FULCRUM

OF EVIL
ISI, CIA, AL QAEDA NEXUS


M.K.DHAR
 INSIDE THE ISI OF PAKISTAN
Making of the Fulcrum of Evil
Evolution of Pakistan as a terror breeding and exporting state is intrinsically
related to its political evolution and also formatting and reformatting of its
military establishment and intelligence and security agencies. Intelligence is a
tool of governance. However, in Pakistan, the intelligence tools, in tandem
with the army, have determined the fate of the people and the nation. It is,
therefore, necessary to briefly glance through certain aspects of ‘intelligence’
as a tool of governance and managing ‘issues and problems’.
As an important tool of governance, intelligence is a multifaceted concept.
The classical concept of intelligence, as a part of state activity, is often
defined as an integral part of statecraft and diplomacy, besides being an aid to
general governance, administration, external and internal security. The
totalitarian regimes have had the history of treating intelligence tools as an
inalienable power of the kings, autocrats, dictators and military rulers. They
use intelligence operations as an extension of durbar/court power, mostly for
securing their power bases and enforcing their writ on the mortgaged people.
The potentates all over the world, ancient, medieval and modern, have had the
distinction of using intelligence-security organizations to brutalize their own
people and to subjugate the people of other races and nations.
Some modern democracies in the developed, developing and
under-developed countries claim to have added veneers of respectability to
their intelligence and security organizations. They claim to have made these
subordinate to the laws of the country. These organizations, they claim, are
used as an extension of their law and order machineries and for maintaining
internal and preventing external security threats. However, barring a handful
of countries, most other nations have persistently refused to make their
intelligence and security services transparent and accountable to the supreme
and sovereign authorities of the people.
In short, intelligence as a tool is used by individuals, organized sectors and
states for tactical and strategic purposes for encountering the adversaries and
competitors with sufficient foreknowledge, gathered through open and
tradecraft means.
This is a honorable expression of intent, rarely protected by certain legal
provisions and constitutional shields. Only a very few countries have devised
appropriate Acts of their freely elected constitutional institutions to instill
accountability and transparency in the intelligence organizations by making
these answerable to the constitutional and judicial entities. These
organizations are, nonetheless, invariably answerable to certain segments of
the executive and legislature, whosoever may happen to occupy that position.
Some free democratic countries in the Western hemisphere have opted for this
methodology to strengthen the regimen of accountability and transparency in
their domestic and external intelligence organizations. In spite of that on
several occasions the agencies try to formulate their own foreign policies and
resort to covert actions behind the chief executive and the legislative
watchdog.
However, even countries like the USA and the UK are known to have
twisted the arms of their agencies like the CIA, FBI, MI6 and MI5 either for
tailoring intelligence to suit personal and party interests of the leaders and
power caucus or forced the agencies to “sex up” certain intelligence inputs for
serving specific foreign and internal policies of the government of the day.
Misuse of intelligence agencies for reshaping the lives of people in other
nations has been accepted as a behavioral norm by super powers and
countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who see the entire world through
the prism of Islamic fundamentalism. These policy prerogatives of the power
players, who are, in fact, Fulcrums of Evil, have almost been legalized under
international law. Power to impose their respective national will on other
nations in the name of protecting and promoting democracy, changing
leadership etc has been projected as newer aspects of imperialism.
President Truman, who had piloted the Bill creating the CIA, had later rued
in an article in The Washington Post that the Agency he had created for
serving the democratic edifices of the USA had deviated from its objectives
and indulged in activities detrimental to the constitutional liberty of the
people of America and foreign countries where the agency operated. It is
worth quoting him from this article:
“I think it has become necessary to take another look at the purpose and
operations of our Central Intelligence Agency—CIA. At least, I would
like to submit here the original reason why I thought it necessary to
organize this Agency during my Administration, what I expected it to do
and how it was to operate as an arm of the President… I think it is fairly
obvious that by and large a President’s performance in office is as
effective as the information he has and the information he gets. That is
to say, that assuming the President himself possesses a knowledge of our
history, a sensitive understanding of our institutions, and an insight into
the needs and aspirations of the people, he needs to have available to
him the most accurate and up-to-the-minute information on what is
going on everywhere in the world, and particularly of the trends and
developments in all the danger spots in the contest between East and
West. This is an immense task and requires a special kind of an
intelligence facility…
Therefore, I decided to set up a special organization charged with the
collection of all intelligence reports from every available source, and to
have those reports reach me as President without department
“treatment” or interpretations…
I wanted and needed the information in its “natural raw” state and in
as comprehensive a volume as it was practical for me to make full use of
it. But the most important thing about this move was to guard against
the chance of intelligence being used to influence or to lead the
President into unwise decisions—and I thought it was necessary that the
President does his own thinking and evaluating…
For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted
from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times
a policy-making arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may
have compounded our difficulties in several explosive areas… I never
had any thought that when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into
peacetime cloak and dagger operations. Some of the complications and
embarrassment I think we have experienced are in part attributable to
the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so
removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of
sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue—and a subject for cold war
enemy propaganda… With all the nonsense put out by Communist
propaganda about “Yankee imperialism,” “exploitive capitalism,”
“war-mongering,” “monopolists,” in their name-calling assault on the
West, the last thing we needed was for the CIA to be seized upon as
something akin to a subverting influence in the affairs of other
people… I well knew the first temporary director of the CIA, Adm.
Souers, and the later permanent directors of the CIA, Gen. Hoyt
Vandenberg and Allen Dulles. These were men of the highest character,
patriotism and integrity—and I assume this is true of all those who
continue in charge… But there are now some searching questions that
need to be answered. I, therefore, would like to see the CIA be restored
to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President, and
that whatever else it can properly perform in that special field—and that
its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere… We
have grown up as a nation, respected for our free institutions and for our
ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the
way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our
historic position and I feel that we need to correct it.” Limit CIA Role to
 Intelligence. Harry. S. Truman. The Washington Post December 22,
1963 - page A11.

I do not think any other US president has indicted the CIA as was done by a
pained Truman. Many of his successors, especially the second Bush in the
White House, have allegedly misused the CIA to suit their warmongering
foreign policy and debilitating internal policies. The recent US history woven
around the cataclysmic events on 9/11/2001 and invasion on Iraq on trumped
up charges of seeking and destroying WMD and subsequent Congressional
report amply support the views that even in the 21st century, a US President
can manipulate the working methodologies of the intelligence agencies of the
supposedly most free country of the world, and invoke God’s mandate to
justify state insanity.
The pained feelings of President Truman were succinctly echoed in a book
titled: “The Secret Team—The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United
States and the World” by Col. L. Fletcher Prouty, a former CIA agent. He
described the agency as, “the CIA is the willing tool of a higher level High
Cabal, that may include representatives and highly skilled agents of the CIA
and other instrumentality’s of the government, certain cells of business and
professional world and, almost always, foreign participation. It is the ultimate
Secret Team…”
In fact, intelligence personnel are often used as secret teams by the
governing coterie. Besides the USA many other ‘real democratic’ countries,
including India, are also known to have used the intelligence agencies for
serving topical and limited interests of the ruling parties and caucuses. Most
of the totalitarian countries like the Peoples Republic of China, the infant
Russian democracy and the countries that have adopted some kind or other
form of election to form totalitarian governments, do not care for
accountability of the intelligence community as the cornerstone of democracy.
There is hardly any difference between Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria,
Indonesia and Malaysia in this regard. In these countries, intelligence
machineries have been fashioned to serve the ruling elite, which operates
under some variants of guided and controlled democracy.
In democratic India, where constitutional liberty is an important factor, like
the USA and the UK, the intelligence agencies have been kept out of the
purview of constitutional and parliamentary accountability and are treated as
secret niches. The Indian system has continued to follow the old feudal and
imperial policy to treat intelligence and security organizations as “bureaus”
and “departments” of some administrative ministries. This is a fallacious
situation. Expectation of the people for more constitutional liberty and
freedom is soaring up. On the other hand, the graph of transparency and
accountability of the intelligence and security agencies to the constitutional
authority, at the Centre and the States, are nose-diving.
Constitutional liberty, rule of law and accountability to the highest
constitutional bodies of the country like the Parliament and the Apex Court
signify the degree of freedom enshrined in the constitution of a country.
Without these factors enshrinement of all and sundry assurances in a
constitution are trampled by the rulers of the day. Even elected democracies
like India are known to have trampled the assurances enshrined in their
constitutions and legal documents. In the face of alleged inability of the
political system to ensure justice and liberty to the citizen, the judiciary has
assumed a pro-active role and started dispensing regulatory guidelines and
enforcement principles to key government machineries. Such perceived
transgression by the judiciary into the domain of the political system has
assumed an acute form of debate. However, deterioration of the democratic
principles enshrined in the constitution and the laws of the land is likely to
force the common people to look up to the judiciary for justice.
Without the four cardinal ingredients of supreme protection, assured to the
people-based democracies often degenerate to ‘mobocracy’ and tyranny by an
elected group of people. Even intervention by the Apex Courts often fails to
protect the interests of the people. The Apex Courts are also subverted
through various means—offers of carrot and wielding of the stick,
misappropriation of inherent powers, and their unabashed misuse by the
ruling classes. Such ruling classes are backed by organized crime cartels,
industrial houses and in countries like India by caste satraps. This assertion,
applies equally at the national as well as provincial levels.
In short, a country/nation shapes up its constitutional, administrative,
military and security and intelligence machineries according to its internal
and external imperatives, which are based on historical evolution of the
people and the country, the ideology it adopts for its people, the type of
government the people give unto themselves and scores of other social,
economic and political compulsions. Geo-historical peculiarity, regional,
geopolitical and strategic global connectivity often decide the short and long
term genetic evolution of a nation.
*
India and Pakistan are two classic examples; though there is a cardinal
difference between the two systems. India has used intelligence agencies as a
tool of governance. Pakistan has used its intelligence agencies to strangulate
internal political evolution, to enforce geopolitical changes in the region and
to push the Wahhabi jihad agenda of the fundamentalist Islamists to different
world theatres. Like the CIA it functions as The Secret Team of Pakistan.
Modern India was brought up in the crucible of Westminster style
democracy minus the initial years of oligarchic rule under the John Company
and archaic Victorian era. The Indian nationalists of all hues- the so-called
secularists, Hindu rightists, socialists and Subhasists etc., were exposed to
liberal European and British education, political philosophy and social and
political ideologies. While the post-Bolshevik communists preferred to idolize
the Soviet system of state machinery, the mainstream Indian nationalists had
clearly opted for Westminster type democracy. Vast majority of Indian
Muslims had an early tryst with the Westminster style democratic tenets but
they firmly believed that with the coming of the British, the First Nation of
India (Muslims) were pushed down to Third Nation status and the Hindus had
managed to emerge as the Second Nation. This fear of Hindu domination had
pushed them towards the path of exclusivism and separate nationhood ideas
and beliefs.
Even if some people cry hoarse over the concept of secularism, the bitter
truth remains that right from the days of Aligarh movement to the partition of
the country vast majority of Indian Muslims had reposed trust on Iqbal’s and
Jinnah’s perception of a Muslim polity (scores of others were there too),
which did not survive beyond the life span of the latter. Pakistan had
demolished Jinnah’s dream of secular democracy and finally settled for
Islamicized military dictatorship, punctuated by periodical variants of
controlled democracy.
Located in between the crucial geopolitical junction of Iran, Afghanistan,
China and the former Soviet Union, Pakistan had rediscovered itself as a
country closer to the Arabs, Pathans, and Persians than the Hindu Indians.
Even the majority of Muslims converted from Hinduism were brainwashed to
identify themselves as purebred Arabs, Turks and Pathans. They also
discovered that they were the “people of the Indus” and they had nothing to
do with the “people of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Yamuna, Narmada, Krishna
and Kaveri, etc.” To quote Aitzaz Ahsan, the author of the Indus Saga, “Indus
(Pakistan) has a rich and glorious cultural heritage of its own. This is a
distinct heritage, of a distinct and separate nation” (pp.11). This peculiar geo-
strategic location and ideological reorientation had endowed on Pakistan the
unique status of the most important geopolitical and strategic ally of the USA
and China.
The newborn Muslim state had lost appetite for Westminster style
democracy and constitutional accountability early in its journey as a nation.
The reasons were not far to seek. The British clones in Pakistan politics, who
had championed the Muslim League movement and demand for Pakistan, had
very little following in the western tracts of Punjab, Sind, Balochistan and the
NWFP. The people in these tracts were not exposed to liberal democratic
tenets learnt by the Bengali Muslims and Muslims who lived in Central India.
The West Pakistanis, especially the Punjabis, were apprehensive of the
majority Bengalis of East Pakistan and had initially accepted their leadership
for a couple of years. The murder of Liaquat Ali Khan, the last democratic
Prime Minister of Pakistan, had soon propped up the Punjabi Establishment—
comprising bureaucrats, army officers and West Pakistani oligarchs–taking
control of Pakistan. Pakistan had, for all practical purposes, become a
Punjabistan with short interludes of dominance by prominent Sindhis like
Z.A. Bhutto and his daughter Benazir. Pakistan also shifted its geopolitical
mooring from the British to the Americans, enlisting itself as a member of
SEATO, CENTO and a major US ally outside the NATO.
It is interesting to note that the CIA was born in 1947 and the Inter Services
Intelligence a year later. Two near twins almost grew up in the same genetic
stew—warmonger American stew and debilitating Islamist Pakistani stews.
The USA had overlooked the need for helping Pakistan to strengthen its
democracy. To the Pentagon and White House, Pakistan in khaki uniform was
more useful than rabble-rousing democratic regimes. The Bengalis were
perceived as unreliable as the Sindhis and Balochis were. The Pathans were
still suffering from the hangover of nationalist democrat Khan Abdul Gaffar
Khan. They were treated as unreliable as the rogue socialist Nehru in Delhi.
The military leaders suited the USA more as pliable partners against its Cold
War enemies – the USSR, China and their satellite countries. The USA
believed and still believes that by encouraging and patronizing military and
tin-pot dictators it can protect the democratic traditions of the people. History
has proved that the United States exhibited intractably complicated standards
in practicing and promoting democracy. The claim of Bush administration
that one of the main causes of its intervention in Iraq was restoration of
democracy is nothing but a charade. There was no reason for it to shed tears
for the death of democracy in Pakistan.
The state establishment of Pakistan has been fashioned according to the
needs of the people in khaki with occasional sideshow of elected fragile and
controlled democracy, which is nothing but a thin veneer of political
skullduggery. The Punjabi junta never allowed the people of Pakistan to enjoy
the nectar of constitutional liberty and accepted norms of democracy. The
interests of Punjab oligarchy, Sind feudalism and fanatic tribalism of the
frontier areas have always dictated its internal policy. The Bengalis were
more attuned to democracy and, therefore, were sacrificed by the military
dictatorship of West Pakistan.
Its foreign policy has been immensely influenced by Afghanistan policy in
the west, Central Asia in the northwest and India in the east. Pakistan’s
proximity to China and its nearness to the former Soviet Union had also
determined its preference for strategic allies. Iran being a next-door neighbor
and a Shia country, as opposed to Wahhabi and Deobandi Islam practiced by
Pakistan, had also influenced its foreign policy to drift closer to the Wahhabi
regimes in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world.
The USA had opted for Pehlvi ruled Iran and post-Jinnah Pakistan as
strategic Cold War allies. It had also set eyes on the Arabian Peninsula and
Islamic countries in North Africa and Turkey for encircling the USSR with
dependable satellite regimes. After the Second World War, exploitation of the
Islamic nations in its fight against the USSR was a priority agenda with
Washington. The USA had no distinct leverage in Afghanistan and depended
on the UK for support of the Afghan people against the USSR. However, the
Afghan polity was as suspicious of Pakistan as of the intents of the USA and
UK.
Pakistan had walked into the American orbit for good reasons. Pakistan
needed steady military supplies against archenemy India. It also needed
economic aid to bolster its near-bankrupt economy. The British were not in
strategic and tactical position after the World War to satisfy the strategic and
economic needs of Pakistan. It was a passive partner of the Third World War,
often described as the Cold War. China had helped Pakistan intermittently,
whenever relationship between Washington and Islamabad underwent several
phases of tactical waxing and waning. Pakistan, in fact, had adopted a
conscious policy of periodically renting out the country to the best bidders.
India was left with little option but to tilt towards the Soviet Union, though
officially it professed non-alignment, a new version of neutrality with a tilt
here and there. Nehru could have leaned on the USA-Britain axis. However,
he had to take into consideration the factors of geopolitical compulsions of
being a near neighbor of the USSR, having China as the next-door neighbor
and non-religion based friendly relationship with Iran, Afghanistan and other
major Muslim countries. India under Nehru also dreamt of emerging as the
leader of a third force—the non-aligned countries, as poised against the Allied
Powers and the Soviet Block.
Pakistan’s Afghan policy is better understood in the context of its concern
for South Asian security…. “Management of the Afghan crisis conducted
entirely by the army (even during its diplomatic phase) and more especially
by its Inter Services Intelligence agency, is a reflection of the darkest
moments of leadership of Zia-ul-Haq, and of the martial law…until 1985.”
Pakistan-In the Face Of the Afghan Conflict 1979-85, Frederic Grare. p. vii.
The Mortimer-Durand Line had demarcated the boundary between British
India and Afghanistan in 1893. The Afghans never gave up the demand of
return of the ‘Pakhtun’ areas from Pakistan, which were arbitrarily added to
the political geography of British India. The idea of an independent
Pakhtunistan comprising the Pakhtun dominated areas of Balochistan, NWFP
and Northern Areas of Pakistan was perceived as a threat to the very existence
of Pakistan. Some Pakhtun elements even asserted that Pakhtunistan extended
from the Indian Ocean to Gilgit and from Durand line to Kashmir. Such
demands virtually meant Pakistan would further disintegrate with Iran
grabbing parts of Balochistan, Afghanistan annexing the claimed Pakhtun
areas and India gobbling up Sind and Punjab. Especially after creation of
Bangladesh, the Pakistani psyche worked in schizophrenic isolation, seeking
hegemony over Afghanistan and foothold on the Indian fault lines in Punjab,
Kashmir and elsewhere inside the heartland of the country.
Pakistan’s desperate action of grabbing the Northern Areas the Gilgit
Agency and a chunk of Kashmir proper by deceit and war had given it the
much-wanted ‘strategic geographical depth’ against its Hindu Indian enemy.
This depth was of paramount interest to Pakistan at a time when conventional
war was the only tool left to it to grab entire Kashmir and for insulating
Pakistan as much as possible against conventional Indian forces. With both
India and Pakistan emerging as nuclear capable nations these considerations
of ‘strategic geographical depth’ have not diminished.
Pakistan willingly agreed to play the Cold War game of the USA in
Afghanistan with this very consideration of ‘strategic geographical depth’ to
its western borders. Installation of a client government in Kabul would have
given Pakistan the geopolitical advantage of pushing its strategic depth to the
borders of Central Asian countries and Iran.
In this game, Pakistan used the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) deftly, in
collaboration with the CIA, British, French and Saudi intelligence services.
Pakistan had nearly achieved this objective by installing the Taliban regime in
Kabul and made preparations for jumping into the oil and energy markets of
Central Asian countries, again in collaboration with the US multinationals.
Pakistan’s Afghan sojourn and its dalliance with the fundamentalist brand
of Islam and back-scratching with the Islamist terrorists had paved the way
for reorienting the Pakistani society and polity towards the perilous course of
tryst with Islamist jihad. Recreation of the jihadist milieu on Pakistani soil
after it was successfully tried in Iran and elsewhere in the Arab Peninsula, had
transformed the Pakistani society considerably. From Zia-ul-Haq to Pervez
Musharraf, there has been an unbroken chain of growth of the bacteria of
Islamist jihad on Pakistani soil. It witnessed the humiliation of the Soviet
Union, installation of a puppet mujaheedin regime in Kabul that was followed
by the disastrous Taliban regime. Pakistan had become a safe haven for
Islamist terrorism including the Al Qaeda al Sulbah. The Saudi brand of
Wahhabism, Egyptian brand of Salafism and indigenous Deobandi tenets had
pushed Pakistan back to the brink of Islamisation of middle ages vintage. To
some segment of Pakistanis, brought up in liberal Westminster type
democracy and liberal modern education, the developments of Islamisation
process had poised severe social contradiction and civilisational constraints.
However, they had no means to confront the armed forces and its agencies
like the ISI, as the Armed Forces had assumed a unique character—the
character of the Prime Establishment Force. This force determined the
political, economic, social and even religious agenda of the beleaguered
Islamic nation.
Every country has an army; the ISI owns Pakistan. Pakistan army is an
unparalleled political entity, which has determined the destiny of the people
of Pakistan from the beginning. Pakistan had got its army involved against
India in 1947-48 in Kashmir bypassing diplomatic protocols. Collapse of
Muslim League old guards, who were mostly Mohajirs, had left a political
vacuum. The Punjabi elite headed by the army filled this in. It had acquired a
unique political status in Pakistan out of which the civil and political leaders
could not rescue the country. The Armed Forces of Pakistan have become
synonymous with the State and its political soul.
The army was also responsible for dismemberment of the nation. The
armed forces, in tandem with an obliging bureaucracy and landed oligarchy
(mostly Punjabis) had systematically destroyed the political fabric of the
nation and replaced the political process by its own brand of democracy
blended with theocracy and Islamist fervor. Under Zia-ul-Haq, the essence of
Islamic fervor was extended to the outer limit of Islamisation, which affected
almost all segments of the society. This was done in the name of carrying out
jihad against the communist forces in Afghanistan, Hindu India in Punjab and
Kashmir and to subjugate the democracy loving people of Pakistan, by letting
loose the fundamentalist Islamic tanzeems (congregations), which had grown
into breeding grounds of terrorism.
Pakistan used the ISI to export these terrorist forces all over the world to
fight the Hindu, Christian and Jewish forces. In the process, vast segments of
Pakistani society and the armed forces were converted to staunch Islamists. A
major part of the Pakistani Establishment, the religious parties and tanzeems
had encouraged armed militancy and very soon, Pakistan was transformed as
the torchbearer of Islamist jihad almost all over the world, the Fulcrum of
Evil in the eastern hemisphere. In this manic and messianic role, the main
actor was the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan, an equivalent of the
‘Global Fulcrum of Evil, the CIA’ and the quarantined Northern Fulcrum of
Evil, the reformatted KGB.
The contentious Kashmir issue had prompted Pakistan to fight two major
wars with India in 1948 and 1965. Pakistan’s involvement in low intensity
proxy war against India has also soured the relationship. Amassing of nuclear
deterrent both by Pakistan and India has complicated the security scenario in
the geopolitical region. Acquisition of nuclear arsenal and delivery systems
had emboldened the military junta so much that it had planned, at the back of
the elected government the audacious Kargil Operation by infiltrating armed
mujahedeen and regular forces deep into India, across the Line of Control.
Pervez Musharraf and the ISI wanted to achieve through nuclear blackmail
what their predecessors could not achieve by fighting three open wars. Radio
conversation between the holed in mujahedeen and their ISI handlers, as
intercepted by the Indian agencies, amply prove that the ISI had taken equal
initiative with the regular army in mounting the audacious Kargil Operation
by taking advantage of slackness of Indian civil and military intelligence.
Animosity towards Hindu India did not stem from partition days. It is
rooted in the convergence lines of Hindu and Muslim civilizations from 10th
century AD onwards. Hindu India had accepted gracefully various
civilisational streams from times immemorial. They had learnt to live
peacefully with Christianity brought to India by European nations.
Christianity had also not opted for mass conversion at the point of bayonets,
though the Church had adopted other means to convert the Hindus to
Christianity.
Islam in India was identified with civilisational conflict that refused to
honour the old civilisational and religious symbols of the Hindus and the
Buddhists. The uneasy coexistence and compulsive situation of engagement
between the two civilizations did not result in assimilation, as Islam does not
believe in assimilation. It believes in physical overpowering of the kefir and
jahiliya people and imposing on them the tenets of Islam. The Hindus were
treated as Dhimmis, a conquered and vanquished people who were granted the
right to life under certain conditions.
History of the birth of Pakistan amply testifies the underlying philosophy
of Pakistan’s incurable anti-India policy. “It was soon after the revolt of 1857
that the two sentiments began to agitate the Muslim mind. There was a fear of
Hindu rule and a feeling of separateness from other Indians. The first grew
out of the loss of Muslim sovereignty over India and the emergence of an
alien power under whose aegis the principle of majority rule was to be
gradually applied….So the Muslims decided to stand against the coming of a
Hindu rule with the tenacity of the primitive and the sophisticated argument
of the modern. Every weapon in the arsenal of human ingenuity was to be put
to use to oppose, blunt, avert and finally destroy this fear.” A History of The
Idea Of Pakistan. vol 1. K.K. Aziz p. 1.
Besides the initiation of the Aligarh movement, as a symbol of Muslim
separateness from the Hindu-led renaissance and nascent nationalist
movement, Hindu-Muslim relationship often took violent turns. “In 1893 the
old religious strife between the Hindus and the Musalmans broke out afresh.
A series of fanatical riots took place at the festivals of the two faiths in many
of the British provinces and native States of India, from Burma to the
Northwest and Bombay. In some of these tumults, especially in the city of
Bombay, much blood was shed, men were killed, and houses were burned.”
Sir W.W. Hunter, A Brief History of Indian People, p. 238.
The catastrophic riots of 1893, the first major civilisational conflict in
about over 800 years was repeated rather forcefully by the Muslims of
Bengal, under British encouragement, in connection with the partition of the
province. The composite edifice of Hindu-Muslim coexistence had collapsed
by 1906-07 and the bonds were never restored.
Indo-Pakistan relationship had taken birth in the womb of civilisational
conflict. India’s covert ties with the Baloch, Pakhtun and Sindhi separatists, in
retaliation to Pakistan’s exploitation of Indian fault lines in the Northeast,
amongst the fundamentalist Muslims and other susceptible areas have also
contributed to the growth of unending hostility between the two countries.
Pakistan has deftly manipulated the ethnic insurgency in India’s Northeast by
supporting the Naga, Mizo and Meitei rebels and later aiding the ULFA, Bodo
and Tripura rebels from its operational stations located in Bangladesh, Nepal
and Thailand. It has also very aggressively exploited the Indian fault lines in
Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and has extended the thrust of Islamic
militancy to India’s heartland, aiming systematic subversion of the Indian
Muslims and for instilling in them the ‘idea of re-formation of another
Muslim India.’
Together the CIA and ISI have etched on the stone of history several gory
stories of strategic wars, jihadist wars and tactical proxy wars. The post-
Second World War USA emerged as the hub of neo-imperialism and its
associate Pakistan emerged as the hub of Islamist jihad within a short span of
time. In this game of playing the role of the hub of Islamist International,
Pakistan was amply helped by its rabidly fundamentalist Islamist
organizations, the military and its prime intelligence organization: the Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI). The CIA was converted at a global clandestine
arm of the White House and US Establishment. The ISI was refashioned as an
integral partner of the Pakistani Establishment headed by the armed forces
and select groups of bureaucrats and landlords.
*

The growth and evolution of the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan, the
prime intelligence and security agency, is intrinsically related to the growth of
Pakistan as a military dictatorship on the Indus with transient dalliance with
Islamic democracy. Islamic rule and democracy are contradictory political
concepts as are the concepts of democracy and communism. Both the political
systems are governed by the principles of ideological orthodoxy—one based
on Sharia and Hadith and the other on neo-Bibles of dictatorship of the
proletariat.
Certain Pakistani rulers have emulated the ancient concepts of Islamic rule
with some sprinkling of modern democratic icing. They have caged a modern
people within the confines of archaic theological concepts. The underlying
stories also encompass the tragic evolution of a major segment of the
Pakistani society to hardcore Wahhabist, Salafist and Deobandi school of
thought. Wahhabism, a rigid concept of purest of pure Islam, had grown out
of Saudi Arabia. It prescribed for purging Islam of all impurities and urged
the Sunni followers to practise Islam as prescribed by the Quran and the
Hadith. Wahhabi movement had rocked the eastern and northwestern parts of
India in the 19th century. It was directed against the Sikh kingdom, the British
and the Hindus. The Wahhabi movement had found deep roots in Bengal,
where it took the form of Faraizi and Titumir movements. Such strong rooting
of Wahhabism in Bengal had inspired the British in 1905-1906 to incite the
Muslims against the Hindus, the former supporting division of Bengal and the
latter opposing it. It is not surprising that the Muslim League movement had
winged out of Bengal, toeing the British policy of two religions, two nations.

The story of the Inter Services Intelligence cannot be judged in isolation as a
simple intelligence agency of the State of Pakistan. That kind of attempt will
be a narrow tunneled action in language and format used by government
agencies and departments. Understanding ISI would require a broader
historical, geopolitical and strategic approach. The ISI has become an integral
part of the fundamentalist psyche of sections of the Islamicised Pakistanis,
who ardently believe in spontaneous jihad. It is the ultimate Secret Team of
Pakistan that controls national affairs, affairs related to geo-political
importance and the business of promoting Islamic jihad. It is a part of the
Pakistani Establishment that had replaced the democratic process and handed
over a seemingly unending lease of the people of Pakistan to the military
rulers.
The major pillars of the Pakistani Establishment are: Army, Bureaucracy,
Feudal Lords and the Inter Services Intelligence. The ISI symbolized the
emergence of Pakistan as the Fulcrum of Evil that bred Islamist terrorism and
exported jihad to various parts of the world, either on its own or in tandem
with the CIA and Saudi Royal Intelligence. Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda had
teamed up with Pakistan in the killing field of Afghanistan. Therefore, while
studying the ISI it is necessary to underscore the embedded relationship
between it and the CIA and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Pakistan’s Afghan
mujahedeen involvement starting with Benazir Bhutto through Zia-ul Haq and
other civil or military rulers continuously added flab and teeth to the ISI. In
the US CIA often jumped the fences of law, but post 9/11 developments
indicate that it could be reined by the system. In Pakistan the ISI became a
part of the system. It had developed a symbiotic relationship with the head of
the army who often acted as head of the state.


Pakistan’s Intelligence and
Security Edifices
Pakistan’s civil and military security and intelligence edifices consist of the
following agencies:
Federal Intelligence Agencies:
i. Intelligence Bureau
ii. Ehtasab (Accountability) Bureau
Ministry of Defense:
i. Inter Services Intelligence
ii. Inter Services Public Relations
Army:
i. Military Intelligence
ii. Special Services Group
iii. Surveyor General of Pakistan (Geographical Division)
Ministry of Interior:
 i. Federal Investigation Agency
ii. Narcotics Control Division

Pakistan Intelligence Bureau (PIB) is the inheritor of the Central Intelligence
Bureau of British India. Its counterpart is the Intelligence Bureau of India,
which is the prime internal security and intelligence agency of the
government of India. Pakistan IB is normally headed by a senior police
officer. However, army officers have also intermittently headed the agency at
regular intervals.
The Intelligence Bureau, one of the oldest security and intelligence edifices
of the British Empire, had inherited the established skills and tools of the
trade. Prior to 1958 military takeover, the PIB used to be answerable to the
Cabinet Division of the Prime Minister’s secretariat. After military takeover
by Ayub Khan, the IB was brought under the control of the Chief Martial Law
Administrator (CMLA). The Cabinet Division of the Prime Minister presently
supervises the agency. In fact, it is under direct control of the Presidency, who
has all-pervasive control on the civilian facade.
The PIB, like its Indian counterpart, covers the activities of the political
parties, activists and carries out internal security related functions, which
encompass the entire panorama of the civil society. It is also responsible for
counterintelligence operations on Pakistani soil. The PIB is responsible for
censoring all suspected foreign and internal mails and monitoring telephones
of the targeted security suspects. In this area of operation, its duties and
responsibilities often overlap the duties and responsibilities of the Inter
Services Intelligence.
The Intelligence Bureau had gained prominence under Benazir Bhutto. She
used the agency and its controversial Director Masood Sharif to topple
provincial governments and to carry out extensive surveillance on her
political opponents and other adversaries. This very case of extensive use of
the IB to the consternation of the military and the ISI was cited as one of the
reasons for Benazir’s dismissal in November 1996. Its wings have since not
been restored. The IB continues to play its role under the careful eyes of the
military dictator and the ISI.
Organizationally, Pakistan IB follows the old British pattern, which is also
the beaten path for the Indian Intelligence Bureau. It has strong presence in
the provinces with units located at tehsil (revenue unit) and sub divisional
level. The IB has significant presence on the international borders with India
and Afghanistan. The ISI, Narcotics Bureau, MI Directorate and the
Geographical Division also share this responsibility. In some remote areas,
the IB shares its responsibility with the special operational forces of the
Special Services Group.
A few handpicked personnel are also posted to Pakistan embassies abroad.
However, the ISI and MI operatives outnumber them. The Delhi, Dhaka,
Kathmandu and Colombo diplomatic premises of Pakistan usually contain
some elements of the Intelligence Bureau, often at non-diplomatic level.
For the purpose of the present dissertation, we will briefly mention about
the structural and functional features of the Ehtasab Bureau and the Special
Services Group. These two arms of the Pakistani Establishment play key roles
in internal and external security and intelligence related matters.
The Ehtasab (Accountability) Bureau of Pakistan enjoys a dubious
reputation. It is more than an anticorruption Bureau of the government of
Pakistan. Its stated objective is to combat corruption in high places and in
public life. The Bureau is armed with more power than the Indian Central
Bureau of Investigation. The Ehtasab Bureau has so far been used against
high profile personalities like Asif Ali Zardari and Benazir Bhutto. Twenty
other important personalities including a few public servants have also come
under the scanner of the Bureau. Nonetheless, it must be stated that the
Ehtasab Bureau has added some tinge of sanity to the stinking corrupt public
life of Pakistan, where nothing moves without graft. The Ehtasab Cell
established in the office of the former PM, Nawaz Sharif, often overshadowed
Ehtasab Bureau. These wings of the government were often used to “unmask”
the corrupt practices of politicians regarded as rivals and threats to the
political and military establishments.
Following is the organizational structure of the Ehtasab Bureau with about
a total strength of 1000 officers and men:
Chairman
Deputy Chairman
Chief of Staff
Five Provincial Bureaus
• Identification & Inquiring Unit
• Investigation Monitoring
• Prosecution Wing
• Financial Crime Wing
• Overseas Ops Cell
• Administration
 Mixed military, police and civilian personnel are posted to the Ehtasab
Bureau. Its functions often overlap the functions of the income tax, revenue
and Federal Investigation Agency. The latter mostly functions under direct
supervision of the top executive, who is usually an army dictator.

The Special Services Group (SSG) is an integral part of the Pakistan army.
Conceptualized in the model of the U.S Special Forces and British SAS, the
SSG is more potent a force than the Indian National Security Guard, which is
essentially a Paramilitary force, summoned to aid the civil police authorities.
The SSG is designed to perform military commando role in hostile terrain in
foreign locations and internal locations as adjuncts to the main armed forces
and the Inter Services Intelligence.
Pakistan Army raised the SSG in 1953-54 as an elite commando force
under the US advice and supervision. In fact, under the US advice and
influence Pakistan gave serious attention to study the techniques of ‘people’s
war and guerrilla warfare’ in theatres like Algeria, Yugoslavia and North
Vietnam. A Special Forces Unit was formed in Pakistan with the help of the
USA. Techniques learnt by Pakistan were applied in the Indian North East,
Kashmir and later in Punjab. This was one of the first major forays of the
American defense forces and special operations units into Pakistan’s military
establishment, a couple of years before Pakistan’s democracy collapsed and
military and bureaucracy hijacked the country. To hide its real character
Pakistan camouflaged the formation of the SG under cover of 10th battalion
of Baloch Regiment. Headquarter of the unit was located at Cherat near
Attock.
The SSG was revamped in 1964 by the Mobile Training Team of US
Army’s Special Forces Group (Airborne). The US team and the SSG had
jointly set up a new airborne school at Peshawar for the 19th Baloch
Regiment. Later 24 companies of the 19th Baloch were merged with the SSG.
Each company of the SSG specialized in desert, mountain, and ranger (border
protection) and underwater warfare. These units had carried out several joint
exercises with the US Army Special Forces Mobile Training Team.
A special wing of the SSG called the Musa Company (named after Prophet
Moses) was added and was assigned anti-terrorist role. It was also assigned
the role of combat diver unit. This unit has now been enlarged and equipped
with modern under water warfare system.
In 1981, the British SAS had imparted extensive training to the SSG at
Cherat.
 The SSG had organized basic training for the Sri Lankan paramilitary
forces in 1986, in tandem with the ISI. It was assigned significant role in East
Pakistan during the liberation war. Its presence in the Afghan war was
prominent. Working shoulder to shoulder with the anti-Soviet mujaheedin
forces, the Al Qaeda, CIA and ISI operatives, the SSG had helped the Afghan
rebels in driving out the beleaguered Soviet forces. The SSG commandos at
certain points of time physically commanded the forces of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. The SSG also played an important role in the ouster of Babrak
Karmal regime.
The SSG was assigned significant role in the 1998-99 Kargil adventure of
the Pakistan army. It still operates a high altitude warfare school in the Gilgit
region.
At home, the SSG is used for guarding the nuclear installations, sensitive
installations like the Tarbela Dam etc. Some elements are used as personal
security of the President of Pakistan.

Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) is a federal law-enforcing agency molded
in the pattern of its Indian counterpart—Central Bureau of Investigation,
which was originally conceived as an agency to investigate, on behalf of the
central government, crimes related to economic offences.
The FIA was freely used by the political and military establishment in
similar fashion, often to frame political opponents and perceived enemies of
the Establishment. Another common feature is “killing the assigned target by
publicity and trying him through media.” Wide publicity given to “detected”
cases most frequently ended without conviction. However, the “demolition”
objective was easily achieved.
Benazir Bhutto had appointed Rehman Malik as chief of the Federal
Investigation Agency, which then launched a secret war against the Islamists
that amounted to a direct attack on the ISI. The Pakistani military was equally
dismayed by reports of FIA contacts with the Israeli secret service, the
MOSSAD, to investigate Islamist terrorists. The FIA leadership under Bhutto
also angered Islamist elements because they allowed Ramzi Yousef, the 1993
WTC bomber, to be extradited to the US for trial. One of the first acts of
President Leghari after dismissing Benazir Bhutto on 05 November 1996 was
to imprison Ghulam Asghar, head of FIA, suspended on non-specified
corruption charges. Rehman Malik, Addl. Director General FIA, was also
arrested.
The Federal Investigation Agency conducts the investigations on receiving
reports of corruption, either through the P.M.’s Accountability and
Coordination Cell or directly from the public. After investigations, the cases
are referred to the Chief Ehtasab Commissioner for trial by the Ehtasab
Courts. However, the Chief Ehtasab Commissioner often complained against
the FIA and the Anti-Corruption Police for non-cooperation.
Pakistan FIA, just like its Indian counterpart, has institutionalized torture to
a point where it is viewed as the primary method of crime detection. Most of
the FIA agents and officials are motivated by religious bias and beliefs. The
practice of repeatedly bringing false charges against members of the political
opposition is a widely used tactic in Pakistani politics and has been used to
arrest thousands of opposition party activists. According to the United States
State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993,
there were no significant efforts in 1992 or 1993 to reform either the police or
the judicial system, and authorities continued to be lax in their prosecution of
abuses in these areas. Pakistani and international human rights organizations
have demanded that steps be taken to reverse the trend by bringing torturers to
justice and by taking such procedural steps as reducing the time prisoners
spend in places of first arrest, where most torture takes place.
In 2002, the FIA (Federal Investigation Agency) had established a
transnational federal counter-terrorism unit, on the pattern of the American
FBI, which would arrest any suspect or investigate any terrorist incident in
any part of the country. The counter-terrorism unit, called special
investigation group (SIG), initially had 50 officers besides a commander. The
force was placed under the administrative control of the Director General
(DG) FIA. It cooperates with the FBI and is nominally under the Interior
Ministry.
The Government of Pervez Musharraf was keen to set up an anti-terrorist
network for which it had received $80m worth US aid. The force is designed
to coordinate with the passport authorities and border controls as well as
airports to monitor movements of the suspected terrorists. This development
resulted in a tug of war between the incumbent DG (Director General) (DC)
FIA, the Director Immigration and Airports as well as Intelligence Bureau for
heading the organization. The border controls, airports, passports and
immigration lie with Director Immigration. Similarly, the IB is also interested
in controlling the counter-terrorism force as the intelligence outfit has such a
charter. However, President Musharraf’s intention to set up an anti-terror
network through the FIA has not yet fully materialized.

The Narcotics Control Bureau of Pakistan is organized on the pattern of its
Indian counterpart. Prior to April 1989, narcotics matters were dealt in the
Ministry of Interior. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), the field
organization, was an attached department of the Ministry. As the complexity
of narcotics problem had grown globally, and the drug abuse had proliferated
in Pakistan, a Narcotics Control Division was set up in April 1989.
The Anti Narcotics Task Force (ANTF) and the PNCB are the law
enforcement arms of the Narcotics Control Division. The PNCB was set up in
1973. This Department essentially performs the coordinating, controlling and
supervisory functions.
The functions of ANTF are to inquire into and investigate all offences
relating to, or connected with preparation, production, transportation,
trafficking or smuggling of intoxicants, narcotics and chemicals used in the
manufacture of narcotics or dangerous drugs or assets. It also investigates into
any offence committed in the course of the same transaction under any law
for the time being in force, including any attempt or conspiracy to commit, or
any abutment of any such offence.
The presence of two law enforcement agencies with almost the same
functions, under the Narcotics Control Division, necessitated their
reorganization so that the resources and workforce of these two organizations
could be jointly put to use for more effective narcotics law enforcement. The
Government has since placed these two organizations under the command of
the Directorate General of ANTF.
The army officers often dominate the Narcotics Control Bureau and
officers are sent on lien from the ISI. These elements, it has been alleged by
several NGOs and intellectuals, promote manufacture and export of opium
derivatives in collusion with tribal warlords and drug mafia. It is also alleged
that the ISI regularly earns a great amount of money out of drug dealings,
which is used in promoting and funding the jihadist groups and other terrorist
related operations against India and other countries. The United Nations and
the United States had on several occasions drawn Pakistan’s attention to such
abuses of drug dealing by its prime intelligence agency.

 The Inter Services Intelligence
In the previous dissertation, introductory remarks have been made about
the role and utility of intelligence agencies and different intelligence,
investigation and security agencies of Pakistan. An attempt has been made to
briefly narrate the historical and strategic reasons that converted Pakistan and
ISI as a Fulcrum of Evil. In the narratives below, we will try to examine the
structural and functional mapping of the Inter Services Intelligence of
Pakistan (ISI), brief accounts of its exploitation of the fault lines of India and
its linkage with the CIA and Al Qaeda al Sulbah and its role as the breeder
and exporter of Islamist jihad in different theatres of the world. This study
intends to unfold the genetic characteristics of the Fulcrum of Evil.
The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the Inter Services
Public Relations are officially under the Ministry of Defense. In reality, the
ISI functions under direct control of Pakistan Army and its chief is
answerable to the military dictator. The present civilian government has no
direct control on the army and the ISI. Recent interventions by the judiciary in
the ISI matters, especially disappearance of people and illegal detention have
been resented by the army. However, to maintain balance the army is trying to
use the judiciary against the President and Prime Miniter of Pakistan. The ISI
does not report to the civilian authority, whenever Pakistan is allowed to have
a paradigm of democratically elected government.
The grey heavily guarded fortified unmarked brick building that houses the
sprawling campus of the ISI in Islamabad flaunt two motto plaques:
“Espionage should be regarded honourable”- Sun Tzu, Chinese military
strategist and “By way of deception, thou shall do war”- Gen. George Patton.
The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) enjoys a unique status in the
infrastructure of the Pakistani Establishment. It is not an ordinary intelligence
apparatus of the state. It has emerged as a fulcrum of Islamic jihadist
operations of the State of Pakistan and jihadist tanzeems created by the state.
It has acquired the status of a global fulcrum that mimicked the style of
functioning of the CIA. Over years it has assumed the singularity of a ‘state
within the state’ discharging the following important tasks:
• Controlling the internal civil and political affairs in
Pakistan;
• Ruthlessly quelling internal dissensions and political unrest;
• Promoting multinational Islamist jihad movements in
tandem with organizations like the Al Qaeda al Sulbah;
 • Attending to the most strategic geopolitical task of
subjugating Afghanistan;
• Destabilizing India by waging proxy-war by exporting
jihadist movements and promoting separatist sentiments amongst Indian
Muslims;
• The ISI, as an important part of the Pakistani establishment,
has taken on the responsibility of exporting Islamic revolution wherever
perceived necessary by the elite club of jihadists. Like the CIA, it
attempts to change the world order—towards a new order as perceived
by the Wahhabis and Deobandis; and
• ISI is not a simple intelligence agency. It is a tool in the
hands of Pakistani Establishment and is an anchor for the Wahhabi
Islamists. It is a part of the Secret Team that controls Pakistan.

A perceived branch of the Military Intelligence, the ISI had modeled itself as
a tool in the hands of the military dictators, unscrupulous politicians and had
mimicked the CIA tricks of synthesizing intelligence tradecraft with the
broader national policy on regional and global security concerns and foreign
policy imperatives. Its operatives were extensively trained in the ‘black arts’
of sabotage and subversion in the UK by the SAS and MI5, and in the USA
by the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of its operations were bankrolled
by the USA and Saudi Arabia.
Intelligence establishments are integral parts of nation states. Collection,
collation and dissemination of domestic and external intelligence are the
prime functions of an intelligence agency. Besides security and military
related intelligence, countries do indulge in collecting economic, corporate
and industrial intelligence. Intelligence gathering on the fault lines of real and
perceived enemy countries is an integral part of strategic policy formulation.
These fault lines are studied with a view to sharpen certain diplomatic
initiatives and with the inherent objective of exploiting the weaknesses of the
perceived enemy. Often direct and indirect military and quasi-military
offensives are mounted along those fault lines, when diplomacy demands
open or covert war over peace. The ISI has been used by Pakistan deftly in
this role of exploiting the fault lines of India and engaging the enemy in
quasi-military actions through proxy-war on its own and with the help of
Islamist jihadi tanzeems.
Before we proceed to examine the ISI’s structural and functional
characteristics, it may be necessary to briefly relate the outline of three other
contemporary Fulcrums of Evil. That may add more transparency to the
unique status of Pakistan as a member of the Big League—the CIA,
Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the Royal Saudi Intelligence (RSI).
Very little, however, is known about the mysterious Royal Saudi
Intelligence. Prince Turki, chief of the RSI, enjoyed a long tenure of 25 years.
He was CIA’s partner in several dirty operations including Iran-Contra deal,
US involvement in Kuwait and projecting Osama bin Laden as a potent Arab
face for the Afghan war. He was later posted to London as Saudi ambassador
and then to the USA (2005) as ambassador. His successor Prince Nawaf bin
Abad al Aziz resigned in January 2005 due to ill health. The present
incumbent is Prince Muqrin bin Abdul-Aziz. A member of the royal family
he heads the Al Mukhabarat Al A’amah. It is known that the RSI is organized
in the fashion of the CIA. The CIA, MI6 and the SAS have extensively
trained the personnel of this outfit. Saudi Intelligence has also a ‘Special
Operations’ division that takes up tasks to thwart recent thrusts unleashed by
Osama bin Laden. Members of this special operations force have undergone
extensive training in the USA. The RSI has collaborated from time to time
with the CIA, MI6, ISI and other US intelligence outfits. In a sense, it is a
major partner of the US clandestine operations in the Middle East and almost
all over the Muslim world.
Soon after the Arab Spring movement the Al Mukhabarat Al A’amah
started two new units: one for detecting and suppressing internal rebellion and
the other for penetrating Iran. IN the second objective Saudi Arabia has taken
considerable assistance from the USA and Israel.
*
India and Pakistan inherited a somewhat well defined administrative and
intelligence establishment from the British Empire. The Central Intelligence
Bureau, which was predominantly staffed by the white and trusted Muslim
officers, was divided between the two new nations at the time of partition.
Ghulam Mohammad, the senior non-white officer of the CIB, had headed the
Pakistani part of the Intelligence Bureau (PIB). The Indian Intelligence
Bureau, pathetically understaffed and inadequate to the requirements of the
internal and external challenges was, in all practical purposes, fashioned by an
enigmatic personality, Bhola Nath Mallick. As far as building of the edifices
and resource bases are concerned he was to the Indian IB what Lt.Gen.
Ghulam Jillani Khan was to the ISI.
Inducted to the ISI as a two-star Brigadier (a former military attaché in
Washington), Jillani had survived the regimes of Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq until Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman replaced
him. Jillani had fashioned the ISI as the ‘second estate’ of Pakistan, the first
being the armed forces.
 The political establishment of Pakistan, the ‘first estate’ in a secular
democratic country, as envisaged by Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
was hijacked by the military and bureaucratic establishment headed by
civilian and army duo Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza. They
relegated the political establishment to the position of ‘third estate’. General
Ayub Khan’s coup in 1958 transformed the political history of Pakistan for all
times to come. The Armed Forces were foisted permanently on a nation,
whose democratic aspirations were jackbooted by the former. Ayub Khan’s
hijacking of power indicated that Pakistan was poised for a different political
direction in which the Army, Bureaucracy and the ISI were to play important
roles.
Some scholars have averred that the Inter Services Intelligence, as a second
hub of intelligence apparatus, was conceived after the alleged failure of the
PIB to provide appropriate intelligence about the Indian Army’s deployment
and political determination of the Indian leaders to pit the entire nation
against Pakistani aggression in Kashmir in 1948. Such assumptions do not
reflect the truth. A British officer serving the Pakistan army conceived the
idea of creating an intelligence and security organ for better coordination
between the divergent wings of the armed forces and also an agency for
external intelligence generation. The inspiration and idea were provided by
the British Home and Foreign Offices, who still considered Pakistan as their
strategic backwaters. The British interest in and around 1948 still hovered
around Russian influence in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Chinese ambitions
in Tibet and Karakoram region. The British wanted to mould the ISI on the
pattern of its own geopolitical interests in the region that could make wider
maneuvers outside the domestic compulsions of Pakistan. The ISI was created
in the image of perception of the British strategic policy in the region–in fact,
as a part of Britain’s Cold War Strategy. This Cold War or The Third World
War was later spearheaded by the USA. The ISI, a strategic ally, naturally,
changed its partner soon after Britain faded into the background.
Jinnah was, largely, a British-bred constitutional democrat and he relied on
the British iron-frame that he shared with his friend turned foe, Jawaharlal
Nehru. His passion for Kashmir was not simply based on religious affinity of
the majority of the people. His calculations were based on strategic inputs that
he had received from his British mentors and the bureaucracy that he had
inherited. On the other hand, Nehru’s passion for Kashmir was emotional.
The Indian leaders then failed to realize that in post-British era Kashmir was
going to emerge as a geopolitical entity of great importance. Kashmir
bordered Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the Soviet Union and commanded
important mountain passes connecting India with Central Asia and China.
 Jinnah had capitalized on this apparent failure of Nehru and his team of
political and bureaucratic support base. He utilized his existing intelligence
machineries to mobilize, train, arm and deploy the so-called tribal volunteers.
The Pakistan IB and the rudimentary elements of the Military Intelligence had
played their cards well. On the other hand the Indian intelligence fumbled
and had failed to warn and motivate the political leadership about the
necessity of augmented military preparations against the well-planned
Pakistani thrust in Kashmir i.e. the entire Kashmir, inclusive of the Northern
Territories and Gilgit Agency.
Jinnah would have not initiated any action to let down Ghulam
Mohammad, the first Director of the PIB. Mohammad had done a better job
than his Indian counterpart. Jinnah and his political establishment were aware
of the need for strengthening the armed forces and its intelligence prowess.
He and his political successors did not intend to weaken the PIB by floating
the ISI and fashion it after the CIA. The initial political liberal democrats
would have not liked the idea of endowing the bureaucracy and the military
establishment with hegemonic powers at the cost of political freedom that was
earned by the Muslims of the sub-continent over mountains of dead bodies
and rivulets of human blood. Exigencies of situation had made them to accept
the British plan as a second hub of intelligence generating tool.
However, these democrats and believers in parliamentary democracy were
few in numbers and after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, the Mohajir
dominated Muslim League lost relevance in Pakistan. The bureaucracy and
Army filled in that vacuum and the ISI gradually turned into a powerful arm
of the Punjabi dominated establishment. From an intended tool of the Cold
War it started emerging as the main tool of governance in Pakistan.

*
The Inter Services Intelligence Directorate was conceived, way back in 1948,
apparently as a nucleus inter-services co-ordination module and a tool to
generate external intelligence, by Major General R. Cawthorne, an Australia
born British Army officer, who had opted for the Pakistan Army and served
as the Deputy Chief of Staff of Pakistan Army. Though the credit is given to
Cawthorne, the inspiration, as stated earlier had come from Britain. Pakistan
army had inherited a Military Intelligence unit and did not require a special
agency to coordinate between different wings of the infant armed forces.
Pakistan was also not positioned as a global player to take up a crash
programme for creating an external intelligence agency like the MI6 and the
CIA. At the initial stage Britain needed the ISI as a companion agency to
strengthen its own strategic perspectives in the region. However, Pakistan had
different aims in mind.
The Kashmir war episode had made a section of Army officers to believe
that the political leaders had mishandled the operation, did not fully support
the Kashmir war commander (Gen. Akbar) and did not commit the Punjab
Boundary Force under Maj. Gen. Rees to the Kashmir war efforts. The
disparate units of the Pakistan army, active strength 30,000 odd, did not give
good account of coordination, planned offensive and superior logistical
supplies. Pakistan was also horrified to notice that the Kashmiris themselves
were not sufficiently Islamicized to join hands with Pakistan. It understood
the urgent need for motivation and indoctrination of the Kashmiri people.
But for the logistical difficulties faced by Delhi and political vacillation
and miscalculation, the so-called Azad Kashmir Forces would have been
cleared out from entire Kashmir Valley just in another 30 days. India under
Nehru fumbled and tumbled at the doors of the UN, instead of allowing the
Army to reoccupy Muzaffarabad.
This concern of senior Pakistani officers was shared by Britain, which was
keen on using Pakistan as a watchtower against Afghanistan, Russia and
China. The British HQ also wanted the ISI for keeping a watch on the new
corps of Pakistani Army officers. London was keen to see Kashmir on the
plate of Pakistan as that would have provided them direct access to China and
the USSR.
The Kashmir war debacle and lack of coordination between the army units
on the one hand and the political leadership on the other, had prompted
military brains like General Rees and Major General Cawthorne to
architecture the Inter Services Intelligence as conceptualized by London, as a
pivotal source to cater to military requirements, long term strategic planning,
inter-agency coordination, grooming and training of military attaches posted
to Pakistani diplomatic missions and to establish working relationship with
friendly foreign military intelligence agencies, etc.
The father figure of the ISI was Lt. General Ghulam Jillani Khan, who
fashioned the outfit as a virulent fighting machine against Pakistan’s
archenemy, India, and other geo-political adversaries. Between 1948 and
1958, the ISI head directly reported to the army chief, who in turn briefed the
Prime Minister and Internal affairs Minister. However, with the advent of
Ayub Khan, the intelligence outfits also changed. The ISI chief was often
required to report directly to the President who was also the army chief.
Therefore, we have on record the list of ISI chiefs from 1958 onwards, when
the agency ceased to be a part of the MI and started emerging as a unique
institution that had shed all pretensions of accountability to the administrative
machineries of the civilian governments.
 Following is the line up of leadership of the ISI from the period democracy
was hijacked by the Armed Forces:
1. Brig. Riazat Hussain
1958 onwards.
2. Lt.Gen. Ghulam Jillani
Khan 1969 to early years of Zia-ul-
Haq.
3. Lt.Gen. Akhtar Abdur
Rahman Zia regime till March 1987.
4. Lt.Gen. Hamid Gul
March ’87-May 1989.
5. Lt.Gen. (Retd) Shamsur Rahman
Kallue May ’89-Aug 1990.
6. Maj. General Assad
Durrani Aug ’90-March 1992.
7. Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir
March’92- May 1993.
8. Lt.Gen. Javed Ashraf
Kazi May’93-June 1994.
9. Lt.Gen. Nasim Raja
June’94-1996.
10. Lt.Gen. Ziauddin 1996
—sacked by Musharraf in 1999. His
retirement benefits were reportedly denied.
11. Lt.Gen. Mahmood
Ahmad Dismissed by Musharraf
under American pressure for complicity with
the Taliban. India, it is reported, had supplied
supporting material to the USA.
12. Lt. Gen Ehsan-ul-Haq
Posted on Oct 8, 2001. He was the Corps
Commander at Peshawar. He was formerly
posted to Pakistan High Commission in Delhi
in the rank of Counsellor. Removed in
October 2004.
13. Lt.Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani
 Appointed on October 4, 2004. Now COAS.
14. Lt. Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha Retired March 2012
15. Major General Isfandiyar Ali Khan Pataudi- Appointed March 2012.
Like most other military-controlled intelligence organisations, the ISI did
not prefer staffing its corps of officers and operatives from amongst the
civilians. A few civilian personnel inducted at the initial stages to perform the
desk jobs were eased out in 1956 after Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar
Mirza initiated the process of combined military and bureaucratic
stranglehold on Pakistan. The present estimated strength of the ISI, about
18,000, is mostly drawn from the Army, Air Force and Navy, with a minor
sprinkling of civilians.
*
Following is the broad divisions of the functional structure of the ISI:
1. Joint Counter-Intelligence Bureau (JCIB)—It is
responsible for counterintelligence activities and operations;
2. Joint Intelligence Signal Bureau (JISB)— It generates and
denies SignaI intelligence and liaise with the Signal Corps of the Armed
Forces and the US and UK signal intelligence community;
3. Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB)—It handles political
matters. One section is assigned to study and assess Indian political
developments;
4. Joint Intelligence Finance (JIF)— It manages budgetary
and non-budgetary funds of the ISI; evaluates and approves critical
operations;
5. Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT)—It is responsible for
technical, including ElInt, PhotoInt, ImageInt, SatInt, etc;
6. Joint Arms Direction Group (JADG)—This wing is
responsible
for
planning coordination in military exercises and procurement of
weapons from unconventional sources, besides periodical evaluation of
joint exercises;
7. Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM)—It oversees
forward intelligence tasks, sabotage and subversion operations in
foreign countries. Three sections are devoted to India;
8. Joint Intelligence North (JIN)—It is the hub of operations
 in Kashmir and other “special operations”;
9. Foreign Liaison Section (FLS)—Responsible for liaison
with friendly foreign intelligence services;
10. Inter Services Federal Intelligence (ISFI)—It
supplements the intelligence efforts of the provincial governments and
often works as the direct arm of the political/military bosses in internal
political matters;
11. Public and Service Groups (P&SG)—It functions in close
liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and maintains media
liaison. The post-holder is generally close to the Chief of the Army
Staff and the top executive. The position holder is handpicked;
12. Joint Intelligence X—Its exact functional charter is not
known. It is said that this wing is responsible for Intelligence Estimate,
Threat Assessment and Formulation of Highly Sensitive Operations,
including assassination, in collaboration with the JIB, JIM, JIN and
ISFI
The Joint Intelligence Finance (JIF) manages the central command of the
ISI and its personnel policies. Besides managing the human and asset
resources, almost all the top intelligence and dirty-trick operations are
evaluated and cleared by the JIF. There are reliable inputs that this wing of the
ISI also manages the Drug Money and operates several frontal financial
organizations, such as leasing companies, financial corporations, construction
companies, NGOs and charitable organizations inside Pakistan and in some
foreign countries like Bangladesh, the UAE, Kuwait and Nepal.
Inter Services Federal Intelligence though officially responsible for inter-
services co-ordination, is known to have been used extensively for internal
intelligence, especially in suppressing political rivals, in tandem with the Joint
Intelligence Bureau. The internal political roles played by the ISI have been
highlighted by a number of politicians and intellectuals, including Benazir
Bhutto.
Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous mainly looks after forward external
intelligence in targeted countries. It is concerned with forward intelligence
thrust inside India, infiltration of trained agents, terrorists and Islamist jihadis
inside India. It also supervises some assigned operations from third country
bases in conjunction with the JIX and JIN.
The JIN is especially responsible for all operational responsibilities in
Jammu & Kashmir, starting from recruitment of the terrorists, their training,
arming and infiltration in the target areas. The Special Services Group (SSG),
a US/UK trained commando force, expert in high altitude warfare, pitches in
with the ISI in these spheres of special operations. The JIN is also responsible
for floating and sustaining fundamentalist jihadist organizations, which front
the ISI in its clandestine proxy-war activities. Brigadier Abdullah (as in
December 2003), in charge of JIN operations in Kashmir, was at one point of
time shifted to Muzaffarabad for augmenting the so-called mujahideen thrust
inside Indian Kashmir. After 9/11 attacks on the USA and 13/12 attack on the
Indian Parliament, Pakistan claimed that Brig. Abdullah was withdrawn from
Muzaffarabad. This hollow gesture was aimed at misleading the USA, which
had advised Pakistan to tone down its interference in Indian administered
Kashmir. President Musharraf has done very little to slow down the activities
of the JIN and its army of mujahideen, Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah
collaborators. According to informed Indian and western sources Pakistan
still runs over 100 training centres for the mujahideen located in Pak-occupied
Kashmir, Punjab and the NWFP. A recent input from Indian agencies
indicates that one Brigadier Qasim of the Northern Light Infantry has been
located at Muzaffarabad to oversee and coordinate the ISI and tanzeem
operations in Indian Kashmir. New camps have been established alongside
army detachments to give impression that the jihad operatives were part of the
regular armed forces. If this is correct, Brig. Qasim has replaced Brig.
Abdullah, a cohort of Pakistani minister Rashid, who came to the limelight
after disclosure by a certain Indian Kashmiri rebel leader that Rashid had
organized several Jihadist camps for operations in Indian Kashmir.
Both the JIM and the JIN had established strategic linkages with the
Islamist terrorist/mujahideen groups, including mujahideen from the Al
Qaeda al Sulbah ranks with a view to striking deep inside India. The hijacking
of IC 814, attack on the Red Fort and attack on the Indian Parliament, it is
reported, was masterminded by the JIM, in tandem with the terrorists of the
Jaish-e-Muhammad, Hijb-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Tayeba, whose ranks
were trained by the Al Qaeda al Sulbah in eastern Afghanistan camps. It is
now confirmed that Osama bin Laden was in constant touch with the IC 814
hijackers, once they landed at Kandahar. Interrogation of Muttawakil, the
former foreign minister of the Taliban regime, by the US and Indian
investigative agencies have confirmed the linkages between the hijackers and
the Taliban and the Al Qaeda.
The Joint Intelligence Signals, located at Malir Cantonment, Karachi, is
responsible for interception and analysis of signal intelligence and breaking of
codes. It also supplies the ISI operatives in India and other foreign countries
with low to high-grade cipher materials. The Joint Intelligence Signals had
assumed greater responsibilities as the Cold War ally of the USA. Being a
member of the SEATO and CENTO Pakistan had received sophisticated
monitoring equipments and listening devices. Besides offering operational
platforms to the USA Pakistan was helped by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the U.S Army Signal Centre at
Fort Gordon and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to
strengthen its signal intelligence prowess.
It is reported that the JIS has its listening and observation posts at
Peshawar, Parachir, Bada Bier, Karachi, Quetta, Lahore, Hyderabad, Thatta,
Gwadar, Qila Ladgast, Gilgit, Skardu, Chitral and Manshera. Besides
operating radio signals intelligence, some of these units are equipped with
sophisticated equipments to monitor the footprints of Indian satellite
communications and monitoring other electronic intelligence operations
originated by India, Iran, and the former USSR republics in Central Asia.
The satellite imagery facilities of Pakistan have recently received
sophisticated equipments from China and the USA. Some French equipment
has also been acquired during last two years. The Cold War supplies of US
equipments for monitoring SigInt and ElInt from the former Soviet Union and
China are still in place and some of these equipments have recently been
replenished as part of the package of US forays in Afghanistan. The Joint
Intelligence Signals was supplied with super-fast computers and software to
break and read the cipher traffic of the Soviet Union and China. In the recent
past, it has received from the USA digital analyzers for code breaking. That’s
how the ISI enjoys an edge over its Indian counterparts.
The Joint Intelligence Bureau is theoretically responsible for monitoring
developments in neighboring countries, affairs of Pakistan’s military attaches
posted in Missions abroad and activities of guest military attaches in home
turf.
The JIB also acts as the political wing of the ISI. Several Directors of the
ISI have deftly manipulated the internal political events in Pakistan. Notable
amongst them are Lt. Gen. Ghulam Jillani Khan, Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, Lt.
Gen. Javed Nasir and Lt. Gen Ziauddin. Pakistan’s political history is replete
with military coups and installation of puppet civilian governments. In these
operations, crucial roles were played by the ISI. In fact, most of the political
operations initiated by the army are managed and executed by the ISI. Most
other enforcing agencies of Pakistan grudgingly accept the predominant
position of the ISI.
A section of the foreign media reported that Pervez Musharraf had recently
abolished the JIB. A spokesperson of the military regime promptly denied
this. In fact, General Musharraf had adopted certain diversionary tactics and
operational camouflages to cover up the activities of the JIB. This mild course
correction was necessitated by recent Pakistani bonhomie with the USA and
its free-world allies. President Musharraf is a defter manipulator than his
predecessors in uniform. His deemed actions against the jihadists are aimed at
consolidating his grip on the Armed Forces and the ‘street warriors of
Pakistan’.
The Afghan Bureau, located about 12 km away from the GTHQ of the ISI,
had played key role during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and
successive communist regimes. Brigadier Youssaf, in charge of Afghanistan
operations of the ISI, has chronicled the exploits of the Afghan Bureau in his
book, The Bear Trap.
The Central Asian Bureau has played important roles in fomenting Islamist
movements in the XUAR region of China, Chechnya, Dagestan, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, etc. These episodes and ISI’s involvement in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo will also be examined alongside
ISI’s role in the South and South East Asia.
Like most other intelligence organisations, the ISI has put in position a
well-defined functional and operational structure as follows:
Director General Intelligence (DG ISI)
(Three star General)
|
Deputy Director General-Political
(Two star officer)
|
Deputy Director General-External I
(Two star officer)
|
Deputy Director General-External II
(Two star officer)
The number of two star officers has proliferated over years and it is
estimated that four such officers of the rank of Major General (one each from
the Air Force and Navy) have been put in charge of designated divisions.
These are reported to be post-Nawaz Sharif developments.
The DDG (Pol) controls the territorial and subject desks and sections,
which cover the activities of the political parties, student, labour, mujahideen
organizations, madrassas and religious institutions, tribal affairs, internal
surveillance/security duties, VIP security duties, minority affairs and anti-
terrorism activities. An officer of the rank of Brigadier generally heads each
sub-division. However, officers of the rank of Colonels and Majors head some
of the lesser units.
The DDG-Pol continues to function with full blessings of the military
dictator and is said to have been tasked to screen the candidates, eliminate the
undesirable aspirants either by persuasion or by force and to ensure that the
election returns a rubber stamp National Assembly. Some of the Pakistani
newspapers have been brave enough to expose such nefarious tactics of the
ISI.
The office of the DDG-External I requires some special mention. It
controls the ‘foreign operations’ of the ISI and presides over the most dreaded
wing of the ISI-Counter intelligence. It also covers the territorial, geo-
political, economic, strategic intelligence affairs in the Middle East, Africa
and other countries. The DDG-Ex I also maintains liaison with the PMO,
whenever there is one, and with the office of the CMLA/CEO, whatever
designation a military dictator prefers to decorate himself with. DDG-
External I is a powerful position.
Counterintelligence is a multi-faceted instrument. Separate sub-divisions
cover groups of diplomatic missions on Pakistani soil and carry out human,
technical, electronic and signal surveillance against the target missions. This
vast sweep of activities includes identification and neutralization of
embassy/mission based foreign agents as also identification, interception,
categorization and final disposal of foreign intelligence agents operating from
non-diplomatic bases and hubs. This division has strong presence in Lahore,
Karachi, Peshawar and a few other important places, especially along Indian,
Iran and Afghan borders. India, as expected, gets special attention of the
JCIB.
The JCIB also carries out liaison work with Pakistan based diplomats of
the accredited countries and maintains professional linkages with the
intelligence agencies of friendly and fraternal countries like the USA, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Nepal, Bangladesh and China. Some instances of the JCIB
outstretching its operational activities into the areas defined for the JIM have
been reported from time to time. The JCIB, it is reported, takes up
independent operations in countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Gulf locations
and India. Reports of cross-connectivity and friction between the JCIB and
the JIM are common. Such conflicts of operational interests have been
reported from Nepal and Bangladesh, the countries used by Pakistan for
intelligence encirclement of India.
Appointment to the top position of the ISI is normally determined by
concurrence between the military dictator and the chief of the armed forces.
In democratic dispensations under Z.A. Bhutto and Benazir some efforts were
made to establish civilian control on the Secret Team. However, these efforts
were demolished, often with devastating consequences.
Changes in the ISI leadership in recent times by General Musharraf are
interesting: Why was Lt.-Gen. Mehmood Ahmed shifted from X corps,
Rawalpindi, to become DG, ISI? Was it because he was needed more in the
ISI or was there less trust to keep him on in Rawalpindi?
Lt.Gen. Mehmood Ahmed, DG ISI, enjoyed the absolute trust of Gen.
Musharraf, and that was the reason why Gen. Musharraf is in office today as
President. The position of Corps Commander, X Corps, Rawalpindi, is very
crucial and only the most trusted colleague of the COAS is usually entrusted
with the job. Lt.Gen. Mehmood Ahmed had literally fashioned the entire
“counter-coup” of October 12, 1999 dismissing Nawaz Sharief and installing
Musharraf as President. Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed, Lt. Gen. Muhammad
Khalid Aziz and Gen. Musharraf were extremely close since their service
together in the Special Services Group (SSG). However, Lt. Gen. Aziz was
not aware of the astounding events of October 12, 1999, until Lt. Gen.
Ziauddin arrived at GHQ at about 14.00hrs announcing that he was there to
take over as COAS.
Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed was shifted, after the October 12, 1999, coup to
the post of DG ISI because Gen. Musharraf wanted to have absolute control
over the Secret Team, which had until the coup, been controlled by Lt. Gen.
Ziauddin. There was no diminution of trust between Lt. Gen. Mehmood and
Gen. Musharraf. However, Lt. Gen. Mehmood, Gen. Musharraf and Maj.
Gen. Jamshed Gulrez (the new Corps Commander, X Corps, Rawalpindi, and
formerly one of the principal “watchdogs” in ISI, monitoring Lt. Gen.
Ziauddin), were together involved in the Kargil operation in mid-1999, and
clearly have remained very much a close group. This accounts for Maj. Gen.
Jamshed Gulrez’s posting to X Corps, which is the most trusted operational
posting in the Army. (Position as in early 2004).
However, Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed was shifted under the US pressure
after Indian sources tipped off the Americans about flow of funds from
Pakistan to the terrorists who had perpetrated the 9/11 attack on America.
In the days, following Lt. General Mehmood Ahmed’s dismissal, a report
published in the Times of India, revealed the links between Pakistan’s chief
spy Lt. General Mehmood Ahmed and the presumed “ring leader” of the
WTC attacks Mohamed Atta. In many regards, the Times of India report
constituted “the missing link” to an understanding of who was behind the
terrorist attacks of September 11. The details of this sordid Pakistani
involvement have been highlighted in a subsequent chapter.
 The person to follow Gen Mehmood, Lt. Gen. Ehsan-ul-Haq was said to be
a confidant of Musharraf. However, in Pakistan’s queer military rule trust is a
mirage. The latest changes in October 2004 indicate that the top military ruler
in Pakistan did not like his trust to be pinned on a single point for a prolonged
period. He liked to reshuffle his inner group as frequently as it was necessary
to maintain his own stability.

 Interference in Pakistan’s Internal Matters
Pakistan was not destined to be an anchor of democracy. Its leaders, and
later, the military, belied the expectations that Pakistan would emerge as
another Westminster type democracy, a secular country, upholding the
dignified values of modernism with democratic global connectivity. The
combined bureaucratic and military forces hijacked its internal political soul.
Military in Pakistan has emerged as the destiny maker of its people, who have
been made to believe that Islam, Sharia and Hadith are more important than
modern developments based on the universal principles of democracy,
constitutional liberty and secularism. These vested interests had shackled
Pakistan to medieval millstones. In defining and deciding the archaic political
stagnation of Pakistan, the military rulers and oligarchic pseudo-democrats
liberally used the Inter Services Intelligence.
The internal political operations of the ISI transcended the defined
intelligence parameters assigned to it as a wing of Pakistan’s military
intelligence. More than a quarter century of military dictatorship had
empowered the ISI to emerge as the ‘third estate’ of the Establishment. On
several occasions it abrogated the role of the ‘second estate’ as well, pushing
the bureaucracy to the third position.
The ISI’s involvement in internal political matters has been well
documented by several Pakistani and foreign authors. Some of the interesting
reading materials have been recorded by John Kaniyalil (The Master
Manipulator), Brig. Tirmazi (Profiles of Intelligence), Lt Gen. Gul Hassan
(Memoirs), Z.A.Bhutto (If I Am Assassinated…), and Benazir Bhutto
(Daughter of the East). The list is fairly longer. There are several recoded
comments by Pakistani intelligentsia on the aspects of blatant interference by
the ISI in domestic political affairs.
Democracy had eclipsed in Pakistan with the assassination of Liaquat Ali
Khan. The later democratic totems were hated for their inefficiency and also
for being Bengalis. The Punjabi triumvirate of Ghulam Mohammad, Choudhri
Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza (had Bengali blood in him) had started
involving the ISI in internal political manipulation, as they did not have
sufficient faith on the overly police staffed PIB. This trend was capitalized
extensively by President Ayub Khan. He was the first Pakistani leader to
involve the ISI with the ethnic insurgencies in North East India. According to
Memoirs of General Gul Hassan, former president Iskandar Mirza in an
interview had admitted this fact to the Pakistani High Commissioner in
London.
 Pakistan is not the only country that uses intelligence machineries for
political purposes. Apart from established democracies like the USA and UK
developing democratic countries like India too have used their internal and
external intelligence organs to protect and promote the political interests of
the ruling parties. Most Indian leaders used the R&AW, IB, CBI and other
enforcement agencies against their political adversaries. Any conscientious
Indian intelligence officer has not yet candidly revealed these nasty secrets of
India. However, inappropriate utilization of the intelligence apparatuses in
India was not directed at system change, except for once, during Indira
Gandhi’s emergency regime. This is the basic difference between the two
countries.
However, the use of the ISI infrastructure both by the elected governments
and the military dictators right from Ayub Khan to Musharraf, with brief
interludes of the Bhuttos and Nawaz Sharif, is a mirror reflection of the use of
the apparatuses and apparatchiks of the intelligence and political police by
totalitarian regimes like Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s USSR and Mao’s China.
The Pakistani leaders have freely used the intelligence organizations, both
the PIB and the ISI for suppressing internal political dissent. In this regard,
there is hardly any difference between Z.A. Bhutto and his blue-eyed-boy
turned assassin Zia-ul-Haq. Such aberrations happen with solar-regularity, as
Pakistan refuses to rein in the intelligence organizations by adopting structural
and regulatory Acts and making them responsible and accountable to the
representatives of the people and the Constitution of the country. In India,
these agencies are appended to some ministries. In Pakistan, these are integral
parts of the Secret Team operating under army’s hegemony.
As the early blossoms of democracy in Pakistan withered away and the
civil servant/army coterie hijacked the fledgling nation, Major General
Iskandar Mirza had started nursing and nurturing the ISI as an instrument of
governance. The extra-constitutional rulers direly needed an extra-legal
instrument to perpetuate their stranglehold and to carry out a different kind of
war against its umbilical enemy, India, more virulently than the descendants
of Ishmael fight the descendants of Brother Isaac.
Pakistan Intelligence Bureau, under direction of President Ayub Khan, was
the first Pakistani intelligence organization to contact the rebel Naga leaders.
This historic episode has been narrated elsewhere in this book.
However, Ayub Khan was the first president to set up a review commission
on the functioning of the intelligence outfits of Pakistan mainly with a view to
tighten his hold on the Establishment. He was also the first national leader to
utilize the ISI for spying on internal political opponents. Thereafter, most
Pakistani rulers have had the pleasure and compulsion of contributing to the
growth of the Inter Services Intelligence. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, General
Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, General Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto,
Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musarraf used the ISI for unleashing proxy-war and
sustained sabotage and subversion campaign against India. Z. A. Bhutto’s use
of the ISI to crush the Baloch rebellion is no less a gory chapter than the
genocide in former East Pakistan. The ISI is still playing dirty games in
Balochistan by killing, kidnapping and ambushing innocent civilians in the
name of fighting Baloch insurgency.
Contrary to speculations that General Zia-ul-Haq was the mastermind
behind honing and sharpening the dirty operational edges of the ISI, it was
Pakistan’s man of destiny, Z.A. Bhutto, who had strengthened the military
dominated intelligence outfit and virtually formalized its involvement in
domestic politics. Bhutto had manipulated the ISI to produce intelligence that
had convinced Ayub Khan that Nehru’s death and Lal Bahdur Shastri’s
tenuous rule offered the best opportunity to invade Kashmir. Pakistani
historians and military strategists now recognize the fact that Bhutto had
forced the war on Ayub Khan. His manipulation of Lt. General Ghulam Jillani
Khan, Director General ISI, and a few other Generals around Yahya Khan
before and during the Bangladesh war, formed part of a cynical conspiracy,
which had led to Pakistan’s break up. It was Bhutto who manipulated the post
’71 Pakistan Army to his advantage and upgraded the rank of the ISI chief to
three-star Lieutenant General. General Jillani later survived the judicial
hanging of his Sindhi mentor and continued to enjoy Zia’s patronage.
Russian involvement in Afghanistan in 1979 had changed the old geo-
political equations. Involvement of the US, China and Islamic countries in the
new killing fields of Afghanistan had tempted General Zia to involve the ISI
as a shadow extension of Pakistan’s regular forces in the Afghan imbroglio.
He had, in fact, remodelled the ISI to a CIA style organization, adding to its
sinister arsenal the unbridled power to interfere in internal affairs, including
affairs of his political and military opponents. Legal murder of Bhutto is a
testimony to the sinister capabilities of the ISI, nursed so carefully by the
slain Premier himself.
Having turned Pakistan into a theocratic state Zia also encouraged the
madrassas and fundamentalist tanzeems to collaborate with the ISI for
breeding and supplying jihadis to Afghanistan and to the new war theatre in
Kashmir. The ISI was made to infuse in its ranks more fundamentalist
adherents to Zia-brand Islam. Zia had encouraged the ISI operatives and the
‘deeni tanzeems’ to break the barrier between the state controlled and
privately organized machines for manufacturing jihadists. His regime was
responsible for establishment of direct liaison between Osama and his Arab
legion and the ISI and its Jihadist ‘street warriors.’
From Bhutto and Zia onwards, there was no looking back for the most
important pillar of Pakistani Establishment. The ISI had turned into a pseudo-
political entity under Zia and absence of political parties and democratic
process and the Russian presence in Afghanistan had conferred upon it hallow
of invincibility. The US and China winked at the growth of the ISI and
abetted its growth as an instrument for shifting the tectonic plate of Islamic
Jihadist movement from the Arab World to the fertile soils of Pakistan, where
sub-continental moderate Islam was being replaced by orthodox Sunni
Wahhabism. In fact, the CIA had organized specialized courses for the ISI
operatives in its Georgia facility for Vietnam style guerrilla warfare. The US
had calculated that the special commandos of the ISI would operate in
Afghanistan. It did not calculate that Pakistan would divert some of the
commandos in Indian part of Kashmir.
To study the correlation between the ISI and Pakistan’s internal political
development we may broadly divide the canvas into four distinct periods:
Ayub/Yahya regime, Z. A. Bhutto period, Zia-ul-Haq regime and post-Zia
regimes marked by Benazir-Sharif interlude and Pervez Musharraf period.
These periods are interconnected and there may be some frequent forward and
backward references to facts, events and developments. It is recognized that
history is always in transit; it progresses in unbroken chain with changes in
the society and polity. Time and history do not use full stop in chronicling a
nation’s march through its destiny.
The ISI was activated in a big way to monitor and subvert the language
movement in East Pakistan, which later took the shape of autonomy and
independence demand. It is believed that the ISI, primarily tasked with the
liaison job with the Naga insurgents, was drafted to internal intelligence
matters and matters related to organizing opposition to the ‘Indian inspired
language movement’ and strengthening the religious fundamentalists around
1958. In addition to Dhaka, new ISI detachments, attached to pure West
Pakistani regiments, were stationed at Comilla, Chittagong, Mymensingh,
Rajshahi, Pabna and Bagura and other places to supplement the PIB, in which
there were number of Bengali employees. In East Pakistan, the ISI did not
employ any Bengali personnel.
Shahid Suhrawardy and his lieutenants like Mujibur Rahman were kept
under ISI surveillance, as the military-bureaucratic leaders in West Pakistan
were not sure of allegiance of the Bengali elements in the civilian intelligence
fraternity. Bengali speaking Pakistani leaders believed that West Pakistan had
used the ISI in reducing the influences of Sher-e-Bangal Fazlul Rahman and
Maulana Bhasani and promoting Nurul Amin. The Bengali sub-nationalists
dubbed the latter as a collaborator of the Punjabi clique. This chain of
involvement of the ISI in East Pakistan had culminated in the alleged
detection of the Agartala Conspiracy case, in which Mujibur Rahman and his
colleagues were implicated for conspiring with India. The oppressive
measures undertaken by Pakistan army that preceded the break up of Pakistan
were organized by the ISI through Jamait-e-Islami and other fundamentalist
tanzeems.
With a view to undermining the alleged links between the language and
autonomy agitators of the Awami League and Indian intelligence, the ISI had
set up forward posts near key East Pakistani towns closer to Indian border.
Some of these detachments were responsible for infiltrating sections of Indian
Muslims and other ‘agents’ — Marxist-Leninist protagonists with a view to
spreading disinformation and gaining forward intelligence about Indian
involvement with the Bengali agitators. Around the same time, the ISI was
encouraged to infiltrate the Jamait-e-Islami of East Pakistan and several
Ansar forces for fomenting anti-India and anti-Hindu agitations. Several Sufi
pirs were also infiltrated by the ISI for opposing the alleged pro-India
activities of the Awami League. In this regard, the pirs of Maijh Bhandar,
Monar Char and Narayanganj are rated as prime forces that had allowed the
traditional Sufi platforms to be used by the staunch Wahhabis.
Ayub Khan’s effort to depoliticize Pakistan had pushed the country back to
the days of colonial rule. His Basic Democracy Programme and
administrative fiat and programme for subduing the media had witnessed
aggressive inroads by the IB and the ISI in the domain of public life. The
National Press Trust was created to manage news, and radical newspapers like
Pakistan Times were transformed into government organs. Ayub Khan had
even assigned the task of informal pre-screening of all newspapers to the ISI,
a job normally done by the IB. The proclaimed democrats like Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif also exhibited such fascist tendencies.
There cannot be a better source than falling back on Altaf Gauhar, the
Pakistani author. He has extensively commented in his book ‘How
Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics’ and has covered a vast canvas of
internal operations of the ISI and MI. To quote him:
“I had opportunity to watch quite closely the working of our own
Intelligence agencies during the 1965 war with India. At that time the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was headed by Brigadier Riaz Hussain,
who later became the Governor of Balochistan. The Military
Intelligence (MI) was under Brigadier Muhammad Irshad and A.B.Awan
was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (DIB). Each agency had its
own sphere of duties but they had a common goal — preserving the
national security. Since there is hardly any significant political activity,
domestic or foreign, national or international, which does not, directly
or indirectly, impinge on national security, there was much overlapping
in the work of the three agencies…
“The DIB reported directly to the Prime Minister and the two military
agencies to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (C-in-C). It was left to
the C-in-C to bring all matters of interest to the notice of the Prime
Minister through the Ministry of Defence…
“This arrangement continued fairly smoothly until the imposition of
Martial Law in 1958. I was in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat during
the last days of parliamentary government in 1957-58 and Malik Feroz
Khan Noon used to get reports of the contacts which military
intelligence agencies were making with the political leaders of different
parties. There was little that he could do about it since President
Iskander Mirza was drawing up his own plan of action to put an end to
parliamentary rule in collusion with the C-in-C, General Ayub Khan.
Noon was resisting Mirza’s pressure to grant a four-year extension of
term to Ayub Khan. I remember Ayub Khan bursting into my office one
afternoon in full uniform. I was relieved when he said: “Since the
Principal Secretary has gone for lunch I thought I would ask you to
request the Prime Minister to stay with me in Rawalpindi when he comes
on a formal visit next week.” He left the room before I could recover my
breath. When I conveyed the message to the PM, he said: “I know he
wants me to give him an extension of term. His term does not end till
1959. Why is he in such a hurry?” Years later when I mentioned this
incident to Ayub Khan he said: “The fellow was under the influence of
his wife. He wanted to promote General Sher Ali. My boys were keeping
tabs on him….
“Once the Martial Law was promulgated in 1958 all the intelligence
agencies came under the direct control of the President and Chief
Martial Law Administrator. The maintenance of national Security,
which was the principal function of these agencies, came to mean the
consolidation of the Ayub regime; any criticism of the regime was seen a
threat to national security. The three intelligence agencies started
competing with each other in demonstrating their loyalty to Ayub Khan
and his system of government. Since Ayub Khan was reluctant to
increase the military budget, neither the ISI nor the MI could post their
officers in the districts and because of that limitation their domestic
activities remained quite restrained. But they continued to be assigned
specific duties to keep a watch on ‘undesirable’ politicians and civil
servants…
“When I came to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, I found
a psychological warfare unit under operation in the office of the
Secretary. It was headed by Col. Mujibur Rahman, who later became the
Secretary of the Ministry in the Zia-ul-Haq regime. Was it an
intelligence plant meant to keep an eye on the working of the civil
government? Whatever its purpose I found it a complete waste of time
and I was able to persuade the President to have it recalled by the
GHQ…
“The President used to receive regular reports on the political situation
in the country from the ISI and the MI. These reports in sealed envelopes
marked ‘Eyes Only’ were usually handed over to the President by the C-
in-C. On a few occasions the President gave me these reports and it
seemed to me that the agencies were keeping the politicians, particularly
the East Pakistanis, under close surveillance. I rarely found anything
insightful in these reports. ..
“The DIB had direct access to the President and his weekly reports used
to be fairly exhaustive. It was during the presidential election in l964
that the ISI and the MI became extremely active. While the DIB gave the
President a detailed assessment of his prospects in the election, the ISI
and the MI kept him informed of the trend of public opinion based
largely on gossip. The election results showed that the three agencies
had seriously underestimated the popularity of Mohtrama Miss Fatima
Jinnah and given Ayub Khan too optimistic a picture of his prospects…
“The crisis of intelligence came during the 1965 war. Brigadier Riaz
was good enough to show me his set-up, an impressive affair judging by
the sophisticated equipment and the operators at work. He told me that
he had contacts inside the Occupied Kashmir and in other major Indian
cities. “I will flood you with news. Don’t worry”…
“When the war started there was a complete blackout of news from all
the intelligence agencies. When I got nothing out of the ISI for two days
I went to Brigadier Riaz only to learn that all his contacts had gone
underground…
The performance of the MI was even more frustrating. The mobile
transmitter which the MI had acquired to broadcast the Voice of
Kashmir conked out and Brigadier Irshad came to me to find him a
spare transmitter. When I told him that it would take at least a month to
import another transmitter he pleaded with me to take over the
broadcast part of the operation. “How can I do that I know nothing
about the operation?” …
“I protested. “But that is the beauty of it.” said Irshad, “even I know
very little about it.” It did not take the Indians long to extract the whole
operational plan out of the ‘infiltrators’ whom they captured the moment
they entered the Indian occupied territory in Kashmir. Four of them were
put on All India Radio to make a public confession. I heard the details of
the operation on the air in utter disbelief. I rushed to Muzaffarabad to
acquaint Irshad with what I had heard. He fell back in his chair and
moaned: “The bastards have spilt the beans.”…
“After the cease-fire I brought these incidents to Ayub Khan’s notice and
urged him to review the working of these agencies. “They have no idea
of intelligence work,” I submitted “all they can do is investigative work
like sub-inspectors of police, tapping telephone conversations and
chasing the suspects.”…
“Much later Ayub Khan set up a committee to examine the working of
the agencies under General Yahya Khan. Both A.B. Awan and I were
members of the committee. The GHQ tried to put all the blame on IB for
their own incompetence. Yahya wanted the committee to recommend that
officers of ISI and the Ml should be posted at district headquarters.
Awan strongly opposed the idea and I backed him. We could not
understand the purpose of getting the military agencies involved in
domestic administration. As we left the meeting Awan said to me “They
are planning to impose martial law.” He proved right though it took the
Army quite some time to get rid of Ayub Khan after unleashing a
popular campaign against him…
“The intelligence agencies got even more deeply involved in domestic
politics under General Yahya Khan. The ISI jumped headlong into the
political crisis in East Pakistan. A National Security Council was
created under the chairmanship of General Yahya Khan with Major
General Ghulam Umar as second in command to control the intelligence
operation, which was meant to ensure that no political party should get
an overall majority in the general election. An amount of Rs 29 lac was
put at the disposal of General Umar for the purpose. Before the Army
action General Akbar, who was the head of the ISI and with whom I had
good relations when I was in service, requested me that I should
introduce him to some Bengali academics and journalists. The ISI was
trying to infiltrate into the inner circles of the Awami League. Had I
given him any names they too have been put on Rao Farman Ali’s hit list
of Bengali intellectuals? The operation proved a total disaster. Lawrence
Ziring says: “New efforts at a political solution might have been
 attempted later, but army intelligence failed time and again to correctly
assess the situation and the demeanour of the generals was hardly
conducive to rational decision-making.” (Lawrence Ziring, The Tragedy
of East Pakistan, OUP, 1997).
“For General (retd) Aslam Beg to claim on solemn oath before the
Supreme Court of Pakistan that the ISI got involved in the internal
politics of the country only after a special cell was created by Prime
Minister Bhutto in 1975 is a culpable attempt at concealing the truth
and distorting the record of the operations of the military intelligence
agencies since independence. The present government has only to report
to the Supreme Court that the ISI deals with matters relating to
Pakistan’s national security and that would be the end of Asghar Khan’s
writ petition against Aslam Beg. Who will provide a definition of
national security to rule out the involvement of the ISI and the MI in
domestic politics which is seen as the biggest threat to the security and
solidarity of Pakistan?” (Published in The Nation 17 August 1997.)

