.G., (2004). “Maximising Safety Performance via leadership Behaviours”, 28 International Congress of
Psychology, Beijing, CHINA
Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice Page 2 of 24
Since its inception, the concept of safety culture has been a key topic in discussions of safety
across many industries. There is “a general recognition that while the importance of engineered
safeguards and formal management systems to control risks is essential, it is equally important
to win the commitment of the workforce to treat safety as a priority through a genuine corporate
commitment to achieve high levels of safety2”.
The concept of ‘”safety culture” has largely developed since the OECD Nuclear Agency
observed that the errors and violations of operating procedures occurring prior to the Chernobyl
disaster were evidence of a poor safety culture at the plant, and within the former Soviet nuclear
industry in general3. Safety culture has been defined as:-
‘‘….that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals, which
establishes that, as an overriding priority, plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by
their significance4”.
Safety culture is important because it forms the context within which individual safety attitudes
develop and persist and safety behaviours are promoted5. It is interesting to note that the
concept of safety culture developed in response to major organisational accidents; however, it is
now being more widely applied to explain accidents at the individual level6.
Safety climate is regarded as a manifestation of safety culture in the behaviour and expressed
attitude of employees7. The number of dimensions of safety climate remains disputed, although
recurring themes across safety climate surveys include management commitment, supervisor
competence, priority of safety over production, and time pressure8. Elements of safety climate
emerge as predictors of unsafe behaviour or accidents in numerous structural models9,10,11,12
and non-linear models13,14, and it is increasingly becoming accepted that a favourable safety
climate is essential for safe operation15.
Lisa Ronald in her excellent literature review16 of factors contributing to successful safety
programs concluded that the following dimensions were recognisable predictors of improved
safety outcomes:-
 People Oriented Culture
 Active Safety Leadership/Management Commitment
 Joint Health and Safety Committee Activities
 Safety Diligence
 Safety Training and Motivational Programs
2
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, INSAG-15 (2002). “Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture”,
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria.
3
Pidgeon, N., & O’Leary, M., 2000. “Man-made disasters: why technology and organisations (sometimes) fail”. Safety Science,
34, 15–30.
4
International Atomic Energy Agency (1986). “Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl
Accident”, VIENNA: International Atomic Energy Agency, ISBN: 92-0-1231
5
Zohar, D., (1980). “Safety climate in industrial organisations: theoretical and applied implications”. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 65, pp.96–102.
6
Florczac. C., (2002). “Maximizing Profitability with Safety Culture Development”, Butterworth-Heinemann:NY
7
Cox, S., Flin, R., (1998). “Safety culture: philosopher’s stone or man of straw”? Work and Stress, 12, pp.189–201.
8
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P., Bryden, R., (2000). “Measuring safety climate: identifying the common features”. Safety
Science, 34, pp. 177–193.
9
Brown, K.A., Willis, P.G., Prussia, G.E., (2000). “Predicting safe employee behaviour in the steel industry: Development and
test of a sociotechnical model”. Journal of Operations Management, 18, pp.445–465.
10
Cheyne, A., Tomas, J.M., Cox, S., Oliver, A., (1999). “Modelling employee attitudes to safety: a comparison across sectors”.
European Psychologist, 1, pp.4–10.
11
Thompson, R.C., Hilton, T.F., Witt, L.A., (1998). “Where the safety rubber meets the shop floor: a confirmatory model of
management influence on workplace safety”. Journal of Safety Research, 29, pp.15–24.
12
Tomas, J.M., Melia, J.L., Oliver, A., (1999). “A cross validation of a structural equation model of accidents: organisational and
psychological variables as predictors of work safety”. Work and Stress, 13, pp.49–58.
13
Guastello, S.J., (1989). “Catastrophe modelling of the accident process: evaluation of an accident reduction program using the
Occupational Hazards Survey”. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 21, pp.61–77.
14
Guastello, S.J., Gershon, R.R.M., Murphy, L.R., (1999). “Catastrophe model for the exposure to bloodborne pathogens and
other accidents in health care settings”. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 31, pp.739–749.
15
Wiegmann, D.A., Zhang, H., Von-Thaden, T., Sharma, G., and Mitchell, A., (2002). “A Synthesis of Safety Culture and Safety
Climate Research”, Technical Report ARL-02-3/FAA-02-2, Federal Aviation Administration, Atlantic City International Airport,
NJ, Contract DTFA 01-G-015.
16
Ronald, L., (1998), “identifying the elements of successful safety programs: A literature review”. A Report prepared for the
Prevention Division, Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia, 6711 Elmridge Way, RICHMOND, BC, V7C 4N1
 Disability (injury) Management and Health Promotion

 Workplace and Workforce Demographics
Specifically Ronald makes the observation, “active safety leadership/ management commitment
variables appear to play an integral (if not the most crucial) role in ensuring safety success”.
It is also worth noting the 1982 report by the US Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety17
which outlines why management commitment may be so essential to safety program success.
Specifically, it states that while legislation has contributed to improved safety performance,
compliance will not by itself produce an outstanding safety record.
"The initiative to achieve and maintain excellent safety must come from management..., they
alone have the authority within their companies to establish the policies and priorities and to
communicate them throughout their organisations…... they alone have the authority to implement
safety programs, commit resources, and reward their managers and employees for achieving the
goals of those programs. The goals may not be attainable without the cooperation of employees,
but only management has the authority to request of its employees the actions needed to realise
those goals."
Additionally, the authors state that