Ayub Khan’s eclipse and the rise of Yahya Khan had ushered in a new
relationship between the state of Pakistan and its intelligence machineries.
Reported to be a hard drinker and given to other pleasures of life Yahya had
given long ropes to the armed forces, the IB and the ISI in tackling the
burgeoning problem in East Pakistan, which later took the shape of an
avalanche. Several Bengali freedom fighters have complained that the
intelligence organizations were ruthlessly used on two fronts: hunting down
the Bengali nationalists and organizing the pro-Pakistani elements into
machines of general pogrom. The ISI had organized mixed group of Urdu
speaking non-Bengalis and Bengali speaking East Pakistanis into several
hundred armed groups and gave them free hands in mass assassination of the
Hindus and Muslims sympathetic to the Awami League. Regular West
Pakistani soldiers were loaned to these armed bands for exterminating the
Bengalis. According to a few surviving freedom fighters the Urdu speaking
Muslims and the Pakistan army regulars were responsible for killing over half
a million Bengalis in the southern districts of East Pakistan.
Bhutto came to power on the ashes of Pakistan left over by the disastrous
developments in East Pakistan, total discredit of the army and near collapse of
the administrative machineries. The armed forces as well as the intelligence
machineries were extensively used by Z.A. Bhutto to contain tribal
insurgency in Balochistan. “The problems of Balochistan were symptoms of
Bhutto’s growing authoritarianism. This formed the background to the
eventual coup that brought Zia-ul-Haq to power in July 1977.” India and
Pakistan, Ian Talbot, p.209.
Bhutto’s use of the ISI, SSG and regular military in quelling Balochistan
revolt often far exceeded the atrocities committed by Pakistan army in East
Pakistan. Special contingents of the ISI had used helicopter gunships to
identify rebellious ‘tribal villages in remote hill areas and bombed the
population to submission’.
Bhutto had the unique advantage of witnessing the uneven growth of the
ISI and its proximity to the military brass. Its role in Bangladesh was too well
known to him. Being a proclaimed democrat and an Islamic socialist he
should have curbed the powers of the ISI. Instead, he had strengthened the
ISI’s power by assigning the organization vast political roles. Stanley
Wolpert, the US scholar, has mentioned in his book Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan:
His Life and Times that Bhutto regime had freely utilised the IB and the ISI in
domestic political matters. He had used the IB Director M. Akram Sheik and
Joint Director Muhammad Isa for compiling dossiers on political opponents.
Bhutto also extensively exploited the services of General Ghulam Jillani
Khan, DG ISI, to augment internal political objectives. “At times we were
also ordered to bug the telephones of some individuals. Such orders came in
writing from the Prime Minister himself. The authority had not been
delegated to anyone else. We would compile the report and send it to PM with
appropriate recommendations to continue or discontinue the watch” Profiles
of Intelligence, Brig (retd) Syed A. I. Tirmazi. p.279.
Bhutto was responsible for encouraging the ISI and Brigadier Nasserullah
Babbar to formulate Pakistani policies and operational thrusts inside
Afghanistan against the regime of Mohammad Daoud and later the
communist regimes. Pakistan’s Afghan policy, at that point of time, was
independent from the US policy. The USA was still watching the
developments and was embroiled in handling the situation in Iran.
Bhutto’s severest undoing was his alleged act of rigging the March 1977
elections. He had extensively used the IB and the ISI in ‘rigging the election’
and ensuring his overwhelming victory. In a number of cases, the opposition
candidates were bullied, harassed and intimidated. Organised violence was
unleashed in Sindh and Punjab constituencies. The ISI and the IB were also
used to widen the differences between the MQM and other political entities.
That was the most unfortunate part of political misadventure, which had
outraged broad-spectrum of public opinion in Pakistan and resulted in the
ouster of Bhutto in a military coup.
Bhutto loyalist Lt Gen. Ghulam Jillani Khan, however, had no
compunction in betraying the trust of his mentor and collaborating with Zia-
ul-Haq, who had replaced Bhutto in a military coup. A Deobandi Islamist and
an ardent follower of the Islamist tenets of Wahhabism, Zia had deftly used
the ISI and Ghulam Jillani’s successor Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rahman to
establish a stranglehold on Pakistan.
Zia-ul-Haq is credited with a couple of achievements: ending Pakistan’s
international isolation and freshly tying the knot of friendship with the USA;
embarking on a new Afghan policy; fresh de-politicization of Pakistan;
enhancing sectarian religious conflicts, giving encouragement to ethnic
clashes between the Mohajirs and Sindhis, Punjabisation of Pakistani polity
and Islamisation of Pakistan. In all these matters, Zia had fully utilized the IB
and the ISI machineries. Use of the intelligence apparatuses to fabricate
criminal cases against Z. A. Bhutto and his ultimate judicial assassination had
added a shameful chapter to Pakistan’s political history. In short, Zia had used
the intelligence machineries for exclusively gagging all political activities,
except those allowed by him as window dressing.
However, Zia had deftly used the ISI and the SSG in Pakistan’s
involvement in the Afghan imbroglio. This episode of the unique achievement
of the Inter Services Intelligence would be elaborated in a separate chapter.
*
Zia-ul-Haq’s death on 17 August 1988 paved the way for restoration of
democracy in Pakistan. The army was reluctant to hand over power to Zulfi
Bhutto’s daughter. After agonizing procrastination, Benazir had to give
informal undertaking that she would remain in office but not in power, she
would not tamper with the Afghan policy and not interfere with the
Establishment.
For a brief period Benazir Bhutto and General Gul, the ISI chief, had
differed on Afghan issue. In an interview on May 20, 2000, Benazir revealed,
“Sometimes, I went along with ISI proposals although I did not agree with
the strength of the argument. For example, I wanted to accept Soviet
foreign minister Schevernadze’s proposal for the peaceful political solution
of Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal, which was due. ISI did
not agree, wanting to give the Mujahideen the taste of victory by marching
into Kabul as conquerors…However, I did not have the heart to stop them
from trying because they were so convinced they could do it and had paid
such a heavy price fighting for freedom.”
In the same interview, Benazir said she found that many officers, including
ambassador rank, wanted to keep on the good side of ISI thinking they were
the permanent government and “the PPP a temporary guest.” She said that the
ambassadors, generally respected for having intellectual integrity, would
report to ISI on an unofficial level and seek briefings from them. They would
then argue the ISI line with the Foreign Office.
Benazir also had differed with the Kashmir policy of the ISI. She said in
the same interview, “Three crucial changes took place in the Kashmir policy.
First, the leadership of All Parties Hurriyat Conference was effectively
replaced with Harkat ul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Tayeba. Second, the arena
of conflict was expanded beyond the disputed area. Third, non-military
targets, that are civilians, were also included as targets. This has led to a sea
shift in the perceptions with regard to the Kashmir dispute.”
She wanted to put the All Parties Hurriyat Conference back in the centre of
the policy. That, she argued, would lead to a peaceful solution of the problem
acceptable to India and Pakistan and the international community. Benazir’s
views were drastically opposite to the views of the Army and the ISI. General
Hamid Gul, the ISI chief, and the Army chief, General Aslam Beg, opposed
her. They opposed her alleged attempt to tamper with the national security
polices adopted by the Establishment.
It was General Gul, who had cobbled up the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI),
a coalition of parties, which later replaced Benazir. An expert in the tradecraft
of clandestine arming and training of mujahideen, General Gul had not only
masterminded the ISI’s Afghan saga, he had also helped the military regime
to fashion its strategic thrust in the Indian Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.
The ISI, under him, had replicated the rogue CIA. With close links with the
Jamait-e-Islami General Gul had prompted the ISI to support pro-Jamait
groups headed by Hekmatyar.
Benazir, however, after her electoral victory sacked Hamid Gul and
inducted Lt.Gen. (Retd) Shamshur Rahman Kallue. This had infuriated the
Army Establishment, as the top brass wanted to install a serving ally. An
alarm was sounded that Benazir was determined to curtail ISI’s internal
political clout, as the PPP had suffered immensely during Zia regime,
including judicial hanging of her father. She had made an effort, through the
Zulfiqar Committee, to curtail ISI’s sphere of influence.
Following her contrived dismissal, Maj. General Asad Durrani was
appointed chief of the ISI, who served the tenure of the IJI government, a
creation of the infamous intelligence organization and Army. He was
followed by Lt.Gen Javed Nasir and later succeeded by Lt.Gen Javed Ashraf
Kazi, following the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif.
With the induction of General Nasir, an officer of the Corps of Engineers,
the ISI was again embroiled in internal politics and export of terrorism. An
Islamic fundamentalist, a member of the Jamait-e-Islam and Tabligh-i-
Jammat, the proselytizing fraternity, and a Kashmiri to top, Gen. Nasir thrived
on anti-Indian brine. He brought in qualitative changes in the ISI’s
involvement with the Punjab and J&K terrorists and finalizing the blueprint of
escalation of Islamist Jihad, in the fashion of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah, amongst
the vulnerable sections of the Indian Muslims.
His tenure coincided with Benazir’s second incarnation, during which, state
sponsored terrorism had not only affected Afghanistan and India; it brought in
adverse impact on Pak-US and Pak-China relations too. Besides prolonged
cross-border terrorism in India, involvement of Pak trained mujahideen of
Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin and Lashkar-e-Tayeba etc, terrorist
outfits in Bosnia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia,
Southern Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Xinjiang province of
China and even on the US soil had peaked by 1992 end. That was the time
when the USA toyed with the threat of declaring Pakistan a terrorist state.
General Nasir’s removal, after Nawaz Sharif’s dismissal, was welcomed in
Washington and Beijing. Nawaz Sharif had not made any effort to bridle the
rogue ISI. Rather he used the ISI, IB and Ehtasab Bureau to harass his
political opponents and even the judiciary. His later day performance
reminded discerning Pakistanis the height of arrogant days of Z.A.Bhutto.
Benazir had tinkered with the idea of leashing the intelligence
organizations. Besides strengthening the IB, she had appointed an intelligence
review committee under Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan. But before she
could take action on this report she was out of office. “I agree to what she
says, but cannot condone the fact that a prime minister failed to take
corrective measures,” was how the former Air Force chief Zulfiqar Ali Khan
had responded in a recent interview.
In fact, similar exercises had been done before as well; Yahya Khan did it
for Ayub Khan, Rafi Reza for Z.A. Bhutto, and Sahabzada Yakub Khan did it
for Zia-ul-Haq. However, the military and political leaders did precious little
to rein in the errant intelligence organizations.
The review committee headed by Zulfiqar Ali Khan had found that ISI’s
extremely good performance in the external sphere was considerably marred
by its undue involvement in domestic political affairs. As for the IB, the
committee found it in a state of limbo and organizational and functional
disarray. The committee, the former Air Force chief said, had recommended
formation of the National Security Council with PM as chairman, and
ministers of foreign, defence, interior, finance, chairman JCSC, and all
services head as members. It also recommended creation of a joint
intelligence committee (JIC) with secretaries of all mentioned ministries, IB,
ISI chiefs as its members.
As for the role of IB, the committee proposed that its role be restricted to
internal security and political matters and externally for counterintelligence
operations.
“We also advised against ISI dealing with internal security matters which
should be handled by the IB, with the emphasis that of course normal political
activity should not be watched at all,” Zulfiqar Ali Khan said adding that the
committee proposed the establishment of a National Intelligence Training
Academy, and that selection of the IB chief purely on merit was also part of
the recommendations. All these recommendations stemmed from the
conclusion that some of the agencies, which of course are an essential part of
the security in every state, in certain instances had “gone beyond their
mandate.”
Instead of providing information, they assumed the role of policy makers.
Interestingly, Benazir Bhutto’s revealing interviews have triggered a debate
among the characters involved with every one of them trying to justify
himself.
Nevertheless, the ISI was not to be tamed by Benazir. Some reports suggest
that in 1989 the ISI had secretly recorded the one-to-one talks between Rajiv
Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto. The recorded material had reportedly contained
agreement between the two leaders to mutually reduce troops. This was
probably the last straw. The Army Chief General Aslam Beg and President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan reportedly played the contents of the tape to the
opposition leaders and dismissed Benazir.
It should be interesting to note that Pakistan had appointed six committees
to review the functioning of its intelligence agencies:
a) Ayub Khan appointed Lt.Gen. K. M. Sheikh
Committee 1960
b) Ayub Khan appointed Fida Hussain Committee
1967
c) Yahya Khan appointed G. Ahmed Committee
1971
d) Z. A. Bhutto appointed Rafi Raza Committee
1974
e) Zia appointed Sahibzada Yakub Khan Committee
1981
f) Benazir appointed Zulfiqar Ali Khan Committee
1989
Some of these review operations were carried out to strengthen the
intelligence edifices and to cater to the domestic political and military needs
of the rulers. Z.A. Bhutto and Benazir had tried in vein, and rather a little late
in the day, to rein in the powerful ‘third estate’ of the Establishment. By that
time, the ISI had transcended the reach of any political government that
Pakistan might have intermittently had. In the recent past, Pervez Musharraf
has carried out certain cosmetic changes to reassure his fidelity to the USA
and to secure his own position.
*
By 1990, when the PPP government was ousted, interim Prime Minister
Jatoi had sanctioned an entire Corp for intelligence work. Now a Lieutenant
General headed the ISI. Even more drastic was the logistical spread of
intelligence. Whereas the intelligence had previously been confined to the
divisions, they now spread down to the districts and the tehsils (sub districts).
Field Intelligence Units under the corps commanders became larger and more
influential. Field Intelligence Units (FIU) and Field Intelligence Teams (FIT)
were reconstituted. By 1990, there were some seven different intelligence
organizations right down to the sub district level. All this meant more pay,
more administrative costs, more maintenance, and more influence. It also
meant that the intelligence now formed hardcore activity of the armed forces
and through it, the Army controlled large parts of the country.
In 1990, the ISI backed the first Nawaz Sharif regime. However, Nawaz
Sharif and the intelligence fell out when the Prime Minister failed to make
General Hamid Gul the Chief of Army Staff. Nawaz paid for it with the loss
of his first regime.
Since that fateful day, the intelligence loyal to the Zia dream, more
extended than the past, had been in search of a new political leader. They
thought they had found one in President Leghari. He was Oxford educated,
and came from a tribal family bordering Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh and
had connections to Ichra, the seat of the Muslim Brotherhood. He attended
meetings of the Tabligh-i-Jamaat, and was supposed to be docile. However,
Leghari disappointed the ISI when he disagreed to defer the 1997 elections.
Leghari sealed his own fate by insisting to hold the elections. In Pakistan, one
cannot survive by disagreeing with the Army and the ISI. One does what they
say—or pays. In the meantime, Nawaz was ready to make amends and play
the games of the ISI and army. The opposition Pakistan People’s Party refused
to boycott the elections. The mantle of hope once again fell on Nawaz Sharif.
However, Nawaz Sharif never trusted the ISI and sought to make his own
base. This had brought in some ingredients of confrontation. However, some
of the new ministers sworn in during August had intelligence links. Dr. Attiya
Inayatullah had worked with General Zia and was familiar to his apparatus.
Dr. Ghazi could be trusted because of his links to the Zia era. General Javed
Asraff Qazi was an old school boy having headed the ISI itself. Colonel
Tressler was another good old boy from the Zia days when he served in the
Foreign Service. If ISI linked persons dominated the cabinet, so were the
ambassadorial postings. General Asad Durrani, Ambassador designate to a
Gulf country, had been the head of ISI. General Shujaat, posted to a North
African country, also had ISI background as the head of ISI’s internal
division.
Zia’s ghost continued to echo in the corridors of power when Musharraf
later took over by ousting Nawaz Sharif after the disastrous Kargil adventure.
It was a difficult choice for Musharraf. He wanted to work out a compromise
between the jihadi that he was and a General who dreamt of the Turkish
reformer Ataturk. He was surrounded by other Zia favourites. Sharifuddin
Pirzada, Zia’s law minister, was back. Zia’s Attorney General Aziz Munshi
was back as Attorney General.
To make sure that jihadi programmes remained intact in the frontier
province, home to many of the madrassas and bordering Afghanistan, another
ISI officer had been made the Governor. He was the likeable General Ifthikar
from Kohat. An old Nawaz favourite, another ISI chief, General Javed Nasir
headed the lucrative Property Trust. Discreetly handled, this could bring in
big sums for extra - state activities. Additionally, Musharraf had asked him to
look after the Sikh places of worship in Pakistan. It was an act of irony that a
former ISI chief was entrusted with the religious affairs of the Sikhs. Other
intelligence officers had risen to key positions too. General Gulzar, Corps
Commander Tenth Corps, was inducted to the ISI.
The Chief of General Staff had double credentials. He served as a staff
officer to General Zia and served in the ISI. General Ghulam Ahmad, Chief of
Staff controlling access to General Musharraf, had an intelligence
background. Other old hands of the Zia era had been re-inducted, some at
plush salaries. One controlled all governmental postings and transfers. Other
intelligence officers staffed the National Accountability Bureau or the
Investigative cell in the ISI. They determined who should be prosecuted and
who should be let off. Moreover, in case the civilian bureaucracy felt the need
of the tender ministrations of ISI officers, more intelligence officers were on
hand. Even the Inspector General of Prisons in Sindh, who had the arduous
task of taking care of the former Prime Minister’s spouse, Asif Ali Zardari,
was an ISI officer.
As mentioned earlier Nawaz Sharif had tried his best, in some ways rather
tyrannically, to impose his will on the Pakistani system. He had promoted
incumbent ISI chief to the rank of a Lt. General. The IB was a suspect in his
eyes, being loyal to Benazir. He made efforts to prune its powers. However,
he had used the IB extensively to spy on the activities of the MQM. These
sordid efforts came to light in December 1990 when some radio transmitters
were discovered by MQM MNAs from their rooms. These incidents had
widened the gulf between IJI and the MQM leader Altaf Hussain.
The Mohajir Quami Movement, political umbrella of the Muslims who
migrated to Pakistan from India, had always irritated the post-Liaquat
Pakistani leaders. Z. A. Bhutto, a Sindhi aristocrat, was suspicious of the
Mohajirs. His daughter had initiated the process of widening the gulf between
the Mohajirs and the Sindhis. However, the efforts to divide the MQM
fructified after Benazir was pushed out of office. The shenanigans had led to
differences between Altaf Hussain and his political colleagues and he
expelled 19 MNAs from the party. This was taken advantage of by the ISI, IB
and the Corps Commander at Karachi. Some masked gunmen killed a few
prominent MQM leaders in Karachi during May 1991. These developments
finally led to a split in the MQM three months later.
Another incident that was attributed to political killing by the intelligence
operatives was the suspicious death of General Asif Nawaz Janjua. Police had
recorded an FIR against Brigadier (Retd) Imtiaz, Director IB. Janjua’s wife
had complained to the President about her apprehension of her husband being
assassinated for political motives. Subsequent enquiries had pointed fingers at
the possibility of a political conspiracy behind the death of the General.
Nawaz Sharif had used the ISI to investigate some of the questionable
financial dealings by Benazir and her husband Asif Zardari. The ISI and the
Federal Investigation Agency had pursued the matters doggedly, which had
led to trial and incarceration of Zardari and banishment of Benazir from
Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif had used the ISI, IB and the MI very deftly with a
view to creating an atmosphere of suspicion amongst the intelligence
hierarchy. Nevertheless, in Pakistan the ISI often emerges as the real master.
To quote Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, leader of the Awami National Party, ‘the ISI
is the real master of Pakistan. Neither Mr. Nawaz Sharif knows what they are
doing, nor did they keep Ms. Benazir Bhutto informed about their activities.’
That the ISI is involved in money laundering for internal and external uses
was highlighted by the Mehran Bank incident. The Mehran Bank proved to be
the den of political skullduggery, espionage and money laundering with the
main objective of influencing the political course in Pakistan in 1990s. Later
investigation confirmed that the bank, in collaboration with the ISI,
influenced politicians to change sides. It indulged in fake loans, kickbacks
and bribes, etc. The bank’s president Younus Habib was later arrested for
siphoning out money from Mehran as well as Habib Bank. The Habib Bank
had in the meantime earned notoriety as the funding conduit of the ISI inside
Pakistan as well as in stations abroad. Its relationship with the notorious Bank
of Credit and Commerce had also come under international scrutiny for
suspected funneling of funds to terrorist organizations. The Habib Bank was
used by the ISI for funding activities of the Indian separatists from its bases in
Nepal and Bangladesh. Senior Pakistani journalists have pointed out ISI
involvement in running front companies, trusts and NGOs which generated
approximately Rupees 1000 million a year.
Pakistan as a nation state is likely to continue under military stranglehold
for an indefinite period. Restoration of democracy in Pakistan is a remote
possibility. The armed forces are a major political force in Pakistan. They are
not likely to ease grip on the political lives of the nation and they are expected
to use the ISI, IB and other intelligence organizations to curb political
freedom and to promote Islamic fundamentalism with a view to perpetuating
their power bases. Hence, the organizations like the ISI are likely to play vital
roles in the future growth of internal political developments and regional and
global real politick.
To understand ISI’s internal political role clearly it is necessary to briefly
touch on the effects of Islamisation of Pakistan and role played by the
intelligence agency in churning out jihadist mujahideen. It is alleged that Zia-
ul-Haq had turned Pakistan into an Islamic State with a view to perpetuating
his personal hegemony on the beleaguered people of the country. It is correct
that Zia had promulgated several decrees to give a distinct Islamic character
to Pakistan, an Islamist identity, not vastly different from the theological
autocracies of the Arabian Peninsula. Some of his ordinances included:
Hadood Ordinance, Qazaf Ordinance, Zaqat Ordinance, Usher Ordinance,
Federal Shariat Court, Ramzan-e-Mubarak Ordinance, Compulsory Arabic
News in PTV, Majlis-e-Shora (in place of National Assembly).
However, the essentiality of the Islamic character of Pakistan did not start
with Zia. It had started way back in late 19th century and culminated in the
creation of Pakistan. The Urdu speaking Muslims of the United Provinces,
Bihar, Bengal, and Maharashtra and not the Sindhi, Punjabi, and Pushtun
speaking Muslims of the present geographical entity called Pakistan
spearheaded the movement. Zia, a Jalandhari Punjabi Muslim, was the first to
initiate the steps to link up Pakistan with multinational Islamism, which
incidentally coincided with the arrival of another multinational Islamist
movement on Pakistani soil, the Al Qaeda al Sulbah. The two multinational
Islamist forces coexisted from 1979 until Musharraf succumbed to the US
pressure and turned his forces against Osama bin Laden after the Taliban
regime was removed. These aspects will be examined later in a separate
chapter.
The Inter Services Intelligence had aided and abetted the growth of
fundamentalism and sectarian strife in Pakistan with a view to churning out
huge numbers of jihadists that it required for the killing fields in Afghanistan
and in its proxy-war against India. Fundamentalist jihad was added by the ISI
as a weapon to transform the civil society of Pakistan to a breeding ground. It
manufactured Islamic street warriors with the dual purpose of controlling the
Pakistani society and permanently depriving it from democratic aspirations
and to export jihad to India and other countries.
Several thousands of these jihadists were also deputed to the Central Asian,
European and Russian theatres of Islamic jihad. Internal political atmosphere
of Pakistan was vitiated by the growth of several fundamentalist and jihadist
organizations. This also weakened the civil society of Pakistan. A vast
segment of illiterate and poor Pakistani people had started losing faith in
democratic political process. Their despair was exploited by the ISI and the
tanzeems encouraged by it. Some of the top Islamist mujahideen tanzeems
promoted/generated/ patronized by the ISI are listed below:
1. Jamait-e-Islami
2. Jammat-ul-Fuqra (established in 1980 by ISI to assist
Afghan and Kashmiri Mujahideen)
3. Pasban (a front of the JEI)
4. Hijb-ul-Mujaheedin (trained and funded by Fuqra and
associated with Al Qaeda al Sulbah)
5. Islami Mahaz
6. Ikhwan-ul-Mussalmin
7. Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad
8. Sipah Sahaba
9. Muslim Mujahideen
10. Al Jihad
11. Jammat Islamiyaa
12. Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin (reincarnation of Harkat-ul-Ansar)
13. International Justice Group
14. Jamait-ul-Mujaheedin
15. Harkat-ul-Ansar
 16. Lashkar-e-Tayeba
17. Al Faran
18. Al Badr
19. Allah Tigers
20. Jamait-ul-Ulema
21. Jaish-e-Mohammad
22. Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami.
To this list can be added the armed sectarian organizations (Shia-Sunni),
some of which are funded by the ISI, Saudi intelligence, NGOs and Iran.
The list is vast and some of the tanzeems go on changing name and colour
with a view to camouflaging their true colors. Most of these organizations
owe allegiance to Wahhabi-Sunni cult of Saudi variety and Deoband-Bareilly-
Patna Sharif schools of Islamist theology. Though basically Hanafi by sect the
volunteers of these organizations accepted the supremacy of the Salafi
pedigree of Osama bin Laden. The ISI and the jihadist Ummah keep on
breeding new organizations keeping in view their operational needs in
different theatres. The denominations are changed as required by political
compulsions of the ruling regime in Pakistan and its domestic and
international commitments.
Most of these jihadists have been trained in about 8000 madrassas run by
the jihadist mullahs and patronised by umbrella organisations like the
Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad, Arab financiers and foreign funds canalized
through innumerable NGOs. The ISI works as the main coordinator, on behalf
of the Islamist State of Pakistan. The volunteers of the Islamist mujahideen
organizations are also drawn from countries like India, Bangladesh, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Philippines, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia.
Some of the prominent training bases of these Islamist forces are located
at:
1. Islamic University, Peshawar, Pan-Islamic Institute, on the
model of Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in the former USSR.
2. Binori Town Mosque, New Town District, Central
Karachi, mainly training the Taliban for Afghanistan and India.
3. Camps located in the suburbs of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
These were destroyed by the US bombing.
4. Khunar Valley camps, Afghanistan. Destroyed by the US
bombing.
 5. Badr 1 and Badr 2 camps near Khowst, Afghanistan (also
used by Al Qaeda). Presumed to be destroyed by the US bombing.
6. Pabi Camp near Jallozai, Peshawar, Pakistan.
7. Warshak Institute, near Peshawar, Pakistan.
8. Miran Shah camp, near Peshawar, Pakistan.
9. Saada camp, near Peshawar, Pakistan.
10. Muzaffarabad, Jalkot, Biarai, Cherat camps in Pak
Occupied Kashmir.
11. Pasrur, Lahore, Kasur, Changa Manga (reportedly scaled
down as Punjab thrust has been pushed to the back burner).
12. Muridke camp of the Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad and
affiliated groups.
This is an illustrative list. Some of these training facilities have either been
shut down or camouflaged after the USA moved in a big way following its
war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and against Osama bin Laden.
However, the camps in Pak Occupied Kashmir (AJK) continue to be
functional.
Most of the funds for training the mujahideen can generally be traced to
Saudi Arabia, a few other Islamic countries and drug money generated by the
ISI. Several NGOs, affiliated to the government of Pakistan also funnel in
foreign funds. Liberal donations are also raised from the Pakistani civil
society in the name of Islamist jihad against jahiliya India, Zionists, and
Christian nations, where Muslims are allegedly oppressed. The amount of
propaganda literature in support of jihad surpasses the quantity of text books
marketed for the impoverished students.
The ISI played definitive role in shaping the growth of internal political
ethos of Pakistan. Its ideological interlocking with the mujahideen tanzeems is
complicated and it cannot be stated with certainty if President Musharraf will
succeed in carrying out a house cleaning operation to distance the ISI from
the tanzeems and mujahideen organizations. Pakistan army has used these
tanzeems for internal as well as external purposes. He has taken some
measures by banning a few of them. But these entities have resurfaced with
new names and are operating with immunity. Musharraf has started a
programme to regulate the madrassas and have started expelling the foreign
students. For a better understanding of these intricate dynamics it is necessary
to follow the future course of internal political developments in Pakistan.
Internal political evolution of Pakistan will have proportionate impact on the
geopolitical and geo-strategic conditions of its neighboring countries and
rapidly growing Islamisation process and jihadist movements amongst the
Islamic Ummah.
*
 Intervention in India
an Overview

The contents of the following episodes concerning ISI operations inside
Indian heartland are descriptive and illustrative in nature. No major real life
operations by Indian intelligence agencies have been incorporated with a view
to protect Indian counterespionage tradecraft.
Espionage is a cunning combination of theory and practice, but
incorporation of ‘chase-a-spy’ stories belongs to the domain of fiction and not
real life frontline battles against hostile intelligence agencies. Some readers
might find this approach dry and pedantic. It is expected that they would
understand the constraints of the author.
India has been a favorite playground of the Inter Services Intelligence, as
the agency had spearheaded Pakistan’s forward policies in India more
assiduously than the diplomatic maneuvers as permitted by international
protocol.
As an integral part of the art and science of statecraft, the intelligence
agencies are intricately related to the war and peace efforts and diplomatic
maneuvers of a nation. Nation states resort to intelligence tradecraft not only
for stealing secrets of other nations. These arts are also used either in isolation
or in blending with diplomacy for pushing diplomatic initiatives beyond
conference tables, wine glasses, demarches and note verbales. Intelligence
often overlaps diplomatic initiatives, and intelligence agencies are used to
open up second or third track diplomacy when first track diplomacy reaches
an impasse. Intelligence agencies are also used to unleash open and proxy
wars. Camouflaged intelligence offensive often replaces blunted diplomacy.
Pakistan has deftly used its intelligence agencies against India, not merely
as an extension of its diplomatic maneuvers, but specifically as important
tools to explore the Indian fault lines and to get directly and indirectly
involved in sinister destabilization games. Such usages were not sporadic.
Interventions in Indian affairs, especially in its internal security affairs,
emanated out of geopolitical research on the history of fault lines inherited by
India from the British Empire and the ones generated out of inappropriate
handling of racial, ethnic, linguistic and socio-economic contradictions
embedded in Indian body politick and those generated by bad governance.
Indian fault lines are too many. These include:
 • Fault lines like the problems in Nagaland (Naga Hills),
Mizoram (Mizo Hills) and Kashmir had arisen out of political and
administrative gaps left over by the escaping British power and
unattended by the successor Indian governments. Creation of Pakistan
was not the only problem left over by the British; it also left for India
the anomalous princely regime in Kashmir, un-administered areas in
Nagaland, NEFA and a very badly managed Christian majority tract in
Mizo Hills.
• The Manipuri fault line had arisen out of political
mismanagement, bad governance, corruption, economic and
developmental imbalance and wooing of the Nagas at the cost of the
Meities.
• Assam is a classical case of acute economic imbalance,
blatant minority wooing, encouragement to duplicitous demographic
changes and severe political neglect. These far-flung areas of India were
treated by the Indians as ‘videsh and Kalapani’ and the people of the
area considered Indians as ‘Bhai’, Mayang, ‘Indian Dogs’ and
‘Bohiragoto.’ No attempt was made graciously to get these areas
emotionally integrated, least speaking of political, economic,
administrative and cultural integration. No serious attempt was also
made to smooth the unresolved issues of racial and ethnolinguist
geography of the major tribal groups erroneously clubbed with Bengalis
and Assamese.
• Looking towards the west one can clearly discern the Great
Punjab fault line, which was created by over zealous Arya Samajis and
chauvinist Hindus, Shiromoni Akali Dal and political mishandling by
the Congress and religious fundamentalists.
• Partition of India had not resolved the Great Indian
Civilisational fault line that had affected the majority Hindu and
minority Muslim communities soon after the fall of the Mughal power.
This religious fault line is being systematically exploited by the nations
of the Muslim Ummah, basically Pakistan.
• Racial, ethnic, linguistic, political and socio-economic fault
lines are common features with many nations around the globe.
However, India did not make systematic efforts to study these fault lines
and vulnerability offered to hostile nations like Pakistan and China.
Unattended and festering fault lines have had the history of either
blowing up on the face of the nation by the process of internal
combustion or violent explosions facilitated by inimical states and
agencies.
 • As a multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-linguistic and multi-
religious country, India was endowed with myriad of geopolitical fault
lines. These had remained unattended for centuries and were aggravated
by new geopolitical realities arising out of confluence of three major
civilizations in India between eighth and eighteenth centuries—the
coming of Islam and the Christian powers. These new civilisational
forces had fully exploited the inherent weaknesses of the Indian Hindu
society, its class, caste and sectarian divisions. However, instead of
delving deep into the fault lines arising out of civilisational confluence
it is sufficient to state that India’s political history and geography have
been largely determined by the conflicting forces, which had struggled
incessantly over the centuries to foist their superiority and hegemony on
the landmass called Indian subcontinent and its people. Creation of
Pakistan out of the geopolitical entity of culturally united and British
administered India by itself is an example of exploitation of the great
Indian fault line by the conflicting civilisational forces.

Pakistani intervention along the Indian fault lines is as old as the history of
separation of minds of the Hindus and Muslims that had resulted in the
partition of the country. We have quoted from Hasrat Mohani and other
Muslim scholars in support of the fact that there existed seeds of separation of
minds well before the partition of the country. The Pakistani elite never forgot
the legacy of “Muslim India” and they pursued the hatred game even after
partition.
Pakistan has used its intelligence agencies to intervene in Indian affairs
soon after partition. In the initial stages, such interventions were spearheaded
by remnants of the Muslim League, religious parties and organizations and
the Intelligence Bureau. These forces continued to promote communal hatred
and clashes in vulnerable states like West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and
Maharashtra. This was the time when Pakistan sponsored forces told Indian
Muslims that the partition was not complete and more Muslim majority areas
were to be taken out of India. These Pakistan controlled forces still dreamt of
the possibility of creation of another Muslim India. For perpetuating these
sentiments amongst sections of Indian Muslims, Pakistan used its machineries
to foment communal cleavage. However, barring a fringe of the vulnerable
Muslim population the general Muslims in post-partition India preferred to
remain Indian.
To a very limited extent, the Military Intelligence was also used in specific
areas of operation. With the maturation of the Inter Services Intelligence, this
dreaded wing of Pakistani Intelligence was effectively used against Indian
targets. Besides depending on the communalized Muslim political forces and
religious institutions and organizations Pakistan deftly deployed the Inter
Services Intelligence for exploiting the Indian fault lines through various
techniques and trade crafts borrowed from its Cold War partner, the Central
Intelligence Agency and the British Secret Service.
The ISI was oriented to undertake ‘break-India’ operations right from the
days after Muslim League started withering away in East and West Pakistan
and the combined forces of military, bureaucracy and landed gentry started
emerging as the decisive political force. The ISI devoted two full wings of its
establishment for carrying out operations inside India. The Joint Intelligence
Miscellaneous (JIM) and the Joint Intelligence North (JIN) are reported to be
responsible for directing the Indian operations of the ISI. While other wings
of the ISI are known to play supportive roles, the JIX often came to the notice
of the Indian agencies for coordinating special operations inside India. The
Pakistan IB, unlike Indian IB, is not totally barred from conducting operations
in selected foreign countries. For Indian targets they are allowed to conduct
certain shallow penetration trans-border operations as well as assigned High
Commission based operations.
Territorially the JIM is responsible for conducting forward intelligence
operations in India in collaboration with the JIB and the JIX. The JIM is
organized into several sub-desks, which handle different affairs in India and
control different intelligence generating thrusts. Deputy Director General
External II oversees and coordinates these operations. The JIM operations can
be categorized into six major sections under the broad heading of Classical or
Traditional forward intelligence operations. Every country carries out such
operations in their proximate geographical region, targeted against real and
perceived enemies. These operations are different from unconventional
Special Operations (SOP), such as sabotage and subversion in collaboration
with disaffected groups in the target country. These include:
• Home based operations;
• High Commission/Diplomatic Mission based operations;
• Third country based operations;
• Operations conducted through religious tanzeems and
terrorist outfits created and trained by the ISI for operations in India and
other countries;
• Operations conducted through and in collaboration with
Islamist jihadists of other Muslim countries, which use Pakistan as
convenient conduit; and
 • Operations conducted through friendly intelligence agencies
of third countries.
These are not watertight divisions. Home based operations are often carried
out with the help of High Commission based intelligence operatives of the
ISI, IB and the MI. More frequently than not, third country based operations
are extremely fine-tuned to merge with High Commission based and home
based operations.
Pakistani intelligence sponsored special sabotage and subversion
operations are directed against carefully chosen targets. Such operations are
directed at exploiting the fault lines in the target country by supplying arms
and explosives and by sheltering the disaffected armed insurgent and terrorist
groups. An illustrative listing will be helpful to understand the extent and
depth of such interference by Pakistan:
• Disaffected ethno-linguistic groups;
• Nascent separatist movements arising out of maladjusted
ethno-religious and socio-economic edges of political geography;
• Exploitation of the religious minority groups;
• Exploitation of the remnants of unresolved post-
independence disputes;
• Low intensity proxy war by way of assisting groups of
disaffected Indian people;
• Organized and targeted but sporadic acts of sabotage and
subversion by home trained agents in collaboration with locally raised
talents;
Home based operations are those, which are conceived by the concerned
area and subject desks of the ISI, IB and MI, and are executed mainly through
home based guided agents. The ISI is reported to have a system of preparing
periodical Intelligence Estimate on the identified fault lines with the help of
in-house experts and borrowed scholars. These Intelligence Estimates are
crystallized as Intelligence Operations. Specially targeted home based agents
are selected from amongst the ISI ranks and from open market talents. Such
agents are recruited after good amount of research from amongst the Pakistani
nationals and are specially trained to carry out specific operations. Home
based operations are diverse in nature:
• Shallow penetration trans-border operations, which are
carried out through low-level intelligence assets, border smugglers,
sawari traffic (habitual but illegal trans-border traders). These
 categories of agents are utilized to collect tactical intelligence,
geographical data, data on communication facilities, defense
preparations within 25 km of the international border, deployment of
units of the Armed Forces in the bordering regions, location of radar
and missile batteries, etc.
• Shallow penetration trans-border operations are often
trained to cultivate susceptible Indian talents from amongst compatible
religious and linguistic groups and known petty smugglers and persons
involved in sawari traffic.
• Such operators are also trained to raise low-cost Indian
talents for deployment as static and itinerant observation agents who are
paid to cover assigned targets in areas primed by the Pakistani agency
• These low caliber shallow penetration agents are not
generally allowed to contact ‘Long Term Resident Agents’ and
operatives functioning from inside Pakistan’s diplomatic premises in
India. They are given an operational time frame and fixed location.
• During the process of intelligence gathering, such shallow
penetration agents also ‘create’ safe houses and ‘safe conduits’ for
future use. Such safe houses are mostly selected from amongst religion-
compatible people.
However, in between 1992-94 some interesting incidents of steady contacts
between the shallow penetration itinerant agents and their Indian collaborators
were noticed coming in contact with the High Commission based low level
intelligence operatives. On scrutiny, it was found that some IB and MI
operatives went out of the way to adopt such unorthodox methodology to
score points against more efficient ISI operatives.
Nazir Khan (assumed name) of Kairana, Uttar Pradesh, was noticed by a
security agency for religiously visiting Jama Masjid, for Friday prayers,
which were also attended by some employees of Pakistan High Commission.
Curious operatives of an intelligence agency induced a Muslim namaji to
keep a watch. The result was revealing. Nazir invariably stood in the mid
section of the congregation, next to Ahsan Malik (assumed name) of the
consular section of Pakistan embassy. After prayer, they moved around the
Meena Bazaar and disengaged after the employee picked up a particular Urdu
magazine. Identity of the embassy employee was well established. Agencies
identified Nazir as a newcomer to Kairana and working as a Unani doctor. He
moved around with his sling bag and pitched near cantonment locations
peddling aphrodisiac and medicines for ‘secret diseases’– syphilis, premature
ejaculation, erection-dysfunction, etc. Gullible and sex starved army
personnel patronized him and often traded secrets of their formations. Nazir
was under instruction to share his inputs to a MI operative in the High
Commission once a week. Ahsan Malik was deputed to ‘receive’ medicines
from Nazir. The Indian namaji later informed that Ahsan Malik was involved
in a fight with another chancery based official–Ghulam Haidar, an ISI
operative, over rights to ‘receive’ Nazir’s ‘medicines’. That was the point
when the Indian agency pounced upon all the three at Meena Bazaar and
neutralised the bizarre rivalry between the MI and ISI operatives over the
rights to control a petty itinerary agent.
Normally the respective MI and PIB counterparts of the ISI launch such
‘contactable’ shallow operations. Such practices are unconventional and often
risky. These incidents had obviously offered the Indian intelligence agencies
opportunities to neutralize a couple of home - based operations.
Occasionally itinerant Indian smugglers and petty border traders are tapped
by the Pakistani agencies and pressured to work for them in lieu of
unhindered entry and exit facilitations. These talents are elaborately briefed
about selection of targets, gathering of information and sharing the same
directly with Pakistan based intelligence operators, who function from Field
Intelligence Unit and Field Intelligence Teams (MI) and border detachments
(IB, ISI and the Geographical Division).
Incidents of home based operations are rampant in Punjab, Western Uttar
Pradesh, Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat and even in parts of Assam,
Bihar and West Bengal. The last two territories are generally covered by
Nepal and Bangladesh based Pakistani intelligence operatives.
Home based shallow penetration forward intelligence operations normally
target road networks in the bordering regions, bunds, canals, ditches, existing
and new defense preparations, cantonments, radar formations, electrical and
surface communication lines, locations of PCOs/ STD-ISD booths in the
bordering towns, location of madrassas and mosques, etc. The agents are
taught to draw sketches and snap photographs of the targeted locations and
concealment devices to carry their end product to Pakistan safely. Such
itinerant home based agents are also used to generate friendly talents on
Indian side to be used by deep penetration itinerary agents and on rare
occasions by the long-term Resident Agents.
Collation of information obtained from the itinerant agents is a painstaking
job, which is carried out by the desk operatives for building up an intelligent
collage of the targeted border areas of India depicting its military preparations
and other tactical information that are used by the Pakistani defense forces at
times of active engagement with the enemy troops. It may take years to
complete a collage of communication network in a border state like
Rajasthan.
The Deep Penetration Itinerary Agents (DPIA’s) are selected with greater
care, as they are required to travel deep into the country and cover assigned
targets, mostly defense related and strategic targets. Different categories of
talents are selected for these specialized jobs, mostly one-time jobs. Some
such jobs are continuous in nature, for which India based talents are recruited
and attached to the High Commission based intelligence operators. Such
Indian assets are not Residents, but itinerary agents assigned specific tasks.
For example, a Pakistan based or an Indian itinerary agent may be tasked to
locate himself for a specific period somewhere near Trivandrum to collect
some specific information about a particular space rocket or rocket fuel used
by India. Once the job is done, the itinerary agent is withdrawn. Such an agent
can be redeployed at other locations with different tasking. It is obvious that
job requirement requires specialized briefing and training of such agents,
which are carried out by ‘assigned ISI officers’ based on specific training
manuals. Such training process of specialized deep penetration itinerary
agents often lasts over three months.
Indian experiences indicate that the ISI and the MI often select serving
personnel for such area and job specific operations. They are trained and
briefed to infiltrate into India through unapproved routes with false identity
and travel documents. They are guided to the target area, roost for a while
before engaging in collecting and documenting the targeted intelligence.
Often such collected intelligence is communicated over ISD phones and
captive fax facilities to innocuous cover addresses in Pakistan or a Gulf
country. For such specialized communication substitution, coded languages
are used instead of alphanumeric codes. For example, an innocuous fax
communication like the following one may contain sensitive intelligence:
“Dear Mamu,
I have been to Rekha’s home. She is pretty and healthy and her home is
located seven kilometres from Naibabad (Babina-Madhya Pradesh) next
to the railway track to Sinjhapur (Jhansi). Three beautiful sisters
accompanied her. The bride’s home is about five kilometres from an
airport, a little noisy. I have requested my brother to send you the
photographs of Rekha and her sisters. The photos are ready. By the
grace of God, we are doing well, but a little bit of short of money for the
presents to be taken to the home of the bride.
Yours sincerely,
Amit”

This communication intercepted sometime in 1996 indicated that an operative
of the ISI, Shahid Khan, was operating at Naibabad (Babina after
transposition of alphabets) area of Madhya Pradesh by the side of a railway
track towards Sinjhapur (Jhansi after transposition- simple coding device)
with the assigned task of surveying and photographing a radar station, missile
placements and strength of the cavalry uint. Bride was substituted for radars.
He had, in fact, used a fax channel but did not use the computer
communication channel as the Internet facility was not available and there
was no provision for transmitting a scanned photograph. These days such
facilities are available even at remote border locations. Now the agents are not
required to carry documents and drawings on their person. Fortunately, this
communication was intercepted and after a good deal of research the Pakistan
based itinerary agent was neutralized.
Another queer instance of a deep penetration itinerary agent was noticed at
a small hamlet on the fringes of Chandipur rocket experiment station in the
state of Odisha. The Baleshwar area of coastal Orissa had witnessed influx of
fishing community from East Bengal/Bangladesh. Most of them managed to
speak Oriya, language of the people of Orissa. In fact, the neighboring
districts of Indian Bengal and Orissa are bilingual.
Some observers noticed over period that a Bengali fisherman was in the
habit of using a dialect not commonly used by the general Bengali fishing
folks. Once the man was identified as a newcomer, his linguistic peculiarities
were analyzed and it was ascertained that he spoke a strain of Bengali
commonly spoken in the district of Chittagong in Bangladesh. There was no
known history of an inland Bangladeshi settling amongst the coastal fishing
folks. He was quietly lifted and interrogated. The clever process paid good
dividend. He turned out to be a plant by the Inter Services Intelligence of
Pakistan. He was recruited by the Dhaka Mission based ISI officials and
planted at the fishing hamlet near Chandipur to observe and photograph the
rocket testing facility. In fact, a simple observation by a curious officer had
resulted in a big catch. The duration of the agent’s deputation was for six
months. It was deduced that after his successful return to Bangladesh his ISI
handlers would have redeployed him at some other strategic location in
India.

The deep penetration itinerary agents are assigned important defense related
and strategic tasks like strategic heavy industries, armament factories, rocket
experiment facilities like Chandipur in Orissa, forward radar formations,
mobile missile facilities, Air Force bases in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Punjab,
Haryana, Delhi, Kolkata, Kalaikunda, Barrackpore, Siliguri, Dumduma, and
Tezpur and Naval yards in Mumbai, Kochin, Vishakhapattanam and Kolkata,
etc. Important strategic locations like nuclear power plants, arms and
ammunition dumps and such agents also target communication hubs. In fact,
the ISI and the MI deploy their deep penetration itinerary agents to almost all
possible defense related strategic areas.
These agents are sent on specific missions and are not supposed to
establish contact with the Mission-based intelligence operators. They are
required to directly communicate with their handlers in Pakistan. In
exceptional cases, however, a couple of home based agents were noticed
contacting the Mission based operatives. Observers of an Indian intelligence
agency had noticed a new face entering and exiting the Pakistan High
Commission premises at an odd hour, not meant for official transaction. He
was trailed to a village near Saharanpur, Western Uttar Pradesh. On discreet
questioning, it transpired that he was a resident of Shahiwal, and was deputed
from Pakistan to cover movement of a particular Indian Army Division to
forward positions in Uri-Poonch area of Kashmir. He was required to share
the information promptly with his handler at Lahore. He was directed to
contact a particular non-diplomat official of the High Commission and share
the gathered intelligence with him. Certain sources in the AHQ in Delhi later
confirmed that India was required to depute a new Division formation to
Jammu & Kashmir from the eastern sector to strengthen security
arrangements on the eve of parliamentary election (1998-99). They had also
confirmed that Pakistan had deployed almost simultaneously an infantry
brigade in the occupied Kashmir area with a view to countervail the accretion
to Indian strength.
The home based itinerary agent was neutralized after identity of the
Mission based non-diplomat intelligence officer was established. That officer
was quietly declared a persona non grata and withdrawn from Delhi.
In a similar case, an Indian surveillance team somewhere in Delhi, detected
a DPIA assigned to Dumduma in upper Assam with a bagful of defense
related photographs and sketches. He was supposed to meet a High
Commission based operative inside the shrine of Nizamuddin Aulia Delhi.
The ISI operative was supposed to dispatch the documents related to Indian
Air Force through the diplomatic bag. There was no other option but to
depute a Muslim worshipper with a concealed video camera to record the
transaction. The High Commission based operative and the itinerant agent
were picked up outside the religious shrine and security agencies whisked
them away for interrogation and categorization.
*
The second category of Home controlled operations relates to the classical
practice of locating long-term resident agents (LRA) in targeted areas of
India. These LRA’s trained and infiltrated by the JIM and JIX are allowed to
‘sleep’ for a while with a view to merging with the assigned target area’s
milieu. They are activated at a later date through instructions conveyed over
cell phone, satellite phone (in case-sensitive areas), e-mail and coded
messages broadcast over the Pakistan Radio and TV at appointed time, date
and frequency. In some cases use of innocuous social messages, like nikah
(marriage), sent over fax at pre-determined PCOs have come to notice.
An incoming intercepted fax routed through a suspect terminal had
contained the following message: ‘Beta Nura. Nikahnama of Gudia is on the
9th September. Please attend the ceremony at Gudia’s place—Chacha
Malihabadi.’ (Dear son Nura Gudia’s marriage is on 9th Sept. Attend the
ceremony at Gudia’s place- uncle Malihabadi).
A fruit seller picked up the fax message. He was followed at a place near
Sarai Kale Khan, Delhi. Later investigations proved that Nura alias
Shamsuddin was a Pakistani national and was directed to a rendezvous with
an Indian Air Force personnel at Udampur for obtaining sensitive documents.
The channel was plugged and the Pak LRA neutralized.
On rare occasions, India based trusted ‘hawala’ operators (illegal money
transferor) are also used as communication channel. The ‘hawala’ operators
are those categories of illegal money launderers and transferors who transact
beyond national boundaries and transfer money from one country to another
at hefty commissions.
The resident agents are assigned specific tasks, which may include:
• Defense related targets–bases, cantonments and formations;
• Targets in other sensitive areas like nuclear plants,
armament industries;
• Creation of Islamist modules, jihadist groups and
engineering of communal violence;
• Selected sabotage and subversion tasks against Indian
targets;
• Establishing linkages with insurgent/terrorist groups;
• Cloning of sub-agents in assigned areas and commanding
communication channels;
• Tasking such clones to carry out assigned propaganda;
• Imparting training to susceptible Indian talents in sabotage
 and subversion operations.
This is an illustrative list. Tasks assigned by the JIM/JIX to the long-term
residents agents may widely vary and encompass other sensitive security
matters in the target area of location and operation.
It will not be irrelevant to mention that the LRA ‘targets’ are selected with
great care by assigned ‘case officer’ and ‘handling officer.’ Case officers are
those employees of the Pakistani intelligence organizations who are assigned
to specific job-targets in India for achieving penetration. He is supposed to be
the trainer of the target. Some training schedules span over months,
depending on importance of the target objective and coverage. For instance a
LRA stationed somewhere near HAL production facility in Karnataka or
Kalpakkam nuclear plant in Tamil Nadu will be required to be conversant
with basic matters related to aircraft production and uranium processing
protocol. Such agents are required to select Indian targets according to the job
specification assigned by the ‘case officer.’ Identification of the Indian
targets is done after proper study and analysis. Normally peripheral targets are
selected as the first step. Such peripheral targets later lead to ‘hardcore’
targets that work in the vital areas of planning and production facilities.
The ‘handling officers’ are those who launch the LRA targets across the
national boundary into the target areas of India and who continue to run the
communication channel with the LRA. The ‘handling officers’ normally
report to the ‘case officers.’
The LRAs are graded according to the nature of the job assigned. A low
priority general area or broad target coverage mission may require a low
calibre agent. He may even be a fringe criminal. Such low grade LRAs are
given basic ‘covers’, trained in rudimentary security and concealment drills
and non-sophisticated communication methodologies. Such agents may not be
treated as ‘loners,’ who operate on their own without raising ‘sub-agents’
from among the Indian collaborators.
For example, a low grade LRA located at Siliguri chicken neck corridor
may be directed to clone sub-agents at Binnaguri, Dhupguri, Mainaguri etc.
places in north Bengal, amongst the low level defense personnel, defense
suppliers and disaffected sections of the population like activists of the
Kamtapuri Liberation Organization.
The same Resident may also be required to clone sub-agents at Baghdogra
Airbase and other military formations. Such low grade Residents are trained
to merge with the background and operate a widespread network. Some of the
favorite areas for locating low grade Long-term Resident Agents are Kolkata,
Delhi, Guwahati, Dumduma, Siliguri belt, Danapur, Patna, Kanpur,
Jhansi/Babina, Saharanpur, Jullandhar, Amritsar, Adampur, Kota, Jaisalmer,
Mumbai, Nasik, Ahmedabad, Bhuj, Kochin, Vishakhapattinam, and Tuticorin.
This is an illustrative list.
Some of these LRAs have come to notice being operated by Dhaka and
Kathmandu based ‘case officers’ and ‘handling officers’ of the Inter Services
Intelligence.
A classical case of locating and running a low grade LRA was unearthed in
1990 rather accidentally. A long-felt need of a barber shop near the North
Bengal University campus at Matigara, next to Siliguri town, was satisfied
when a tolerably modern facility was started by Fatik Khatik (assumed name),
a barber by caste and a resident of Mungher in Bihar in early 1988. The
Bengali community commonly accepts barbers from Bihar. Located near
Bihar border, Siliguri-Matigara area has had the tradition of accommodating
large Bihari population who work in the transport sector, service the military
establishments and carry out other odd jobs.
A glib talker, Fatik soon took a wife from a low caste Bengali family, said
to be a migrant from Bangladesh. He and his wife gradually befriended some
junior commissioned officers of the Indian Army by offering lower prices to
the brave sons of the nation. For over two years, Fatik cultivated few
unsuspecting army officers by offering discounted rate and free services. His
wife Chameli profusely helped her husband by running a petty teashop by the
side of her husband’s business establishment. Her tea tasted sweet and warm
and her personal demeanor warmer, especially towards the visiting army
personnel. In the process, Fatik befriended a non commissioned officer of
Binnaguri MI FIU unit and succeeded in gleaning out detailed information
about armored units, vehicle mounted missile deployment, armament depots
and the Air Force detachment at nearby Baghdogra.
Fatik’s customers periodically felt desolate when his wife visited her
parental home almost after every two months, somewhere on Bangladesh
border near Phansidewa Market. A strip of riverine land separated the Indian
and Bangladesh borders. Chameli’s parents (cover parents) lived bang on the
border and eked out living as petty cultivators.
Fatik and Chameli would have carried out Pakistan’s long-term intelligence
objectives but for a minor accident in which the bus Chameli was travelling
overturned injuring her seriously. The hospital staff at Kadamtala Border
Security Force detachment discovered a packet from unconscious Chameli. It
contained three spools of exposed films and some documents written in
Bengali.
The small accident and recovery of the suspicious documents finally led to
the discovery of the spy ring established by the ISI from its diplomatic base in
Dhaka. Fatik was picked up for interrogation. He turned out to be resident of
Tentulia in Bangladesh and his assumed wife Chameli alias Nura Begum, a
border smuggler, was a resident of Dhaka, who was picked up by the ISI
handling officers for teaming up with Fatik alias Qadir Khan. But for the auto
accident the ISI agent duo would have carried out deep penetration
intelligence network amongst the gullible and sex-starved junior officers of
the Indian Army. Pakistan had used Fatik’s skill as a barber, his glib tongue
and Chameli’s easy charm. Unearthing of this spy ring had resulted in
intensive security and intelligence drill by the Indian intelligence agencies,
the MI and the local army formations.
The trained Residents, some of whom may be serving personnel of the ISI,
are normally located closer to sensitive defense locations/formations, ethnic-
religious malcontent elements and vulnerable but friendly co-religionist
population. The JIM and the JIN have come to notice for planting their
serving officers amongst the Punjab and Kashmir terrorists. Between 1988
and 1991, about four serving ISI officers were planted amongst the Punjab
terrorists, especially the Second Panthic Committee and the Khalistan
Commando Force (KCF). Some sources had confirmed the existence of two
serving ISI agents inside the Golden Temple little before Operation Black
Thunder was started.
Reliable sources indicated that one of the ISI agents Fazle Illahi alias
Gurdas Singh, was a resident of Gujranwala, Pakistan. He lived in one of the
‘parikrama’ rooms of the Golden Temple and maintained contact with the
Second Panthic Committee chief, Dr. Sohan Singh, through a retired Sikh
journalist, who acted as an ideologue. Fazle Illahi escaped from the temple a
little before Operation Black Thunder was launched. He was hidden under a
pile of green fodder and driven to a border location near Khemkaran. Fazle
Illahi was a serving junior commissioned officer of the ISI.
Similarly, serving officers of the ISI of the rank of Captain and Major were
infiltrated inside Indian side of Kashmir for training, motivating and directing
the Kashmiri militants. They were withdrawn just before launching of major
counter-operations by the Indian army.
A junior commissioned officer of Baloch Regiment, on deputation to the
ISI, was located somewhere near Bikaner in Rajasthan as a LRA sometime
around 1997. Housed in a religiously compatible village he had succeeded in
merging with the local background after marrying into a local Muslim family.
Over time, he managed to procure sub-contract in construction work inside
the Air Force base. He operated as a civil contractor with impunity for over
three years.
 An Indian intelligence agency went onto his trail after a chance
interception of telephone call made by him from a number in Bikaner to a
number in Bahawalpur. A little bit of research confirmed that the number
belonged to a security detachment of Pakistan Army. It was a cover address
for a field station of the ISI, which operated agents inside India. This chance
interception had neutralized the Pakistan Army’s serving officer after he made
serious dent in the security and intelligence setup of India in the western
sector.
Some top level Resident Agents are assigned the tasks of infiltrating the
Islamic educational and religious institutions with the help of organizations
like Jamait-e-Islami, Tabligh-i-Jammat, renowned Islamic institutions,
madrassas and even NGOs run by the minority community. Normally talents
for such LRA operations are scouted out by the ISI from amongst madrassa
trained religious experts fully conversant with the scriptures and prescriptions
of daily rituals of pure Islamists. Most of the LRA talents are located in
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi area religious
institutions and madrassas.
Borrowing a leaf from real life occurrence, narrated in a fictionalized form
for the sake of protecting an agency, may illustrate this category of ISI
operations vividly. A particular madrassa in Meerut area (1993-94) was
infiltrated by an intelligence agency by locating a student from an East Indian
state. In the course of learning and preparing himself to become a maulvi, the
student noticed arrival of a new alem (scholar), who extensively spoke on the
theme and meaning of jihad, history of conflict between the Muslims and
Hindus and oneness of the Ummah. The student was provided a micro tape
recorder with a view to recording some of the alleged objectionable taqrirs
(speeches) of the alem. The sample speeches contained highly objectionable
comments on mountains of injustices heaped on the Indian Muslims and
calling upon them to prepare for jihad against the jahiliya (ignorant) and kefir
(non-believer) people of Hindustan. After prolonged surveillance, it was
established that the alem in question was in periodical contact with a female
visa agent of Jama Masjid area of Delhi, who was a regular visitor to the
Pakistan High Commission. She was also seen in company of a non-diplomat
employee of the High Commission. Painstaking enquiry process established
the identity of the alem as one Shahriyar Khan (not real name), a resident of
Mianwali in Pakistan. He was recruited by the ISI from one of the madrassas
in Mianwali and deputed to India for lodging in a congenial madrassa and for
carrying out subversion of the Indian Muslims. The law took its own course.
Similar instances of locating LRAs under cover of madrassa alems were
unearthed in Jammu & Kashmir. Two such LRAs also operated clandestine
radio sets for communication between the terrorists and their ISI handlers.
India was obliged to install frequency jamming devices and direction finders
to neutralize some such clandestine signal operations conducted by the
experts of JIS wing of the ISI.
This process is used for creating Islamist modules among the vulnerable
sections of the minority community and in establishing linkages with the
Mafia and the Underworld, which generally work in tandem with the
intelligence operatives on guidance received directly from Pakistan and third
country bases. These are labyrinthine processes and require minute analysis
and neutralization by the professional organizations of the state and the
central governments.

Mission Based Operations
To understand the nature and extent of Mission based intelligence operations
of Pakistan it is necessary to examine the composition of the personnel and
agencies involved.
The accredited diplomats are required to gather open political information
from the host country and feed assessments to their respective external affairs
ministries. This is a mandated job and information for such assessments are
collected through open means such as published materials, proceedings of the
Parliament/Legislatures, media persons, elected representatives, social
contacts, senior level friendly bureaucrats, contacts in the clubs, associations,
etc. These innocuous means of information gathering are fortified by
information obtained from persons ideologically inclined to a particular
power or political block.
The Communist parties, which openly and clandestinely fraternized with
the Soviet Block countries and China and shared information and perceptions
with their ideological and material mentors, kept intelligence agencies in
India awfully busy. Similar instances of pro-West political parties, leaders and
activists sharing open but privileged information with the diplomats of the
Western countries were observed. Most such contacts are not illegal and
clandestine contacts, though some of these Indian contacts of the foreign
embassies are kept under selective and periodic observation. Indian
counterintelligence divisions are normally deployed to cover such contacts
between the diplomats, right from the Ambassador to the Third Secretaries
and non-diplomatic staff. The accredited diplomats are trained to gather such
‘open’ information and their jobs are not obstructed by the intelligence
agencies of the host countries.
However, countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh keep the Indian
diplomats under bumper-to-bumper vehicular surveillance and the PIB, ISI,
DGFI and NSI operatives intimidate all their open social contacts. No such
restrictions had ever been imposed on Pakistani and Bangladeshi diplomats
operating in India. They enjoy total freedom of movement and some of them
do not hesitate to steal personal pleasures from willing Indian beauties.
Besides the diplomats foreign Missions of almost every country are known
to ‘accommodate’ certain numbers of undercover intelligence officers, in
addition to declared and accredited Military Attaches. During its halcyon
days, the Soviet Union used to deploy over 30 accredited undercover
intelligence officers from the KGB and the GRU. In addition, the Soviet
satellite countries used to maintain a large compliment of undercover
intelligence officers. The USA also matched the Soviets by deploying
adequate number of accredited intelligence officers from the FBI, CIA, and
NSA, etc. It received full cooperation from countries owing ideological
affinity to the anti-Soviet Cold War Block, except France. The French,
perhaps for historical reasons, always maintained their independent profile
even in matters of intelligence gathering from Indian bases. The US
intelligence operatives in India normally maintain ‘mutual relationship” with
South Korean, Japanese, Pakistani and the Filipino intelligence agencies.
During ‘normal’ periods of diplomatic relationship, Pakistan
‘accommodated’ over 7-10 accredited undercover intelligence operatives
ranging from the ranks of Minister/Counselor to Third Secretary/Attaché.
Over 30 non-accredited and non-diplomatic staff assisted them. The
difference between the two categories is subtle but important. The accredited
undercover diplomats enjoy diplomatic facilities and immunity, whereas the
non-diplomat supporting staffs are accorded normal diplomatic courtesy
without diplomatic immunity. Compared to this massive presence of Pakistan
IB, ISI and MI presence in Missions in India, Delhi could normally afford to
station 2 to 4 accredited undercover diplomats and about 5 to 6 non-
diplomats. Subjected to intense surveillance the Indian Mission based
operatives are barely able to move out to create intelligence assets and
cultivate the existing ones.
The High Commission based operations are supposed to be very subtle and
classical. These are supervised by the ISI operatives posted under cover of
diplomats and subordinate ISI operatives working as non-diplomats.

The JIM operatives of the ISI and the Pak DMI operatives in India, operating
as undercover accredited diplomatic and non-diplomatic officials, devise
different ways and means to penetrate their target areas and personalities:
 • Sympathetic conscious/sub-conscious friends in conducive
religious, cultural and social circuits, intellectuals, glitterati, media
personalities and business groups involved in trading with Pakistan,
defense contractors and suppliers, etc.
• Migrants from West Pakistan who suffer from ethnic and
cultural nostalgia and nurse dreams for the lost paradise.
• Fundamentalist groups among religious minorities who are
fed on the theme of resurgence of the Ummah, reassertion of Islam on
the sub-continent and the historical spontaneity of Islamic revolution.
• The non-diplomatic intelligence officers ‘pick up’ soft
Army, Navy, Air Force and Intelligence and Security personnel either
by establishing direct contact after prolonged watch and identification
of their places of residence. Sub-agents and lower embassy based staff
maintain regular watch at places of residence and work of the middle
and lower ranking defense personnel. Their social friends or through
reliable Indian Muslim contacts, who frequent the High Commission
premises as visa agents also help considerably.
• Recent trends reveal that Mission based intelligence
operators visit certain parts of India on ‘sight seeing’ but in actuality to
contact their ‘secret agents’ and to ‘generate new contacts.’
• Socialites, big business personalities and femme fatales
having access to top target areas and individuals in the government
sectors and the defense services are painstakingly cultivated.
• Some Resident agents placed in key positions are also
guided by the High Commission based operators.
• Some itinerant agents infiltrating through regular and illegal
routes remain in touch with non-diplomatic operators.
• Third country based operatives—Nepal, Bangladesh,
Maldives, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Singapore etc., often contact Delhi
based operators with a view to skirt the intelligence operatives of their
respective host countries.
• The undercover officials of the Consular section pick
intelligence talents from the passport and visa seekers. Such contacts
are tasked to gather intelligence on defence and strategic area
information, which are apparently ‘open’ but when pieced together take
the shape of ‘intelligence report.’
• Intelligence talents are generated at holy places where the
 faithful of the Allah regularly congregate. Ajmer Sharif in Rajasthan
and the Dargah of Nizamuddin Aulia in Delhi etc., are favorite places
for picking up new intelligence contacts and contacting existing agents.
• Some Pakistani visitors to India manage to stay back and
settle down in sensitive locations. There are over 3000 such overstaying
and missing Pakistani nationals in India. They are energized by the
Mission based operatives for penetration of target areas.
• The most important task is related to cultivating Indian
politicians and representatives of the people. The ISI achieved
significant break-through, though not at the gigantic scale by the KGB
and the CIA.
• The Mission based intelligence operators finance and
influence sections of the vernacular media.
• Several religious groups are funded through third country
based NGOs for proselytizing operations and bringing out religious
publications, which are often rated as hate literature

It would be better if a few paragraphs were added here before we enter into
other aspects of Mission based operation.
It will be incorrect to assert that the Inter Services Intelligence targets only
traditional intelligence and special targets for exploiting India’s fault lines.
Like the other two major foreign agencies-the CIA and KGB, Pakistan has
also targeted the sensitive segments of Indian panorama. This segment
contains the most sensitive areas of Indian politics, media and opinion
makers. It is a matter of record that during the Cold War period and thereafter
the KGB and the CIA (and its ally agencies) had achieved spectacular success
in penetrating the highest rungs of Indian political spectrum and other vital
sectors of national activities. Indian intelligence defense mechanism proved
almost ineffective, simply because the political masters had not armed these
sensitive organs of governance with adequate sinews of war. Failure had not
taken place due to incompetence.
Pakistan had also achieved spectacular success in penetrating the security
diaphragm of certain areas of the political spectrum. The embassy based
officials operated in Delhi, Central Indian States, East and North East India,
Maharashtra, and Gujarat. The Southern Indian States were penetrated
through political talents raised in Delhi and through political and religious
leaders who were won over as intermediaries. The three major Eastern States
were penetrated through Delhi based political, media and state based religious
intermediaries.
A major target area was the Parliament secretariat office, from which
sensitive documents related to questions and answers and meetings of
Estimate Committee, Standing Committee and Public Accounts Committee
on defense and other sensitive areas were smuggled out. Such papers were
also gathered through certain Members of Parliament. Members of Parliament
frequenting the intellectuals’ hubs in Delhi and prestigious hotels were tapped
directly and indirectly through common media friends. This process continues
unabated as Indian intelligence fraternity fights shy of political top guns, as
they are not sure who will be the next boss in Delhi. It is not suggested that
the honorable representatives of the people should always be under
intelligence scanner, but there is a scope for upgrading the present state,
keeping in view the degree of penetration achieved by different intelligence
agencies in India’s political domain. We have before us the instances of
spectacular penetration by the KGB and the CIA.
In Central-Northern India Pakistan had achieved spectacular success in
penetrating over a dozen legislators and a provincial chief minister, who had
come under the scanner for maintaining questionable clandestine links. These
were not routine national day and roja iftar (Ramadan Fast breaking social
festivity) contacts. Reasonable suspicion had arisen about funneling of funds
by Kuwait, Iran and Pakistan embassies to such politicians from this region. It
is needless to mention that such fund transfer was not meant for construction
of mosques and madrassas. National sensitivity about ‘secularism’ had also
prevented deeper probe into clandestine contacts between Pakistan chancery
based intelligence operatives and certain legislators of Northern, Eastern, and
Southern States.
The ISI had achieved spectacular success in Eastern and North Eastern
States. Instances of prominent penetration were noticed by an Indian
counterintelligence agency. In West Bengal, the degree of penetration was
noticed in half a dozen legislators, prominent labor leaders and frontal
students’ unions. In Assam the degree of penetration encompassed over ten
legislators and two ministers, at different points of time. In Bihar at least four
legislators and a minister were penetrated by Kathmandu based ISI operators,
who had helped bonding between certain mafia groups in Nepal, Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh. The ISI had achieved moderate to average success in
penetrating segments of the political spectrum in the States of Kerala,
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat.
Did the ISI fund Indian newspapers and elections? The answer is a straight
yes. Instances of ISI funding certain vernacular media in Assam, West
Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala and
Andhra Pradesh had come to notice. Similarly certain shades of the political
spectrum and individuals were given financial support by the ISI for
electioneering. In all, Pakistan imitated the operating pattern of the CIA and
KGB and is recognized to have achieved appreciable (alarming?) success.
The controlling ministries of the concerned intelligence agencies know these
facts. According to some estimates nearly forty Indian MPs were funded by
the CIA, 35 by the ISI and 25 by the Russian FSB. Several instances of ISI
funds reaching Indian politicians through underworld networking for election
purposes were also monitored by the concerned agencies. In this regard, only
minor instances came to notice about contacts between embassy based
operators and politicians ravaging the electoral process.
The notorious Ghulam Nabi Fai affair in USA brought to light involvement
of over 40 Indian intellectuals, media persons and scholars in the ISI funded
‘seminar circuit.’ The ISI has floated several such fronts in India through
Muslim scholars, religious leaders and political parties to preach and
propagate its causes and to subvert the Indian Muslims. Such tricks are not
new. The CIA and KGB also tried the same tricks between 1960 and 1998.
The scale of CIA operations of such dimension has come down.
These are a few illustrative tradecraft techniques used by the Mission based
JIM/PDMI/PIB operatives. The designated and accredited Military Attaches
normally function ‘openly’ without resorting to clandestine espionage activity.
Their modus operandi is limited to sniffing out information from ‘friends and
contacts’ in the Indian defense forces, military attaches of friendly third
countries and from ‘open contacts’ amongst the bureaucrats, defense
correspondents and socialites who happen to have access to defense and
defense related supply and contract matters. This is vast fertile field of
exploitation by trained intelligence operatives.
However, in exceptional cases identified senior military attaches have
come to notice for ‘handling’ clandestine intelligence sources personally. It
may be stated in brief, without going into the operational details, that a
serving Brigadier of Pakistan Army, posted in the High Commission in the
rank of a Minister-Counselor was caught red handed in Delhi in 1988 after his
operational diaphragm was penetrated by an Indian intelligence agency. This
Brigadier was later incarcerated for a pro-fundamentalist military coup
attempt in Pakistan.
Similarly, a few senior accredited non-intelligence diplomats too had come
to notice for actively engaging in ‘running intelligence errands.’ Two such
accredited career diplomats, who later rose to higher positions in Pakistan
Foreign Service, were noticed establishing clandestine contacts with Indian
targets. One interesting aspect of social behavior of the Foreign Service
diplomats was their amorous activities. Susceptible Indian socialite women
were cultivated by them both for penetrating Indian intelligence targets and
for deriving personal pleasure. Three such incidents deserve mention as these
cases pertained to sensitive national security.
• In case number one a Minister-Counselor level diplomat
was noticed cultivating a charming belle, identified as the sister of a
journalist having access to the coterie of the Prime Minister of India
around 1987-88. An unmarried woman, she received the diplomat
regularly. All such visits were documented on celluloid and the Prime
Minister of India was made wiser about the undesirability of allowing
access to the particular journalist. It is believed that the Prime
Minister’s aides were adequately sensitized.
• The second case involved a married lady, wife of a defense
supplier, who had easy access amongst the senior echelons of the armed
forces. After considerable coverage of their intimate contacts, the
Ministry of Defense was sensitized about the supplier. On advice from
higher authorities, the lady was contacted and counseled to discontinue
the undesirable contact. Deprived in personal life she understood the
gravity of the situation and mended her ways.
• A popular park on Delhi ridges was used by a Minister-
Counselor rank diplomat to establish contact with middle-level
personnel of the DRDO, an organization devoted to defense related
research and development. After prolonged deliberations at political
level, it was decided to ‘compromise’ the diplomat and neutralize the
Indian contact. A delicate operation had terminated the contact and the
diplomat was declared persona non grata.
Such incidents are plenty, but our intention is not to go into the nuts and
bolts of Indian counterintelligence operations. Disclosing operational details
is not the core theme of this volume.
The main window of High Commission based operations is the Consular
Section of the embassy. Under normal circumstances, the Consular Officer in
charge is an undercover intelligence operator of the rank of First Secretary.
The nominal in charge may be a regular accredited diplomat of the rank of
Counselor. A few Second or Third Secretaries and a group of non-diplomatic
staff with a queer mixture of intelligence and foreign office personnel assist
the Consular Officer.
The Visa officers and other supporting staff identify prospective
intelligence targets. Once a suitable target is identified and isolated, he/she is
cultivated patiently over a time. Initially allurement of easy granting of visa is
dangled before the prospective visitor or Visa agent of the host country and
trial tasks are assigned to determine the reliability and authenticity of the
target. Visa seekers from all over India converge on the Delhi based Mission
(whenever travel facilities are open) as Pakistan maintains the only nodal
Mission in the capital city.
Some intelligence operatives embedded in the Commercial Section of the
embassy pitch in to help priming intelligence assets from amongst the
exporters-importers, who are compelled to keep the Pakistani embassy
officials in good humor.
Visa applicants primarily belong to families whose relatives have been
resettled in Pakistan after partition. Renewal of family ties, marriages and
other family matters propel the Mohajirs settled in Pakistan and Indian
Muslims separated from their family members. The traffic is considerable
whenever travel facilities are relaxed by India and Pakistan. In majority of
cases, they approach the Visa window through reputed Visa agents, who are
graded according to their track record, the most successful one getting the top
billing. The Visa agents mostly belong to Delhi, Mumbai, Bhopal, Hyderabad,
Lucknow, Kolkata and western Uttar Pradesh. With the easing of Indo-Pak
travel restrictions in recent times strength of the consular section of Pakistan
High Commission has been increased and larger
number of suspicious contacts has been noticed attracted to the espionage
honey pot of the embassy based intelligence operatives.
After initial identification, the prospective agent is isolated and given
innocuous tasks of gathering open information, which are verifiable. After a
couple of trial runs the ‘target’ is treated as a ‘contact’, assigned a nom-de-
plume, and taught the basic tradecraft of communication, concealment and
cover. After a couple of successful ‘runs’ the ‘contact’ is upgraded as a ‘casual
agent’. Up gradation from ‘casual source’ to confirmed and listed ‘source’ or
‘agent’ depends on qualitative and quantitative performance of the agent.
The classical example of such an intelligence asset is that of Begum Nafisa
(name changed) from village Kairana near Saharanpur. Nafisa’s immediate
family had abandoned her to the mercy of their neighbors before they took a
train to Pakistan on the eve of partition. Nafisa was brought up by a distant
relation and was married off to a hereditary butcher, who owned a shop at
Meerut Cantonment. Historically an important location of the Indian Armed
Forces, Meerut is of great importance to Pakistani strategic planners. So is the
nearby airbase at Ambala.
Nafisa’s longing for reuniting with her family in Pakistan was exploited by
a female Visa agent who bribed the officials to obtain a passport and get a
visitor’s visa affixed on it. In the process, Nafisa was ‘introduced’ to a ‘Khan
Sahib’, a non-diplomatic staff of the Visa Section, who hadn’t failed to exploit
the eager woman sexually and photographing her in compromising position.
Later she was exploited to prod her husband to ‘meet’ Khan Sahib. The initial
intelligence venture later thrived as a steady source of information as Hamid
(name changed), Nafisa’s husband, became a conscious intelligence agent of
the Mission and his wife helped in maintaining the communication channel by
personally carrying intelligence documents to Khan Sahib. Nafisa normally
concealed the written messages in between the pages of a Quran that she
carried while visiting the Visa Section of Pakistan High Commission as a
known Visa agent.
It was difficult to break her cover, as the intelligence and police personnel
on duty near the High Commission were not allowed (in nineties and later) to
search and frisk the female visa visitors. One of the Indian intelligence
agencies deployed the services of a friendly female ‘Visa Agent’ of Delhi to
substitute the Quran of Nafisa by a similar volume. A close scrutiny of the
printed pages of the Holy Book revealed the communication secret. Papers of
similar size and texture were used to carry two/three pages of neatly
calligraphed reports in Urdu, which contained reports on deployment of the
Indian Army units and accretion, addition and other operational details of the
Ambala airbase. It did not take long for the Indian intelligence agency to
compromise Khan Sahib after the clever communication channel was busted.
Raja Khijir Khan (name changed), an attaché in the High Commission, who
operated as Khan Sahib, was neutralized in a brilliant ‘spot detection’ by the
concerned agency while accepting questionable documents from an Indian
‘contact’ right under the nose of the seat of Indian administration at a corner
of the India Gate lawns.
The Visa and Trade & Commerce windows are deftly used by the High
Commission based intelligence operators to reach out to distant stations in
India. Target objects and areas like Cochin and Trivandrum (Kerala),
Vishakhapattinam and Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), Bhuj (Gujarat), and
Jodhpur (Rajasthan) are targeted through talents identified by the Visa agents
and some ‘religious contacts’ who often visit the Mission for soliciting
support to their mosques and madrassas. In Gujarat and Rajasthan borders
some followers of Pir Pagara (a saint-politician) of Pakistan have been deftly
exploited by the High Commission based operatives as well as home based
operatives of the ISI.
Some non-diplomat undercover ISI personnel normally take rounds in their
‘Delhi registered cars’ of the bus terminals and MRT stations to monitor late
movements of defense ministry and AHQ staff. After sustained period of
observation, some such staffs are ‘isolated’ for local enquiries through local
‘friends.’ Once graded as vulnerable such defense personnel are given late-
hour lift and gradually cultivated. Several such contacts between Pakistan
Mission based operatives and defense personnel had been unearthed by Indian
intelligence agencies. This methodology is applied by ‘trusted friends’ of the
Mission to locate and refer susceptible contacts from other strategically
important departments of the government.
The Information and Publicity wing of the Mission is extensively used by
ISI undercover agents for cultivating vulnerable ‘friends’ from amongst the
Indian media persons. Such media persons and persons from the world of
letters, arts and culture are frequently trapped by the ISI operatives for
purposes varying from collection of intelligence to creating favourable public
opinion and for influencing the opinion and policy makers of the country.
The Mission based undercover agents of the ISI usually infiltrate certain
religious, educational, cultural and charitable organizations run by the Indian
Muslim community. Certain important leaders of the Students Islamic
Movement of India (SIMI) had come to notice for being cultivated by the
Mission based operatives. A few of them were sent to Pakistan for training
and later they were found to be involved in sabotage, subversive and terrorist
activities. Similar conduits are normally adopted for infiltration of certain
prominent mosques and madrassas in Delhi and traditionally important
Muslim bases all over India.
Instances of contact outside the parameters of diplomatic assignments
between Mission based accredited and cover diplomats and leading figures of
Muslim religious institutions have come to notice. Regularity of some such
contacts inside the chancery premises and outside has evoked curiosity and
concern amongst the Indian counterintelligence community.
A particular instance of regular contact between Maulana Safiqur of Hojai
(names changed) in the eastern state of Assam and First Secretary Intikhab
was subjected to deep enquiry. It was established beyond doubt that the
accredited diplomat, not an undercover intelligence officer, was extending
financial support to the Maulana for preaching a particular brand of Islam that
encouraged growth of militant and separatist ideas. Despite overwhelming
proof of sabotage carried out by a Mission based diplomat in collusion with a
rabid Maulana no tangible action could be pursued as the cleric enjoyed
support of a particular political party. This instance has been cited to facilitate
the readers to understand as to what degree of license the Pakistan diplomats
enjoy in India taking advantage of certain constitutional provisions followed
irrationally by certain political forces. Several such instances can be narrated
but that is not the area of exploration of this dissertation.
 India based ISI operatives were noticed for infiltrating the Afghan refugees
during the mujahideen jihad against the communist regime in Kabul. Besides
the Pakhtun refugees, Afghans owing allegiance to the Northern Alliance
were especially targeted. A good number of Afghani Pakhtun refugees in
India were opposed to the blatant interference by Pakistan, the USA and Saudi
Arabia in the ongoing tussle between the communist regime and the
mujahideen. Pakistan High Commission had recruited a few Afghan Pakhtun
and Shia talents from Delhi and had got them infiltrated into the Afghanistan
embassy that still owed allegiance to the Kabul regime. Intelligence on Indian
logistical support to the Kabul regime was collected on regular basis under
the very nose of the Indian intelligence agencies, which were not given any
political direction by the Union government about security approaches to be
adopted against such undesirable contacts between the susceptible Afghan
refugees and Pakistani diplomats.
Similar efforts are usually made to penetrate the foreign students from
Palestine, Nigeria, Arab countries, Malaysia and Indonesia. There are
incontrovertible proof that certain Muslim religious students pursuing studies
in Indian institutions were allured by the Mission based ISI operatives for
going over to Pakistan for training in ISI and Al Qaeda camps and taking part
in Afghan jihad. The ISI operatives targeted even Indian Shia students
pursuing religious studies in Iran, though Pakistan is a known Sunni country
of Shia baiters. This strategy served dual purposes. Besides exploiting them
for intelligence generation inside India, some Indian Shia students tapped by
the ISI were manipulated by Gulf based ISI operatives for gaining
information on Iran’s involvement with the Afghans.
Another unusual sabotage and subversion practice adopted by the Mission
based intelligence operators pertain to direct liaison with the terrorist
organizations of Kashmir. Some instances of direct financing of J&K terrorist
outfits by the Mission based operatives were detected by Indian agencies and
neutralized. Such daring methodology is adopted by the Mission based
operators taking advantage of lax attitude of the Indian authorities.
In fact, a separate volume can be written on the classical intelligence
generation approaches adopted by the ISI, PIB and the PDMI inside India and
intelligence encirclement of India from the SAARC countries, simply for
educating the Indian politicians, bureaucrats and members of the public. They
are the most uneducated segment of Indian elite who manage the political
affairs of the country and control the security and intelligence agencies.
Dissemination of such knowledge should not be linked to the perverted
perceptions and practices of ‘secularism.’
Pakistan adopts an aggressive policy in implementing the classical and
unorthodox intelligence tradecraft inside India and its neighboring countries
from its home base, Indian bases and bases in third countries. The depth of
Pakistan’s Indian coverage is comparable to the success earlier achieved by
the KGB and the CIA. The KGB success was possible due to willing support
of the communist parties, individuals with Marxist leanings and soft and
tolerant pro-Soviet policies of the governments between 1948 and 1988. Left
to the verdict of Indian intelligence agencies some of the stalwarts of the
communist parties could be presented as a painted album of KGB agents in
India. Similarly vast numbers of Indian elite always like India to align with
the USA. These elements were deftly exploited by the CIA.
Expert observers attribute the following factors to Pakistan’s success:
• Existence of some Muslims who continue to believe in
“Two Nation” theory and the feasibility of creating another Muslim
India from the present geographical configuration of the Indian nation.
They talk in terms of Mughlistan and Hyderistan;
• Success of Pakistan and other Islamist forces in subverting
some Indian Muslims and injecting in them acute communalism;
• Successful exploitation of Indian fault lines in the North
East, Punjab and Kashmir;
• Generation of Islamic jihadist modules inside India by the
ISI and terrorist tanzeems created by it;
• Dogmatic approach to the concept of secularism by certain
Indian political forces, because of their vote-bank policies and not real
concern for positive secularism enshrined in the Constitution;
• Inability of Indian governments to mend the country’s
existing fault lines and generation of new fault lines through
shortsighted political maneuvers;
• Success of planned demographic accretion and imbalance in
certain parts of India;
• Collaboration by pro-Pakistan forces in Bangladesh polity
and establishment; and
• Inability and often unwillingness by countries like Nepal to
contain Pakistani thrust against India from their territories.

The readers may feel tempted to ask if India is capable of repelling Pakistani
machinations against multiple targets and fault lines. There is no singular
answer to such questions, as subsequent chapters will highlight various other
multifaceted intelligence incursions by the ISI and other Pakistani agencies
inside India. The present volume is not meant for suggesting and prescribing
ways and means to combat Pakistan’s Fulcrum of Evil.
*

ISI in Indian North East
Eminent Pakistan and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) observers normally
identify Pakistani forays in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir as the beginning of
proxy war against India. That is an incomplete statement of fact. Pakistan had
abandoned its diplomatic initiatives in dealing with post-partition pains of
adjustment of the fringe problems, and resorted to proxy war way back in
1947-48 by creating a flashpoint in Kashmir. Besides ‘inventing’ this
perpetual flashpoint, Pakistan had also discovered another fault line in India’s
North East. Before India could adjust the severely broken political, ethnic and
economic edges in its North East, Pakistan had extended its hands of
friendship to the arrogant and secessionist tribal Angami Naga leader A.Z.
Phizo. At that point of time, Pakistan apparently acted on its own to help the
rebel Nagas. Indian intelligence agencies, however, know that soon after
independence Pakistan’s Naga and Kashmir policies were influenced, if not
guided, by British intelligence stalwarts and strategic planners. Britain still
dreamt of maintaining foothold in Kashmir with a view to pursuing its China
and Russian policies and its Cold War objectives. In Indian North East Britain
still harbored the dream of maintaining a stranglehold on the ‘Christian tribal’
people of Naga, Khasi and Lushai Hills.
It is claimed by some Pakistan watchers that President Ayub Khan had
created special operations cells in the ISI before the 1965 war to handle the
Naga insurgents and Kashmir separatists. Ayub Khan had indeed carried out
reorganization of the PIB and the ISI, and the JIN had come into existence
after the review by K.M. Sheikh Committee. Ayub Khan was not a religious
fundamentalist. He virtually hated the Pakistani politicians, who, according to
him, had turned Pakistan to a bottomless plunder-pit after the death of M.A.
Jinnah. He had concentrated power in his hands and had brought the army and
intelligence under total control. He had deftly used the ISI in internal matters
as well as for exploiting Indian fault lines.
In fact, Ayub Khan had initiated the process of involving the ISI, PIB and
the PDMI in the disturbed areas of Indian North East. The process had begun
as early as 1948 when Pakistani intelligence officials based in Dhaka and
Pakistani diplomats located at Shillong had contacted Angami Zapu Phizo to
evaluate his intrinsic hold on the diverse Naga tribes and his linkages with
certain intelligence and political people in the UK. They also deeply probed
the fault lines in the Khasi and Garo Hills and initiated the process of
cultivating certain disaffected individuals like Wycliff and Prentice. These
operations were done in tandem with the British intelligence.
Phizo was not a stranger in the power politics in the Naga territory.
According to Bendangshi, a reliable author on Naga affairs, Phizo had
collaborated with the advancing Japanese forces and the Indian National
Army of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose on the ‘expectation’ that the new
masters of India would recognize a sovereign Naga State. There is no
authentic record to support this claim recorded by Bendangshi. “With the
declaration of formation of a Republican Government of Free Nagaland on
September 18 1954, the “Naga insurrection had commenced, with Phizo
conspiring with Pakistan to wage a war of independence.” B.G. Verghese,
India’s Northeast Resurgent. p.88.
After the military crackdown, Phizo had escaped to Dhaka with the help of
Shillong based Pakistani diplomats, from where he was given travel
documents to escape to London, via West Pakistan. By March 1956, full-
fledged insurrection had started in Nagaland in which Pakistan provided some
initial support with cash and arms and ammunition. Intelligence inputs and
analysis had left no doubt that Phizo was guided by certain church leaders,
British officials and by Pakistani intelligence, who initially acted at the behest
of the UK. However, Pakistan took up the Indian North East as a fertile
ground for getting vast contingents of Indian army locked in internal security
duties. This strategy was adopted to keep India bogged down in the east,
while Pakistan plotted a grand subversive plan in Jammu and Kashmir.
“From 1956 onwards, the Nagas had been receiving weapons and training
in East Pakistan. In that year, A.Z. Phizo, who led the Naga insurgency, had
fled to Dhaka, reportedly hidden inside a coffin, from where he was flown to
London on a Peruvian passport provided by the Pakistani authorities. From
1956 to 1966, Pakistan trained at least eight batches of Naga insurgents (1700
people in all), and armed them.” B.N.Pakem quoting DGMI Status Report
1967.
Pakistan administration had started taking interest in the Naga affairs long
before 22nd March 1956 when the followers of Phizo announced the
formation of the self-styled Naga Federal Government and an armed struggle
was started. By 1960, at least three contingents of Naga insurgents were
dispatched to East Pakistan to collect weapons, as the Second World War
vintage weapons of the Naga underground army were pitiably inadequate to
face the better weaponry of the Indian armed forces. Pak MI and the ISI from
their advanced bases in Mymensingh and Sylhet districts coordinated these
activities. Around that time, the MI and ISI had started cultivating some
aggrieved politicians of the Khasi-Jaintia and Garo Hills (Meghalaya).
According to some Indian intelligence sources, by 1959 a liaison office of
the Naga Federal Government was started in Dhaka. with active connivance
of the ISI. Besides arranging training to ‘Naga Army’, this liaison office
availed of the hospitality of the ISI to communicate with foreign embassies
and arrange foreign trips for its leading figures.
The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 and India’s humiliating defeat had
changed the security scenario in the entire subcontinent. India stood
humiliated and discredited in the eyes of its own citizens. Pakistan derived
additional strength from the fact that Indian armed forces were mere paper
tigers. The nascent political agitation in East Pakistan was subdued, as India
had no capability to fiddle with the internal affairs of Pakistan. This period
witnessed increased collaboration between China and Pakistan in military and
diplomatic fields. More than that, the two countries literally ganged up to
encourage ethnic insurgency in Indian North East. Post-1962 period
witnessed Pakistan taking keen interest in Mizo rebellion and similar
rebellious and terrorist activities by the Hindu Meities of Manipur, and the
discontented indigenous population in Tripura and Assam.
External support to the ethnic insurgency in the Indian North East had
assumed a distinct pattern after 1962. Pakistan directly collaborated with the
Naga insurgents and by 1970, about 12 Naga underground gangs had visited
Pakistan for training and lifting sophisticated arms and ammunitions. Average
size of the gangs varied from 200 to 500. The Naga gangs visiting East
Pakistan between 1964 and 1970 under Mowu, Thinosolie Angami and other
self-styled military leaders of the underground in average consisted of over
300 members. (General) Zuheto of the later day Revolutionary Government
of Nagaland had led a gang of 1200 to East Pakistan. Nirmal Nibedon, an
authority of Naga affairs, felt that the approximate number of Naga rebels
visiting Pakistan was around 1700. His conservative estimate was
contradicted by the results of interrogation of the Naga rebels captured in East
Pakistan after the fall of Dhaka in December 1971. The aggregate figure was
estimated to be over 5000.
Pak MI and ISI had set up camps for the Naga rebels along Assam-
Meghalaya borders in the districts of Sylhet and Mymensingh. A permanent
liaison office of the NFG/NNC was set up at Bara Mogh Bazar in Dhaka. It
may be noted that besides a large number of Naga rebel armed personnel,
leaders like Mowu Angami and Thinosolie Keyho were arrested in Dhaka
after the fall of the Pakistani regime in December 1971. Their interrogation
left no doubt in Indian mind about the nefarious plans executed by the ISI and
Pak MI.
The Naga gangs normally took the Angami, Zeliangroung route of
Nagaland and Manipur, the North Cachar Hills of Assam for crossing over to
East Pakistan. According to certain interrogation reports, the Naga gangs
carried communication sets with them. On reaching Pakistan, they were
received by the emissaries of the ISI and MI, and were accommodated in
specially built camps in desolate forest areas. Only the top leaders were
allowed to visit Dhaka escorted by Pakistani personnel. Though some arms
and ammunition were gifted by Pakistan, the bulk of the weaponry came from
Chinese stock and some were smuggled from Thailand. Some friendly
sources had warned the Indian intelligence and their investigations left no
doubt that the ISI was responsible for procuring arms and weapons from
Thailand in collaboration with pro-Pakistani Rohingya rebels of Arakan. The
Kachin Independent Army (KIA) supplied the Naga rebels with some
weaponry, for which payment was made in both cash and kind like raw
opium, meant for the refineries in the golden triangle.
After Kevi Yallay’s (Phizo’s elder brother) visit to London in 1965-66, the
Naga rebels had taken ostensive decision not to disturb the Indian armed
forces during the war with Pakistan. Around the same time, Phizo had
finalized a deal with China for sending gangs to the communist country for
training and lifting weapons. “The China front was opened by Phizo’s trusted
secretary, Thuengaleng Muivah, a handsome man, who had also initiated the
Kachin connection in northeast Myanmar. Muivah is central to later
developments in Nagaland and, was a major figure even at that time.” Sanjoy
Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist. p 103
The KIA link transpired to be a vital one. The Kachins, fighting their own
wars against the Myanmar regime, had agreed to assist the Nagas with
training and weapons. The link assumed importance after the Chinese assured
India in 1978 to stop aiding the Naga and other insurgent groups. Muivah had
also helped the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in establishing
contact with the Kachin rebels. He rendered similar assistance to some of the
Meitei terrorist groups.
Scato Swu, the self-styled Kilo Kilonsar (Prime Minister of the FGN- later
president of the RGN), had written to the President of the People’s Republic
of China in May 1966 appealing for help for the Naga people. Scato had later
confided to the author that Pakistan had assured Phizo about active Chinese
participation in Naga Freedom Struggle. He finally regretted that decision.
Th. Muivah carried the letter. Thinosolie Keyho, representing the military
wing of the FGN, accompanied him. Muivah also visited North Korea and
North Vietnam and learnt the techniques of prolonged jungle warfare. Isak
Chisi Swu, a Sema ideologue, who differed with other Sema leaders like
Kughato, Scato and Zuheto, joined him. Acting under Chinese influence,
Muivah had repudiated the Shillong Accord and had floated the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) on Burmese soil in 1980. With
Chinese and Pakistani help, he tried to internationalize the issue already
settled by Shillong Accord in 1975.
Between 1966 and 1974, eight major gangs were sent to China. Mowu
Angami led a better-known gang to China. On its return journey, the gang was
engaged by the Indian army near Jotsuma village, in which a large number of
armed Naga volunteers were killed (1968). This was a turning point in the
underground movement. However, by 1975, the year Shillong Accord was
signed, the Naga Federal Government had dispatched six large gangs to
China. A realistic assessment indicates that altogether, 2000 Naga youths
were trained by the PLA and huge quantities of weapons were supplied. In
post-1975 period, the NSCN (IM) and Khaplang groups had sent their own
volunteers to China and to camps operated by the KIA and the Communist
Party of Burma.
Tilt towards China and weakening of the Pakistani Establishment had
brought about schism in the Naga underground movement. The Inter Services
Intelligence made frenetic efforts to maintain unity by inviting a Naga group
to Dacca for discussions. However, defying all Pakistani efforts, the
Revolutionary Government of Nagaland had taken shape by the end of 1968.
Phizo’s pan-Naga dream was shaken. However, Th. Muivah ahd his hardcore
followers continued to ignore the Shillong Accord of 1975 and pursued pro-
Chinese policy.
After 1971, Pakistan was in no position to invite Naga gangs to Pakistan.
The last gang of about 250 had visited Pakistan in 1969 end, when the ISI had
supplied a huge quantity of weapons. Snapping of Dacca base had
strengthened Pakistan-China understanding on Naga issue. Between 1980 and
1997, a couple of moderate sized Naga gangs had visited Bangladesh with a
view to lifting weapons, which were carried to Bangladesh ports from
destinations in Thailand. Agents of the Directorate General of Forces (DGFI)
of Bangladesh and the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan had facilitated
procurement and transport of these weapons with helps from Rohingya
(Burmese Muslims) soldiers of fortune.
As stated in earlier paragraph NSCN (IM) link with Pakistan did not snap
after the creation of Bangladesh. There are intelligence reports to suggest that
Muivah had visited Dhaka, Karachi and Kathmandu seeking cooperation from
the ISI and establishing a communication link via Kathmandu and Dhaka.
Interception of some Naga gangs returning from Bangladesh in 1992 had
revealed the delicate linkages between the Hmar Peoples Convention, ULFA
and NSCN (IM). The Cachar territory of Assam was used by the NSCN for
infiltration into Bangladesh, where its cadres received arms consignments
from the ISI and DGFI stoolpigeons.
The capture of ‘General’, an important NSCN (IM) leader, by the Indian
security forces and intelligence agencies clearly indicated that in 1990, a top
Naga insurgent leader and his colleagues had walked into the Pakistan High
Commission in Dhaka and requested help for the Naga cause. This walk-in
transaction had later flourished into lavish supply of arms and ammunition to
the NSCN (IM) following top-level consultations in Dhaka, Kathmandu and
Islamabad.
Many assimilated Naga leaders of Nagaland and Manipur have commented
that the government of India committed a strategic mistake by offering the
‘pan-Naga’ mantle of Phizo to Th. Muivah. They are of the opinion that the
government of India had collaborated with Muivah and helped him to
internationalize the issue. India’s willingness to talk to Muivah-Isak duo has
heightened expectations of the Naga people in Nagaland and Manipur, Assam
and Arunachal Pradesh. Most political observers in the North East feel that by
continuously talking on the agenda on Nagalim—Greater Nagaland, the
government of India has initiated the delayed action fuse of another tectonic
explosion in a very sensitive area of the country.
The Naga insurgency is termed as the mother of all insurgency movements
in North East India. It provided succor and support to many other ethnic
insurgency movements in North East India like, the Mizos, HPC of Manipur-
Mizoram and Assam, the ULFA, Bodo Security Force and NDFB of Assam.
The game started by the ISI and Pak MI during Ayub regime is being pursued
in collaboration with the DGFI of Bangladesh and various jihadi tanzeems.
This proxy war linkage was pursued with strategic devotion in respect of
other tribal groups of the North East. Pakistan continues to be an important
factor. Brief mention of linkages of these insurgent outfits with ISI and DGFI
can help in understanding the depth of Pakistani involvement with the Indian
fault lines.
*
The most intriguing was the Mizo insurgency movement, which was
supported by both Pakistan and China. Apparently, arising out of 1959 Mao
Tam (bamboo death) related famine, the Mizo uprising was conceived by
crafty Laldenga (meaning born on Sunday) with perfect admixture of
deception, conspiracy and superior organizing capability. He had deceived the
Assam chief minister and conspired with Pakistan’s intelligence and army
officials before launching the major offensive on February 28 midnight, 1966.
 Pakistan was in the right frame of mind to assist the Mizo rebels as it was
preparing for another round of war against India after the Chinese humiliated
the giant neighbor in 1962. Its collaboration with the Naga rebels had yielded
good results and it had paved the way for forging ties between the Naga
rebels and the Chinese. Around the same time, self-styled General Kaito of
the Naga army had led a gang of 200 to Pakistan for lifting weapons.
Laldenga followed the Naga trail.
Laldenga visited East Pakistan quietly in December 1963 along with
Lalnunmawia and Sianghaka. After they crossed over the ISI and MI officers
received the Mizo leaders. His confabulations with the Pakistani authorities
offered Pakistan an additional opportunity to supply sinews of war to the
Mizos against India. India’s preoccupation in the Naga and Mizo hills,
Pakistan reasoned, would give it an edge over the enemy forces in Kashmir.
The ISI and the MI officers promised money, arms and safe base to the Mizos
in East Pakistan.
On return to India Laldenga was imprisoned for about a month for his
alleged illegal crossing of the international border and was released after he
executed a good behavior undertaking in February 1964. Around March that
year Laldenga was contacted by Pakistani intelligence agents and was advised
to prepare his men and whatever war materials they could get from Burmese
and internal sources. By 1964, Pakistan was preparing another offensive in
Indian Kashmir under the guidance of Z. A. Bhutto. Pakistan required one
additional front to keep the Indian forces busy in the North East. Following
this Laldenga ordered his MNF volunteers and designated leaders to cache in
safe jungle hideouts whatever weapons they had mobilized from internal and
Burmese sources (leftover of Ma Ma Operation in Burmese Chin Hills).
Soon after Laldenga’s release, about 20 Mizo youths crossed over to
Pakistan to finalize the arms deal. Some of the youth directly went to Dhaka
and were lodged in ISI safe houses. Laldenga had deputed trusted lieutenants
Zamawaia and Sainghaka to East Pakistan border near Ruma Bazar to finalize
the arms deal and to cache the weapons in safe hideouts.
The Pakistani ISI and MI agents supplied the weapons from Dohazari
railhead in Chittagong. From there the weapons were brought to Rumabazar
in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) via Bandarban by boat. The weapons were
taken on head load to Hamunmuam in East Pakistan and were cached near the
Indian village of Bungtlang in lower southwest Mizo Hills. Simultaneously,
Laldenga formed the V battalion of the rebel Mizo army.
The long story of Mizo-Pakistani collaboration, setting up of safe hideouts
in Chittagong Hill Tracts, Laldenga’s lodging in a Dhaka guesthouse of the
ISI, has been well recorded by the Indian security agencies and various
authors. The initial story indicated that Pakistan had plotted with Laldenga to
start insurgency in Mizoram in 1965 when its Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto
had planned to impose another round of war on India soon after the Indo-Pak
skirmish in Kutch and the demise of Jawaharlal Nehru. Pakistan continued to
aid the Mizo rebels with safe hiding places, weapons and cash supply.
Pakistan’s resolve to keep the Mizo insurgency alive was frustrated by a
combination of factors: pressure from the church, disillusionment with
Pakistani objective and dismemberment of Pakistan and general
disillusionment of the people. A tired Laldenga finally settled for a peaceful
solution, as he did not have friendly hinterland in Bangladesh as against the
NSCN groups, which used the adjacent Myanmar territory to carry on their
military adventure.

Pakistan’s collaboration with the North Eastern insurgents did not end with
the Nagas and Mizos. The Hindu Meiteis of Manipur valley had also taken
to agitation and insurgency to ventilate their real and perceived grievances
inflicted upon them by Indian misrule. The Pakistani Establishment (the ISI)
allured a group of Hindu Meitei youths for training in the Sylhet district of
East Pakistan in late 1968. They were offered the alluring prospect of
Pakistani intervention with Myanmar for return the Kobow valley to
Manipur.
The ISI had set up camps for the Meitei youths at several places in Sylhet,
where there is a sizeable Manipuri community. Z.Ramyo, a Tangkhul Naga
rebel leader, and Thinosolie Angami, a self-styled Brigadier of the outlawed
Naga army, cemented the deal between the Meiteis and the Pakistani
intelligence agencies. Oinam Sudhir, Arambam Somorendra and N.
Bisheshwar were in contact with the Pakistani operators. For them Jiribam,
then an isolated pocket of Manipur bordering Cachar, acted as a launching
pad. About 150 Meitei youths had left for East Pakistan for undergoing
training in late 1968. They were accommodated by the ISI in Srimangal and
Kulaura camps and were given training in small weapons, use of explosives
and fabrication of improvised explosive devices. The boys were treated with
moderation and one Captain Mainul of the ISI had paid the Meitei volunteers
an amount of rupees three hundred thousand.
However, after the liberation war of Bangladesh, about 75 Meitei youths
fled from East Pakistan camps trudging their way back to Manipur. The
security forces intercepted most of them and documents recovered from them
revealed tantalizing evidence of ISI-RGM (Revolutionary Government of
Manipur) collaboration. Between 1972 and 1975, it appeared that the Meitei
terrorist activities had come under some control. However, bad governance,
lack of development activities and rampant corruption forced the Meitei
youths to the extreme end of armed resistance. After imposition of military
rule in Bangladesh, the links between the Meitei youths and the ISI were
resumed. Post-1975 Bangladesh government had allowed the ISI to set up
shop in Habiganj area of Sylhet for training the Meitei youths and supplying
them with military hardware.
In later years the Meitei youths organized under various banners had
collaborated with the Chinese and Pakistani intelligence operators based in
Tibet and Bangladesh respectively. The Meitei insurgents under the leadership
of Bisheswar had taken the Nepal route to Tibet. They were ideologically
oriented by the Chinese and taught the tactics of urban guerrilla warfare. The
Meitei-China contact took place around the time Th. Muivah was goaded by
the Chinese to form the NSCN (I). Fresh Chinese interference had brought
closer the Naga and Meitei insurgents.
The Kachin Independent Army of Burma and the NSCN (Khaplang) also
aided them. As late as in 1994, the “PLA remnants repaired to Bangladesh
and set up camp in Sylhet. There they formed a political front called the
Revolutionary People’s Front with Irengbam Bhorot doubling as chairman
and supreme commander of its armed wing.” Verghese, India’s Northeast
Resurgent, p 120.
To make the long story of Pakistani collaboration short, it is sufficient to
state that a Meitei rebel gang of seven was intercepted as late as in 1998 while
returning from Bangladesh after receiving training from the ISI operatives
and their DGFI counterparts of Bangladesh. According to intelligence sources
these youths were trained alongside the rebel Tripura youths of National
Liberation Force of Tripura (NLFT) in Sylhet area of Bangladesh.
Some divergent trends have recently been noticed in dealings and contacts
between the ISI operatives and Bangladeshi intelligence and security agencies
like the DGFI and DGNSI. In June 2005 Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) of
Bangladesh arrested nine Meitei youths belonging to People’s Liberation
Army at Kalaghat in southern Bandarban district, Chittagong Hill Tracts. The
group had gone there on the prompting of the ISI agents in Bangladesh. This
secret was not shared with the DGFI. Similarly two Meitei and two Khasi
youths were arrested in Srimangal area of Sylhet in July 2005. They had gone
there on assurances by ISI agents. These incidents do not indicate
Bangladeshi cooperation with India. These are symptoms of occasional
misunderstanding between the Pak and Bangladesh agencies.
The Meitei youths had turned to all possible sources to procure arms and
expertise: Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Kachin rebels, NSCN (K) and NSCN
(IM). According to some impeccable sources, two members of the UNLF had
visited Islamabad from Bangkok in 2001 for seeking assistance to fight the
Indian forces. They had moderate success, as post-2001 Pakistan was
reluctant to expose its hands more brazenly.
The angry young men of Imphal valley had taken up arms after prolonged
frustrating experiences with the Indian administration and foxy and corrupt
politics of its own leaders. Pakistan and other forces had simply exploited the
frustrations of the Meitei youths as it had earlier done with the Nagas and the
Mizos. Manipur continues to bleed. The demand of Greater Nagaland and
government of India’s ambiguous policy drift has compounded the situation.
The Joint Intelligence (M) and Joint Intelligence (X) units of the Inter
Services Intelligence of Pakistan based in Bangladesh, and other bases in the
Arakan Hills of Myanmar and Thailand continue to stoke the fires. Inspiration
and support from Chinese sources are also palpable. Meitei youths converted
to Maoist-Leninist ideology have emerged as the most hardcore insurgent
groups, which are not yet ready for opening any political dialogue. They
cannot be treated as lackadaisically as India treats its socio-political and
economic gangrene called the Naxalite movement. Manipur requires as much
attention as the troubled Kashmir.


Intervention beyond the Misty Hills
Pakistan’s intelligence community and foreign policy framers and executors
have seldom overlooked any opportunity to detect and exploit the ethnic fault
lines in Indian North East. The protagonists of ‘One India One Nation’
concept did not comprehend that Indian ethnic geography was not finally
drawn with the linguistic reorganization of the states. That India was a
conglomerate of sub-nationalities and could be bonded together as a
wholesome Nation only through balanced socio-economic and political
sharing and caring was not understood by the political and bureaucratic class,
which still suffers from the hangover of the imperial system. Sub-nationalities
merge in the mainstream of the nation if the latter can prove that it is worth
living in a well-bonded geopolitical identity described as nation. Even after
Bangladesh was born out of Pakistan, India failed to recognize some hard
factors that determine the concept of nationhood.
With political awakening, economic advancement and opening up of more
opportunities instilled in the people of North East India a stark realization that
they were subjected by India to severe imbalance, if not exploitation. These
perceptions gave rise to conflict of interests, which were merely stewed into
the political broth of India by its policy makers. They mostly treated these
conflicts of interest and perceptions as law and order problems. Perceptions,
like Plato’s ‘idea’, generally take concrete shape. Minor concessions in the
nature of autonomous district councils within the exploitative political
structure proved inadequate to satisfy political aspirations of the people.
Soon, the acute political and economic imbalance gave birth to
disillusionment and diffidence. These natural eruptions were influenced by
the existing ambience of insurgency in the North East and by the scheming
forces of ISI and DGFI (Directorate of Forces Intelligence) of Bangladesh. At
certain level other foreign powers and agencies also collaborated with the ISI.
Assam is a typical example of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural
and multi-linguistic state of India. This eastern sentinel of India suffered most
from economic and developmental imbalance compared to the rest of
mainland India. Its quintessential ethnic geography contained volcanic
proportions of tectonic fissure and its multi-religious ambience often
presented the illusion of a classical civilisational conflict zone. The index of
economic development of Assam and growth of infrastructure was
appallingly poor. Like the British imperialists, the post-independence
government of India treated this resource rich tract only as a tea, oil and forest
products harvesting region.
The government of India tried to juxtapose the ethnic geography and
accompanying political, economic and social ambitions of the people of the
region in a half-hearted manner—conferring statehood status on the Naga
tract with the hope that this concession would calm the insurgent Nagas. It
granted the same status to Manipur belatedly, almost under duress and created
Mizoram under pressure of insurgency. It created states like Arunachal
Pradesh and Meghalaya by carving out territory from Assam. Between 1947
and 1970, Assam lost its mega-geographical proportions and was still left
with maladjusted ethnic problems. The policy planners denied adequate
national attention and a better economic deal deserved by the people of
Assam.
The governments in Delhi and Assam had pitifully and criminally
neglected the influx of Muslim population from East Pakistan and later
Bangladesh. Demographic imbalance created by such unchecked influx over a
period of 60 odd years (1920-80) had generated serious political, religious,
linguistic and economic imbalances.
It will not be historically incorrect to state that three major religious groups
—Assamese and Bengali Hindu society, predominantly Christian population
of Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and increasing Christian population in
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura and infiltrated Muslims had
contributed to social tension, political fluidity and had added fuel to the
ambience of insurgency. Burgeoning Muslim population in Brahmaputra and
Barak Valley of Assam considerably added to further communal tensions and
growth of Islamic fundamentalist and militant organizations, which drew
inspiration from the Islamist forces of Pakistan and Bangladesh.
To these diverse factors of destabilizing features were added the unresolved
issues of ethno-political ambitions of the leading tribes like the Bodos,
Rabhas, Kacharis, Mechs, Karbis and Tripuris (conglomeration of several
smaller tribes), etc.
Politicians in mainland India and Assam had also not taken note of
separatist ideas circulating in Assam Valley, especially in Upper Assam in
early fifties and sixties. The Motok population took pride in their Thai origin
and championed the cause of Ahom Tai Mongolio Rajya Parishad, an
organization that pleaded for a separate Ahom dominated state. The Motok
people did not want separation from India but better economic deal and due
share of its natural resources like tea, timber, oil, coal and other minerals. The
Motoks lived nearer to the Naga insurgents and they had access to the lawless
territory of Myanmar. Delhi depended more on the leadership of the
Brahmaputra and Barak Valleys and did not pay attention to the embroiled
psyche of the Motok people, who have a long history of struggle against the
Muslim and British occupations. This tiny seed of separatism in Upper Assam
had immensely added to the latter separatist movement spearheaded by the
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).
Inadequate, hesitant and half-hearted attention by the governments in Delhi
and the North Eastern states to these widening fault lines offered opportunity
to Pakistan, China and Bangladesh to interfere in the internal affairs of India
through their intelligence agencies and military establishments.
Assam went through silent tectonic convulsions for a long time and mutely
watched the separation of the Naga territories, 1962 war with China, and
creation of Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh with helplessness.
The simmering agitation by the Plains Tribals, the Bodo-Kacharis and Dimasa
tribes had also alarmed the Assamese perception of their political and
economic security on the stretch of land, which already witnessed prolonged
but silent invasion by the Muslim and Hindu Bengalis from East Pakistan and
Bangladesh. Assamese perception also took notice of the burgeoning conflicts
between the three major religious groups. The broad-spectrum perception of
Assamese Hindus that the Muslims and Christians were overwhelming them
had opened up the opportunities to Hindutva champions like the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Tactically the ULFA protagonists support the
coexistence of multi-religious groups in Assam. However, it is necessary to
mention that this is a tactical move only and does not reflect the attitude of the
Assam Hindus in general.
Pakistan and Bangladesh were not initially interested in helping the
anti-‘Bahiragato’ (foreigners) agitation by the All Assam Students
Association (AASU) that had started agitating in 1979 on the issue of
inclusion of alarmingly large number of ‘foreigners’ in the electoral rolls. This
was a genuine concern. Over six decades Muslim settlers from East Pakistan
and Bangladesh had infiltrated in Assam and had settled down on agricultural
lands owned by the Assamese. The Muslim League and the British
administration encouraged such migration and later the Congress party had
found it useful to give legal coverage to the foreigners for increasing its vote
bank. In fact, Congress policy of minority wooing had alarmed the Assamese
people. The sleeping giant of Assamese conscience had finally woken up
when threatened with territorial decimation, political marginalization and
pathetic economic neglect of their ancient land that had forced itself on Indian
Union at the dawn of partition of the country. A section of the Assam people
had never forgotten that Nehru’s Congress party had consented in principle to
Jinnah’s demand for inclusion of Assam to Pakistan, clubbing the tract with
Eastern Bengal.
The concept of ULFA as a tool of grievance redressing through violent
agitation was born in the heads of a few Motok youth, a dispossessed
community with inheritance of the Thai-Ahom rulers who had conquered
Assam and integrated with the Indian culture. The organization was formed in
April 1979 at the Upper Assam town of Sibsagar, a seat of the ancient Ahom
kings. Only a couple of ‘boys’ including Rajiv Konwar alias Arobindo
Rajkhowa, Golap Barua alias Arup Chetia, Samiran Gogoi alias Pradip Gogoi
and Paresh Barua were involved in the formation of ULFA. They were
inspired by several factors–ongoing agitations by the AASU and AAGP,
existing insurgency in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur and Marxist-Leninist
influence on some of the Motok leaders.
There were some allegations, not totally baseless, that Assam Congress
leaders had prompted the AASU and ULFA leaders to start serious law and
order problem in the state in the ruse of locating and deporting the
‘outsiders’–Bangladeshi Muslims, after Delhi had installed a Muslim woman
leader as the chief minister of the state. Intransigence of important Muslim
leaders of the Congress and mindless minority wooing added fuel to the fire.
According to Assamese perception the Congress leaders had made a mockery
of the concept of secularism only for retaining political power with helps
from Muslim voters, who were demographically threatening the aboriginal
people of the state. Involvement of internal political intricacies in the growth
of separatism amongst the Ahom Hindus cannot be ruled out and such
allegations require deeper probe.
The allegation that the Assam Gano Parishad (AGP) and All Assam
Students Union (AASU) were identified with the ULFA is only partially
correct. The ‘anti-bahiragato’ (foreigner) agitation of the AASU had
awakened the Assamese middle class and the rural population. Their anti-
Bengali parochial history was sharpened by the anti-Muslim agitation (illegal
migrants from East Pakistan/Bangladesh) and a growing assertiveness of the
assorted tribal population. The ULFA exploited the failures of the AGP
governments and youth leaders of the AASU. They exploited the disillusioned
Assamese people to set up a parallel government spanning the whole of
Assam by capturing the local units of the AGP and the AASU.
Pakistan and Bangladesh were suspicious about the motives of the ULFA
as their political goal, though the separatist movement had coincided with the
political motives of the AGP and ASSU, which had occupied the political
centre stage riding on the crest of basically anti-Muslim ‘anti-bahiragato’
movement. Pakistan movement had demanded and almost succeeded in
grabbing Assam as part of Pakistan clubbed with Eastern Bengal. Even Z. A.
Bhutto often referred to Assam as an unfinished agenda of the partition.
Bangladesh still now cherishes the goal of achieving a Muslim majority state
in Assam; a precursor to the demand of creation of a greater Bangladesh.
Assam for Islam is no more an empty slogan.
The ULFA protagonists, like the self-styled ‘General’ of the NSCN (IM),
had solicited support from the ISI of Pakistan on their own volition. Munim
Nobis, a top ULFA leader, had visited Karachi along with a Bangladeshi
businessperson in 1988 with a view to establishing contact with the ISI.
Around that time, the ISI and the Pakistani Establishment had gathered
enough expertise in supporting and sustaining the Indian rebels in the North
East and Punjab.
However, Munim’s first sortie to Pakistan did not result in establishing firm
contact with the ISI. Paresh Barua sent Nobis to Pakistan next year. This time
he walked into a Karachi police station and demanded to be taken to an ISI
official. This version of the ULFA-ISI initial contact is based on the account
of Sanjoy Hazarika, a North East expert. However, my later tryst with the
ULFA operations in 1990-91 and other sources of information indicated that
the ULFA leadership—Paresh Barua, Arobindo Rajkhowa and Arup Chetia—
had initial discussions with the Dhaka based station chief of the ISI, one
Habib Rana, an undercover diplomat. Paresh Barua’s friends in the DGFI, of
Bangladesh, facilitated this meeting. These negotiations continued for over
one year. Paresh Barua was specially flown to Kathmandu and Islamabad for
meeting the ISI officials in October 1998 with a fake passport issued by
Bangladesh. Around October 1990, the top ULFA leadership was flown to
Pakistan in a Bangladesh Biman flight with passports provided by the DGFI.
They were taken to Islamabad and Peshawar. At Peshawar, they were exposed
to the Hizb-e-Islami faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Pakistani
instructors imparted them training for over a month. This was the real first
brush of the ULFA with ISI officials, one of whom was a Colonel Mustaq
Chaudhry (obviously an assumed name) of the Joint Intelligence X Division
of the outfit: (Source personal knowledge).
Another round of visit took place next year (Sept 1991) when Paresh Barua
and Sunil Nath visited Islamabad from Dhaka. They were taken to Darra,
Asia’s largest illegal arms market. Pakistan wanted the ULFA to conduct
Afghanistan type guerrilla warfare in Assam, indulging in large-scale killing,
sabotage and subversion and tying up operational arrangements with the
Muslims, who were smarting under pressure of extradition to Bangladesh.
ULFA did not agree with the suggestions, as the ordinary Assamese people
were not ready for such all-out ‘jihad’ type war against India. The Assamese
Hindus were not ready to collaborate with Muslim jihadists, who were
working in tandem with the ISI, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Ahl-
e-Hadis Bangladesh and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami, an organization linked to the
Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Intelligence sources indicated that the ULFA leaders
were trained an Al Qaeda camp in the vicinity of Spen Kumal in Kunar
province.
A little after Operation Rhino conducted by the Indian army, Pakistan
started supplying arms and explosives to the ULFA in a big way from its
bases in Bangladesh and Nepal. Most of other weapon holdings of the ULFA,
until that time, had come from the NSCN (Khaplang) and the KIA. Some
weapons were collected from the DGFI sources of Bangladesh and some were
purchased from the NSCN (IM) groups operating on Assam- Nagaland
borders. According to some reliable Bangladeshi sources the ISI had arranged
a crucial meeting between the ULFA high command and the NSCN (IM)
supremo Th. Muivah somewhere in Thailand in 1994.
ULFA has maintained close liaison with the ISI, which supplied several
passports to Paresh Barua and other ULFA cadres to facilitate their visits to
Thailand, Singapore and Pakistan. ULFA cadres have received arms training
from the ISI at various training centers in Pakistan, close to the Afghanistan
border. Some Afghan mujaheedin and Al Qaeda al Sulbah elements of 055
Brigade had trained the ULFA cadre. They were specially trained in
manufacturing improvised explosive devices, ambush techniques and
techniques of assembling and delivering automobile bombs. That the top
ULFA leadership was in close touch with Pakistani High Commission based
ISI operatives have been well chronicled.
The ULFA had announced its support for Pakistan during the Kargil war.
They described the Pakistani intruders – primarily Pakistani Army regulars
and selected mujahideens – as ‘freedom fighters’. Some children of top ULFA
leaders were reportedly studying in the USA and Canada under ISI protection
and support. The Indian government is yet to identify these children. ULFA’s
website newsletter Swadhinata (Freedom), receives editorial support from ISI
agents inside Pakistan. It was in this newsletter that the ULFA first supported
Pakistan during the Kargil war.
It is now confirmed from delicate sources that at least 250-300 ULFA
cadres were trained at Rawalpindi and other locations in Pakistan. The
training included courses in the use of rocket launchers, explosives and
assault weapons. Paresh Barua had been regularly visiting Karachi since
1991. Barua is also reported to have met Osama bin Laden in 1996 during a
visit to Peshawar. The ULFA leader was taken to a camp on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, where he not only received assurance of military help in
the form of arms and ammunition, but also assurances of co-operation and
logistical support of all international organizations owing allegiance to bin
Laden, including the International Jihad Council, the Tehrik-ul-Jihad, Harkat-
ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), apart from the Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Several madrassas (religious seminaries) and mosques sponsored by the
ISI in the Sylhet and Cox’s Bazar areas are being used to hoard and transfer
arms procured by the ULFA from Thailand and Myanmar. Rohingya
Liberation Army elements were introduced to the ULFA for facilitating
weapons transfer from places like Cox’s Bazar and Ukhia to Assam. In fact, a
small detachment of the ULFA was stationed at Ukhia under ISI and DGFI
protection for facilitating arms transport with Rohingya collaboration. ISI
largesse enabled ULFA to buy arms in Siem Reap area of Cambodia and
adjacent Thai territories. The ISI also ‘introduced’ ULFA to LTTE
transporters who, for a fee, undertook to transport arms from Southeast Asia
into Myanmar. In April 1996 Bangladesh seized more than 500 AK-47 rifles,
80 machineguns, 50 rocket launchers and 2,000 grenades from two ships off
Cox’s Bazar. Four Tamils were among those arrested.
Interrogation of Rohit Deori, a ULFA leader, had revealed that he was
taken to Pakistan from Dhaka and was given intensive training. According to
him, Arobindo Rajkhowa was being totally manipulated by the ISI. All
strategic moves of the ULFA, its operational activities and liaison with other
groups with North Eastern insurgent groups, are coordinated by the ISI.
In fact, after 1991 ULFA-ISI liaison became a routine affair. The Pakistani
Establishment and the ISI were still suspicious about the Assamese attitude
towards the illegal Muslim migrants, the ‘bahiragatos.’ However, after 1992
the ISI and Islamist Jihadists had taken up a parallel approach in developing
militancy amongst the Assamese Muslims. In this game, the ISI was ably
supported by the intelligence agencies of Bangladesh–the DGFI, NSI and
BDR intelligence wing. The Muslim militant organizations in Assam, about a
dozen in numbers, were floated at the instance of ISI and Bangladesh
intelligence operatives. Details of the growth of Islamic militancy in Assam
and their connectivity with ULFA will be discussed separately.
It is interesting to note that Paresh Barua, the kingpin of the ISI, had
opposed tooth and nail the talks between the government of India and the
ULFA faction headed by Arobindo Rajkhowa. At his insistence, Pakistani and
Bangladeshi intelligence agents prevailed upon Rajkhowa and others to back
out from the talks when they visited Dhaka to persuade Paresh Barua. Th.
Muivah, who advised them against any settlement with India, also contacted
the ULFA leaders in Dhaka. Since 1992, the ULFA and the NSCN (IM) have
been collaborating inside and outside India. It is too early to comment on the
‘peace probing’ initiated by the ULFA through certain eminent Assamese
personalities.
Instances of Chinese input in the ULFA imbroglio were suspected for a
long time. Contact between the Chinese intelligence and ULFA was facilitated
by the NSCN (K). Some consignments of weapons were also procured from
Chinese sources through the KIA. Surrendered ULFA leader Rohit Deori
(Luit Deuri) told Subir Bhowmik in a BBC interview on 19 January 2001 that
a Chinese agency codenamed “Blackhouse” had supplied them huge
consignments of weapons through Bhutanese territory. Much of the weapons
the NSCN initially procured from the former Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
between 1988 and 1995 were believed to have been routed to the ULFA by
the Chinese agencies. Use of the surrogate was designed to conceal the origin
of the supply. Recent seizures of a huge quantity of weapons from the Meitei
rebel groups by the Burmese army in November 2001 from around Tamu—
nearly 1,600 pieces of automatic weapons—have prompted speculations
about the supply from Chinese sources from January 1990 onwards.
Over years the ISI and Islamic militant tanzeems had developed grassroots
level cooperation with the ULFA activities.
The arrest of four ISI operatives and agents by Guwahati police in 1999
had revealed that a section of Muslim religious leaders and youths from
Goalpara, Dhubri, Barpeta, and Nalbari districts were visiting Pakistan via
Bangladesh for arms and explosive training organized by various Pakistani
and Afganistani terrorist outfits like Harkat-Ul-Jehad, Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen
and Laskar-e-Tayeba, as per the plans of the ISI. The same operatives were in
regular contact with the ULFA activists in Nalbari, Bongaigaon and adjacent
areas of lower Assam.
As far as the role of ISI in stoking rebellion in Assam, it is pertinent to note
that once an ardent admirer of populist ULFA outfit Prafulla Kumar Mahanta,
the then Chief Minister, was forced to say on April 6, 2000 in the Assam
Assembly that activities of ULFA and other rebel groups were confined in six
different areas:
(a) Promoting indiscriminate violence in the state by
providing active support to the local militant outfits,
(b) Creating new militant outfits along ethnic and communal
lines by instigating ethnic and religious groups,
(c) Supplying explosives and sophisticated arms to various
terrorist groups,
(d) Causing sabotage of oil pipelines and other installations,
communication lines, the Railways and roads,
(e) Promoting fundamentalism and militancy among local
Muslim youths by misleading them in the name of jihad, and
(f) Promoting communal tension between Hindu and Muslim
citizens by way of false and highly inflammatory propaganda.
As far as Bangladesh’s DGFI and National Security Internal (NSI) are
concerned, the State and the Central governments were painfully aware of full
backing received by the North East terror groups from pro-Pakistan elements
in Bangladesh Establishment and Islamist tanzeems. These matters were
brought to the notice of the Bangladesh authorities through agency level and
diplomatic channels. Bangladesh has consistently denied the existence of any
Indian insurgent group’s presence in their country.
The ULFA leaders sheltered in Bangladesh have also developed vast
financial interests in that country. Huge amount of money, suspected to be
over $ 50 million was invested by the ULFA in several business interests
jointly with Bangladeshi business houses controlled by sympathetic
politicians and military officers. Income from these investments is ploughed
back to Assam insurgency and maintaining plush lifestyle of the leading
figures. This compelling bondage of financial linkage also stands in the way
of individual ULFA leaders reneging from their ISI/DGFI controllers. It is
reported that money matters had also generated misunderstanding between
Paresh Barua and Arobindo Rajkhowa.
After return of Sheikh Hasina to power Indo-Bangla relationship has
warmed up. Bangladesh banned activities of Indian rebel groups. This had led
to surrender of Arabinda Rajkhowa group and return to Assam. Paresh Barua
and group retreated from Bangladesh and took shelter in China.
*

Pakistan’s meddling in India’s ethnic insurgency does not end with the Naga-
Mizo-Meitei and ULFA ethnic groups. The ISI/DGFI hands are visible behind
the Tripura tribal groups and the Bodo Cacharis of Assam, who are still trying
to redraw the maps of their ethnic geopolitical identity.
The fault line in Tripura was created by the unimaginative and cruel
partition of India. With a sprinkling of Bengali population, and vast majority
of tribals, Tripura presented a collage of cultural assimilation under the
Debbarman kings. The composition of Tripura’s tribal communities is
complex in nature. The 19 micro-tribal groups are: Tripuri, Reang, Jamatia,
Naotia, Halam, Chakma, Magh, Kuki, Mizo and Garo, etc. The Tripuris are of
Bodo Cachari stock. Most of these tribal groups followed the religion of their
kings, Hinduism, and several Bengali cultural practices. To Hinduism were
mixed several indigenous tribal practices verging on animism. Tripura tribals
were deeply influenced by the prevailing Hindu Bengali culture and tradition.
Way back in 1901, they formed about 53% of the population of the kingdom.
According to 2001 census Christians constituted about 3.2% of the
population, against 1.6% recorded in 1991 census. Missionaries from New
Zealand had set up the Baptist Church of Tripura in the 1940’s. It had
maintained steady connection with the American Baptist Foreign Mission
Society (ABFMS). The Church in Tripura maintained vigorous connection
with the Presbyterian Church active in Meghalaya and Mizoram. The
Christian groups were influenced by their co-religionists in Mizo Hills and
Shillong based church leadership. The Southern Baptist Church of the United
States is said to be the main supporter of evangelical activities in Tripura,
which has targeted the non-Christian Reangs and Tripuris. Aggressive
conversion was accompanied by propaganda that economic and political
rights of the tribal people were being grabbed by the Bengalis, who had
migrated in lakhs from East Pakistan. Allegations of involvement of the
Baptist Church in encouraging tribal militancy have not been found baseless.
Drastic change in population ratio took place after the partition of India and
migration of large Hindu Bengali population from East Pakistan. The Mizo
disturbance and later Bangladeshi Muslim (non-tribal) forays into the
Chittagong Hill Tracts had propelled a large number of Chakmas to flee to the
safety of Indian Tripura. The Bengali influx, their land hunger and occupation
of tribal land and the vacuum created by the absence of the influence of the
ruling family had pushed the tribal groups to tether’s end. The traditional
loyalty of the tribal population to the Crown was decimated by sudden
imposition of democratic rule, in which the Bengali-speaking people took a
major lead. In short, demographic imbalance coupled with economic
exploitation, political deprivation and encouragement by a section of the
Christian Church had inspired the Tripura tribals to follow the paths earlier
adopted by the Mizos and Nagas. Once the fault line widened, Pakistan, did
not waste time to exploit it.
The first sign of tribal insurgency manifested in the formation of Seng
Krak (clenched fist) around 1947, and Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) in
1967-68. Thereafter several insurgent groups have been formed: Tripura
National Volunteers (B. Hrangkhawl-TNV), All Tripura People’s Liberation
Organization, All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), and National Liberation Front
of Tripura (NLFT), etc. The last one is often described as the Christian
Taliban force of Tripura, because of their dogged loyalty to the Baptist
Mission and liberal support given by the Southern Baptist Church of the USA.
The NLFT movement had cut the tribal lives of Tripura on religious lines.
Support of the Church has split some Tripura insurgent groups on Hindu-
Christian lines. Heavy religious coloring is discernible in Christian tribal
opposition to Bengali dominated political and societal affairs of the state.
Since formation of these organizations, Tripura witnessed a vicious cycle
of violence. A total of 1718 civilians and members of the security forces (not
counting insurgents) died in militancy-related violence between April 1993
and February 2001. During the same period, 1961 persons were kidnapped.
Often the level of violence exceeded the number of killings in Kashmir.
Four important features of the Tripura tangle are:
• Support by Congress and CPM to certain tribal militant
factions for vote-bank politics;
• Open support of the Church;
• Support by Pakistan and Bangladesh;
• Germination of Bengali resistance in the nature of Amra
Bangali and United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF); and
• Emergence of the RSS in Tripura with the avowed objective
of curbing advancement by the Christian Missionaries.
Involvement of Pakistan had started with assistance rendered to the TNV
and TUJS from bases in Dhaka, Sylhet, Brahmanbaria and Chittagong Hill
Tracts, where the ISI and Pak MI had set up elaborate arrangements for the
Mizo rebels. The ISI operatives often crossed over to Tripura and helped the
tribal targets to form armed cells. They were taught guerrilla warfare, jungle
ambush and other predatory activities. While a section of the Church
encouraged tribal resistance, the ISI trapped the disaffected groups and
induced them to undergo training and brainwashing in East Pakistan camps.
Between 1968 and 1970, five groups of Tripura rebel volunteers were trained
in Sylhet and CHT camps along with the Naga and Mizo gangs to give them
the geopolitical perspective of anti-India activities of the ethnic minorities.
Despite intelligence input the ruling governments, both Congress and
Communists, wooed some of the tribal groups out of political compulsion and
overlooked the blatant Pakistani input. Years of neglect and indulgence had
steeled the division between the tribal and Bengali segments of the
population.
Over years, the Tripura rebel groups established linkages with the NSCN
(IM), UNLF, PREPAK and other rebel groups of Manipur and the Bodo and
Kamtapuri rebels. Taking queue from the ATTF and NLFT, several smaller
groups of terrorists had sprouted intermittently. A large number of small
groups of extremists having links with either NLFT or ATTF came into
existence and perished. Those having links with NLFT were –
Tripura National Liberation Front (TNLF)
Tripura Tribal Volunteer Force (TTVF)
All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF)
Social Democratic Front of Tripura (SDFT)
Tripura Tribal Democratic Force (TTDF)
All Tripura Volunteer Association (ATVA)
Tripura Tribal Action Committee Force (TTACF)
Tripura Humkurai Sepoy (THS)
All Tripura Security Armed Force (ATSAF)
Liberation of Tripura Tribal Force (LTTF)
Tripura Regimental Force (TRF)
All Tripura Bharat Suraksha Force (ATBSF)
Tripura National Sengkrak Force (TNSF).

The groups having association with ATTF were –
 Tripura Tribal Youth Force (TTYF)
Tripura Liberation Organization (TLO)
Tripura Young Rifles (TYR)
Tripura Lion Force (TLF)
Tripura National Army (TNA).
Most of these groups were basically criminal gangs and do not exist at
present. Bangladesh security forces have come to notice for siding with more
hardcore terrorists who are ready to toe their dictates and that of the ISI
without reservation. The recent incident of killing of a group of Tripura rebels
is relevant to note. Seventeen terrorists affiliated to the Biswamohan
Debbarma faction of the proscribed National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT) were killed in a series of internecine clashes on November 29 and 30,
2003, in one of the group’s camps at Shazek Hills in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts of Bangladesh, near Amarpur subdivision of the South Tripura district.
The Bangladesh Border Rangers had reportedly brought about the clash.
Aided by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, insurgents in the
northeastern States, especially Tripura, use Bangladesh as their “soft
hideouts”. Tripura’s Finance Minister Badal Chowdhury had told Frontline in
a recent interview. There are no confirmed reports about visit of any NLFT
leader to Pakistan. However, there are reliable reports of one Sajan
Debbarma, an NLFT leader, visiting Bangkok with a passport provided by
Pakistan High Commission in Dacca in September 2003. While in Bangkok,
Sajan had several meetings with Bangkok mission based ISI operatives, who
assured him of supply of weapons through Ukhia based (Bangladesh)
Rohingya conduits.
Tripura insurgents have procured weapons through the Ukhia channel and
also from DGFI backed Bangladeshi smuggling cartels. An interesting aspect
of DGFI contact with the NLFT is the involvement of the Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB) that was deployed in large numbers in the CHT ostensivly
for tackling ‘terrorist’ activities. Outfits such as the NLFT, ATTF buy arms,
ammunition and modern communication gadgets from South East Asian
countries such as Singapore and Thailand and collect them in Phuket area
before bringing to Chittagong in Bangladesh. Cox’s Bazar is one of the major
illegal arms centers in Bangladesh. The consignments are loaded into either
ships or trawlers in Chittagong, a border district of Bangladesh, and
transported to Tripura. These consignments are offloaded in the districts of
Dholai, South Tripura and North Tripura and they reach various parts of the
North East via land routes through dense ravines. Tripura is one of the
corridors for pushing arms into the North East.
 Several camps have been established in Bangladesh for the North East
rebel groups. The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) has 25
training camps in Bangladesh, mostly in Khagrachari (CHT) and Hobiganj
(Sylhet) districts. The other group operating in Tripura, the All Tripura Tiger
Forces has 20 training camps.
Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland or the NSCN
has 18 camps in Khagrachari, Bandarban, and Rangmati districts. The United
Liberation Front of Assam has 17 training camps in Sylhet, Maoulvibazar,
Mymensingh, Kurigam and Sherpur districts. Ten camps of the Peoples
Liberation Army, which operate in Manipur, are in Khagrachari, Moulvibazar,
Hobiganj, Sylhet and Sherpur districts of Bangladesh. National Democratic
Front of Bodoland operating in Assam has 2 camps in Khagrachari and
Tangail districts.
According to impeccable intelligence sources, following camps in
Bangladesh run by the ISI and DGFI have been identified:
• Silra, Manu, Hingajiya, Jogibil, Kanagaon, Beltali,
Shaistaganj, Minabad, all in Sylhet district;
• Brahmanbaria;
• Barera, Madhabpur, Satbaria, Mestala in Comilla district;
• Satkuchia, Anandapur, Chattaura, Usmanpur in Chittagong
district; and
• Diwan Bazaar, Diwan Bari, Ajodhya Bazar, Chatrachara
and Tarasingh Bari in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

It is noteworthy that besides the ISI and the DGFI certain Islamist groups
affiliated to the Jamait-ul-Mujaheedin and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami ( al
Qaeda front) render support to the Tripura militants. Bangladesh, in all
practical purposes, has emerged as the reliable partner of Pakistan in matters
of exporting proxy war. If reports of Al Qaeda al Sulbah presence in
Bangladesh are correct, (as believed by US sources) it can be safely presumed
that the pro-Pakistani and pro-jihad elements in the neighbouring country will
emerge as bigger threats sooner than later.
The aspect of supply of arms and ammunition to Tripura rebels by
intelligence agencies of Bangladesh and the ISI was highlighted by the
seizure of huge quantity of ammunition at Bogra. On June 27, 2004,
Bangladeshi police recovered 62,112 rounds of Chinese rifle bullets and 120
kilograms of explosives from an abandoned truck in the precincts of one Syed
Akhlakur Rahman Pintu’s house at Jogarpara village of Kahalu Police Station
in Bogra. Subsequent raids in the neighboring areas yielded more ammunition
and explosives, which were later found to be deadly RDX. The total amount
recovered, currently stands at about one lakh bullets and nearly 200 kilograms
of explosives.
According to a leading Bangladesh newspaper, Ajker Kagoj, dated Oct 24.
2004, BDR had recovered 1 Anti Aircraft HMG with 169 rds, 1 AK 47, M16
rifle 2945 rounds from Basahari Union in Bandarban Dist CHT on Oct 23,
2004. Suspected Arakan Army had cached these weapons on behalf of a
smuggling syndicate that operated with assistance of the ISI and the DGFI.
This huge cache of weapons was berthed in the jetty of a government owned
fertiliser company and was being unloaded by the Rohingya laborers. These
weapons were meant to be supplied to the rebel groups of Indian North East,
including the Tripura rebels. On Oct 10 the BDR had recovered 2 AK47 and
805 rounds from the same area from an Arakan Army cache. Arakan Army
has become a supplier to NSCN, ULFA, NLFT and other Indian insurgent
groups.
Various media reports have indicated that the arms and ammunition seized
by Bangladesh police in June 2004 was being smuggled for the All Tripura
Tiger Force (ATTF), a terrorist group operating in the State of Tripura. The
suppliers reportedly intended to send the contraband to the Chittagong Hill
Tracts (CHT) area first. After that, they intended to smuggle it further across
the border into Tripura. The cache of arms was sent from the outfit’s Satcherri
headquarters in Hobiganj district of Bangladesh, just across the West Tripura
district. Bangladesh police also arrested Kishore Debbarma and his two
associates, Jogesh Debbarma and Chitta Debbarma, from the Teliapara area of
Hobiganj district who belonged to the ATTF. An AK-47 rifle and a wireless
set were also recovered from Jogesh Debbarma’s residence.
The Tripura rebel groups are still exploited by the ISI operatives and the
DGFI. In recent times it came to notice that the ISI was using some Jamait-ul-
Mujahideen subterfuges in the districts of Comilla, Sylhet, and Satkhira etc.,
to supply weapons and to arrange shelter for the Tripura rebels. This is a
marriage of convenience. Similarly some Rohingya elements had also come
to notice for supplying weapons to Tripura rebels on cash payment. In fact, a
consortium of rebels operates in that area of Bangladesh with ISI and DGFI
patronage.
However, since 2010 the level of tribal insurgency has declined.
Disillusioned by ISI inability to render help, Al Qaeda’s empty promises and
return of Awami League to power the tribal rebels were forced to surrender.
Few criminal groups still operate as insurgents.
 *

The saga of ethnic turbulence in the Northeast with ISI and Bangladeshi
collaboration cannot be concluded without examining the contours of the
Bodo upheaval and worrisome uprisings by the Kamtapuri Liberation
Organization (KLO) of West Bengal and some splinter groups in Meghalaya.
All these organizations have been aided by the Intelligence agencies of
Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Assam has over 30 organizations, Hindu, Muslim and tribal, which swear
by the concept of armed struggle and agitation to redeem their real and
perceived grievances. The tanzeems purportedly working for Muslim
interests, have been counted in a different chapter:
• AAASS =All Assam Adivasi Suraksha Samiti
• ACMF =Adivasi Cobra Militant Force
• ANCF =Adivasi National Commando Force
• ASF =Adivasi Security Force
• ATF =Assam Tiger Force
• BCF =Birsa Commando Force
• BVYLF= Barak Valley Youth Liberation Force
• BLTF =Bodo Liberation Tiger Force
• BTF =Bengali Tiger Force
• GNF =Garo National Front
• GTF =Gorkha Tiger Force
• HLAA=Hindu Liberation Army of Assam
• KLO =Kamatapur Liberation Organisation
• KNV =Karbi National Volunteers
• KPF =Karbi People’s Front
• KRLO =Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation
• KRPF =Koch Rajbongshi Protection Force
• RNSF =Rabha National Security Force
• TLAA =Tiwa Liberation Army of Assam
• TNRF =Tiwa National Revolutionary Force
 • Dima Halam Daoga (DHD)
• United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
Besides the Kamtapuri Liberation Organization (KLO), which operates in
parts of northern West Bengal and adjoining areas of Assam in collaboration
with the NDFB and the ULFA there are 14 listed Muslim militant
organizations, which operate in conjunction with Pakistani and Bangladeshi
Islamist jihadi organizations. These organizations are also heavily funded and
supported by the ISI and the DGFI.
The canvass is formidable. The problems are embedded in the fragmented
ethnic entities of the geographical area of Assam. In the absence of genuine
political, economic and social efforts to integrate the splintered ethnic groups,
they are subjected to real and perceived persecution, neglect and suppression.
The Muslim community is being encouraged by Bangladesh, Pakistan and
international jihadist groups to resort to terror tactics with a view to bring
Assam on the map of International Islamic Jihad. We propose to comment on
the last aspect in details. Let us now concentrate on the Bodo imbroglio.
The Bodo-Cachari community has to its credit a deep-rooted historical
heritage. They ruled over a vast kingdom stretching from parts of present
North Bengal to major parts of Assam, including parts of present
Mymensingh and Sylhet districts of Bangladesh, with their capital at
Hidimbapura (named after the mythological non-Aryan wife of Bhima, the
third Pandava), present day Dimapur, a major town in Nagaland. “What had
fuelled Bodo resentment over the years was the supercilious and arrogant
attitude of the Assamese bureaucrats and politicians, most of whom had a ‘we
know better than you attitude’, who talked of the Plains’ Tribals—the true
indigenous people of Assam—with disdain and even contempt and who had
done little over several decades for these disadvantaged groups.” Sanjoy
Hazarika, Strangers Of The Mist, p 152.
The Bodos had taken the first definitive step in 1930 and 1940 when they
pleaded before the Simon Commission and other British Parliamentary groups
to assert their separate identity. Frustration over the formation of Autonomous
District Council, Assamese intransigence, linguistic, cultural and economic
conflicts had sharpened the Bodo imbroglio, a tangle that was shared equally
by the Christian and the Hindu segments of the community. Fuel was added to
the fire, as certain observers point out, by the Research and Analysis Wing of
the Cabinet Secretariat and the Intelligence Bureau (intelligence agencies of
the government of India), when it was decided by the rulers in Delhi to use
the Bodo tangle against the Assamese agitators. The frustrated and
disillusioned Assamese Hindus labored under the umbrella of AASU and the
AGP for greater rights for the people of Assam and eviction of illegal Muslim
migrants from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh. The Special Services
Bureau (an irregular armed unit under R&AW) volunteers belonging to Bodo
and allied tribal communities were used to strike terror against Assamese and
minority targets with a view to diverting attention from the ethnic aspect of
the Assam tangle. Earlier the Bodo elements of the SSB were utilised to assist
the Mukti Bahini of the rebellious East Pakistan Bengalis. They assisted the
Indian paramilitary and regular army contingents to penetrate deep inside East
Pakistan in aid to the Mukti Bahini of Mujibur Rahman.
The Bodo rebels took advantage of their military training to fight under the
banners of All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), Bodo Security Force (BdSF),
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Bodo Liberation Tigers.
BdSF had first established contact with the NSCN in Myanmar and later
inside Assam and Bangladesh. By 1987, they also approached the ULFA,
United Peoples Manipur Liberation Army (UPMLA) and the Kachin
Independent Army.
The Bodo rebels belonging to NDFB and BLT etc were brought in touch
with the ISI operatives based in their Dhaka High Commission and the field
commanders of the DGFI of Bangladesh by the NSCN (IM) and ULFA
leaders. They sneaked into Bangladesh through the riverine areas of
Brahmaputra, adjoining areas of West Bengal and Meghalaya. This
development and the emergence of the Kamtapuri Liberation Organization
offered godsend opportunity to Pakistan and Bangladesh and to some extent
to certain pro-Beijing elements in Bhutan to destabilize the narrow corridor
that connected Assam and the North East with the rest of India. A special cell
of the ISI was set up in Dhaka to give sharper edge to Operation
Strangulation, a code name given to Bodo-Cachari and Kamtapuri activation
programme adopted by the agency.
According to impeccable sources the Bangladesh and ISI operators had set
up camps for the Bodos and Kamtapuri Liberation Organisation in Dhaka,
Bhurungamari, Kurigram, Jatrapur, Biswanath, Gaibandha, Mithapur,
Palashbari, Garh Jaripa, Lal Monirhat, Chandan Pat, Kakina, Gomnati, and
Dakshin Dewanbari etc. places in the bordering districts. The Bodos have also
transit camps in the CHT area for lifting weapons from Cox’s Bazar, Ukhia
and other minor ports on river Karnaphuli.
Ranjan Daimari, an important Bodo leader was flown to Pakistan by the ISI
helpers for a meeting that was supposed to decide induction of sophisticated
weapons. Later, intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh facilitated
travel schedules of NDFB leaders like Ranjan Daimari to Thailand,
Singapore, Pakistan and Nepal for negotiating arms induction through three
routes:
 • Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar route for weapons from Thai
market, especially from the Muslim rebel groups in Southern Thailand;
• Nepal-North Bengal route for weapons supplied by the ISI
through Nepal conduit; and
• Bangladeshi supply of weapons of Chinese origin, often
received through Bhutan sources.
There are reasons to believe that the NDFB was supplied 3” mortars and
light and heavy machineguns by Bangladesh, which were secreted in Bhutan
camps. These weapons were meant to be used against spectacular strategic
Indian targets in Assam.
Least but not the last of the rebel groups the Kamtapur Liberation
Organization (KLO), an umbrella organization of the Bengali speaking Koch-
Rajbangshi tribes, had also unfurled the banner of revolution to protest
against the decades old neglect by the Caste Hindu dominated governments of
West Bengal. The KLO was later taken under the wings of the ULFA and the
NDFB and were encouraged to set up camps inside Bangladesh in
collaboration with DGFI and ISI operatives. The NDFB and the ULFA were
tasked to assist, train and support the KLO rebels from West Bengal. It is
interesting to note that the fledgling KLO had also established camps in
Bhutan forests alongside the ULFA and the NDFB.
The Kamtapur Peoples Party and the KLO were encouraged by Pakistan
and Bangladesh as the rebel elements virtually ganged up with the ULFA and
the NDFB to ‘soften up’ Indian defenses in the chicken neck area between
West Bengal and Assam. For a while, the Royal Government of Bhutan
dithered to take action against the North East insurgents using its territory.
Under Indian pressure, the Royal Bhutan Army finally acted in December
2003 and January 2004. As a result of sustained operations by the Bhutan and
Indian Army (only in Indian area) 2641 cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers
(BLT) led by the outfit’s chairman cum commander-in-chief, Hagrama
Basumatary, surrendered on December 6, 2003, at Kokrajhar in Assam,
paving the way for the formation of the interim Bodoland Territorial Council
(BTC). They also deposited 615 arms, including 138 .303 rifles, 11 self-
loading rifles, 64 AK-series rifles, 3 light machine guns and 110 hand-made
cartridge guns. The Lower Assam Division Commissioner, Emilly
Choudhury, swore in a 12-member interim BTC headed by Basumatary in
presence of the Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, Governor Lt. Gen.
(Retired) Ajai Singh and Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi on December 7.
However, the developments have not totally eliminated the operational
efficacy of the NDFB, which is operating from bases in Bangladesh and
certain other hideouts in Bhutan and India. It may take some more time for
Pakistan and Bangladesh to reorganise and reenergize the ULFA and NDFB
insurgents. Recent serial bomb blasts in Assam (March 2005) attributed to the
ULFA indicate that the hardcore cadres under influence of the ISI and DGFI
are opposing the fragile efforts of initiation of dialogue between the ULFA
leaders and government of India. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi agencies are
at the game and eventually, unless India succeeds in concluding
comprehensive peace with the NSCN groups, Pakistan and Bangladesh are
going to whip up proxy war in the Indian North East.
There are indications that the NDFB and the government of Assam are
preparing for talks, which may lead to ceasefire and restoration of peace. But,
available indications from security and intelligence sources tend to prove that
the ISI and DGFI are not keen on a settlement between the NDFB and the
government of India. However, the outcome is likely to be decided by stances
adopted by ULFA and the NSCN (IM) and the policy makers in Islamabad
and Dhaka. A section of the NDFB leadership is still under deep influence of
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The Bodo, ULFA and NSCN (IM) worked in tandem with the Achik
National Volunteer Council (ANVC), Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council
(HALC), rebel outfits of Khasi segment of Meghalaya and the Garo National
Front, the ethnic elements of the Garo Hills segment of Meghalaya. In fact,
the NSCN (IM) acted as the guide and guru of these rebel groups. The
Meghalaya rebel groups draw sustenance from the NSCN (IM) and the
ULFA, besides Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence agencies. The
Meghalaya malcontent groups operate mainly on the platform of communal
hatred against people of other states of India. Political and economic
mismanagement by the state governments and lack of adjustment between the
Khasi, Garo and Jaintia tribal groups of the state had also contributed to the
revolt by a section of the youths. The future of militancy by the Meghalaya
groups will depend on negotiations between the government of India and
NSCN (IM) and ULFA.
From the above-summarized account, it is clear that Pakistan did not start
its proxy war against India with its involvement with the Punjab terrorists. It
started very back in 1956, soon after A.Z. Phizo took up arms against India in
support of his demand for an independent Nagaland. From 1956 to 2005, over
a span of 58 years Pakistan and its surrogate Bangladesh Army and
intelligence agencies have stoked the fire of insurgency in the Indian North
East with the avowed objective of bleeding India to a position of weakness.
Their efforts have been fortified by rapid growth of Islamist jihadi groups in
Bangladesh, which work as conduit for the ISI, DGFI and the Al Qaeda al
Sulbah.
*