"commitment provides a sense of purpose, identity and direction to those responsible for managing
a company... [which] must be highly visible and effectively communicated to all ranks of workers. It
must be genuine and backed by the highest levels of company management, including the chief
executive officer and the board of directors or owner." But importantly, the authors state, "it must be
accompanied by actions that convince everyone in the company of the sincerity of the commitment,
[since] commitment can create only an illusion of accomplishment unless it results in action."
(Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety, 1982)
Research has focused on supervisors as role models for instilling safety awareness and
supporting safe behaviour18,19. Involvement of the workforce in safety decision-making has also
received attention20. Both of these concepts naturally lead to a consideration of the safety
philosophy of upper management and the safety management system of the organisation.
Hofmann and others21 label the individual attitudes and behaviours discernible in safety climate
as the micro-elements of an organisation, which themselves are determined by macro-elements
of the safety management system and practices. In this sense management attitudes and
behaviour are critical components toward safety; permeating down through the organisation to
the workforce.
More recently Barling22 and Broadbent23 both explore the impacts that specific management
systems and approaches to leadership can have upon safety outcomes in measurable terms
and have drawn some powerful conclusions. In 2004, whilst presenting his own thinking on the
value of transformational leadership competencies Broadbent coined the term “transformational
safety®; to describe a particular range of observable leadership behaviours directly related to
the safety environment21.
This paper is primarily concerned with how to better lead your businesses toward Best Practice
outcomes by implementing/integrating the constructs of Transformational Safety® within your
more traditional behavioural based safety (BBS) programs. To achieve this goal we are going to
have to spend some time thinking about BBS in general, and maybe considering some of the
socio-historical context from whence it came.
17
Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety: National Research Council. (1982), “Toward Safer Underground Coal Mines”,
National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., pp.1-190.
18
Fleming, M., Flin, R., Mearns, K., Gordon, R. (1996). “The offshore supervisor’s role in safety management: Law enforcer or
risk manager”. Conference Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and
Gas Exploration and Production, New Orleans, 9–12 June 1996, SPE 35906.
19
Mattila, M., Hyttinen, M., Rantanen, E., (1994). “Effective supervisory behaviour and safety at the building site”, International
Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 13, pp.85–93
20
Simard, M., Marchand, A., (1994). “The behaviour of first line supervisors in accident prevention and effectiveness in
occupational safety”. Safety Science, 17, pp.169–185.
21
Hofmann, D.A., Jacobs, R., Landy, F., (1995). “High reliability process industries: individual, micro and macro organisational
influences on safety performance”. Journal of Safety Research, 26, pp.131–149.
22
Barling, J., Loughlin, C., and Kelloway, E.K. (2002). Development and Test of a Model Linking Safety-Specific Transformational
Leadership and Occupational Safety, Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, No 3. pp.488-496.
23
Broadbent, D.G. (2004), “Maximising Safety Performance via Leadership Behaviours”, Proceedings of the 28th International
Congress of Psychology, Beijing, CHINA, 8th – 14th August, 2004
BBS programs have become increasingly popular over the past couple of decades. To quote a
very famous American physicist, who was also well known within Australia, Julius Sumner-
Millar, “Why is it so24?”
This is something well worthy of consideration as the amount of “take-up” for BBS style
programs appears to have been exponential in their application. At the most simplistic of levels
it is believed to deliver cost savings25. In real terms that often means less people experiencing
occupational injury; that has to be a good thing. Another factor is that it is relatively “simple” to
explain, even if that explanation is only part of the story.
You often hear behavioural safety advocates saying things like “ninety percent of your accidents
are caused by unsafe behaviours; therefore if we can modify the unsafe behaviours we get rid
of the accidents”. Now, this is actually nothing new. It is actually the work of H. W. Heinrich.
Heinrich was an Assistant Superintendent of the Engineering and Inspection Division of
Travellers Insurance Company during the 1930's and 1940's. Thus the claim that 90% (or a
similar number) of injuries are due to unsafe acts is a “straight lift” of Heinrich's work.
Heinrich's conclusions though were based on poorly investigated supervisor accident reports,
which pretty much held workers accountable for their own injuries; accident causation, as a
science, did not exist at the time. Heinrich actually concluded that 88% of all industrial accidents
were primarily caused by unsafe acts (his actual data only gave 70%). DuPont says that 96% of
injuries and illnesses are caused by unsafe acts. Behaviour Science Technology (BST) has
stated that between 80% and 95% of all accidents are caused by unsafe behaviour. When we
really try and explore the science behind these claims we find a fair bit of “poetic licence” being
used.
Almost all of the behavioural safety advocates conveniently leave out the rest of Heinrich’s
findings. For example if we take the time to read the original work we can see that another of his
conclusions, "ancestry and social environment are factors in every accident26", does not seem
to receive much airplay; despite it
being the first domino in the
sequence; and this is a sequential
model! We also find that many
conveniently forget to identify the
second domino (accidents are the
fault of the person concerned). One
of the regular criticisms of BBS
programs is that workers feel that it
is “fault based” and part of a “blame
game”. We spend quite some time
trying to convince workforces this is
not the case, when maybe it is
partly so?
It has been said, somewhat unfairly I believe, that Heinrich was both racist and strongly class
conscious within his conclusions27. If we are going to allow such a criticism to stand then we
also have to discard the conclusions of almost all of the scientific thinkers of the 1920’s, 1930’,
and even the 1940’s. Even within my own field of applied psychology we have been equally
effective in taking the same path of the times28. Psychologists at the time were very keen to
support the hypothesis that intelligence was race related29. It’s only a small step to jump from
that view, to linking intelligence (read problem solving) to thinking about accident causation.
24
Australian Red Cross Society (1998). “ Why is it so? : The very best Millergrams of Professor Julius Sumner Miller;”
Ringwood, Vic; Penguin Books
25
Hantula, D.A., Rajala, A.K., Brecher, E.G. DeNicolis Braggerm J.L (2001). “The Value of Workplace Safety: A Time-Based
Utility Analysis Model,” Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, Volume: 21 Issue: 2
26
Heinrich, H.W., (1936). “Industrial Accident Prevention”, McGraw Hill, New York, NY.
27
McDonald, G., (2006). “The Origin and Fallacies of Behaviour Based Safety - A TWU Perspective”, Published by the TWU
Health and Safety Department, 1700 Broadway, Second Floor, New York, NY
28
Gould, S.J. (1996). “The Mismeasure of Man”, WW Norton and Company, New York: NY
29
Gossett, T.F., (1965). “Race: The history of an idea in America”, New Yorlk: Schocken Books
Whilst you might feel that I have been somewhat critical of Heinrich’s work I would beg to differ.
What I have done, ever so briefly, is consider the basic premise from the position of current
safety science; a way of thinking that was unavailable to Heinrich. This giant amongst men was
a product of his time and the world owes limitless gratitude to this man for his attention to a field
that had been often timed ignored.
Another more contemporary investigator in the world of safety is James T Reason. We often
find him floating about within many business safety systems. What often surprises me is often
we find Reason within BBS systems as well; again if we read his own work he was not a great
advocate of BBS. Indeed the Reason Model was far more focused on identifying latent or
underlying conditions that were primarily the purview of management etc. In 2003 though he
began to change his tune somewhat; suggesting that in “highly protected environments” we
might have reached a point of diminishing returns and something else is called for30.
For James Reason it all happened sometime in the 1970’s, whilst he was preparing a cup of
tea. At the same time his cat was crawling up his leg indicating its own need for sustenance.
Reason states he then proceeded to open the tin of cat food and, without thought or regard,
loaded up the teapot. Not only that, the “moggy” had its first taste of Chinese green tea.
As a cognitive psychologist, Reason suddenly realised a new research topic was literally under
his nose. In tracing the causes of absent minded incidents, Reason began an exploration of
human error. Three decades later, Reason has become a leading expert on error and one of the
recognised architects of the tools used to improve safety in the workplace.
The key development around Reason’s work is “The Swiss Cheese” model. Unlike Heinrich’s
Domino Model, which was considered to be very sequential (knocking over one domino before
you get to the next one), Reason suggests the accident is actually a product of a number of
events that are continually moving
about, and it is when these events
(holes in the cheese) line-up that an
accident/incident occurs. In other
words, the need for sequencing in
causation has been removed, and
more open acknowledgement of
other factors influencing the system,
allows for a somewhat gentler
approach to the problem of
causation.
This is a very simplistic view of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model, although it can be as simple or
as complex as you wish to make it. There are untold articles and monographs exploring
Reason’s work and they are well worth reviewing31,32,33. Again we find that many behavioural
safety advocates are quick to identify the cheese slices concerned with risk appreciation,
personal attitudes, work practices etc. Only more recently have we begun to see some more
serious consideration of the more global contextual environment in which both the dominoes
and the cheese co-exist34. Reason himself has made this point35 over and over again. When we
look at a number of industrial environments that are known to invest heavily in safety
programming we find they are beginning to see a recognition of the need to approach the
dominos and the cheese from a different direction.
Falconer, within a body of work exploring one of the most risk protected industries, military
service, has published extensively in the area of “soft skills” as a fundamental requirement often
30 th
Reason, J.T., (2003). “Aviation psychology in the 20 century – did we really make a difference”, Australian Aviation
th
Psychology Symposium, December 12t -5 2003, Sydney, Australia
31
Johnson, W., & Palanque, P. (2004). “Human Error, Safety And System Development”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 3300
AH Dordercht, THE NETHERLANDS
32
Partington, A. (2003). “Constructing Risk and Safety in Technological Practice”, Routledge:London
33
Reason, J. T. (1990). “Human Error”, Cambridge University Press,
34
Young, M., Shorock, S., Faulkner, J., & Braithwaite, G. (2004). “Who moved my ‘swiss’ cheese? The (r)evolution of human
factors in transport safety investigation” , International Society of air Safety Investigators Annual Conference, Gold Coast,
th nd
Australia, 29 Aug – 2 Sept, 2004.
35
Reason, J.T., (1997). “Managing the risks of organisational accidents”, Ashgate Publishing Company: Hampshire, England
overlooked36. Conclusions were that “culture” is a construct not given enough attention, and it is
high time more attention was paid. Similarly the question of “culture” has been explored within
the oil and gas industries for some time with strong conclusions supporting the view that culture
is a significant protagonist within the causation argument37,38,39. For the moment, let’s consider a
low margin industry such as “facilities management”; becoming increasingly popular as
businesses try and rationalise to their core business and seek to “out source” just about
everything else, and generally look for low price alternatives. In such a harsh environment,
where safety performance becomes a point of difference between competitors (at least on the
paperwork) we see increasing attention being paid to culture related constructs40.
For the purpose of clarity lets not
forget Heinrich basically stated
these sorts of things as his first
(1st) domino; “social environment”
is certainly applicable to the
cultural environment within the
workplace. As to the question of
“ancestry” I am going to suggest
that the myths and histories
associated with a workplace,
provide an organisational ancestry
in and of itself. This view is an
extension of the seminal work of
Edgar Schein and his work on the impact of myth within organisational life41. I am sure you can
see where we are going with this. The construct of safety culture has a clear place even within
Heinrich's domino theory of accident causation. Not only does it have a clear place it has the
primary place; i.e. safety culture has a clear relationship with Domino 1.
Moving back to the cheese for a moment. If we accept that we have all these cheese slices with
holes in them (system failures) it stands to reason (no pun intended) that the speed at which the slices
move around the plane is going to have a direct relationship with the number of times the holes
are going to line up; and when they do
you have an accident/incident (system
event). So what is it that determines the
lateral movement of the cheese?
Surprise, surprise, I am going to put it to
you that the culture that exists within the
organisation is that which provides
these controls (system stability). In
other words the healthier and robust is
your safety culture the less movement
of the cheese.
I am sure you have seen the journey coming around the mountains and where have we ended
up. In some respects we have arrived at the beginning. Two of the primary models which are
commonly referenced within the world of BBS can be shown to require a solid appreciation of
the impacts of safety culture to make them more complete. Such requires leaders within the
business to take far closer looks at their own safety behaviours. Before we start dealing with
36
Falconer, B., (2005). “Cultural Changes in military aviation: Soft Issues at the Sharp End”. Human Factors and Aerospace
Safety Journal, 5 (1), pp. 61-79.
37
Laing, R., (2003). “Safety in the Oil and Gas Industry - An Operator's Experience”, Construction Safety Awards, London
December 9, 2003
38
Flin, R. & Mearns, K. (2002). “Factoring the human into safety: Translating research into practice”. In B. Wilpert & B.
Fahlbruch (Eds) Systems safety - Challenges and Pitfalls of Intervention. Amsterdam: Elsvier.
39
McDonald, R., (1997). “Empowering and Motivating Grassroots Staff to Take Ownership of Safety Management”, Offshore
Safety Management Conference, Marcliffe Hotel, Aberdeen, 29th September 1997
40
Birsztejn, T., (2006). “Establishing Best Practice Strategies To Optimise The Performance Of Your Contractors: Tackling The
th
Soft Issues Not Usually Contained Within A Contract”, The 5 Annual Pan European Assett Management and Plant
Maintenance Summit, October 2006
41 nd
Schein, E. (1992). “Organisational culture and leadership” .2 Edition. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass
that “sacred cow” let’s take a small deviation in the journey; to use more appropriate language
we might call it a small detour.
Those who are regularly exposed to my own work shall know that I have been
known to become a little lateral in my approach to the subject at hand. To this
end let us take a brief journey into the world of Karl Popper and the philosophy of
science. Popper is arguably the most influential scientific thinker of the 20th
Century.
We all have our philosophies, whether or not we are aware of the fact, and our philosophies are
not worth very much. But the impact of our philosophies upon our actions and our lives is often
devastating. This makes it necessary to try to improve our philosophies. (Paraphrased from
Karl Popper42).
The way in which we believe things occur determines how we will respond and attempt to
manage them. An analysis of accident causation in many ways is an examination of our own
philosophies and/or prejudices. It is therefore culture, time and place specific. If one believes
that people are dying from the plague because of selective retribution from God for past sins,
then the way this risk is managed will be different from the society, which believes in germ
theory.
If you really want to try and stretch those little things called synapses and neurones let’s play
with another “sacred cow”; the concept of Zero Injury.
1. Do you believe it is attainable?
2. On what fundamental belief do you base this conclusion?
3. Is it based upon your historical experience?
4. Is it what you want to achieve for business outcomes?
5. Is it something you focus upon for a competitive advantage?
6. Is it just “right”?
You therefore have a number of competing philosophies which all have their own prejudices
attached to them. Let me suggest to you that large numbers of your workforces generally do not
believe that Zero Injury is attainable; despite your best efforts, at times, to convince them
otherwise. Why do we know this with some certainty? Because of the many people who have
been asked this question directly and anonymously (n>20,000)43.
To consider this from a quality perspective just reflect on the principles of the Six Sigma
approach. This is one of the most aggressive quality systems available and it statistically
acknowledges that “perfection” is unattainable; although success can be “pretty close”44. If we
apply Six Sigma to Zero Injury we are forced to acknowledge that we shall always have a
system event within the sixth sigma; not zero (pretty close though). This does not mean your
goal should not be Zero Injury; you might need to think about that for a while.
So let’s spend a moment considering how we attain these philosophies. Knowledge is acquired
and processed in the context of world views, of systems of knowledge and of cultures which
people share and regularly confirm to each other (I hope you thought that bit was important). It is built into
existing frames of reference, evaluated and selected, and meaning is attached to it, and tied into
the historical experience of a given social environment. It is neither autonomous nor objective
but rather bound into those social conditions under which people live, and influenced by the
social position of an individual in his or her society and their respective material living
conditions. The sociology of knowledge has provided ample evidence for this and many
empirical studies have explored the images of society held by different social strata and
professional groups45. Such paradigms which are relatively resistant against change do also
exist in science, as Thomas Kuhn has argued46.
42
Popper, K., (2002). “The Logic of Scientific Discovery,” Routledge Classics: Taylor & Francis Books
43
Pitzer, C., (1999). “Safety Culture Survey Report – Minerals Council of Australia”, Publication of The Minerals Council of
Australia, PO Box 4497, KINGSTON, ACT, 2604, AUSTRALIA
44
Pande, P.S., Neuman, R.P. Cavanagh, R.S. (2000). “The Six Sigma Way: How GE, Motorola, and Other Top Companies are
Honing Their Performance”, McGraw Hill, New York:NY
45
Mannheim, K., (1956). “Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge”, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London
46
Kuhn, T (1996). “The Structure of Scientific Revolutuions”, Univerity of Chicago Press
In everyday life, we accept a statement as “true” if it is confirmed by the rules of everyday