 Interference in Kashmir
It is said that Jawaharlal Nehru had gone to Srinagar for honeymoon, trekked
on snow and had a fall in an icy crevice, and finally developed love for the
valley from where his ancestors had come to the court of Delhi to work as
Persian experts. Besides the snow and chinars, he had developed affection and
regard for another Kashmiri, Sheikh Abdullah, to whom he preferred to leave
the fate of the thorny state. Nehru had developed a love affair but was not
responsible for turning it into a flashpoint. Kashmir tangle is a historical fault
line that was thrust upon India by the departing British and its Pakistani
collaborator, M.A. Jinnah. It was a part of West’s Cold War calculation.
Kashmir with a client power like Pakistan would have been of tremendous
value to the enemies of the USSR and China. However, this calculation
continues to elude solution despite dissolution of the Soviet Union and end of
the Third World War (Cold War).
The British had created the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in its
present geopolitical form out of the Empire of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In
1820, Ranjit Singh had confirmed the Dogra chieftain Gulab Singh, his
vassal, as the raja of the State of Jammu. Gulab Singh first added Ladakh in
1830, which had some treaty relationship with Tibet. Poonch was created as a
separate State under Gulab Singh’s brother. It had separate relationship with
the British Crown.
In 1846, the British, against payment of ready cash, conferred domain over
the Kashmir Valley on Gulab Singh. In the later part of nineteenth century,
Gulab Singh and his successors expanded the kingdom to include Gilgit,
Hunza, Nagar and tracts closer to Chinese Sinkiang and Afghanistan. The
assembled State of J&K had harboured the seeds of divergence from the very
beginning. Poonch was a Muslim majority area in Jammu region. Rest of the
Valley and Northern territories was also predominantly Muslim while Ladakh
was predominantly Buddhist. These factors—a Hindu king and his
predominantly Muslim subjects—had offered opportunities to the Muslim
League to demand accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.
The transfer of power had witnessed several such historical incongruities.
Junagarh in modern Gujarat was a Hindu majority principality ruled by a
Muslim ruler, so also was the case of Hyderabad. Pakistani leaders had
expected to use Junagarh as a bargaining chip for demanding accession of
Kashmir. Indian military operations in Mongrol, and favorable plebiscite in
Junagarh left Pakistan high and dry. However, it continued to stick adamantly
to the claim on Kashmir, a Muslim majority buffer against India. Pakistan and
some of its British advisors were keen on accession of the Muslim ruled
jagirs of the kingdom of Kashmir, as these tracts provided natural geopolitical
depth to Pakistan and extended its borders to the adjoining tracts of Central
Asia, China and Afghanistan. The British Foreign Office considered these
mountainous tracts as vital to its geo-strategic interests and Cold War
imperatives.
Pakistan was well aware of the fact that the Maharaja of Kashmir was well
within his right to decide on accession to either India or Pakistan. His
indecisiveness was exploited by Pakistan, which launched the first proxy war
in 1947 by infiltrating the tribal laskars (volunteer soldiers) to the territory of
the Maharaja. General Akbar Khan (General Tariq) had later admitted in his
book that Pakistani political leaders and Army groups were responsible for
infiltrating the tribals and army contingents with a view to occupy the Muslim
majority State and expand its secured borders against India. The Indian
troops, it is alleged, did not pursue the fleeing Pakistani laskars and regular
troops beyond a certain limit under British pressure and because Sheikh
Abdullah did not have any political influence on the Kashmiris living beyond
the valley. The Indian army was capable of reoccupying the entire Kashmir
territory grabbed by Pakistan. However, Indian ambivalence had provided
Pakistan with strategic depth. The expanded border provided Pakistan with
highly strategic depth from easy reach of the Indian armed forces.
According to Hewitt, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, later a Chief Minister of
NWFP, had rallied the tribesmen and the mixed contingent was commanded
by Major General Tariq, a nom-de-plume adopted by General Akbar to hide
his identity, and the direct involvement of Pakistan Army. Pakistan has
continued to adopt this proxy war strategy through the war of 1965 and the
Kargil war of 1999.
Between 1947 and 1971 Pakistan’s intelligence edifices, the Intelligence
Bureau, Military Intelligence and the Inter Services Intelligence continued to
encourage the pro-Pakistan elements mostly headed by Jamait-e-Islami, a
fundamentalist organization which had its roots in India and Pakistan.
Between 1965 and 1970, the Jamait-e-Islami had set itself to the task of
converting the traditionally Sufi Kashmiri Muslims to Sunni Wahhabi and
Deobandi formats of Islam, which propagated non-compromising attitude
against the non-Muslim kafirs. In spite of being alerted in advance by the
intelligence agencies the governments in Delhi and Srinagar dithered to take
action against the planned spread of Wahhabi Islam in Jammu and Kashmir
by Pakistan funded Jamait-e-Islami. Madrassas operated by the Jamait had
started churning out Kashmiri ‘talibans’ long before Pakistan had invented the
‘taliban’ formula for Afghanistan.
 Kashmir is unique among all the crisis points along the Indo-Pakistan
border. Despite international pressure and domestic compulsions, Pakistan
continues to treat Kashmir as the “core issue.”
The primary reasons are the extent of the ideological commitment and self-
interests of several key players involved. For Islamabad, the liberation of
Kashmir is a sacred mission, the unfulfilled legacy left by Muhammad Ali
Jinnah. Moreover, a crisis in Kashmir constitutes an excellent outlet for the
frustration at home, an instrument for the mobilization of the masses, as well
as gaining the support of the Islamist parties and primarily their loyalists in
the military and the ISI. Continued demand for merger of the Muslim
majority area of India with Pakistan constitutes the fulcrum of ideological
framework of Pakistan, which was created for a ‘safe home for Indian
Muslims.’ This faith of the Pakistani Establishment keeps open the scope for
demanding other Muslim dominated areas of India as parts of Pakistan or
emergence of such areas as separate Muslim Homelands. According to some
Pakistan watchers, Islamic fundamentalism and jihad in Pakistan were deeply
rooted because of Pakistan’s Cold War partnership in Afghanistan and its
single-minded hunger for the territory of Kashmir.
The ISI has a major interest to pursue its offensive in Kashmir, as an
integral part of the national policy of Pakistan. Back in early eighties,
Pakistan started to train Sikhs and other Indian separatist movements as part
of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s strategy for forward offensive with a view to
punishing India for its alleged role in the dismemberment of East Pakistan.
Pakistan had adopted the tools of terrorism and subversion as an extension of
ideological and guerrilla warfare. Islamabad hoped that the terrorists trained
by it and Pakistani intelligence operatives in their ranks would be able to keep
India busy and warn Pakistan of any impending Indian invasion. That would
provide Pakistan many opportunities to launch guerrilla warfare against the
Indian Army, even before it reached the border with Pakistan. Therefore,
sponsoring separatist subversion has become a crucial component of
Islamabad’s national military strategy.
During the 1980s, the ISI had put in place a vast training and support
infrastructure for the Afghan resistance that was used for the training and
support of other regional groups. There was a corresponding ideological
development in Indian Kashmir. Coinciding with Pakistan’s involvement in
Afghanistan, the ISI operatives and Islamist tanzeems had started convincing
the Kashmiri youths that under Hindu occupation ‘Islam was in danger.’ The
ISI operatives sustained Pakistani propaganda and Pakistan’s spectacular
success in Afghanistan quickly indoctrinated a section of frustrated and
subverted youth. They started believing in the propaganda that if Pakistan
could humble mighty Russia it could easily force India to concede Kashmir.
This transformation was not brought about in a day. As stated in previous
paragraph the Jamait-e-Islami and other tanzeems had established over 370
madrassas that churned out fundamentalist elements. These rabid communal
elements of JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) recently recalled how
“in 1984 ISI were encouraged by the events in Pakistan and Afghanistan and
spectacular Pakistani success in promoting proxy war in Punjab.”
The timing of the change was not spontaneous. Pakistan made fervent
efforts through the ISI, Military Intelligence and pro-Pakistani elements to
catch young people from the Valley for training, so that they could carry out
jihad on return. The ISI had installed Amanullah Khan as the JKLF chief.
Amanullah Khan and some of his supporters started the present struggle in
Kashmir in league with the ISI. A man with common intelligence can
understand that any movement started in a Muslim majority area with the help
of Pakistani military intelligence (ISI) would eventually be given the tinge of
religious struggle. It did not strike Delhi that any Afghanistan type jihad
started in Jammu and Kashmir would lead to communal disaster. Pakistan was
keen to whip up communal offensive also with an intention of drawing
general Indian Muslim sympathy towards the ‘struggle of the Kashmiri
Muslims.’ By 1992, Amanullah proved that he was an agent of the ISI, having
sacrificed the nationalist liberation struggle in Kashmir at the altar of Islamist
politics.
Meanwhile, by the late-1980s, with the war in Afghanistan slowing down,
the vast network of training camps for Afghan mujahideen was transformed
by the ISI into a centre of Islamist terrorism throughout South Asia, as well as
the melting pot of the worldwide Islamist jihad. This transformation
concurred under an active ISI program to initiate full-fledged subversion in
Kashmir Valley that was still in the process of gathering momentum. At first,
the ISI’s assistance to the Kashmiri Islamists was funnelled through
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, thus providing Islamabad with an
instrument of deniability. However, alongside stoking the fire of insurgency in
Punjab the ISI was training small groups of Kashmiri youths in camps set up
in the Occupied Kashmir, Peshawar and Khowst. These volunteers were
pushed inside Indian Kashmir and were directed to set up networking in
collaboration with serving ISI officials who were located in the Indian side of
the Kashmir valley.
Islamabad increased its support for Islamist terrorism in Kashmir because
there were a genuine commitment to jihad among the Kashmiri terrorists and
international volunteers espousing their cause. This minority fringe dreamt of
mujahideen style sustained struggle against India with Pakistani, Al Qaeda al
Sulbah and broader Islamist support. Moreover, the ISI transformed its major
paramilitary command (trained street warriors of Islamist tanzeems) into a
major political force as a direct result of their increased support for terrorism
in India. Pakistan felt the need for formulating a new strategic approach to
coincide with its Afghan policy and experimentations in Punjab. President
Zia-ul-Haq had worked out the blueprint to use the ISI’s numerous tanzeems,
trained Kashmiri youths and Afghan forces, as well as an institutional
infrastructure in preserving the political influence that comes with such
operations. To achieve these objectives the Joint Intelligence North (JIN) of
the ISI was integrated with Joint Intelligence X and the Afghan Bureau for
maximizing the jihadist inputs.
Islamabad readily picked up the opportunity of severe discontent prevailing
among the Kashmiri youths after a series of political blunders was committed
by Delhi. It found out a task for the ISI’s vast Pakistani and Afghan cadres
previously involved in sponsoring jihad in Afghanistan. These trained
jihadists were no longer needed in Afghanistan, and Islamabad did not want
them to get involved in sectarian feud with the Shias and Ahmedias and in
domestic politics. These strategic calculations of Pakistan, however, had not
influenced the Kashmir policy of Delhi. It was busy with Punjab, internal
political skullduggery, a government sinking under the burden of scandals and
insensitivity of the political and intelligence community. Indeed, Pakistan
took advantage of these factors and gradually escalated terrorism and
subversion in Kashmir since the early 1990s as a part of the ISI’s
implementation of a long-term objective.
Amongst the other Islamic countries, Iran considered an escalation in the
jihad for the liberation of Kashmir a key for the assertion of strategic
prominence of the Tehran-led Islamic Bloc, as well as a demonstration of its
regional power position. In order to expedite the implementation, the Iranians
utilised a sacred mission that is, liberating the area of Ayatollah Khomeyni’s
roots, as a rallying point. The extent of agitation and indoctrination of Iranian,
Afghan, Kashmiri, Indian/Pakistani and other volunteers in the Special Forces
and terrorist training camps in Iran made it impossible to distinguish between
jihad and state policy of Pakistan and to a lesser degree Iran.
Similarly, the Armed Islamic Movement (AIM), as well as several Saudis,
Gulf Arabs, and other supporters of Islamist causes, had put Kashmir high on
their list of jihads to be fought on different frontiers. Indeed, Kashmir was
mentioned in lists of sacred goals to be achieved in Israel (HAMAS), Algeria
(FIS), Sudan, Egypt, to name but a few examples. Kashmir was a high
priority objective because of the firm belief in the possibility of success. It
was an easy campaign to wage for logistical considerations because of the
presence of numerous cadres and large weapon stockpiles in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. AIM’s operations were closely coordinated in Tehran and
Khartoum, from where financial assistance flowed to the jihadis using
Pakistan as a springboard. However, Indian diplomatic, intelligence and
political machineries had failed the country in formulating a comprehensive
policy against these new thrust areas.
All of these states and organizations have large, highly trained and well-
equipped forces. Virtually all of these forces were not committed to the
Kashmiri jihad. Another reason that halted International Islamic Jihad in
Kashmir was Pakistan’s concern about its own geopolitical interests. The
Pakistani authorities, for fear of Indian retaliation, slowed down the attempt
for total ideological conversion and mobilization, in 1992. Moreover,
Islamabad did not want any other agency, not even the Al Qaeda al Sulbah to
interfere in the Kashmir jihad. It was not ready to accept Iran’s role amongst
the Kashmiri Shias. Direct Arab involvement, Pakistan thought, would invite
international intervention on behalf of India. For it, the ISI and tanzeems
created by the State were the sole implementing agencies, as Pakistan’s
objective was to grab the Muslim majority area for itself and not allow it to
become the playground of international Islamic intrigues.
Pakistan expanded its operations to sponsor and promote separatism and
terrorism, primarily in Kashmir, as a strategic long-term programme. Among
the most crucial activities of the ISI were to propagate religious
fundamentalism in small but lethal doses and train and indoctrinate selected
leaders from Kashmir, where people were more influenced by Sufi tariqas
and cherished the principle of Kashmiriyat (Kashmiri culture) to create
jihadist cadres. A large number of youths from Kashmir Valley and Poonch
district in Jammu region were given extensive training in the use of automatic
weapons, sabotage and attacks on security forces in camps established by the
ISI and tanzeems floated by Jamait-e-Islami, Jamait-ul-Ulema-Islami,
Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e- Tayeba
and such other Jihadist organizations.
Automatic weapons and explosives were issued to them. According to
intelligence reports, special teams were trained by the ISI to organize
agitations, hartals (shut downs), and engineer incidents to damage the secular
and democratic image of India. In the accretion of Islamic jihad in India,
Islamabad found a task for Pakistani and Afghani cadres that the ISI, CIA and
Al Qaeda al Sulbah had trained during the Afghan war. To secure the goal,
Brig (Retd) Imtiaz, head of the ISI political section, had developed a long-
term programme called K2. The escalation of terrorism since 1990’s is
believed to have been a direct outgrowth of the implementation of the K-2
operation. Extent of the growing state support for terrorism and insurgency in
Kashmir is clearly reflected in the evolution of the various organizations
operating there. By 1990, there were over 30 militant groups in Kashmir and
29 of these were receiving assistance and shelter in Pakistan.
Prior to the 1965 war, the Valley was rocked by the incident of
disappearance of Hazrat Bal (relic of the Prophet) around 1963 end. There is
no evidence to link Pakistan with the incident of disappearance. The feuding
political leaders and their anti-social surrogates had generated the volatile
incident in collaboration with Pakistani advisors. However, Pakistan took
advantage of the situation by infiltrating a number of intelligence agents with
a view to instigating the cleric and Muslim population of the valley.
Some scholars have asserted that Pakistan had started directly intervening
in Kashmir from 1970, before the war in East Pakistan.
By 1970, Pakistan had trained a number of Kashmiri youths in acts of
sabotage and subversion. “It was the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane by
two Al-Fatah activists in early 1971 to help gain the release of two of their
associates held in a Kashmir jail that signaled the start of terrorism there. The
militant movement resulted in crystallizing the attitudes of groups of people
towards a religious ideology, pushing the nationalistic component of the
Kashmir identity into phase of dormancy. The new ideology perceives of an
Islamic state stretching from Kashmir and covering Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Iran, and Central Asia.” Turkkaya Ataov, Kashmir and Neighbours, p125.
It is relevant to note that the Indian Airlines flight Ganga from Srinagar to
Jammu was hijacked in early 1971 by pistol and grenade wielding Kashmiri
youth belonging to Al-Fatah. The aircraft was allowed to land in Lahore and a
hijacker had set fire to the aircraft at the tarmac. Thousands of Pakistanis
were allowed to greet the hijackers and Z.A. Bhutto had also embraced the
two hijackers. The incident had led to the banning of over- flights by India
and Pakistan, which later aided India during 1971 war with Pakistan.
However, Pakistan blamed India for staging the hijacking incident as an
integral part of its designs in East Pakistan. It is acknowledged by the
intelligence community that the Inter Services Intelligence had started
engineering the violent events in Kashmir through its Joint Intelligence North
division, which was staffed by specialist army officers. There is ample
intelligence evidence that the hijackers were trained by Srinagar based ISI
operatives and the military regime in Pakistan had encouraged them to
perpetrate the crime.
The Jamait-e-Islami and other fundamentalist outfits received financial and
policy guidance from the ISI. The post-Iran revolution Islamic jihad spirit had
also gripped the psyche of the Pakistani and Kashmiri fundamentalists who
had started graduating out of the JeI-run madrassas and similar institutions in
Pak-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan mainland. Bangladesh war and
demolition of the religion based two-nation theory that sustains Pakistan’s
ideological base had hardened the attitude of the regime of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto. The ISI was used by Bhutto to stir up rebellion amongst a section of
the Kashmiri youths owing allegiance to Muslim Conference, Jamait-e-
Islami, Ahl-e-Hadis and JKLF, etc organizations. They were encouraged to
send volunteers to Pakistan occupied Kashmir for undergoing training in
sabotage and subversion and in the use of arms and explosives. Likewise, the
ISI was used in the western front to subdue the Balochistan revolt. Though a
Sindhi himself, Bhutto did not dither in using the ISI and IB to muffle the
voices of the progressive elements in Sind itself.
Bhutto had also taken advantage of the existing political situation in Indian
Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah, the trusted egg-basket of Congress government,
had started displaying signs of equivocalness in his public utterances and
policy decisions in respect of relationship with India and Pakistan. He and
Mirza Afzal Beg were in Delhi in the beginning of 1971 to meet the Pakistani
ambassador. The Plebiscite Front, Abdullah’s political platform, had come
under cloud for activities prejudicial to the constitutional and legal status of
the accession of Kashmir to India.
Intelligence reports had substantiated the links between the Plebiscite Front
and Al-Fatah, a militant organization floated at the behest of the Inter
Services Intelligence in 1968 with the avowed objective of destabilizing the
State of J&K. Mounting proof of collaboration between the ISI and the
Plebiscite Front and the Al-Fatah had resulted in the declaration of Zafar
Iqbal Rathore, a Delhi based Pakistani diplomat, as persona non grata.
Syed Mir Qasim of the Indian National Congress had achieved resounding
victory in the 1972 State assembly elections, following Pakistan’s ignoble
defeat in Bangladesh and balkanization of the country. By early 1973
restraints on Abdullah and associates were lifted and course of events through
1973 and 1775 proved beyond doubt that Z.A. Bhutto was eager to exploit
any situation in J&K that signified pro-Pakistan activities of a section of the
people inspired by the JeI and the ISI. Indira Gandhi, who had pursued the
policy of greater integration of Kashmir with the rest of the Indian system (a
highly controversial policy decision), had realized that her party was not
capable of managing the political process in Kashmir and she required the
charisma and personality of Sheikh Abdullah to tackle the situation, thus, the
1975 Indira-Abdullah accord, signed in the wake of the earthshaking JP
movement and overall political disturbances all over India, did not prove to be
a positive achievement.
 Even before he was toppled by Zia-ul-Haq, Bhutto had initiated the process
of activating the ISI in Kashmir. The imposition of Internal Emergency and
withdrawal of support by the Congress legislators to Sheikh Abdullah
ministry had aggravated the sentiments of the people, who perceived it as an
Indian design to revert to the ‘integration’ process initiated by Indira Gandhi
earlier.
The military coup by Zia-ul-Haq and developments in Afghanistan had
changed the entire geopolitical texture of the subcontinent. Zia-ul-Haq, a
political pariah, and Pakistan, an isolated country, was picked up by the USA
for fighting its war in Afghanistan. Zia also had initiated the process of
Islamisation of Pakistan. His tenure was marked by the growth of the ISI as a
strong tool of the State Establishment, which was used to patronize the
mullahs, madrassas and mujahideen. These new road warriors of Pakistan
were supposed to carry out ‘free world’s’ mission inside Afghanistan against
the Soviet forces and simultaneously to enhance the orbit of interference and
proxy war inside India.
Delhi had not taken full cognizance of the fact of Pakistan’s emerging
feature as an Islamist state. India’s Afghan policy was also punctuated by
indecisiveness. New Delhi had failed during the crucial stage between 1977
and 1979 to exploit the foreign relations imperatives of Pakistan, which were
marked by closer ties between Washington, London, Paris, Riyadh, Beijing
and Islamabad. After returning to power in 1980, Indira Gandhi pursued a
policy of confrontation with Sheikh Abdullah and Farooq Abdullah.
By mid 1988, even before Benazir Bhutto assumed power, proxy war in
Kashmir was activated by Pakistan in a planned manner. There were bomb
blasts in Jammu and Srinagar. The rebel elements had hoisted Pakistani flag
on 14th August to mark its Independence Day anniversary. Next day a slogan-
shouting mob tried to set fire to the Rishi Pir temple. By 25th August same
year about ten people were killed in riots engineered by pro-Pakistan
elements. The bombing of a bus and death of Eijaz Ahmad Dar, a terrorist, in
police custody had sparked off renewed violence. A bus explosion in
September 1988 killed 11 persons. By early 1989, Pakistan under an elected
government expanded its operations inside Indian Kashmir alongside the
escalated violence in Punjab.
Pakistan trained terrorists, aided and abetted by ISI operatives, some of
them low ranking officials, pushed up the degree of violence by taking
advantage of poor political management and haphazard responses by the law
and order enforcing agencies. On July 13, 1989, terrorists ambushed a CRPF
vehicle killing two and injuring fourteen. While the credit was claimed by the
JKLF, another terrorist outfit Hizbullah Islamia Jamhooria warned the
wavering Kashmiris with dire consequences if they collaborated with the
government of India.
The policy of establishing ‘mass control’ on the defenseless people of
Kashmir and neutralizing the government machineries by Pakistan trained
terrorists included women targets who were directed to strictly follow the
Islamic dress code of putting on burqa. A ladies’ toilet was bombed in
Srinagar and two women were attacked with acid for flouting the
fundamentalist dictates. This was followed up by the dramatic events of
hijacking and blowing up of a transport bus at Tanmarg on August 17, 1989.
In fact, in the second half of August more than 50 persons were injured in
violent incidents perpetrated by the terrorists. Muhammad Yusuf Halwai was
assassinated in Srinagar and the residence of Shafi Muhammad Qureshi,
President, Congress Party J&K, was blown up by explosion. In all
seriousness, soon after the inauguration of Benazir government the ISI had
infiltrated four serving officers including one Capt Manjur for guiding the ill-
organized Kashmiri youths. About 50 youth were exfiltrated into Pak-
occupied Kashmir and were trained in camps run by the ISI. This batch of
Kashmiri youths was also trained at the Khowst camp of the Afghan
Mujahideen to bolster up their jihadist camaraderie. According to the Times of
India (August 2 1988), their activities were bolstered up by pro-Pakistani
speeches of the Mirwaiz, considered to be the spiritual leader of the Kashmiri
people.
The policy of drift adopted by V.P. Singh government had emboldened the
terrorists, and they assassinated Tikka Lal Taploo, Vice-President of the
Bharatiya Janata Party. Several police parties were attacked with hand
grenades and intelligence officers were targeted. These violent incidents were
followed by the assassination (November 4) of N. K. Ganjoo, the judge who
had awarded death sentence to Maqbool Bhatt. Over 50 explosions rocked the
Kashmir valley. The most daring action of kidnapping Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed,
daughter of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, Union Home Minister, proved that the
governments in Delhi and Srinagar were not equipped to handle the situation.
The militants demanded release of 5 of their colleagues. According to Dawn
newspaper of Pakistan, it was a bluff, which Delhi had failed to call. The
government of Delhi succumbed to the pressure.
Taking advantage of the knee-jerk reaction of Delhi the ISI agent
provocateurs and the Kashmiri militants escalated the scale of violence and
committed several bank robberies, attacked policemen and killed a couple of
central intelligence personnel. All these had devastating effect on the
situation. The police and intelligence machineries had grounded to a halt.
Intelligence generation was severely impeded. Out of utter helplessness, Delhi
replaced the Governor and reappointed Jagmohan, who enjoyed a ‘tough guy’
image and true to his image, he managed to generate a situation in which the
elected government of Dr. Farooq Abdullah was dismissed. It had demolished
the political buffer between Delhi and the militants and the central
government was presented with the only choice of tough military action- a
choice that strengthened the hands of the Pakistani planners and their
surrogates in the valley. To top the whirlwind of violence, 17 civilians were
killed in Army firing in March 1990. The peace doves amongst the militants
were intimidated by the hanging of Mir Mustafa, who had seen through the
charade of Pakistani deceit and had initiated the process of talks with the
government.
By 1990, Pakistan sponsored a well-orchestrated programme to root out the
Pundit population of the valley. Sustained violence against them and
helplessness of the state and central administration to protect them generated
a unique situation in which the Hindu population in the Kashmir valley was
hounded out. Pakistan had supported the plan with a view to achieving
absolute majority status for the valley Muslims and for destroying the social
bondage of Kashmiriyat (Kashmiri culture) between the Hindu and Muslim
population. It reminded some observers of the infamous Dixon Plan for
Kashmir that envisaged penny pocket majority area wise plebiscite to
determine the geopolitical status of Jammu and Kashmir. It is surprising that
President Pervez Musharraf has again come out in 2004 with a modified
variant of the Dixon Plan that advocated communal award, obviously in
favour of Pakistan.
In order to escalate their Islamist Jihad, the ISI had started patronizing in
the early 1990s the Markaz-al-Dawa-al Irshad, a centre for promoting
international Islamist activities. Maulavi Zaki, the centre’s spiritual leader,
told the trainees that their destiny was to fight and liberate “the land of Allah
from infidels” wherever they might be. The commanders and instructors were
Armed Islamic Movement members, primarily Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen from
Algeria, Sudan and Egypt. Most of them had fought for more than a decade in
Afghanistan. A good number of Kashmiri youths from India were trained in
this organization and they were baptized to the concept of worldwide
terrorism mission of the jihadists.
By 1990, Pakistan had floated several other terrorist organizations besides
patronising the JKLF. Some of the frontal ISI outfits were Ansar-ul-Islam, Al-
Fatah, Hijb-ul Mujahideen and Al-Harmazah. By mid 1990 there were over
40 terrorist outfits in Kashmir. Pakistan encouraged the multiplication of
militant forces with a view to preventing possible sabotage of any particular
group by India and growth of peace bug in some others. If one group was
contaminated it was supplemented by a loyalist one. After resounding success
in Afghanistan Pakistan had given up the pretension of supporting the
“independence” group headed by a faction of the JKLF. Some outfits like the
People’s League, patronized by Pakistan demanded outright merger of
Kashmir with Pakistan.
The ISI had floated numerous jihadist tanzeems, some of which were
actively involved in fighting in Afghanistan alongside the Hizb-e-Islami and
Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Some tanzeems were floated by Markaz-al-Dawa-al-
Irshad, Jamait-e-Islami and Jammat-ul-Ulema-i-Islami etc organizations.
However, these tanzeems functioned under the overall supervision of the ISI
and Pak MI. Some of the tanzeems are:
Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad (changed to Markaz ud Dawa)
Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) changed to Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HUM)
Hijb-ul-Mujahideen, (HUM)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM)
Lashkar-e-Tayeba (LET)
Dukhtaran-e-Millat
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
Al Umar Mujahideen
Jamait-e-Mujahideen
Lashkar-e-Omar
Tehrik al Mujahideen
Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front
All Party Hurriyat Conference
Muttahida Jihad Council
Al Barq
Al Badr
Al Jihad
J&K National Liberation Army
Muslim Janbaz Force
Kashmir Jihad Force
Mahaz-e-Azadi
 Jamait-e-Taluba
Ikhwan-ul-Mujahideen
Al Mustafa Liberation Fighters
Tehrik-e-Jihad-e-Islami
Most active militant forces include HUA, HUM, JEM and LET. Some of
the terrorist outfits keep on changing names with a view to fox the Indian
security forces and as a part of policy tactics for gaining affiliation to one or
the other Pakistani terrorist tanzeems.
In Afghanistan Pakistan mainly supported the Hizb-e-Islami group of
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with the hope that the fanatic Islamist group, once
installed in Kabul, would serve Pakistani interests. In contrast, Pakistan did
not choose any particular organization to spread mayhem and terror in
Kashmir. The reasons are not far too seek: Pakistan could not identify any
single Kashmiri group that believed in Wahhabi tenets as blindly the Sunni
Pakistanis did. Most of the fighters were of Pakistani origin with fringe
participation by Indian Kashmiris. Most of the terrorists were hired on wage-
package basis and a large number of mercenaries were hired from amongst
the ‘Afghan Arabs.’ The valley was on fire, but the torch of flame was carried
by the ISI and Pakistani tanzeems trained by it.
Pakistan was and is engaged in a low quantum proxy war in Kashmir and
wants to keep the issue alive for misdirecting the home crowd from the real
problems of the country. It also wants to get the world powers, especially its
ally, the USA, involved in the historical imbroglio with a view to deriving
strategic mileage. Being a nuclear power, Pakistan often flaunts the Kashmir
issue as the ‘nuclear flashpoint’ in South Asia.
The ISI planners and the military rulers are of the view that to keep
Kashmir issue alive they would require support of fringe Kashmiri (Indian)
groups and draw bulk support from the jihadist tanzeems. The show of
crackdown on the jihadists is mainly directed at preserving the pro-American
President and his inner coterie and to appease the USA, which continues to
pursue a policy of “occupation and control” of the Islamist regimes in the
Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan’s peace overture towards India is not
linked to the jihad in Kashmir, which continues to be the “core issue of
dispute.” Therefore, Pakistan continues to run training facilities for the
Kashmir jihadists.
Some of the illustrative prominent training bases of the Islamist forces are
located at:
1. Islamic University, Peshawar, a Pan-Islamic Institute on
 the model of Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in the former
USSR.
2. Binori Town Mosque, New Town District, Central
Karachi, mainly training the Taliban for Afghanistan and
India.
3. Camps located in the suburbs of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
Destroyed by the US bombing.
4. Khunar Valley camps, Afghanistan. Destroyed by the US
bombing.
5. Badr 1 and Badr 2 camps near Khowst, Afghanistan (also
used by Al Qaeda al Sulbah). Presumed to be destroyed by the US
bombing.
6. Pabi Camp near Jallozai, Peshawar, Pakistan.
7. Warshak Institute, near Peshawar, Pakistan.
8. Miran Shah camp, near Peshawar, Pakistan.
9. Saada camp, near Peshawar, Pakistan.
10. Muzaffarabad, Jalkot, Biarai, Cherat camps in Pak
Occupied Kashmir.
11. Pasrur, Lahore, Kasur, Changa Manga (reportedly scaled
down as Punjab thrust has been pushed to the back-
burner).
12. Muridke camp of the Markaz-al-Dawa- al-Irshad and
affiliated groups.
Besides Pakistani and Indian youths, jihadists are recruited from amongst
the foreign volunteers. All of them are trained in about 40 camps in Occupied
Kashmir, 30 odd camps in Pakistan and previously in about 22 camps in
Afghanistan. The Afghan link has been disrupted after the fall of the Taliban
government. According to Indian defense sources about 700 Pakistani youths,
1020 foreign mercenaries have been killed in action so far. About 400 Indian
Kashmiri youths also lost their lives while engaged in terrorist actions.
It is not mandatory for the ISI to train all the Pakistani, Indian Kashmiri
youths and foreign mercenaries in camps run by them. More than 5000
madrassas in Punjab, Sind and NWFP operated by the Jamait-e-Islami,
Jammat-ul-Ulema-I-Islami, Markaz etc. organizations churn out militants
after picking them up for religious and jihadist training from impoverished
families. Some of these youths are indoctrinated by the madrassas to take up
jihad against India as a holy Islamic duty. They are also given a compensation
package, depending on individual expertise and efficiency. A minister in
Nawaz Sharif government had even visited a Markaz run training facility for
witnessing the training programme. Foreign media had extensively covered
the visit. A serving minister in Pervez Musharraf regime has been listed as an
organizer of terrorist training camps in PoK.
According to Indian agencies the trainees are given following lessons:
• Introduction to AK-47 rifles, Chinese pistols, rocket
launchers/LMGs and explosives. Art of ambushes with minimum firing
practice on AK-47 Rifles and pistols plus live demonstration of
explosives;
• Lectures and practical demonstrations in concealment,
camouflage, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering;
• Training in sabotage and subversive operations;
• High altitude survival and fighting courses; and
• Indoctrination for jihad against jahiliya India through
lectures and video films.
This is followed by extended training course for eligible
trainees for about 10/12 weeks. The following training programmes are
pursued:
• Handling of sophisticated/heavy weapons including rocket
launchers, MMGs/LMGs, AK-47/56/74’s, MI/sniper rifles, mortars,
remote control devices anti-personnel/tank mines and explosives,
including IEDs;
• Finer aspects of ambushes/raids, operation of walkie-talkie
sets;
• Use of anti-aircraft guns and HMGs;
• Rock climbing/mountaineering, jungle survival, mock
exercise for border crossing;
• First aid/para-medical training; and
• Audio-visual education on commando operations.
After initial arms training, some terrorists are imparted wireless
communication training (Morse and computer-based data mode) for ensuring
direct link of terrorists with Pakistan authorities. Specialised training in new
weapons including SVD, Dragonov sniper rifles; 12.7 mm HMGs and 82mm
are imparted.
 In selected cases, training programmes have been streamlined and extended
to periods ranging from six months to one year. Emphasis is being laid on
building up tough physical standards and development of leadership qualities.
Educated youths, preferably with technical/science background and affiliated
to pro-Pak groups, are being selected for specialised and prolonged training.
Before we elaborate the developments inside Kashmir, we must look back
at the manufacturing lines of Islamic terrorism inside Pakistan and
Afghanistan, because these factories as well as the factory of Al Qaeda al
Sulbah have produced the Islamist jihadists to wage war against Kafir nations
including India.
The madrassas in Peshawar, Karachi, Muridke, Attock and other places in
Pakistan and Khowst in Afghanistan had become the breeding grounds of
Taliban and mujahideen. Over 35, 000 volunteers from Pakistan, Afghanistan,
India and other Islamic countries were trained alongside some Arab trainers.
In early 1992, world attention was drawn to the presence of Mujahideen in
Peshawar area. Some of the Afghan veterans (Afghan Arabs) were transferred
to Azad Kashmir where the Pakistani Army built new camps for them. By
early 1993, there were over 1,000 ‘Afghan’ Mujahideen in the Markaz-al-
Dawa-al-Irshad alone. Following the completion of advance training, they
were sent to Kashmir, Algeria and Egypt. The ISI also deputed some of the
Afghan Arabs, in consonance with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Taliban to
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Since mid-1993, the main offices of the Islamist terrorist organizations
have functioned from Peshawar alongside the Al Qaeda al Sulbah camps. At
one point of time Osama bin laden had included Kashmir as a target of
Islamic war. Some units of Al Qaeda (Brigade 055) had operated in Kashmir
for a brief period. Coinciding this Arab, Afghan and Uzbek mercenaries were
pushed in Kashmir by the ISI.
In the summer of 1993, the ISI had under its command another force of
some 200 Afghans belonging to Jallalluddin Haqqani’s people from the
Khowst area, which operated under direct ISI command. They were
earmarked for special operations in Kashmir. According to Muhammad Fazal
al-Hajj, a PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) terrorist
captured in southern Kashmir in the summer of 1993, additional Afghan
Arabs were being prepared by the ISI for the forthcoming escalation. At least
400 ‘Afghans’ and other foreigners were either killed or arrested by the Indian
security forces.
Pakistan had devised lucrative packages for the Arab and other
mercenaries. Some of them were given 20,000 to 50,000 US dollars
depending on the tasks carried out by them under the guidance of the ISI. The
fidayeen dastas (suicide contingents) were paid between 100,000 to 200,000
US dollars.
The ISI felt the need for inducting the Arab and other mercenaries as the
Kashmir youths gradually came to understand that Pakistan was not interested
in the azadi (independence) of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan knew very well
that it could not grab Kashmir by waging three and a half wars between 1947
and 1971. Its attempt to grab areas of Kashmir in a limited war in 1999 was
also frustrated. Pakistan army was also aware that it could not grab Kashmir
by waging proxy war at the cost of lives of innocent Kashmiris and
impoverished Pakistani youths. On the other hand, Pakistan’s preoccupation
was comparatively free in Afghanistan. The USA grudgingly agreed to the
installation of the Taliban government in Kabul. Pakistan was compelled to
substitute the Kashmiri youths by deputing Pakistani and Afghan Arab jihadis
into Indian Kashmir. They came in trickles for the love of money and kept up
the pressure of terrorism up to 2000. These volunteers along with the suicide
squads carried out some spectacular attacks in Kashmir, Delhi, Gujarat and
other places.
Pakistan was obliged to cooperate with the USA after the devastating attack
by Al Qaeda al Sulbah on the US targets on September 11, 2001, and the US
declaration of war against terrorism. It hurriedly withdrew the ISI sponsored
Pakistani tanzeem members and the Afghan Arabs. They were accommodated
in Occupied Kashmir and in camps located at Nashri, Lohar, Kot Jamal,
Sensa, Khureta, Rawalkot and Lanjot, etc. Over 2000 Lashkar-e-Tayeba, 700
Jaish-e-Mohammad and about 200 Hijb-ul-Mujahideen jihadists were pushed
into Indian Kashmir along with 1500-2000 Afghan Arabs. It may be
mentioned that the 055 Brigade, the Al Qaeda al Sulbah Unit that functioned
inside Afghanistan during jihad against the communist regime, had also
deputed about 200 mixed foreign terrorists to fight inside Indian Kashmir.
The bill was picked up by the ISI. Indian army and intelligence sources have
confirmed the ‘death and capture’ of scores of the members of the 055
Brigade of Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Documents left by the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the Taliban after the US
strike in Afghanistan had revealed that Al Qaeda al Sulbah had trained a
number of Kashmir terrorists, along with terrorists from Indonesia, the
Philippines, Uzbekistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. (Washington Post-Nov 2001)
The Kashmiri terrorists, especially the tanzeem members from Pakistan were
trained in the use of high explosives and advised to target important Hindu
targets.
“Islamic militants with ties to Al Qaeda al Sulbah and possibly directed by
Al Qaeda al Sulbah leaders are operating in the disputed territory of Kashmir,
intelligence officials and analysts say, in what may be an effort to provoke a
war between India and Pakistan.” Liz Sly and Michael Kilian, Chicago
Tribune, May 29, 2002.
Philip Smucker, a US journalist, had extensively travelled across Pakistan
occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Skardu area in mid-2002 to study the reported
influx of Al Qaeda al Sulbah terrorists in safer havens in Pakistan
He wrote: “A week-long investigation uncovered evidence that Al Qaeda al
Sulbah and an array of militant affiliate groups (Pakistani tanzeems) are
prospering inside Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, with the tacit approval of
Pakistani intelligence (ISI). The evidence comes after recent statements by the
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that he had ‘seen indications that
there are Al Qaeda al Sulbah operating near the [UN] Line of Control’ that
separates Indian and Pakistani Kashmir, but that he had no hard evidence on
numbers or location…Senior officials in Pakistan called Mr. Rumsfeld’s
statements inaccurate and stressed that he had no real evidence. But the
Pakistani military, which has begun to chase stray Al Qaeda al Sulbah
elements in its tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, has been unwilling to crack
down in Kashmir on Islamic militant groups that it has been pledging to
eradicate since January…The group now operates with impunity in this
remote part of northern Kashmir. Fighters for several like-minded Pakistani
‘jihad’ groups stream up and down a road leading to the Line of Control near
Kupwara.” Philip Smucker, Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 2002.
These evidences add up to the estimates made by the Indian security forces
and intelligence community that Pakistan had secreted the Al Qaeda al Sulbah
and a large contingent of terrorists manufactured in the ISI and tanzeem
factories in areas closer to Indian borders and some of them were pushed
inside India for carrying out terrorist activities. Besides the serving ISI,
officials and the officers of Military Intelligence, Pakistan government used
the services of some retired ISI/Army officers in relocating and redeploying
the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and tanzeem terrorists nearer to Indian border and in
other safer places in Pakistan. Some of these officers are: Lt. Gen. Hamid
Gul, Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, Lt. Gen. Naseem Rana, former Pakistani High
Commissioner to Malaysia, and Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed. Lt. Gen. Nasir
and Lt. Gen. Rana were active members of the Tabligh-i- Jamaat (TJ)
Pakistan even during their active service.
Pakistan’s collaboration with Al Qaeda has been proved by the evidence of
killing of Osama in Abbotabad, near Islamabad by US Navy Seals. Osama
was living in Pakistan from 2002-3 with his entire baggage of family and
close aides.
In one of the most detailed accounts of Osama bin Laden’s life after the
September 11 attacks, his youngest wife has told Pakistani investigators that
the al-Qaeda leader lived in five safe houses as he travelled across Pakistan
with his family for nine years following the 9/11 attacks and fathered four
children when he was on the run.
The detailed account of bin Laden’s life on the run has been given by his
30-year-old wife Amal Ahmad Abdul Fateh, and is contained in a police
report dated January 19.
The report contains the testimony given by Osama’s young widow during
interrogation by a joint investigation team (JIT) comprising civilian and
military officials and was first reported by the Pakistani newspaper Dawn.
Amal Abdulfattah’s account provides rare details of the Al-Qaeda
leader’s life from when he fled Afghanistan in late 2001 until his death last
May during a US Navy Seal operation in Abbotabad, in Pakistan.
Bin Laden was 54 years old when he was killed in May 2011 by US
Navy SEAL commandos in Pakistan. According to the report, Fateh said she
agreed to marry bin Laden in 2000 because “she had a desire of marrying a
mujahid.”
In July 2000, she came to Karachi and months later crossed into
Afghanistan to join her husband and his two other wives at his base on a
farm outside Kandahar.
“The September 11 attacks caused the Bin Laden family to scatter,” the New
York Times reported. Fateh returned to Karachi with her newborn daughter
Safia and stayed there for about nine months during which she shifted
between seven houses arranged by “some Pakistani family” and bin Laden’s
elder son, Saad.
She then left Karachi in the second half of 2002 for Peshawar, where
she was reunited with her husband. At that time, the American pursuit of bin
Laden was running high since Qaeda operatives had attacked an Israeli-
owned hotel in Kenya and nightclubs in Indonesia.
The search was firmly focused on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
area. Fateh told investigators that Bin Laden took his family deep into rural
mountain areas of northwest Pakistan and not into the tribal belt where much
of the Western attention was focused.
They first stayed in the Shangla district in Swat, about 80 miles
northwest of Islamabad, living in two different houses for eight to nine
months.
In 2003 they moved to Haripur, a small town closer to Islamabad,
where they stayed in a rented house for two years. It was in Haripur that
Fateh gave birth to a girl, Aasia, in 2003 and a boy, Ibrahim, in 2004 — both
of whom were delivered in a local government hospital.
The police report states that Fateh “stayed in hospital for a very short time of
about 2-3 hours” on each occasion while a separate document states that she
gave fake identity papers to hospital staff, the New York Times report said.
Finally in mid-2005 bin Laden and his family moved to Abbotabad, where
she gave birth to two more children Zainab in 2006 and Hussain in 2008.
Fateh told investigators that the houses in Swat, Haripur and
Abbotabad were organised by their Pakhtun hosts, identified as two brothers
named Ibrahim and Abrar, whose families stayed with them throughout.
Ibrahim is believed to refer to Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, a Pakistani-born
Pashtun who grew up in Kuwait and who was known for a time to American
intelligence as ‘the courier’, because he carried the Qaeda leader’s messages.
During the raid by the Navy SEAL commandos, Fateh, who was in the
same room as the Qaeda leader, was shot in the leg. She survived but four
others were killed in the raid: the courier, his wife Bushra, his brother Abrar,
and bin Laden’s 20-year-old son, Khalil.
Though Pakistani leaders deny the Abbotabad house for Osama was built
by the ISI and Osama and his Al Qaeda cadres were protected by Pakistan.

Muridke based Lashkar-e-Tayeba headquarters (built with Saudi patronage),
had also deployed its cadres to arrange safe houses for Al Qaeda al Sulbah
and Taliban terrorists and to work as their guides inside Indian Kashmir.
After Pakistan realized that it had failed in winning the hearts of Kashmiri
youths it inducted a large number of mercenaries and Pakistani tanzeem
trained terrorists with a view to terrorize the Hindus and Sikhs of Jammu area
and make them flee the state. The objective was simple. Pakistan wanted to
make Jammu, Rajouri, Udhampur and Punch Muslim majority areas and press
for a Dixon formula type solution with the backing of the USA and its allies
in Afghan and Iraq wars. Fortunately the Kashmiris in particular and India in
general refused to be trapped by the new ploy of Pakistan, despite attack on
Indian Parliament, a major Hindu temple in Gujarat and repeated attacks on
Hindu temples in Jammu. Had Pakistan succeeded in its sinister ploy Pervez
Musharraf could have gone whole hog to press the USA and UN for
implementation of his new Dixon formula.
Pakistan has offered more than 8000 Indian Kashmiri lives, both terrorists
and civilians, and over 5000 Pakistani and mercenary lives at the altar of its
sinister plan. From the days of Zial-ul-Haq to Pervez Musharraf Pakistan has
continued the policy of waging jihad against India. Continued military rule
and proxy civilian rule have compelled Pakistan to keep the nation in ferment
and divided by foisting on the people the slogans of jihad against India and by
exporting jihadists, in collaboration with Al Qaeda al Sulbah, Islamic
Brotherhood and similar other movements in other parts of the world.
However, terrorist sources in Pakistan have admitted some of their ranks
being ‘martyred’ in Indian Kashmir. A list of over 700 ‘martyrs’ has often
been flashed in terrorist websites. Some of the names are:
• Manzoor Bhai (Rawalkot),
• Dawood Bhai (Azad Kashmir)
• Nazir Kansour alias Assadulla
• Akbar Bhai (Afghanistan)
• Umar Gazi (Saudi Arabia)
• Khalid Bhai
• Basharat Abbas (Azad Kashmir)
• Utta-ul-Rehman (Dir)
• Basharat Abbas (Azad Kashmir)
• Abid alias Akhtar (Rahimyar Khan)
• Sikander Hayat (Faisalabad)
• Mohmeer Khan (Karachi)
• Rehman Khan (Bardo)
• Zulfikar Munshi (Sargodha)
• Zulfikar Ahmed (Gujrat)
• Umer Niyazi (Gujranwala)
• Tariq Mahmood (Lahore)
• Zafar Bhai (Gujranwala)
• Amir Bhai (Dir)
• Gazi Yousuf (Lahore)
The honours’ role maintained by the Pakistani tanzeems, according to
Shehzad Mohammad, a Pakistani journalist, includes names of over 7000
Pakistani youths.
 Apprehension of the following ISI officials in India has firmly established
that the Pakistani agency is fully involved in promoting terrorism in Kashmir.
• Amjad Ali, and Mahfooz Ali, both ISI trained Pakistan
nationals were arrested in Delhi on March 4, 1994
• Maj. Sohail Ahmed, PA No. 16742
• Capt. Aftab Hussain Shah, PSS 21961
• N/Sub. Mustaq Ahmed, No. 155492
• Sep/Driver Fateh Mohd., No. 3231138
The list is illustrative since this book does not aim at chronicling of
individual roles played by ISI officers. The above goes to prove that the ISI
had even deputed its own officers to take part in jihad in Kashmir and other
places in India.
Retired Major Ehsan-ul-Haq sent military commander of a Lahore-based
militant organization, Islami Inquilabi Mahaz Amjad Ali, Mehfooz Ali Khan
along with two other Pakistan nationals to Delhi. A large number of
documents, 16 kg of high explosives, seven electronic detonators, two hand
grenades were among the materials found on them. They also had two sets of
“Win Word” floppies containing 250 pages that included notes on RDX and
TNT, the production of explosives and the manufacture of poisons from easily
available substances. They had received extensive training in guerilla warfare
in Afghanistan, Kotli and Bagh from ISI instructors. They had been told to
establish bases in different cities of India and then strike mainly with
explosives at railway tracks, bus stands, telephone lines, government and
commercial buildings. They even intended to poison wells to create panic and
cripple the economy by damaging the transport and communications system.
Pakistan’s Kashmir Jihad thrust was reoriented after it was compelled to
ally with the USA in its war against Afghanistan. Some pressure was brought
upon the renegade Islamic nation to restrain its involvement in Kashmir and
to rein in the jihadist tanzeems like the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-
Tayeba, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. India also had provided the USA with
incontrovertible evidences about involvement of the ISI in terrorist activities
in India and even involvement of the ISI in attacks on the US targets in
September 2001. As a result of the US pressure after the attack on the Indian
Parliament, President Pervez Musharraf announced a series of measures to
dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. Accounts of
organizations based in Pakistani territory, which were named by the UN and
the USA as terrorist or suspected terrorist organizations were frozen by the
administration. Arrests of about 2000 cadres and the leaders of the LET, the
JEM, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which is a Sunni extremist
organisation, the Tehrik-e-Jaffria Pakistan (TJP), which is a Shia extremist
organization, and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a
terrorist organisation based in the FATA were cosmetic in nature. Jaish-e-
Mohammad, Jamait-e-Islami and Lashkar-e-Tayeba leaders were soon
released. Freezing of their bank amounts revealed that these tanzeems and
even Al Zawahiri had very negligible amount deposited in Pakistani banks.
Najam Sethi, an independent media person of Pakistan, had described this as
a big charade.
Pakistani Establishment had embarked on certain cosmetic exercises in
dealing with the jihadist tanzeems with the dual purpose of telling the USA
that it was acting tough against the terrorists and to India the message was one
of great deception.
It was clear from what Hafeez Saeed, the chief of Lashkar-e-Tayeba, said
in front of a big crowed in a Karachi mosque, after he officially resigned from
the LeT post, “The shackles of slavery in Kashmir will be broken. Jihad won’t
stop even if we are martyred. There will be more hands to carry on our
mission. Muslims and Hindus can never live like brothers.”
Another terrorist outfit Jaish-e-Mohammad changed its name to Khudam-
ul-Ansar. Azhar Mohammad, the kingpin of JeM, is still very active in the
terrorist circuit training and infiltrating jihadists into India. The third most
important jihadi tanzeem Harkat-ul-Mujahideen has changed its name to
Jamait-ul-Ansar. It is very active inside Indian Kashmir.
The government of President Musharraf has been trying to hoodwink the
people of Pakistan and also mislead the USA. He has been offering false
hopes to India. Some Pakistani intellectuals and media persons have openly
criticized the government for allowing the tanzeems to function from behind
thin veils of official ban. Even critics like Afrasayyab Khattak, chairman of
the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, said recently to the
Reuters that the contradictions inherent in Pakistani policy were
unsustainable. “The state should not allow non-state players to use its territory
against any country, nor should it allow private militias. This is a big
contradiction which threatens the country from inside,” he said. “Pakistan
cannot co-exist with militancy.”
Mohammad Shehzad, an independent Pakistani journalist, recently tried to
unmask the charade played by Islamabad. Lashkar-e-Tayeba has been
collecting millions of rupees through charity, donations and by making door-
to-door appeal to Muslims. In a recent article in South Asia Tribune, a US
based web news bulletin, Shehzad said, “The Lashkar set up camps in almost
every city, town and village of Pakistan. It collected hides from Abbotabad,
Attock, Bahawalpur, Chakwal, Dera Ismail Khan, Faisalabad, Gujranwala,
Gujrat, Hafizabad, Hyderabad, Islamabad, Jhelum, Karachi, Kasur, Lahore,
Mirpur (Azad Kashmir), Mirpur Khas (Sindh), Multan, Muzaffarabad, Okara,
Peshawar, Quetta, Rahimyar Khan, Rawalpindi, Sahiwal, Sargodha,
Sheikhupura, Sialkot, and Vehari. Ud Dawa also urged the Muslims to donate
cash so that it could sacrifice animals on their behalf soliciting Rs. 12,000, Rs.
1800, and Rs. 3500 for a cow, share in a cow and a goat respectively.”
Pakistan’s Kashmir agenda has not been put on the backburner after it
apparently joined hands with the USA to hunt down Osama bin Laden, who is
hiding somewhere on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Arrest of a couple of
important Al Qaeda al Sulbah functionaries from the interior cities of Pakistan
clearly indicates that the Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah are very much alive.
Some Pakistani political observers feel that the homegrown jihadi tanzeems
and Al Qaeda al Sulbah are likely to follow up recent bids on the life of
Musharraf and topple the regime in collusion with some ambitious Generals.
Pakistan has failed to grab Kashmir through war and proxy war. Its actions
have disillusioned the people of Kashmir. Even the fidayeen groups have
failed to cow down the people of the state. The jihadist tanzeems have,
therefore, started a new strategy of demoralizing the political forces inside
Kashmir, cutting across political lines, by assassinating more than fifty of
them within a short period. The fidayeen attacks and sporadic organized acts
of terrorism are directed from Pakistan based camps of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen,
Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Jaish-e-Mohammad etc tanzeems. The ISI has
revitalised its terrorist bases in Azad Kashmir. It is feared that collapse of the
so-called Azad Kashmir governing system after the October 2005 earthquake,
the terrorist tanzeems will take over the madrassas, health care centers and
reestablish grip on popular perception on either side of the LoC. The post-
2005 quake situation has reportedly strengthened the presence of the jihadi
tanzeems in PoK. Taking advantage of failure of the military administration
these tanzeems have provided relief services, medical aid and even adopted
orphans. Intelligence agencies feel that the post-quake situation will enhance
the image and grip of the jihadi tanzeems. The quantum of ISI backed
terrorism is likely to escalate after the earthquake dusts settle down. India
may be required to pursue a calibrated policy of openness of heart and
preparedness of mind.

*
 Operations in Punjab
India’s gaping fault line in Punjab had arisen from a queer admixture of a
sense of insecurity of a minority religious order; their perceived identity crisis
and craving for distinct sub-national identity. These tendencies in a section of
the Sikh leaders were primarily encouraged by the British, exacerbated by
segments of religious preachers, provoked by Hindu reformists like the Arya
Samaj, partition of the country and unimaginative handling of the peoples and
problems by a section of power-hungry politicians.
According to Kuldip Nayar, an eminent journalist and author: “The real
seeds of Hindu-Sikh separatism were sown by the British by conferring
minority privileges on only keshadhari Sikhs in the matter of recruitment to
the services and later introducing separate electorates and reservation of seats
in legislatures. Sikh leaders of the time realised that maintaining a distinct
identity apart from the Hindus brought them economic benefits.” Tragedy Of
Punjab p.21.
Historically speaking the demand for Sikh homeland had its origin from
the time of Guru Gobind Singh. However, the demand had gathered
momentum after 1920 and was formally articulated on November 15, 1948.
The Punjabi Suba (a separate Sikh State) demand by Master Tara Singh and
Sant Fateh Singh was dressed up with a political philosophy by a dismissed
ICS officer, Sardar Kapur Singh, and other leaders like Narinder Singh
Bhullar. These agitations were carried out under cover of seeking distinct
cultural and religious identities. To this were added the ingredients of Hindu
intransigence and the other evil of modern India — Hindi chauvinism.
However, the historical story of cleavage between the Hindu and Sikh
communities has not been candidly told so far. The formulations of separate
identity were encoded and elaborated later as the October 1973 Anandpur
Sahib resolutions, which demanded, amongst other privileges, comprehensive
autonomy for Punjabi Suba.
Prior to 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the Sikh leaders were not tapped by
Pakistan. The Inter Services Intelligence, according to certain intelligence
sources, had established contacts with Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a former
Punjab minister, and Ganga Singh Dhillon, a US based leader of World Sikh
Organisation, in early 1973. Ganga Singh Dhillon was the President of Sri
Nankana Sahib Foundation of Washington. Even before he hobnobbed with
General Zia-ul-Haq, he was tapped by the ISI during Z.A. Bhutto regime and
was inspired to articulate the demand for a separate Sikh homeland. Dhillon
had struck friendship with General Zia, a Punjabi muhajir from Jallandhar,
and was reportedly funded by him to spearhead the separatist movement. It is
interesting to note that Ganga Singh had cordial relationship also with Giani
Zail Singh, a prominent Congress leader and Home Minister in Indira
Gandhi’s cabinet and later, the President of India from 1982 to 1987. Dhillon
also cultivated some US opinion makers, like Senator Mark O. Hatfield and
Congressman James C. Corman. Dhillon was responsible for mobilizing
sympathetic US opinion in favor of perceived Sikh demands of an
autonomous homeland. The United States also was vexed with the regime of
Indira Gandhi for her alleged role in balkanizing Pakistan. She had earlier
annoyed the US by supporting the Soviet and Chinese stand on Vietnam.
Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan was another independent Sikh homeland
(Khalistan) protagonist. Until 1969, he was a minister in Punjab and later
went over to the UK. He was instigated by the operatives of the ISI to voice
demand for Khalistan with a view to counterbalance alleged Indian fishing in
the troubled waters of East Pakistan in collaboration with the Awami League.
Chauhan articulated the demand for Khalistan at a London press conference
in September 1973. Chauhan had visited the USA in 1971 and indulged in
separatist activities. He visited Pakistan a little before Indo-Pakistan war in
October 1971 and made anti-India statements at Nankana Sahib to the delight
of his ISI mentors.
Dr. Chauhan returned to India in July 1977 during Janata government
regime and continued his secessionist and pro-Pakistan activities. On
November 12, 1979, he installed a transmitter in the Golden Temple and
started transmitting holy hymns on March 2, 1980, soon after Indira Gandhi
returned to power. During Hola Mohalla festival, (festival of cplpr) he hoisted
the Khalistan flag at Gurdwara Keshgarh Sahib, Anandpur. On the eve of
Baisakhi festival (New Year) in 1980, Balbir Singh Sandhu, an associate of
Chauhan and the secretary general of National Council of Khalistan, declared
the formation of a sovereign Sikh state comprising Punjab and areas of
Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Rajasthan.
Chauhan and his cohorts maintained connectivity with Tohra faction of the
Sikh Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee, Shiromani Akali Dal and Jarnail
Singh Bhindranwale a militant Sikh priest. Bhindranwale had emerged after
April 1978 as the protagonist of Sikh fundamentalism and the pivotal figure
of Sikh terrorism. Chauhan also maintained connectivity with Punjab
Congress leaders and Giani Zail Singh. In fact, they had several meetings, but
wily Chauhan deceived the man responsible for maintaining internal security
of the country.

It may be noted that after 1977 Zail Singh and Sanjay Gandhi had facilitated
the formation of Dal Khalsa with the help of an Amritsar based educationist.
This fundamentalist and terrorist outfit later derived support and sustenance
from Pakistan for promoting terrorist activities in Punjab. Dal Khalsa was
floated by the Congress leaders with a view to generate competitive
fundamentalism and taking the wind out from Akali sail.
Chauhan failed to elicit support from Sikh masses and left for the UK in
1980. His deputy Balbir Singh Sandhu announced the formation of Khalistan
in June 1980. From the UK Chauhan made several trips to Pakistan.
According to intelligence sources once he was conducted by the ISI to
Peshawar to see for himself the preparations for the war of liberation of
Afghanistan by the mujahideen. While in Pakistan, Chauhan was hosted by
the ISI at guesthouses in Lahore and Rawalpindi.
Chauhan maintained contacts with London based ISI operatives and his
linkages with General Danier Graham, co-chairman of the American Security
Council and a retired chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and
also the Pakistani foreign minister Agha Shahi. This clearly proved his access
to foreign funds and advice for promoting the Khalistan concept. Chauhan
also maintained linkages with Senator Jesse Helms and Sam Nunn, both
known for their anti-India proclivities. Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State,
and Charles Percy of the Foreign Relations Committee often gave patient
hearing to Chauhan. Chauhan was allowed to return to India a few years ago,
and is now located near Chandigarh.
At the initial stages of the separatist movement, the Punjab extremists were
fired by the sinister propaganda that the foreign powers were ready with the
formula of according recognition to an independent Sikh nation–Khalistan.
Both the CIA and the ISI had found it convenient to prop up Sikh separatism,
as they were afraid of Indian support to the Soviet regime on Afghanistan
issue. To the USA Punjab was a holding ground to keep India busy with a
burning problem. To Pakistan, it was a sweet revenge for alleged Indian
interference in East Pakistan.
Akali intransigence and spate of agitations by them on near-impossible
political demands received encouragement from an unexpected quarter. The
Maoist-Leninist groups of pro-Chinese Communist extremists, popularly
known as Naxalites, were on the run in Punjab.They had failed to stir up mass
revolution in the land of plenty. The state machineries also hunted down the
communist extremists mercilessly. Finding that their brand of proletarian
philosophy was not acceptable to Sikh masses, they joined the Akali
bandwagon with a view to widen mass bases.They also took cover of the
initial hit squads of Bhindranwale. One of the prominent Maoist-Leninist
leaders Giani Bakshish Singh, a Naxal leader of Birmingham, UK, visited
Pakistan in November 1971, on the eve of Indo-Pakistan war. He was not a
religious person and believed in armed revolution. Intelligence sources
averred that the Giani was hosted in Pakistan by the military rulers, who
provided him with funds for instigating internal strife in Indian Punjab.
Giani Bakshish Singh visited Indian Punjab in 1972 on the ostensive
purposes of paying condolences to the family of Sant Fateh Singh. During his
Punjab visit, Giani Bakshish Singh contacted the dormant Naxal elements,
some Akali Dal leaders and leaders of the All India Sikh Students Federation.
He had two discreet meetings with Giani Zail Singh.
Bakshish Singh also paid two visits to West Bengal with a view to meeting
the Naxal leaders. Some Marxist-Leninist leaders of former East Pakistan,
who were used by the ISI to motivate the maverick Sikh leader, rekindled his
interests in separatist politics.
His efforts succeeded in rebooting of the dormant Naxal elements of
Punjab and bringing them nearer to the Akali activists and religious diehards.
He impressed upon them to recruit a paid cadre, to organize secret cells in
police and armed forces, collect weapons and to communalize the existing
strained relationship between the Hindus and the Sikhs. It may be mentioned
that Pakistan had unsuccessfully tried to cultivate the Naxal leaders of West
Bengal on the eve of 1971 war. Nevertheless, their efforts succeeded in
Punjab, though to a lesser degree, and the Naxals were made to work under
the general umbrella of the Akali agitators. It may also be mentioned that
Communist fronts like the Kisan Sabha had also taken the cover of Akali
agitations and religious fundamentalists.
Post-Bangladesh electoral success of Congress party in Punjab and blatant
appeasement of the fundamentalists by Giani Zail Singh, the then Chief
Minister, had further pushed the Akalis to the wall. Congress brand
fundamentalists outwitted the Akali brand of fundamentalism. The Akalis had
come up with the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973, demanding creation of
a greater Punjab and other aspects of greater constitutional autonomy. These
demands echoed some of the demands articulated by Giani Bakshish Singh
and Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan. Akalis did not pursue their agenda when they
were returned to power with the Hindu Jan Sangh as partner after emergency
was lifted. Had they betrayed the Sikhs?
Of the myriads of naïve political acts that the Akali government performed
the greatest blunder was to allow the Nirankari Sikh (a breakaway sect)
community to hold a congregation in the holy city of the Khalsa—Amritsar.
The Janata government in Delhi too did not apply its mind and failed to
fathom the hidden danger in the faulty move. On April 13, the Baisakhi day, a
motley and armed Sikh mob of Nihangs, Akhand Kirtani Jatha (AKJ)
followers, AISSF protagonists, and followers of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale,
the jathedar of Dam Dami Taksal (DDT) sect, charged at the Nirankari
congregation. The skirmishes resulted in the death of Fauja Singh, chief of
AKJ and 12 Sikhs and three Nirankaris. This incident had a trigger effect on
the charged situation in Punjab. The Akali Dal government of P.S. Badal
failed to restore normalcy. His predicament increased when his rivals in the
Akali Dal sided with the religious fundamentalists, and the Congress forces
headed by Giani Zail Singh and Sanjay Gandhi started egging on
Bhindranwale to toughen his fundamentalist activities with a view to
discrediting the Akalis.
Zail Singh had influenced, at the behest of Sanjay Gandhi, the DDT chief
Jarnail Singh and allegedly funded him to field his candidates against the
Akalis in SGPC election. His protégés were badly mauled. Despite his
political incompetence and flare for acting as the renaissance man of Sikh
fundamentalism, Jarnail Singh was used by Congress to campaign at the
parliamentary polls in 1980 election in favor of its candidates. With the return
of Indira Gandhi to power, Jarnail Singh expected big policy shift in Punjab.
However, his expectations were belied. Congress party did not have time for a
small time preacher; and the preacher, in turn, immersed himself in the fires
of communal and religious hatred. A vengeful man by nature and a fiery
religious preacher, Jarnail Singh took upon himself the task to avenge the
insults meted out to him by Sanjay Gandhi and Zail Singh. At that point of
time he was contacted and encouraged by Ganga Singh Dhillon, Jagjit Singh
Chauhan and Giani Bakshish Singh. In fact, before making another
clandestine visit to Punjab in February 1980, Bakshish Singh had gone to
Pakistan and, reportedly, had an audience with President Zia-ul-Haq.
Some observers have commented that Congress and Akalis crafted out a
paper tiger called Bhindranwale. The Akalis had put a soul into it and decided
to have a joy ride. The tiger later devoured its creators and riders and left
behind a new ideology—armed Sikh militancy with Pakistani collaboration.
Under Jarnail Singh’s fiery influence the Babbar Khalsa activists and
Bhindranwale follower Ranjit Singh and others assassinated Baba Gurbachan
Singh, the head of the Nirankari sect. This was followed by the assassination
of a Hindu media baron and supporter of Nirankari cause, Lala Jagat Narain,
in September 1981.
In all fairness, it must be added that the ISI and Pakistan were not in direct
touch with Bhindranwale. However, they were in touch with him indirectly
through a section of Akali leaders owing allegiance to Tohra, Dr. Jagjit Singh
Chauhan, Ganga Singh Dhillon and Giani Bakshish Singh. Ironically,
Pakistan had got in touch with Major General Shabeg Singh (Retd), a hero of
Bangladesh war, in 1982, and motivated him to start another liberation
struggle in Indian Punjab, on the lines of the struggle he was part of in former
East Pakistan, while serving the 8 Mountain Division. This was a unique ‘turn
around’ operation of the ISI. There are reliable reports that before embracing
Bhindranwale as his guru Shabeg Singh had at least three meetings in Delhi
with a senior Pakistani diplomat at various pre-arranged social platforms.
Bhindranwale carried on his virulent activities by encouraging the AISSF
youth, Dam Dami Taksal volunteers and Naxal elements that had gathered
criminal coatings around them. Inspired by him the Dal Khalsa hijacked an
Indian Airlines plane on September 29, 1981. Bhindranwale followers also
started inciting communal passion by desecrating Hindu religious places.
Motorcycle borne brigands sprayed bullets mainly targeting the Hindus, and
perceived personal enemies of Jarnail Singh.
Planned attacks were made against Hindu targets and police officers who
dared taking action against the Bhindranwale bandits. On April 25 1983, A.S.
Atwal, a Deputy Inspector General of Police, was killed by one Major Singh
alias Bachhatar Singh on the orders of Jarnail Singh, while he was coming out
from the temple after offering prayers.
Killing of police officers and destruction of state machinery were the
preparatory actions of the ISI and their stooges amongst the Bhindranwale
group and Akali Dal. Instructions were sent to the militant command through
Dal Khalsa protagonists and through contacts won over during visits of Indian
Sikh pilgrims to holy places in Pakistan. Two important interactions between
Zia-ul-Haq and selected members of the Sikh jatha were noticed in 1982 and
1983. ‘Agents’ of Indian intelligence organizations masquerading as pilgrims
had properly documented these meetings. This very source had alerted the
government of India that Pakistan was bent upon communalizing the political
cleavages in Punjab by inspiring the Sikh militants to direct the killing spree
against selected Hindu targets. A major targeted killing of Hindus took place
on Sept 28 1983 when morning walkers were sprayed with bullets at Jagraon.
This was followed by planned attacks on Hindu bus passengers. In 1983, 106
people were killed and 177 injured in 161 violent incidents committed by
Bhindranwale followers and other militants.
The AISSF had started ‘Gurmat training camps’ all over Punjab with a
view to train the Sikh youth in armed and unarmed combat and to indoctrinate
them in separatist ideas. Bhindranwale also exhorted upon the youths to
collect weapons and motorcycles with a view to pursue assigned militant
activities. His followers brought in huge number of weapons and ammunition
into the Golden Temple hiding these in ‘kar seva’ vehicles and trucks
carrying foodstuff. Sacks full of salt and sand were also inducted to dump
human bodies in basements and below the debris of the construction sites. A
cover organization styled as Dashmesh Regiment was floated to give a
regimental colour to the band of Jarnail Singh brigands. The hoodlums,
inspired by religious hatred of Bhindranwale, pipedream of an independent
Sikh State by a section of frustrated Akalis and Sikh Diaspora, continued the
spate of violence mostly directed against Hindus and certain Sikhs who
refused to conform to Pakistan inspired secessionists.
Sikh intransigence of the period had coincided with certain other internal
and external developments:
• AASU agitation in Assam
• Bodo-Kachari movement
• Naga and Meitei insurgency
• Gorkhaland agitation
• Pakistan’s continued involvement with CIA, Royal Saudi
Intelligence and Al Qaeda al Sulbah in Afghanistan.
It is not that Indira Gandhi and her experts were not aware of these
developments and the need for adopting pragmatic policies in Punjab.
However, Bhindranwale goons worried Indira Gandhi and her apparent
successor Rajiv Gandhi. They were aware that Pakistan had instructed the
‘pro-Khalistanis’ to mount planned attacks against the Hindus and bring out a
communal carnage. The gun-wielding goons targeted industrial towns like
Jullandhar, Ludhiana, Batala and Gobindwal, where the Hindus were
predominant operators. Following Pakistani machinations Jarnail Singh gave
open call to his followers to kill the Hindus and desecrate their places of
worship.
This strategy chalked out by the ISI was conveyed to the armed bands of
Bhindranwale through nodal points in the UK, USA and Canada. While
Afghanistan was the main front for Pakistan, the secondary front in Punjab
was being activated with the objective of containing India in its home ground.
Pakistan and the USA did not want India to take an active part in the Afghan
Cold War.
Punjab situation deteriorated rapidly in 1984. According to intelligence
sources around this time the ISI deputed its ace operative Captain Shahid (a
fake name) via Kathmandu in the garb of a Sikh and arranged for his safe
housing in Jullandhar. Only once he visited the Golden Temple to meet Jarnail
Singh. He reportedly returned to Kathmandu on the eve of Operation Blue
Star.
 Certain foreign intelligence reports indicated that some UK based Babbar
Khalsa elements and a representative of Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan had visited
Karachi and Islamabad and held meetings with ISI operatives at a Rawalpindi
safe house. They were instructed to accelerate the process of violent activities
against the Hindus and the Indian government.
Some doubts have been expressed that Delhi had not taken into
consideration the strategic policies of Pakistan and the USA while calibrating
its actions against the Sikh militants. It had ceased to be mere fundamentalist
tirade against selected religious targets. Bhindranwale had already given a call
for creation of Khalistan and his audio and videotapes were being played in
the Gurdwaras in India, the UK, Canada and the USA. The author has
firsthand knowledge of ‘soft-treading policy’ of Canada and the USA on Sikh
issue and propagation of secessionist propaganda amongst the Sikh Diaspora.
The ambience of violence was exacerbated with the attempt on the life of
Darbara Singh, former chief minister of Punjab on March 12, 1984. To
Delhi’s utter shock Sanjay Gandhi’s and Zail Singh’s collaborator in the
creation of Dal Khalsa, Prof V. N. Tiwari, MP, was assassinated by the
terrorists on April 3, 1984. The list of Bhindranwale killings was topped by
the assassination of Giani Pratap Singh, a revered spiritual leader, on May 19,
1984. Barely after two days of the dastardly incident Ramesh Chandra, son of
Lala Jagat Narain and a prominent journalist, fell to the bullets of
Bhindranwale goons.
The month of May had seen the peak of violence in Punjab. Eighty-one
persons were killed in 78 incidents. The entire government machinery was
paralyzed and Indira Gandhi had reached the tethers end. She was to face a
national election in 1985 and her rating amongst the Hindus had already nose-
dived. She was almost isolated on the home front and internationally her
government did not succeed in receiving appreciation on the Sikh issue. The
Sikh Diaspora had activated organisations like Council of Khalistan,
International Babbar Khalsa, World Sikh Organization and Khalistan
Government in Exile. Some opinion makers in the USA, Canada, the UK and
West Germany had lent sympathetic shoulders to the Khalistan protagonists.
The Inter Services Intelligence had started financing the Khalistanis abroad
and in India. A crucial meeting between a Pakistani diplomat in Ottawa and a
few ISYF leaders (May 1984) had created the grounds for the visit of Sikh
renegade youths to Pakistan via Canada and the UK for ideological and arms
training. Intelligence agencies also laid hands on Pakistani plans to exacerbate
the violent movement in Punjab as it suspected indirect Indian help to the
Northern Afghanistan leaders, who were opposed to pro-Hekmatyar policies
of Pakistan. Some vague US intelligence sources also floated intelligence that
India was operating against the mujahideens from bases in Tajikistan. Visibly,
Indira Gandhi was being pushed to the wall by active Pakistani hostility and
inscrutable silence from the USA and its Cold War allies.
Political brinkmanship of the Akali Dal, indecisiveness of the government
of India, Hindu and Sikh feuds, inaction of the police and often blatant
submission by the police chief P. S. Bhinder and his wife (Congress MP), near
total surrender of the state administration and Punjab media had created a
situation under which Indira Gandhi was left with no other option but to act
tough. The game started by her son as a political adventure had reached a
stage that threatened the very threads of national security. By mid-May 1984
Indira Gandhi was advised by her political and security advisers to take strong
military action against Bhindranwale, who had fortified himself inside the
Akal Takht and Golden Temple.
She was in no position to defer the avoidable, ill-planned and clumsily
executed army action (when compared to Operation Black Thunder of 1988),
as she was to face the nation in 1985 and take a fresh verdict to form the next
government. She had also the onerous duty of blunting Pakistani and US
designs. Thus, was born Operation Blue Star, a scar on the history of India,
when full military force was used to eradicate an evil conceived and delivered
by the politicians across the board.
Blue Star was followed by a period of uneasy calm. Bhindranwale
followers dispersed all over Punjab and some even took shelter in other
Indian states. A few Dal Khalsa and AISSF leaders took shelter in Pakistan
and were greeted by the ISI with open arms. The AISSF volunteers hijacked
IC 405 on July 5, 1984, and took it to Lahore, Pakistan. While in the act of
hijacking the plane the AISSF men raised slogans hailing General Zia-ul-Haq
of Pakistan. In the second incident of plane-hijacking the Sikh youths
commandeered IC 421 and took it to Lahore. At Lahore, an ISI operative
supplied a pistol to the hijackers before the flight was forced to proceed to
Dubai. Certain circumstances had compelled the hijackers to surrender at
Dubai.
The assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards on October 30,
1984, subsequent anti-Sikh communal riots and flight of the Sikhs from
certain other states to Punjab had added new dimensions to the ambience of
terrorism.
This period witnessed direct Pakistani involvement. The Sikh youths
fleeing to Pakistan were trained by the ISI and they were armed with
sophisticated weapons. This phase was marked by target killing by the
terrorists and initiation of the cult of exploding improvised explosive devices
(IED) by the Babbar Khalsa faction, which had mastered the technique from
Pakistani trainers. The bomb culture had culminated in the explosion in Air
India Jumbo Jet Kanishka off the Irish coast while on a flight from Toronto to
Delhi. Canada based International Babbar Khalsa group headed by Talvinder
Singh Parmar was responsible for the heinous crime.
The apparent political accord between Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Harchand
Singh Longewal led Shiromani Akali Dal did not extinguish the fire of
insurgency. The fundamentalist fringe amongst the Sikhs and Pakistan’s
efforts to enlarge the orbit of proxy war resulted in greater violence. Pakistan
was using the expertise acquired by it in Afghanistan. It was determined to
consolidate its tentacles in Punjab. The USA and its friends blinked
uncertainly and India replied in a knee-jerking manner by indeterminate
police action.

Post-Blue Star Role of the ISI
Blue Star had succeeded in killing Bhindranwale and his close associates,
but it did not quell the singed psyche of the Sikhs. Bhindranwale followers
had dispersed inside Punjab and elsewhere in India. Those who had gone over
to Pakistan were picked up by the ISI and were psychologically and
logistically armed to continue acts of terrorism. It was a low cost and low
intensity proxy war, much lesser than the Afghanistan operations. In fact,
Punjab was the experimental laboratory of ISI’s global export of terrorism,
which later spanned all the continents. The Indian system had offered
Pakistan with a unique opportunity to shift its theatre of proxy war from
Indian North East to North West.
Delhi was not unaware that soon after the Akali Dal was catapulted to
power in Punjab a high level meeting between the ISI officials and Sikh
militants took place in Lahore, which was attended by the representatives of
the AISSF, Babbar Khalsa and Dal Khalsa, etc. A few Sikh representatives
from World Sikh Organisation and Council of Khalistan also attended. It was
decided to ignore Rajiv-Longwal accord and to continue with the violent
activities. Soon after this meeting, the followers of Bhindranwale started
reappearing in small groups.
The Army and the paramilitary forces launched ‘Operation Munda’ to mop
up the ‘militant’ youths. However, the exercise turned out to be
counterproductive. It forced a number of youths to escape to the safe ISI
niches in Pakistan. Barnala, Punjab’s chief minister, had miserably failed to
contain the rot. By early 1986, Rajiv Gandhi faced a phalanx of militant
organizations with the Dam Dami Taksal as the top cone of a tectonically
instable pyramid.
 While the faction ridden AISSF continued to be the fertile breeding
ground, the other prominent groups included:
• Babbar Khalsa (Pakistan based Sukhdev Singh Dassowal
and Sukhdev Singh Sakhira and Talvinder Singh Parmar groups),
• Khalistan Commando Force (Chehru),
• Khalistan Liberation Army (Tarsem Singh Kohar),
• Jarnail Singh-Babla gang (killer group of Sant
H.S.Longowal), Mathura Singh gang (killer of Lalit Maken, General
Vaidya),
• Roshan Lal Bairagi gang,
• Khalistan Armed Police,
• Khalistan Liberation Force (Tat Khalsa-Avtar Singh
Brahma),
• Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (Manochahal),
• Mai Bhago Regiment (Bibi Bhag Kaur), and
• Mata Sahib Singh Commando Force (Harsharan Kaur), etc.
Pakistan had encouraged the formation of multiple terrorist groups, as it
was apprehensive of some of the major groups compromising with the
government of India. This pattern has been followed by Pakistan in Kashmir
also.
The need for formation of a common political umbrella for the militant
groups was emphasised by the foreign-based militant organizations like the
WSO, ISYF, International Babbar Khalsa and their mentor, the Inter Services
Intelligence of Pakistan. This was made possible by a strategic move of the
Dam Dami Taksal. It was decided to appoint a five-member Panthic
Committee (Committee of the Faithful) to guide the ‘Sikh Panth’ and to act as
political umbrella of the terrorist groups.
The developments in early 1986 had given opportunity to the Sikh
terrorists to reoccupy the Golden Temple and adjacent buildings. The Akali
Dal government failed to stem the rot and the holy precincts were turned into
torture and killing chambers.
Rajiv Gandhi too responded fast by ordering NSG action inside the Golden
Temple premises after the Panthic Committee had proclaimed “Khalistan’. He
again ordered the launching of ‘Operation Mand’ to flush out the terrorists
from the Mand (riverine) wetland area.
 He had already played the peace card through Ragi Darshan Singh and a
Jain preacher Sushil Muni. These efforts yielded more sounds than results.
However, another Sikh leader, Buta Singh, the Union Home Minister,
further compounded Rajiv’s predicament. Buta Singh, like his illustrious
predecessor Giani Zail Singh, nursed the ambition of adorning the cape of
power in Punjab. Branded as a ‘low caste’ Sikh by the existing faulty social
system, he was despised by the upper caste Jats and Khatris (warriors).
Though the administrative and police forces in Punjab were highly
subverted and the judiciary almost stopped functioning. The terrorist groups
supported and supplied by the ISI almost immobilized the state. The political
and bureaucratic tools of the government apparently failed to provide security
to the people. They underestimated the fact that General Zia-ul-Haq, a
Jullandhari Punjabi, was just readying his arsenal to exploit the new Indian
fault line. He was keen to get back to Jullandhar, the supposed industrial
capital of an independent Punjab. Why not? Had he not succeeded in
humiliating the USSR, a much bigger power?
The political players in Delhi, who played with the Punjab fireballs during
Indira Gandhi’s second tenure and the corporate whiz kids of Rajiv Gandhi
had failed to fathom the Punjab obsession of the muhajir military President of
Pakistan. Zia’s family was Arains from Jullandhar. He reposed greater trust on
fellow majha (central) Punjab muhajir (refugee) Muslims of Jat stock.
General Arif was his Vice-chief of Staff and General Akhtar Rahman, a
fellow Jullandhari headed the Inter Services Intelligence. Another Jullandhari
Arain, Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti, headed Zia’s Opeartion Fairpaly that
ended the capricious but democratically elected government of Zufiqar Ali
Bhutto. It was no wonder that the majha and doaba areas of Punjab received
greater attention from Pakistan during the height of the movement, though the
high priest of violence hailed from the malwa (lower) region.
The initiatives taken by the Zia-ul-Haq regime in fomenting and supporting
Punjab is a glaring example of exploitation of developing Indian fault lines by
the ISI. Masterminded by Zia himself and refined by Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Punjab operations were jointly handled by the JIM and the JIX. The gory
saga of training and arming of the Sikh militants was meticulously
architectured to maximize the use of training facilities developed to train the
Afghan Mujahideen and Al Qaeda al Sulbah cadres, in camps in Pakistani
Punjab and the Frontier areas. It is intriguing to note that the ISI and the Al
Qaeda al Sulbah had established a joint camp at Lawrancepur near Attock for
training Sikhs and Kashmiri mujahideen.
By 1984-85, the ISI enjoyed comfortable logistical position to dole out
Afghan war surplus and funneled cash assistance and hardware supplies from
the CIA resources to the Sikh militants. Special training was imparted to
fabricate improvised explosive devices and in the use of RDX, Semtex, C4
and sophisticated timing devices. At one point of time, Punjab militants were
supplied with Korean and Japanese communication sets and VHF monitoring
devices.
Pakistan’s strategic calculations were clear about Punjab. India, it knew,
would never allow Punjab militancy to traverse beyond the event horizon, and
the Sikhs, sooner than later, would be disillusioned with Muslim Pakistan,
with whom they had historically troubled relationship. The Sikh militant
leaders too were aware that Pakistan would not like to go to war with India
for creating an independent state of Punjab as India did in the case of
Bangladesh. Zia-ul-Haq made the serious foray into Indian Punjab to keep
India busy and prevent it from logistically supporting the Kabul regime and
factions of the Northern Alliance. It was also a rehearsal to Zia’s planned
actions, in Jammu and Kashmir, which is generally and erroneously referred
to as Operation Topac.
Zia had his Punjab blueprint worked out way back in 1978-79 with inputs
from some important leaders of the Sikh Diaspora and some key leaders of
the Sikh Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee (SGPC). Desire of a section of
Sikhs to assert their separate ethnolinguist identity by demanding a separate
country had also added to the fire. The Indian leaders refused to recognize the
infernal power of the fire of fundamentalism that was raging in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, stoked by the CIA and the ISI. Pakistan was ready to play the
game as long as the Sikh militants were capable of fighting the security
forces. With Bhindranwale gone, the ISI knew, that no other rabble-rouser
could madden the Sikh psyche the way the Taksal scion had done. The job
assigned to the ISI was well done by the JIM and the JIX. Within the above
parameter, the ISI acted successfully in exploiting the post-Blue Star
developments in Punjab. The situation offered them a golden opportunity to
destabilize the north western flank of India.
*
Pakistan seized the advantage of the arrival on its soil of the Sikh youths
after Operations Blue Star, Mand and Wood Rose. The last two operations
were launched to seek out the Bhindranwale, followers and neutralise them.
Gurjit Singh, married in the family of Bhindranwale and other Sikh youths
were interrogated and cultivated by the ISI by a team headed by Brigadier
Nasir (JIM) and were advised to intensify the liberation struggle by launching
full scale insurgency in Punjab. Some leaders of the Babbar Khalsa and Dal
Khalsa (Kanwar Singh Dhami and Narain Singh) also had reached Pakistan.
They were separately motivated to resume violent activities. A little later, in
1985-86, about 120 Sikh youths were trained in camps in Pakistani Punjab
and a few of them were taken to NWFP to acclimatise with the training
rigours of the Afghan Mujahideen. Kanwar Singh Dhami was inspired by the
ISI to indulge in large-scale killings of Hindus and selected political targets.
Politically the situation did not improve. The Akali Dal continued its
intransigence and often supported the terrorists through political and other
actions. The fountainhead of Bhindranwale brand of terrorism was located at
Dam Dami Taksal, the Sikh seminary, though the SGPC and the Babbar
Khalsa did not agree with its religious edicts on most occasions. The Dam
Dami Taksal inspired the All India Sikh Students Federation, Babbar Khalsa
(Dassowal), Babbar Khalsa (Sukhdev Singh Sakhira), Khalistan Commando
Force (Manbir Singh Chehru), Khalistan Liberation Army (Tarsem Singh
Kohar), Jarnail Singh Babla gang, Mathura Singh gang, Roshan Lal Bairagi
gang, Khalistan Armed Police (Manjit Singh Khajala), and Bhindranwale
Tiger Force of Khalistan (Gurbachan Singh Manochahal) etc., separatist
groups. A special cell, termed as ‘S Division’ of the JIM was set by the ISI to
coordinate the Sikh affairs. Islamabad did not opt for a separate ‘bureau’ as it
did in case of Afghanistan and the Central Asia.
In November 1984 two ISI operatives were deputed to Punjab with a view
to assess the ground situation and bring about some coordination under a
political umbrella—like the later day Panthic Committee. These two
emissaries were accommodated at a Gurdwara near Ajnala border in Amritsar
district to avoid suspicion of the sleuths and police personnel. Several such
Gurdwaras had sprung up along Pakistan border around this time.
The Joint Intelligence X of the ISI also activated the Sikh Diaspora and
under its guidance, a world Sikh convention was held on July 23, 1984, in
which World Sikh Organisation (WSO) was formed. The WSO provided
platform to the Sikh separatists, collected funds and tried to influence the
foreign media and political opinion makers.
The International Sikh Youth Federation was formed in the UK by a
nephew of Bhindranwale. In Canada Lakhbir Singh Rode, Satinder Pal Singh
Gill and Pushpinder Singh Sachdeva took leading parts in organizing
separatist activities. In the USA, Dr. Arjinder Pal Singh Sekhon acted as the
leading light. The ISYF had managed to capture the key Gurdwaras and
influence the Sikh Diaspora. They also established contact with the ISI
operatives in Toronto, Washington, Bonn and London. With backing from the
ISI, the ISYF had set up bases in Pakistan in collaboration with Shyam Singh
Sindhi, a Pakistani Sikh. Its bases were used by the Indian Sikh youths for
indoctrination and training by ISI trainers. Besides giving training and
supplying arms the ISI also had set up support bases on J&K, Rajasthan and
Gujarat borders. A few support cells were created in Nepal for facilitating
movements of Indian Sikh terrorists to Pakistan and other countries.
Another sinister organisation, the International Babbar Khalsa, was formed
in the province of British Columbia, by Talwinder Singh Parmar, a wanted
criminal in India. He was assisted by Surjan Singh Gill, Inderjit Singh Riyat,
Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri. It was later gathered that
Surjan Singh Gill acted as an agent of the Canadian Security and Intelligence
Service. He had helped Talwinder with the making of explosives for
sabotaging two Air India flights. Gill was later spirited out of Canada and was
relocated in the UK, allegedly by the CSIS. Talwinder Singh Parmar had
visited Pakistan on three occasions and was used by the ISI for promoting his
brand of secessionism both from India and Canada. Some of the leaders of the
IBK are still living in Pakistan as guests of the ISI.
The Sikh separatists received an unexpected boost with the return of Ajaib
Singh (UP) from Pakistan. He was hosted by the ISI in a Lahore guesthouse
and was trained in demolition work. He was infiltrated back to India, and on
return he conveyed to the Dam Dami Taksal and other militant leaders the
Pakistani directive of forming an apex body with a view to coordinating
training and assistance. Keeping this directive in view and the momentum of
the separatist movement the Dam Dami Taksal hosted a meeting of top
terrorists and it was decided to hold a sarbat khalsa on January 26, India’s
Republic day. The sarbat khalsa was expected to float an apex body as
demanded by the ISI. As expected an apex body named Panthic Committee
was formed.
Around 1986 Hola Mohalla Gurjit Singh, an ISYF (Pakistan) leader,
returned from Pakistan and informed the Panthic Committee about the
concerns of Pakistan over slow progress of the movement. The Sikh Diaspora
also egged upon the Dam Dami Taksal and the Panthic Committee that they
should accelerate the process of declaration of formation of Khalistan, an
independent Sikh State. Consequently, a congregation on April 28, 1986, of
the DDT, Panthic Committee and individuals like Dr. Sohan Singh; former
director of health services, Baldev Singh Sahota, Manbir Singh Chehru, Dalip
Singh (driver of Jarnail Singh) decided to declare the formation of
‘Independent Khalistan.’ A declaration was made in a press conference on
April 29.
Coincidental to these developments, General Zia-ul-Haq was under
political pressure both at home and from abroad. Benazir Bhutto had
sharpened the movement for restoration of democracy. The western
supporters of Pakistan were also feeling uncomfortable over Pakistan’s role in
promoting insurgency in Punjab, especially after downing of the Air India
Kanishka, bombing at Narita airport, Japan, and detection of militant
activities by the Sikh activists on the US, UK and Canadian soils. However,
Zia was more concerned to repeat the Afghanistan performance in Indian
Punjab, which he considered as a rehearsal for launching a large-scale proxy
war in Jammu & Kashmir.
Lt. Gen Hamid Gul, Director General of the ISI, Zia’s second spearhead in
Afghan mujahideen war, was entrusted with the job of reorienting the
activities of the Sikh militants. His functionaries of JIM and JIX carried out a
meticulous planning in consultation with some of the Sikh terrorists lodged in
Pakistan.
The training schedule drawn up included basic physical drill, handling of
Kalashnikov rifles, small weapons, GF Rifles, grenade attacks in close quarter
combat, ambush and clandestine communication. A string of training camps
exclusively managed by the ISI were set up at Kasur, Changa Manga,
Rattoke, Muridke, Lahore, Faislabad and other places. Some of the Sikh
trainees were taken to Peshawar and camps inside Afghanistan to train with
the Afghan mujahideen and Al Qaeda al Sulbah operatives.
According to Indian intelligence sources around March 1986, two ISI
operatives were deputed to Punjab with a view to supervise the organizational
and operational aspects. They were hosted by Wasan Singh Jaffarwal and met
amongst others by Dr. Sohan Singh. One Swaran Singh, a notorious smuggler,
had facilitated the border crossing of the ISI agents. After their return to
Pakistan, the ISI decided to fully unfold its proxy war plan in Indian Punjab.
In a subsequent meeting of the Panthic Committee in the third week of
May 1986, it was decided to formally approach Pakistan for military help.
Gurjit Singh carried a letter from the Panthic Committee to Pakistan. Letters
were also sent to various diplomatic missions in Delhi and heads of some
countries.
Temporary euphoria over the declaration of Khalistan had electrified the
Sikhs in India and abroad. The Council of Khalistan, World Sikh
Organization, ISYF, and International Babbar Khalsa had started mobilizing
some opinion makers in their respective areas and had even started
distributing Khalistan Passports and stamps. An announcement was made
about opening of a diplomatic consulate in Peru. Why Peru? There were
speculations that Giani Bakshish Singh had struck a deal with the Sandero
Luminiso (The Shining Path) left extremist movement in Peru. Even if this
speculation was a red herring, Peru’s relevance was proved from the fact that
a Consulate of the Republic of Khalistan had functioned from a building in
Peru during 1984-85.
 The ISI operatives lodged in the US, UK, Canadian and West Germany
based Pakistan diplomatic premises had extended helping hand to the
Khalistan protagonists. Islamabad also felt elated about the events in Indian
Punjab and was especially gratified to note the PC announcement that
Khalistan would support Pakistan in the event of another Indo-Pakistan war.
The ISI accepted 275 Sikh youths for training in various camps.
The ground truth, however, was different. The Panthic Committee
members were not ideologically oriented and they lacked organizational
cohesion. There was no operational interconnectivity between different
terrorist groups, which had theoretically merged with the Khalistan
Commando Force (KCF). Each member of the PC behaved like an area-
overlord. Gurbachan Singh Manochahal operated in Amritsar area, Wasan
Singh Jaffarwal controlled Gurdaspur, Dhanna Singh Ludhiana and Jullandhar
and Gurdev Singh Usmanwala assumed charge of Ferozepur and Faridkot.
The Babbars freebooted all over Punjab and with help from the ISI they
emerged as the explosive experts of Sikh separatist movement. They were not
united in their resolve to fight the government of India like their counterparts
in Afghanistan had temporarily rallied to pursue the Soviet backed regime.
1986 ended with ominous notes. The Panthic Committee was reorganized,
propaganda abroad was accentuated and attacks on police were escalated. The
AISSF was reorganized at the behest of the ISI and Gurjit Singh assumed its
command with the blessings of Dam Dami Taksal. Between Operation Blue
Star and the end of 1986, Sikh terrorism took a virulent turn.
Induction of Prof. Darshan Singh Ragi as the jathedar of Akal Takht,
formation of United Akali Dal under S. S. Mann and initiation of talks with
government of India had alarmed Pakistan. They did not appreciate the
creation of several layers of temporal and spiritual authorities and acute
factionalism amongst the Panthic Committee members. Major Karim
Chaudhry, a supposed emissary of the ISI, had crossed over to Punjab in early
1987 with a view to coordinating the terrorist movement. Some friends of Dr.
Sohan Singh hosted the visitor and a few top militant leaders were made to
meet him individually. Under Pakistani provocation a convention of Sikh
organizations called by Ragi Darshan Singh was sabotaged and the
representatives of the PC, AISSF (G), KCF, KLF and the BTFK reiterated the
demand for Khalistan. Ragi was compelled to withdraw from the Golden
Temple complex.
Ragi Darshan Singh was not the only pawn that was moved by the
government of India for initiating peace talks. The Indian Prime Minister took
personal interest in inviting a group of terrorist leaders belonging to AISSF
(G), KLO, KCF and KLF for discussion on settlement of the Sikh problem.
Sometime in November 1987, Rajiv Gandhi used the good offices of
Tarlochan Singh Riyasti, a respected freedom fighter, for establishing contact
with the Sikh youths. This was defeated due to intransigence of some of the
militant groups and certain politicians of the ruling party.
Pakistan received another blow when it came to light that the Indian PM
had taken initiative to cultivate Jasbir Singh Rode, a nephew of Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale and militant appointed jathedar of Akal Takht for advancing
the peace process. Jasbir Singh, and the High Priests Savinder Singh, Jaswant
Singh and Kashmir Singh were inclined to initiate peace talks with blessings
from a faction in the Dam Dami Taksal and a few militant outfits. Another
faction in the DDT headed by Bhai Mohkam Singh, however, opposed the
move taken by Jasbir Singh. Mohkam Singh, according to intelligence
estimates, was being manipulated by the ISI. He opposed peace moves. They
in turn, alleged that Jasbir Singh, was acting as an agent of India intelligence.
Jasbir Singh was released from jail along with the High Priests in March
1988 and was flown to Amritsar. Not everyone in the Sikh militant movement
was enamored of Bhindranwale’s family. Cardinal opposition came from the
Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan. Pakistan had conveyed to Wasan
Singh Jaffarwal (rehabilitated by Prakash Singh Badal in 2001), Dr. Sohan
Singh and some of the KCF and Babbar Khalsa leaders that they were ready
with free supply of arms and ammunitions and advanced communication
technology to help the Sikhs in their war of liberation. An emissary of the
Panthic Committee was contacted by Pakistan at Kathmandu and was given a
sizeable monetary incentive for sabotaging Delhi’s peace initiative. The idea
to supersede the first Panthic Committee and form a more stridently militant
second Panthic Committee was mooted by Pakistan. Dr. Sohan Singh and the
hardliners had fallen in the Pakistani trap. However, Pakistan had failed to
create a band of Sikh taliban out of its failure in uniting the Sikhs under the
banner of the First Panthic Committee.
The Inter Services Intelligence had conveyed its displeasure to the Sikh
terrorist leaders through another emissary, Ainul Haq alias Shamsher Singh,
who travelled to India through Nepal amidst news of Jasbir Singh being used
by the government for peace talks. He met the top militant leaders near
Firozepur, in Punjab, and directed them that Afghan people were on the verge
of securing freedom with Pakistani help. The Pakistan government was ready
to extend all help to the Sikhs if they genuinely wanted freedom. He promised
to transfer rupees 20 million through a Habib Bank cut out in Kathmandu.
This promise did not materialize and Kathmandu based cover ISI officials
doled the terrorist leadership out a small amount.
Jasbir’s arrival in Amritsar was greeted by volley of automatic fire in the
air by the holed in militants. It was difficult to determine which group fired
out of jubilation and which one out of indignation. Jagir Singh and Nirvair
Singh, two killer representatives of the KCF and KLF, were opposed to the
arrival of Jasbir. Their disapproval was demonstrated by an attempted assault
on the living quarters of Jasbir. This was repulsed by the combined forces of a
section of the holed in Babbar Khalsa and armed followers of AISSF and
Dam Dami Taksal. The police forces occupying the higher positions at
Brahmbuta Akhara and other buildings observed the queer developments in
the temple complex.
Disturbed by the developments Pakistan again summoned two Panthic
Committee leaders to Islamabad via Kathmandu to receive instructions and
cash support from the ISI operatives. His warning was clear: Jasbir
experiment of Delhi was doomed to fail. Too many powerful forces were
against a peaceful settlement and the latest scion of the Brar (a caste) family
was surely not the real deliverer. Pakistan’s game was not difficult to
understand.
Under pressure from Pakistan, most of the terrorist outfits in Punjab
reneged from the peace initiative. The ISI had pumped in a great quantity of
weapons and explosives with instructions that the final war of Sikh liberation
was to be started from the Golden Temple. Wasan Singh Jaffarwal had in the
meantime joined Dr. Sohan Singh in Pakistan and chalked out the blueprint of
the battle order. Two ISI representatives were taken into the Golden Temple to
plan the offensive preparations. It was argued that once the final offensive
was started, the Sikh masses would start marching to Amritsar and that would
be the time for Pakistan to mobilize its troops along the international borders
for starting a Bangladesh type liberation war. Pakistan’s machinations had
spurred the hardcore terrorists to launch repeated aggressive actions from
inside the Golden Temple. The government was forced to initiate Operation
Black Thunder for forcing out the Khalistani protagonists and terrorists from
inside the temple complex.
Failure of the peace initiative and successful conclusion of Operation Black
Thunder did not signify the end of militancy in Punjab. With Pakistan as the
fountainhead, the militant and terrorist groups were responsible for over 3500
violent incidents in 1987 and first half of 1988. The high pitch of violence
continued unabated in which 1247 persons were killed in terrorist action and
over 305 encounters took place during 1988 between police and the terrorists.
The ISI was noticed delivering arms and ammunition to the Sikh terrorists
right near the international border. Gurjit Singh, the AISSF leader, escaped
from jail and went over to Pakistan. On the other hand, Dr. Sohan Singh
returned from Pakistan with a fresh brief from the ISI. His arrival signified a
new beginning in the terrorist movement.
The second Panthic Committee replaced the first Panthic Committee on
November 4, 1988, with Wadhwa Singh and Mehal Singh (both Babbar
Khalsa), Satinder Pal Singh (Canada), Dhanna Singh and Dr. Sohan Singh as
the prominent members. Atinder Pal Singh (KLO) was also accommodated in
the committee.
By the end of 1988 militant groups were divided into two clear camps. The
Dam Dami Taksal supported the AISSF (Bundala), the first Panthic
Committee, KCF and BTFK. The other group comprised AISSF (Bittoo), the
second Panthic Committee, KLF, breakaway faction of KCF under Jaffarwal
and Babbar Khalsa. Split in the movement had polarized the terrorists. The
faction headed by Dam Dami Taksal was suspected by Pakistan for having
discreet links with the government of India. Alleged linkages between Jasbir
Singh Rode and Indian intelligence agencies fortified this suspicion. ISI
success in frustrating the peace overtures of Jasbir Singh was a momentous
success. A nephew of Bhindranwale was disgraced.
Division amongst the terrorist ranks had resulted in competitive violence.
Each faction recruited criminals in large numbers. Political changes in Delhi
had also offered better motivation to Pakistan and the Sikh terrorists. Loud
cacophony from Delhi about its goodwill for Pakistan and peace overtures did
not soften the new regime of Benazir Bhutto. The ISI continued its thrust in
Punjab and finalised its blueprint for launching invigorated proxy war in
Kashmir. Encouraged by Pakistan and refurbished with free supply of
weapons by the ISI the terrorists launched fresh attacks against innocent soft
targets. Pakistan manipulated the events so deftly that the government of India
was compelled to deploy regular armed forces.
The Joint Intelligence X division of the ISI organized a series of
coordination meetings between Pakistan based Sikh terrorist leaders and the
terrorists and their supporters abroad for planning out a comprehensive thrust
with a view to keep India busy in the Punjab while it planned initiation of
large scale uprising in Kashmir. The crucial May1989 meeting between the
ISI and the Sikh terrorists in Lahore decided to accelerate the process of
stirring up violence. Communalization of the Khalistan issue between the
Hindus and Sikhs, Pakistan emphasized, was the best ideological weapon
against Hindu India. Passing through the phase of acute Islamisation initiated
by Zia regime, the Pakistani Establishment encouraged the mujahideen
groups in its own backyard. Some of the Sikh terrorists were also exposed to
the training schedule prescribed for the mujahideen.
*
 Before he was humbled in the parliamentary polls Rajiv Gandhi had
initiated certain positive actions, which were aimed at weakening the terrorist
movement. Pakistan’s intentions in Punjab had become more transparent by
mid-1989. The Pakistani Establishment was convinced that the Jat Sikh
gentry were incapable of putting up a united front against India. Their
Hindu/Indian roots were much deeper than the egalitarian preaching of the
Gurus and artificial efforts by certain leaders to project Sikhism as altogether
a new faith.
A disillusioned Islamabad had no intention to help the Sikhs beyond a
point. They maintained tactical supply of Afghanistan surplus weapons and
explosives and imparted rudimentary training to the disorganised terrorist
cadre that believed more in loot and rape than advancing the cause of the
‘qaum’ (nation). Islamabad simply wanted the chaos to continue at a
heightened scale with a view to diverting Indian attention from Kashmir,
where it had decided to play the new game of ‘inflicting thousand cuts’ on
India by launching a reinforced proxy war. The ISI had started “limiting” its
supplies to the terrorist groups. They depended more on isolated spontaneous
acts of sabotage and subversion. As a result, a low-key insurgency continued
to disturb the state.
The confused situation was confounded after installation of an interim
government headed by Chandrashekhar. Though not keen on whole heartedly
promoting the separatist Sikhs, Pakistan responded to the political confusion
in India by deputing another ISI emissary, Captain Shafiq, to discuss the
situation with Dr. Sohan Singh and two of his colleagues somewhere in
Himachal Pradesh. Held inside a serene apple orchard the meeting
strengthened the defiant attitude of the armed terrorist groups and they stoutly
opposed any solution through negotiation.
However, the initiation of peace talks by the government of India in late
1990 had stirred up mixed reactions among the militant groups. Pakistan did
not want the terrorist groups to mend fences with the government of India at
that critical point. Soon after staging the Zarb-I-Momin (the Believer’s Blow)
military exercise in December 1989, the Pakistan army had concluded that it
was adequately poised to fight a conventional war with India. There were
rumors of the possibility of another round of Indo-Pak war in early 1990. For
a change, V. P. Singh too talked in terms of war, which was echoed by
General Aslam Beg. The Pakistan Army in consonance with the President had
started calling the shots, bypassing Benazir Bhutto, who was finally deposed
in August 1990. The ISI had played a decisive role in these developments.
The timeframe chosen by Pakistan to woo a section of the Babbar Khalsa
was not propitious. The ISI had noticed the fluid political situation in India as
against the installation of the ISI-friendly IJI government of Nawaz Sharif.
Islamabad knew that Delhi would not be able to take any firm decision.
However, a bridgehead was established by the Indian intelligence agency with
the Babbars. Support from an unexpected quarter facilitated the operation,
when Atinder Pal Singh, a journalist turned terrorist, then a Member of
Parliament, pitched in to soften a section of the Babbar Khalsa. Adequate help
was received from a Patiala based lady member of the parliament. The
militants later assassinated her.
The desired result was achieved when Dr. Sohan Singh expelled Wadhawa
Singh and Mehal Singh from the second Panthic Committee and inducted
Daljit Singh Bittoo (son of a renowned agricultural scientist) and Shahbaz
Singh. A few Punjab observers and ‘experts’ have described this as
ideological incompatibility between the second Panthic Committee and the
Babbar Khalsa. They also pointed out Pakistani displeasure with the Babbars.
These assertions were far from the truth. Babbars never lost the confidence of
the ISI and Pakistan. The fissure came through because of the initiative taken
by Rajiv Gandhi and adequate help that he received from other sources.
The Babbar Khalsa had in the meantime floated its political fronts like the
Shiromani Babbar Akali Dal, and Babbar Akali Istri Dal. It declined to wind
up the London based ‘Khalistan Government in Exile’.
Peace initiatives did not stop the cycle of violence. Under instructions from
the ISI the second Panthic Committee and the armed terrorist groups tried to
bring about communal cleavage. A number of attacks on Hindu targets were
made by the ISI inspired terrorist outfits headed by Wasan Singh Jaffarwal,
Paramjit Singh Panjwar and Gurjant Singh Budhsinghwala. A set of new
players had taken over the reins of the movement. Jasbir Singh Rode had
faded into near oblivion. Dr. Sohan Singh, Wasan Singh Jaffarwal, S.S.Mann
and Daljit Singh Bittoo etc., occupied the centre stage.
Soon after assumption of power, Prime Minister Chnadrashekhar was
influenced by certain quarters to personally talk to Simranjeet Singh Mann on
December 28, 1990. He preferred to overlook the resolution passed at a
conference of the assorted Akali Dals at Fatehgarh Sahib on December 26,
that had empowered Mann to talk to Delhi on condition that India should
either finally decide on the fate of the Sikh ‘Qaum’ or give a free hand to the
terrorists. Mann was neither an ideologue of the Sikh Qaum nor the Chief of
its factious Panthic Committees and armed groups. He was accepted as a
totem and like most totems he came in the line of firing of the militant and
terrorist groups as soon as the talks were initiated.
The Panthic Committees headed by Dr. Sohan Singh, Gurbachan Singh
Manochahal and Wasan Singh Jaffarwal disassociated from the talks. An
emissary of Dr. Sohan Singh, cryptically known as Aflatoon, was summoned
to Kathmandu by the embassy based ISI station in charge for conveying stern
warning that the Sikhs should not compromise with Delhi. Pakistani decision
was transmitted down to the lower formations.
Important intelligence inputs at that point of time indicated that Pakistan
was not at all interested in allowing its clients in Punjab to settle for peace.
The ISI and the Chief of Army Staff General Aslam Beg had made it
abundantly clear that they had two main objectives before them:
‘strengthening collective defenses of the regional Muslim countries’ and
‘augmenting the freedom struggle by the Kashmiri Mohalla (neighborhood)
fighters.’ They considered Punjab as a strategic holding ground for the Indian
military and paramilitary forces. Such strategic ‘holding ground’ theory was
earlier tested with considerable success in the North East. The ‘political
government’ in Pakistan was engrossed with the Gulf War and the ‘other
government’ run by the ISI Secret Team was keen on exacerbating the proxy
war in Punjab, propping up the Taliban and planning a big thrust in Indian
Kashmir.
Rajiv Gandhi too was not happy over the direct contact between the Prime
Minister and the Sikh militants. He had made this abundantly clear in a letter
to the PM on January 24, 1990. To quote him, “I regret to say my information
is that, far from showing any signs of improvement, things have only
worsened in the last few days……It is one thing to have contacts with
insurgents and terrorists at intelligence and police levels, quite another for a
Head of Government to engage himself in talks without pre-conditions with
parties dedicated to the dismemberment of the country.”
Chandrashekhar’s minister of state, Subodh Kant Sahay, aggravated his
discomfiture. He preferred to open up a line to Manjit Singh, President
AISSF, for exploring the feasibility of a parallel dialogue. The idea was not
bad, but Manjit and Mann were in conflicting camps and the former did not
enjoy the support of the more virulent factions of the terrorists.
By early 1991, the ISI had almost stopped its earlier policy of supplying
free weapons to the Sikh terrorists. The armed ‘jathebandis’ (contingents)
were made to pay for the hardware. For certain strategic reasons the ISI had
also pruned down its earlier programme of exposing the Sikh terrorists to
Afghan mujaheedin and Pakistan’s home grown militant groups. The policy
shift had arisen out of diversion of Pakistani attention to Kashmir. In fact, the
ISI had shifted its main operational theatre to Kashmir and diversified its
‘encirclement’ operations to Assam and adjacent areas of the North East.
However, fresh efforts by Indian agencies did not go without reward.
AISSF (Manjit), Panthic Committee (Manochahal), Atinder Pal Singh, Gurtej
Singh, former secretary SAD (M) decided to support the civic elections in
Amritsar, Ludhiana and Jullandhar, in which the BJP emerged successful due
to Hindu backlash against Sikh militancy in the urban pockets. Some militant
groups aligned to Dam Dami Taksal and splinter groups of the KCF and KLF
supported the urban civic elections.
The factious Akali Dals and the ‘softened’ militant groups showed greater
enthusiasm when elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly and
Parliament seats were declared for June 1991. AISSF (Manjit) and the Panthic
Committee (M) decided to field record number of candidates. A faction of the
Babbar Khalsa supported them. A large number of relatives of the killed and
detained militants too came forward to contest the elections. This neat
national gain was achieved through acts of negotiations between certain
separatist groups and representative of the political government.
Chandrashekhar and Subodh Kant Sahay exhibited boldness in extending
hands of conciliation to certain exhausted and disillusioned groups.
Pakistan backed second Panthic Committee, militant groups aligned to it
and the hardcore Babbar Khalsa opposed the election process. They indulged
in ‘operation elimination’ of election candidates and had succeeded in killing
over 22 of them. Under pressure, some of the militant and aligned political
forces declared that if elected to the state assembly they would pass a
resolution demanding creation of Khalistan. However, Dr. Sohan Singh’s
outfit under Pakistani direction asked the people to impose ‘people’s curfew’
on the election dates. Pakistan influenced groups were directed by the ISI to
scuttle the elections at any cost. Success of the democratic process, they
averred, would weaken the cloudburst of terrorism in Kashmir.
*
The peace initiatives and the election process had brought about significant
fissure in the terrorist organisations. However, 1991 witnessed a spate of
violence. Kidnapping for ransom had degenerated into a thriving business.
The ISI encouraged isolated violent actions and partly shifted its operational
bases to Nepal and Bangladesh. The Romanian Charge d Affairs, Liviu Radio,
was abducted. He was later released on October 9, 1991. The Sikh militants
were encouraged by the ISI to broaden their orbit by establishing cells in
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. Certain safe houses
were established in Nepal for assisting the Sikh terrorists. Pakistan had
planned out the strategy of discreet occupation of the Gurdwaras on India-
Nepal border with a view to setting up cells for terrorist operations in Sikh
inhabited areas of Uttar Pradesh. The intention was to generate communal
clashes between the Sikhs and Hindus. This policy was pursued in Punjab
also. In spite of simmering communal tension statistics indicated that amongst
killed nearly 80% belonged to Sikh community. The militants also suffered
severe casualties.
There is ample evidence with the Indian security and intelligence agencies,
including interrogation reports of arrested terrorists that the ISI and the Field
Intelligence Units of Pak MI were deeply involved with the Sikh terrorist
groups. It appeared that the civilian government had lost control on the ISI. In
1992 a coordination meeting took place between the ISI representatives and
the Sikh terrorist leaders like Daljit Singh Bittoo, Paramjit Singh Panjwar,
Wasan Singh Jaffarwal from Punjab and Supinder Singh, Harbhajan Singh
Bains and Lalli from the US and UK. Pakistan also tried to bring coordination
between the Sikh terrorists, Kashmir terrorists and Afghan mujahideen. In
fact, Daljit Singh Bittoo was spotted by intelligence agents meeting Afghan
mujaheedin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
As a result of such high level confabulations Pakistan decided to switch the
arms supply route through Gujarat land and coastal borders. Pakistan had also
deputed Air India Kanishka blast suspects Lal Singh and Manjit Singh
through Gujarat border with huge consignments of weapons. These were
intercepted by Indian agencies. Mohammad Khan, an ISI agent, was
intercepted in this connection. His interrogation revealed sensational details
about ISI involvement with the Sikh terrorists.
As 1992 progressed, the Punjab government and political forces in Delhi
had established superior control on the terrorist movement. Successful police
operations, deployment of the armed forces and exhaustion of the people had
blunted the rampaging separatist movement. The ISI made sporadic efforts to
keep the fire burning from across the border and from bases in Nepal and
Bangladesh. However, Sikh militancy lost steam because of the following
reasons:
• Pakistan did not repose complete trust in Sikhs. It offered
only meagre arms and training assistance to the terrorists.
• Pakistan’s civilian government was under pressure from
Washington to gradually disengage from Punjab.
• The Muslim mercenaries were unwilling to join hands with
Sikh kafirs in this proxy war of Pakistan. It was not an Islamic war. It
was Pakistan’s exclusive foray to a political fault line of India.
• The movement had lost ideological bearing and it was
highly criminalized.
• Religious fundamentalism was used by the Sikhs for
political gains and not for fighting Muslim type jihad.
 • The common people of Punjab were used to economic
prosperity and their political and economic survival depended on their
ties with the rest of India and not with any Islamic country. The
disruptive forces and adverse impact on the state’s economy exhausted
them. Criminalization of the movement also had exasperated them.
• As expected by Pakistan no communal holocaust took place
in Punjab.
• Factionalism and greediness had weakened the militant
leaders and their so-called political and intellectual supporters.
• Pakistan had shifted its proxy war base to Kashmir.
However, Pakistan continued to support the terrorists by providing the top
leadership with safe hideouts, monetary help and marginal training to carry
out targeted attacks. Selected candidates were taken for undergoing training
with the Afghans, Afghan Arabs of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah. A few of them
were deputed to fight against the Northern Alliance alongside the
mujahideen.
Besides assassinating Beant Singh, Punjab Chief Minister, in 1995, the
Babbar Khalsa International had emerged as the largest group in Pakistan. It
managed to recruit cadres from Indian Punjab and from amongst the Sikh
youths travelling to foreign countries illegally. They had deputed several
gangs to India in collaboration with the ISI to carry out bombings against
selected targets, including important Hindu political leaders. Renewed efforts
by Pakistan indicate that it was trying to revive Sikh militancy as its proxy
war efforts in Kashmir had started suffering reverses and it had come under
tremendous western pressure after 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre and
other US targets, fall of the Taliban government and Al Qaeda al Sulbah
thrust from Pakistan bases.
Revival of Babbar Khalsa activities in 2005 and the subsequent arrest of
BKI leader Jagjit Singh Hawara revealed that the ISI was again trying to
revive Sikh militancy. With the normalization process between India and
Pakistan making some progress, the ISI is under tactical pressure to slow
down its operations in Kashmir. The jihadi tanzeems are also under nominal
restraint, though they are capable of carrying out jihadist and shaheedi dasta
attacks against important and easy targets. These trends indicate that back in
Pakistan the Sikh militancy issue is just burning with lesser heat.
The reported meetings between Ganga Singh Dhillon and General
Musharraf, appointment of Lt Gen (retd) Javed Nasir, a former Director
General of the ISI, as the chief of Pakistan Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee
and the reported involvement of the dreaded Lashkar-e-Tayeba with the Sikh
terrorists indicate that Pakistan has a definite plan to revive terrorism in
Indian Punjab and link it up with the growing pattern of militarization of the
fundamentalist Islamists in India. Such long-term plans are not translated into
action over night. Much will depend on stability of the present regime in
Pakistan, bacterial growth of the jihadi tanzeems and ascendance achieved by
the Secret Team of the Establishment that rule Pakistan.
The era of Pakistan acting as the spearhead of Islamist jihad in the region
and engaging India in intense proxy war has been temporarily slowed down,
because of inner political turmoil, presence of Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Taliban
elements in Pakistan, Baloch intransigence, sectarian turmoil in Gilgit-Skardu
region, Punjab and Sind and finally due to the US pressure on Pakistan.
However, Present political spectrum in Indian Punjab, deteriorating socio-
economic conditions, lack of employment and strengthening of structural
infrastructure of the fringe militant groups and fundamentalist ethno-religious
factions bear similarity to conditions prevailing before Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale had started his hate campaign and Pakistan had started
interfering in the Indian Sikh affairs. The fault lines in Punjab exist. These
have been papered over and not really repaired. Punjab continues to be the
operational target area of Pakistan and ISI.
Nearly 35 Sikh militant leaders of Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Liberation
Force, and Khalistan Commando Force etc are living in Pakistan under ISI
protection and patronage. They occasionally try to cause isolated blasts to
prove their existence. The separatist movement has been blunted, but Sikh
separatism continues to be alive.

 Subversion of Indian Muslims
Pakistan’s proxy war against India was not confined to supporting insurgent
groups in the North East; engineering terrorism in Punjab and unleashing
armed insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Its tentacles were also directed at
certain sections of the Indian Muslims who maintained links with Pakistani
jihadist tanzeems and dreamt of attaining one or more ‘Muslim India’, out of
the truncated India. Various scholars have brought out the main features of
this tendency to treat the Indian Muslims as ‘Muslim India’ in the light of
historical developments surrounding the ‘indigenous’ Hindus and ‘external’
Muslim political, social and religious forces. Such arguments often lead to
communal cacophony and disharmony. Unearthing the so-called
‘civilisational’ conflict is not the thrust area of this chapter.
It is, however, necessary to understand how the Pakistani mind frame is
oriented towards the Indian Muslims. To understand Pakistan’s India policy
and ISI’s operations in India it is necessary to briefly narrate the political,
ethnic and religious imperatives that had resulted in stormy Indo-Pak
relationship. Operations of the ISI directed at the Muslims of India cannot be
understood without expanding the basic ingredients that turned Pakistan and
other Islamists against the very existence of a Hindu majority India. After all,
intelligence operations are born out of political, diplomatic and economic
compulsions of a nation. In case of Pakistan, religion is an added factor. A
little diversion is necessary to explain the theme against the historical canvas.
It will be incorrect to presume that export of Islamic militancy and
fundamentalism to India is merely a part of the proxy war of Pakistan against
the kefir and jahiliya (unenlightened) nation. Some scholars have maintained
that the roots of Islamic fundamentalism in the subcontinent were firmed up
in the eighteenth century coinciding with the decline of the Mughal Empire
and the emergence of British colonialism.
The earthshaking fear that Islam would be corrupted and the Muslims
would have to live under jahiliya rules had alarmed the Islamic clergies
occupying centers of power and had prompted them to launch an Islamic
revivalist movement, with the sole objective to re-establish the political
authority of Muslims in Indian sub-continent. Directly affected by the decline
of Muslim rule, the Ashraf (upper caste/aristocrat) Muslims were mainly
concerned for regaining of power or to share power with the ruling class. The
contemporary Islamic theologians in British India, who also belonged to the
same class, and had enjoyed honorable status in the society, adopted the
strategy to mobilize the Muslim masses with a call to return to Prophet’s Era
by strengthening the tenets of Islam. Gradually Islamic institutions underlined
the need to adopt methods appropriate to the changed political environment.
They got the support of elite Muslims in their endeavour and glorified the
philosophy of two religions –two nations. These fundamentalists injected the
venom of civilisational incompatibility between the Hindus and the Muslims.
They expected this to grow into a whirlwind causing disruption of burgeoning
Hindu hegemony in British India.
Another movement that had irrevocably changed the character of
egalitarian Islam in the subcontinent was the Wahhabi movement.
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (Hambali school of purest Islam), a Salafi Arab
close to the Saud family, claimed to be a true monotheist who had followed
entirely the preaching of Al Qur’an and Sunnah. The Turks who were mostly
Sufis had, according to Wahab, had distorted the teachings of Muhammad.
They were opposed to the purist form of Islam. Wahab stood by the Saud
family. The Saudi family also embraced the tenets of Wahhabism with a view
to maintain its hold on the holy precincts at Mecca and Medina. The later day
salient landmarks are:
• Emergence of Sir Syed Ahmed and beginning of British-
Muslim collaboration;
• Strengthening of Ahl-e-Hadith, Jamait-i-Islami, Jamait-ul-
Ulema, Al Sunna and Tabligh-i-Jammat movements.
From these beginning points to partition the history of Hindu-Muslim
divide has been encapsulated as a distinct fault line.
Other fundamentalist institutions also promoted Muslim separatism and
militancy. Foremost among these was Maulana Mehmood-ul-Hassan. He
declared India as a Dar-ul-Harb, territory of the kefirs against which the
Muslims were required by the Quran to carry out jihad. He was among the
founders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (JUUH).
Essentially, he did not believe in the creation of Pakistan. Nevertheless,
some Deobandis, who founded the Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam (JUUI) at a meeting
in Calcutta in 1945, supported the formation of Pakistan.
In the meantime, other developments were on the verge of changing the
face of Islam in Hindustan. The germination of the idea of a separate Muslim
nation and the need for the creation of a Muslim homeland had started
haunting the early Muslim intellectuals generally known to have been
spearheaded by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1867-1888). “With Sir Syed Ahmed
Khan begins the period of Muslim self-awakening.” K.K.Aziz. A History of
the Idea of Pakistan– Vol. I, p. 12.
 Hindu chauvinism also started sprouting in the Hindi heartland in the form
of demand of use of Hindi in official works, instead of Persian and Urdu.
Growth of Indian nationalism was identified as Hindu nationalism. The
enlightened Hindus believed that after advent of the British the Englishman
had emerged as the First Nation and the Hindus retained the Second Nation
status. The Muslims, they believed, were relegated to Third Nation.
The gulf between the two communities kept on widening. The Muslims
were ashamed by the loss of power and were afraid of being ruled by the
Hindus. Right from the pro-Hindu agitation spearheaded by the Banaras
Hindus in particular and establishment of the Aligarh Anglo-Muslim School
to the Allama Iqbal’s pronouncement about a separate state for the separate
Muslim nation and finally the adoption of Pakistan resolution at Lahore in
1940, several developments had taken place that promoted acute
fundamentalist attitude amongst the Muslims. The Ummah had started seeing
a world vision for the revival of the lost glories when Islam ruled the waves
and the peaks.
“Some Muslim scholars, especially Mian Kafayet Ali had given a call for a
movement called the Silsila-i-Jamait-i-Vahdat Umam Islam.” S.A.Latif, The
Cultural Future of India, Pp 1-18. The movement was allegedly started under
inspiration from Turkish Islamists who believed in revival of the Khilafat.
The plan envisaged creation of Muslim republics around the known Muslim
world:
• Hydera Republic in Hyderabad (India)
• Muhammadiya Republic in Bengal and Assam
• Islamistan in Muslim North West (all in Hindustan)
• Surya Republic (Syria-Palestine-trans Jordan)
• Sinuysia Republic (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya)
• Azarya Republic (Azarbijan, Dagestan, Chechenya, Crimea,
etc.)
• Turanian Republic (Eastern and western Turkistan)
• Aqsa Republic (Muslim provinces of western China)
• Barghasia Republic (Muslim east Africa)
• Java Republic (Java, Sumatra and Borneo), modern
Nausatara Raya.
This was the first Pan-Islamic vision, reportedly born out of a resurgent
Turkey and later hijacked by the Arabs and Indian Muslims. This world
vision of the early Islamists is now being echoed by sinister terrorist
organizations like Al Qaeda al Sulbah. These Islamists are now claiming that
sooner than later Islam will be the predominant religion in Asia, Africa and
Europe.

The growing threat of a demographic death of the European civilization has
been causing enormous fright among Christians. Along with fast-paced
growth in Muslim population, caused by immigration and higher Muslim
fertility, there has been a big increase in jihadi attacks and militant activities
in many European countries, e.g., the Madrid bombings on March 11, 2004,
gruesome murder of Theo Von Gogh in Amsterdam in November, 2004,
London bombings of June 7, 2005, riots across Paris suburbs in 2006, attack
on Glasgow airport in July, 2007, etc. From 9/ 11 onwards till date more than
18,300 terror attacks have taken place across the globe in which nearly 60,000
innocents lost lives and 90,000 were injured.
The demographics of Christians of Europe have gone into a tailspin. As
against the requirement of a minimum TFR (Total Fertility Rate) of 2.1 child
per woman, according to Eurostat 2004 data the TFR of 10 European
countries ranged between 1.29 in Greece and 1.99 in Ireland - including the
Muslim TFR which is believed to be nearly 3 times higher than that of
Christians. In the U.K. now 85 Sharia Courts are functioning. According to a
Pew Research Center study in 2010, the Muslim population worldwide was
growing at 1.5 percent per annum, while non-Muslims were growing at 0.7
percent.
According to Laina Farhat-Holzman, there has been a rapid growth of
Muslim numbers in 20 major cities of Europe. Daniel Pipes feels that
Sweden’s Stockholm and Malmo may become the first two Muslim majority
cities of Europe and that Moscow could be the third. Bruce Bawer has pointed
out in his book, ‘While EuropeSlept’ that in Sweden many Muslims go around
flaunting T’ Shirts proclaiming, “2030 and then we take over”.
On October 31, 2009, a militant group, ‘Islam4UK’ led by Anjem
Choudhry,Judge of a U.K. Sharia Court, had staged an aggressive
demonstration in London demanding end to the “oppression of democracy
and man-made laws”. The same Islamist, Anjem Choudhry, has recently
announced plans to stage a demonstration in Delhi on March 3, 2012, to
demand ‘shariah for Hind’ and destruction of Hindu temples. No wonder,
many Christian leaders of European countries, including Angela Merkel,
David Campbell and Nicholas Sarkozy, have publicly announced that multi-
culturism (i.e., secularism) has failed in Europe.
 In India the plight of the demographically-challenged Hindu civilization is
equally bad. Since independence there has been a fast increase in the
percentage of population of Muslims alone. The percentage of population
share of three other religious groups, namely, the Hindus, the Sikhs and the
Jains has been on decline, as discussed in para 46 of my Paper. After
analysing Census 2001 the two well-known demographers, late Mari Bhat and
Francis Zavier concluded, “The fertility of Muslims which was about 10
percent higher than that of Hindus before independence is now 25 to 30
percent higher than the Hindu rate”. The Muslims are now growing at a rate
45 to 50 percent higher than the Hindus. Thus, the majority community is
now heading towards sunset time. Census 2011 has confirmed that the
percentage of Hindus has already fallen below 80 percent. It may be noted
that the early Islamist visionaries envisaged the creation of a separate Muslim
homeland to the north west of India and Bengal-Assam.
The Pakstani branch of Jamait-e-Islami headed by Maudoodi, on the other
hand, became active in what can be called ‘Islamic’ politics, beginning in the
1950s with the instigation of riots against the Ahmadiya community. In the
past three decades, the organization has become the core of radicalism and
fundamentalism in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. It played an important
role in the campaign against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and then supported the
military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. The Pakistani dictator skillfully used
his alliance with the Jamait to strengthen his position. Jamait-e-Islami
Pakistan and Bangladesh have identified themselves with acute
fundamentalist and terrorist forces, though they continue to take interest in
open political activities. Both in Bangladesh and Pakistan the JeI are
supportive of the worldwide jihad of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Some so-called secular scholars have taken pains to prove that aggressive
Islamic proselytizing programme had started after the Hindus initiated
aggressive ‘shuddhi’ movement spearheaded by the Arya Samajists. Yogendra
Sikand has asserted this theory in ‘The Origins and Development of The
Tablighi Jama’at (1920-2000). Several Islamic institutions in India reportedly
spearheaded the movement. However, it is claimed that Maulana Ilyas had
launched his Tablighi movement in 1920s. Prominent among his associates
and followers were Ashraf Ali Thanawi of Deoband and Khwaja Hassan
Nijami, an Urdu scholar. The founder of Jamait-e-Islami had travelled to
Mewat region to see for himself the progress made by Tabligh-i-Jamaat
amongst the Meo Muslims, who more or less followed Hindu practices and
were being enticed to accept ‘shuddhi.’ The Tablighi movement is one of the
most prominent proselytizing machines of Islam all over the world and some
of its variants in Pakistan and Bangladesh have taken to jihadist tactics and
have identified themselves with Ahle-e-Hadith, (also pronounced as Hadis),
Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-
Tayeba and Al Qaeda al Sulbah, etc. The Jamaat functions in complete
conjunction with Jamait-e-Islami.
It would not be appropriate to deduce from the coincidence of timing for
the emergence of Hindu revivalist movements and the formation of Tabligh-i-
Jamaat. It was not born out of fear of Hindu ‘shuddhikaran’ (reconversion)
movement. It had historical continuity. The Tablighi movement is the cardinal
act of assertion that Indian Muslims were divided into two broad categories:
the Ashraf (Arab or Central Asian aristocrats) and Ajlaf (Indian born middle
and low caste converted Hindus). The former retained or tried to retain
Islamic purity and followed the Hadith and Qura’an. The Ajlaf continued to
be plagued by Hindu social and cultural practices and preaching of Sufism,
which militated against the tenets of pure Islam, advocated by Wahhabis, Ahl-
e-Hadith and Deobandi schools. To these schools may be added the names of
institutions like Nadwatul-Ulama of Lucknow, Dar-ul-Ulum Manzar Islam of
Bareilly and Faragi Mahall of Lucknow. The last one was created under the
patronage of Aurangzeb, the last of the Great Mughals. It was patronized by
Shah Wali Ullah. These organizations as well as organizations located in
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh drew inspiration from Wahhabism
and the Deoband School. Tabligh-i-Jamaat was created as the front face of the
Islamite seminaries and institutions that aimed at conversion, teaching and
preaching of purist Islam as advocated by the Wahhabis.
It is, therefore, transparent that growth of Islamic militancy in India
(Bharat) is a legacy of the past, a civilisational burden that has not been
lessened by partition of the country and reaping of the fruits of independence
in sovereign India. The Wahhabi stream of Islam, Ahl-e-Hadith, Jamait-e-
Islami and Tabligh-i-Jammat etc., have only supplemented the efforts of
Pakistan to export religious fundamentalism to India and push a section of the
Indian Muslims to the path of jihad. It should be remembered that a common
string—the string of unified Islam in the subcontinent, garlands all such
Islamist organizations and Jamaits in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The
trend has followed, more or less, the pattern followed by Pakistan and Al
Qaeda al Sulbah led Arab forces in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
However, the dimension of this trend is intertwined with the direct
involvement of Pakistan in proxy war against India in Kashmir, Punjab, North
East and elsewhere.
Pakistan had been converted as the hub of international Islamism and
organizations like Jamait-e-Islami Pakistan, Jamit-ul-Ulema-Islam, Ahl-e-
Hadith Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad and Tabligh-i-
Jamaat and different front militant organizations spawned by them and the Al
Qaeda al Sulbah have been responsible for instigating a fringe of the Indian
Muslims to behave as members of the Ummah and not as Indian nationalists.
This self-imposed holy duty of Pakistan is at the root of subversion of the
Indian Muslims, who are, otherwise, happy to be good Indians as other Indian
are.
The fear of being ruled by the Hindu majority was the visible premise of
the Islamists who wanted a Muslim state out of India. They achieved what
they had wanted, though the creation of Pakistan was based on faulted logic
of the inevitability of the clashes of civilizations—Hindu and Islamic
civilizations. Once Pakistan was created, the Indian Muslims had the right to
move over there and pursue their Islamic goals. History had forced them to
stay back and they developed a peculiar mentality. It has been aptly described
by Syed Abid Hussain, the eminent scholar, “This is, as a matter of fact the
same movement of religious communalism which had started shortly before
1947, had temporarily subsided after partition and is now coming to the
surface again. It is sponsored by a small section of religious leaders but is
becoming fairly popular among the middle class and to some extent among
students…” Syed Abid Hussain, a former Vice Chancellor of Jamia Millia
Islamia, The Destiny of Indian Muslims.
The eminent educationist and historian Mushirul Haq has also echoed this
view. Pakistan and other Islamist forces have exploited this fringe of Indian
Muslims to promote and propagate fundamentalism and its inseparable twin,
Islamic jihad. To militancy and communalism were added the elements of
jihad as experimented by Pakistan against Russia in Afghanistan. Islamic
jihad got a major boost when the USA in collaboration with Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia intervened in Afghanistan. Since then, jihad has become an
international weapon to bring about Islamic resurgence, as opposed to other
civilisational forces like Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism. In countries like
Thailand, where Buddhism is the reigning religion, Islamic jihad has fanged
out its ugly claws. The trend is same all over the world, though regional
coloring may slightly differ from global positioning of the Islamist forces.
The above brief narration of facts regarding the evolution of the
psychological process of Indian Muslims who felt orphaned after the collapse
of the Mughal empire and who were afraid of Hindu domination are based on
history of the growth of a separate nationhood complex amongst the Muslims.
Separate volumes can be written on these aspects of historic dusts shoveled
under carpet of politics. A proper understanding of this is necessary to study
Pakistan’s nefarious designs targeting the Indian Muslims.
*
Pakistan had never reconciled with the existence of a Hindu India, a larger
India, which was once ruled by the Muslims. Existence of the second largest
Muslim population in Hindu India also sent shivers in Pakistan about the
validity of the ‘Two Nation’ theory, which had virtually collapsed after the
emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. From the very early days of partition,
Pakistan had targeted the Indian Muslims for subverting their loyalty and
turning them to Muslim Indians—Muslim first, Indians second.
Before 1965, Pakistan used the services of Pakistan Intelligence Bureau
and remnants of the Muslim League in fomenting disaffection amongst Indian
Muslims. The Jamait-e-Islami, Ahl-e-Hadith, Tabligh-i-Jamaat, Wahhabi and
Deobandi protagonists and other Islamist tanzeems aided them. After 1965
Indo-Pak war the task was taken directly over by the Joint Intelligence M and
Joint Intelligence X of the ISI and Islamist jamaats (congregations) and
tanzeems supported by Pakistan and other Pan-Islamic organizations in Arab
countries. Attempt to Islamicise the Indian Muslims, vastly the ajlaf segment
had become a state policy of Pakistan from day one and in this mission the
Inter Services Intelligence acted as the guiding angel.
The process was given a boost by the military regime under Ayub Khan
and was later fortified by Z.A. Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq. In consonance with
Pakistan’s involvement with Afghan war and immense growth and spread of
Islamic revolution in Iran, Egypt, Algeria and the Arab world in general,
Pakistan had adopted the burden of the Ummah to spread radical Islam
amongst Indian Muslims elsewhere in the world. It readily shared the task
with the Wahhabi exporters of purist Islam in Saudi Arabia and the Royal
Saudi Intelligence. In fact, Pakistan had started emerging as the second pivot
of activities of the messiahs of Islamic jihad. Inciting the Indian Muslims to
take to armed militancy and acts of terrorism had become an integral part of
Pakistani proxy war mechanism. However, the ISI had not mixed up the
Kashmir broth with its broader Indian thrust area. The growth of radical
Islamist militancy and separatist activities amongst a section of the Indian
Muslims should be treated as an extension of Pakistan’s proxy war and an
integral part of the Jihadist International. It also coincided with the Pakistani
design of recapturing the Islamist bases in Bangladesh.
The JIM and the JIX had achieved another spectacular breakthrough in
India while handling sections of vulnerable Indian Muslims. The Iranian
revolution and the mujahideen wars in Afghanistan had transcended the
concept of nationalism and ushered in an era of multinational militant
Islamism. Besides Pakistan’s renewed foray into the killing fields of Kashmir,
which is the proxy war area of responsibility of the JIN, the ISI made
systematic efforts to inject the jihadist poison amongst the vulnerable section
of the non-Kashmiri Indian Muslims. The thrust went beyond the parameters
of the oneness of the Ummah. It was directly spawned in the hatcheries of the
multinational jihadist identity of Pakistan and supported by the jihadist
tanzeems and the ISI. The concept was given a garlanding effect
encompassing the tanzeems in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The whole
chain has to be viewed as single entity transcending the national boundaries.
The best example of this is the working philosophy of the Jamiat-e-Islami and
Ahl-e-Hadith.
Certain scholars try to peg the date on December 6, 1992, demolition of the
mosque at Ayodhya by perilous gambling of the Hindutva protagonists as the
day for attack on ‘secularism.’ They forget that a similar violation had
occurred on June 6, 1984, at Amritsar when the Indian army attacked the Sikh
temple. Yet, other scholars link the rise of Muslim militancy in India with the
following factors:
• The Iranian revolution,
• The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and reinvention of
jihad by the CIA, ISI and the family of Saud,
• Emergence of Al Qaeda al Sulbah as the Jihadist
International,
• Muslim disaffection with the US policies towards Muslim
countries, especially the Palestinians, Iraq and Iran, and
• Pakistan’s proxy war against India.
It would be preferable to examine the issue through the prism of existing
and prevailing divide between the Hindu and Muslim societies which was
aggravated periodically by all the factors mentioned above. The Jamait-e-
Islami, Tabligh-i-Jamaat, The Jamaat-ul-Ulema etc., organizations are
garlanded across the psyche of the Muslims inhabiting India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh. The Islamist gems like the Muslim Brotherhood, Rabita,
Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad, Ikhwan-ul Muslimeen, Ahl-e-Hadith, Wahhabi
institutions and the Islamist alma mater at Deoband top this garland. The
Ummah is a total whole that does not respect the boundaries of nation states.
The jihadist tendency and growth of militancy amongst a section of Indian
Muslims was distinctly noticed after East Pakistan emerged as Bangladesh
with Indian support. To the Ummah it was the first dismemberment of a
Muslim nation in post-Second World War era. This period coincided with the
Iranian revolution, assertion of Oil Power by the Muslim countries, Pakistani
determination to punish India through proxy war in theatres other than the
North East, the Afghanistan developments and rebirth of Islamist jihad under
the pioneering efforts of the CIA, ISI and the Royal Saudi Intelligence.
Pakistan had never ceased to export and strengthen the idea of separatism
amongst Indian Muslims. This idea received a boost under Zia-ul-Haq and
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the process has continued unabated. It aggravated a
little more after Pakistan decided to have a renewed round of heightened
proxy and open war against India on the issue of Kashmir. I would, therefore,
like to approximate the peaking up of Islamist jihad and militancy amongst
the Indian Muslims from around 1980. That is also the time frame Pakistan
started intelligence encirclement of India from Bangladesh and Nepal and
opening up of the fissure lines in Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,
Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and other states. Ethnic
unrest in some of the northeastern states, Punjab terrorism and Kashmir
imbroglio coincided with the broader designs of the Inter Services
Intelligence of Pakistan.
The ongoing process of ‘Islamisation’ of the Indian Muslims by the Pan-
Islamic forces did not cease with the partition of India. The fundamentalists
loathed the ‘assimilistic’ tendency in Indian Islam (the munafiqins, pseudo-
Islamists) and socio-religious practices of the Hindus polluting their ‘khalis’
(pure) identities. This new ‘war’ was aimed at transforming ‘nationalism’ of
the Indian Muslims to trans-Arab ‘Islamism’—the concept of Islam wedded
more to the fundamentalist values of Sunni Wahhabism of Saudi variety.
Pre-Zia forces in Pakistan pursued this policy with dogged determination.
Zia had given a free hand to the ISI to assist the tanzeems to penetrate the
vulnerable sections of the Indian Muslims, whose imagination was dazzled by
the success of the mujahideen forces and Pakistani army in Afghanistan. To
them Islamic Pakis tan had glorified Islam by confronting the heretic
communist regime. The Islamist tanzeems in India were allured to be a part of
the glorified entity of Pakistan.
Her democratic façade notwithstanding, Benazir Bhutto gave a free hand to
the ISI to diversify the ‘Afghan veteran’ Islamists to infuse militancy amongst
the ‘nationalist’ Muslims in India, Nepal and Bangladesh. She did very little
to restrain the ISI from extending the area of conflict beyond Kashmir, though
in a later interview she had admitted her differences with the ISI on that score.
Major segments of the ISI was Islamicised and these operators had already
engaged the targeted tanzeems in India.
The JIM and the JIX had fully exploited the fault lines reopened by the
Hindu chauvinists through their accentuated religion-tinted political activities
from mid-1987. Like their Congress predecessors, the extreme Hindu fringe
failed to recognize that the Afghan experience had infused a new Islamist
identity amongst the radical Muslims all over the world. The Indian Muslims
were as vulnerable targets as the Muslims of Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines were. The geopolitical interests of Pakistan coincided with the
neo-Islamist thrust propelled by Al Qaeda al Sulbah and its worldwide
affiliates. The ‘Hindu forces’ did not appreciate that jihadist thrust from
Pakistan could only be contained by balanced and pragmatic state policies and
not by reenergizing the ‘Hindutva’ forces.
The JIM and the JIX had taken full advantage of this emerging
contradiction and due to their untiring efforts the Islamist strain of jihadism
came to root in firmly on Indian soil with possible devastating consequences.
The symptoms of jihadist infection have been characterized by:
• Rapid growth of linkages between the multinational jihadist
forces and Islamist radicals in India and cementing of the garlanding
bond between the tanzeems in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
• Acceptance by a section of Indian Muslims that Pakistan
and Al Qaeda al Sulbah are the real promoters and protectors of Islamist
values;
• Growth of Wahhabi and Deobandi affiliated religious
organizations and NGOs in various parts of India, which are affiliated to
the institutions and NGOs, operated by international Islamist
organisations in Pakistan and the Arab world;
• Growth of militant and armed Muslim organizations under
cover of religious tanzeems.
• Proliferation of secret modules and cells affiliated to Al
Qaeda al Sulbah, Lashkar-e-Tayeba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Markaz ud
Dawa, Jamait-ul-Mujahideen and the HUJI, etc;
• Acquisition of logistics to use violence for reassertion of
distinct Islamist identity;
• Rapid retaliatory and pre-emptive response to perceived
acts of injustice and offensive actions emanating from the majority
community. Infiltration in the political parties and criminalized Muslim
political figures that offered political leverage to the Islamists.
• Adopting provocative tactics by claiming ownership on
historical monuments like the Taj Mahal by so called representative
Muslim bodies like Waqf Boards and establishment of institutions like
Urdu University to remind the Hindus that imposition of Hindi in the
wake of British ascendance was not acceptable to the Muslims;
• Increased forays in the hinterland areas by Kashmiri
terrorists and terrorists deputed from Pakistan and Bangladesh;
 • Formation of underground tanzeems to spread jihad and to
promote violent activities by harboring jihadists from Pakistan and
Bangladesh;
• Infiltration of the madrassas and prominent religious
institutions by the inducted international Islamists etc;
• Use of other political parties in the name of caste
polarization for achieving political leverage.
• Active collaboration between Muslim mafia dons and ISI
operatives has added the new dimension of criminalization of the
Islamist jihad thrust.
Pakistan’s efforts to inject ‘Islamist’ militancy have traversed beyond the
Pan-Islamic efforts of unifying the Ummah. The JIM and the JIX, in
collaboration with the fundamentalist tanzeems, have penetrated the
madrassas where Wahhabi brand of fundamentalism and jihadism are taught
more than any other secular or vocational subjects.
Attacks on Hindu temples in Gujarat, Jammu, Uttar Pradesh and violent
incidents in West Bengal, Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,
Rajasthan and in Delhi etc., are symptomatic of the “Islamist’ war against the
Dar-ul-Kafir and Jahiliya Hindu society. This new war is aimed at rekindling
the religious fault line that had resulted in the division of the country and it
now aims at creating ripples and waves of a ‘second Two Nation’ movement,
i.e. formation of an other Muslim India out of the existing India. It may be
recalled that attacks on Swaminarayan temple in Gujarat and the makeshift
Ramjanam Bhoomi at Ayodhya were mounted by jihadis from Pakistan in
collaboration with ISI modules established inside India.
One would feel tempted to assume that the Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami, the
Saudi based fountainhead of Islamist jihad, and the Egyptian Islamists,
belonging to Al-Jihad and Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya, were responsible for
transforming the Indian Muslims. This is a partial truth. It is understood that
the Saudi Wahhabi Sunnis and the Al Azhar trained purists of Egypt have
been using the Pakistani collaborators in spreading militancy amongst Indian
Muslims and Muslims in South East Asia. This particular concept is
applicable to the broader context of Islamic thrust in different parts of the
world. However, the fault lines existing between two broad divisions of
Indian Muslims (nationalist and pro-Islamist) were exploited by the ISI taking
advantage of their poorer economic status, acute illiteracy and abject
dependence at the grassroots level on religious leaders for seeking succor
from divine forces and blind conformity to religious tenets. In the macro
context of Pakistan’s jihad against India, the ISI played up these factors to
generate hostility between the two communities.
At the micro level, the Islamist religious institutions of Pakistan and other
Islamic countries, the jihadist organizations, Islamic charities and NGOs were
exploited to encourage the Islamist identities of the Indian Muslims. Most of
the funds were directed to the construction and renovation of mosques and
establishment of madrassas, instead of opening modern educational facilities,
hospitals, and investing in employment generating schemes. Indian Muslims
were encouraged by Pakistan based agencies, in collaboration with the Indian
counterparts, to make the Muslims more religious, and believers in the purest
form of Wahhabi and Deobandi tenets. No systematic studies have been made
in India to quantify the quantum flow of such funds through regular and
informal channel. The Holy Ghost of secularism and vote bank compulsions
had prevented the Indian ruling factions from carrying out such studies. We
propose to examine some of these aspects in the following chapter.



*
 ISI in Action amongst Indian Muslims
The previous chapter has outlined the historical growth process of the genesis
of Pakistan’s efforts to export rabid jihadist Islam to India and other countries
through its fulcrum of evil, the ISI and numerous tanzeems bred by the
Establishment’s Secret Team. The following paragraphs will be devoted to the
mechanism adopted by the fulcrum and various manifestations unearthed by
the Indian researchers and professional agencies.
The Inter Services Intelligence and its associates had taken the following
firm steps to bolster up Muslim militancy in India since 1950:
• Encouraging existing religious tanzeems and frontal
representative bodies and NGOs to float organizations for preaching
and promoting militant ideologies;
• Upward and lateral linking of these deeni tanzeems and
organizations with Pakistani, Pan-Islamic and organizations of similar
hue in Arab countries and later in Bangladesh and South East Asia;
• Liberal funding from its own resources and resources
controlled by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman etc Gulf countries and Libya
and Iran;
• Arranging scholarships for the targeted Islamists in Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, and Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Iran
and other countries for religious studies. Liberal funding was also
arranged for establishing new mosques and madrasaas and renovating
the old ones. Some such funds from Arab countries were channeled
through Pakistan based NGOs.
• Providing arms training to selected bands of Indian Muslim
youths connected to students’ bodies and disaffected groups on
Pakistani and Bangladeshi soil for carrying out armed jihadist activities;
• Funding of madrassas through Tabligh-i-Jammat, Students
Islamic Movement of India and other Islamic NGOs. Attempts were
made by the ISI to bring uniformity in syllabi followed by the Pakistani
and Indian madrassas. This was done through tanzeems like the Markaz
and Sunni edicts as embodied in the Hadith. This resulted in a system of
education that later helped churning out of the talibans. The same
practice was followed in Bangladesh
• Special funding of madrassas operated by Ahl-e-Hadith
sect by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. There has not been any study in
 India to identify which sect/tanzeem/and organization regulates which
madrassas in different geographical locations and what brand of
militant Islam they preach. Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas strictly follow the
Wahhabi brand of Islamic teaching.
• Encouraging Muslim students from other countries to
pursue studies in Indian religious institutions and madrassas, and
offering them scholarships, thereby establishing a brotherhood between
South and South East Asian Muslim fundamentalists.
• Formation of ‘self defense’ and ‘jihadi modules’ and cells in
vulnerable Muslim dominated areas with a view to protecting the
Muslims from Hindu chauvinists and communal elements. These cells
were also encouraged by the ISI to print, distribute hate literature and
educate the deeni awam (faithful people) in the tenets of Wahhabism
and the need for maintaining separate identity of the Indian Muslims.
Such hate literatures are circulated in different vernacular language.
• Bringing systematic pressure on the political parties to
restore unto the Muslims the special reservations and privileges they
enjoyed under British patronage and before partition. In fact, some
parties have started succumbing to such pressure.
• Imparting training to selected Muslim youths in the use of
weapons and explosives by trainers trained in Pakistan/Bangladesh and
by deputing Pakistani trainers under supervision of the ISI. A good
number of youths were also taken to Pakistan and later Bangladesh for
being trained in ISI and tanzeem managed camps. Some of the youths
were also exposed to Afgahn and Kashmir theatres. However, most of
them were sent back to India for assisting the visiting ISI and tanzeem
jihadis, arranging hideouts for them and acting as their arms carriers
and surveillance tools. In several violent incidents carried out by ISI
sponsored tanzeems in Indian urban areas these Pakistan trained Indian
youths played pivotal roles.
• Establishing branches of Pakistani jihadist tanzeems like
Lashkar-e-Tayeba, Hijb-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-
Jihad-al-Islami etc., amongst vulnerable Indian Muslims and tasking
them in guerrilla warfare, sabotage and subversion.

Bands of SIMI (Student Islamic Movement of India) volunteers and members
of Ahl-e-Hadith, Jamait-e-Islami and other tanzeem volunteers from mainland
India were trained in camps inside Pakistan, Pak-occupied Kashmir and some
were even taken to Al Qaeda al Sulbah/Taliban training camps in
Afghanistan. On return these youths were required to clone clandestine cells
in camouflaged names all over the country for imparting training to local
Muslim youths, mostly drawn from educated and indoctrinated segments and
from madrassas. Approximately 300 such ‘cells’ and ‘modules’ were
identified in Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka,
Kerala, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Assam. According to
Home Ministry sources, their agencies had succeeded in neutralizing these
modules. Even if this claim is authentic, numerous such underground and
camouflaged cells are still active and continue to take part in violent
activities. The criminalised elements and mafia members manage some of
these cells. Tapping of the Muslim dominated mafia by Pakistan was
dramatically revealed after the infamous Mumbai serial bomb blasts in 1993.
After the SIMI was branded as a terrorist organization and important
leaders were arrested some of the leading figures fled to Pakistan and floated
another organization named Indian Mujahideen. This was blessed by
Pakistan. Some IM cadres were trained in Pakistan. This outfit was
responsible for several bomb blast in several places in India
*
Attempts have been made to portray an illustrative list of operational
approaches adopted by the ISI to spread jihadist zeal amongst sections of
Indian Muslims. It is also necessary to understand the operational tools used
by the operatives of JIM, JIX and diplomatic mission based cover operators.
• To start with, we may have a look into the mechanism
adopted by the ISI and PIB undercover diplomats in cultivating and
influencing the key Muslim political leaders, important figures in the
Muslim religious and societal organizations, known sympathizers of the
cause of Pakistan and Muslim leaders suffering from partition day’s
hangovers. A list of such individuals contacted, cultivated and
motivated by the chancery based operators from all over India is likely
to run into a couple of hundreds. However, the hardcore list should not
be less than six dozens. For reasons of personal access to such lists and
awareness of maintenance of such lists by prime intelligence
organizations, I will refrain from scribbling down the list. Such lists are
meticulously maintained and shared with the government from time to
time. It is a different matter that the Indian system is not attuned to
admit the bitter truth and is in the habit of burying such truth for certain
compulsions.
• Such motivated and inspired individuals are tasked to
spread communal sensitivities, the inevitability of the idea of another
partition of India for creation of a greater Muslim Homeland, the need
 for developing militancy in demographically viable pockets and to
emerge as effective leverages in the existing political systems. This
particular aspect, is loaded with political overtones and fractured
political frontiers. The truth, however, remains that the ISI regularly
exploits such individuals and groups for promoting the ideas of the need
for new ‘living spaces’ for the Indian Muslims out of the present
territory of India. Such individuals often work from under the cover of
‘secular’ political parties. They are aligned with Pakistan in the shadow
realm of a dream of Greater Muslim Homeland.
• A section of the ISI operatives acting from home bases,
India, Nepal, and Bangladesh regularly act as link chains between the
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian religious, pseudo-religious,
charitable organizations and NGOs. Such linking produces a
networking effect that facilitates free movement of saboteurs, terrorists
and jihadists. This particular section of the ISI also maintain close
liaison with the underworld, organized mafia and criminals, who are
tasked for carrying out sabotage and subversive activities.
• The JIX is known for liberally financing certain
organizations in Pakistan, Middle East, Europe and American continent
for maintaining web domains and pages that spread the messages for
creation of Mughlistan in India, highlight the plights of the minorities in
India, promote jihadist ideas and urge upon the Indian Muslim youths to
join the ranks of Islamic jihadists. A systematic study of these web
pages would bring out the quantum of virulent propaganda bombarded
at Indian Muslims. Unfortunately, Indian public opinion is totally
unaware of such sinister efforts by the ISI and the political class are
obsessed with the efforts of pushing all national dirt under political
carpet.

Certain studies have highlighted a conspiracy theory behind demographic
shift in certain areas of India, especially in Assam, West Bengal, Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh. The general tendency has been to blame uncontrolled
migration from Bangladesh and lack of family planning measures. While the
conspiracy theory is untenable, there exist a ring of truth that demographic
accretion has added fresh weapons to the quiver of the ISI and its separatist
allies in India. This aspect requires examination, as it has important bearing
on Pakistan’s efforts to link up the jihadist upsurge in Bangladesh with the
vulnerable Muslim population in the bordering states of India.
A number of scholars, the Task Force on Border Management appointed by
the government of India, and distinguished persons like the present Governors
of J&K, Assam and Uttar Pradesh had pointed out that Islamic militarization
in India is intricately related to the abnormal growth of Muslim population in
sensitive areas like Assam, West Bengal and Bihar. They also have pointed
out the menace of growing numbers of madrassas and mosques all along the
sensitive border areas with Bangladesh and Pakistan. These indices have been
linked with the Pakistani designs of encouraging demographic imbalance in
certain areas of India and inciting the Muslims to demand another partition of
India. One need not essentially agree with these arguments, but there are
certain deeper truths in these emerging factors.
The most affected areas of India to be disturbed by population imbalance
and rapid growth of Muslim population are Assam, West Bengal and Bihar.
Certain pockets of Uttar Pradesh also have shown this tendency. We have
discussed this aspect in the chapter dealing with Nepal.
Percentagewise growth of Muslim population in Assam is significant
between 1991 and 2001: Dhubri—29.5; Goalpara—31.7; Hailakandi—27.2;
Karimganj—29.4; Cachar—24.6; Barpeta—25.8; Naogaon—32.1; Marigaon
—27.2 and Darrang—28.9. This signified the decadal growth of Muslim
population as against overall population as: Dhubri—74.3%; Goalpara—
53.6%; Hailakandi—57.6%; Karimganj—52.3%; Barpeta—59.4%; Naogaon
—51% and Marigaon—47.6%.
Similarly decadal population growth in certain districts of West Bengal has
also been interesting: South 24 Parganas— 34.2%; North 24 Parganas—
23.6%; Nadia— 21.9%; Murshidabad—28.4%; Malda—30.7%; South and
North Dinajpur—31.9%; Jalpaiguri—31.3%. Compared to this growth of
Muslims in these districts, on overall population growth belonging to other
religions was: 33.2 % for South 24 Parganas; 24.2 % North 24 Parganas; 63.7
% Murshidabad; 49.7 % Malda and 25.4 % Nadia.
In Bihar percentage wise growth and comparative growth has been:
Kishanganj — 35.2% 67.6%
Araria — 36.1% 41.2%
Purnea — 44.1% 36.7%
Katihar — 36.7% 42.5%
(Source: Arun Shourie in Indian Express Oct. 11, 2004)
This trend of growth has been linked to illegal migration from Bangladesh
and very marginal inter-district migration. Muslim scholars have tried to
explain away this trend with higher rate of fertility and lack of family
planning. They also do not find anything abnormal in the considerable growth
of madrassas and mosques in the bordering regions in Assam, West Bengal,
Rajasthan and Gujarat. According to them poverty, lack of access to modern
education, exploitation by religious leaders, institutions and fundamentalist
fervor helped in the growth of places of worship and religious studies in
Urdu, Arabic and Persian.
According to studies by intelligence agencies of the government of India
there are about 60,000 madrassas in India including 54 in Andaman and
Nicobar islands. State efforts to modernize the madrassa education have not
made sufficient dent as yet. In fact, these inherent weaknesses amongst the
impoverished, uneducated and fervently religious Muslims have given
opportunity to the ISI, Pakistani religious and jihadist tanzeems as well as
Bangladeshi outfits to spread militancy amongst them. Islamic charities and
institutions of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries and Muslim Diaspora,
also support them financially. Such madrassas have been responsible for
spreading jihadist messages amongst their students.
The Task Force on Border Management of the government of India
reported: “In several cases, considerable foreign funds have become available
to these institutions through non-banking institutions. Efforts at Arabisation
of Muslims and their education is a matter of concern, which should not be
dismissed light-heartedly. Bringing the educational curriculum of madrassas
into the mainstream by the inclusion of subjects such as physics, chemistry,
mathematics, information technology and so on is a major challenge which
must be accepted in the long term interest of the country.”
Another comment by this body is also relevant to quote, “There has been
mushrooming and visible growth of mosques and madrassas all along India’s
international borders. The intriguing thing is that these have come up where
there is very small or no population of the minority community and that
madrassas and mosques has sprung up on both sides of the border as if in
unison. These institutions could be construed as Islamic infrastructure and
have a potential for intelligence encirclement of India. Concerted efforts are
being made for Arabisation of Indian Muslim tradition by promoting Arabic
or Salafi brand of Islam among Muslims living in border areas.’’
It is not known if the government of India and the concerned state
governments have taken note of this pregnant warning.
It has often been alleged that Pakistan and the Inter Services Intelligence
uses the madrassas and mosques to spread militancy amongst Indian
Muslims. The allegation is not baseless. The brand-characteristics of a
particular Islamic tanzeem determine the nature of education and
indoctrination imparted by the madarises (madrassa alems) under its control.
Such detailed studies have not been carried out. Certain brands of tanzeems
preach the messages of militant Islam and jihad. They receive adequate
support from Pakistan and Islamic countries. For example, madrassas
affiliated to Ahl-e-Hadith sect differ vastly from those controlled by Jamait-e-
Islami and Al Sunnah brand of Muslim tanzeems. It has come to notice that
the ISI targets such madrassas with greater efficacy.
There are reliable reports with Indian agencies that about 1280 madrassas
in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan,
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Assam were identified and exploited by
Pakistan for training jihadists. Some of these madrassas allegedly identified
by the agencies are (illustrative): Jamait-ul-Hidaya, Jamit-ul Ahle-Hadis
(UP), Hafisia Madrassa (Assam), Madrassa Uloom Islamia (Chitli Qabar,
Delhi), Madrassa Babul Uloom (Jaffarabad), Madrassa Jamia Islamia
Sanabul (Jasola, Delhi), Madrassa Riaz-ul-Uloom (Urdu Bazar)—all in Delhi
area. A few madrassas near Azad Market, Delhi, have also come to the
adverse notice of the security agencies. Similarly, Madrassa Miftahul Uloom,
Sakinaka (Mumbai) and Dar-ul-Uloom Noori (Indore) have been noticed
harbouring armed militants. Indian intelligence agencies have fairly long lists
of madrassas used by pro-Pakistani militants for spreading jihad and
executing violent actions against the country.
Other aspects of madrassas being used for grooming, harbouring and
launching Islamic militants are:
• Rabid communal and fundamentalist curricula;
• Attracting poor Muslim boys/youths by offering free food
and shelter;
• Preparing the students for jihad;
• Arranging shelter and transit facilities for the terrorists
visiting target areas in different parts of the country;
• Working as talent spotters for recruiting militant volunteers
for deputation to either Bangladesh or Pakistan for specialized training
with the terrorist tanzeems;
• Functioning as intelligence gathering and reconnaissance
centres.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and countries in the Gulf region, Egypt, Libya,
the USA, UK and Germany and others liberally fund these categories of
madrassas.
A rarely publicized fact that applies to the states of West Bengal and Assam
is that the Wahhabis, who had developed a firm footing amongst the Bengali
Muslims (Faraizi and Titumir movements) during the early British reign,
strictly control chains of madrassas run in the bordering districts. These
Wahhabis are firmly linked with the Wahhabi organizations in Bangladesh,
which often become partners of the coalition governments in that country. In
West Bengal, Assam and Bihar, such Wahhabi elements work from under the
cover of mainstream political parties of the right, centre and the left.
Pakistan’s painstaking efforts to spread jihad amongst Indian Muslims is a
part of its long-term strategic aim to reestablish the unbroken chain of Islamic
hegemony in the subcontinent. This objective cannot be achieved by war;
hence, the tool of jihad has been chosen. This jihad is not for an immediate
war victory. It is a historical tool. This major policy shift by Pakistan and its
main tool of implementation, the ISI is required to be studied in the context of
global jihad concept enunciated by Osama bin Laden and Al Jawahiri of the
Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Jihad, as an Islamic concept enunciated by the Prophet, is a noble concept
of struggle against baser elements of life and society. However, “today’s
global jihad movements, from the Taliban in Afghanistan to Osama bin
Laden’s worldwide Al Qaeda al Sulbah to the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), ignore the greater jihad advocated by the Prophet and
adopt the lesser jihad as a complete political and social philosophy.” Jihad,
Ahmed Rashid, p.2.
*
To implement ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah brand jihad concept in India
Pakistan heavily depended on jihadist tanzeems created and nourished by the
ISI. Like they did in Pakistan and Afghanistan the ISI and other terror arms
of Pakistan heavily depended on the Indian madrassas in Assam, West
Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and bordering areas of Rajasthan,
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
Pakistani jihadist organizations were motivated to train Indian youths to form
jihadi modules almost all over the country. The following Pakistani
institutions are reported to have been involved in training and supporting
Indian Muslim youths and other volunteers in carrying out acts of terrorism as
part of ever-expanding jihad:
• Jamait-e-Islami
• Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islami
• Ahl-e-Hadith Pakistan
• Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
• Jammat-ul-Fuqra (established in 1980 by ISI to assist
 Afghan and Kashmiri Mujahideen)
• Pasban (a front of the JEI)
• Hijbul-Mujaheedin (trained and funded by Fuqra and
associated with Al Qaeda al Sulbah)
• Islami Mahaz
• Ikhwan-ul-Mussalmin
• Markaz-al-Dawah-al-Irshad (Fathered LeT)
• Sipah Sahaba
• Jammat Islamiyaa
• Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin (reincarnation of Harkat-ul-Ansar)
• International Justice Group
• Jamait-ul-Mujaheedin
• Lashkar-e-Tayeba
• Jaish-e-Mohammad, etc.