experience, if it seems reasonable, if it is held true by people we love and respect, or if it is
confirmed by secondary information. A statement is taken to be “scientifically true” if it has been
published in a highly reputable volume and is taken for granted by respected scientists, or if it
has been tested according to the rules of scientific methodology. Karl Popper insists that the
truth of a statement can never be objectively confirmed in scientific rigour and that the scientific
method exists to falsify well-established hypotheses, and thus gradually narrows the field of
potential truth47. It does not count very much in real practical research sadly, because new
hypotheses are being continuously generated and tested in the hope of verification (not
falsification), while sets of well established hypotheses being falsified is the exception. In other
words those of us sitting in the Universities are more concerned about supporting what we
believe, and often designing our experimentation etc. with our “philosophies and prejudices” in
mind. Not quite the way it is supposed to work. Safety research is rarely any different.
In extra-scientific everyday life, sensual experience, the opinion of a reference group, although
sadly it is mostly the mass media, prove to be the relevant proofs of truth. In most of the
sciences the empirical proof of truth is made by statistical tests based on probability theory,
while quoting from the bible, or from a classical author has lost in persuasiveness (although in
some cultures this measure of truth still exists).
How about we end our detour into the philosophy of science at that point. If there was a point it
was to point out that there is a great deal of flexibility in regards to what constitutes a “true”
theory. I would put it to you that such applies equally powerfully to the “theories” of accident
causation and their safety related outcomes.
Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons, including issues around our discussion above; there
continues to be real debate as to what behavioural based safety is and its efficacy, from a
number of sources48,49. Nevertheless even one of the critics, and a past President of the
American Society of Safety Engineers, Donald J. Eckenfelder, has stated
“This is the best idea that safety has seen in the last thirty years and perhaps since we first
decided that injuries were preventable.50”
I have to say that in my capacity as a Safety Psychologist this all intrigues me and, as you can
see; tends to take up a bit of “thinking time”. On the other hand when I put on my Safety
Consultant hat, which is more concerned with the basic outcome of having workers return home
at least as well as when they arrived at the workplace, I am nowhere near as “precious” about
the “science”. It is not the purpose of this presentation to provide a detailed primer and critique
of behavioural safety; there are numerous locations where you can embark upon that journey if
you so wish51,52.
Firstly we have the very real issue of what is a BBS program? Now before we all get caught up
on definitions, and more definitions, I need to suggest that there actually is some importance to
this debate also. No doubt you have heard the expression “we need to make sure we are
comparing apples with apples”; and the alternate position equally heard, at times, is “you can’t
say that; you’re comparing apples with oranges”. My own concern is that essentially what we
have here is an industrial environment within which there are an infinite number of programs out
there all purporting to be behavioural safety programs. Some of these are actually quite good
and others are actually quite good “quackery”.
While behavioural safety shares a concern with human behaviour and safe performance in the
workplace with other approaches, it is actually more than that. Behavioural safety is the
application of behavioural research on human performance to the problems of safety in the
47
Popper, Karl. (1960). “The Poverty of Historicism”. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London
48
Manuele, F.A., (2002). “Heinrich Revisited: Truisms or Myths”, National Safety Council 1121 Spring Lake Drive, Itasca, IL
49
Eckenfelder, D.J., (1996). “Values-Driven Safety: Re-engineering Loss Prevention using Value-inspired Resource
Optimization”. Government Institutes Inc, Maryland USA.
50
Eckenfelder, D.J., (1996). “Values-Driven Safety: Re-engineering Loss Prevention using Value-inspired Resource
Optimization”. Government Institutes Inc, Maryland USA.
51
Hidley, J.H. and T.R. Krause, (1994). “Behavior-Based Safety: Paradigm Shift Beyond the Failures of Attitude-Based
Programs”. Professional Safety. Oct.1994 pp. 28-32.
52
Geller, S.E., (1995). “Behavioral Safety: Key to Achieving a Total Safety Culture”. Professional Safety. July 1995, pp. 16-22
workplace. This means that any safety program labelling itself as a behavioural safety program
should meet the standards of behaviour analytic research, as these practices are applied to the
workplace; such a position narrows the field significantly. Indeed one international organisation,
the Cambridge Centre for Behavioural Studies, provides independent accreditation of workplace
behavioural safety programs against defined parameters53.
Having been an applied safety professional for many years, supporting both small businesses
and multinational corporations with their safety related interventions, I have lost track of the
number of times internal safety managers and CEO’s have expressed frustration with their
behavioural safety systems.
We regularly hear comments similar to:-
i. We gained significantly in the early days and it’s levelled off.
ii. We just can’t seem to get any further improvement
iii. Our people don’t seem as serious about safety as they were
iv. The consultants’ have gone and we are seeing our safety performance start to slide again
One can understand the levels of frustration behind these observations as behavioural safety
interventions are often quite expensive to implement. In most cases they would seem to be at
least cost neutral in the medium term. The anecdotal evidence though is that in the longer term
their efficacy is being questioned by the very people who are reaching into the corporate wallet
to pay for them in the first pace; and thus the value of the original investment would seem to be
being questioned.
This is unfortunate as again the real meaning to safety statistics deteriorating is often people
being killed, maimed, or experiencing other life impacts that are not desired. I appreciate the
strength of the imagery here, and it is deliberate. Whilst some might practice the psychological
process of “dissociation” and think of safety performance as LTIFR etc; this too is unfortunate.
Statistical processes are important and we find businesses boasting to each other about the low
levels of their LTIFR etc. Nevertheless the real world impact of such numbers is people growing
up without fathers, mothers etc. Households being completely decimated due to the financial
changes often associated with workplace injury. Increases in chronic health conditions,
alcoholism and a whole range of other socio-cultural impacts.
Let me say again; it is not worth getting too “precious” about whether you have the best or worst
BBS program on the planet. The value here is how do we make it culturally superior and
therefore improve its performance and sustainability. I have already explored the history of
safety culture, some of the foundational elements of many behavioural safety interventions, and
how the healthier the safety culture the more robust the safety systems that essentially hang off
it. There is limited value in implementing behavioural safety systems within cultures that do not
have appropriate commitment and stability. They shall not work effectively, irrespective of how
much money is thrown at them.
The very basis of this presentation is how The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement
System can be the point of difference in making your behavioural safety (BBS) programs give
maximum “bang” for your “buck”.
The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System is an integrated suite of applications
and interventions which has a foundation in the world of transformational leadership. Many of
the worlds leading authors have commented about the applicability of transformational
leadership principles to the real world of applied safety54, 55, 56, 57.
53
Cambrdge Centre for Behavioral Studies, 336 Baker Ave. Concord, MA 01742
54
Zohar, D., & Luria, G., (2003). “The Use of Supervisory Practices as Leverage to Improve Safety Behaviour: A Cross-level
Intervention Model”, Available from: Prof. Dov Zohar, Faculty of I.E. & Management, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology,
Haifa 32000, Israel. E-mail: dzohar@tx.technion.ac.il
55
Barling, J., Loughlin, C. & Kelloway, E.K. (2002). “Development and test of a model linking safety-specific transformational
leadership and occupational safety”. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 3, pp. 488-496.
56
Barling, J., Weber, T. & Kelloway, E.K. (1996). “Effects of transformational leadership training on attitudinal and fiscal
outcomes: A field experiment”. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, pp. 827-832.
57 th
Broadbent, D.G., (2004). “Maximising Safety Performance via leadership Behaviours”, 28 International Congress of
Psychology, Beijing, CHINA
Therefore to achieve our goal we are going to have to take a closer look at the world of
transformational leadership, and particularly safety leadership. Recall the excellent work of Lisa
Ronald58.
“active safety leadership/ management commitment variables appear to play an integral
(if not the most crucial) role in ensuring safety success”.
So let’s think about what are some of the factors that might act as influencing vehicles as far as
enhanced safety performance is concerned. What is it then that stops things falling on your
head? One group from Australia have developed a model of safety performance which draws
upon more traditional understandings around work performance in general59. They then go on to
describe two (2) key aspects of safety performance as being:-
Safety Compliance - The term “safety compliance” is used to describe the core activities that
need to be carried out by individuals to maintain workplace safety.
These behaviours include adhering to standard work procedures and
wearing personal protective equipment.
Safety Participation - The term “safety participation” is used to describe behaviours that do
not directly contribute to an individual’s personal safety, but which do
help to develop an environment that supports safety. These behaviours
include activities such as participating in voluntary safety activities,
helping co-workers with safety-related issues, and attending safety
meetings.
The largest of questions is; what do we need to do more of to maximise safety compliance and
safety participation within our workplaces. Once we get these aspects right, outcomes such as
reduction in injury rates etc shall naturally follow.
Thus the safety systems that fly, couple aspects of Transformational Leadership within their
behavioural paradigms, remember the majority of BBS programs are pretty “lite on” on this area.
Now we are getting closer to the purpose of this article. You don’t believe me do you? What are
the real world consequences of ignoring Transformational Leadership within safety system
design; and then what is the “payoff” when we actually do ensure Transformational Leadership
is an integral foundation of the safety system.
When some researchers exploring safety climate/culture crunched their numbers they found
some common relationships between a range of variables eg supervision & management,
existence of a safety system, risk taking behaviour, work pressure, and work competence.60 A
further group concluded when they looked at over a dozen safety climate outcome measures
the common theme was “management safety activity”.61 The United States Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA) have recognised the “power” of leadership and have defined
“management leadership” as a key program element in safety system design.62 The U.K.
Health and Safety Regulator apparently is aware of this and associates the organisational
factors influencing safety culture as follows.
 Senior management commitment.
 Management style.
 Visible management.
 Good communication between all levels of employees (management action).
 A balance of health and safety and production goals (management prioritisation).
58
Ronald, L., (1998), “Identifying the elements of successful safety programs: A literature review”, A Report prepared for the
Prevention Division, Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia, 6711 Elmridge Way, RICHMOND, BC, V7C 4N1
59
Neal, A, & Griffin, M. (2002). Safety Climate and Safety Behaviour, Australian Journal of Management, Vol 27, pp. 67-76
60
Flin, R. et al. (2000). “Safety Climate: Identifying the Common Features”, Safety Science, 34, 177
61
Guldenmund, F. (2000). “The Nature of Safety Culture: A Review of Theory and Research”, Safety Science, 34, 215.
62
Program Evaluation Profile (PEP), Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20210
Some well regarded Canadian researchers63 have argued that leadership is one of the most
critical determinants of workplace safety performance. They go on to express the belief,
supported by much research64,65, that leadership plays an integral role in developing and
maintaining the safety climate within an organisation.
By now I hope that it is
understood how crucial
safety leadership is to
your safety results.
Your leadership creates
and maintains the
culture that determines
what will, and will not,
work in your BBS
Programs (or in any
other endeavour really).
An effective safety
leader clearly
communicates what
results are required; in
addition to what is
acceptable to achieve
those results.
It doesn’t take a lot of time to see the relationship which is clearly self evident. The impact of
management, and more importantly, leadership is a key, if not the key “influencer” on any
effective safety management system. We may have all sorts of reasons for not wanting to look
in this mirror; nevertheless the “hard data” doesn’t lie.
The most obvious strategy is that we develop a transformational safety leadership (TSL) culture
throughout the organisation, and I mean at ALL levels, which shall then directly impact upon the
way that all the “speed bumps” and “collisions” are resolved.
Transformational leadership culture may well be something you have not come across before.
Consider for a moment you develop a free thinking, problem solving, transformational leader
within an organisational culture which is highly transactional. You will not likely achieve the
“beyond expectation” safety outcomes that you wish to experience. So how do you determine
where the organisation is as regards the goals of optimal safety culture and safety leadership?
Firstly we need to gain an appreciation as to where the organisation is placed against the
parameters of Safety Culture and Safety Leadership. The Transformational Safety® Survey, an
integral component of The Transformational Safety® Improvement System, has two primary
components that have been strategically integrated to allow an organisation to gather this
information quite painless66, a third component is developed to explore site specific workplace
behaviours (items of which can be drawn from an organisations current behavioural data). If you
have a closer look at the model presented you can see aspects of the more traditional BBS;
particularly when we look at Site Specific Workplace Behaviours. One of the key differences is
that we loudly acknowledge that the leadership behaviours demonstrated within the
organisation, particularly the safety leadership behaviours, have a critical impact within the
behavioural triggers of operational workforces.
Part A of the Transformational Safety® Survey is targeted at the construct of Safety Culture. It
uses a Likert scale survey methodology, in conjunction with formal 1:1 survey structure to
interrogate a number of well validated cultural dimensions. Using the unique safety-plex© to
display the results, organisations are able to compare their safety culture against work units,
63
Barling and Zacharatos, A. (1999), “High performance safety systems: Management practices for achieving optimal safety
performance”, paper presented at the 25th annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Toronto, CANADA
64
Hoffman D.A. & Morgeson, F.P. (1999). “Safety-related behavior as a social exchange: The role of perceived organizational
support and leader-member exchange”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 286–296
65
Zohar, D. (2000). “A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group climate on micro accidents in
manufacturing jobs”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 587–96.
66
At times looking into the organisational safety mirror can be a little painful.
departments, geographical locations,