A good number of Indian jihadists were picked up for training along with the
Afghan Arab volunteers of Al Qaeda al Sulbah, in camps in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. On return, they organised secret ‘jihadist modules’ and imparted
training to their comrades. These modules are known to be located in NCT
Delhi, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Coastal Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh,
Tamilnadu, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and
Assam. The Islamist militants for locating their cells and modules and
targeting high-valued targets have liberally used the metropolitan cities of
Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, Coimbatore, Bangalore and Hyderabad.
Besides the religious institutions and madrassas of subversive nature, the
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and Indian units of the Harkat-ul-
Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and Ahl-e-Hadith etc., organizations were used for
talent spotting and deputing the youths for training to Pakistan. Some of these
forces collaborated with Pakistan on being assured by the ISI that sooner or
later Hyderabad would emerge as an independent country or a federated
country of Pakistan. Some of the rabid Islamist elements that were exposed to
ISI operations in the Gulf countries and were in some way or other connected
to the Malayalee Muslims who had gone over to Pakistan after partition also
took to jihad as a tool of realizing the dream of restoration of the grandeur of
Islamic rule in India. Intelligence agencies have located some such elements
operating in the coastal areas of Karnataka.
Some of the important jihadist Muslim groups of the Southern Peninsula
are:
• Muslim Defence Force—formed in Saudi Arabia by Abu
Hamsa of Hyderabad. It operates in Tamilnadu, Karnataka and Andhra
Pradesh. It is linked to Lashkar-e-Tayeba.
• Indian Muslim Mohammedia Mujahideen formed by Azam
Ghori. Active in Andhra Pradesh and parts of Karnataka. A Ahl-e-
Hadith affiliate.
• Al Ummah—formed by S.A. Basha. It has a known
Lashkar-e-Tayeba link. Active in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and
Tamilnadu.
• Deendar Anjuman—formed by Hazrat Moulana Syed
Siddique Kibla. Active in Andhra Pradesh, Goa and Coastal Karnataka.
• Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam— an organization that is
suspected to be linked with SIMI and Lashkar-e-Tayeba.
The southern tip of India that skirts the Arabian Sea also is described as the
green jewel of India—Kerala. One of the rare homes of Marxist political
groups, Kerala like West Bengal, vainly flaunted the banner of secularism
overlooking the growing communal divide between the Hindus and Muslims.
Approximately around 1989 several rabid communal Muslim groups were
contacted by the ISI from the Maldives and Gulf countries, where the Arabs
exist in large numbers. They also cultivated the fundamentalists through
organizations of Malayalee Muslims owing allegiance to SIMI, Ahl-e-Hadith,
Jamait-e-Islami and All India Jihad Committee, etc. Pakistan’s objective was
aligned to the goal of radicalizing the coastal area and to generate jihadist
resurgence amongst the Moplas (of Arab descent) and other Muslims. As late
as in May 2003, the Muslim militants carried out dastardly communal attack
on the Hindus at Marad in Kozhikode district. There are several instances of
violent clashes between the Hindus and Muslims in Kerala over last one and a
half decades.
In short, following are the important militant Muslim organizations in
Kerala:
• Islamic Service Society
• National Development Front
• Muslim National Development Front
• People’s Democratic Party
 • All India Jihad Committee
It is difficult to narrate so briefly the growth and spread of Muslim
militancy and rooting of the jihadist cells in the southern peninsula. Between
1989 and 2003, more than 25 serious bomb explosion cases took place in
Chennai, Hyderabad, Goa, Hubli and Trivandrum. In Kerala, the Muslim
militants were found to be more aggressive than their RSS counterparts. The
most heinous attempt was a jihadist attempt on the life of L.K. Advani,
former Deputy Prime Minister, at Coimbatore. The latest attack on the IISc,
Bangalore by Pakistan Based and local militants sufficiently prove Pakistan’s
perfidious designs in the Southern Peninsula.
These were not political turf battles. These were genuine terrorist activities
directed against a community and in support of Pakistan’s plan for getting a
strong foothold on the western coast of India that berths important Naval
Fleet of the country and is the home of India’s premiere rocket development
centre. At one point of time, before the recent clashes between the Sri Lankan
Tamils and the island Muslims, there existed a well-defined collaboration
between the LTTE and the ISI. The contact points were located in the Gulf
countries, Canada and the UK. The ISI was noticed helping the LTTE in
procuring and importing arms and weapons from Thailand, Singapore and
destinations in Pakistan via transfer facilities at the Maldives and high seas.
This was ISI’s reply to Sri Lankan bonhomie with the Mossad.
Some intelligence experts have opined that the growth of Muslim militancy
in Maharashtra and Gujarat was attributable to demolition of the mosque at
Ayodhya, communal riots and Mumbai serial bomb blasts. Gujarat has
emerged as the focal point of alleged ‘Hindutva fascism’ that had engineered
the communal carnage in 2002. There cannot be any excuse, whatsoever, for
the deplorable bad handling of the situation by a government headed by a
supposedly Hindutva party. However, the history of communal carnages in
Gujarat and Maharashtra can be traced back to late nineteenth century, when
the first major Hindu-Muslim communal riots broke out in and around 1893.
After the 1940, Pakistan resolution was passed at Lahore the Muslim League
had made it clear that it was in favour of merger of Junagarh with Pakistan.
Ahmedabad was the seat of important Muslim rulers and the Muslims
considered this tract as a continuation of the Muslim majority province of
Sind. Junagarh is still shown as a part of Pakistan in official maps.
Gujarat has been used by the ISI for establishing Sikh and Muslim terrorist
cells, especially in Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat, and Jamnagar areas. The list
of important interceptions by intelligence agencies on Gujarat-Pakistan border
runs into several pages. Ports like Jam Salaya have been liberally used to
induct terrorists, arms, and ammunitions from Pakistan, well before 1993.
Between 1993 and 1995 several terrorist gangs, both Sikh and Muslim, were
infiltrated through the Gujarat route including the infamous 1985 Air India
crash suspect Lal Singh. Indian intelligence agencies had busted several Sikh
gangs infiltrated into India by the ISI and several arms and explosive caches
were recovered. Pakistan had cleverly used the efficient trucking routes that
exist between Gujarat and rest of the country that is dominated by Sikh
truckers’ cartels.
The ISI also activated the Kashmir jihadist groups and their parent bodies
in Pakistan to convert Gujarat and Maharashtra to a wider operational theatre.
Under Pakistani guidance, elements of Laskar-e-Tayeba, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad etc., jihadist organizations have set up
cells in Gujarat, Maharashtra and even in certain pockets of Rajasthan. They
found ready collaborators amongst sections of the Students Islamic
Movement of India (SIMI), Ahl-e-Hadith cells and the Muslim underworld.
They scouted out local talents and allured them with money and other
incentives to join their ranks for carrying out sporadic bomb explosions and
target killings. Mumbai and Gujarat state intelligence agencies suspected the
hands of a little known Dubai based organization called Darul Lashkar in the
bomb explosion incidents in Mumbai in 2003 and 2004. They also pinpointed
the alleged involvement of Moradabad (UP) based Ahl-e-Hadith cell headed
by Gobra faction. Earlier in 1993-94, the Ahl-e-Hadith groups headed by Dr.
Jails Ansari had carried out serial railway train bomb blasts in Maharashtra,
Delhi, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
One striking feature of the growth of Muslim militancy in west India is the
formation of numerous ‘sleeper cells’ by the ISI after locating and
indoctrinating talents picked up from the madrassas, unemployed youth and
alleged victims of Hindu chauvinism. Some important talents were picked up
from the ranks of SIMI units in Maharashtra and Gujarat. According to
estimates made by a central intelligence agency, such ‘sleeper cells’ numbered
over 150.
In this context it was also observed that migrant Muslim workers from
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Bangladesh etc., places carried their
bags of fanaticism and were found to be easy targets of the ISI and its front
paws like the Lashkar-e-Tayeba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen. Bangladeshi nationals owing allegiance to HUJI, Ahl-e-Hadith
and Jamait-ul-Mujahideen were located by the ISI in western India for
collaborating with Pakistani LeT, JeM and HuM cadres. ISI operations in
western and southern India have taken worrisome shape as these activities are
linked to long term Pakistani strategic goals of activating the creation of
Hyderistan (with former Hyderabad State as nucleus), achieving firm footing
on the western coast and reclaiming Junagarh. Like China, Pakistan also is in
the habit of converting mythology and ancient history to current-day reality.
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal have remained the active operational
areas of terrorist groups from Kashmir, HUJI, JuM (BD), and Lashkar-e-
Tayeba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen terrorist tanzeems.
Some of these tanzeem operators infiltrated from Bangladesh and Nepal and
in a striking number of cases they travelled from Pakistan through Kashmir
and carried out heinous crimes in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West
Bengal. Intelligence agencies have had the opportunity of coming across ISI
saboteurs infiltrating directly from their home bases either through
Bangladesh or bordering areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat. Top terrorists like
Omar Sheikh and Azhar Mohammad operated even in Delhi area and their
operational areas covered ISI affiliates operating from Nepal and Bangladesh.
The jihadist hit squads are primed, the ISI planners select targets, and they
provide the logistics of safe housing, money supply through hawala, transport
and local collaborators. The targeted areas are surveyed with the help of local
collaborators and surprise attacks are mounted. The daring raids carried out
inside the Red Fort and on the Parliament building and Ayodhya Temple and
busy market complex in Delhi clearly establish this modus operandi adopted
by the ISI. An intelligence estimate had identified about 30 such ISI support
cells only in the city of Delhi. It has not been possible to identify most of such
cells in UP, Bihar and West Bengal. Nevertheless, attack on the US consulate
in Kolkata, kidnapping of industrialists and repeated bomb blasts indicate that
the border areas of West Bengal have become very vulnerable to ISI
operations.
These incidents also brought out in focus the facts of major exploitation of
Muslim dominated pockets in Jharkhand and Bihar for safe hideouts, transit
route to Nepal and Bangladesh and caching of weapons. Some of the Ajlaf
Muslims are reported to have infiltrated the Marxist Leninist outfits and caste
based political parties active in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. To
identify each ‘sleeper cell’ and ‘support unit’ spanning the entire Indian
territory is a challenging task for the intelligence and security agencies. The
ISI has been taking advantage of this vast geographical factor, factors of
demographic distribution and the factors of Indian respect for the concept of
secularism.
Assam has presented a kaleidoscope of Islamic militant organizations,
which have maintained links with Bangladesh based militant and terrorist
organizations and Pakistani jihadist agencies and the ISI. Some of the
prominent Assam organizations are:
• Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA)
 • Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS)
• Muslim Liberation Army (MLA)
• Muslim Liberation Front (MLF)
• Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MLTA)
• Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA)
• Muslim Security Force (MSF)
• Muslim Tiger Force (MTF)
• Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)
• Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)
• Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF)
• Revolutionary Muslim Commandos (RMC)
• United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA)
Some observers had commented that the impressive array of Muslim
separatist organizations had started sprouting after the AASU and AGP
pioneered agitation against the illegal Bangladeshi migrants. It is not
proposed to dissect the entire spectrum of events between 1925 and 1988, a
period that witnessed the peak of illegal Muslim migration from East Bengal,
East Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Assam for Muslims has become a favorite theme with the separatist
Muslims. These planners also include certain areas of West Bengal that have
emerged as Muslim dominated between 1940 and 2000. Demographic
changes have added political feasibility to the long-term scheme of the
Muslim separatists. Unabated growth of Islamic fundamentalism and jihadist
tanzeems in Bangladesh has improved the feasibility factor to the realm of
possibility. Emergence of Hojai in Assam as a world class seat of Islamic
learning that follows the Wahhabi and Deobandi tenets has fortified the
resolve of the separatists who operate from behind the veils of madrassas,
mosques and inaccessible remote villages. These favorable geographic,
demographic and historical factors have not escaped ISI’s attention. The
agency and its masters in the Secret Team of Pakistani Establishment are
working on long-term objectives to turn these parts of India to another battle
zone, another flashpoint like Jammu & Kashmir.
The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen has reportedly been active in Assam for over 15
years and now its cadres have joined hands with Jaish-e-Mohammed activists.
Bangladesh branch of the HUJI, Ahl-e-Hadith and JuM have also infiltrated
Assam in a big way and it is now claimed that the Muslim separatist groups in
Assam are aligning their activities with the ULFA and Bangladesh based
jihadist tanzeems and ISI/Al Qaeda al Sulbah operated outfits.
Muslim separatists in Assam were responsible for over two dozens of
bomb blasts between 1999 and 2004. The recent devastating bomb blast in a
train at Dimapur, Nagaland, is also attributed to the Muslim militants. In
August 1999, Assam police arrested four ISI agents with 30 kg of RDX. Since
2001, 39 HuM and JeM terrorists have either surrendered or been arrested.
However, a large number of Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and
Jaish-e-Mohammad volunteers continue to be in Assam, West Bengal and
parts of Bihar under cover of religious institutions, madrassas and locally
spawned tanzeems. Assam and West Bengal are special target areas for
sabotage and subversion both to Pakistan and Bangladesh from historical
point of view. Both the countries are confident of escalating terrorist activities
based on changed demographic pattern and proximity of porous international
border.
Recent reports available with the intelligence agencies of the Union and
State governments indicate a developing axis between the ULFA and the
Islamist tanzeems of Bangladesh and Assam. The possibility of such
information being pieces of deliberate disinformation originated by Pakistan
and Bangladesh for thwarting peace efforts by a section of the ULFA and the
government cannot be ruled out. However, the ULFA leadership cannot
continue their struggle without help from Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is not
impossible for the most extreme factions of the ULFA succumbing under
Islamist pressure and agreeing to collaborate with the jihadist Muslims of
Assam. Available reports indicate that Paresh Barua was recently in Karachi
for consultations with the ISI almost corresponding to the period of ULFA
empowered eminent citizens’ dialogue with the government representatives.
In the event of Pakistan pitching in a big way, India has to prepare for a
longer battle in Assam against forces backed by Pakistan, Bangladesh and
other Islamic countries.
Another prime Muslim organization that has been caught in the vortex of
armed militancy is the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The SIMI
has played important roles in collaboration with Pakistani militant tanzeems
and the ISI in spreading Muslim militancy among Indian Muslim youths.
Organised at Aligarh in April 1977 by Mohammad Ahmadullah Siddiqi, a
professor of journalism in the USA, SIMI was originally treated as an
offshoot of Jamait-e-Islami, the pan-subcontinental Islamic organisation.
Before it was proscribed under POTA in 2002, Dr. Shahid Badr Falahi with
Safdar Nagori as general secretary headed the organization. Falahi was
detained under POTA for alleged linkage with terrorist activities. Nagori is
reported to have gone underground and engaged in terrorist activities. Sayeed
Khan, a former president of SIMI, broke away from the organization in
protest against its linkages with the ISI and indulgence in jihadist activities.
Saudi based World Assembly of Islamic Youth, Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami,
Jamait-e-Islami Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh financially support
SIMI. Intelligence agencies now understand that the ISI also finance some of
the SIMI operations. It has established linkage with Islamic Chhatra Shibir of
Bangladesh and the HUJI. Its connectivity with Hijb-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-
e-Tayeba and Jaish-e-Mohammad has been established beyond doubt by the
law enforcing agencies in West Bengal, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and
Maharashtra and other states. A couple of SIMI activists have been arrested
and prosecuted for armed violence in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and
Maharashtra. In southern India National Democratic Front (Kerala), Al
Ummah (AP), Islamic Youth Council and Tamil Nadu Muslim Munnetra
Kazhagam are associate organizations of the SIMI.
SIMI had sent a number of volunteers to Pakistan for training in ISI and
Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Hijb-ul-Mujahidden run training camps. These
volunteers were later noticed being active in terrorist activities often on their
own and in tandem with Ahl-e-Hadith and other tanzeems.
Hate India and Hate Hindu are the twin ingredients of the nation called
Pakistan. It still suffers from the imagined trauma of being a ‘victim nation’,
victim of Hindu domination. This fuel keeps firing the engines of the
Islamists in Pakistan, who draw sustenance from the ISI and the military. It
should be appropriate to conclude this episode by highlighting ISI collusion
with the jihadist tanzeems of Pakistan and their attitude towards normalization
of relations with India. These tanzeems and the ISI do not want normalization,
even if it meant another war. They are not anxious about the future of the
Muslims in India. They want to use the Indian Muslims as war fodders, as
they once used the Sikhs and other ethnolinguist groups in the North East.
Indian Muslims are not pro-Pakistani, though some of them might have
undergone subversion. However, the Pakistani Establishment does not appear
to be sincere in concluding lasting peace and the Fulcrum of Evil is
encouraging the Islamist tanzeems to keep the war cries at high pitch and
target the Indian Muslims more aggressively. These forces are likely to use
the Kashmir weapon to create another flashpoint in the subcontinent.
Mohammad Shehzad, an independent journalist of Pakistan, had exposed
(26.03.05) some of the writings in the mouthpieces of the jihadists, which
point out that they and their mentors, the ISI, are not interested in
normalization with Hindu India. Shehzad had liberally quoted from Nawa-i-
Waqt (23.03.05), Friday Times (JeIP) and Zarb-e-Taiba, mouthpiece of Jamat-
ud-Dawa (former Lashkar-e-Tayeba). The Zarb-e-Taiba has vehemently
opposed the normalisation process with India and urged Pakistan to talk
Kashmir first and other issues later. This episode is concluded with a warning
quote from the mouthpiece, which sounds more or less an epitaph to the Indo-
Pak normalization process:
“Instead, it should play its full and dynamic role in the Kashmir freedom
struggle clearly telling the world that it would not tolerate Indian
oppression on the Kashmiris. Islamabad’s defensive attitude that
Pakistan is not involved in cross-border infiltration, etc., should stop
now as it has not done us any good. Rather, it has damaged our cause.
We have staged a retreat at every step. Time has proved that our
approach was wrong while India’s strategy had been wise. This should
have been otherwise.”
“I would plainly say that we can’t afford such retreats or wrong
approach on Kashmir now. Pakistan will have to take an active part in
the Kashmir freedom movement. It is our moral, legal and religious
responsibility to support Kashmiris’ struggle against Indian occupation.
And we will have to discharge our duty in this regard. This is the only
way to rectify our past conduct. But if we did not change our attitude or
revise our policy of retreat, we should be ready to face serious
consequences. This would not only affect the independence struggle of
the Kashmiris but also weaken our case on Siachen, Northern Areas and
the Azad Kashmir.”
“I would suggest that Pakistan should activate its embassies all over the
world for exposing Indian’s naked aggression on the Kashmiris and its
continuing brutalities on the Kashmiri men, women and children.
Delegations comprising the Kashmiris be sent throughout the world to
tell the world at large about the massacre of the Kashmiris being carried
out by the Indian troops in occupied Kashmir. Islamabad should stop
unnecessary interfering in the affairs of Azad Kashmir government. And
lastly, steps be taken to take the Kashmiri leadership into confidence.”

Indian scholars and policy planners should evaluate the issues seriously when
a Pakistani journalist speaks so openly about the intents of the mujahideen
tanzeems. While our focus on Kashmir is well arched, it should be borne in
mind that the ISI has been successful in sowing the seeds of jihad in certain
parts of India amongst certain sections of the Muslims, who still dream about
‘Muslim India.’ However, it must be added that vast majority of the Muslims
of India have rejected the jihadist invitation from Pakistan. They are loyal and
respectful to the system. It is up to the Indian system, political spectrum,
societal texture and security and intelligence tools to prepare the nation to
face the threat of Islamisation and jihad from Pakistan, Bangladesh and
mother bases in Arab countries.

*
 Intelligence Encirclement of India
Nepal Base
Pakistan’s use of the ISI and other agencies for intelligence and strategic
encirclement of India involved two vital territories: Nepal and Bangladesh.
Pakistan’s intelligence thrust in Nepal is an integral part of its geopolitical
and diplomatic move to gain firm foothold in a vital Hindu country, which is
located between its ally China and its enemy India. Nepal has had historical
love-hate political relationship with India, besides having umbilical cultural
and religious bondages. India often treated Nepal as a Hindu backyard.
Modern Nepal resented this attitude and directed its energies to open up to the
rest of the world.
Pakistan took advantage of this susceptibility of Nepal. Its strategy was
aimed at intelligence encirclement of India as well as for gaining a steady
access to the susceptibilities of Nepali ruling class towards big brother India.
Pakistan had started paying strategic attention to Nepal soon after its debacle
in East Pakistan. Till then Nepal was left solely as a strategic playground of
China in its endeavors of exploiting the Nepalese susceptibilities of India and
India’s strategic and tactical concern over Chinese influence in the Hindu
kingdom. The merger of the Himalayan Protectorate of Sikkim with India in
early 1975 had alarmed both China and Pakistan. China was worried about
direct Indian presence on its border along the Chumbi Valley and nearer to
Tibet, which was still resentful of Chinese occupation. Nepal was worried on
different considerations. With a sizeable Nepalese population, the democratic
regime in Gangtok emerged as a tough reminder to the people of bordering
Nepal that they also deserved a better political status. Certain political forces
in Nepal always looked forward to the big neighbor for support to their
democratic struggles. The royal family never appreciated India’s democracy
casting shadows on the divine monarchy.
Between 1970 and 1977, Pakistan government made delicate diplomatic
maneuvers to nudge closer to Kathmandu with the objectives of strengthening
its presence in the Himalayan kingdom and enhancing its listening and
sniffing capabilities inside India. This had become necessary after it lost
temporary control on Dhaka. In addition to enhancing its diplomatic presence
in Kathmandu, Pakistan encouraged its financial and commercial institutions
to pay attention to Nepal and gradually set up their tentacles in the kingdom?
Along with diplomacy and commerce came the Inter Services Intelligence
operatives, who were housed in the diplomatic premises and were tasked to
penetrate the Nepalese diplomatic corps, bureaucrats and political opinion
makers. Other important tasks given to the ISI included cultivation of the
Muslim mafia which operated on either side of Indo-Nepal border and the
burgeoning Muslim population in the Terai region, along borders with Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim. The ISI normally targets the
susceptible Muslim population in the primed country of operation. India and
Nepal have a peculiar demographic texture in their common bordering
districts. This is the thrust area of operation of the ISI. To understand the
dimension of the Pakistani approaches it is necessary to examine the
demographic characteristics.
India has a long border with Nepal. As much as 821 kilometers stretch of
the 1664 kilometers Indo-Nepal border lies in Uttar Pradesh. Of these 391
kilometers is spread across Poorvanchal’s five districts of Maharajganj,
Sidharth Nagar, Balrampur, Shravasti and Bahraich, all in the Gorakhpur
Range. The area has 252 villages, of which 66 are Muslim dominated. The
Muslim population in the five districts varies from 25 to 40 percent with an
exception of Maharajganj, which has 14%. Right across the border in Nepal
there is a comparable Muslim population. There are 158 mosques and 146
madrassas in these districts and another 102 mosques and 60 madrassas
across the border. The region across the border has a network of 10-tarred
roads and 78 all-weather roads. As against only four authorised routes with
customs and police posts, there are at least 15, if not more, unauthorized
routes. In 1999 alone, the police registered 19 cases of fake currency
smuggling. This would imply that at least another 81 had gone undetected or
ignored.
Besides this, on the Indian side, twenty districts (Uttaranchal-4, Uttar
Pradesh-6, Bihar-7 and West Bengal -1 and Sikkim- 2) and on the Nepalese
side 27 of its 75 districts lie along the border. The border is entirely porous,
which makes movement of criminals, smugglers, saboteurs, fugitives and
intelligence agents extremely easy.
Pakistan’s strategic move to include Nepal in its ‘operation intelligence
encirclement of India’ was palpably visible since 1980, when Kathmandu
based ISI operatives had started intelligence operations against Indian targets
in tandem with its diplomatic missions in Dhaka, Colombo and New Delhi.
Besides this, the Kathmandu post was also used as a fallback station to the
Dhaka mission for supporting the insurgent groups in the Indian North East
and Islamic fundamentalist groups in Bangladesh and India. From 1982
onwards, the Kathmandu mission was in touch with a couple of Indian Sikh
leaders, though the nature of contact at this stage could not be described as
hostile. It was subversive in nature, nonetheless.
To examine these issues it is proposed to briefly analyze the growth of
Muslim population in Nepal Terai and in bordering districts in India, rapid
growth of fundamentalist concepts punctuated by mushrooming of mosques
and madrassas and forays made by the ISI operatives and other Pan-Islamic
forces. The exploitation of Indian fault lines by Pakistan and its operating
tool, the ISI, also requires brief examination.
Muslim population in Nepal has dramatically increased. According to 2001
official census estimate Nepal’s population is about 25 million and decadal
growth is about 2.5%. However Muslim population has registered
phenomenal growth of over 10%. From mere 2½ % Muslim population is
now reckoned to be about 5%.
In fact, Muslims have a significant presence in the eastern region of India.
From Bahraich district of eastern Uttar Pradesh to Gonda, Basti, Gorakhpur
and Deoria and the districts of Champaran, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Saharsa,
Purnia in Bihar and areas of Jharkhand Muslim population has registered
significant growth. In West Bengal, the districts of West Dinajpur, Malda,
Murshidabad, Birbhum, and 24 Parganas and in Assam the districts of
Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang, Nagaon and Silchar have registered alarming
growth of Muslim population. Similarly there has been phenomenal growth of
Muslim population in the Terai areas of Nepal bordering Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
and West Bengal.
District wise growth of Muslim population in Nepal’s bordering districts in
India will give a clear picture of the alarming growth. The percentage of
increase in Muslim population (1981-91) in Uttranchal district of Uttar Kashi
was 196.44, Chamoli 109.74, Pithoragarh 43.45, and Nainital 59.70. In the
U.P. districts of Pilibhit it was 39.34, Kheri 35.71, Bahraich 49.18, Gonda
42.20, Sidharath Nagar 32 and Maharayganj 29. Likewise, in Bihar districts
of West Champaran it was 24.04, East Champaran 31.021, Sitamarhi 32.27,
Madhubani 28.71, Sahara 55.40, Araria 36, Kishanganj 46 and Chhapra 45. In
Darjeeling district of West Bengal it was 58.18.
On the other hand Nepal’s population growth as per 2001 census figures
has thrown up some interesting features. In the hill region there has been
1.5% growth, 2.55% in Inner Terai region and 2.70% in Lower Terai region.
In 1952-54, 64.5% people lived in the highlands, Inner Terai 29% and Lower
Terai 2%. In Lower Terai now population concentration is 55.9%. This is not
because of inner migration from hill to Terai, but because of migration by
Indian Muslims and higher rate of growth amongst the Muslim population.
Migration of Indian Hindus to Terai is much lower as they are discriminated
by the government of Nepal.
There has been phenomenal growth in the districts of Jhapa-1.98, Morang-
2.23, Udayapur-2.63, Saptari-2.03, Siraha-2.17, Dhanuka-2.11, Mahottari-
2.29, Sarlahi-2.55, Sindhuli-2.23, Lalitpur-2.65, Makwanpur-2.22, Rautahat-
2.75, Bara-2.96, Parsa-2.89, Chitwan-2.86, Rupandehi-3.05, Kapilavastu-
2.06, Rukum-2.66, Dang-2.66, Bardiya-2.76, Surkhet-2.45, Doti-2.14,
Kalilali-3.89, Kanchanpur-3.82. It is evident that in the Lower Terai region
there has been more than double the growth than the national average of
1.5%. Of this growth about 40% belong to Muslim community. The point
made is very clear. On either side of Indo-Nepal border there has been crucial
accretion of Muslim population, which has converted the area into a solid
near-Muslim majority tract and a playground for the Islamist forces of
Pakistan, Bangladesh and India with liberal material input from Arab
countries.
Along with the growth of Muslim population there has been significant
growth in the numbers of mosques and madrassas. On the Indian side
significant growth of madrassas has been in the following districts (as in
1998): Sidharthnagar-51, Maharajganj-52, Bahraich-30, Srawasti-28,
Balrampur-25, Pilibhit-12, Lakhimpur Kheri-25, West Champaran-27, East
Champaran-20, Sitamarhi-48, Madhubani-30, Saupal-20, Araria-21,
Kishanganj-25, and Darjeeling-8
On Nepal side significant growth of madrassas has been at: Rapendehi-26,
Kapilavastu-30, Nawalparsai-18, Bardia-20, Banke-18, Kanchanpur-9,
Mohattari-30, Sirha-6, Sunsari-9, and Jhapa-5.
There has been sharp increase in the numbers of mosques in the Muslim
inhabited areas. According to Nepal police sources, about 120 mosques came
up between 1985 and 2000. Mosques along with madrassas play significant
role in spreading separatism amongst the Muslims. According to Husain
Haqqani, a noted Islamic scholar and journalist: “In some ways, madrassas
are at the centre of a civil war of ideas in the Islamic world. Westernised and
usually affluent Muslims lack an interest in religious matters, but religious
scholars, marginalized by modernisation, seek to assert their own relevance
by insisting on orthodoxy. Instead of providing value based education based
on modern, proper and scientific teachings to create good citizens for the
overall development of Indian society, these Islamic institutions produce
clergies for driving the Muslim mass to medieval era as a part of their
movements for Muslim separatism. Instead of guiding the Indian Muslims for
their social, economic and spiritual developments, the hard doctors of Islam
being produced by Islamic institutions keep their co-religionists away from
their emotional integration with Indian society. In the absence of any scope
for re-interpretation of religion for democratic, secular, scientific, industrial
and modern conditions of the society, common Muslims do not see beyond
mosques and madrassas. The young Muslim alumni of madrassas are unable
to join the ‘national mainstream.”
His observation is applicable to almost all the countries with sizeable
Muslim population, especially so in the subcontinent. These are revealing
figures and analysis obtained from Home Ministry sources, which are
reasonably concerned over the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the
bordering regions of Bangladesh and Nepal.
*
The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, especially its Joint
Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) and Joint Intelligence X (JIX), has carried
out systematic exploitation of the Muslim population of Nepal. The most
significant incursion made by the ISI is amongst the growing Muslim
population in Nepal Terai area. The latest census figures indicate that growth
of Hindu population has gone down by 6%, whereas the Muslim population in
the southern part of the country bordering India has shown an astounding
growth of over 15%. Besides progressive procreation, there has been liberal
influx from India and Bangladesh. Growth of population has been
accompanied by mushrooming of madrassas. Institutions and organizations
like Jamia Mohammadia (Tulsipur), Jamia Sirajul-Uloom (Boundhiyar),
Jamaitul Banatun Salehat, Jamia Ittehad-e-Millat and Darul-Uloom-Fazi-e-
Rahmaniya have taken up the task of spreading radical Islam. There are
confirmed reports of regular visits to these bordering Muslim villages by
Kathmandu based diplomats of Pakistan and other Islamic nations. These
institutions and madrassas receive generous funds from Pakistan, Indian
Islamic Institutions, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. Recently some
units of the HUJI of Bangladesh have taken root in the Muslim inhabited
Terai areas of Nepal. The HUJI is known to be a front of the Al Qaeda.
Several Bangladeshi Ahl-e-Hadith activists frequently styled as Jamait-ul-
Mujahideen, Jagroto Muslim Janata and Bangla Bhai have also infiltrated the
area and adjacent tracks in West Bengal and Bihar. Roles played by Tabligh-i-
Jammat of India and Bangladesh require critical examination by the
intelligence and security communities. Rapid demographic changes along
India-Bangladesh and Indo-Nepal borders are intricately linked with the
Islamist terrorist activities and growing collaboration between the terrorists
and the crime cartels.
Besides the above-mentioned organisations, Nepal Islamic Yuva Sangha,
Jamait-e-Islami Nepal (1990), Nepal Muslim Seva Samiti, Jammat-e-Millat-e-
Islam, Nepal Muslim Ittehad Association, Muslim Democratic Welfare
Association, Jammat-e-Ahle-Hadis are actively involved in promoting
‘talibanisation’ of the madrassas and forging links with SIMI and HUJI as
well as with organisations like Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad and Harkat-ul-
Mujaheedin. Islamic Yuva Sangh (IYS) and the Muslim Ekta Sangh (MES)
have a perceptible presence in the Terai belt, especially in the Nepalgunj area.
They have all contributed to deepening of the communal divide. The IYS
reportedly has links with the Binori mosque and the Haqqani School of
jihadist preachers in Pakistan. Some members of the IYS had graduated out of
Binori, Muridke and Peshawar jihadist breeding grounds. The Royal Nepal
Intelligence had acknowledged this fact.
Jamait-e-Islami Nepal, India, and Islamic NGOs in India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh support most of these organizations. In addition, the Pan-Islamic
institutes based in the Middle East also support and fund these organizations.
Besides, the ISI operatives and Pakistan based fundamentalist tanzeems, the
Saudi Arabia managed Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami takes keen interest in
spreading Wahhabi brand of Islam amongst the Nepali Muslims. From Indian
side the Tabligh-i-Jammat, Jamait-e-Islami, Darul-Uloom Deoband, Darul-
Uloom Nadwatul, and Majlis-Ittehadul-Muslimeen etc., take keen interest in
fortifying fundamentalism amongst the Muslim population on either side of
the Indo-Nepal border.
Nepal Muslims numbering over 280 have been trained in Deoband,
Nadwatul Islam in Uttar Pradesh and major madrassas in UP and Bihar.
About 50 of them were trained in Hojai in Assam and 75 in Jamait-e-Islami
affiliated madrassas in Dhaka, Jessore and Natore in Bangladesh. About 500
students were sponsored by the Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami and Markaz-al-
Dawa-al-Irshad for religious studies in Pakistan. Markaz trained youths are
notoriously linked to the jihadist tanzeems. In addition to this, the SIMI of
India and Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS) of Bangladesh have heavily infiltrated
the Muslim youth organizations of Nepal. The accumulated effect of these
efforts by the Islamist forces in Nepal and the ISI of Pakistan has been a sharp
increase in the numbers of pro-jihad Islamists in Nepal, who are closely
linked to the ISI modules in Nepal and India. It cannot be claimed that the
Markaz, Rabita, and HUJI trained Nepali Muslim youths have taken to jihad.
Nonetheless, from security point of view these elements should be treated as
‘sleepers’ in Nepal and ‘active’ in India, as the regional jihadist strategists do
not consider Nepal to be a ripe case for launching any jihad. It can be used as
a launching pad for intelligence and jihadist operations against India.
Use of third country bases for achieving intelligence encirclement of India
has been a post-1971 development. The secured bases in Nepal were not only
used for generating classical intelligence from India. These were used very
efficiently during separatist activities of a segment of Sikhs for achieving
Khalistan, a homeland for the Sikhs. Besides the Sikh terrorists, the ISI bases
in Nepal were extensively used by the terrorist groups of Jammu & Kashmir
for exfiltration and infiltration of the terrorist cadres, arms induction and
securing safe haven. Several ISI trained Pakistani jihadists were also deputed
to India through Nepal route for carrying out spectacular attacks in the
hinterland areas of India. The axis of terror spanning Pakistan, Bangladesh
and India was often bridged by an unwitting Nepal, which was not prepared
to tackle a problem of such proportion.
Over years, Nepal has seemingly overcome its hesitation in cracking down
on the ISI operatives and Islamic jihadists. However, the post 9/11 events
have woken up Nepal to the threat of Islamic resurgence and ISI operations.
The stark fact that Pakistan embassy had played an important role in arming
the IC 814 hijackers had also jolted the Nepalese administration. It is now
overwhelmed by the Maoist threat on the one hand and royal intrigue on the
other. The present royal regime is likely to use Pakistan card to countervail
India and other countries, which advocate restoration of democracy in the
Himalayan kingdom. In addition to the palace a section of the Nepal Army
has been in touch with certain ISI operatives for hurting India out of an ill-
conceived perception that its southern neighbor was supporting the Maoist
ideologues and foot soldiers.
The ISI operatives also used Nepal bases to facilitate support to the North
Eastern insurgent groups like NSCN (IM), NDFB, ULFA and KLO. The ISI
operatives had come to notice for arranging fake passports and visas for
transit of the insurgent leaders to countries like Thailand, the UK and other
destinations in Europe. It is an acknowledged fact that the NSCN (IM) leaders
have lived in Kathmandu over several spells and David Ward, a so-called
friend of ‘Naga Vigil’, had used Kathmandu as an operational base. Other
terrorist organizations, which have used Nepal as safe bases in Jhapa, Ilam,
Tapleganj and Panchthar etc., areas, are the ULFA, NDFB, KLO and the
NLFT of Tripura.
The Sikh terrorist groups like the Khalistan Commando Force,
Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan, ISYF factions, Babbar Khalsa and the
Panthic Committee activists took shelter in certain gurudwaras in the Terai
areas of Uttar Pradesh, after Operation Black Thunder. From 1987-88
onwards, the Sikh terrorists had started taking shelter in Kathmandu, Birganj
and other centres of Nepal where they were sought out by the ISI operatives.
These terrorists were given shelter and passage to Pakistan for training and
for supplying weapons through the porous border with India. It is interesting
to note that four members of the Second Panthic Committee, which was
formed at the instance of the ISI in September/October 1988, were summoned
to Kathmandu by the ISI operatives and a meeting between the two parties,
which took place at Hotel Mayalu.
 During the halcyon days of Sikh separatism between 1988-93, Pakistan
pumped in weapons to India through Punjab, Jammu, Rajasthan and Gujarat
land borders. However, steady flow of weapons and explosives reached the
Sikh militants through Nepal border, mainly with the connivance of the mafia
gang controlled by Mirza Dilshad Beg and his associates in Uttar Pradesh and
Delhi. Some Birganj Sikh transporters were used for this purpose. Several
consignments of RDX and other explosives were sent down to Delhi area for
carrying out explosions against Indian targets.
Ranjit Singh Neeta conceived a segment of Khalistan Zindabad Force in
Nepal at the instance of ISI operatives. Ranjit was later arrested in India while
his associate Mahenderpal Singh was arrested by Nepal police at Birganj.
Joga Singh, a Sikh originally hailing from Poonch in J&K, was trapped by
the ISI to rent out a floor of his hotel to the ISI operative Sarfaraz, a Kashmiri
militant. His collaborators included Hilal Beg, perpetrator of Lajpat Nagar
explosion in Delhi. Sarfaraz had befriended several important Nepali
Muslims, one of them Tariq Ali, married a daughter of Nepalese Premier
Tulsi Giri. At the initiative of ISI Nepal police released its agent Sarfaraz,
when several Muslim members of Nepali parliament intervened with the
authorities. Sarfaraz had carried out several intelligence operations against
India in collaboration with the Punjab and Kashmir terrorists. Besides
important role played by front man Joga Singh in harbouring Kashmir
militants, several Sikh militant leaders were also accommodated at Hotel
Mayalu at the instance of ISI operatives, especially one Mohammad Ismail
Rana, a non-diplomat undercover agent. Amongst the Sikh leaders who had
taken tactical shelter in Hotel Mayalu, the names of Daljit Singh Bittoo
(AISSF), Kanwaljit Singh (PC) and Wadhawa Singh (Babbar Khalsa) figured
prominently.
Kanwar Pal Singh, a cohort of Joga Singh, was deported to India by Thai
authorities through Kathmandu. His interrogation had brought out the
involvement of Nepal based ISI operatives in providing fake travel documents
to the Sikh terrorists. Bhag Singh, a known Khalistani sympathiser, was
arrested on the Indo-Nepal Border while escorting Ajmer Singh, a suspected
Sikh terrorist. Similarly Yakheer Singh, a Sikh terrorist, was arrested with
20kgs of RDX from Kathmandu. Nepal police arrested scores of other Sikh
militants for indulging in terrorist activities. Lakhbir Singh (KCF-P) was
arrested from Kathmandu with 15 kgs. of RDX supplied by ISI operatives.
The material was to be used to carry out explosions in different parts of Delhi.
Lakhbir had made sensational revelation: three functionaries of the
Kathmandu-based Pak embassy, namely, Mohammed Arshad Cheema, the
First Secretary, Ijjaz Hussain Minaz, the Counselor, and A. Saboor, an upper
division clerk, were involved in helping the Sikh terrorists and supplying
them with explosives and other helps.
Yakheer Singh had revealed the name of Mohammad Arshad Cheema for
supplying him the explosive substance and charges. A little later Harpal Singh
and Amritpal Singh were arrested at Kathmandu with 3.5 kg of RDX that they
had received from a Pakistan embassy embedded non-diplomatic staff.
The ISI operatives have also been covertly housed in different United
Nations, Pakistani and its proxy organizations for expanding operational
orbits. In Pokhara region, from where the bulk of the Indian Gorkha regiment
personnel are drawn, a Pakistani construction company called Sachal
Engineering Works (Pvt) Ltd, had started operating for construction of a patch
of road from Marshyangdi to Kairenitar. After prolonged prodding by Nepal
the company finished the work only in 2002. It had made bids to bag new
contracts for Hartok-Tanghas Road, Talikawa-Lumbini road and Syangia-
Tansen Road. Sanchal Engineering has a couple of Nepalese partners, who are
prominent politicians and former diplomats. Headquarters of the company is
located at 52, West, 1st Floor, Blur Area, Islamabad. In Nepal, Ghulam
Hussain Cheema headed the company. There are 9 undercover ISI operators
working amongst the Gorkha and assorted tribal communities, and are
promoting the idea that these aboriginals are not Hindus but Kirats. In fact,
the ISI, in collaboration with certain Maoist elements, has encouraged the
‘Kirat movement’ amongst the tribal communities like Gorkha, Limbu,
Newar, Magar and Tamang. The governments of India agencies genuinely
suspect that some of the Gorkhas have been infiltrated by the ISI. A strange
agitation had cropped up in the Gorkha region during 1999 Kargil war when it
was rumored that most of the Indian army casualties belonged to Gorkha area.
The rumour was spread by the ISI to cause disaffection amongst the Gorkhas,
who are liberally recruited to Indian army units.
It is interesting to note that six Nepali soldiers of Indian army were
detained and classified for suspected link with the ISI. One of them, Prem
Bahadur Chhetri, was arrested in Nepal and was serving sentence in
Gorakhpur jail.
In addition to some such companies, Pakistan has also housed ISI agents
inside PIA office and commercial institutions. Himalayan Bank Limited was
incorporated in 1992 by some distinguished business personalities of Nepal in
partnership with Employees Provident Fund and Habib Bank Limited, one of
the largest commercial banks of Pakistan. The Bank’s operations had
commenced from January 1993. It has five branches in Kathmandu Valley
namely Thamel, New Road, Maharajgunj, Pulchowk (Patan) and
Suryavinayak (moved from Nagarkot). Besides, it has nine branches outside
Kathmandu valley namely Banepa, Tandi, Bharatpur, Birgunj, Hetauda,
Bhairawa, Biratnagar, Pokhara and Dharan. The bank is also operating a
counter in the premises of the Royal Palace. Several intelligence agencies
have reported presence of undercover ISI operatives in the bank through
which Pakistan tries to exercise influence on important Nepalese opinion
makers.
A few other banks with foreign collaboration are suspected to have been
infiltrated by the operatives of the ISI, DGFI of Bangladesh and Karachi
based Indian mafia don Dawood Ibrahim. These are:
• Nepal Bangladesh Bank – Collaboration with International
Finance Investment & Commercial Bank Ltd. Bangladesh
• Nepal Arab Bank—Collaboration with National Bank Ltd,
Bangladesh.
• Nepal Investment Bank is linked to Islamic Finance Forum,
Turkey.
• Bank of Kathmandu has suspected Dawood Ibrahim link.
• Nepal Bangladesh Finance & Leasing Company—It has
suspected links with the DGFI.
It is now suspected that Dawood Ibrahim owned a major cable network in
Nepal and used as a cover for ISI and mafia activities. The media empire
consisting of a wide cable network, a newspaper and a TV channel is
managed by a poorly educated Nepali of Kashmir origin, Jammim Shah.
Indian agencies have irrefutable proof about his connectivity with Dawood
Ibrahim. It is reported that the government of India has shared its concerns
with the Nepalese government.
About 5000 Kashmiri Muslims have settled down in semi-urban pockets of
Terai area, bordering Indian Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Scores of Kashmiri
militants were given assistance in Nepal by ISI operatives and their front men.
The mujahideen Kashmiris were provided transit facilities to Pakistan and
some of their operation plans in Indian heartland were architectured by
Kathmandu based ISI operatives. According to intelligence estimates about
150 Kashmir mujahideens were sheltered by the ISI in Kathmandu alone.
Following the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane on December 24,
1999, it was officially confirmed that Ijjaz Hussain Minaz was the chief of the
ISI operations in Nepal. Discreet investigations were made to establish
veracity of an unpublished report that Minaz, on the strength of forged travel
documents, had visited Jammu and Kashmir in 1998. A. Saboor, a Pakistani
diplomat, was asked to leave Nepal after he was nabbed with counterfeit
Indian currency worth Rs. 2 crores. Moreover, the controversial Pakistani
diplomat, Mohammad Arshad Cheema, had hit the headlines after he was
reported to have gone to the departure lounge of Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan
International Airport and handed over a bag to the hijackers on December 24,
1999.
Mohammed Arshad Cheema, his assistant Zia Ansari, and a Nepali
Muslim, Abdul Riaz Khan, reached the airport in an embassy car. Airport
officials had noted down the registration number of the car. They walked into
the departure lounge unchecked with a briefcase in hand using diplomatic
immunity clearance. One of the Pakistani officials handed over a briefcase to
a hijacker. Cheema did not have the briefcase when he returned from the
airport. After the hijackers took control of it, the Indian Airlines Airbus A300
jet with 178 passengers and 11 crews aboard was commandeered in a zigzag
trip to the Middle East and back. The hijacked plane made stops in India,
Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates, where 26 passengers were released
and the body of a slain passenger was unloaded. It was later revealed that the
hijackers had hidden explosives in the aircraft that were handed over to them
by Mohammad Arshad Cheema and his team at Tribhuvan airport.
This is not the first time Cheema, an ISI operative in the Pakistan embassy
in Kathmandu, had found himself in the eye of a storm. In October 1998,
Yakheer Singh, a Sikh militant, had confessed that Cheema had handed a
packet containing RDX. It is interesting to note that Cheema, who had
completed his official tenure in Kathmandu and was to leave Nepal on April
13-14, 2000, was nabbed when a police party led by Kathmandu District
Superintendent of Police Madhav Thapa raided the rented house in
Baneshwar and found a cache of RDX in a cupboard on the first floor.
Cheema and his wife had been staying there for around a week. Cheema, who
claimed that he had left his diplomatic quarters hardly a week earlier to stay
in the house of a friend, denied any knowledge about the RDX and alleged
that someone had planted it there. The building also housed the offices of
Sachal Engineering Works, a construction company run by Pakistani national
Hussein Cheema. Arshad Cheema was deported from Nepal.
Cheema’s expulsion followed the decision of Nepal not to grant permission
to Space-Time, a television network allegedly funded by Pakistani
intelligence. The Space-Time network was in the recent past perceived as the
hub for launching anti-India propaganda. It had mischievously and wrongly
publicized remarks purported to have been made by Hindi film actor Hrithik
Roshan that had led to serious anti-India outbursts by a volatile section of the
Nepalis.
The ISI operatives embedded in Kathmandu’s Pakistan embassy and
elsewhere had received more than adequate help from a Nepali Muslim mafia
turned political leader who was also involved with Pakistan based Indian don
Dawood Ibrahim. This clique supplied explosives and weapons to the Indian
terrorist groups, especially the Kashmiri militants belonging to over half a
dozen militant groups. These mafia groups operated in places like Kolkata,
Delhi and Mumbai in collaboration with the local underworld mafia.
Use of Kathmandu by the ISI was again highlighted when arrests made in
Ahmedabad after the Lajpat Nagar blasts in New Delhi provided information
on Mumbai’s serial blast accused Tiger Memon’s links with Dawood Ibrahim
and JKLF. Memon had received certain instructions from Dawood through
ISI’s Kathmandu base.
On June 2, 1996, the Gujarat Police picked up four JKLF operatives. Abdul
Ghani Ghoni, a Kishtwar resident who operated under code name of
“Assadullah”, had been present during the meeting in March where Memon
and Bilal Beg planned the bombing offensive in Lajpat Nagar, Delhi. Ghoni
said that the meeting had taken place in House Number 54, Lane 16, in
Rawalpindi’s Chalala Scheme. Ghoni and his associates, Pakistani national
Abdul Rashid Jalaluddin, Chhota Javed Ahmad and Ayub Ahmad Bhatt alias
Zulfiqar, made arrangements for the operation. Chhota Javed had ferried the
explosives used in the Delhi blasts from Kathmandu.
A brief narration of certain events will bear clear testimony to Nepal based
ISI operators’ involvement with the Kashmiri terrorists. Mufti Mehrajuddin
Farooqi, a former Additional Advocate General of Kashmir, had revealed in
his post-interrogation report in February 1992, that he had established contact
with the ISI operatives when on an ostensive pleasure trip to Kathmandu.
Nepal police arrested Raja Irfanullah, another Kashmiri terrorist, in the same
year for prejudicial activities.
Mohammad Sharif, a Pakistani ISI agent arrested in Delhi in June 1993,
revealed that he was housed in Nepal by embassy based ISI operatives.
Samar Khan, a Hijb-ul-Mujahideen activist arrested in Kashmir, admitted that
he had received Rupees 9.8 lakhs from Pakistan High Commission in Delhi
for Abdul Ghani Bhatt, Chairman Medical College and a conduit to the
terrorists.
Latif Ahmad Waza, a Kashmiri terrorist, admitted on his arrest that he was
given 18 kgs. RDX and 4 radio sets by an ISI operative of Pak embassy in
Nepal. Javed Ahmad Khan, a top activist of Lashkar-e-Tayeba, disclosed that
these commodities were meant for use in Delhi. In June 1996 two significant
arrests made in Kathmandu by the Nepal police brought out sensational facts
about ISI operations. Mohammad Azimuddin arrested from Kathmandu’s
Dallu housing project had led the police to a cache of RDX that was received
by him from Pakistan embassy.
Another Kashmiri militant, suspected for involvement in Lajpat Nagar
bomb blast organized by the JKLF, was arrested from Kathmandu in
September 1996 with 29 kg RDX. In December same year Fayaz Ahmad
Shah and four others were arrested with 20 kg RDX. He had received a fax
communication from Pakistan Trading House, Islamabad, with directions to
prepare the jumbo bomb for causing explosion in Delhi.
In January 1997, Nepal police recovered 13.5 kg RDX from Baneswar area
of Kathmandu. The consignment belonged to Mohammad Shaqil Siddiqi, who
was deputed by the ISI to cause bomb blast at the World Trade Centre in
Mumbai. In the same month Fayaz Ahmad Shah (JKLF) was arrested by
Nepal police from an ISI managed safe house from Lazimpet Khat locality of
Kathmandu.
Mohammad Shah Dhobi of Hijb-ul-Mujahideen was given a visa for
Pakistan where he was instructed to carry out bombing in Delhi. He was
promised a reward of two million rupees. His involvement was revealed after
another terrorist Javed Karwa was arrested by Nepal police. This significant
arrest of October 1997 had led to the discovery of a large ISI network in
Nepal and Delhi. During the same period, the name of Tariq Hussain, a
diplomat and ISI operative of Kathmandu based Pakistan mission, had
cropped up. He had recruited three Kashmiri youths for sending them to
Pakistan for specialized training by the ISI.
Linkages between Mirza Dilshad Beg and the ISI had figured prominently
when Nepal police from Thamel area of Kathmandu arrested Yusuf Bhatt and
Abdul Rashid in January 1998. In August same year, Mohammad Altaf Khan,
an area commander of Al Jihad, was arrested by Nepal police while arranging
supply of AK47’s rifles to Kashmiri terrorists in India, in collaboration with
Mirza Dilshad Beg. Around the same time Nepal police arrested Bilal Ahmad
Afroz alias Basarat, in May 1998 at Kathmandu for involvement in Shalimar
Express bombing.
An ISI operative located in Pakistan embassy had supplied 5 kg RDX to
one Javed Ahmad Musi alias Nasir Ahmad Bhat of Tehriq-ul-Mujahideen for
carrying out a blast in Delhi. Nepal police arrested him in April 1999. In June
same year, Azizuddin Sheikh was arrested from Indo-Nepal border while he
was in the process of smuggling in AK47 rifles to India from a cache lodged
in Siraj-ul-Uloom madrassa in Kapilvastu. In the same month Pakistani
nationals Shahnawaz alias Khalid Aslam, Maqsood Lala and Shabir Ali were
arrested in connection with the arrest of an Indian Lokesh Kumar at
Tribhuvan Airport with Rupees 62 lakh in Indian currency, suspected to be
hawala money for carrying out subversive activities. In November 1999
Mumbai bomb blast suspect Qasim Lajpuria alias Mechanic Chacha was
arrested from Indo-Nepal border.
However, a new dimension has been added to the role of ISI in Nepal
following its confirmed linkages with the Maoist rebels. It is now confirmed
that the Maoist rebels are being given subtle support by the ISI with tacit
connivance of the Chinese intelligence for strengthening the emerging
political force, which is not expected to follow the existing Indo-Nepal
treaties and traditional ties between the two countries. Such a contingency,
Pakistan appreciates, will give rise to a new social engineering, which will
witness considerable de-Hinduisation of Nepal. This strategic calculation of
Pakistan, which coincides with Chinese assessment, may change the balance
of power in South Asia, not only for India but also for super powers like the
USA and Russia. In case the ISI is not checkmated in Nepal and Bangladesh,
there is a likelihood of emergence of serious strategic imbalance in the region.
Recent blockade of Kathmandu by the Maoists and the attempt on the life of
Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka prove that the extremist forces favoring Pakistan and
China are on the ascendance in the vital areas of South Asia.
In recent times some serious allegations were made that the ISI was
supplying weapons and explosives to Nepali Maoists through sealed container
services that Nepal is entitled to avail of from Kolkata and Haldia ports in
West Bengal. These allegations require careful examination in the light of
shocking discovery of hazardous bombs and rockets shipped to India from
war zones in the Middle East.

 Bangladesh
Collaborator in Islamic Jihad and Proxy war
The strategy of intelligence encirclement of India by Pakistan from East
Pakistan/Bangladesh is interwoven with the historic pains and pleasures of the
Bengali speaking people of the country. Destined to be the cultural epitome
and torchbearer of renaissance and nationalist fervor, the Bengali Muslims of
East Bengal were forced by certain historic factors to anchor alongside the
fundamentalist aspects of Islam, which had never agreed to cohabit with
Hindu Bengalis and Indians. Total domination of the Bengali Hindus by the
conquering Muslim powers and a serious role reversal after British takeover
of Bengal had brought out the political, economic and religious interests of
the Muslims in sharp contradiction against the dominating interests of the
Bengali Hindus. Linguistic, cultural and traditional cornerstones of the
Bengali national entity could not overcome the political and economic
contradictions. With the creation of Pakistan, East Bengal had become an
important operational base against North East Indian fault lines.
With a brief break, after the freedom struggle and independence, Pakistan
resumed in a big way to infiltrate the civil services, police forces and armed
forces of Bangladesh. Islamist organizations like the Jamait-e-Islami were
strengthened with financial and other helps. The impoverished, illiterate and
politically orphaned people were dragged closer to the fundamentalist Islamic
tanzeems. The Islamisation process started in right earnest after the fathers of
Bangla independence were assassinated and Pakistan trained army officers
took over the reins. These leaders reverted to Islamic fundamentalism as they
had very little material benefits to offer. Bangladesh also cloned the Pakistani
culture of prolonged military rule.
Even after restoration of democracy, Bangladesh now reflects the mirror
image of Pakistan’s Islamicised society and its jihadi tanzeems. Pakistan has
exploited the services of the Bangladeshi intelligence and security agencies in
mounting operations against India. It also fully exploited the jihadi tanzeems
trained in Pakistani and Afghanistan theatres of Islamist jihad. Pakistan and
the ISI find it easy to exploit the fundamentalist streaks in the Bengali
Muslims as the democratic regimes failed to meet even minimum
expectations of the impoverished people. It is necessary, therefore, to briefly
dwell on the historical sensitivities of the Bengali Muslims and their
susceptibilities to succumb under fundamentalist pressure—to turn to religion
after being denied the fruits of independence, democracy and economic
progress.
 Muslims of Bengal, especially East Bengal, had woken up to the reality of
perceived and partially real Hindu hegemony and loss of First nation status
after the Bengali Hindus walked into the phase of nationalist awakening
inspired by western education and British liberal systems of governance. They
had emerged as the early symbols of First Hindu nation. To understand the
present state of Islamisation process in Bangladesh and ISI activities from its
soil it is necessary to dwell a little on those historical perspectives.
It was not a strange coincidence that Pakistan’s very ideology was
spearheaded by a section of Bengali speaking Muslims. Strains of Islam had
travelled to Bengal in waves. The initial impact was from the Arab traders
from the Gulf countries who had started flourishing trade with present
Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia and other South East Asian countries. This
early impact is noticed amongst the delta and estuary Bengalis—in their
social customs and languages. The later impact of the Pathans, Sultanates and
Mughals had spread Central Asian type of Islamic characteristics amongst the
Bengali society. Like most Islamists, the Central Asian and Pathan rulers also
converted the Bengali Hindus liberally. Proselytizing activity is an inbuilt
ingredient of Islam.
The later day Wahhabi movement and the Faraizi agitation heavily
influenced the Bengali Muslims. The British rulers and Hindu zamindars
considered the Wahhabi movement as a revolt against the new British
authority. Rural Muslims considered it as a revolt against Hindu and British
exploitation.
Village ballad singers, troubadours and roving faqirs and pirs (holy
mendicants) moved from village to village with painted scrolls and sang
songs in praise of Islam and greatness of Allah and decried the black religious
and social practices of the Hindus and Christians. Stories of Muslim Ghazis
(living martyrs) humbling the Hindu gods and Christian angels were sung by
these mendicants in the remote villages mostly inhabited by Ajlaf Muslims,
converted from lower caste Hindus.
Puritanical Islam as preached by the Wahhabi sect and the protagonists of
Deoband School in turn influenced both these movements, though a stream of
queer admixture of Siddiqui, Naqshbandi and Chishti schools of Sufism
influenced a section of the Muslims. Sufi tariqas have been widely accepted
by the Bengali Muslims, which made them staunchly anti-Hindu. The brands
of Sufism practiced by different Pirs of Bangladesh are closer to the
ideologies of the Islamist groups in Central Asia. In fact, Sufi movement in
Bengal was more influenced by the non-Arab conquerors. Islamic fervor of
the Bengali Muslims was fortified by the Khilafat movement, which was
erroneously spearheaded by the Indian National Congress supremo, Mahatma
Gandhi. He was espousing a cause which had lost historic relevance and was
crumbling down on impact with modern civilization and the new world
forces.
Advent of the British Raj, growth of educated Hindu Bengali upper and
middle classes, land and business monopoly of the Hindus and their near-
hegemony in government services had created acute economic and political
imbalance in Bengal. The Bengali Muslims, now devoid of political and
economic power, resented Hindu ascendancy. They converged around the
separatist philosophy propounded by Shah Wali Ullah and later by Sir Syed
Ahmed though a good number of Bengali Muslims had identified themselves
with the early nationalist movements headed by Bengali Hindu elite.
However, by and large, the Bengali Muslims did not identify themselves with
Bankim Chandra Chattopadhaya’s Anandamath (abbey of Bliss) brand anti-
Muslim Hindu freedom struggle and Bande Mataram slogan. According to
Khalid B. Sayeed, “what was interesting to note was that Hindu leaders in this
novel made it quite clear that they were not fighting against the British, who
had come to India to free the country from Muslim clutches.” Pakistan The
Formative Phase. p. 22.
The Bengali Muslims, mostly converted from low caste Hindu
communities, had also hardened their attitude towards the Hindu society and
exhibited harder fundamentalist proclivities. Later in 1905-06, Muslim
League was conceived at Dhaka to prove finally that the nationalist
movement under Indian National Congress was a Hindu movement. This
political outfit of the Indian Muslims had rejoiced over the partition of Bengal
and had indulged in severe anti-Hindu communal riots, presumably with
support of the Lt. Governor of Bengal. The British scheme to merge eastern
and northern Bengal with Assam and creation of a Muslim majority tract was
designed to hit at the root of Bengali Hindu nationalism. Later, the Muslim
League leaders advocated the cause for incorporation of Bengal and Assam in
the proposed Pakistan formula.
The above statement is devoid of any bias against the Bengali speaking
Muslims. Bengali Muslims are endowed with cultural and linguistic Bengali
nationalism, which is totally secular. However, Islamist nationalism has
always dragged some Bengali Muslims to Pakistani and Saudi models. These
two differing nationalist strains are always at war with the concept of
secularism and purist Wahhabism.
Emergence of Bangladesh was hailed by many as the ‘defeat of two-nation’
theory. This is perhaps not a correct historical prognosis. The second
separation of Eastern Bengal was also prompted by political, economic and
ethnolinguistic differences. The East Pakistan Muslims broke away mainly
because of serious political and economic imbalance imposed by Punjabi
dominated West Pakistan. Their faith in secularism could not overcome the
serious manifestations of blatant anti-Hindu sentiments and proclivities
towards Islamic fundamentalism. In place of two nations, we now have three
nations. The break up of Pakistan proved that religion couldn’t be the ultimate
bonding glue to keep a nation together. Unfortunately, the subcontinent,
including the hardcore Hindutva protagonists, has also refused to learn this
lesson from the break up of Pakistan.
Pakistan had never reconciled with the break-up of its territorial integrity.
Sooner than later, it piloted a conspiracy to eliminate the top freedom fighters
and succeeded in regerminating the Islamist forces. After the Afghan saga and
emergence of Islamic International Jihad, Pakistan regained firm foothold in
Bangladesh. Acute Islamic fundamentalism and communalism are again
threatening the gasping minorities that believe in secular concepts.
Bangladesh is emerging as the backup replica of Islamist Pakistan. The
fundamentalist forces are at constant war with the secular forces.
Pakistani intelligence agencies, the Inter Services Intelligence, Intelligence
Bureau and Military Intelligence had earlier used the East Pakistan territory to
direct proxy war against India in the North Eastern states. However, with the
balkanization of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh, India was spared the
pains of proxy war in the North East only for a brief period. On the other
hand, different strains of Islamist forces in Bangladesh had not abandoned the
Pakistani practices of aiding and abetting the ethnolinguist insurgents in
India’s North East. Soon after the assassination of the leading figures of the
freedom struggle the pro-Pakistani Islamists amongst Bangladesh army and
administration as well as the dormant Islamist tanzeems resumed support to
the Indian ethnic insurgents. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and imposition of military rule, Pakistan took advantage of the
presence of large numbers of repatriated officers and men of Pakistan army
and re-established its stranglehold on the intelligence system of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh was turned into a spiritual and operational colony of Pakistan.
Bangladesh intelligence machineries are pivoted around:
• The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI),
• The Directorate General of National Security Intelligence
(DGNSI)
• Military Intelligence (MI)
• Intelligence units of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR)
• Intelligence units of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)
 • Criminal Intelligence Department (CID)
• Presidential Security Force (PSF).
The DGFI was created after the assassination of Mujibur Rahman and take
over of the country by the military junta. The DGFI is modeled after the ISI
of Pakistan and is divided into cascading ‘divisions’ and ‘sections’, which
look after internal and external intelligence, manage country desks and handle
analysis and intelligence projection. It has assumed the charters of internal
security intelligence, defensive and offensive counter and forward
intelligence, internal political intelligence, liaison with the Islamist jihadi
tanzeems and coordination with similar forces in India and Pakistan. A
separate division of the DGFI, under a deputy director, looks after special
forward intelligence in India. The DGFI is mostly staffed by military
personnel with attached field units and detachments in the Bangladesh Rifles,
which are equivalent to the Border Rangers of Pakistan. The BDR follows the
training and functional pattern of the Indian Border Security Force to some
extent. The DGFI maintains intelligence unit components in the BDR, who
normally liaise with the insurgents and terrorist groups in India.
Officers of the level of Colonel who report to the South Asia Division of
the organization operate the DGFI’s Nepal, Bhutan and India desks. The India
desk has three distinct sections, which handle North Eastern states, West
Bengal and rest of India.
The officer corps of the DGFI and personnel of the NSI have been
extensively trained in Pakistan and the CIA and MI6 have also imparted
occasional training. There exist special arrangements with Pakistan for
training of Bangladeshi military and civilian intelligence officers by the Inter
Services Intelligence of Pakistan. The special units of the DGFI are also
required to undergo CIA type commando training. Most of them are expert in
handling explosives, sophisticated weapons and other black arts of
intelligence trade.
Officers of the DGFI and occasionally NSI are assigned cover postings to
its diplomatic missions in countries considered important to strategic
intelligence to Bangladesh. According to Indian intelligence departments,
there are 9 Bangladeshi cover intelligence operators in its Delhi and Kolkata
missions.
The Directorate General of National Security Intelligence is a separate
civilian organization but traditionally is headed by a senior military officer. It
is responsible for collecting internal intelligence and monitoring internal
political affairs. The pivotal intelligence agency, however, is the Directorate
General of Forces Intelligence. It monitors disaffection within the ranks and
runs counterintelligence operations. The heads of the Directorate General of
National Security Intelligence and the Directorate General of Forces
Intelligence are usually the President’s closest advisers. The Police Special
Branch also operates an intelligence wing, which augments both the
Directorates’ intelligence capabilities. Since assuming power in 1982, General
Ershad had exercised tight control over the intelligence establishment.
Another security organization is the Presidential Security Force, which was
formed by Ershad while he was the chief martial law administrator. The
organization’s mission was to ensure physical security of Ershad and his
family. Because two of his predecessors were gunned down during army
rebellions, Ershad was undoubtedly concerned over threats to his life. The
commander of the Presidential Security Force is an army brigadier who
reports directly to the President. Surprisingly the PSF is also engaged in
collecting intelligence on its own with the ostensive purpose of protecting the
President. Under an elected government, this organization has receded to the
background, but is used by the incumbent prime ministers for monitoring the
functioning of the armed forces.
It would be incorrect to claim that freedom struggle had transformed all the
Bengali Muslims to secularists. Even at the height of freedom struggle the
Islamist elements had cooperated with Pakistan and massacred both Hindus
and Muslims. These elements headed by Jamait-e-Islami and affiliated
tanzeems had just gone underground and resurfaced after Mujibur Rahman
was eliminated.
However, anti-India activities of the pro-Pakistani and Islamist elements
were initiated and intensified after Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and
military rule was imposed. The Indian texture of the intelligence fraternity,
common to India and East Pakistan, was dismantled and the structures were
recast on the pattern of the ISI and a new ideology was added: the hate India
ideology. The anti-India proclivities of the Bangladeshi intelligence were
fortified by the emergence of Jamait-e-Islami, its student wing—Islamic
Chhatra Shibir (ICS) and Tabligh-i-Jammat. Revival of fundamentalist
tanzeems was encouraged by the developments in Iran, Afghanistan imbroglio
and virtual recognition by the USA and China that Islamist Jihad was the
correct weapon to achieve regional and strategic political goals. As it
happened in Pakistan, the activities of the Bangladeshi intelligence agencies
and the ISI operations from Bangladesh coincided with the ideology and
implementation of the policies of mujahideen activities against kefir regimes
in Afghanistan, Europe and in South and South East Asia. According to some
Bangladesh scholars the Afghan, Chechnya and Bosnia veterans had
transplanted the ideas of Al Qaeda al Sulbah, ISI and Taliban type Islamist
resurgence in Bangladesh.
To understand the Bangladesh based thrust of the ISI and the DGFI against
India, it is necessary to understand the near complete capture of Bangla
society by pro-Pakistan jihadists. Coordination and execution of Pakistan’s
anti-India operations are implemented in collaboration with the DGFI. An
officer of the rank of Brigadier maintains liaison with the ISI. Besides the
DGFI, the JIM and JIB have powerful fundamentalist friends in Bangladesh
in the Jamait-e-Islami (political ally of the BNP), Islamic Chhatra Shibir
(ICS), Islamic Oikyo Jote (third important political force), Al Badr, Harkat-
ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and Al Qaeda al Sulbah affiliated Al-Jihad. The
latest incarnation of Islamist forces in Bangladesh are headed by Bangla Bhai
(Bengali Brotherhood), Jagrata Muslim Janata (Awakened Muslim People),
Ahl-e-Hadith and Jamait-ul-Mujahideen. In addition to the above, two groups
of the Rohingya rebels (Myanmar Arakani Muslims) operate freely in
collaboration with the Bangladeshi and Pakistani operatives. The Rohingyas
aspire for establishment of an independent Islamic state in the Arakan region
of Myanmar.
Main Islamic militant and jihadist groups in Bangladesh are:
• Jamait-e-Islami (JeI) - A religious-political party originally
floated by Maulana Maudoodi. It dates back to the British colonial era.
It supported Pakistan against Bengali freedom struggle during the
liberation war, and most of its leaders fled to Pakistan after
Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. In December 2000, Motiur Nizami
Rahman, a former pro-Pakistani militant, assumed leadership. In the
October 2001 elections, JeI emerged as the third largest party, with 17
seats in the parliament and two ministers in the new BNP headed
coalition government. JeI’s final aim is to establish an Islamic state in
Bangladesh.
• Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS)– Jamait’s youth organization.
Set up in 1941, it became a member of the International Islamic
Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO) in 1979. ICS is also a
member of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and has close
contacts with other radical Muslim youth groups in Pakistan, the
Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia. The ICS has known links with
the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which has often been
involved in terrorist activities. It has been implicated in a number of
bombings and politically and religiously motivated assassinations.
Nurul Islam Bulbul is its current president and Mohammed Nazrul
Islam is the secretary general. The ICS has eight territorial divisions and
230 subdivisions. It is engaged in perpetual struggle against Chhatra
League, student front of the secular political party Awami League. It is
known that several members of the ICS were taken to Pakistan for
militant training at Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Tayeba camps.
The ICS also has a sizeable armed group.
It is pertinent to mention that JeI and ICS Bangladesh
maintain close liaison with JeI units in Assam, West Bengal and Bihar.
The ICS also maintains regular contacts with the SIMI units and other
Islamist tanzeems operating in the bordering areas of these states. There
exists an unbroken chain of Islamist linkages between these
fundamentalist outfits of Bangladesh and India. The ICS has infiltrated
the youth and student wings of the BNP and set up networking with
JMB, HUJI, JMJ and other jihadist organizations.
• Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ)– The party was floated by certain
pro-Pakistani maulanas after General Ershad seized power through a
military coup. The party maintains close liaison with the Islamist
fundamentalist forces. It had joined the BNP government headed by
Begum Khaleda Zia after 2001 elections under the leadership of
Maulana Amini. This party had given a slogan: Amra sobai Taliban,
Bangla hove Afghanistan (We all are Taliban, Bangla will be
Afghanistan).
• Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI)– It is Bangladesh’s main
militant outfit having links with the mother organization in Pakistan.
The HUJI has active units in India and the three outfits often work in
tandem. Set up in 1992, it now has an estimated strength of 25,000 and
is headed by Shawkat Osman aka Maulana or Sheikh Farid of
Chittagong. Its members are recruited mainly from madrassa students
and unemployed youth. Its members describe themselves as jihadis, and
until last year, they called themselves as ‘Bangladeshi Taliban’. The
group is believed to have extensive contacts with Muslim groups in the
Indian states of West Bengal and Assam. The HUJI is known to have
steady links with Pakistan based jihadist outfits.
Bangladesh intelligence is aware that the HUJI has a
considerable arms holding, which are often supplied from Pakistan
through sea route and Nepal. HUJI jihadists had taken part in Afghan
jihad and jihad sponsored by the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah in the
South East Asian countries, Bosnia, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Kosovo.
HUJI is reported to have direct links with Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Recent
demand of HUJI to treat 15 of its cadre killed in Afghan action as
martyrs proves the point beyond doubt.
According to some recent reports from Bangladesh, HUJI
adopted the new name Jamait-ul-Mujahideen, Bangladesh, sometime in
2003, to avoid attention from the US and Indian Bangladesh watchers,
who had identified HUJI as an Al Qaeda al Sulbah and ISI offshoot.
(The Daily Star 14.09.2005).Only in Oct 2005 Bangladesh government
banned the HUJI, an action already treated as sterile.
• The Jihad Movement of Bangladesh (JMB)– Osama bin
Laden’s February 23, 1998, fatwa urging jihad against the USA and
Israel was co-signed by two Egyptian clerics, one from Pakistan, and
Fazlul Rahman, “leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh”. This is
not believed to be a separate organization but a common name for
several Islamic groups in Bangladesh, of which HUJI is considered the
biggest and most important. Fazlul Rahman, as the leader of JeI, had
opposed the freedom struggle and had organized Ansar forces to
assassinate liberation loving Bengali Muslims and Hindus. He is now
close to the BNP and has reportedly floated, at the behest of the BNP, a
movement styled as Jagrato Muslim Janata (Awakened Muslim People).
Al Qaeda al Sulbah supports Jihad Movement and other similar outfits.
• Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO)– It is a
political group among Rohingya migrants from Myanmar, who live in
the Chittagong-Cox’s Bazaar area. It claims to be fighting for an
autonomous Muslim region in Myanmar’s Arakan (Rakhine) State. It
was set up in 1999 through merger of the Arakan Rohingya Islamic
Front (ARIF) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO).
• Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO)– Traditionally, the
RSO has been very close to Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar based Jamait-
e-Islami and Islamic Chhatra Shibir. In the recent past, the HUJI has
started championing the Rohingya cause as the Myanmar rebels often
help the HUJI in smuggling arms from Thailand. In the early 1990s,
RSO had several military camps near the Myanmar border, where
cadres from the Islami Chhatra Shibir were also trained in guerrilla
warfare. The most important camp is at Ukhia, which is often compared
to Tora Bora complex created by the NATO engineers for the Afghan
and Al Qaeda fighters. Pakistani experts had helped the Bangladeshi
military engineers in constructing the Ukhia camp.
• Jagrato Muslim Janata (JMJ)– It is a recently formed
organization that indulges in killing and assassination of secular and
suspected Marxist-Leninist activists (Purva Bangla Sarbohara Party) in
Bangladesh. They are active in northern districts of Bangladesh,
bordering India. The movement is also known as ‘Bangla Bhai’-Bengali
Brotherhood. It is also known as Jamait-ul-Mujahideen. This outfit is
supported by Pakistani Islamist tanzeems like Jaish-e-Mohammad and
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. They try to cruelly enforce Sharia rules and
social customs like their Taliban counterparts. The JMJ enjoys the
backing of the BNP-led coalition government and Jamait-e-Islami and
has spread its tentacles in the bordering areas inside India.
Bangla Bhai, HIzbut Tehri, Jamait-ul-Mujahideen
Bangladesh volunteers collect regular ‘jihad zaqat’ from the devotees
who congregate at their area mosques. This movement is known to train
large number of Bengali Muslims in jihadist activities. Selimullah, one
of the leaders of the outfit based in Bangladesh’s eastern district of
Mymensingh was arrested in Chittagong early in 2001. He admitted in
court that more than 500 jihadists had been training under him in
Bangladesh. On his computer, intelligence sources found photographs
to be sent to donors showing Islamic soldiers at rest and at attention
position, armed with AK 47s and wearing shiny new boots. Selimullah
said that his group received weapons from supporters in Libya and
Saudi Arabia, among others.
• Shahadat-i-Alam-al-Hiqma– This organisation was floated
by Syed Kawsar Hussain on December 29, 1996, after he returned from
a prolonged training visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initially he ran
his outfit as Freedom Party. He claims that his Hiqma party is affiliated
to World Islamic Front, i.e. Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami.
Bangladesh government had banned this organization in
2000 for its alleged links with Awami League.
• Tabligh-i-Jammat is the main proselytizing arm of the
Islamic movement. Bangladesh has a tradition of holding annual
Vishwa Ijtema (world congregation) of the TJ at Tungi near Dhaka. The
annual TJ fair has, over years, added to the religious fervor of the
Bengali Muslims and converting Bangladesh as the experimental
ground for the Rabita-al-Alam-al Islami and other pan-Islamist
organizations to implement the strictest form of Islam as prescribed by
the Wahhabi sect of Saudi Arabia. Bangladesh unit of the TJ is
suspected to have close liaison with the Saudi intelligence and the ISI.
• Ahl-e-Hadis (Hadith) Bangladesh—Bangladesh unit of the
Islamist organization has two factions: one headed by Prof. Mohammad
Rejaul Karim. He rose through the ranks of ICS and was affiliated to JeI
BD. However, he has managed to link up with the Ahl-e-Hadith Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan. His group has about 16 branches in Bangladesh. It
is known to have links with HUJI. Dr. Ghalib heads the other group.
Rejaul Karim accuses Dr. Ghalib for having linkage with international
 Islamist jihadists. Ahl-e-Hadis BD is known to have organized violent
actions against the minority Hindu and Buddhist communities. Ahl-e-
Hadis BD manages about 200 madrassas in the country, which receive
lavish donations from Arab countries.
• The main figure behind Bangla Bhai, Jagrata Muslim Janata
and Jammat-ul Mujahideen is Shaikh Abdul Rahman of Jamalpur, son
of Abdullah Ibn Fazal. He has deep links with Wahhabi sects of Saudi
Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and other Arab nations. His father was also in
constant touch with them even before Bangladesh was created. He was
detained as a war criminal for killing innumerable freedom fighters.
Fazal had founded the Ahl-e-Hadis in Bangladesh at the behest of Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan. Abdul Rahman had studied in Al Medina
University of Saudi Arabia and from there had gone over to Pakistan
where he was trained by the ISI at Muridke and later he fought in
Afghan jihad. He was financially supported by Saudi Revival of Islamic
Heritage Society (Kuwait) and Al Haramain Islamic Foundation.
Returning to Dhaka he served in the Saudi embassy and gradually built
up a pro-Saudi and Pakistani network of terrorist organizations with a
view to bring in Islamic changes through jihad. According to Daily
Ajker Kagoj of Dhaka, there are about 1000 jihadists in the
organizations well trained in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya and Lebanon.
During 2005 Jamait-ul-Mujahideen, Bangladesh emerged as the most
violent jihadi tanzeem. It is responsible for serial bombing, suicide
bombings and targeted violence against the secular forces.
Dr. Ghalib and others had admitted during interrogation that they were in
receipt of huge funds from a Kuwait based charity organization (pan-Arab
Wahhabi organization) for promoting Islamist fundamentalism in Bangladesh.
These funds were used by Ahl-e-Hadis, Bangla Bhai and Jamait-ul-
Mujahideen for training armed cadres in desolate river islands (chars) and
forested areas.
According to The Daily Star (22.08.2005), “A study by the Human
Development Resources Centre (HDRC)…these organizations once depended
on foreign funding. They are now big enough to gather funds internally
through various businesses. According to the HDRC these organizations earn
about Tk 1,200 crore a year through business investments.”
Saudi-based NGO Al Haramain Islamic Institute is one such organization
that brought in Tk 20 crore through the NGO Affairs Bureau from 1997 to
2001, its annual report of 2002 said. It was finally banned in September 2002
after the UN listed it as a terror cell. Haramain had Tk 19 crore more in the
pipeline to be spent on Islamic education in 38 districts. The police arrested
seven foreign citizens of Al Haramain in September 2002 and later, under a
special arrangement with a Middle East country they were taken to a five-star
hotel right from the Dhaka Judge’s Court and then put on a flight under strict
secrecy.
Militants received funds for madrassas from the UAE-based welfare
organizations Al Fuzaira and Khairul Ansar Al Khairia, Kuwait-based
Doulatul Kuwait and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society and Bahrain-based
Doulatul Bahrain, said intelligence sources.
The HDRC study said the JMJB, under a programme called ‘Operation
Research’, had received funds from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Muslim
World League. Laden’s close associate Enam Arnot and his organization
Benevolence International Organization, which was registered with the NGO
Bureau, had bank accounts in Bangladesh. A UN report said he was a top
fund raiser for Laden.
Pakistani citizen Mohammad Sajid, who was arrested for attacking poet
Shamsur Rahman on January 18, 1999, told police that he received Tk 2 crore
and gave the money to someone called Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar, when arrested in
Sirajganj the same year, confessed to police that he distributed the money
among 421 madrassas for training activists of Harkatul Jihad (HUJI). Both
the militants said Laden had sponsored them to develop madrassa
infrastructure.
The Korea Times reported on October 13 2004 that three Bangladeshis,
who were deported to Dhaka from Seoul in April the same year, collected
about $87,000 and sent the money to Jamait-e-Islami in Bangladesh. The
three were members of a Seoul-based Islamic Organisation, Dawatul Islam.
Bangladesh embassy in Seoul, however, denied the contents of the report.
Dr Asadullah Al Ghalib, a militant, now under arrest for attacking different
NGOs including Brac and Grameen Bank, had confessed to the Joint
Interrogation Cell (JIC) that he received around Tk 27 crore every year from
the Middle East, especially from an organization called Revival of Islamic
Heritage Society (RIHS) of Kuwait. RIHS was registered with the NGO
Affairs Bureau on January 11, 1996. Ghalib admitted having spend the funds
on the JMB, JMJB and Al Hiqma, all banned, and the first one is suspected to
be involved in the August 17, 2005 serial bombings in Bangladesh. Since
Ghalib’s arrest, the government stopped disbursement of funds from RIHS.
RIHS was blacklisted by the US State Department on September 9 2002,
for funding Islamist terrorists.
The Bangladeshi jihadists had received specialized training in Pakistan and
from Rohingya terrorists. On January 22, 2001, Chittagong police had
arrested Salumullah Selim, a 45-year-old man, from a residence in the port
city. On interrogation, they learned the true nature of his identity — he was
the army chief of an Arakan militant outfit called Arakan Rogingya National
Organization (ARNO). Records showed he was previously arrested in 2000.
He admitted that he trained local madrassa students in armed combat.
According to him, more trainers from African and Middle Eastern countries
frequently visit Bangladesh to train the local Islamist militants.
Away in the forest of Bandarban police uncovered a madrassa, run by
JUM. Boys took religious lessons during the day; during night turned it into a
militant camp to train the same students in arms and explosives. This was one
of the many madrassas that militants used as training centers. The
government sealed three of them after police raids found dummy rifles for
training. They have mustered enough capability to create a dangerous
situation, a Special Branch report in 2003 warned.
A more revealing comment came from Sayed Kawsar Husain Siddiki,
chairman of now banned militant group Shahadat Al Hiqma. On February 8,
2003, he said in a press conference in Rajshahi that Hiqma arranged arms
training to its members. Intelligence agencies have reported the presence of
militant camps in Ramu, Ukhia, Mongkhola, Dalujhiri, Chhagalnaiya and
Jarulchhari. In the northern districts, such training is given at night along
different river islands and forests.
Another militant, Abdur Rouf, arrested at Boalmari in Faridpur on
September 19, 2003, also admitted taking training from Pakistan and working
as a trainer at a madrassa at Bhaluka in Mymensingh. He was later released
on bail.
Another sinister aspect of Islamist tanzeems in Bangladesh is that they are
able to generate huge funds from within the country. According to a study
conducted by Prof. Abul Barqat of the department of Economics and General
Secretary Economic Policy Committee of Dhaka University (Ajker Kagoj
21.04.05), the Jihadi and fundamentalist organizations earn on an average a
profit of Taka 1,200 crore every year, which they spend on recruitment of
cadres, training and arming them, paying their salaries and other
organizational expenses.
These tanzeems invest in financial institutions, educational organizations,
drug and diagnostics industry and business, health clinics, religious
institutions, commercial and trading ventures, transport sector, real estate, IT
& Communication, NGOs and organizations like Bangla Bhai.
Their estimated income break up is as follows:
 Banking, Insurance, Leasing- Taka 3.25 cr, NGOs-2.50 cr, Wholesale and
retail business-1.30 cr, Drugs and Diagnostics-1.25 cr, Education-1.10 cr,
Real Estate-100 cr, Transport-90 cr, Information and IT- 70 cr. These figures
represent 1.53% of national investment and 2.1% of non-governmental
investment, 3.3% of national revenue income, 3.7% of national export income
and 6% of national development budget. In addition to income generated
from within the country, these organizations receive huge funds from Saudi
Arabia, other Arab countries, Iran and Pakistan. It would be seen that while
the Ahl-e-Hadith work as the umbrella its tentacles are in control of the three
major jihadist groups: JMJ, Bangla Bhai, JUM Bangladesh. While Dr. Ghalib
has been arrested the JMB and Bangla Bhai chiefs have eluded arrest. It is
now believed that JMB is the youth front of Al Mujahideen formed in mid-
1990 at the behest of the ISI. It drew inspiration from Al Qaeda and received
funds from both the lynchpins of international Islamic jihad.
Latest research has brought out that Jamiat-ul-Jihad, JMB, Ahl-e-Hadith
Yuba Sangha, Harkat-ul-Jihad, Hizbut Tawhid, Tawhidi Janata, Islamic Jubo
Sangha, Islamic Sangha. Al Falah A’am Unnayan Sangstha and Sahadat-e-
Hiqma, Islami Biplobi Parishad, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (also in Uzbekistan), Biswa
Islami Front, Al Jamaitul Islamia, Iqra Islamic Jote, Allhar Dal (party of
Allah), Al Khidmat Bahini, Al Mujahid, Jamait-ul-Yahya-Turag, Al-Harkat-
al-Islamia, Al- Mahfuz-al-Islami, Jamait-ul Faluda, Sahadat-e-Nabuwat,
Joish-e-Mustafa, Tahfize Haramaine Parishad, Duranta Kafila (wild band) and
Muslim Guerrilla had been spawned by the Al Mujahideen under Saudi,
Kuwait, Pakistani and Al Qaeda patronage and funding. These groups had set
up over 60 training centers for Bengali youths to organise sustained struggle
for setting up a Taliban type Islamic state in Bangladesh.
According to Zayadul Ahsan (The Daily Star-21.08.2005), “Many of their
activists are Afghanistan and Pakistan veterans who fought there after
receiving training in Pakistan, Libya and Palestine. After returning to
Bangladesh these militants scattered over the country and started militant
activities since the early 1990s. According to intelligence agencies about 7000
members from different organizations including the Freedom Party were
trained in Libya, Lebanon and Palestine.” These organizations claim to have
10 lakh members.
Bangladesh is a violence prone country, where plenty of arms and
explosives are easily available. Most of these Islamist organizations maintain
their armed groups, who engage in killing and plundering the minority
communities. Often warring political groups use these outfits to score
vengeance against their adversaries. Some of these groups operate with
immunity in the bordering tracts of Assam and West Bengal and manage their
functional units amongst Indian Muslims. Such trans-border affiliates are
used by Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence agencies to export terrorists
and jihadists inside India. In fact, units of ICS, JMB, HUJI and Ahl-e-Hadith
(B) are active in Indian districts of Malda, Murshidabad, South 24 Parganas,
Nadia, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling and several districts of lower Brahmaputra and
Barak valleys in Assam. The HUJI and JMB have set up cells in other parts of
India, including the Southern Peninsula.
These hardcore militant organizations are patronized by Pakistan based
jihadist tanzeems, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait based Wahhabi and Pakistan
based jihadi fulcrums and the Inter Services Intelligence. These bodies depute
religious experts to train and motivate the Bengali jihadists. A few chosen
volunteers have been intermittently recruited to undergo training in ISI camps
at Peshawar and Khowst to fight alongside the Afghan mujahideen. A few of
them were motivated to infiltrate into India and indulge in jihadist activities in
West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and as far as in Delhi and Mumbai. At times,
these jihadists were manipulated by the ISI from its bases in Thailand,
Malaysia and Kathmandu. The ISI also uses the JeI, ICS, HUJI, and Jamait-
ul-Mujahideen collaborators for housing and facilitating infiltration into India.
International Islamic Jihad has taken positive steps to bring Bangladesh into
the axis of Islamic jihad. The ISI and the Al Qaeda al Sulbah have already
established firm roots in Bangladesh.
Besides spreading communal virus and killing Hindu minorities
indiscriminately, these jihadist bodies have challenged the democratic system
itself in Bangladesh. These organizations have been used by the DGFI and ISI
for providing training facilities to the Indian terrorist groups belonging to the
ULFA, NDFB, NSCN (I), TNLF and scores of Meitei (Manipuri) terrorist
groups. The DGFI and ISI operatives have also come to notice for deputing
its members to Assam where the Muslim separatists have floated over a dozen
militant outfits. These aspects have been discussed briefly in another chapter.
The ISI and the DGFI have often adopted clever moves to accommodate
Indian terrorist trainees in camps run by some of these tanzeems. They are
sumptuously compensated for such collaboration.
Use of Bangladesh territory by the JIM and JIX of the ISI had intensified
after the ascendance of the military rulers, who were mostly trained in
Pakistan and who had strong commitment to Islamic values. Besides its
central hub in Dhaka, the ISI has deployed elements in Chittagong, Sylhet,
Rangpur, Tangail, Jessore and other places in Bangladesh. A special section of
the Pakistani High Commission maintains regular liaison with the Bengali
jihadist organizations, which draw considerable funds from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and other countries of the Ummah.
 Pakistan has several strategic reasons to use Bangladesh as a base for its
anti-India operations. Bangladesh had been a part of Pakistan and a sizeable
section of the people share the core of Pakistan ideology; a homogenous
home for Muslims of the subcontinent. Despite the freedom movement and
atrocities committed by Pakistan army, the bonds of religion have been
further strengthened by the common ideology of jihad. Poverty and lack of
education have prompted sprouting of madrassas in every nook and corner.
Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Ummah countries fund these breeding
pools of jihad. Pakistan’s ISI and its Islamic jihadist organizations enjoy Pan-
Islamic linkages with corresponding groups in Bangladesh. Emerging
political influences of Islamic parties in Bangladesh further reinforce the
above.
In recent years, Pakistan’s proxy war against India has come under US
surveillance. The US intelligence agencies’ teams operating in post-9/11
Pakistan in sizeable numbers are exercising close scrutiny and surveillance on
Pakistan’s Islamic jihadist organizations and their linkages with the ISI.
India’s extensive border fencing along the international border and Line of
Control is significantly impeding cross-border terrorism and proxy war
activities of Pakistan.
Pakistan has adapted to the changed situation and strengthened its bases in
Bangladesh for its proxy war against India, continuance of which is an
essential strategic requirement for the Pakistan Army’s grip on power in
Pakistan, notwithstanding commitments given to the United States.
Bangladesh has been exploited by Pakistan as a springboard for ISI
operations against India. Pakistan’s main target is strategic destabilization of
the Indian North East and using West Bengal-Bangladesh borders as the
highway to Indian heartland for its terrorist road warriors. In addition to
agency level cooperation Pakistan and its Arab benefactors have liberally
assisted the Islamist jihadis in Bangladesh for converting it to a ‘collapsing
country’—the most instable region in Asia. India has more worrisome
concern from developments in Bangladesh than the proxy war by Pakistan.
This factor has played a significant role in fomenting ethnic insurgency in
the North Eastern states. Jihadist activities in the states of West Bengal, Bihar,
Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh have also increased rapidly. However, post-9/11,
Pakistan’s strategy of exploiting Bangladesh as an alternative base for proxy
war has been recognized by the international community after reports of Al
Qaeda al Sulbah presence in the country and series of terrorist attacks against
‘secular targets’, especially the bomb attack on the British High
Commissioner at Sylhet. Besides serial bombings in Bangladesh the world
community has been alarmed by the spurt in Islamist Jihadist actions in the
UK, India, Egypt and elsewhere in the world. Almost everywhere the
investigators and researchers have found out smoking gun evidence of
involvement of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—two important fulcrums of evil
that export jihad more than any other commodity.
Geographically, India-Bangladesh border is porous and difficult to keep
under close surveillance due to the presence of numerous rivers and hilly
terrain in the North. Fencing of the India-Bangladesh border is yet to gather
momentum. Bangladesh’s border configuration rests on vulnerable Indian
states like West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
Bangladesh territory provides ISI with multiple ingress routes to these
sensitive Indian states. Bangladesh territory sandwiches the Siliguri corridor
through which narrow corridor runs India’s slender communication links with
its seven North Eastern states. Pakistan’s ISI has developed the capability to
play havoc against this corridor from Bangladesh territory.
Bangladesh’s politico-religious factors provide a force-multiplier effect in
terms of its utility as an alternative base for Pakistan’s proxy war. Armed
Forces are increasingly coming under Islamic fundamentalist influences. They
seem to perceive that Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is a better weapon to
keep India’s might at bay. Bangladesh already provides safe havens and gun-
running facilities to many insurgent groups of India’s North East. Pakistan’s
proxy war activities and ISI operations can be safely camouflaged under the
umbrella of such organizations. Political fixations of the present government,
in terms of its policies towards India and Pakistan, make it easy for Pakistan
to exploit Bangladesh as a proxy war base against India.
The Pakistani Establishment is aware that the ‘secular’ Bengali elements
and forces, which championed the ethnolinguist movement against Punjabi
exploitation, will not allow them to reoccupy the country physically.
However, taking advantage of the religious resurgence, preponderance of
jihadist philosophy in major segments of the Muslim Ummah and Pakistan’s
emergence as the jihad exporting country the policy planners in Islamabad
have strengthened their efforts to tighten grip on the Islamised masses of
Bangladesh. This neo-occupation of Bangladesh by Pakistan, as it did in
Afghanistan during Taliban days, has offered it a springboard for revamping
its campaign against India and in advancing its tongues of jihad to the South
East Asian countries.
Bangladeshi fundamentalist tanzeems have not lagged behind their
Pakistani promoters. Hundreds of ‘Qaumi Madrassas’ have begun springing
up along the entire stretch of the India-Bangladesh border (2,400 km). These
‘Qaumi Madrassas’ under the guise of imparting religious lessons provide a
nucleus network for Islamic jihad and ISI’s proxy war against India. Reports
indicate that the maulvis (religious teachers) are mostly trained in Pakistan
and they are firm believers in staunch Salafist Wahhabi and Deobandi
teachings, though most of the Bengali Muslims are Hanafis and some of them
also practice some kind of Sufism.
Al Qaeda al Sulbah linkages with Bangladesh have received wide attention
in the USA. Reports of Al Qaeda al Sulbah operatives’ flight to Bangladesh
after the US invasion of Afghanistan have been confirmed. Arrival of a large
Al Qaeda al Sulbah group at Chittagong in December 2000 was reported by
western sources. Ajker Kagoj, a Bangladeshi newspaper, quoted an unnamed
foreign embassy in Dhaka as saying that Osama bin Laden’s friend Ayman al-
Zawahiri, had been hiding in the country for months after arriving in
Chittagong. According to Bangladeshi Islamic groups with close ties to Al
Qaeda, al-Zawahiri arrived in Dhaka and stayed briefly in the compound of a
local fundamentalist leader. However, a source in the Directorate General of
Forces Intelligence shared with the representative of TIME magazine that al-
Zawahiri was believed to have left Bangladesh, crossing over the eastern
border into Burma escorted by Rohingya rebels. Zawahiri is not an itinerant
traveller like ibn Batuta. He is the most important figure in international
Islamist jihad. His visit to Bangladesh was obviously not related to
sightseeing.
Bangladesh has maintained mysterious ambivalence on the issue of sea
vessel Mecca, which had unloaded a large number of Arab looking
passengers at Chittagong soon after the US attack on Afghanistan. One
military source said that most of the men who arrived from Pakistan after the
US intervention in Afghanistan, stayed in Bangladesh rather than merely
transiting to other destinations. On Sept. 24 2002, a fuller picture finally
emerged when the NSI, Bangladesh’s domestic intelligence agency, arrested
four Yemenis, an Algerian, a Libyan and a Sudanese from three houses in the
upper-crust district of Uttara in Dhaka. Bangladeshi intelligence sources said
they received information from foreign agencies that the men—Abu Nujaid of
Libya, Sadek Al Nassami, Abu Sallam, Abu Umaiya and Abul Abbas of
Yemen, Abul Ashem of Algeria and Hassan Adam of Sudan—were involved
in militant arms training at a madrassa in Dhaka run by a Saudi-backed
charity, al-Haramain. Indonesia’s Al Qaeda al Sulbah leader Omar al-Farooq
told a US agency that al-Haramain was the foundation used to channel bin
Laden’s money to the SE Asian Islamist jihadists. Al-Haramain continues to
funnel Al Qaeda and Saudi Wahhabi money to Bangladeshi fundamentalists
and jihadists. Bangladesh security and intelligence agencies however, have
denied that the seven Arabs were in any way involved with terrorist activities.
After being held for five days at a secret location, the men were driven to
court and released on Sept. 29. No charges or proceedings were brought.
After they were freed from custody, the seven were driven to Dhaka’s
Sheraton hotel where they spent the night, and then disappeared.
Southern Bangladesh has become a haven for hundreds of Bengali jihadis.
They find natural allies in Indian Muslim separatists for hiding out across the
border, and also Muslim Rohingyas, tens of thousands of whom fled the
ethnic and religious suppression of the Burmese military junta in the late
1970s and 1980s. Many Rohingyas are long-term refugees, but some are
trained to cause trouble back home in camps tolerated by a succession of
Bangladeshi governments. The original facilities date back to 1975, making
them Asia’s oldest jihadi training camps. Moreover, one former Burmese
guerrilla who visited the camps regularly described existence of three others
near Ukhia, south of the town of Cox’s Bazaar. These camps are able to
accommodate a force of 2,500 between them. The biggest, he claimed, had 26
interconnected bunkers complete with kitchens, lecture halls, telephones and
televisions concealed beneath a three-meter-high false forest floor that
stretched between two hills. Weapons available for training there included AK
47s, heavy machine guns, rifles, pistols, rocket-propelled grenades and
mortars. Mantraps and mines, which can be triggered by spotters hiding in
tree houses, protected approaches to the camp. The ISI started backing the
Rohingyas after 1979, when two officers of the JIX were deputed for
imparting specialized training at camps near the northern Bandarban district.
Over years, the Ukhia camp has hosted militant visitors from the southern
Philippines, Indonesia, southern Thailand, Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan
and even Uzbekistan and Chechnya. Videotapes showing Al Qaeda in
training that were unearthed by CNN in August 2002, included footage from
1990. The footages featured Rohingya rebels undergoing training in Al Qaeda
camps.
In a queer incident, 10 truck-loads of medium and heavy arms and
ammunitions received at the government controlled Chittagong Fertiliser
Company Ltd. (CUFL) jetty in January 2005 was attributed to one ISI front
man Salauddin Kadar Chaudhury. The Rohingya labourers and volunteers of
JeI and HUJI unloaded the consignment. The huge quantities of weapons,
good enough to arm at least two battalions of armed forces, were later handed
over to the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) for the ostensive purpose of
fighting ‘terrorists in Chittagong Hill Tracts.’
According to intelligence sources, another major arms landing took place
in early August 2005 near Amabasyapur (Cox’s Bazaar). The supply was
originated by the ISI station in a South East Asian country and was meant for
India. The RAB of Bangladesh helped the ISI carriers to despatch the
consignment to Indian border near the Barak valley.
 These instances tend to prove that Bangladesh is on the verge of becoming
a free playground of the Islamist jihadist forces, which are bent upon
destabilising the country by escalating hostile activities against India and the
western countries. It is not that the epicentre of Islamist jihad is being
transferred to Bangladesh from Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is a new
centre, which is likely to play a serious and dangerous role in promoting
instability in India, Myanmar, Malaysia, Southern Thailand and Indonesia
*
The Inter Services Intelligence and the Directorate of Forces Intelligence have
collaborated since 1976 in imparting training and supplying arms to the
militant groups of the North Eastern states of India. Camps operated by North
East insurgents in Bangladesh have increased by about 40 over the past few
months touching the figure of 180-200. The new camps in Bangladesh have
been detected even after security operations in Bhutan to flush out Indian
insurgents from that country. Dhaka has consistently denied presence of Al
Qaeda al Sulbah elements or NE insurgents in that country.
According to informed sources ISI, often in collaboration with the DGFI
and DGNSI, run a number of camps for Indian insurgents at the following
places:
Sylhet: Sunamganj, Nurpur, Ghilachera, Shaistaganj, Brahman Bazar,
Daulatpur;
Chittagong HT: Bandarban, Ukhia, Diwanbari, Maschari, Gandachari,
Rajarbil, Kaptaimukh, Khagrachari and Teknaf,
Mymensing/Tangail/Netrakona: Nandipur, Kendua foothills, Jogania,
Malidurga, and Sherpur; and
Rangpur: Biswanath, Sonarai, Dakshin Tutupara, Nij Gadamari, Maliani,
Kurigram, Madhyam Kadma, and Singria, etc.
These and other camps are generally attached to the BDR or Ansar camps
and are supervised by serving officers of the DGFI and Bangladesh army.
Movements from one camp to another and contact with Dhaka based Indian
insurgent leaders are carried out under supervision of the DGFI and Pakistan
army personnel. Top leaders are normally kept in secured guesthouses in
crowded cities to ensure their safety from poaching Indian observers.
Dhaka has consistently denied presence of Al Qaeda elements or NE
insurgents. The number of camps, which earlier stood at 155, has increased
despite repeated denials by Bangladesh government. Concentration of camps
has been seen in Khagrachari, Bandarban and Rangamati mountain tracts of
Chittagong Hill Tracts besides those scattered in Cox’s Bazaar and Maulvi
Bazaar districts in Sylhet. Camps have also been detected in Habiganj, Sylhet,
Sherpur and Kurigram. A few camps were opened in the northern districts of
Bangladesh to accommodate the Bodo and Kamtapuri terrorists.
The camps, whose list has been prepared by Indian security agencies,
include those run by the ULFA, National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB), National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), All Tripura Tiger
Force (ATTF) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah
(NSCN-IM). The list also includes training camps run by People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Achik
National Volunteer Council (Meghalaya), Chakma National Liberation Front
(CNLF), and Dima Halam Daoga (Assam).
Various outfits even establish tactical alliance among themselves under
which members of a friendly group are trained at the camps operated by some
other outfit. India has already handed over to Bangladesh a list of 155 terrorist
camps operating at various places in that country with their pinpointed
location and asked Dhaka to shut these.
A list of 85 insurgents wanted by India was also given to Bangladesh at a
high-level meeting of officials in Dhaka sometime back and their deportation
was sought. The Indian side alleged that ISI activities directed against India
were on the rise in Bangladesh. ISI men along with Al Qaeda operatives were
imparting training at several of the camps.
Reports also suggested that sophisticated weapons were being smuggled
into India from various places in Bangladesh including Cox’s Bazaar, Sylhet
and Chittagong and ISI operatives are playing a key role in this. India has also
asked Bangladesh to hand over insurgents wanted for crimes in North East,
including top ULFA leaders Anup Chetia and Babul Sarma, etc. The list of
insurgents includes those from Assam, Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur along
with details as to where and when they were arrested in Bangladesh.
According to sources in Bangladesh, Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua alias
John David Salemar alias Jaj Willium Balot alias Abdul Aziz had been
arrested and sent to jail in Bangladesh on January 1, 1998, under Foreigners
Act and Passport Act. Babul Sarma was jailed on December 24, 1997, also
under the same acts as was another top ULFA leader Laxmi Prosad Goshami.
Other insurgents demanded by India from Bangladesh include Bendang Wati,
Chaoba alias Maden, Tusi, Champa alias Chaoba, Kaning Aum (all of ULFA),
Sohan Deb Barma and Ghanta Deb Barma of ATTF, Saul Borok, Dhingro
Deb Barma, Makshod Borok, Saybam Deb Barma and Kumon Deb Barma
(all of NLFT).
The volunteers of Jemmah Islamiyah operating in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front insurgents of the
Philippines and the Islamic terrorists of Southern Thailand have used
Bangladesh as transit point to Pakistan, Afghanistan and other destinations of
jihad in Europe. Several Islamist jihadists have been trained in camps run by
the HUJI, JMJ, JUM, Ahl-e-Hadith, DGFI and the ISI. Bangladesh has
consistently denied having provided facilities to the terrorist groups of South
East Asia. This episode will be discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter.
According to certain ‘secular’ forces in Bangladesh, their country was
likely to act as the alternative pivot for International Islamist Jihad, in view of
the US pressure on Pakistan and the latter’s temporary policy shift against the
jihadist tanzeems. They feel that Bangladesh would soon emerge as an
ungovernable country and could be treated as a ‘collapsed nation.’ Such a
situation, they aver, would destroy the secular fabric of Bengali Muslims, and
Arabisation of the poor and impoverished Bengalis would bring about another
phase of turmoil in South and South East Asia.
Najam Sethi, Editor, Daily Times of Pakistan had commented in an
editorial on February 27, 2005: “If Bangladeshis … should care to look at
Pakistan more closely instead of hating it blindly, they will find that the
disease of ‘Islamist terrorism’ was incubated in Karachi and Khost and then
passed on to Dhaka. A glance at the looking glass in Dhaka will discover
Pakistani-jihadi footsteps all over the place. The Harkatul Mujahideen al-
Islami (the one called HUJI in Bangladesh) is the outfit whose leader was a
graduate of the Banuri Mosque seminary in Karachi and whose activists tried
to kill our prime minister Shaukat Aziz recently. HUJI is the international face
of the Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. As for the “pseudo-Islamic” nature of
what is happening in Bangladesh, let us accept that that is the way of ‘Islamic
revolution’ these days. This is what the Uzbek Islamist Tahir Yuldashev did in
Osh before he came down to Afghanistan and then to Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.
The Hizb-al-Tahrir, which Pakistan banned only after Yuldashev’s discovery,
worked in tandem with him in Central Asia and is now clearly working in
tandem with HUJI in Bangladesh…
“The phase Bangladesh is passing through can be taken in two parts. An
aspect of it belongs to the early 1990s when the “Islamist” outfits in Pakistan
did not offend the conservative Muslim League but were seen as a threat by a
liberal PPP. These days the ruling BNP in Bangladesh is most reluctant to
take action against the Islamists as they continue to attack Awami League
cadres and communists; but when phase two opens up the BNP will be
equally threatened. The “purifying” dynamic of the Islamists will demand
that the BNP bend to the kind of shariah the warriors favour in light of their
training in Afghanistan and their “salafi” contact with Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Therefore, while the Bangladeshi journalist may be offended today that
Bangla Bhai and Jangi Bhai are being hauled up under pressure from the
United States and the European Union, a day will come soon enough when
the state of Bangladesh will come under threat from the Islamic warriors it is
now empowering through denial.”
With this warning note from an eminent Pakistani journalist, Indian and
other South and South East Asian security experts can hope for the best that
Bangladesh will not be engulfed by the Pakistani and Saudi fulcrum of evils
and it will not emerge as the most important hub of Islamist jihad in the
eastern flank of the Indian subcontinent.