etc. The actual items of the
Transformational Safety® Survey are
components of a fully researched and
factor analysed safety culture
instrument. Part A of The
Transformational Safety® Survey was
developed by The University of
Loughborough's school of Safety
Science67. When developing
transformational safety® within an
organisations’ culture we are always
trying to move our cultural dimensions
toward, or ideally inside, the “green
zone”.
7. Management operates an open door policy on safety issues
8. Safety is the number one priority in my mind when completing a job
9. Co-workers often give tips to each other on how to work safely

10. Safety rules and procedures are carefully followed
11. Management clearly considers the safety of employees of great importance
12. I am sure it is only a matter of time before I am involved in an accident
13. Sometimes I am not given enough time to get the job done safely
14. I am involved in informing management of important safety issues
15. Management acts decisively when a safety concern is raised
16. There is good communication here about safety issues which affect me
®
Sample Items from Part A of The Transformational Safety Survey
Part B of The Transformational Safety® Survey Part B is based upon the thinking of Joseph
Rost68, James McGregor Burns69 and the later developmental work of Professors Bernie Bass70
and Bruce Avolio71. In this component of The Transformational Safety® System we build on the
powerful work that has come before with a specific targeting of safety leadership behaviours.
Part B has been developed around the authors own experience in applied safety management
and observation of safety cultures, whilst also being synergistically related to the constructs
developed by Professors Bass and Avolio, though with a powerful safety leadership focus.
67
Cox., S., & Cheyne, A.J.T., (2000), “Assessing safety culture in offshore environments”, Safety Science, 34, pp. 111-129
68
Rost, J., (1991), “Leadership in the twenty first century”, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport: CT
69
Burns, J.M., (1978), “Leadership”, Harper and Roe Publishers, New York:NY
70
Bass, B.M., (1985), “Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations”, New York: Free Press
71
Avolio, Bruce J. (1999), “Full Leadership Development: Building the Vital Forces in Organisations” Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
The Transformational Safety® System safety leadership constructs are:

 The Invisible Man (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Laissez-Faire)
 The Fire-fighter (FRLM® 72 equivalent – MBE-P)
 The Policeman (FRLM® 72 equivalent – MBE-A)
 The Dealer (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Contingent Reward)

® 72
The Motivator (FRLM equivalent – Inspirational Motivation)
 ® 72
The Knight (FRLM equivalent – Idealised Attributes)
 The Innovator (FRLM® 72 equivalent – Intellectual Stimulation)

® 72
The Carer (FRLM equivalent – Individualised Consideration)
 The Missionary(FRLM® 72 equivalent – Idealised Behaviours)
Reporting of Part B of the

Transformational Safety®
Survey uses an exploded
pie chart. Best practice
balancing of the
Transformational Safety®
slices are able to be
determined by the, taking
into account a range of
factors including context,
hazard and risk profiles
etc.
With Part B we take advantage of the same colour metaphor. When it comes to the
transformational safety® dimensions that appear in red we actually do not wish to see any of
them, or if they have to be present, only in infinitesimal proportions. Those colours that are
shown in amber are depicting the presence of safety leadership behaviours that are required in
an effective safety system, though they should not be the primary behaviours exhibited within
the organisation. These are transactional leadership behaviours within a safety related context.
It is when the transformational safety® leadership behaviours are shown to be demonstrably
“green” that you are giving your safety system the power of transformational leadership
competencies. Part B of The Transformational Safety® Survey has the ability to separate the
result profiles based upon level of leadership within the organisation. This is critical data if an
organisation is attempting to determine the levels of leadership within the organisation that shall
most benefit from targeted transformational safety® interventions.
1. I am proud to be associated with the management team at this workplace for the manner in
which they approach safety
6. My line manager/supervisor comes across as being fair and ethical in matters of workplace
safety
11. When my line manager/supervisor promotes safety within the workplace it is personal,
powerful and has a high impact on me
16. My line manager/supervisor is willing to consider all approaches to workplace safety, even if
that means “rocking the boat” a bit
21. My line manager/supervisor is regularly seen “out and about” talking to people abut their own
jobs and workplace safety
26. My line manager/supervisor is always willing to help out with safety matters though there is
often something required in return
31. My line manager/supervisor is regularly looking around the workplace for poor housekeeping,
things out of place etc
®
Sample Items from Part B of The Transformational Safety Survey
72
This instrument is not a replacement for assessing general transformational leadership; if that is required the appropriate tool is
the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) available as a unique service from www.transformationalsafety.com or from the
Australasian distributor www.mlq.com.au.The Transformational Safety Leadership dimensions do not share any direct statistical
® ®
association with the FRLM . Items have been developed to share a synergistic relationship only. The Full Range Leadership
Model is copyrighted to Professors Bernie Bass and Bruce Avolio.
The Transformational Safety® Survey is able to be provided using a range of delivery systems.
By far the most powerful and valid administration of The Transformational Safety® Survey is
using our patented wireless delivery system. Due to the added validity that this delivery system
gives to the data this mechanism shall always be explored prior to exploring alternate methods
of data collection. Wireless delivery allows there to be no impacts associated with literacy, and
allows complete anonymity; maximising more robust result profiles.
Should it be determined that the On-Site Wireless Delivery System (shown
actual size) is untenable then a number of alternate delivery systems to enable
data collection may be appropriate. These are:-
 Customised Web Administration
 Email Administration
 PDF Fillable Form Administration
 Paper/Pencil Administration
Off-site administrations provide an abridged Part A. The power and flavour of a number of
cultural constructs are unable to be quantified without using the additional value of strategic
Focus Group methodologies.
Having completed Part A and Part B of The Transformational Safety® Survey organisations are
well placed to assess their position toward a Best Practice transformational safety® system. Part
C (customised behavioural safety indicators) also allows the organisation to map its
contemporary BBS outcomes (beyond those traditional LTIFR metrics).
The preferred method for exploring the interrelationships of “safety culture”, “safety leadership”
and BBS opportunities is to implement the Integrated Safety Culture Assessment; this
presentation format was developed by the author in 2000. It was created as result of an
awareness of the significant gap in the manner in which many safety culture assessments were
not only being delivered, also the value of their reporting. Essentially the author’s view was that
safety culture assessments were being poorly implemented, despite a small number of
"providers" leveraging significant dollars out of their customers. And for what! In many cases
organisations would be told information they felt they already knew. The biggest concern was
that, for the most part, there was very little science behind the offerings out there (there’s that
word again).
Added to that, much of what was being offered to the market did not really address the identified
constructs of safety culture as demonstrated by some of the worlds leading published
commentators. You will remember Lisa Ronald’s pre-eminent work on safety culture programs
throughout the world, identified some significant predictors of effective safety cultures, and yet
many of the tools on the market did not adequately measure, and/or assess, the presence of
those within the organisation. Arguably one of the most well respected thinkers on
organisational culture in general, and more recently specifically in the area of safety culture is
Edgar Schein73, we have spoken of him previously. Ed Schein has developed a cultural
framework specific to safety which has been adopted throughout the nuclear industry
internationally74.
In Schein’s model75, culture is assumed to be a pattern of shared basic assumptions, which are
invented, discovered or developed by an organisation as it learns to cope with problems of
survival and cohesiveness.
According to Schein’s three-level model, an organisation’s safety culture can be assessed by
evaluating the organisation’s artefacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions. On the first
level of the model are the organisation’s artefacts. Artefacts are the visible signs and
behaviours of the organisation, such as its written mission, vision, and policy statements. The
second level consists of the organisation’s claimed or espoused values. Examples of claimed
73
Schein, E., (2004). “Organizational Culture and Leadership”, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
74
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, INSAG-15 (2002). “Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture”,
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria.
75 nd
Schein, E. (1992), “Organisational culture and leadership” .2 Edition. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass
values might include mottos such as, “safety first” or “maintaining a blame-free work
environment.” The third level is comprised of the basic assumptions of the individuals within the
organisation. Basic assumptions are the beliefs and attitudes that individuals bring into the
organisation or that are developed as a result of experience within the organisation. Examples
of basic assumptions may include, “safety can always be improved” or “everyone can contribute
to safety.” The organisation’s basic assumptions regarding safety culture are less tangible than
the artefacts and claimed values. They are often taken for granted within the organisation that
shares the culture.
Artefacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions are evaluated to identify the presence or
absence of the characteristics that have been found to be important for the existence of a
positive safety culture. These characteristics include:
 Safety is a clearly recognised value in the organisation.
 Accountability for safety in the organisation is clear.
 Safety is integrated into all activities in the organisation.
 A safety leadership process exists in the organisation.
 Safety culture is learning driven in the organisation.
The TransformationalSafety.Com Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© achieves its
benchmark status within the market as a result of the manner in which it literally integrates a
number of different safety culture interrogation methods into the one intervention. In the world of
applied psychology this might be though of as convergent validity. The Transformational Safety®
Culture Improvement System’s Integrated Safety Culture Assessment includes:-
®
 Quantitative Analysis - The Transformational Safety Survey
®
 Qualitative Analysis - Transforming Safety Focus Groups
 Observational Analysis - On-Site behavioural review mechanisms
 Procedural Analysis - Summary observations of organisational procedures against international standards
eg., AS/NZS 4801, BSI 18001(1999), or ILO-OSH 2001.
All of the above are integrated within the most comprehensive safety culture assessment report available
today; with specific mapping to the Ed Schein Safety Culture Model.
Would it surprise you to know that the Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© is the only
qualitative/quantitative intervention in the World that "maps" an organisations safety culture
against the framework of Ed Schein.
Let us now have a look at
At Risk
Safety Culture some graphical
representations of how
Transformational Safety
Survey results can assist
organisations place their
Transformational
Leadership safety cultures into some
The Motivator
sort of developmental
Transactional
Leadership The Knight context. If one looks at the
Passive-Avoidant The Innovator
The Carer
image presented we find
The Policeman
The Invisible Man The Dealer The Missionary that those organisations
The Fireman
who demonstrate a profile
with a lot of red safety
Dangerous Expected Effort Heightened Desire to
Workplaces Only reach safety leadership behaviours
leadership outcomes (primary behaviours
Average Safety consistent with The
Performance Invisible Man and The
Exceptional Safety
Performance Fireman) are actually
demonstrating a safety
Optimal
culture which is
Safety significantly "at risk".
Culture Whilst they might
occasionally delve into
Visual depiction of the impacts of Transformational Safety® Leadership Behavioural Competencies upon Safety some of the transactional
Culture
leadership competencies this is generally inconsistent in its application. Rarely do cultures

based upon invisibility and fire fighting develop toward a healthier safety culture without some
sort of cathartic impact.
Let us move on to a
Traditional BBS transformational safety
Programs view of a traditional BBS
based culture. These
cultures are heavily based
around observed
Transformational behaviours and dealing
Leadership
with the employees, by
Transactional The Motivator way of risk/reward
The Knight
Passive-Avoidant
Leadership
The Innovator systems. There are
The Policeman The Carer regularly both overt and
The Invisible Man The Dealer The Missionary
The Fireman covert reward systems in
place. It has to be said
that the regulatory
Dangerous Expected Effort Heightened Desire to
Workplaces Only reach safety compliance pressures and
leadership outcomes statistical measurement
Average Safety systems often encouraged
Performance (read legally required) by
Exceptional Safety
Performance authorities, encourages
the maintenance of these
more traditional systems.
Optimal
Safety Traditional BBS systems
Culture have islands of recognition
®
around the values
Visual depiction of the impacts of Transformational Safety Leadership Behavioural Competencies upon
Safety Culture
associated with particular
leaders. Why do some
team leaders have “safer” work teams than others doing the same or similar work. It has been
shown it is not because of the “size of the stick”. It is the quality of the leader. Indeed it would
seem that some of the global leaders in the marketing and promotion of BBS systems have
begun to “twig” to this observation. Scott Geller’s “People Based Safety” program begins to try
and leverage this construct within their BBS paradigms.
The contrasts, or inconsistencies in approach, often continue to show themselves though.
These types of cultures also tend to show icebergs of avoidance. In other words there are
occasions where the passive-avoidant approaches of invisibility and fire-fighting continue to
show some presence. This is a significant problem and is frequently a source of concern for
those running these programs.
It is evident from this depiction where transformational safety leadership behaviours need to
develop. The whole “oval of influence” needs to consistently move toward the right and
encompass more of the transformational safety leadership behaviours.
Note well, a highly functioning transformational safety culture does not discard the transactional
styles of “policing” and “dealing”. We recognise these are effective approaches when utilised
strategically within a primarily transformational culture.
At the same time transformational safety does not suggest that we should discard the
risk/reward systems associated with traditional BBS. Behavioural based safety has shown itself
to be effective, to a point, in its application over a number of years.
It is when these actions occur, more often than not, that the system begins to reap the rewards
so regularly associated with transformational cultures.
Now that our journey is coming to a conclusion it is valuable to review where we have been.
I have attempted to demonstrate, from a number of sources, the powerful probative value of
safety culture as a foundational element within any workplace safety system. Without an
effective safety culture the evidence clearly shows that you could end up having the most
number of fatalities and severe injuries within your industry76.
I have then explored the fundamental positions of Heinrich and Reason and demonstrated the
relationships that safety culture has within those behavioural paradigms. Many contemporary
BBS systems have the work of these authors as foundational elements; some may not even
realise it.
In addition we have seen the Transformational
very powerful impact that Safety Culture
effective leadership, particularly
transformational leadership,
has been shown to have within
corporate outcomes generally, Transformational
and more particularly within the Leadership
real world outcomes of safety. The Motivator
Transactional
Leadership The Knight
Finally By adopting an Passive-Avoidant The Innovator
integrated approach to the The Policeman The Carer
The Invisible Man The Dealer The Missionary
implementation of The Fireman
Transformational Safety® within
your organisation’s cultural Heightened Desire
Dangerous Expected
systems, the evidence clearly Workplaces Effort Only to reach safety
leadership
shows direct and indirect outcomes
impacts upon safety outcome Average Safety
measures77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84. In Performance
Exceptional Safety
striving toward a Best Practice Performance
implementation of
Transformational Safety® 85 the
Optimal
integration of the Safety
Transformational Safety® Culture
Culture Improvement System
would be the strategy of Visual depiction of the impacts of Transformational Safety® Leadership Behavioural Competencies
upon Safety Culture
choice.
76
Bergman, L., & Barstow, D., (2003). “A Dangerous Business”, A FRONTLINE coproduction with The New York Times and
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
77
Geyer, A.L. & Steyrer, J. (1998). “Transformational Leadership, Classical Leadership Dimensions and Performance Indicators
in Savings Banks”. Leadership Quarterly, 47, 397-420.
78
Sarros, J.C. and Santora, J.C. (2001). “Personal Values and Executive Leadership: Global Comparisons and Practical
Implications”, Paper presented at the 2001 Academy of Business and Administrative Sciences International Conference,
th th
Quebec City, CANADA, 12 – 14 July 2001
79
Page, A., (2004). “Keeping Patients Safe: Transforming the Work Environment of Nurses”, National Academies Press, New
Your:NY
80
Krause, T., & Hidley, J., (2004). “The Art of Collaboration”, Perspectives in Behavioural Performance Improvement,
July/August.
81 th
Yule, S.J., Flin, R., & Mearns, K. (2002), “Managing Director Influence on Safety Performance”, Proceedings of the 25
Congress of Applied Psychology, SINGAPORE
82 th
Yule, S. (2002). “Do Transformational Leaders lead Safer Businesses”, Proceedings of the 25 Congress of Applied
Psychology, SINGAPORE
83
Flin, R., & Yule, S. (2004), “Leadership for Safety – Industrial Experience”, Qual Saf Health Care, 13 (Suppl II):ii45–ii51. doi:
10.1136/qshc.2003.009555
84
Barling, J., Moutinho, K., & Kelloway, K.E., (2006), “Transformational leadership and group performance: The mediating role
of affective commitment”, Working Paper 00-07, Queens School of Business, Queens University, ONTARIO: CANADA
85
Copyright © 2006, David G Broadbent – All Rights Reserved:
David G Broadbent asserts his rights, in accordance with the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) and the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, to be known as the author of the concept “Transformational Safety” and
“Transformational Safety System”.
The phrase Transformational Safety® is a registered trademark and incorporates The Transformational Safety® Culture
Improvement System, The Transformational Safety® Survey, and The Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© Model
incorporating the Observational Protocol.
Attachment 1. The Structure of Culture
Although "culture is everything" that goes on in an organisation (communications, procedures,