However, after return to power of the Awami League led coalition to power
and ouster ok Begum Khleda Zia’s BNP and Jamait-e-Islami coalition the
radical and extremist activities in Bangladesh have gone down drastically.
The dastardly attempt on the life of Sheikh Hasina, revolt by th Bagladesh
Border Rifles and coup attempt by Hizbut Tehrir and a section of retired army
officers have resulted in strict suppression of the pro-Pakistani jihadist
groups.
Under Sheikh Hasina Indo-Bangla relations have improved considerably
and in case this trend continues Bangladesh may become an island of secular
democray in South Asia.

*
 The Afghan Saga
Beginning of CIA, ISI and Mukhabarat Al A’amah bonhomie
On the eve of US involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan was not a strange
bedfellow for Washington. Pakistan had rented itself out to the USA earlier
also. However, the regime of Zia-ul-Haq had isolated Pakistan by imposing a
fundamentalist regime and by judicially hanging Z. A. Bhutto. He, therefore,
did not lose time to rent Pakistan out once again when the USA allured it with
a floral bedspread. Uppermost in Pakistani mind were its Afghan and Indian
policies, which had become more clouded because of the USSR presence
across the borders.
Pakistan’s external intelligence operations are related to three important
aspects of its foreign policy. To the east, its policy is determined by historical
relationship with India. The bitter relationship is not limited to Kashmir
imbroglio. These aspects require some elaboration as Pakistan’s foreign
policy determinants are often implemented by its fulcrum—the ISI— and not
through bilateral and international diplomacy. The CIA is also used by the
USA in similar fashion. Through Afghan operation the ISI had earned the
right to dine on the same table with the CIA.
Roots of these developments run deeper into the history of Islam’s
civilisational clash with the Hindu entity of Bharatvarsha. Its roots are
intertwined with the history of the struggle of separation of the Islamist
Muslim Indians from the main body politick of Hindu India, and creation of a
separate Muslim homeland.
In the east, the Muslims of India were alarmed over the advent of
renaissance amongst the Hindus and their developing agitation for ‘self rule’,
and ‘dominion status’, etc. Hasrat Mohani, a known Muslim thinker, writer
and poet, had introduced a resolution way back in 1931 at the All India
Muslim Council to say, “Whereas the Muslim community is now convinced
that the Hindus are bent upon establishing a Hindu Raj in India and whereas
the Hindus and the British Cabinet have joined hands to ignore most of the
important Muslim demands contained in the Delhi resolution of this
Conference, the Committee believes that the establishment of Dominion
Status in India and the vesting of responsibility in the legislatures is
detrimental to Muslim interests and will, therefore, not be acceptable to
them.” IAR 1931, Vol. I, p. 284.
Hasrat Mohani’s comment is one of the earlier but evolving intent of two-
nationhood expressed by several Muslim leaders. These aspects have been
narrated in a previous chapter.
Similarly, Pakistan’s concern with its western flank has also a long
historical background colored by ethnic kaleidoscope and geopolitical
complications. To the west, Pakistan’s policies are guided by the fast
changing situations in Afghanistan. Both India and Pakistan had inherited the
British susceptibility towards Afghan forward policy. The Afghan rulers had
played significant roles in shaping the medieval history of India and had
added richly to its cultural and religious heritage. They nursed the Sufi strain
of Islam as assiduously as was done by most of the Mughal rulers, with slight
aberrations.
Ethnically and culturally, the Afghans are different from the people of
Pakistan. Converted from Hinduism to Islam, the Afghans are 84% Sunni and
about 15% Shi’a. All the four major sects of Islamic people: Hambali, Salafi,
Hanafi and Maliki are found among the Afghans. Basically following the
Naqshbandi brand of mystic Islam the Afghans were treated at par with the
Naqshbandi Sufis of Central Asia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and other
countries.
The most distinguished Naqshbandi Tariqah (order) is a school of thought
and practice that believed in the path of guidance through a Shaykh
(equivalent to Hindu Guru). It believes in singing and dancing in praise of
Allah and the Prophet. It stood in the vanguard of those groups, which
disseminated truth and fought against evil and injustice, especially in Central
Asia and India in the past, in China and the Soviet Union in modern times,
and in Europe and North America today. Naqshbandi Shaykhs who took up
political, social, educational and spiritual roles in their communities, acted
according to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet
The Wahhabi-Deobandi sects, who believe in the purest form of Islam, as it
purportedly existed during the days of the Prophet, oppose these Sufi
concepts. From the point of view of religious practice, the people of Pakistan
and Afghanistan differ vastly. However, the Afghan tribes had learnt to
coexist with the Wahhabi-Deobandi schools of Islamic practices over years of
association with the Hanafi Sunnis of Pakistan. In later days, the Afghan
mujaheedin had struck alliance with the Wahhabi-Deobandi Islamists of
Pakistan under political compulsions. Commonality in religious practices
however, could not overcome the ethnic differences. Ethnically the Afghans
are 44% Pakhtuns, 25% Tajik, Hazara 10%, Baloch, Aimaks and Turkman etc
13% and Uzbec 8%. Linguistically 35% are Pushtu speaking, 50% Dari
(Afghani Persian), 11% Turkic and 4% speak other minor languages.
Afghanistan has been tossed by the cultural and religious influences of the
Islamic people of Turkic origin, Iranians and the Central Asian Muslims.
They, unlike the Pakistanis, did not opt for Wahhabism blindly and were not
very significantly influenced by the Deobandi brand of Islam. They were not
even deeply influenced by modern Islam spread by the Aligarh school of
thinkers and their contacts with the British did not leave much cultural scars
on them.
It would be seen that Afghani Islamic people reacted sharply against
advance of communist Russia in their country. The devout Muslims, the
Afghans had fought against the Russians in their traditional tribal way with a
queer combination of faith and weaponry. At the same time, they also did not
like the forays made into Afghanistan by fundamentalist Wahhabi preachers.
However, Pakistan’s effort to convert the Afghani Pashtuns and other
ethnic tribes to Hanafi/Salafi and Wahhabi/ Deobandi brand of Islam through
sustained education in the fundamentalist run madrassas did succeed for a
while. The birth of Taliban movement is a unique chemical religious
experimentation by the Pakistani and Arab Islamists. Talibanism was used by
Pakistan to convert Afghanistan into a client state, bonded to it by religious
glue and political servitude. Similarly Al Qaeda al Sulbah also tried to impose
strict Salafist tenets on the Afghans. These conflicts resurfaced once Russia
was out of Afghanistan and Pakistan bared its fangs through the Taliban
surrogate.
Obviously, the Pakistanis had not learnt the lesson from East Pakistan.
They had forgotten that religion alone was not good enough for ethnical,
cultural and civilisational bonding. However, the quest of Pakistan to
dominate Afghanistan and perpetuate the Mortimer Durand line to
permanently solve the vexed Pashtun national issue did obviously not
succeed.
Pakistan with 66% Punjabi, 13% Sindhi, 9% Pakhtun (Pashtun),
3% Baloch and 8% Mohajir (Muslims migrating from undivided India) is
ethnically a different country. Its state language Urdu is the mother tongue to
only 8% of the population. More Muslims in Hindu India speak Urdu. Over
48% Pakistanis speak Punjabi, 10% Siraiki, 12% Sindhi, 8-9% Pushtu 3%
Baloch, 2% Hindco (mother tongue of President Ayub Khan), and 1% Brahui,
etc.
Over 77% Pakistanis are Sunnis and about 20% are Shi’as. Most
Pakistanis, like their Indian counterparts, are Hanafis and are attached to
Deobandi and Wahhabi sects. A minority of them are attached to the Barelvi
School. Sectarian clashes in Pakistan are more pronounced because of the
influence of Wahhabism and Deobandi lines of fundamentalist preaching.
Some Pakistanis were immensely influenced by the Aligarh School’s process
of blending Islam with modernism. India’s historical and civilisational brush
with the British had also left considerable impact on modern Muslim mind.
Pakistan has had the history of producing modern forward thinking political
and social leaders, though the Wahhabi and Deobandi followers have
succeeded considerably to shackle the Pakistanis to the blinded bondages of
religious fundamentalism.
Some efforts were made by the British School old guards to sustain the
modern aspects of Islam, but their endeavors finally succumbed to the
machinations of fundamentalist leaders like Zia-ul-Haq. The old guards were
epitomised by an Aligarh and Sandhurst product Ayub Khan. According to
him, “Those who looked forward to progress and advancement came to be
regarded as disbelievers and those who looked backward were considered
devout Muslims. It is a great injustice to both life and religion to impose on
twentieth century man the condition that he must go back several centuries in
order to prove his bona fides as a true Muslim.” Mohammad Ayub Khan,
Speeches and Statements, Vol I, pp. 110-11.
Like the Afghans, the Pakistanis too have not been able to smoothen the
edges of ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences. Besides these differences,
Pakistan presumed that as an inheritor to the British vestiges, it had the right
to establish hegemony on Afghanistan to protect itself from the dual peril of
Soviet influence and Iranian foray into Afghanistan’s political and economic
lives. Post-Cold War Britain also supported Pakistan to strengthen its anti-
Afghan and anti-India policies. Moreover, Pakistan, as an ally of the USA,
had an eye on the oil and energy resources of Central Asia and for such long-
term economic conditions it made continuous efforts to dominate the political
and economic affairs of Afghanistan. The western fulcrum of evil, epitomized
by the CIA, had conjoined its global interests with the eastern fulcrum of evil,
represented by the ISI of Pakistan, that was more tuned to breed and export
Islamist terror all over the globe. This queer combination had produced a
deadly effect in the geopolitical region flanked by India and Afghanistan.
Under these peculiar ethnic, religious and foreign policy imperatives
towards its eastern and western neighbors Pakistan had embarked on
diplomatic initiatives dominated by military and covert intelligence contents.
That’s where the Inter Services Intelligence came to play a larger than life
role.
With this brief background information, we propose to journey through
Pakistan’s Afghan saga, which has virtually changed the geopolitical and geo
strategic ambience of the world not only in our proximate area, but also
globally. Pakistan had been a reckonable factor in aiding the USA in its efforts
of dismantling the Soviet Empire and ending the Cold War, often described as
the Third World War
 The people of Afghanistan, generically described as Afghan, had lived in
their tribal entities as a cultural whole, and like their Indian counterparts,
lived as a cultural nation, not bound by a common political identity, common
linguistic, cultural and ethnic bondage. Different clans, tribes and linguistic
groups lived in isolated valleys and mountainsides, occasionally traded with
each other, carried out trade and commerce with neighboring people in India,
Iran, and Uzbekistan and other countries. Situated on the civilisational
highway between the Persian, Sumerian, Greek, Bactrian, Parthian and other
Central Asian politico-civilisational entities west and north and the Indian
civilization in the east, Afghanistan has had the unique opportunity of being
both a battleground and a civilisational melting pot.
The shaping up of the Afghanistan state was more dictated by the British
consolidation over the Durrani kingdom and the Russian consolidation on the
Muslim majority republics of Central Asia. Sandwiched between Iran, the
Soviet Union and British India Afghanistan had become a hotspot in the post-
Second World War Cold war geopolitical conundrum. Internally, Afghanistan
remained divided into near-autonomous tribal territories controlled by the
Pashtun, Hazara, and Tajik and other tribes. Fine balancing by the monarch
King Zahir Shah between the feuding tribes and between the western and
Russian interests had brought in an era of modernisation amidst growth of
fundamentalism in Iran and Pakistan. The balance was disturbed on July 17,
1973, when Mohammad Daoud, a cousin of the king and Prime Minister,
deposed Zahir Shah with tacit Soviet backing and proclaimed a republic, for
which the fragmented tribal societies were not prepared.
The emergence of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA),
divided into Parcham and Khalq factions, and seizure of power by Nur
Mohammad Tarakki with the direct backing of the Soviet Union had signaled
the beginning of an era of conflict and incessant war that devastated
Afghanistan. With the direct intervention by the Soviet Army under Brezhnev
and Andropov on December 24, 1979, a new and bloody phase was added to
the Cold War. The USA under Jimmy Carter was alarmed but was not keen to
directly intervene. The situation soon changed. The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) collaborated with the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of
Pakistan, Royal Saudi Intelligence agency, and the Chinese State Security
Bureau to convert the Afghani tribal resistance to land reform, women’s
freedom and strong centralized rule of the Kabul regime into an armed
conflict between the mujahideen and the Afghan Communists and the Soviet
armed forces. The CIA and ISI were ably assisted by the MI6, Egyptian and
Turkish intelligence agencies and armed forces in this new Hot turned Cold
War game of the USA and Pakistan.
 *
Pakistan was drawn to the developing Afghan conflict out of its own
geopolitical compulsions, pressure from the Islamic Ummah and CIA
machinations. As stated earlier, it was not a new tango for Islamabad.
Pakistan saw an immense opportunity in transforming its power equation with
the USA, China and the Arab world by becoming a frontline partner of the
Cold War. In this new game plan Pakistan deftly used the ISI, SSG and other
special operations groups of its armed forces as well as numerous Islamist
tanzeems spawned and supported by the ISI.
However, involvement of the ISI in Afghan imbroglio can be divided into
four phases: Z.A. Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto and post-Benazir
initiatives.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had patronised Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and General
Ahmad Shah Massoud (1974) to oppose Mohammad Daoud. Brigadier
Naseerullah Babbar of the 2nd Frontier Corps trained about 5000 Afghan
tribals, Pashtun and Tajik-Uzbek and others, in Pakistan, under supervision of
the ISI. Later, General Babbar had emerged as the main advisor of Bhutto on
Afghan affairs. Pakistan’s support to the Jamait-e-Islami coalition under
Mullah Burhanudduin Rabbani and Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami continued
unabated, as Bhutto was weary of the Pashtun population of Pakistan getting
involved with the pro-communist forces. Having lost East Pakistan, Bhutto
had carried out a mini-war against the Baloch partisans, in which the Inter
Services Intelligence and the armed forces were mercilessly used. Growth of
Russian influence in Afghanistan had alarmed China and America and in
Bhutto, they found a ready ally to fight a proxy war against the Russian
surrogates and directly the Soviet forces. However, before he could plunge
into the Afghan bloodbath Bhutto was deposed by General Zia. The new
master of Pakistan was destined to change the country for indefinite future
decades.
Direct Soviet intervention in 1979 had also alarmed President Jimmy
Carter, who initially took a cautious approach, after the great Iran fiasco.
However, his aggressive National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brizinski, and
others impressed upon him that the Soviet Union should be checkmated in
Afghanistan. Carter agreed to assist initially to the tune of $ 400 million,
which was scoffed at by Zia saying it were ‘peanuts. He needed more money
and liberal aid to tide over the near-bankruptcy of Pakistani economy. He also
wanted to build up military strength with a view to renewing offensive
measures against India. Under Ronald Reagan, the cautious policy changed.
In 1981, the USA agreed to give Pakistan an economic and military package
of $3.2 billion over six years. Zia had in mind the thrust he wanted to launch
against India also, in addition to committing his country against the Soviet
Union.
Reagan and his advisors, especially CIA Director Bill Casey, agreed to
supply huge quantities of ‘Soviet type’ small, medium and heavy weapons
after procuring the same from Egypt, Turkey, East European Communist
countries and China. According to some US sources, the USA had actually
financed China and Egypt for setting up factories to produce Soviet type field
weapons.
“Between 1981 and 1985 annual US military aid to the mujahideen
channelled through Pakistan’s ISI grew from $ 30 million to $ 280 million,
making it the biggest single CIA covert operation anywhere in the world.”
Afghanistan—A Modern History, Angelo Rasanayagam, p.105.
The CIA and Saudi payments to the Afghan mujahideen through Pakistan’s
ISI was handled by the notorious BCCI and its head Agha Hassan Abedi, a
personal friend of Zia-ul-Haq. In fact, the CIA also used the BCCI for
funneling other international covert operations including handling of drug
money by the Afghan warlords and very important military and intelligence
officials of Pakistan.
The Afghans are divided into several ethnic tribes with warlords and ethnic
political leaders dominating their spheres of influence. However, the seven
Afghan parties which opposed the communist regime— Jamait-i-Islami,
Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis), Hizb-i-Islami, Hizb-i-Wahadat Islami (Shia faction),
Jumbish-i-Milli-i-Islam (Dostum), Ittehad Islami (Sayyaf), Harqat Inqilabi-i-
Islami and the tribal commanders and warlords affiliated to them were
dominated by the majority Pashtun groups, Tajik-Uzbek factions, Hazaras,
Chatar Aimaks, Balochis and Nuristani and other tribes. They were
temporarily united to fight the common evil of communism, social and
religious reforms, women’s freedom, etc. They were never united in the real
sense under a centralised power at Kabul. The tribes were dominantly Sunni
Pashtuns with large number of Shias dominating the North and parts of areas
bordering Iran. However, their opposition to the Soviet occupation had
coincided with the concerns of the USA, Saudi Arabia, China and Pakistan.
Their combined efforts canalized through the ISI had started a classic war in
Afghanistan, which finally led to the ruination of Afghanistan and collapse of
the Soviet Empire.
In addition to Pakistan, Washington and Riyadh added another sinister
aspect by encouraging Arab mujahideen to plunge into the war to get the
USSR bogged down in its Vietnam in Afghanistan. CIA Director William
Casey and U.S legislators like Congressman Charles Wilson, Gordon
Humphrey, Orrin Hatch and Bill Bradley were determined to turn Afghanistan
as the burial ground of the Soviet Union. Later President Reagan had adroitly
used the Afghanistan developments to accelerate the process of collapse of
the Iron Curtain under Mikhail Gorbachev.
The Arab variation was headed by a Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden
who, in collaboration with Dr. Abdullah Azzam, the Jordanian ideologue, had
built up a guerrilla outfit and terrorist apparatus that came to haunt the entire
free world and particularly the interests represented by the USA and its allies.
Osama received full support from the ISI for establishing contact with
Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and Khalis etc Afghan leaders and in setting up training
camps and safe houses for the Arab mujahideen. The CIA and Saudi
intelligence also liberally funded him. In fact, several scholars share the view
that Osama was picked up by the CIA to mobilize Arab fighters and other
Muslim mujahideen for carrying out its agenda in Afghanistan. We propose to
narrate the involvement of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan jihad in a
separate episode.
Geopolitically Pakistan was not threatened by the Soviet Union. But
Pakistan’s anxiety to keep its own Pashtun population under control and save
Pakistan from disturbances caused by armed operations of the Afghan
mujahideen and free drug movement from the traditional fields in
Afghanistan had prompted Zia to follow up the initiatives taken by his
predecessor Z.A. Bhutto. Internationally a pariah, Pakistan was befriended by
the USA, UK and Saudi Arabia for making it an operational base of Cold War
against the USSR. Under American prodding, allurement and guidance
Pakistan agreed to collaborate with the Afghan mujahideen on the pretext of
giving shelter to the refugees fleeing their country. Zia-ul-Haq followed
meticulously the tactics adopted by India during unrest in East Pakistan, with
the difference that it was functioning as a surrogate of the USA and Saudi
Arabia.
Lt. General Abdul Akhtar Rahman, the astute ISI chief, himself a
fundamentalist and a military strategist, had planned out the entire Afghan
operation. Between Zia and Akhtar, Pakistan decided to adopt a military
option in Afghanistan. Zia wanted the Afghan water to boil at a balanced
temperature to keep the Soviets engaged in protracted guerrilla warfare.
Policy directions received from Washington were guiding him.
The Afghan Bureau of the ISI was established in the northern outskirts of
Rawalpindi, 12 kilometers from Islamabad. The sprawling area was known as
Ojhri Camp, which housed arms, and ammunition dumps, training facilities
and other logistical establishments required to run a clandestine operation of
mammoth proportions. At one point Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf headed the
camp under direct control of General Akhtar. According to some estimate,
over 150,000 mujahideens were trained by the ISI with an establishment of 60
officers, 100 Junior Commissioned Officers and 300 non-Commissioned
Officers. The Ojhri establishment was divided into five sections. Besides the
main camp at Ojhri, the Afghan Bureau of the ISI had forward units at
Peshawar and Quetta. The camps at Ojhri, Peshawar and Quetta directly dealt
with the Afghan ‘parties’ and ‘commanders’, supervised training and ensured
steady supply of arms and logistics received from the US, Chinese and Saudi
sources.
The Ojhri Camp was again divided into 5 sections:
• Headquarter branch under Brigadier Yousaf, assisted by a
Colonel. It was the Operations Branch and overlooked training,
intelligence and supervised overall operations.
• A branch commanded by a full Colonel supervised logistics
procurement and disbursement.
• Another branch headed by a Colonel dealt with
psychological warfare.
• The department of ‘software’ under a Brigadier that
supervised supply of ration items.
• ‘Commissionerate’ for Afghan refugees, which handled
supply of food, medicines and relief items to the burgeoning refugee
Afghans. All these divisions directly reported to the Afghan Bureau and
Chief Lt. Gen. Akhtar.
Pakistan had started deploying Pakistan army personnel and ISI operatives
(deputed from army) into Afghanistan well before 1981. These personnel
were enlisted in the Afghan Bureau of the ISI and imparted special training to
operate deep inside Afghanistan in collaboration with the mujahideen
commanders. Pakistan army had mastered these kinds of war strategies under
US supervision on the line of training imparted to the US Special Forces for
engagements in Vietnam and other theatres of guerrilla warfare. These special
Pakistani troops indulged in sabotage and subversion often debilitating oil
pipelines, military bases and arms dumps of the Afghan and Soviet forces.
Several Pakistani teams were located in different areas, each one not knowing
the identity of the other. Normally a secret special operations team consisted
of a Major, a JCO an NCO, and about ten soldiers. They merged with the
mujahideen and served under direct operational command of the ISI. The
aerial intelligence was provided by the US spy satellites and unmanned spy
vehicles. These units maintained contact with Ojhri camp through HF radio
operated by the JIS personnel and not regular Army Signals.
 Training to the mujahideen was imparted by the ISI in specially established
camps. The ISI resisted all efforts by the CIA to impart direct training to
mujahideen. The objective was simple. Pakistan did not allow the USA to
exercise direct control on the fighting arms of the mujahideen, though the
political leaders and commanders were often exposed to the CIA and the
White House. About seven camps were established from which about 1500
trainees were churned out every month by the officers of the Afghan Bureau.
Some of the camps were frequently moved to avoid detection by KGB,
KHAD and R&AW agents. Communication between these camps and the
Afghan Bureau was maintained by specially supplied US wireless sets. Some
of these sets were also established in the forward camps headed by different
mujahideen groups.
Generally, 2-3 officers, 6-8 JCOs assisted by over a dozen soldiers,
manned the camps. Instruction was imparted in Pashtun, but Dari and Uzbek
languages were also used as medium of instruction. Advanced and
sophisticated weapons were supplied by the US for imparting training to the
mujahideen. About 30 expert trainers from the SSG were deputed to assist the
ISI for imparting training in high altitude warfare and attached to the training
division at Ojhri camp.
*
Pakistan’s involvement in the anti-Soviet initiatives by the US, UK, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and China and other countries was at the highest level. The
Head of the State personally guided the ISI right from Z.A. Bhutto to General
Zia-ul-Haq. They worked in complete unison, barring a brief period of
disagreement between General Hamid Gul and Benazir Bhutto on the issue of
ISI’s insistence to continue to provide maximum support to the
fundamentalist mujahideen like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, solving the imbroglio
through war and not through a peaceful diplomatic transition. This staunch
Islamist wanted, at ISI’s behest, to set up a Wahhabi-Deobandi dominated
regime in Kabul to the exclusion of the Shias, Naqsbandis and Sufi forms of
Islam.
It was a pipe dream for Pakistan. The Afghans were temporarily united
against the Soviets and their front-paws. However, they were badly divided
on ethnic, tribal and religious lines. They were under influences of some of
the neighboring countries with compatible religious and ethnic affinity. The
Shias naturally looked towards Iran while the Sunnis of all sects looked
forward to Pakistan and Arab countries for support and sustenance.
From ragtag freelancing freebooters they gradually evolved a Party system
(political wings) with military commanders carrying out day-to-day fighting
in areas of their designated influence. This loose command structure was
supervised by the ISI, which coordinated with the major political leaders and
the field commanders. The seven-party alliance comprising Mujaddadi,
Gilani, Nabi, Sayyaf, Rabbani, Khalis and Hekmatyar factions was
represented on the battlefield by their commanders, who enjoyed greater
degree of autonomy and pledged more loyalty to the provider—the ISI and
the CIA. However, Prince Turki, chief of Saudi intelligence service, was
responsible for supervising the financial aid to the Afghan and Arab jihadis.
To this list can be added the charismatic name of Osama bin Laden. He
mobilized and spent a lot of funds for patronizing the ‘Afghan Arab’ jihadis.
However, in spite of apparent unity the mujahideens were badly divided on
the issue of following the modern western model and the Islamist model
promoted by General Zia, the ISI and Osama. Pakistan obviously opted for
the fundamentalist groups, principally Hekmatyar faction, as the engineer
turned mujahideen, was presumably more fundamentalist than the
fundamentals of Islam. This particular angle had also prompted Pakistan to
keep the USA away from getting in direct touch with the mujahideen political
leaders and commanders, and demanded that all aid was to be canalized
through the ISI. This perspective pursued by Pakistan and persons like
Hekmatyar had later developed a suspicion in the minds of US leadership and
legislators, who did not want the communist regime to be supplemented by
staunch Islamic fundamentalists.
The ISI carried out strategic studies about the ground deployment of Soviet
infantry, air force and, cavalry units and missile positions in and around the
major urban centres like Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Bagram, Mazar- e-Sharif
and assigned tasks to the compatible commando forces operating in the
respective areas. Satellite imagery and Special Forces reports obtained from
the CIA also provided excellent strategic tactical inputs.
The commando units were armed with weapons basically manufactured in
the Soviet Union and its client countries with a view to deflect suspicion from
the USA and Pakistan. Some weapons, mostly Second World War vintage and
basically unusable, were supplied by Egypt and Turkey. Chinese supply of
107 mm rocket, multi barrel rockets and advanced Kalashnikov rifles had
tilted the battle in favor of the mujahideen. At a later stage, induction of
American heat-seeking Stinger missiles supplied to the mujahideen through
the ISI had restricted the air strike capability of the USSR and Afghan army.
It is interesting to note that Christina B Rocca, a former CIA expert and
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs was given the
responsibility of buying back some 300, US-supplied, hand-held, heat-seeking
anti-aircraft Stinger missiles that were given to Afghan mujahideens through
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Nawaz Sharif’s DG-ISI, Lt. Gen Javed
Nasir, did not cooperate with Rocca. She complained to the highest authority
in Pakistan but to no effect. In 1993, the Clinton Administration, upon
Rocca’s recommendation, placed Pakistan on the watch list of “suspected
state-sponsors of terrorism”. Nawaz Sharif sacked Javed Nasir. Rocca had
played an important role in fashioning the activities of the Afghanistan and
Far East Division of the CIA.
The ISI decided the type and quantum of arms and ammunitions to be
distributed to various components of the seven party alliances. This was done
in the ruse of allocating weapons to the fittest fighting groups keeping in view
the operations designed for them by the ISI. In reality, Zia had decided to dole
out better arms in larger quantity to the fundamentalist factions like the one
headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The so-called moderate parties had
protested against this spoils distribution system by the ISI. Their efforts to
influence the USA during their visits to Washington to supply arms directly
were sternly opposed by Zia on the plea of secrecy and diplomatic
considerations. The USA was, however, worried about the fundamentalists
getting upper hand and setting up a regime in Afghanistan after the Soviet
withdrawal. They did not want another Iran type fundamentalist state in a
geopolitically sensitive area. However, later developments indicated that the
CIA was equally responsible for encouraging and helping the Taliban forces
engineered by Pakistan. The fundamentalist Frankenstein was as much a
creation of the CIA as it was of the ISI and Mukabarat of Saudi Arabia.
The CIA was neck deep in supporting the Afghan mujahideen. William
Casey, nicknamed Cowboy Casey, had very little patience for the niceties of
democracy and authority of the politicians. He visited Pakistan frequently and
held direct consultations with Zia and his officers. On such occasions, he also
received and heard the Afghan politicians and some key commanders. Casey
also visited Saudi Arabia several times to coordinate the jihad with Prince
Turki. There are reliable reports that he had at least one meeting with Osama
bin Laden, Washington’s blue-eyed jihadist. Some CIA operatives stationed in
Islamabad had also maintained steady line of communication with Osama.
The Saudi intelligence were in constant touch with him and they directly
financed him.
According to Brigadier Yousaf, “A high proportion of the CIA aid was in
the form of cash. For every dollar supplied by the US, the Saudi Arabian
government added another. The CIA transferred the combined funds running
into several hundred million dollars a year to special accounts in Pakistan
under the control of ISI. This money was quite separate from, and additional
to, that used for arms purchase.” The Bear Trap. p. 81
Cash was disbursed by the ISI to the political leaders for their personal and
office maintenance. In most cases, senior commanders were paid directly by
the ISI, who in turn, in consultation with the political leaders disbursed
amounts to the mujahideen engaged in field fighting. These expenses were
different from expenditure incurred on the refugees through international
organizations and voluntary organizations of Pakistan and other Islamic
countries.
Milton Bearden, the Islamabad based CIA station chief, in consultation
with the US ambassador, coordinated the matters related to operational
planning against Afghan and Soviet formations and targets, disbursement of
funds and to some extent distribution of weapons. Bearden also maintained
periodic contacts with the Afghan political leaders though Pakistan did not
encourage his contacts with the Afghan commanders.
According to Tim Weiner of New York Times (August 24, 1998) the CIA
and its NATO allies had helped the Afghan resistance to dig in labyrinthine
underground caves and tunnels in Paktia and Khowst regions that sheltered
thousands of Afghan mujahideen. However, these camps survived the
mujahideen war and the Taliban regime. Later Osama bin Laden had used
these caves to set up his field headquarter.
The CIA’s military and financial support for the Afghan rebels indirectly
helped building the camps that the United States attacked in 1998-99.
Moreover, some of the same warriors who fought the Soviets with CIA’s help
later fought under bin Laden’s banner. From those same camps, the Afghan
rebels, known as mujahideen, or holy warriors, kept up a decade long siege on
the Soviet-supported garrison town of Khowst. Thousands of mujahideen
were dug into the mountains around Khowst. The Soviet accounts of the siege
of Khowst during 1988 referred to the rebel camps as “the last word in NATO
engineering techniques.” After a decade of fighting during which each side
claimed to have killed thousands of the enemy, the Afghan rebels poured out
of their encampments and took Khowst.
Besides cash payments the CIA money was used for purchasing trucks,
light vehicles, Chinese mules and horses and wet rations. While the CIA
money was canalized through the ISI (General Akhtar and his Joint Director,
Administration), the Saudi and other ‘ummah’ funds were funneled direct to
the mujahideen parties. Private Arab individuals also provided direct funds to
the commanders of their choice. In any case, the ISI supervised disbursement
of such largesse.
The CIA was the front procurer of weapons from countries like the UK,
France, and East European countries, Turkey, Egypt, Israel and China and
others. By 1988 the quantum of gross supply exceeded 75,000 tons, which
included MBRL, rocket launchers, RPG rifles, SAM missiles, Stinger
missiles, bombs, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, armor piercing shells
and heavy field guns.
Arms were mostly flown to Islamabad in the Chinese, USA, Saudi and PAF
planes. From Islamabad, these were diverted to Ojhri Camp and transported
onwards to Peshawar and Quetta for distribution amongst the mujahideen.
Afghan political parties maintained their own warehouses on Pakistani soil
and they received the arms supplied by the ISI. Their respective commanders
later picked up the weapons. However, the ISI often delivered weapons
directly to the field commanders planning seize of Soviet and Afghan
positions and directing operations according to ISI blueprint. It is interesting
to note that while the government of India maintained a pro-Soviet policy on
Afghanistan its armed forces had sold 100,000 .300 rifles and ammunitions to
the CIA procurers for supplying to the Afghan mujahideen.
The arms supply followed three conduits. The delivered shipments at
Karachi were transported to the ISI dump at Ojhri. Lt. Gen Akhtar, President
Zia and their team decided on the quantum of weapons to be supplied to
different Afghan parties. Finally, the field commanders carried the weapons to
the actual war zone on head load, road transport and mule packs. The ISI
followed certain secured routes to supply weapons inside Afghanistan.
• Chitral>Badakhshan>Northern Provinces>Panjshir Valley
• Parachinar>Logar>Kabul
• Miranshah>Logar>Western destinations
• Quetta>Kandahar, and
• Balochistan>Herat with Iranian collaboration.
Arms were carried by the Commanders sometimes by motorized vehicles
hired by the ISI from transport syndicates. One such transport syndicate was
set up by the ISI at its own cost, which was operated by personnel reitred
from Pakistani army. This syndicate later helped in boosting up Taliban war
efforts against the Rabbani government in Kabul.
In spite of liberal help by the CIA, Saudi and the ISI, it took over three
years for the mujahideen army to take a cogent shape. The combined strength
of the mujahideen had reached 60,000 and there was later accretion when the
taliban trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan madrassas and certain expert
commandos trained in Virginia centre of the CIA joined their ranks.
CIA also supplied Pakistan with satellite imagery, which was used to plan
attack on the Soviet and Afghan positions. Some special CIA operators were
also infiltrated inside Afghanistan with a view to contacting key leaders. CIA
and the ISI often differed on the priority of targets to be chosen and attacked
by the commanders. Pakistani priority was to mount pressure on Kandahar,
Kabul, Bagram, Khowst and Mazar-e-Sharif. The US planners had very little
say on these strategic planning. In matters of distribution of weapons,
Pakistan paid more attention to the fundamentalist parties. According to
reliable estimates, 67-73% of weapons were handed over to the
fundamentalist groups like Hizb-e-Islami of Hekmatyar. This arrangement
later created political and military impasse in Afghanistan after the Soviet
withdrawal and had resulted in serious factional fighting between the
fundamentalists and the moderates, leading to creation of the Taliban by
Pakistan with the tacit US support.
The Inter Services Intelligence exclusively trained the mujahideen. The
CIA was not involved in imparting ground training, although they were
responsible for training the Pakistani army/ISI personnel in the use of heavy
weapons and/or new weapons like Stinger missiles. President Zia-ul-Haq also
visited the mujahideen training facilities on a couple of occasions.
Pakistan operated seven camps on its soil exclusively for the Afghan
mujahideen. The Arabs maintained their own training facilities. A few Indian
Sikhs were also trained in a camp near Peshawar after 1984. A few of them
were killed in the Soviet bombing on mujahideen camps inside Afghanistan.
According to an estimate, Pakistan had trained over 150,000 mujahideen in
the ISI-managed training camps. In addition to the Afghans, about 5000
Pakistani mujahideen also were trained by the ISI from the ranks of the
Harkat-ul-Ansar, Al Badr and recruits of the Jamait-ul-Ulema-Islami for
teaming up with the Pak army regulars and Afghan mujahideen. Some of
these fighters were assigned to the “Afghan Arabs”, who were later
designated as 055 brigade of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah. At least 235 fighters
from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines had joined up with
the Pakistani mujahideen at this early stage.
Pakistan Army provided fighting hands to the ISI’s Afghan Bureau for
attachment with the mujahideen contingents. According to an estimate, about
5000 active Pakistani army personnel were specially deputed to the ISI’s
Afghan Bureau to fight inside Afghanistan. They coordinated the ground
planning, placement of medium and heavy canons and implemented the attack
plans in accordance with the planning of the Afghan Bureau. The ISI
personnel so deputed to Afghanistan were used in a planned manner in
consultation with the CIA to carry out sabotage of vital installations,
communication centers and special targets like well executed attack on
Bagram airport in which a large number of the USSR planes were destroyed.
In this attack, the ISI and mujahideen personnel had deftly used the Chinese
107 mm missiles. It should be added that about 500 Pakistan army personnel
belonging to Para-Commando units were given special training in the Virginia
training facility of the CIA for gaining expertise in attack on the heavily
armored Soviet forces. Some of these US trained commandos were later used
in Indian Kashmir for executing high profile Indian army targets and political
VIPs.
With a view to keeping tight control on the Afghan political party leaders
(of the seven-party coalition) and the field commanders, two pronged efforts
were made by the USA and Pakistan. While the USA encouraged the
sponsored visit of Afghan political leaders to Washington for interaction with
the State Department officials and the CIA, inside Pakistan General Zia
maintained a protocol of meeting the leaders once in a fortnight. According to
Brig. Yousaf, such meetings normally took place at the residence of General
Akhtar, chief of the ISI.
Details of Pakistani/mujahideen operations against the Soviet and Afghan
targets bear testimony to the fine fighting mettle of the Afghan tribal
commanders. However, the CIA had often planned daring attacks inside the
Soviet-held territory of Tajikistan, especially against oil and natural gas and
industrial facilities. The sharp Soviet reaction and bombing against targets
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had forced Pakistan to back out from
forward attacks inside the Soviet territory.
ISI’s policy of monopoly on the Afghan resistance had never pleased the
USA and especially the CIA. The softening of Soviet attitude and
unwillingness to lend full support to the communist regime in Kabul had
encouraged the international community to reach an agreement with the
USSR for a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan. General Akhtar of the ISI
was not in favour of bringing back king Zahir Shah. He opposed the idea of
calling of an Afghan shoora to determine the future form of government.
While General Zia and General Akhtar had stuck to the military view of
dominating Afghanistan through a proxy fundamentalist regime, the policy
makers in the State Department and the CIA opted for a geopolitical view and
favoured installation of a moderate government of national reconciliation.
Zia-ul-Haq did not want a government of national reconciliation. He used
the ISI to bring about acute factional fighting among the seven parties. He
wanted a proxy regime. At home, Zia faced problems with his ‘dummy
elected Prime Minister Junejo’ and his cabinet. Violence had also started
taking toll inside Pakistan, often attributed to KHAD (Afghan intelligence)
and home grown jihadis. Zia opted for Hekmatyar almost in defiance of the
US wishes. He virtually defied the CIA machinations and in one crucial
meeting with the US ambassador in Islamabad he conveyed that any
‘government in Kabul should be able to represent Pakistan’s national interest’.
After Zia’s death, a couple of important political developments took place
in Pakistan, the USA and the neighbouring India. Benazir Bhutto was elected
as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. George Bush, a former CIA chief, was
elected to the White House and the scandal-hit government of Rajiv Gandhi
had succeeded in giving another deathblow to the Sikh militant movement
(Operation Black Thunder). The Soviet Union was on the verge of
disintegration and the tough right-winger leaders were losing grip on the
internal and external situation. The Cold War seemed to be coming to an end.
Nevertheless, these changes did not change Pakistan’s Afghan policy.
Benazir was allowed by the army to take the hot seat after prolonged
procrastination. She was obliged to maintain Zia appointee Gen. Hamid Gul
as the ISI chief. General Gul was also under influence of the US oil and
energy lobby that was preparing to set up a pipeline from the Black Sea to the
Indian Ocean. A former Director of Military Intelligence, Gul was adept to
bright operational ideas but he lacked the catty sense of a veteran intelligence
sleuth. He lasted for two years and was sacked by Benazir over disagreement
on execution of Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan under the interim
government.
Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan imbroglio, which it mostly executed
through the Afghan Bureau and other operational wings of the Inter Services
Intelligence, did not end with the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan continued to
support Hizb-e-Islami faction headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. For a while,
the CIA also supported Hekmatyar with a view to counteracting the USSR tilt
towards the waxing and waning Northern groups headed by General Rashid
Dostum, Ahmad Shah Massoud and the forces headed by Rabbani. It is
alleged that Iran, the USSR and India supported these groups with a view to
contain Pakistani influence on Afghan affairs. After 1989 withdrawal of the
Soviet troops, the USA had started developing second thoughts on the
prudence of placing Afghanistan solely at the disposal of the ISI. The CIA
inner apparatus had also developed doubts on the efficacy of the ISI in
bringing about reconciliation amongst the feuding partners of the seven- party
alliance.
After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Benazir’s government used the
ISI to assemble a ‘shoora’ of 500 handpicked Afghans, reportedly
representing all the resistance groups at Islamabad. Pakistan managed to float
the idea of formation of Afghan Interim Government and to continue the fight
against Najibullah government. The ISI planned the operation and supplied
the logistics to the AIG, primarily to the Hizb-e-Islami group of Hekmatyar.
This sham chapter of Pakistani machination had brought upon Afghanistan
untold miseries as the feuding Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and other tribal armies
jostled with each other for capturing Kabul. The United States, after the
virtual collapse of the Soviet Empire, had discovered new access to the oil-
rich areas of the former communist monolith and lost temporary interest in
the Afghan pipeline. The job initiated by Carter, pioneered by Reagan, and
mishandled by senior Bush led to the piling up of corpses all over
Afghanistan. From Carter’s paltry $30 million aid to the Afghan resistance to
Reagan’s $630 million per year was a huge quantum jump, which had
fattened the pockets of Pakistani and Afghan leaders.
Important fallout of US and Pakistan involvement in Afghanistan was the
re-emergence of Islamic jihad. Developments in Lebanon, Palestine and
Egypt had so far indicated that the Islamic fundamentalists were sporadically
trying out the tactics of violence for national independence and assertion of
the supremacy of religion over the state. These were localized events. Iranian
revolution had sufficiently aroused Muslim consciousness that the power of
religion could defeat the greatest military power in the world. That military
might was susceptible to suffer ignoble defeat was proved in the Vietnam war,
collapse of the Soviet Empire and Iranian revolution. However, the Afghan
saga had succeeded in reviving organized Islamist jihad against other
civilizations, especially the Christian, Jew and Hindu. Jihad in Afghanistan
and birth of Al Qaeda al Sulbah added a new philosophy to Islamic ideals—
spontaneous international jihad to re-establish supremacy of purest form of
Islam.
The US had lost interest in Afghanistan including its dirtiest contribution to
modern history, the Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Thinkers all over the world also
forgot that the spirit of Islamist jihad that had taken a back seat after the 10th
century was revived in the 20th century by the US designs to defeat a ‘post-
Second World War shadow enemy,’ the Soviet Union. The western fulcrum of
evil had finally re-established its grip on the Asian continent through Afghan
war, which was later fortified by US intervention in Iraq and threatened
intervention in Syria and Iran. Through these ventures, the USA had
succeeded in establishing firm imperial foothold on Asian soil. The USA also
indirectly spurred up fresh Islamic jihad, by abruptly abandoning the jihadists
to fend for themselves. These groups had already started turning against the
USA and the sudden vacuum inspired them to conclude that the USA was at
the root of all their miseries.
Out of the rubbles of jihadist war against the USSR by the Caucasian
resistance groups, Cold War checkerboard moves and subsequent power
struggle in Kabul, a one-eyed sphinx called Mullah Mohammad Omar and his
Taliban had arisen almost unnoticed to the discerning world intelligence
community and the superpower pundits. A legend apart, Taliban was not a
spontaneous band of Robinhood-students who took to arms to fight the ills
from which Afghanistan was suffering for over 20 years. According to myths
catered by Pakistan and other interested parties, Afghanistan was badly
divided in the post-jihad situation. The capital and surrounding areas were
nominally under Rabbani government’s Jammat-i-Islami faction. Its ally
Ismail Khan ruled over the Herat tract, General Dostum and General Massoud
ruled roost over northern provinces, often aligning with Rabbani and
occasionally joining hands with Hekmatyar, who controlled most of the
Pashtun tract adjacent to Pakistan. The ISI, and to some extent the CIA,
continued to be his main providers.
The ISI planners and the PPP government had played tricks behind the
back of the USA. The White House planners were in favour of the national
reconciliation group to continue to rule with wider American support. Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan opted for the Wahhabi-Deobandi Pashtun factions. In
end-1989, a Pakistani military-political mission visited Washington for
drawing up a new plan for Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to create a hardcore
well-formatted Afghan military group based on Hekmatyar mujahideen.
Rubin has stated in his book Fragmentation of Afghanistan that Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan paid hefty cash incentives to the Commanders to rally behind
Hekmatyar and topple the Kabul government through military option. This
Pakistan and ISI planned coup was headed by Tanai. After the USA scuttled
this coup, Tanai was appointed head of Hekmatyar’s Army of Sacrifice.
After dismissal of Benazir Bhutto in August 1990, the ISI in conjunction
with Pakistan army and Hekmatyar forces planned a massive attack on Kabul.
This plan was prevented by US intervention. The waxing and waning of US
support to the ISI in promoting Hekmatyar and the Soviet, Iranian and Indian
support to Rabbani, Massoud and Dostum witnessed funny and fearful
consequences leaving the entire Afghanistan to the mercy of warlords and
criminals.
However, Pakistan’s dependence on Hekmatyar did not yield the desired
result, political consolidation by an ISI backed jihadist group, which would
have given total monopoly of the embattled nation to Pakistan. The Pakistani
rulers, Zia to Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, and the ISI had failed to secure the
trade routes to central Asian markets and the prospective exploitation of the
oil riches.
In fact, the sudden emergence of the Taliban in November 1994 was not
sudden at all. Pakistan and certain sections of the Pashtoon religious
fundamentalists and their Arab mentors had taken advantage of the prevailing
chaos and floated an army of madrassa trained students—the Taliban. The
stated objective was to fight the chaotic inter-tribal bloodshed and establish a
stable government in Kabul. Benazir Bhutto wanted to open up the supply
line to Turkmenistan for importing oil and for exporting Pakistani
merchandize. In this venture she was fully supported by the CIA. IN fact the
ISI and the CIA initially fathered the Taliban. The ISI exploited the prevailing
geopolitical chaos, unconcern of the US in rebuilding the war- ravaged
Afghanistan and the availability of huge quantities of arms and ammunitions.
It had armed the Taliban with modern weapons.
Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, was born in a poor farmer family in
1959. He belonged to Hotak clan of the Ghilzai tribe. Poverty had driven him
out of his village to Singesar in Maiwand district of Kandahar, where he took
up the job of a village mullah. He was poor in his pocket but not in piety and
religious fervor. He had assembled about 30 madrassa students to rescue two
girls taken hostage by the mujahideen and raped repeatedly. That was the core
of the Taliban. His group had initially joined the Khalis group of Hizb-i-
Islami, which was firmly committed to the Deobandi and Wahhabi preaching.
His group came to prominence after the ISI and Pakistan army utilized the
services of it in rescuing a Pakistani convoy of 30 trucks to Quetta that carried
symbolical merchandise to Turkmenistan with a view to opening up a trade
route to that part of Central Asia.
Thereafter, Pakistani ISI, Army, and the transporter mafia got fully
involved in training and arming the Taliban. By early 1995, it was well known
to the world that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were solidly behind the Taliban
and the USA also tacitly supported the move to counteract Iranian and
Russian influence on the ruling factions.
The Taliban drew ideological sustenance from the Jamait-e-Ulema-Islami.
The JUI ran strings of madrassas inside Pakistan and had accommodated a
large number of Afghan Pashtun youths. After the JUI became a partner of
the ruling coalition, Fazlur Rehman, the JUI supremo, was made chairman of
the National Assembly Committee on foreign affairs. In this capacity Rehman
wielded tremendous influence on Afghan affairs and Mullah Omar. General
Babbar, with the blessings of Benazir, opened up surface transport route to
Kandahar and the city’s telephone link was hooked up to the Pakistani system.
A combined group of ISI and Army officers were deputed to Kandahar to
provide blueprint of a Taliban takeover of the Spin Boldak transport hub and
the huge arms and ammunition dump at Pasha near Pakistan border. It is
reported that about 200 ISI and army personnel had aided the Taliban to break
the morale of the forces of Hekmatyar.
Between 1994 and 1996, the Taliban grew phenomenally. Thousands of
talibs studying in Pakistani and Afghanistan madrassas were drafted to the
force. The world was well aware that “the professional know-how could not
have been acquired in JUI madrassas nor in a few weeks of ISI training, but
attest to the truth of contemporary reports that the technical functions required
for mobile warfare in artillery and armor were directed by Pashtun ex-army
officers of the Communist PDPA.” Angelo Ranasinghe, Afghanistan: A
Modern History. p. 146.
What Ranasinghe and others failed to observe was the fact that a large
number of Pakistani Army officers on lien to the ISI were deployed to guide
the Taliban forces in modern warfare. To these were added the well-trained
cadres of the Islamist tanzeems of Pakistan. These tanzeems spawned
hundreds of mujahideen from madrassas controlled by them and supplied
warfront fodder to the Taliban and the ISI
The ISI was directed to step up training of the Taliban contingents. ISI
agents were sent out to make direct recruitment from NWFP, Balochistan,
Sind and Punjab madrassas. By the end of 1995, the ISI had succeeded in
creating an army of about 30,000 Taliban soldiers. The ISI also utilized drug
money and printed huge number of Afghan currency to purchase the loyalty
of several warlords. For a while, it had succeeded in bribing out Rashid
Dostum, a powerful warlord. Later in December 1996, Paksitan directly got
involved in capturing Mazar-e-Sharif in collaboration with the Taliban army.
In May 1997 after the fall of Mazar, Pakistan flew in its foreign minister to
the key northern city where it officially recognized the Taliban government, a
step later followed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
With the Taliban government put in the saddle in Kabul, Pakistan
temporarily gained the geopolitical advantage it had dreamt of since creation
of the Muslim state in 1947. However, Pakistani gain turned to an
international nightmare after the Taliban started asserting its own agenda of
staunchest form of Deobandi and Wahhabi tenets of Islam. It was not even
acceptable to the majority of the saner Pakistanis and rest of the world, which
expected a stable government under Pakistani tutelage. The history of
development of Afghanistan as an opium and heroin producing country, a
country where all formats of human rights were trampled and a country which
allowed itself to become the hub of International Islamist Jihad, is intricately
linked with the stories of induction and growth of Al Qaeda, has been
separately told. The flourishing activities of the Pakistani, Tajikistani,
Uzbekistani, Chechen, Malaysian, Indonesian, Indian, Bangladeshi and
Filipino Islamist jihadists on Afghan soil have also been discussed in separate
chapters. Pakistan, for all practical purposes, had become a conjoined
breeding ground of international Islamic terrorism that had culminated in the
Al Qaeda al Sulbah attack on the USA in September 2001, and the attack on
the symbol of Indian democracy—the Parliament building, on December 13,
2001. CIA collaboration and patronage had finally conferred upon Pakistan
the status of Fulcrum of Evil of the East, an Islamist force that was identified
with rabid Islamist terrorism. Internally, Pakistan was very fast losing its
texture as a nation. Only ‘hate India-hate Hindu’ elixir kept its national
identity somewhat coherent.