housekeeping, the way of running meetings etc.), for practical purposes it can be considered to exist in
layers. Some of the layers are directly observable, and some are invisible and have to be deduced from
the things that can be observed in the organisation. A way of thinking about the layers of culture is shown
below.
Understanding the Safety Culture Map
Underlying Assumptions
Edgar Schein proposes that cultures are based on a set of underlying assumptions about reality. In the practical
context, this means that an organisation will display observable artefacts and behaviours that result from what it
assumes about things such as vulnerability to an event, the nature of people (how are they motivated) and the
importance of following rules. Unless the leaders are intrusive about spreading the appropriate assumptions in their
organisations, people will simply form assumptions based on their own experience. This is normally bad for a safety
culture*.
Ideas and Knowledge

The next layer of culture in organisations is the set of basic ideas and specialised knowledge that management and
others have about what to do, why to do it and how to get it done in their organisation. There is therefore a whole
layer of organisational culture made up of the patterns of thinking and ideas about things such as how to direct
people, how to run meetings and whether to measure things. All of these ideas ultimately manifest themselves in
observable forms such as documents and behaviours. In general it is management that leads the way in these
patterns of ideas. However, management must also make sure that other people understand and hold the "right"
thinking patterns for their tasks. Examples are where specialised knowledge or insight is key to performance (e.g.
skilled operators, designers). In these cases the organisation must train and develop people to hold the appropriate
ideas and insights for the situations that may be encountered.
Patterns of Behaviour
People in organisations develop patterns of behaviour that become deeply embedded and which are passed on to
new staff very quickly. They range from the specialised (skills of the trade), through important traits such as
complying with procedures or wearing (or not wearing) protective equipment, and into less defined areas like raising
concerns and running meetings. These patterns of behaviour are the most obvious manifestation of the culture in the
human dimension and ultimately are of critical importance to safety.
It is known that people will imitate others very strongly in order to "fit in" to a new culture, that patterns of behaviour
are strongly triggered by specific situations, and that the patterns can be very hard to change. These facts mean that
the task of leadership in guiding and shifting behaviours is a serious challenge and requires a long-term effort.
Physical Things
The culture also exists in physical aspects such as documents, tools and equipment, housekeeping standards etc.
These can be of vital importance to performance. If the physical environment makes it hard for someone to do "the
right thing" but easy to do the wrong thing then performance will almost certainly suffer. An example would be out-of-
date procedures. In this type of situation people will tend to apply their assumption that what is really required is to
"do it right", and they will not follow the procedures. Procedural non-compliance then becomes a pattern of behaviour,
which on occasion will cause a serious event when a correct procedure is not followed. At this stage (if the event was
sufficiently serious) management will typically say: "We have a cultural problem".
Words, Language and Images

Finally the culture exists in words, language and images. Indeed without a structured language of organisational
concepts and concerns people cannot effectively form a cohesive culture. It is an important task of leaders to create
and use the language of an organisation. People become especially attached to jargon, and the use of specific
language will also trigger specific behaviours. Therefore it is sometimes necessary to change the jargon and the
language, or to introduce new images in order to change the culture.
Rules of Culture
There are some general rules of culture that can help to solidify the concepts.
1. In social cultures the layers generally tend to get more stable from the top down. However, in organisational
cultures management has particularly strong control over the ideas and knowledge. This means that it is
often easier to change the patterns of thinking in an organisation than to change its patterns of behaviour
(e.g. new managers can come in with new ideas, but fail to get people to change their old behaviours.)
2. Cultures are not good or bad in themselves, but are good or bad at achieving certain results such as safety
or quality.
3. There is always a safety culture in an organisation. The question is whether it is what management needs it
to be, and whether it is improving or degrading.
4. Cultures are a product of social learning. Therefore they cannot be shifted without a learning orientation and
without a lot of explanation and discussion as well as action.
5. Cultures have a natural tendency to degrade in the sense that the basic assumptions can get forgotten
leaving the patterns of thought and action; these then degrade in turn through complacency, changes in
personnel and other means. Therefore cultures always need renewal at the lower (invisible) layers, even to
"stand still".
6. Leaders change culture by intervening at all levels: they hold new and different assumptions and patterns of
thinking, they establish new patterns of behaviour and they can change the physical environment and the
language and images. In particular, leaders constantly refresh the lower, invisible, layers of culture.
7. People do not generally know their own underlying assumptions, and people do not all hold the same
underlying assumptions.
8. Cultures reduce anxiety for their members by establishing shared patterns of thinking, speaking and acting.
Therefore changing the culture will always increase anxiety until the new patterns are learned. Leaders must
make the anxiety of learning less than the anxiety of staying in the old culture.
David G Broadbent
Technical Safety Specialist – Global
TransformationalSafety.Com
Alliance House
12 Ken Tubman Drive, MAITLAND, NSW, 2320
AUSTRALIA
Tel: +612 49343653
E-mail: broadbentd@transformationalsafety.com
Skype: d.g.broadbent
PROFILE
A highly experienced and innovative corporate and counselling psychologist who has
synthesised these frameworks into a value adding experience for a large and varied
customer base. David is very focused upon the needs of his customers and this is evidenced
by a business that continues to prosper within a referral network created by customer
satisfaction.
David has highly developed interpersonal and groupwork skills and this has resulted in
recognition both nationally and internationally for his pragmatic ability to deliver the most
complex information in an entertaining and successful style.
David’s expertise in the world of occupational safety is highly regarded and he is regularly
sought after as a speaker at conference venues and corporate events throughout the World.
David is the Creator of the internationally recognised Transformational Safety Model and
regularly assists organisations assess and develop their safety management systems toward
worlds Best Practice.
SKILLS SUMMARY
 Metallurgist, in a “past life”, makes David one of the very few Safety Psychologist’s in the
world with such a powerful industrial history.
 Highly experienced Groupwork Facilitator.
 Demonstrated Program Development skills within a variety of industrial environments.
 Leadership Development and Change Management strategist within organisational
settings.
 Developed and implemented the POWER© Management Systems; an integrated
management skillset collection.
 Development and provision of Safety Management Systems for both domestic and
international consumption.
 Creator of the SAFE-T-NET Technologies; which is an integrated suite of safety
products that place safety system development within an empirically based psycho-
behavioural framework – and in multiple languages as well!
 Internationally recognised as one of the foremost commentators on Full Range
Leadership and associations with corporate and safety outcomes.
 Industrial History and a pragmatic ability to relate within all levels of an organisation;
from the Stock Room to the Board Room.
 Industry leader in the development of Trauma Recovery Solutions within organisational
frameworks.
 Experienced presenter to both small groups and large convention centres.
David G Broadbent
CAREER HIGHLIGHTS
 Director of Strategic Management Systems; a customer focused organisational
psychology practice.
 Development of a trauma education package for one of Australia’s largest multi-national
corporations.
 Creator of The Transformational Safety System©; the World’s only integrated safety
culture assessment system incorporating Transformational Leadership© Theory.
 Creator of the SAFE-T-NET Technologies; a fully integrated multi-lingual relationship
based safety development system.
QUALIFICATIONS
 Bachelor of Arts (Psych-Hons) - 1987
 Certificate IV in Assessment & Workplace Training – 2000
 Advanced Trauma Specialist – International Critical Incident Stress Foundation - 2000
 Advanced Coach – MLQ Leadership Development Systems – 2001
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
Managing Director - Strategic Management Systems Pty Ltd
Incorporating: The Leadership College – Leadership Development Solutions throughout the Asia-Pacific
The Safety Site – International Provider of Integrated Workplace Safety Systems
DG Broadbent & Associates – Organisational and Counselling Psychologists
TransformationalSafety.Com – Integrated Safety Culture Analysis and Reporting
Key Deliverables:
Leadership Development
 Designed the Lead to Succeed© Program - An outcome oriented leadership development program
incorporating Full Range Leadership principles.
 Developed Good to Greater© - The Asia-Pacific’s first experiential workshop incorporating the
seminal works of Jim Collins’ Good to Great.
 Developed Project to Success© - A Project Management education primer with particular emphasis
upon integrated leadership competencies.
 Created the ATLAS© Paradigm: A leadership competency framework for developmental coaching.
Safety Culture Analysis

 Developed and implemented the Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© model drawing upon
contemporary safety culture research.
 Regularly provides strategic advice to both domestic and international clients in regard to safety
enhancement programs.
 Developed and provides a cross-cultural multi-lingual safety culture assessment system.
 Created The Transformational Safety System©: The worlds first fully integrated safety culture
enhancement system incorporating Full Range Leadership Theory.
 Created the Process Safety Questionnaire (PSQ) – the Worlds first integrated Process Safety
perception survey instrument.
David G Broadbent
Occupational Health and Safety

 Assisted a key regional employer reduce their workers compensation exposure from $1,200,000 to
$60,000 across three (3) years.
 Assisted a key regional employer improve their occupational injury return to work rate from 35% to
100% within a twelve (12) month cycle.
 Developed an integrated EAP/Injury Management System for a high stress work environment which
improved return to rates from 0% to >80% within a twelve (12) month cycle.
 NSW Workcover accredited Rehabilitation Provider with the highest sustained Return to Work Rate
for the preceding fifteen (15) years.
 Has assisted global corporations with review and design of safety management systems.
 Designed and implemented the globally recognised Safety-Net Technologies – an internet based
safety system library targeted at maximising employee engagement with “The System”.
 Internationally qualified to audit against ISO18001: Occupational Health Management System
Development and Implementation.
 Nationally qualified to audit against AS/NZS 4801:2001: Occupational health and safety
management systems - Specification with guidance for use.
Coaching
 Foundation Member of the International Association of Coaches (IAC).
 Regularly provide corporate interventions using industry recognised coaching frameworks; eg
GROW, ACHIEVE, and the IAC-15 Proficiencies.
Risk Assessment
 Development and implementation of Australia’s only risk management training programs based upon
Operational Risk Management (ORM) principles: the risk management protocols utilised by the US
Navy Seals.
 Regularly conducts Risk Assessments/Incident Investigations for numerous organisations.
Trauma Management
 Provider of Trauma Recovery Solutions throughout Australia
 Advanced qualifications in Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)
 Technical Adviser to the AMCOR Global Trauma Education Program – involved film scripting, on-
camera involvement, and individual training of actors etc
 Creation and publication of the “Managing Trauma in the Workplace” Employers Guide – individually
licensed to workplaces.
PAPERS PRESENTED
“Leading the Way to Optimal Safety Performance”, A Global Developmental Workshop for the
International Council of Mining and Metals, The One Great George Street, LONDON, UNITED
KINGDOM, 24th- 25th March 2011
“Developing a Functional Safety Culture through High Reliability Operations”, Health & Safety:
Cultivating High Reliability Organisations in Africa: South African Academy of Occupational Safety and
Health, Southern Sun Grayston Hotel, SANDTON:JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, 26th – 27th
January 2011
“The Development of The Transformational Safety Culture Improvement System and its
application to safety improvement within the Petrochemical Sector”, XXVIIIth International
Congress of Applied Psychology, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 11th – 16th July 2010
“Transformational Safety Leadership: It all comes home to South Africa – From Bass to
Broadbent”, A Professional Development Workshop convened by Murray & Roberts Cementation,
Lonmin Resources and the South African Chamber of Mines, Lonmin Game Farm, RUSTENBURG,
SOUTH AFRICA, 23rd September 2009
David G Broadbent
“Situational Awareness and Collective Mindfulness: A powerful combination to address Human

Error outcomes in South Africa”, The 6th Annual SAFEmap Africa Competency Based Safety
Conference, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, 18th September 2009
“Culture & Leadership: An exothermic business transaction”. TRANS-NET Professional
Development Symposium, Corporate Training Centre, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, 17th
September 2009
“Developing an effective Safety Culture framework within a global business identity”, The
Vesuvius Asia Pacific Safety Symposia, The Sarjuna Resort, KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA, 4th – 7th
August 2009
“Effective Safety Leadership - Transforming Safety Leadership within High Reliability
Organisations”, The 4th Total Safety Culture Conference, Amora Hotel, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, 28th –
31st July 2009
“Oh !@#$!, Where did that come from”, Keynote Address, Safety Institute of Australia Queensland
Conference, Brisbane Conference and Exhibition Centre, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA, June 18th 2009
“Misdirection, ,misperception, and misunderstanding: An experiential journey through some of
the “white noise” surrounding behavioural safety systems,” 2nd Annual BBS in Heavy Industries
ASPAC Conference, Rendezvous Hotel, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 27th-28th November 2008
“Transformational Safety and Local Government: The Challenges of Transitional
Environments,” The Workplace Health and Safety Conference 2008 ; The Times They Are A
Changing, Local Government Association of Queensland, Gold Coast International Hotel, Surfers
Paradise, Queensland, AUSTRALIA, 7th – 9th May 2008
“Transforming Safety on the Veldt: A safari through the land of safety leadership with special
reference to the South African context?” The SAFEmap Africa Competency Based Safety
Symposium, Airport Sun International, Johannesburg, SOUTH AFRICA, 14th September, 2007
“Leading Lean: Transforming your Safety Culture within Manufacturing during the 21st
Century?” The Association for Manufacturing Excellence – Pacific Rim Conference, Sofitel Convention
Centre, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 14th-17th August, 2007
“Safety Culture, Employee Participation and Engagement “, SAFEGUARD National Health and
Safety Conference, SkyCity Convention Centre, AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND, 30th April - 1st May 2007
“What kind of Safety Leader are you?”, SAFEGUARD National Health and Safety Conference,
SkyCity Convention Centre, AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND, 30th April - 1st May 2007
“Transforming Safety – Beyond Behaviour and Towards Belief”, Keynote Address, New Zealand
National Workplace Health & Safety Awards, SkyCity Convention Centre, AUCKLAND, NEW
ZEALAND, 1st May 2007
“Safety Leadership and the Cultural Framework: Breaking Through the Glass
Ceiling of Safety Performance”, Safety in Action 2007, Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre,
MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 20th – 22nd March 2007
“Leading your business toward the Holy Grail: A transformational exploration of how your
leadership impacts safety performance", The Safety Conference 2006, Sydney Olympic Centre,
SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, 17th – 19th October 2006
“Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice: Integrating the Transformational Safety
Culture Improvement System within traditional BBS Programs”, Safety in Action 2006, Melbourne
Convention and Exhibition Centre, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 16th – 18th May 2006
“Maximising Safety Performance via Leadership Behaviours”, 28th International World Congress of
Psychology, BEIJING, CHINA, 8th -13th August 2004
“Leadership Styles and their Impact upon Safety Outcomes”, Transfield-Worley Best Practice
Conference, ADELAIDE, AUSTRALIA, 22nd – 23rd March 2004
“Managing Traumatic Incidents in the Workplace”, Futuresafe 2001, Brisbane Convention and
Exhibition Centre, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA, 6th -8th June 2001
“Critical Incident Stress Management in the Workplace”, Huntersafe 2001 - Managing Workplace
Risk, Newcastle City Hall, NEWCASTLE, AUSTRALIA, 8th – 9th March, 2001
David G Broadbent
"Occupational stress and rehabilitation; The need to give 'em EAP's", Third National Employee
Assistance Professionals Association of Australia Conference, 9th -10th November, 1994, AIRPORT
SHERATON, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA
"Occupational Stress Management: A practitioners perspective", Professional training developed
for Queensland Psychology

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This Paper was presented, upon invitation, at

Leading your Safety Culture toward Best Practice;

 Disability (injury) Management and Health Promotion

Additionally, the authors state that

In everyday life, we accept a statement as “true” if it is confirmed by the rules of everyday

departments, geographical locations,

9. Co-workers often give tips to each other on how to work safely

The Transformational Safety® System safety leadership constructs are:

Reporting of Part B of the

leadership competencies this is generally inconsistent in its application. Rarely do cultures

Attachment 1. The Structure of Culture

Although "culture is everything" that goes on in an organisation (communications, procedures,

Understanding the Safety Culture Map

Ideas and Knowledge

Words, Language and Images

Safety Culture Analysis

Occupational Health and Safety

“Situational Awareness and Collective Mindfulness: A powerful combination to address Human

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