*
 ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah Forays in
South East Asia
When we speak of Pakistan, ISI, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Pan-Arab Islamist
forces exporting Islamist jihad to South East Asia, it should be kept in mind
that degree of involvement, quantum of assistance and manner of
participation vitally differ between different fulcrums. As a nation state,
Pakistan is engaged in proxy war in the region, as it is against India and
Afghanistan. In South East Asia Pakistan, ISI and Islamist tanzeems of
Pakistan functioned in collaboration with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah, HUJI, JUM
and Ahl-e-Hadith (BD) and other local forces like the MLF, ASG and
Jemmah Islamiyah. Pakistani link is common to almost all the Islamist
organizations that gained prominence in the region. Pakistani link is a vital
string that garlands the entire region. Pakistan was the training ground, supply
base and spiritual hub of the Wahhabi Islamists.
The protagonists of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have expanded
their activities in a planned manner in most of the South East Asian countries.
The South East Asian Muslim majority countries and the countries having
sizeable Muslim population have historically practiced moderation, tolerance
and somewhat secular approach in running the affairs of their states.
Especially Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand have
encouraged ethnic, religious and linguistic plurality. Indonesia having 95%
Muslim population has, however, practiced moderation and accommodative
spirit under leaders like Sukarno and Suharto. They had prevented the
Islamist parties and organizations from preaching virulent fundamentalist
tenets of Wahhabism.
The South East Asian Muslim populations had developed early linkages
with the Arab traders and preachers, and were influenced by West Asian
Islam. However, plurality of ethnic composition and cross-cultural impacts
from India and China had modified Islam to a great extent. Sufism, imported
from India and Central Asian countries, also went a long way in moderating
the impact of purist Wahhabi Islam. Muslims of South East Asia had
preserved their historical traditions having roots in Indian and trans-Chinese
cultures.
However, historical events indicate that in post-Iran revolution and post-
Russian occupation of Afghanistan the Muslim pragmatic rulers of South East
Asian countries too succumbed to pressure and started conceding space to the
Islamist parties and organizations. On Pakistani and Al Qaeda al Sulbah
contribution to the growth of Islamic terrorism in South East Asia we can,
therefore, treat the subject in two short themes: growth of Islamic
fundamentalism that aimed at destroying moorings of the Muslim peoples in
ancient cultural values and growth of International Islamist terrorism.
The Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI did not light the initial torch of
Islamisation process in South East Asian countries having sizeable Muslim
population. The initial impetus had come from internal political and economic
conditions, fear of domination by other religious groups like the Christians,
Buddhists and Hindus, and rapid exposure to radical ambience created by Iran
revolution and resurgence of Wahhabi Islamic concepts all over the Sunni
dominated Islamic countries. Pakistan had started emerging as the most
important centre of Wahhabi and Deobandi Islam after Zia-ul-Haq initiated
rapid Islamisation of the country and agreed to collaborate with the USA to
fight the Red Communist forces in Afghanistan. In addition to fundamentalist
production lines in Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, Yemeni and Libyan factories,
Pakistani madrassas acted as nurseries where South East Asian
fundamentalists were sun burnt in radical Islamism. These fundamentalist
fodders did not remain rudderless for a long time. A sizeable numbers of them
were recruited by the CIA and Saudi intelligence agency and were sent to
Pakistan for brainwashing and training in Pakistani and Al Qaeda al Sulbah
camps for fighting against the Soviet backed forces. Most of these jihadis
went for the love of money and a good number of them returned as confirmed
Islamist jihadists with conviction that they could also establish a compact
Islamic nation comprising all the Muslim inhabited states/areas of South East
Asia.
*
The Philippines has witnessed Muslim unrest for over 350 years in the
Muslim majority islands of Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan and the Sulu
cluster of islands. In modern days, the Muslims of the region like to describe
themselves as Bangshamoro (Moro nation), indicating that the descendants of
the Moors (Arabs) were fused into a compact nation and deserved
independence from the Christian Philippines. This is a fallacious claim.
The Philippines Muslim National League (1967) carried out political and
military struggles, out of which grew the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group
(SAG). The Moro Islamic Movement (MIM) was formed in 1968 out of anger
amongst the Muslims over large scale Christian migration to the southern
islands. The MIM had fought pitched skirmishes with the Christians. They
availed of the opportunity of the Philippines opening up to the Muslim
countries like Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Libya, where Muslim
Filipinos were allowed to migrate as cheap work force. Some Muslim
students were also accepted in religious schools of these countries. In 1970
there were about 550 Filipino madrassa students in Pakistan and over 4000 in
other Arab countries. These graduates in turn organized madrassas and taught
Wahhabi form of Islam. Some teachers from Pakistan and Arab countries
were also allowed sabbatical opportunity in the southern Moro islands to
teach Islam. By 1971-72, Libya had started financing construction of mosques
and madrassas. The Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) also pitched in
with adequate support.
Nur Misauri, a professor at the University of the Philippines, had formed
the Moro National Liberation Front in 1968. He was supported by a section of
Malaysian leadership and Libya. The Bangshamoro People’s Liberation Army
(BPLA) organized by him had offered stiff resistance to the Philippines army.
After a few reverses Nur Misauri fled to Libya and later took refuge in
Pakistan, from where he guided the armed movement and helped the
USA/CIA in recruiting Moro volunteers for their Afghan jihad. Following his
initiative 450 Filipino Muslim youths were inducted into Pakistani madrassas
in Karachi, Lahore region and Peshawar area. Nur Misauri acted as a link
between the Filipino mujahideen and the ISI handlers. He was financially
supported by the ISI and was located at guesthouses in Peshawar and Karachi.
According to reports a Pakistani diplomat in Manila had helped Masauri
group in receiving aid from Islamic charities in the Middle East. The Bhutto
administration had allowed free hand to the ISI to assist the Islamist groups in
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Phulippines.
The MNLF later settled for peace talks with Libyan brokerage. Nur
Misauri was confronted by majority of militant members at a meeting of the
MNLF at Mecca in 1977. The group wanted autonomy, while Misauri
preferred independence. Salamat Hashim, the breakaway leader, formed the
MILF under Pakistani patronage. Salamat initially moved his organization to
Cairo and later to Lahore, Pakistan, where he established firm contact with
the ISI and Islamist organizations like Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad and Harkat-
ul-Ansar. Under Pakistani encouragement, Moro Islamic Liberation Front was
established in 1984. The ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah trained its members in
Peshawar, Quetta and Khowst camps alongside the Afghans, Pakistanis and
Arabs. The MILF carried on struggle throughout the regimes of Fidel Ramos,
Cori Aquino, and Gloria Arroyo. Though predominantly a Christian country
the Philippines did not receive protective shield from the USA, as America
was neck deep in strategic bonhomie with Pakistan and the Arab world.
However, the most important face of the Moro revolt is the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), formally known as Al Harkat Al Islamiya. It attained serious
notoriety and was listed by the USA as a terrorist organization after
September 11, 2001.
The Abu Sayyaf Group was originated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, when
about 400 Moro youths were inducted to Pakistan’s ISI managed camp at the
behest of the CIA and Saudi Arabia for training as mujahideen. Ustadz
Abdurazak Janjalani, one of the Moro leaders, and his brother Khaddafy
Janjalani had succeeded in befriending Saudi mujahideen Osama bin Laden.
They were initially trained at Quetta and Khowst. Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf,
who believed in strict observance of Wahhabi Islamic tenets, headed the
Khowst camp. Abdur Rab Rasul acted in conjunction with the Pak JEI
supremo and jointly they converted the Filipinos to staunch Islamist jihadis
and these elements were known as Abu Sayyaf Group. Janjalanis brought
back Wahhabi system to the Moro areas. The group known by Abu Sayyaf
had offered full support to the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah sponsored
operations in South East Asia and with their help bin Laden had organized
Operation Oplan Bojinka. Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani jihadist, and his
associates were designated by the Al Qaeda al Sulbah for blowing up 11 US
flights over the Pacific, assassination of the Pope and other spectacular
terrorist activities. This sinister plan was hatched up over a prolonged period
with meticulous care and planting by long term Al Qaeda al Sulbah residents.
*
The growth and spread of Islamic terrorism in the Philippines is intricately
linked to the concept of exporting Islamic revolution as practiced by Libya
and Arab fundamentalists and the growth of acute Islamic militancy in post
1978 Pakistan, Afghanistan and other Islamic countries in the Middle East.
However, it should be on record that Christian-Muslim conflict in the
Philippines was as embedded in the systemic fault line of the group of islands
as it was with the Israelis and Palestinians. The Malayan province of Sabah
and Libya had provided the initial succor to the MNLF armed insurgency
between 1973 and 1975.
The advent of Cori Aquino regime in 1986 signaled a period of negotiation
between the MNLF and the government, which led to the formation of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), but the MILF continued
its programme of sporadic insurgency. The Misauri faction of the MNLF
rebelled again in 2001, when he was charged with corruption and other
malpractices. He defected with a group of about 500 and attacked government
forces at Jolo. He was defeated and was finally brought to trial by Gloria
Arroyo government.
The MILF, however, continued the insurgency demanding independent
Moro Islamic state. It was supported by the ulema, the datus—traditional
aristocrats. Hashim and his deputy Jafar Ghazi visited Malaysia and Indonesia
to contact the Jemmah Islamiyah leaders. There are very reliable reports of
their visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan seeking support from the ISI,
mujahideen tanzeems and Taliban leadership. Pakistan had come to notice,
along with Al Qaeda al Sulbah for supplying weapons and explosives to the
MILF through Malayan Sabah and Indonesian conduits. Presence of Pakistani
and Arab trainers in Mindanao and Sulu archipelago training camps was
reported by the US sources. Three retired officers of the ISI were recruited by
the spy agency in 1985 and were deputed to Mindanao under cover of
religious teachers. In fact, besides the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan
the Moro insurgency received attention from PLO, LTTE, Hamas, Iraqi Sunni
elements and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Curiously, a five-member cell of the Abu
Nidal group was busted in the Philippines in 1987.
Connectivity of the MILF with Abu Sayyaf Group had started in and
around the madrassas in Karachi, Peshawar, Binori, Bannu and Quetta where
a large number of Moro students were taught the lessons of Wahhabi and
Deobandi Islam, and were indoctrinated with Taliban spirit. A good number
of them were also exposed to the training schedule of tanzeems like Lashkar-
e-Tayeba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Thereafter, the MILF and ASG
developed firm contact with Al Qaeda al Sulbah, which was quick in adopting
regional Islamist jihad groups for carrying out holy war inside Afghanistan
and for carrying out global attacks against the US and allied targets. The
MILF had deputed a contingent of about 500 mujahideen to Pakistan via
Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh in January 1984. There are reliable
reports that the CIA cover flights had flown over 200 MILF mujahideen from
Chittagong to Karachi in the garb of special flights for Haj pilgrims. After
initial screening and training by the ISI, they were taken over by Al Qaeda al
Sulbah. Salamat Hashim acted as the contact man in Pakistan. About 200 of
these mujahideen were selected as fighting material. Saudi charities, ISI front
organizations and Al Qaeda al Sulbah funded these ventures. At that point of
time, the CIA paymaster in Pakistan made some funds available to Hashim.
However, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI developed different agendas in
South East Asia as the Afghan war was being drawn to a victorious end.
With the Afghan connection at his disposal, Osama bin Laden had started
making long-term preparations for fighting the US interests in the Pacific Rim
by stationing his brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa in the Philippines.
This was simply not an intended war against the US interests. The Al Qaeda
al Sulbah and the ISI had arrived at tacit understanding to transplant Afghan
type jihad in South East Asia and create a distinct Islamic hub, as against
increasing Christian influence. By 1989, the eastern fulcrum of evil had
juxtaposed its operational objectives with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and had
started emerging as equal partners in jihad ventures in Europe, the Caucasus
and Central Asia. Their objectives coincided in South East Asia also.
Khalifa had set up several front offices, trading units and charities. He was
also in charge of the Saudi charity, Islamic International Relief Organization.
With the help of these tools, Jamal Khalifa had set up a terror network in the
Philippines. Khalifa even funded Al Qaeda al Sulbah operatives in Jordan,
Indonesia and Malaysia. Committed Al Qaeda al Sulbah stalwarts like Zubair,
Abu Omar and Sadiq Odeh assisted him. Sadiq Odeh was linked to bombing
in Kenya. Later senior Al Qaeda al Sulbah trainers were deputed to the
Philippines who alongside a few Pakistani trainers (former ISI operatives)
trained the MILF, Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, the Malayan Kamuplan Mujahideen,
Jemmah Islamiyah and Lashkar Jandulla volunteers. The linkage is very deep
and stretches to the core positions of Islamist terrorism in the entire South
East Asia.
Of far more consequences was the connectivity between the Abu Sayyaf
Group alias Al Harakat Al Islamiya, ISI floated Islamic tanzeems and Al-
Qaeda. While in Khowst, on Pakistan Afghanistan border Janjalani had
drifted closer to Ramzi Yousef. Ramzi had moved to the Philippines in 1994
after causing the February 1993 WTC bomb blast in USA. Guided by Osama
bin Laden and Khalifa he conceived of the grand plan to sabotage 11 US air
flights over the Pacific– an operation named Oplan Bojinka. He recruited Abu
Sayyaf jiahdis to carry out the plan. One of the suspects arrested for the WTC
blast belonged to the ASG. In Bojinka plan an ISI-trained Pakistani Tareq
Kaved Rana, a resident of Paranque, the Philippines, had played an important
role. He had housed several of the conspirators at his place of stay, which was
used for fabricating bombs. Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Ramzi Yousef and a
Baloch Pakistani named Khalid Sheikh Mohammad guided the Manila cell of
the Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Another Pakistan related terrorist was Wali Khan
Shah, who had played a significant role in the Afghan jihad. He was entrusted
by the ISI mentors to activate terrorist cells in Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines and Thailand. Another Pakistani born in Kuwait, Abdul Hakim
Ali was trained by the ISI in bomb-making at Peshawar. He also teamed up
with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah cell in the Philippines. Amein Mohammad, a
product of Binori madrassa, Karachi, and another Pakistani owing allegiance
to Harkat-ul-Ansar and trained by the ISI, also played vital roles in organising
the Al Qaeda al Sulbah cells in Malaysia.
The plan that included assassination of the Pope was uncovered in time and
a major disaster was averted. However, the leads revealed by spate of arrests
and interrogations, indicated existence of another nascent plan to mount
bigger attacks on the US target. These leads were neglected by the US
security and intelligence agencies. They even did not suspect the ISI for its
involvement with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah in planning out the sinister
Philippines based operations.
Arrest of some Indonesian Jemmah Islamiyah terrorist suspects in March
2005 by Indonesian police in collaboration with Filipino security services
unraveled the existence of fresh Abu Sayyaf training camps in Mindanao
area, where about 35 JI terrorists were undergoing training under expert ASG
and Al Qaeda al Sulbah trainers. These indicators tend to prove that Islamist
jihad in the Philippines is far from over. It continues to be a part of the global
design of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and other jihadist tanzeems, which aspire to
set up a vast Islamic hub comprising territories of Myanmar, Malaysia,
Indonesia, South Thailand, Southern Cambodia and the Philippines.
With the decline of the Abu Sayyaf group and an upper hand enjoyed by
the Philippines’ security agencies over MILF operations, the insurgency
situation has lost some sheen. Nevertheless, the Islamic International Jihad
movement headed by the local insurgent groups, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the
ISI has the potential to escalate the level of violence once the present state of
heightened security measures is relaxed, and the US diverts its attention from
the Pacific Rim.
Talks held in April 2005 between the Filipino government and the MILF
representatives under the aegis of the Malaysian government have reportedly
made satisfactory progress. The tripartite talks were resumed in June 2005.
However, according to Filipino sources, the ASG is not amenable to the idea
of a peace agreement between the MILF and Manila government, on terms of
autonomy within the constitutional structure of the Philippines.
*
Indonesia witnessed growth of Islamic resurgence from early 1926, when
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was formed to revive Islam and to facilitate the
growth of nationhood based on Islam. It drew inspiration from the Indian
Muslim League and Deoband. While the Dutch imperialists endeavored to
suppress Islam as a fissiparous factor, the Japanese occupation forces required
the Muslims in 1943 to promote hostility of the local populace against the
Allied Powers. They had floated Masjumi, a political party of the Muslims.
This did not flourish. The Islamic forces organized Darul Islam. It opposed
the secular policies of Sukarno and was later suppressed by the state. The
Islamic parties did not endorse Sukarno’s policy of Panchsheel and his
closeness to the Communist Party (PKI).
These Islamic forces supported General Suharto in 1965 in his endeavour
to overthrow Sukarno regime. However, Suharto too followed the secular
traditions of his predecessor. In fact, he tried to defang the Islamic parties.
This policy had prompted the Islamic parties to strengthen their forces at the
social level and arouse demands for implementation of the Sharia as the state
policy.
After 1980-82, Suharto had started losing grip on state power because of
heavy corruption, nepotism and economic slowdown. Suharto adopted some
cosmetic measures to implement Islamic rules and extending some fringe
benefits to the Islamic army officials and bureaucrats. He had crafted out
Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990. After disillusionment
with the cosmetic measures of Suharto, the intellectuals joined forces with
Wahid’s NU and Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDMI.
It may be relevant to note that the Islamist forces were not satisfied with
the political moves made by Wahid and Megawati, who were in favor of
promoting moderate Islamic rule. The hardcore Islamists had wanted
implementation of pure Sharia rule. More than 30,000 Islamic academics
were trained in the Middle Eastern and Pakistani institutions and madrassas.
In Pakistan, madrassas at place like Binori, Muridke, Gujranwala, Attock and
Peshawar etc churned out Islamic bigots, who emulated the tanzeems nurtured
by the ISI. Some of them were trained in camp Musa, north of Peshawar by
ISI officials along with Afghan and Pakistani mujahideen. They were exposed
to Wahhabi tenets of Islam and also the practical aspects of jihad. A good
number of them were thus in regular contact with some rabid Islamist
mujahideen tanzeems, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Taliban trainers and had
developed fraternal links with them. They wanted immediate establishment of
Deeni governance, based on Sharia and Hadith. The growth of Islamic
terrorism and jihad in Indonesia was strengthened by failure of the illiberal
democracy and its infiltration by the Islamists trained by Pakistan, Middle
East and Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
The detailed accounts of Islamist jihad in Indonesia and Malaysia will be
clubbed together as the main jihadist body; the Jemmah Islamiyah had
adversely affected both the countries. Some scholars have compared Jemmah
Islamiyah as the mini Al Qaeda al Sulbah of South East Asia.
*
Islam in Malaysia has been synonymous with tolerance. However, since
1970’s fundamentalist and jihadist Islam had started taking root in the
Muslim-majority nation. The founding of United Malayas National
Organisation (UMNO) by Onn bin Jaafar after the Second World War marked
the resurgence of Malayan nationalism. Pro-Muslim factions did not endorse
Jaafar’s secular approach and Tungku Abdul Rahman replaced him. UMNO’s
policy of preference to the Bhumiputras (sons of the soil) and adoption of new
economic policy had for a while satisfied the Muslims suspicious of economic
and political preponderance of the Chinese and Indian population. The
creation of Islamic Consultative Body (ICB) in 1981 had ensured that no
government policy and development programme should violate the Islamic
tenets. Mahathir’s adoption of Inclusion of Islamic Values Policy, Bank Islam
Malaysia Berhad and International Islamic University had titillated the
Islamic aspirations of the Muslim population. Mahathir had tried to play safe
to keep the Muslim clergy and population happy keeping eyes on their
growing contact with the greater Islamic world and resurgence of Islamic
fundamentalism in the region.
However, these measures did not satisfy the staunch Islamists. The
fundamentalist groups saw UMNO as a party of the elite. These forces had
formed the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) in 1951. PAS represented the
Islamist strand of political consciousness, which succeeded in capturing
power in some provinces. However, fundamentalism started growing rapidly
because of widening economic disparity between the Chinese and the
Malayans. These frustrations had received impetus from the institution of
dakwahs, Islamic study groups like the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia
(ABIM) founded by Anwar Ibrahim, the prominent political figure who was
released from jail in end-2004. Despite mixed bag of measures of pacification
of the Islamic aspirations of the people and political repression, the UMNO
coalition came under heavy political pressure from PAS and demands for
implementation of the Sharia and Fiq—Islamic jurisprudence—grew louder.
In fact, the government had conceded to the popular demands and more than
two-third of Malaysia’s 23 million Muslims are subject to Sharia rules.
Aahukum Ahudud–Islamic criminal code– is however, being implemented in
a moderate manner.
Though the UMNO continues to enjoy political preponderance with
support from the Chinese and the Indian political parties, the PAS and the
ulema have not given up their demands for rapid Islamisation. Malaysia has
been exposed to the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and its Southeast Asian tentacle
Jemmah Islamiya. Under pressure, the UMNO has also adopted a policy of
da’wa (mission) to islamise the government and the nation.
Having described in brief the trends of growth of Islamic fundamentalism
in Indonesia and Malaysia, let us make an attempt to analyse the growth and
spread of Islamic jihad in these countries.
Unlike the Muslim struggle for greater political rights in the Philippines,
Indonesia’s tryst with Islamic terrorism started with the son of an East Java
imam, Jafar Umar Thalib, who was trained in Al Maududi Institute of the
Pakistan branch of the Jamait-e-Islami, Lahore. He was picked up by the ISI
and was trained at a Peshawar camp. Later he joined the Afghan mujahideen
under influence of a Yemeni mullah Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah. His camp
was located near Peshawar border that was headed by an expert group of ISI
commandos seconded to the Hizb-e-Islami faction of Hekmatyar. Later he
met Osama at the latter’s camp at Peshawar. During his return journey two
members of Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad accompanied him to Indonesia. They
guided him in organizing terrorist groups,. On return to Indonesia, Thalib
organised Laskar Jihad to fight the Christian groups of Mulukus, who
demanded autonomy and independence. He sent about 3000 fighters to the
Mulukus. A section of the Indonesian military connived with him.
Laskar Jihad’s efforts to radicalize Islam in Indonesia and unfold the
banner of jihad was complemented by organisations like Darul Islam, Islamic
Youth Movement, the Defenders of Islam, Indonesian Committee for
Solidarity with the Islamic World, Anti-Zionist Movement, Indonesian
Muslim Students Action Front and Muhammadiya Students Association. The
same group assisted by Jemmah Islamiyah and a faction of Indonesian army
had carried out extreme atrocities on East Timor Christians. Volunteers from
Pakistan and Bangladesh fortified the Laskar Jihad contingents
The most important link between South East Asian Islamic jihad groups
and the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah was forged by an umbrella organization
called Jemmah Islamiyah. Malaysia acted as a neutral ground for the Islamic
jihadists of Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore and it was used as an
important transit and launching station by the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah
operatives. The most important Al Qaeda al Sulbah meeting in January 2000
that planned attack on USS Cole and the WTC attack on 9/11 was attended
amongst others by Riduan Isamuddin Hambali, an important Al Qaeda leader
in SE Asia, who was trained by the ISI and Al Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. He was an important member of the Jemmah Islamiyah. Besides
Riduan the meeting was also attended by ISI front operator Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad.
Besides the Jemmah Islamiyah, Malaysia was presented by its own jihadist
group–Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) – formed by some extremist
factions of the Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS). Formed in 1995 by Pakistan
trained Afghan jihad veteran mujahideen Zainon Ismail, the KMM cadres
were trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan. About 50 of his cadre were trained
at Muridke camp of Lashkar-e-Tayeba. Later they were flown to Kuwait and
by sea to Alor Satar in northwestern Malaysia. Zainon generally flew down to
Kuwait and from there he visited Pakistan on the basis of Pakistani passport
provided by Pakistani Mission in Kuwait. Zainon received liberal monetary
help from the ISI. He was not alone. Nik Adi Nik Aziz, an Afghan war
veteran, had linked up with the Abu Sayyaf Group, Indonesian radicals Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar Riduan Isamuddin Hambali and Abu Jibril.
This group worked under the umbrella of Jemmah Islamiyah.
Another associate group of Jemmah Islamiyah is Al Ma’unah Islamic. It
grew out of Darul Islam movement and had some of its cadres trained in
MILF camps and in madrassas near Lahore, where they were trained in
guerrilla tactics by the trainers of Lashkar-e-Tayeba, at Shekhupura, Bedah
and Qila Sattar Shah near Muridke, Pakistan. Hafiz Syed Ibrahim the head of
Maekaz-ud-Dawa and creator of LeT had also addressed the Malayan
jihadists.
Conceived way back in 1962 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar
Ba’sayir, the Jemmah Islamiyah grew to be the most important Islamist hub in
Indonesia and Malaysia with tentacles in Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar and
Cambodia. Sungkar and Ba’asyir emerged as the most important Muslim
leaders who supported the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and who had allowed their
institutions to be used by Osama as hibernating and launching bases in South
East Asia.
One of their disciples, Hambali, was sponsored to visit Pakistan as a
mujahid. After initial training in a Peshawar camp of the ISI and Markaz-ud-
Dawa at Muridke, he was deputed to the training camp of Abdul Rasul
Sayyaf, leader of Ittihad-i-Islami in Afghanistan. There he was contacted by
the Al Qaeda, which promised him financial and logistical support. On return,
he settled in Malaysia and carried out clandestine activities on behalf of the
ISI and the Al Qaeda. Abu Jibril, another jihadist Indonesian, ably assisted
him. The Jemmah Islamiyah drummed up the concept of Nausatara Raya, the
Pan-Islamic Republic in South East Asia comprising the Philippines,
Southern Thailand, Southern Cambodia and Singapore. Under ISI and Al
Qaeda guidance and Jemmah Islamiyah support, two important Pakistanis—
Wali Khan Amin Shah and Khalid Sheikh—and Hambali planned spectacular
actions in SE Asia. Hambali started serious recruitment drive to form trained
Al Qaeda cells all over the region. One of his important collaborators was
Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra, who was trained in Pakistan and
Afghanistan and was the mastermind behind Bali nightclub bombing in
October 2002.
The involvement of Al Qaeda al Sulbah, Pakistani and Afghanistan
volunteers in anti-Christian jihad in Mulukus, East Timor and Ambon firmly
indicated the design of the Islamic International in the South East Asia region.
The Al Qaeda had succeeded in establishing bases inside the Moro insurgent
groups, Jemmah Islamiyah and Laskar Mujahideen forces. It is believed by
western sources that Muhammad Atef, a 9/11 suspect, and al-Zawahiri,
Osama’s number two, had visited Indonesia in June 2000 to survey the region.
Between 2000 and 2001, the Jemmah Islamiyah was turned into a terrorist
organization under guidance of Ba’asyir, Hambali and Imam Samudra, etc.
Their cells were responsible for several bombing incidents in Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines.
These developments culminated in the Bali bombing. Of the thirty suspects
arrested, the most important was Ali Gufron Mukhlas, an Indonesian
associate of Ba’asyir and Hambali. His brothers Amrozi and Ali Imran were
also arrested along with Imam Samudra. Imam Samudra was trained by the
ISI and in camps in Afghanistan in 1992. While in Pakistan he was taken to
the Binori madrassa, where bulk of the Taliban cadets were trained. ISI
officials had introduced Samudra to operatives of Harkat-ul-Ansar and
Markaz. He was also trained at the Muridke camp of the Markaz.
The most important accused in the case, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the spiritual
and temporal leader of Jemmah Islamiyah, had inspired the conspirators of
Bali bombing. According to Jakarta Post (04.03.2005) Indonesian Muslim
cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, accused of leading an Al Qaeda al Sulbah-linked
group blamed for bombings across SE Asia, was jailed for two-and-a-half
years at the end of his terrorism trial. Ba’asyir was cleared of terrorism
allegations but was jailed by a five-member panel of judges after being found
guilty of involvement in a “sinister conspiracy” that led to the 2002 Bali
bombings, which killed 202 people.
“The panel of judges decided that the defendant, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, has
been legally and convincingly proven of engaging in a sinister conspiracy that
led to fire and the death of others,” Chief Judge Sudarto said, as quoted by
AFP.
A statement read out by one of the five judges said Ba’asyir had not been
directly involved in carrying out the Bali blasts but had given his approval.
“The defendant knew that the perpetrators of the bombing were people
who have been trained in bomb making in Pakistan and Afghanistan…the
conditions of evil conspiracy have been met,” the statement said. The judges
said that his words to key Bali bomber Amrozi and Hutomo Pamungkas,
during a meeting in Solo, Central Java in 2002 had constituted the conspiracy.
Ba’asyir had told them “I leave it up to you” when he was notified by Amrozi
that he and his friends were planning “a program” in Bali. However, the USA
and Australia have expressed dissatisfaction over the verdict. Majority of the
tourists killed in Bali bombing were Australian nationals.
Violent bombings in Indonesia against Indonesian, American and
Australian targets in 2003-2004 indicate that the activists of Jemmah
Islamiyah are still active and there are clear evidences of their continued ISI
and Al Qaeda al Sulbah linkages. They are avoiding visits to Pakistan to elude
the US surveillance. However, Bangladesh contact points are being used
liberally both for ideological support, training and fiscal incentives. The
movement started by Ba’asyir is still active and the Islamists had targeted
several US installations and defied the authority of the state by organizing
armed camps.
*
Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist country. However, 5% Muslim
population (3.2 million) lives in the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, Satun
and Narathiwat. Thailand had a long history of confrontation with the
Muslim-dominated states of Kedah, Pattani, Kelantan and Terengganu. About
2000 years ago Thailand occupied the present Muslim-dominated southern
provinces. British colonization of Malaya had finally settled the rush of
conflicts between the southern Muslims and northern Buddhists. However,
the present Muslim provinces were ruled by Malaya prathesaraj (pradesha
raja–provincial governors) under strict control of the Thai king. The Thais
had allowed the Muslim political and legal system to flourish. Majority of the
Thai Muslims are Shia, though the Sunni factions have emerged stronger with
Malayan, Arab, Pakistani and Bangladeshi support.
Muslims voiced demands for autonomy and independence between 1945
and 1976. Two Muslim separatist groups Pattani United Liberation
Organisation (PULO) and Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani (BNPP) were
most prominent in the southern provinces. The Malaysian Communist Party
(MCP) encouraged them, but after its decline, the Muslim rebel forces in
southern Thailand suffered several reverses. They, however, did not give up
periodical confrontation. Thai Muslims were more exposed to the Wahhabi
form of Sunni Islam compared to assimilistic Islam in other provinces of
Malaysia. Several madrassas have been built in the southern provinces with
financial help from Libya, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Ismail Mufti, the rector
of Yala Islamic College, is a firebrand Wahhabist. He has gathered around
him a large firebrand Islamist group. On the other hand, ulemas from Pakistan
and Bangladesh visit the southern provinces regularly. Several Indian
preachers belonging to Ahl-e-Hadith and Tabligh-i-Jammat had also impacted
the Thai Muslims. Saudi NGOs and Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad of Pakistan
fund them. In recent times, the HUJI of Bangladesh has also marked its
presence by deputing nearly a dozen alems to teach Islam in the interior
madrassas.
In Thailand’s Islamic insurgency, the following combatant groups are
involved:
• United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bertasu)
• Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP)
• Barisan Nasional Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP-1963)
• Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN-1960)
• Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP)-established by
Afghan veterans with connectivities to the Kampulan Mujahideen
Malaya (KMM)
• Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (PIMM)
• Mujahideen Islamic Pattani Group and
• Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO-established
1965). The New PULO emerged as a breakaway group in 1995.
There is lack of unity amongst the groups and they are divided on parochial
lines.
Thai Muslims are mostly of Malayan origin with liberal admixture of
Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi genealogical streams that occurred in the
course of trading, intermarriage and religious educational exchanges.
Gradually, the old social and cultural practices were eroded after the Arab
world and Pakistan started paying attention to this pocket of conflict in
Thailand. In the mid-1980s, the country had more than 2,000 mosques in 38
Thai provinces, with the largest number (434) in Narathiwat Province. All but
a very small number of the mosques were associated with the Sunni branch of
Islam; the remainders were of the Shia branch. Thai Muslims are either
hereditary Muslims, Muslims by intermarriage, or recent converts; Cham
Muslims originally from Cambodia; West Asians include both Sunni and
Shias; South Asians, including Tamils, Punjabis and Bengalis; Indonesians,
especially Javanese and Minangkabau. This diversity had caused delay in the
spread of Wahhabism and militancy. However, a number of Islamist preachers
from Pakistan, Saudi, Yemen and Bangladesh visited the tract regularly
between 1980 and 2000. These preachers were responsible for strengthening
the Wahhabi stream of Islam through teachings in madrassas and sermons in
the mosques. They also discouraged the Thai Muslims from performing
traditional Hindu art forms very popular in Malaysia and Indonesia. Thai
social practices were also discouraged as being jahiliya.
According to Thai authorities over 5000 students had studied in Indonesian
and Malaysian madrassas, 500 in Saudi Arabia and over three thousand in
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
 Southern Thailand’s terrorist incidents between 2000 and 2004 raised the
question of Al Qaeda al Sulbah, ISI and Bangladeshi mujahideen tanzeem’s
involvement. The Muslim strike groups were fashioned in Al Qaeda manner
with small cells of 30/40 functioning independently. Inputs also came from
Jemmah Islamiyah of Indonesia, which tried to bomb foreign embassies in
Bangkok. In this connection Arfin bin Ali, a Singaporean trained in Pakistan,
was arrested. Similarly Kampulan Mujahideen of Malaysia and the Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) also supported the Thai Muslims.
Many Muslim Thai activists went overseas to Islamic schools, where they
came under influence of hard-line teachers. About 3350 of them were trained
in Pakistani madrassas in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. About 125 of these
were trained in armed combat in ISI-managed facilities near Quetta. Some
were reported to have joined the jihad war against the Soviet Army in
Afghanistan and returned to Thailand as extremists. They in turn exhorted the
Thai Muslims to adopt Sharia and practice Islamic Fiq—jurisprudence.
Between 1980 and 2000, these rabid Pakistan trained elements had succeeded
in establishing over 200 madrassas in the three southern provinces.
Bangladesh also helped the Thai Muslims in developing firm Islamic roots.
The Jamait-e-Islami Bangladesh, Tabligh-i-Jammat Bangladesh and HUJI
sent volunteers to convert the Thai Muslims to hardcore Wahhabists. Along
with Islamic knowledge, came financial help and arms training. Thailand is a
unique ground where the ISI talents freely collaborated with Bangladeshi
jihadists.
During 2000, Thai authorities responded with military force and legal
action against separatist activity in the south. In February, security forces
dealt a severe blow to the New Pattani United Liberation Organization — a
Muslim separatist group — when they killed its leader Sari Taloh-Meyaw.
Authorities claim that he was responsible for 90 percent of the terrorist
activities in Narathiwat, a southern Thai province. In April 2004, police
arrested the deputy leader of the outlawed Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)
— a southern separatist group — in Pattani. Authorities suspected Muslim
separatists conducted several small-scale attacks on public schools, a
government-run clinic, and a police station in the south. In recent times, the
Muslim jihadis have started confronting the Buddhist institutions and
individuals with a view to fomenting communal clashes. Several schools were
destroyed, Buddhist monks were killed and even military and police
personnel were assassinated. Thai military, however, reacted brutally, killing
hundreds.
There are reliable reports about ingestion of ISI and DGFI trained jihadist
trainers to southern Thailand. According to Aurel Croissant of Contemporary
Conflict (Strategic Insight, Vol IV, and Issue 2-February 2005)…. “Purist
salafi (more specifically Wahhabi) has been gaining ground—propelled by
donations from charities and benefactors in the Middle East….Funded by
private donations and in many cases founded by teachers (ustaz), who
themselves have done religious studies in Pakistan and Middle East, some
ponoh (madrassa) became breeding grounds for potential radical Muslims.”
This view has been supported by Thai government who claim that over
3000 Thai Muslims graduated from Pakistani tanzeems.
The trouble is far from over. Between end-2004 and July 2005, over 40
violent incidents have been reported in which the Muslim jihadists had burnt
down schools, assassinated Buddhist monks and even ambushed Thai army
personnel. Massive efforts by the government in Bangkok to adopt the carrot
and stick policy have not produced the desired results. The Thai authorities
are painfully aware of liberal assistance to the southern Muslims by the
Jemmah Islamiyah, ISI supported Pakistani forces and Islamist forces from
Bangladesh.
For the purpose of coordinating the activities of the Muslim jihadist groups
in Southeast Asia, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had set up Rabitatul Mujahidin. He
had deployed JI activists like Tamsil Linrung, Agus Dwikarna, Al-Chaidar,
Omar al-Faruq etc. to Thailand, Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to
western sources, ISI stations in Bangkok—Phuket and Pattaya—have
coordinated the activities of JI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah operatives in Thailand.
Osama bin Laden’s scheme to blow up the Israeli embassy in Bangkok was
detected by chance. Ramzi Yousef had transited through Thailand after the
9/11 attacks on the USA. The Wae Ka Raeh (WKR) and Gurgan Mujahidin
Islam Pattani etc. jihadist organisations are known to have direct links to the
JI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. The WKR is known to be a mafia gang indulging
in drug peddling, kidnapping and other underworld activities. Seven of its
volunteers were trained in ISI camp in Peshawar and later they fought in
Afghanistan jihad. In May 2003, one Thai national, a member of the Om Al
Quran Foundation, an Al Qaeda al Sulbah front, was arrested in Cambodia.
Besides this, about 20 Thai Muslim jihadists were trained at the Ukhia camp
in Bangladesh by the HUJI, an organization known to have confirmed links to
Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI.
ISI complicity with some of the Thai Muslim extremists has been formally
established by the presence of about 12 WKR and Gurgan Mujahidin Islam
Pattani volunteers in a training camp managed jointly by the ISI and DGFI
near Bandarban, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Though poorly armed, it is
believed that Myanmar Muslim rebels are gradually supplying sophisticated
arms to the Thai jihadists through this route.
 Recent attacks on Buddhist monks, Thai government officials, and railway
trains etc. indicate that the Islamists are heading towards ‘communalization’
of the political and economic problems in the Muslim- dominated provinces
of Thailand. With known and identified links with the ISI sponsored Pakistani
Islamist tanzeems, the Al Qaeda al Sulbah, Jemmah Islamiyah, Jamait-e-
Islami and HUJI openly supporting the Muslim separatists it is expected that
the Buddhist regime in Bangkok has to settle down for a longer struggle
against the Islamist jihadists. Next to the Philippines, Thailand is on the anvil
of emerging as a prominent theatre of Islamist jihad.
In recent times the Thai Muslim rebels have gathered strength with liberal
assistance from Iran, Pakistan and Gulf countries. Between 2005 and 2011
nearly 30 fatal violent incidents took place targeting the Buddhists,
government assets and places of entertainment killing nearly 300 people.
Thailand continues to complain about encouragement from Malaysia, which
the later stoutly deny.
*
The Pan-Islamic hub—Nausatara Raya—in South East Asia also includes
southern Cambodia, home of the Cham Muslims. The Chams are descendants
of the mixed Malaya-Polynesian-Chinese-Indian stock and they once ruled
over a vast territory called Champa. Hindu religion and culture prevailed in
this area, which was later replaced by Buddhism and much later, partly by
Islam.
The Muslim Chams of southern Cambodia have a history of resisting the
Lon Nol and Pol Pot regimes. ‘Fulro Champa’, a resistant group, was
organized by Le Kasim, a colonel in Lon Nol regime. Pol Pot had
exterminated over 5 lakh Muslims.
Islamic fervour has also influenced the tiny Muslim population in southern
Cambodia. Under the Khmer Rouge, the Cham Muslims were the most
persecuted community. This population has started regenerating itself with
liberal aid from the Wahhabi institutions in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. More
than 150 mosques and 35 madrassas have been constructed and ulemas from
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia visit these institutions to impart training in Islamic
studies. About 100 students are deputed each year for religious studies in
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. A large number of students are also sponsored by
Islamic charities for studying in Malaysia. The Cham Muslim area of
Cambodia is shown as a part of the greater unified Islamic nation comprising
Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand and southern Philippines.
Arab, Pakistani and Malayan NGOs pump in over $20 million a year for
construction of mosques, madrassas and common civil facilities. The main
aid-receiving agency is Samakum Islam Kampuchea. The Islamic
Development Banks of Jeddah, Dubai Arabs like Ishaq bin Nasir and
Muhammad Qasim pour financial help to the Cham Muslims for opening
madrassas and constructing new mosques.
Dakwa Tabligh is a new development in Cham area. It was imported from
Malaysia, but was strengthened by Pakistan and Malayan preachers and South
Asian Tabligh-i-Jamaat bodies. They preached the practice of Shariat and
Hadith. In this venture, branches of the Ahl-e-Hadith from Pakistan and
Bangladesh have also established roots in Cham area.
*
Potentially Myanmar has a sizeable Muslim problem to account for. The
Muslim population of northern Arakan is known as Rohingya, a word derived
from Rohan given to the area in early 4th-5th century AD by the
Hindu/Buddhist rulers. Otherwise known as the Rakhine state of Myanmar,
the population is broadly divided into three religious groups: Buddhists,
Hindus and Muslims. While the Buddhists and Hindus are known as Rakhine,
the Muslims are termed as Rohingyas. The Hindus and Buddhists are
aboriginal Myanmarese. The Rohingyas are variably described by interested
groups as descendants of the shipwrecked Arab traders, Bengali Muslims
settled in the area by the British (they speak distinct Chittagong dialect) and
aboriginal Myanmar people converted to Islam. The last claim is not very
tangible. Tracing Arab descent is a laboured exercise, though some Arab
traders had made Arakan their homes. Such Arab traffic to South East Asia is
a historical fact. However, their number in Myanmar is very insignificant.
Distinct ethnic, linguistic and cultural linkages between the Arakan
Rohingyas and the Bengali Muslims of Chittagong area are undeniable.
However, the Rohingya people received a raw deal from the military
regime that took over in Myanmar in 1962. The Rohingyas had earned the ire
of the Myanmar people for their petition to Mohammad Ali Jinnah urging him
to include the Rohingya areas of Burma in Pakistan. They had also started an
armed movement to press their demands.
Shortly after the military coup in 1962, the new government took measures
to restrict their freedom and, ultimately, drive the group out of the country.
For example, in the mid-1970s, Myanmar initiated the Emergency
Immigration Act, requiring all citizens to possess National Registration
Certificates (NRCs). However, Rohingyas were only given Foreign
Registration Cards (FRCs), which many employers and local authorities did
not accept.
In 1977, the Rohingyas experienced even greater obstacles. The
government’s Nagamin (Dragon King) program, aimed at taking action
against foreigners, degenerated into attacks on Rohingyas from both the army
and the ethnic majority in Arakan, the Rakhines. By May 1978, over 250,000
Rohingyas fled over the border to Bangladesh. However, because of difficult
conditions in Bangladesh, and under UN supervision, about 200,000
Rohingya refugees returned to Myanmar by 1979.
Even after the current military government, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC), took power in 1988, Burma’s policy toward
the Rohingyas changed very little. For example, under the 1982 Citizenship
Law, a person must establish Burmese ancestry back to 1823 in order to be
considered a citizen. Therefore, most Rohingyas along with other ethnic
minorities are not able to qualify as citizens, and are denied many basic rights
including access to education and even freedom of movement.
The SLORC-dominated government continued to support such anti-
Rohingya policies. However, the Rohingyas were permitted to participate in
the 1990 elections. Two parties that won 80 percent of the vote in their
districts represented the Rohingyas. Unfortunately, the SLORC refused to
relinquish its power. Many scholars believe that the subsequent ‘attack’ on the
Rohingya populace was an effort by the SLORC to unite angry citizens
against a common enemy and distract attention from the party’s unwillingness
to give up its position in the government.
In 1991 and 1992, the Rohingyas experienced widespread repression and
abuse from security forces posted in northern Arakan. Once again, Rohingya
refugees began flooding over the border to Bangladesh to escape human
rights abuse, and by March 1992, 260,000 Burmese Muslims were living in
refugee camps in Cox’s Bazaar. The refugees claimed that many ethnic
minorities in the Rakhine State had been subjected to extrajudicial executions,
rape, religious persecution and torture by the military. In addition, the
Rohingyas were forced to work, unpaid, for security forces, building bridges,
roads and barracks, digging fish and prawn ponds, and labouring as porters.
The Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami, Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and Jamait-e-Islami of
Bangladesh and Pakistan encouraged militancy and terrorism amongst the
Rohingyas in Bangladesh. The Al Qaeda al Sulbah exploited the situation to
the fullest extent. We will comment on these aspects a little later.
The important Rohingya insurgent groups are: The Ommat Liberation
Front (OLF), Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Front and the Muslim Liberation
Organisation of Myanmar. Activities of these organisations are muted inside
Myanmar, but they collaborate with the groups based in Bangladesh like the
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). The Rohingya Solidarity
Organization (RSO) is one of these groups, and the subject of much of the
world’s attention on Myanmar’s Muslims. Founded in the early 1980s, the
RSO has aped movements such as the Taliban and the Kashmir-based Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen. After a failed merger with another Rohingya insurgent group
to form the moderate Arakan Rohingya National Organization, the RSO split
into several factions, all claiming the name RSO.
As the South Asia Intelligence Review reports, at least one of the RSO’s
factions is known to have enjoyed financial and technical support from a
variety of Pan-Islamist organizations throughout South and South East Asia,
including the Bangladeshi/Pakistani Jamait-e-Islami, Afghan warlord
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, and Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI)
of Bangladesh. All these are unquestionably linked with Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Videotapes of Bangladeshi/Rohingya mujahideen training camps acquired
by the media and the US intelligence during the October 2001 campaign in
Afghanistan also support this link, as does the fact that Rohingyas were
among some of the Taliban fighters captured by the Northern Alliance and
coalition forces. According to Islamist network expert Subir Bhaumik,
Rohingya volunteers have been sent to international flashpoints as far away as
Kashmir and Chechnya. Further establishing the links is the fact that Osama
bin Laden himself has openly referred to the persecution of Muslims in
Myanmar, as well as his supporters there, in at least one speech.
Al Qaeda al Sulbah had recruited Myanmar Muslims through its agents in
Bangladesh and had sent them to Afghanistan after initial training by the ISI
in Peshawar. The Rohingyas were recruited by the HUJI under ISI and DGFI
supervision and were sent to Kashmir and Afghanistan. Over 1000 Rohingyas
trained by the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah had returned to Bangladesh and
were lodged at Ukhia camp in Chittagong area. The Ukhia camp is an
elaborate underground facility with amenities to accommodate 2000 trainees.
This vast jihadist facility in Bangladesh is financially supported by the ISI
and Saudi charities.
The Rohingyas were paid Taka 30,000 on first enrolment and a monthly
salary of Taka 10,000. As a proof the US sources later revealed that
videotapes sized by its forces in Afghanistan had vividly shown the
Rohingyas being trained in Afghanistan. The Rohingya insurgents have
become an integrated part of the three main terror machines: the Inter
Services Intelligence and the DGFI, HUJI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. There are
reports that the Rohingyas have been integrated with the HUJI and Jamait-ul-
Mujahideen, Bangladesh for future insurgency activities inside Myanmar.
Certain sources inside Bangladesh indicate that the DGFI uses the
Rohingyas for handling and securing illegal arms shipments and the Rapid
Action Battalions (RAB) for fighting the Chakma Shanti Vahini rebels and
internal extremist groups also use their services. Purva Banglar Sarvohara
Party, a Maoist Leninist faction, is known to have arms procurement deals
with the Rohingyas.
The prognosis for Southeast Asia does not appear to be very encouraging.
Increasing clashes between the Christian and Muslim groups in Indonesia and
the Philippines and lax security environment have tempted the jihadists to
strike against western targets, especially targets aligned to the USA. Several
bombing incidents involving the US, Australian and other western
establishments in Indonesia and Malaysia point out that the International
Islamists are ready to strike anywhere. The so-called war against terror
initiated by the USA, events in Afghanistan and Iraq and simmering cauldron
of disaffection amongst the jiahdist tanzeems in Pakistan are likely to provide
more incentives to the jihadists in Southeast Asia. All eyes are riveted to the
future course of action by Abu Bakar Ba’sayir, the topmost Jemmah Islamiya
cleric of Indonesia. His incarceration is not likely to douse the fire of Islamic
resurgence in the South East Asia. It has become a part of the chain of Islamic
resurgence in the Middle East, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and rest of the
world.
*

 Islamic Jihad in Europe
and ISI Involvement
Before US embassy bombing, attack on USS Cole and 9/11 attack on the US
the western countries nursed a perception that Al Qaeda Islamist jihad was
limited to Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They were worried
about growth of Islamic militancy in USA, Canada and some European
countries where Muslims from former colonies assembled over the years.
Multiculturism was hailed as the new kaleidoscopic societal pattern. Muslim
demographic explosion in the USA, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany,
Norway and Holland etc countries later started worrying the political
researchers. Muslim leaders also never tired in claiming that by 2030 these
European countries would become Muslim majority. Such new realizations
have initiated a new civilizational conflict situation. We intend to talk about
this in later paragraphs.
Islamic resurgence in Europe received a fillip with the break up of the
Soviet empire and shattering of Josif Broz Tito’s dream of a united Balkan
tract that was formed into a single nation by artificially compressing several
ethnolinguist and religious groups. The break up of the united Balkans had
pushed up the barometer of expectations of the Muslim ethnic groups;
basically remnants of Turkish expansion in Europe. Western, Saudi and
Pakistani support to Afghanistan and sympathetic noises from Albania and
Turkey pushed up the expectations of the Balkan Muslims. With the
increasing clashes with the dominant Serbs and Croats, the Muslims of
Bosnia Herzegovina felt the need for asserting their own national identity (on
religious lines), like the other East European and Balkan nationalities (on
secular lines). Islamic groups from other countries stepped in with the
message of jihad and weapons of destruction. These forces had already
achieved success in Afghanistan and were ready to experiment the weapon of
jihad in other theatres.
We should have a brief sojourn of the European theatre, where the ISI, Al
Qaeda al Sulbah and Islamic Brotherhood collaborated with the disaffected
Muslim elements in the Balkans, Russian territories and Central Asian
theatres. Along with the branded jihadis Islamic nations the countries like
Turkey, Libya, and Egypt also stepped in to reassert Islam’s presence in the
heartland of Europe. Unfortunately the US and its western allies had not taken
this as creeping advance of Islam in European heartland. Their intention was
to dismantle Russian influence and create smaller states which would toe the
US and European hegemony. This was a blunderous miscalculation by the
USA.

Bosnia, a Muslim majority fault line in former Christian (Orthodox and
Catholic) Yugoslavia, is a confluence of both the East and the West. The
Balkans has played key roles in European politics, and had even triggered off
the First World War. The European Christians were able to uproot the Moor
political signatures from the Iberian Peninsula. However, Islam had come to
stay in the Balkans. The ethnic European Slavs of Bosnia Herzegovina were
converted to Islam during Ottoman occupation of parts of Europe in the 14th
century. Muslims lived side by side with the Christian Croats and Serbs.
The Afghan jihad was more or less over by 1990, though the mujahideen
groups continued to fight each other for capturing power in Kabul. The
Algerian civil war between the Islamist fundamentalists and the secularists
had also taken a vicious shape in 1992. It was Algeria’s own war. The
Palestinians were bleeding as usual. The jihadis created by the USA, Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan were more or less idle except regular forays into India.
They were in search of a new force called Taliban that was being prepared to
oust the contending but tired guerrilla forces of anti-Soviet jihad.
The Bosnian Muslims had chosen a historically correct time to revolt and
to draw attention of the Western world. They were not in love with the
authoritarian rule of Milosevic and the West little understood the tectonic
movements of the ethnic geography of the Balkan people. Islamic resurgence
in Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries and emergence of Islamic identity as
being synonymous with nationalist identity had inspired the Muslims of the
Balkans.
The declaration of independence by the Bosnian Muslims in 1992 invited
harsh retaliation from the Serb militia backed by the Serbian Christian
regime. The jihadists cobbled up by the CIA, ISI and Saudi intelligence were
more or less free to look around for new killing fields. This was the time
when the Pak-Afghan-Arab Salafi and Wahhabi jihadists found an
opportunity to drift to the killing field of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a new world
theatre for jihad. The Islamic world of jihad had identified a target and the
Western powers erred by taking a simplistic and holistic humanitarian view of
the complex geopolitical and ethnic problems of the Bosnian Muslims,
Croats, Serbs and Macedonian Christians. They were also unmindful of the
likely cascading effect in Albania and Albanian-dominated Kosovo province
of Serbia. Their open tilt against the oppressive regime of Serbia had
encouraged the jihadist brotherhood to transfer their operations to the near-
heart region of Europe.
 According to Gilles Kepel, “jihadists from Peshawar, along with new
recruits (a total of 4000 men), went away to fight in Bosnia; but they were
unable to transform the war into a jihad in any meaningful way because the
term (jihad) struck no chord in the local Muslim population, as it had done
among the Afghans.” Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. p. 239 (I.B. Tauris
Publishers, London, New York)
The Bosnian Muslims were not exposed to Wahhabism and the teachings
of Deobandi School. They were far from being influenced by the Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt and Al Qaeda al Sulbah floated by Azzam-Zawahiri
and Osama. They were not even exposed to the ISI foot soldiers belonging to
Harkat-ul-Ansar and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
However, identification with international Islamist forces was not an
anathema to the Bosnian Muslim leadership. They turned to the OIC, Rabita-
al-Alam-al-Islami, Turkic fundamentalists and Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.
The Bosnian Muslims were also not averse to the idea of accepting aid from
Muslim world like Turkey, Iran, Syria and Pakistan. Iran and even the Muslim
Diaspora in Europe, Canada and the USA remitted funds to Bosnian rebel
leaders. One important name of US Muslim activist in Bosnia is Pakistani/US
national Khalid Sheikh, who had taken part in jihad against India and was
responsible for killing a journalist. He was also linked to 0/11 Twin Tower
attacks. The Al Qaeda al Sulbah Arabs were also accommodated in a strategic
and planned manner. The Bosnians were much different from the Islamic
people of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Chechnya and Dagestan. They were
exposed to liberal western political and social practices. However, in the
name of fighting Serbia, they did not hesitate to accept help from the
jihadists. Therein lay the story of contribution by Pakistan and ISI.
The Bosnian revolt started by President Izetbegovic and his radical
followers had led to the creation of Islamic Brigades, which followed Sharia
laws strictly as against more secular lifestyle of other Muslim Bosnians. He
encouraged foreign mujahideen to join the ranks of his rebel fighters. The
struggle between Serbia and Bosnia had reopened the old gangrene of
Muslim-Christian rivalry that existed since occupation of the part of Balkan
region by Turkey. Islamic solidarity with the Bosnians offered opportunity to
the broader Muslim world to focus attention of the Wahhabi Salafi jihadis to
the troubled Muslim pocket in Europe.
Iran also pumped in military hardware. Pakistan joined in the arms supply
spree. Pakistani contingents belonging to Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen, Markaz affiliated groups and Arab and non-Arab members of
055 Brigade of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah had joined these detachments. Some
of the non-Arabs included Bangladeshi, Malaysian, Indonesian and Indian
Kashmiri Muslims. They were transferred to Turkey, under the very nose of
the NATO and CIA by ISI operatives in chartered planes, and often Pakistan
Air Force planes were used to carry weapons for the Bosnian rebels.
From Zagrev in Croatia these warriors and weapons were transferred to
Bosnia. The US administration under Clinton connived with the Croats and
Bosnians, as it wanted to maintain military balance between the feuding
parties not allowing the Serbian Muslims a free playground. Washington’s
policy to destroy the territorial integrity of former Yugoslavia was aimed at
creating ethnic pocket boroughs dependent on it and NATO allies and the
European Union. The ultimate objective was to finally demolish the flanks of
the former Soviet Union. Clinton again played into the hands of Muslim
separatists thus creating a chain reaction in Kosovo and Macedonia. In
Bosnia, the USA closed its eyes to Islamic Brotherhood taking over the jihad,
which was spearheaded by Al Qaeda al Sulbah and ISI.
Pakistan also flouted the UN ban on transferring weapons to Bosnia as
affirmed by the former Inter Services Intelligence chief Lieutenant General
Javed Nasir. In a petition filed before a court against Pakistan’s largest
newspaper group, Jung, Lt. Gen. Nasir, while recounting his achievements
and credentials as a leading Islamic international figure, alleged that he had
been defamed by a report in the Jung owned newspaper, The News. He also
claimed that despite the UN ban on supply of arms to the besieged Bosnians,
he successfully airlifted sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles, which turned
the tide in favor of Bosnian Muslims and forced the Serbs to lift the siege,
much to the annoyance of the US government.
The documents went on to give details of how the US threatened Pakistan,
then ruled by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, to be declared as a terrorist state,
if Sharif did not remove Zaved Nasir from the top post of the ISI.
Details of Pakistani arms inventory supplied to Bosnia included anti-tank
and anti-personnel rockets, shoulder-held bazookas, 3” mortars, Kalashnikov
rifles of Russian and Chinese origin, land mines and small weapons.
According to an estimate made by the US State Department, Pakistan had
diverted Afghan supply worth 400 million dollars. Alongside the Iranian
Pasdarans, jihadis of Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda al Sulbah, about 500
Pakistani jihadis recruited by the ISI and belonging to HuM, HuA and
Lashkar-e-Tayeba were deputed to Bosnia to fight for the Bosnian Muslims.
Some jihadists from Bangladesh, the Philippines and Indonesia were also
trained in Pakistan before being deputed to Bosnia.
One Abu Abdel Aziz (Barbaros), a fierce Arab, commanded the
mujahideen forces. An Afghan jihad veteran, Aziz was close to Abdullah
Azzam, mentor of Osama and one Captain Mohsin of the ISI. These
volunteers were taken to the town of Zenica in Bosnia from Croatia and were
enrolled in El-Mujahideen Regiment. The El-Mujahideen warriors had driven
terror in the minds of the Serb fighters. But they were also treated with
contempt by the Bosnian Muslims because of their cruelty and mercilessness.
The ordinary Bosnian Muslim society did not accept the Salafist-Wahhabi and
Deobandi philosophy of Islam. The Islamic world, especially Pakistan could
not turn Zenica into Jalalabad and Bosnia into Afghanistan. Europe decided,
in a way, to stick to its own brand of Islam.
Collaboration of the ISI with Al Qaeda al Sulbah in exporting terror to
Bosnia-Herzegovina requires special mention. The Al Qaeda fighters and
other mujahideen known as El Mujahideen battalion were accommodated as
the third battalion of the Bosnian Third Army. Of the 4000 odd mujahideen
about 500 were Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Afghans.
Al Qaeda had taken over control of some important Muslim NGOs like the
al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, and Third World Relief Agency, through
which tens of thousands of million dollars were pumped into the war and
relief efforts of the Bosnian Muslims. During the height of Bosnian war, the
mujahideen tanzeems in Pakistan and Bangladesh carried out special fund
collection drives by approaching the namazis visiting the mosques and by
demanding zakat from the richer sections of the people. According to an
estimate Pakistan had spent over $ 400 million through the ISI and another
$300 million through mujahideen tanzeems. It is interesting to note that some
Arab, Arab Afghans and Pakistani jihadis are still living in Bosnia after
marrying local girls. They are helping the Ummah by spreading hardliner
Islam amongst the Bosnians.
*
Kosovo was the next port of call for the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah forces.
Bosnia-Herzegovina was not the only port where Al Qaeda, Taliban and ISI
sponsored terrorists fought alongside the Bosnian Muslims. Osama bin Laden
is known to operate a terrorist network out of Albania that has infiltrated other
parts of Europe. According to Fatos Klosi, the head of the Albanian
intelligence service (2003), a network run by Saudi exile Osama bin Laden
sent units to fight in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Bin Laden is believed to
have established an Albanian operation in 1994 after telling the government
that he headed a wealthy Saudi humanitarian agency wanting to help
Albania.
In 1994, the ISI linked Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Tayeba
volunteers numbering about 50 had left for Albania through Turkey. They
were lodged in Kosovo by the Kosovo Muslims to fight against Serbian army
and militia. These Pakistanis were grouped under the Al Qaeda banner and
had established linkages with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) elements. Two
more groups of Pakistani mujahideen belonging to Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad
were deputed to Kosovo in a flight chartered by the ISI. The flight took them
to Turkey, from where they were smuggled into Kosovo. Their leader was
known as Mullah Saraf-ud-Din.
The arrival of Islamic fighters among the KLA had changed the color of the
fight between the Kosovars and the Serbs. Joining of the mujahideen fighters
with the Kosovo Liberation Army had dimmed prospects of a peaceful
solution to the conflict and fuelled fears of heightened violence. The
mujahideen had imparted training to the KLA fighters in advanced guerrilla
warfare and one of their Ustadz (trainers) was known as Hijaj Salim from
Pakistan, reported to be an Afghan veteran.
The Islamic fighters created havoc in the war in Bosnia, where they were
regarded as a serious threat to Western peacekeeping troops, especially
Americans. Their arrival in Kosovo had forced the West to review its policy
in the Serbian province. However, initial tacit support to the Kosovars had
emboldened the separatists. Kosovar militancy is now fully identified with
Islamist jihad, which might deepen Western dismay with the KLA and its
tactics. Some European scholars believe that Kosovo and Bosnia have
emerged as springboards for Islamist Jihadists from Pakistan, Afghanistan
other countries to spread the messages of International Islamic Jihad.
For the Albanian Kosovars, the mujahideen represented a public relations
disaster. Although there were only a few thousands bearded young
mujahideen fighters, resplendent in new KLA uniforms, they were a startling
sight in the snowbound villages of central Kosovo. They posed serious threat
to the security of entire Europe. The West, while allowing the mujahideen,
including ISI sponsored jihadists in Kosovo had neglected the possibility of
their entry into other European countries. Willy-nilly the USA and NATO had
allowed Islamic jihad to gain firm foothold on European soil. According to a
French intelligence expert the European countries with sizeable Muslim
population were bound to face Islamist jihad sooner than later. The latest
developments in the Netherlands tend to support this contention. Under the
US pressure, Pakistan had directed the ISI to corck the supply pipeline to
Kosovo. However, arms supply to the KLA is still continuing through Turkey
and Muslim pockets in Macedonia.
Some KLA commanders were clearly embarrassed at the presence of
foreign mujahideen, who exhibited more zeal in cruelty and sexual
exploitation of Serb victims. American diplomats in the region, especially
Robert Gelbard, the special envoy, had often expressed fears of an Islamic
hard-line infiltration into the Kosovo independence movement. American
intelligence had raised the possibility of a link between Osama bin Laden and
the Kosovar freedom fighters. The KLA also was warned by the US and
European commanders to discourage Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and
Egypt based Islamist organizations from sending their foot warriors to their
territory. Several of bin Laden’s supporters were arrested in Tirana, the
Albanian capital, and deported. However, the chaotic conditions in the
country have allowed Muslim extremists to settle there, often under the guise
of humanitarian workers. It is believed that Kosovo’s mujahideen came via
Bosnia, where many settled in rural areas after the war. Several groups are
also held in Zenica prison by Bosnia, which is anxious to distance itself from
accusations of radical Islamic sympathies. Some Bosnian and Kosovar
Muslim leaders have publicly denounced the Pakistani and Arab elements
being unwelcome to their country.
Intelligence services of the Nordic-Polish SFOR Brigade suspected that a
centre for training terrorists from Islamic countries was located in the Bocina
Donja village near Maglaj in Bosnia. Marek Popowsky, a Polish journalist
who visited the affected area and used to be in both SFOR and its predecessor
IFOR in Bosnia, wrote that mujahideen had first come to Bosnia in 1992, and
numbered over 4,000 in the summer of 1995. Besides the mujahideen from
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan, there were several hundred Muslim
extremists who had come from Italy, France, Germany and Britain, he noted.
The Donja camp also accommodated 45 Pakistani, 15 Bangladeshi and 45
South East Asian Muslims. According to Polish sources the KLA leaders had
visited Pakistan for consultation with the ISI leaders and to streamline the
weapons supply procedure through Turkey Ukraine and Bulgania. The same
route was also adopted by Iran.
Deserters from the Turkish, Malaysian and French UNPROFOR battalions
also volunteered as mujahideen in Kosovo and Bosnia. They deserted under
influence of Islamist propaganda and for the allurement of money offered by
Al Qaeda al Sulbah and ISI agents. In addition to dangerous military actions,
the mujahideen also carried out religious and ideological mission, enforcing
abidance by the Koran and recruiting young soldiers to die for Allah. It was
mentioned by UN observers that Bosnian (Muslim) troops respected their
allies but feared them at the same time as Allah’s warriors used to carry out
high-risk actions and were cruel fighters. Wounded enemy soldiers were
usually decapitated or slaughtered by mujahideen. Besides the Al Qaeda and
Pakistani mujahideen, Iran also sent a large number of Pasdarans to fight
alongside the KLO. While efforts were being made to turn Bosnia into a
fundamentalist state, the Islamists had chosen Kosovo as a new playground
for international terrorism.
 The Balkan thrust of the Islamist mujahideens, according to the New York
Times, was likely to bleed Europe slowly for a long time to come. This
prophetic comment is being justified by series of bomb attacks in Spain,
France, UK and other countries.
*
The Northern Caucasus is a part of the Russian Federation, which has been
targeted by international Islamist terrorists by taking advantage of religious
affinity of the people and certain historical, current grievances and
aspirations. Historical grievances based on religious and ethnic differences
and political aspirations can be tackled by internationally accepted diplomatic
and political process and not by forcing the people to take to arms and mixing
it with religious fundamentalism and jihad. That is what is being attempted in
most of the present and former Muslim dominated areas of (and areas of
influence of) the former Soviet Union. It is necessary to understand the lay of
the ground before discussing the ongoing jihad in Chechnya, parts of
Dagestan, Ingushetia and Ossetia.
The Northern Caucasus traditionally has meant the northern slope of the
Caucasus Mountains and the adjacent foothills and plains, as opposed to the
“Transcaucasia” consisting of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Many
Islamists like Shamil Basayev, who sought unification of the Northern
Caucasus, include not only the small republics of the Russian Federation,
which are geographically the Northern Caucasus, but also the Georgian
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia
have sought separation from Georgia with the support of one or more ethnic
groups from the Northern Caucasus.
The Caucasus autonomous republics within the Russian Federation have
changed boundaries and names frequently. During the Russian Revolution,
there were several attempts to establish republics or Islamic emirates in the
region. By 1921, an autonomous “Soviet Mountaineers’ Republic” was
established. During Stalin’s years as Commissioner of Nationalities and later
as Russian leader, he frequently tampered with the boundaries. The
deportation of populations during World War II, and the return of many
Chechens and others during the Khrushchev era, further confused the ethnic
mix. The present boundaries have even changed since the collapse of the
USSR, with the separation of Chechnya from Ingushetia. There are border
problems between Ingushetia and Northern Ossetia. The Northern Caucasus
Republics from west to east has the following population pattern (based on
1989 Soviet census):
• Adygea, the westernmost region, had a population of
432,000; capital Maikop. It was only 22% Adygei and 68% Russian,
 with the remainder Tatar and other minorities. The Adygei are one of
several related Muslim peoples often called Circassian, and speak a
Caucasian language.
• Karachay-Cherkessia, with a population of 415,000, capital
Cherkessk, is 31% Karachay, 10% Cherkess (Circassian), 42% Russian,
7% Abaza and 10% others. The Karachay and Cherkess are Muslims.
• Kabardino-Balkaria, population 754,000, capital Nalehik, is
48% Kabard, 10% Balkar, and 32% Russian. Kabards and Balkars are
Muslims.
• North Ossetia, population 632,000, capital Vladikavkaz, is
53% Ossete, 10% Ingush, and 30% Russian, though the Russian
population may have declined in recent years. The North Ossetians are
Orthodox Christians, though there are Muslims among them.
• Ingushetia, population uncertain as it had not broken from
Chechnya at the last Soviet census; capital Nazran, probably about 80-
90% Ingush. Ingush are traditionally Muslims.
• Chechnya, population uncertain, due to separation from
Ingush and years of war. Capital is Grozny. Chechens are traditionally
Naqshbandi Sufi Muslims. Since 1996-97 Chechnya has maintained an
unrecognized de facto independence.
• Dagestan, population about 1.2 million, capital Makachkala,
some 30 ethnic groups of whom the Avars (28%) are the largest.
Russians are about 9%. The local groups are mostly Muslims with some
Jews and Christians.
• Kalmykia, not strictly speaking part of the Northern
Caucasus, but adjoins Dagestan to the north. Population 3, 23,000,
capital Elista; 45% Kalmyk, 38% Russians, 4% Dargin. The Kalmyks, a
Central Asian people, further complicate the regional religious mosaic
by being traditionally Buddhists. Kalmyk tradition features plenty of
Indian characteristics.
This mosaic of geography, population and political history and linkage of the
Muslim population with the Muslims of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan have complicated the scenario. The Muslim majority republics were
never totally subdued, though Russian repression had kept them subjugated.
They had often raised the banner of revolt.
The separatist movement in Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim territory in
the Russian Federation, had spurred the mujahideen to action.
 Rusian occupation and imposition of Orthodox Christianity had
strengthened Islamic roots in the Chechens. Russian incursion had activated
the Sufi Muslim movement. “The Naqshbandi Sheikh Najmuddin of Hotso
(Gotsinskii) was chosen Imam of Dagestan and Chechnya. The goals pursued
by the revived tariqat (rituals) were the restoration of a theocracy governed
by the sharia…” Russia Confronts Chechnya, John B. Dunlop, p.37.
This Islamic revival spurred the Caucasian population to develop a unique
way of life, where Islam was a manifestation of nationalism and self-identity,
although Muslims, the Chechens and other peoples of the Caucasus did not
manifest any strict following of traditional Islam, let alone fundamentalism.
Islamic fundamentalism had crept in when the foreign mujahideen started
pouring in from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Iran and other countries.
The most prominent advocate of independence was General Dzhokar
Dudayev, the most obdurate leader of the Chechen revolt. He had risen in the
ranks of the Soviet Air Force, including a post of commander of a bomber
regiment equipped with nuclear weapons. Dudayev was married to a Russian
and his break with Moscow occurred over the violent suppression of the
nationalist movements in the Baltic states. He was a Chechen nationalist and a
devoted Muslim.
During the regime of Gorbachev, the Chechens passed through a period of
political uncertainty as the concepts of glasnost and perestroika had started
weakening the bonds between Moscow and the capitals of its sprawling
empire in Europe and Asia. The Chechens, took advantage of the ambiguous
position and fighting between the political forces of Gorbachev and Boris
Yeltsin, unfurled the flag of revolt and resumed resistance to Russian
occupation.
It was during this phase of the fighting that Dzokhar Dudayev raised the
Islamic factor for the first time. He described the Chechen war against Russia
as a jihad, and appealed for greater support from the Muslim World. Islamist
support was slow to come because Iran and other key Muslim states were in
the midst of strategic negotiations with Moscow, and support for the
Chechens could adversely affect this expanding relationship.
However, the CIA and the ISI had started clandestinely supporting the
Chechen rebels through Afghan mujahideen, who carried weapons and
bartered against opium and heroin. The money generated was piped back for
purchasing weapons from Iran, Turkey and other flexible markets. In the
meantime, weakening of the Russian regime had encouraged CIA and ISI to
open a new front in Chechnya. Pakistan supported it in the name of jihad. The
USA supported it in the name of human rights and strategic maneuver against
Moscow with a fond strategic hope that Chechnya could be turned into
another Afghanistan. The CIA followers in the ISI also believed in this
possibility.
Islamic countries like Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Libya had
liberally contributed to the arms and money supply to the Chechen rebels with
full knowledge of the CIA and the White House. Several hundred Arab
volunteers were dispatched to Chechnya through Azerbaijan, Turkey,
Northern Cyprus and Iran. They fought alongside the guerrilla fighters of
Dudayev and Shamil Basayev. However, besides the Arab mujahideen and Al
Qaeda forces most decisive role was played by the Taliban Afghans and
Harkat-ul-Ansar and other mujahideen forces from Pakistan. We would like to
elaborate the Pakistan factor instead of travelling through the entire gamut of
the involvement of Islamic jihadists from rest of the Muslim world.
Pakistan was basically motivated by four cardinal factors to get involved in
Chechen jihad under Dudayev and Shamil Basayev. By 1994 jihad in
Afghanistan was over, though the coalition partners were bleeding
Afghanistan and each other for establishing their hegemony. Pakistan had
already finalized the blueprint of Taliban action in collaboration with Saudi
Arabia and the USA. It needed some excuse to divert most of the Afghan
fighters from the infernal killing field. Sending these restless mujahideen to
die for Islamic causes in faraway lands became at once a practical necessity
and a means of achieving the geopolitical objectives of Pakistani leadership:
a) They wanted to create a trans-Asian axis stretching from
its eastern border with China through Afghanistan, the former Soviet
republics of Central Asia to the oil-and-gas-rich shores of the Caspian
Sea. To do that, Pakistan would have to control all of Afghanistan and
drive out of central Asia the last remnants of Russian influence. Russia,
however, had designs of its own for Central Asia and had done
everything in its power to create a buffer between pro-Pakistani Taliban
forces and former Soviet republics of Central Asia, bordering
Afghanistan from the north.
b) By some strange twist of fate, the mantle of intended
Russian buffer fell on a man trusted by the GRU and Russian Army for
nine years — Uzbek warlord Ahmed Shah Massoud, whose forces now
controlled a narrow strip of land along Afghanistan’s northern frontier
with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. If it weren’t for the
military help Shah Massoud was getting from Russian forces stationed
in Tajikistan, he would have never survived the Taliban onslaught.
To stop the flow of arms to Ahmed Shah Massoud,
Pakistanis needed a diversion that would have forced Russians to switch
their attention and resources away from Central Asia. That diversion
 soon presented itself in the form of a brewing conflict between Moscow
and its rebel Autonomous Republic of Chechnya, which wanted full
independence. It was a perfect opportunity for the Pakistani
intelligence.
c) The Chechen mafia and the Taliban-dominated Afghans
were hurt by Russian intervention as that strangulated the Afghan drug
supply through Chechen conduit to Asian, European and American
markets. Dudayev and Basayev could not carry on the separatist war
without support of the mafia, who helped procuring weapons from the
clandestine arms bazaars in Turkey, Armenia, Iran and other places.
Most of the time Dudayev and Basayev had to depend on the mafia to
canalize arms supply from Iran, Egypt, Libya, Turkey and other
countries. Under pressure from these forces, Pakistan allowed the
Taliban and its own mujahideen forces to team up with the Chechen
rebels.
d) The USA too wanted to keep Russia busy in the mountains
of Chechnya, Dagestan and other troubled spots while it explored the
possibility of tapping the oil supply lines in the troubled zone. It made a
common oil cause with Pakistan to promote some of the mujahideen
forces which either originated in Pakistan or transited through it. There
are reliable Russian reports about small contingents of the US Special
Forces groups helping the ISI to airlift Pakistani mujahideen to Georgia
and adjoining Armenia. Some jihadis were also transferred by boat
from Turkmenistan to southern Dagestan from where they traversed to
Chechnya. These were also favorite arms supply routes for the ISI and
the CIA.

Shamil Basayev, a young Chechen field commander, had taken part in Afghan
jihad and had distinguished himself in fighting the Russian forces. The ISI
and CIA praised his spirited actions. In 1994, Shamil Basayev, who a year
earlier had distinguished himself in Abkhazia—a breakaway republic of the
former Soviet Georgia—caught the attention of Pakistani intelligence
stationed in the neighboring oil-rich Azerbaijan, where about 1,500 Afghan
mujahideen under the command of Pakistani officers were fighting
Armenians to reclaim for Azeris the rebel Armenian enclave of Nagorno
Karabakh. In April 1994, the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence arranged
for Basayev and his trusted lieutenants to undergo intensive Islamic
indoctrination and training in guerrilla warfare in the Khowst province of
Afghanistan at Amir Muawia camp, set up in the early 1980s by the CIA and
ISI and run by famous Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Al Qaeda al
Sulbah later exploited this camp.
In July 1994, upon graduating from Amir Muawia, Basayev was
transferred to Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad camp near Muridke in Punjab to
undergo training in advanced guerrilla tactics. In Pakistan, Basayev met the
highest ranking Pakistani military and intelligence officers: Minister of
Defence General Aftab Shahban Mirani, Minister of Interior General
Naseerullah Babbar (a confidant of Zulfikar and Benazir Bhutto), and the
head of the ISI branch in charge of supporting Islamic causes, General Javed
Ashraf, (all now retired). High-level connections soon proved very useful to
Basayev. The ISI training imparted to Basayev in Rawalpindi, Peshawar and
Chitral included use of Stinger missiles, high explosives (C4, Semtex, PETN,
and RDX) bombs and shoulder-held anti-tank missiles.
That same summer, the Pakistan-backed Taliban offensive against the
government of the Iranian-backed president of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin
Rabbani, threatened to cut the Chechen drug trade. The Taliban had taken
Amir Muawia and other Khowst-area camps, disrupting plans to train
hundreds of Chechen fighters there. After personal intervention of General
Babbar and the ISI, Taliban and government forces allowed shipments of
Chechen drugs through their lines while they were slitting each other’s
throats.
The training of Chechen fighters also went as scheduled in Khowst-area
camps now controlled by one of the largest Kashmiri terrorist groups, the
Harkat ul-Ansar. Pakistani intelligence also sent experienced and battle-
hardened officers to train Chechen fighters on site. One of the most prominent
Pakistani nationals is Abu Abdulla Jafa, who along with Basayev and
Jordanian-born Afghan veteran Khattab had organized a ‘terrorist academy’ in
Chechnya. The ISI had also deputed 9 trainers of the rank of Captain and
subedars (NCO) to train the Chechen guerrillas in urban and mountain
guerrilla warfare. Abu Abdulla Jafa was a career officer of Pakistan’s elite
Northern Light Infantry Brigade, and the tactical mastermind behind
Basayev’s invasions into Dagestan. Pakistan supplied Chechens with deadly
shoulder-launched Stinger anti-aircraft missiles—the leftovers of the Afghan
war. Some of the spectacular explosions carried out by the Chechens in
Moscow and other cities (including the Bolshoi theatre) were rehearsed in the
joint training camps run by the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
As a result of Stinger attack the Russian air force lost at least three SU-25
ground attack planes and half a dozen helicopters. However, Pakistan’s
involvement in the Chechen conflict goes far beyond supplying Chechens
with weapons and expertise. The ISI and its radical Islamic proxies are
regular participants in this war. According to Yossef Bodansky, Director of
the U.S. Congress’s Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare,
the master plan for the flare-up in Kashmir and in the Caucuses was prepared
in August and September 1996, during a secret summit of Hizb-Allah
International in Mogadishu, Somalia. The summit was attended by Osama bin
Laden and high- ranking Iranian and Pakistani intelligence officers.
Pakistan’s ISI chief, General Javed Ashraf, was charged with organizing
the logistics of transporting Afghan mujahideen and Chechen fighters and
their weapons from training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and
Lebanon. Osama bin Laden undertook financing of part of the operation.
Russian intelligence analysts estimated that the campaign in Chechnya and
Dagestan between 1996-2000 had cost bin Laden some $25 million. Before
Al Qaeda attack on the USA in 9/11, some CIA operatives also collaborated
with the ISI for funding the Chechen revolt.
In order to expedite the flow of expertise to Chechnya in the fall of 1994
the ISI organized mixed detachments made of Chechens and veteran Pakistani
operatives, most of them with long combat experience in the ranks of the
mujahideen in Afghanistan. These forces brought with them large quantities
of weapons and ammunition. Fighters from an ISI battalion of Afghan
mujahedeen stationed in Peshawar were also dispatched to Chechnya in late
1994 to bolster the Pakistani-Chechen detachments. These Pakistani-led
detachments saw combat in the beginning of 1995. Significantly, the ISI
retained combat and tactical control over these detachments. The Pakistani
commanders maintained radio communications with their HQ in Pakistan.
The arrangement was not dissimilar to communications maintained between
the Islamist forces in Kashmir and their rear bases in Pakistan.
In early 1995, the international Islamist leadership, particularly the Armed
Islamic Movement (AIM) sponsored by Iran and Sudan, adopted the Chechen
war as a jihad. Senior Islamist commanders and emissaries were deployed to
Grozny from where they coordinated their activities with the authorities in
such places as Teheran, Khartoum, and Islamabad. Their early reports noted
the growing Islamisation of everyday life in Chechnya under direct orders
from Dudayev. Between late 1994 and early 1995, several Islamist charities
associated with the pursuit of militant jihad began establishing front offices in
Chechnya. The flow of money and mujahideen, many of them veterans of
previous jihads, began soon afterwards.
By 1997 end, several hundreds of Chechens were trained in ISI-sponsored
camps near Warsaj (Takhar), Jabal-al-Saraj (Parwan), Khowst (Paktia), and
other smaller sites in Afghanistan. Some 250 Chechens had undergone
clandestine training in a camp near Peshawar by ISI operatives and expert
terrorists from Egypt and Sudan. Some 100 Chechens were trained by the ISI
in the Lahore area in sophisticated terrorism and urban warfare (in Markaz-
ud-Dawa camp).
Iran did not lag behind Pakistan in aiding and arming the Chechens. A
VEVAK (Iran intelligence)-run terrorism training base in Ziarat Jah (Herat)
was transferred to Gorgan (Mazandaran, Iran) in the fall of 1995. Chechens
attended other Islamist higher terrorism schools in Iran under the control of
al-Quds forces. Several hundred mujahideen, mainly Afghans and Chechens,
were trained by Iranian intelligence and the Hizb-ul-Allah in Sudan. In the
spring of 1996, in anticipation for a marked escalation, about 400 Chechens
were sent to Hizb-ul-Allah training camps in the Biqaa, Lebanon, to undergo
the six-month advance courses run by Iranian Pasdaran instructors.
These training programs, including the ones in Pakistan, continued in early
2001, with new classes made of young Chechens replacing the graduates that
returned to Chechnya. Islamabad still continues to support the Chechen
rebels.
Besides Bolshoi theatre bombing and other serious bombing missions
carried out by the Chechen rebels inside the Russian Federation the school
hostage situation at Beslan in Northern Ossetia by the Chechen rebels in
which over 320 people were killed had rattled the world. Shamil Basayev, the
Chechen rebel leader, had claimed responsibility of the hostage carnage.
According to Russian FSB intelligence agencies there were ten Arab Al
Qaeda al Sulbah elements in the Chechen group and one Abu Omar As-Seif,
an Arab Al Qaeda leader in Chechnya, had bankrolled the Beslan siege
operation.
Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen mastermind who had organized the Beslan
attack, was killed by a special operations team of the FSB in a village near
Grozny in the first week of March 2005. However, the daring attack by
Checharn and assorted Islamist terrorists in Nalchik in the northern Caucasus
republic of Kabardino-Balkariam has again proved that the Islamists are
capable of organizing offensive against any vulnerable target in Russia. It is
now speculated that leadership of the Chechen armed group would be taken
over by Shamil Basayev. Basayev has developed firm linkages with Al
Qaeda, ISI and other Islamist forces, which are keen to establish independent
Islamic regimes in the Muslim majority states of Russian Caucasus. The CIA
is not averse to the idea as the US oil interests are growing rapidly in the
Black Sea region. Killing of Maskhadov is not likely to dampen the
combined forces of the Chechen, Ingush and Dagestani rebels, who are still
being aided by the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the tanzeems trained by the ISI.
The Russian intelligence is aware that the Chechens cannot stop fighting
till the International Islamic Brotherhood recognizes the validity of Russian
sovereignty over its Caucasian territories. The last Chechen President played
truant. One day he vowed to hand in Basayev and Khattab, but the next day
appointed him commander of the eastern front. Russian officials are certain
that for the war to stop in Chechnya, the decision must be taken in the ISI
headquarters, Al Qaeda al Sulbah high command, the Iranian intelligence and
the Muslim Brotherhood. The international Islamist jihadists have hijacked
the domestic problem of Chechnya. Even the regime of Pervez Musharraf, in
its post 9/11 and Afghan war situation, has not stopped supporting the
Chechens. Pakistan’s overall strategic goal in Central Asia is intricately linked
with the oil resources in Caspian Sea zone. Chechnya is the new killing field
selected by the Islamist jihadists, headed by Pakistan, Iran and Al Qaeda al
Sulbah.

Beyond the Caucasian trouble spots several parts of Europe have been
affected by Islamist extremists who migrated from Pakistan, Algeria,
Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Mali and other Islamic countries.
Systematic migration to the former colonial countries in Europe has
population and civilizational conflicts.
Fears have been expressed by British scholars and MPs that Britain may no
longer remain a Christian country by 2030 as the number of non-believers is
set to overtake the number of Christians, a media report said. Christianity is
losing more than half a million believers every year, while the count of
atheists and agnostics is going up by almost 750,000 annually, the Daily Mail
reported.

Research by the House of Commons Library found that while Christianity has
declined, other religions have seen sharp increases. In the last six years, the
number of Muslims has surged by 37 percent to 2.6 million; Hindus by 43
percent and Buddhists by 74 percent. But the number of Sikhs and Jewish
believers fell slightly, according to the Mail Friday.

Last week a group of MPs and peers - Christians in Parliament - claimed

public policy was promoting “unacceptable” discrimination against
Christians. The group’s chairman, former Tory justice minister Gary Streeter,
warned that believers were having their faith “steamrollered” by a “secular
and hostile state”. It found that in 2010 there were around 41.1 million
Christians in Britain - down 7.6 percent over the past six years. There were
around 13.4 million non-believers, up 49 percent over the same period.
Bruce Bawar said in Wall Street Journal “Islam’s rise in the West is a
subject that needs to be discussed frankly, without euphemism or
disinformation. The survival of secular democracy, individual liberty and
women’s rights depends upon it.”
It is alleged that a well-planned demographic coup is transforming the
world. As revealed by late OrianaFallaci, a well known strategic analyst, in
her book, The Force of Reason, the ongoing Demographic Coup of Islam is
based on a religious strategy. A reading of the MishkatulMasabihand Sahi
Bukhari further confirms that it is based on the Prophet’s command to the
Muslims to marry women who are more prolific so that on the Day of
Judgement the population of Muslims is the largest. For Muslims worldwide
it is impossible to ignore the command of their Prophet.
The achieve this objective the Islamists are following the twin strategies of
waging jihad against infidels and increasing the population of the faithful by
producing more children. Due to the ongoing demographic coup, today the
world stands at the cusp offoreboding geopolitical changes.
In 1974, the then President of Algeria, HouariBoumedienne, warned the
western world when he declared in his address to the U N General Assembly:
“One day millions of men will leave the southern hemisphere of this planet to
burst in to conquer, and they will conquer by populating it with their children.
Victory will come to us from the wombs of our women.” Apparently the
western nations ignored that warning as if it was arrant nonsense.
Orianna Fallaci highlighted in her tome, The Force of Reason, that this
policy of the womb for breeding Muslims In abundance and then exporting
them to take possession of a territory or country was fine tuned in an Islamic
Conference held in Lahore (Pakistan) the same year, i.e., in 1974.
Earlier during an interview in March 1972 at Beirut late George Habash, a
radical Palestinian leader, had told Fallaci that their revolution was a part of
the world revolution and that ‘it was going to be the cultural war,
thedemographic war, the religious war, waged by stealing a country from its
citizens”. He disclosed the global agenda of Islam in following words: “To
advance step by step. Millimeter by millimeter.Year after year. Decade after
decade. Determined, stubborn and patient. This is our strategy. A strategy
that we shall expand throughout the planet.”
Quite a few countries like Lebanon, Kosovo, Bosnia Herzgovina and the
death- mode in which Macedonia is trapped are some of the examples of
demise of nations by demography. To be more precise, demographic deficit
of the majority community can cause demise of a civilisation.
The growing threat of a demographic death of the European civilization
has been causing enormous fright among Christians. Along with fast-paced
growth in Muslim population, caused by immigration and higher Muslim
fertility, there has been a big increase in jihadi attacks and militant activities
in many European countries, e.g., the Madrid bombings on March 11, 2004,
gruesome murder of Theo Von Gogh in Amsterdam in November, 2004,
London bombings of June 7, 2005, riots across Paris suburbs in 2006, attack
on Glasgow airport in July, 2007, etc. From 9/ 11 onwards till date more than
18,300 terror attacks have taken place across the globe in which nearly 60,000
innocents lost lives and 90,000 were injured.
The demographics of Christians of Europe have gone into a tailspin. As
against the requirement of a minimum TFR (Total Fertility Rate) of 2.1 child
per woman, according to Eurostat 2004 data the TFR of 10 European
countries ranged between 1.29 in Greece and 1.99 in Ireland - including the
Muslim TFR which is believed to be nearly 3 times higher than that of
Christians. In the U.K. now 85 Sharia Courts are functioning. According to a
Pew Research Center study in 2010, the Muslim population worldwide was
growing at 1.5 percent per annum, while non-Muslims were growing at 0.7
percent.
According to LainaFarhat-Holzman, there has been a rapid growth of
Muslim numbers in 20 major cities of Europe (seepara 28 of my Paper).
Daniel Pipes feels that Sweden’s Stockholm and Malmo may become the first
two Muslim majority cities of Europe and that Moscow could be the third.
Bruce Bawer has pointed out in his book, ‘While Europe Slept’ that in
Sweden many Muslims go around flaunting T’ Shirts proclaiming, “2030 and
then we take over”.
On October 31, 2009, a militant group, ‘Islam4UK’ led by Anjem
Choudhry, judge of a U.K. Sharia Court, had staged an aggressive
demonstration in London demanding end to the “oppression of democracy
and man-made laws”. The same Islamist, AnjemChoudhry, has recently
announced plans to stage a demonstration in Delhi on March 3, 2012, to
demand ‘shariah for Hind’ and destruction of Hindu temples.No wonder,
many Christian leaders of European countries, including Angela Merkel,
David Campbell and Nicholas Sarkozy, have publicly announced that multi-
culturism (i.e., secularism) has failed in Europe.
The Madrid train bombings were nearly simultaneous, coordinated
bombings against the Cercanías (commuter train) system of Madrid, Spain on
the morning of 11 March 2004 – three days before Spain’s general elections.
The explosions killed 191 people and wounded 1,800. The official
investigation by the Spanish Judiciary determined the attacks were directed
by an al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell, although no direct al-Qaeda
participation was established. Though they had no role in the planning or
implementation, the Spanish miners who sold the explosives to the terrorists
were also arrested. This terrorist attack is considered the worst terrorist attack
in the history of Spain and Europe.
After 21 months of investigation, Judge Juan del Olmo ruled Moroccan
national Jamal Zougam guilty of physically carrying out the attack, ruling out
any ETA involvement. The possibility of his Al Qaeda link could not be
proved by the administration.
With France’s deadly attacks, Islamic terror has apparently struck once
more in the heart of Europe — and authorities say there’s a dangerous twist:
the emergence of homegrown extremists operating independent of any known
networks, making them hard to track and stop.
“It is concerning us,” Europol chief Rob Wainwright told The
Associated Press in an exclusive telephone interview from The Hague. “We
have a different kind of jihadist threat emerging and it’s getting stronger. It is
much more decentralized and harder to track.”
France’s motorcycle gunman traumatized a nation heading into
presidential elections and spread fears across the continent that the specter of
al-Qaida was once again threatening daily life. Mohamed Merah, a 23-year-
old Frenchman of Algerian descent, sowed his terror over the course of a
week, killing paratroopers, Jewish children and a rabbi. He died Thursday in a
shootout after police raided the Toulouse apartment where he had been holed
up.
Wainwright warned that Europe faces a tough challenge ahead.
Combating individuals acting in apparent isolation, he said, will take
smarter measures in monitoring the Internet, better intelligence and
international cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. And he conceded that
there were limits to what law enforcement officials can do. “We can’t police
the Internet,” he said.
Other European terror authorities echoed that view, saying that
apprehending suspicious individuals with no clear connections to terrorist
networks is legally problematic. “We have one law for war, one law for peace,
but we don’t have a law for the current situation,” said Alain Chouet, a former
intelligence director at France’s DGSE spy agency. “If we stopped (Merah)
three weeks ago, what would people have said? ‘Why are you stopping him?
What did he do?’”
German officials expressed the same frustration in the case of Arid Uka,
a Kosovo Albanian who gunned down two American airmen and wounded
two others last year at the Frankfurt airport before being captured. Aside from
illegally acquiring a handgun, the 22-year-old, who was convicted last month,
had committed no crime until he shot his first victim in the back of the head.
“A group preparing an attack with bombs or other instruments is
running the danger of being detected,” said a high-ranking German
intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the
sensitivity of the issue.
“A single person or a group of two, they have a greater chance of not
being observed by security forces or getting tracked by police — it is very
hard to find individuals like this and stop them from acting.”
Some experts believe that al-Qaida’s new strategy is, in fact, to stop
acting like a network. Encouraging individuals to carry out terrorist attacks,
without organizing them in cells, has become integral to the terrorist
organization’s modus operandi, said Noman Benotman, a former jihadist with
links to al-Qaida and who now works for the London-based Quilliam
Foundation.
“They are part of the overall al-Qaida strategy, and they are part of the
instructions — or suggestions, if you will — for groups and individuals
seeking guidance or inspiration,” he said.
Benotman, who maintains contact with the jihadist community, said that since
the death of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida’s strategy has evolved to include
more individual attacks, rather than the heavily choreographed and expensive
operations seen in the Sept. 11 attacks or the London suicide bombings in
2005.
The German intelligence official noted that al-Qaida theorist Abu
Musab al-Suri published a book about 10 years ago putting forth the strategy
of “leaderless resistance.” The official said that with Internet propaganda,
“you don’t need any teacher or some other person any more to push people
toward these actions.”
Wainwright also sees al-Qaida’s hidden influence in the France attacks.
“He was acting in line with al-Qaida inspired tactics, and although it may not
have been closely coordinated, it was certainly al-Qaida inspired,” he said.
Wainwright said Merah lacked the professionalism of terrorists of the past. He
said the gunman seemed divided between wanting to increase his death toll
and publicizing his acts by filming his deeds and bragging about them.
“It is very telling that he filmed his exploits,” he said. “Still, in spite of the
mistakes, he managed to carry out significant damage. … That is the
challenge for us.”
A British security official said the key to targeting this brand of
individualized terror was figuring out whether people were simply thinking
extremist thoughts or would truly turn violent.
“We prefer the term self-starting over lone wolf,” the official told the AP on
condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of his work.
“But the reality is that there are hosts of people like this out there and
most of them will never do anything. You have to have information to suggest
they are about to do something. Unfortunately, there are no thought police.”
There are nonetheless plenty of recent examples of the dangers of
terrorists working in isolation:
— Maj. Nidal Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist accused of killing 13 people
during the Fort Hood, Texas, and shooting rampage in 2009.
— Taimour Abdulwahab, an Iraqi-born Swede, who targeted Christmas
shoppers in Stockholm in December and blew himself up.
— Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who was sentenced last month to life in
prison after admitting he attempted to blow up an international flight with a
bomb in his underwear as the plane approached Detroit on Christmas 2009.

Britain has been affected by several Islamist terrorist actions. The 7 July 2005
London bombings were a series of co-ordinated suicide attacks in London
which targeted civilians using the public transport system during the morning
rush hour.
On the morning of Thursday, 7 July 2005, four Islamist home-grown
terrorists detonated four bombs, three in quick succession aboard London
Underground trains across the city and, later, a fourth on a double-decker bus
in Tavistock Square. Fifty-two people, as well as the four bombers, were
killed in the attacks, and over 700 more were injured.
The explosions were caused by homemade organic peroxide-based
devices packed into rucksacks. The bombings were followed exactly two
weeks later by a series of attempted attacks.
At 8:50 am, three bombs were detonated onboard London Underground trains
within fifty seconds of each other:
1. The first exploded on a Circle line sub-surface train, number 204,
travelling eastbound between Liverpool Street and Aldgate. The train
had left King’s Cross-St. Pancras about eight minutes earlier. At the
time of the explosion, the third carriage of the train was approximately
100 yards (90 m) along the tunnel from Liverpool Street. The parallel
track of the Hammersmith and City line between Liverpool Street and
 Aldgate East was also damaged in the blast.
2. The second device exploded in the second carriage of another Circle
line sub-surface train, number 216, which had just left platform 4 at
Edgware Road and was travelling westbound toward Paddington. The
train had also left King’s Cross-St. Pancras about eight minutes
previously. There were several other trains nearby at the time of the
explosion; an eastbound Circle line train (arriving at platform 3 at
Edgware Road from Paddington) was passing next to the bombed train
and was damaged,[1] along with a wall that later collapsed. There were
two other trains at Edgware Road: an unidentified train on platform 2,
and a southbound Hammersmith & City line service that had just
arrived at platform 1.
3. A third bomb was detonated on a Piccadilly line deep-level
Underground train, number 311, travelling southbound from King’s
Cross-St. Pancras and Russell Square. The device exploded
approximately one minute after the service departed King’s Cross, by
which time it had travelled about 500 yards (450 m). The explosion
occurred at the rear of the first carriage of the train, in car number 166,
causing severe damage to the rear of that carriage as well as the front of
the second one.[2] The surrounding tunnel also sustained damage.
All the four bombers were UK citizens of Pakistani origin

The USA was also disasterously hit by Al Qaeda piloted attacks. Besides
1992 bombing in the WTC basement by Ramzi Yousef, the Al Qaeda was
responsible for attack on USS Cole, near Yemen, US embassy attack in
Kenya, shooting down of the Black Hawk and lynchinf of US soldiers in
Somalia, the Al Qaeda made the cruelest attack on USA by hijacking
domestic flights.
September 11th or 9/11 assault were a series of four coordinated
suicide attacks upon the United States in New York City and the Washington,
D.C. areas on September 11, 2001. On that Tuesday morning, 19 terrorists
from the Islamist militant group Al-Qaeda hijacked four passenger jets. The
hijackers intentionally crashed two planes, American Airlines Flight 11 and
United Airlines Flight 175 into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in
New York City; both towers collapsed within two hours. Hijackers crashed
American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The
fourth jet, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed into a field near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to take control before it could reach
the hijackers’ intended target in Washington, D.C. Nearly 3,000 people died in
the attacks.
Suspicion quickly fell on al-Qaeda, and in 2004, the group’s leader
Osama bin Laden, who had initially denied involvement, claimed
responsibility for the attacks. Al-Qaeda and bin Laden cited U.S. support of
Israel, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, and sanctions against Iraq
as motives for the attacks. The United States responded to the attacks by
launching the War on Terror and invading Afghanistan to depose the Taliban,
which had harbored Al-Qaeda. Many countries strengthened their anti-
terrorism legislation and expanded law enforcement powers. In May 2011,
after years at large, bin Laden was found and killed. The destruction of the
Twin Towers caused serious damage to the economy of Lower Manhattan and
had a significant impact on global markets.



ISI Operations in Central Asia and
XUAR Region of China
Spread of Islamic movement and militancy in Central Asia is intricately
connected to the historic expansion of Russian monarchic and Bolshevik
hegemony over the region. The Central Asian countries like Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan flanked by Russia, China, Iran,
and Afghanistan present a unique geographical and ethnic diversity that has
influenced human history in spectacular manner. For close to a thousand years
the people of this region redefined India’s destiny in human civilization.
Islamisation of the vast, remote and neglected tract had started soon after
Islam had started spreading beyond the borders of Arabia. The people are
generally Sunni Muslims of Hanafi sect with sprinkles of Shia and the Ismaeli
groups. Sufism later emerged as the most important rallying point. Divided
into Naqshbandi, Qadiriya, Yasawiyya and Kubrawiyya schools, Sufism had
found flourishing homes in Ferghana valley. The Naqshbandis believe in
aggressive missionary work and protesting against the jahiliya (unbeliever)
oppressive regimes. It may be noted that the Naqshbandi sect had inspired
spread of armed militancy in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Ferghana valley
areas. Later the Wahhabis and Deobandis joined the Naqshbandis, after Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan got seriously involved in promoting armed
Islamic revolt in the region.
The specter of cross-border insurgency and militancy, which was earlier
limited to social and trade contacts, changed dramatically after the Soviet
army’s intervention in Afghanistan that was perceived as direct Communist
attack on Islam. The Soviets and those who represented the Soviet regimes
came to be seen as the enemies of Islam.
Azad Beg—the old leader of the Islamic Union of the Northern Provinces
of Afghanistan (Ittihadiya-i-Islami-yi-vilayat-i-Samt-i-Shamil-i-Afghanistan),
who was responsible for numerous operations against the Soviet forces, was
closely related to Ibrahim Beg, one of the leaders of the Basmachi movement.
Naseeruddin, the last Amir of Kokand, was Azad Beg’s maternal great-
grandfather. The Islamic Union was founded in Peshawar in 198I with the
help of Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan for bringing together all the
people of Turkic origin in Afghanistan and then to liberate the Soviet
Turkestan. The ISI provided Azad Beg great deal of money and weapons to
build an alternative framework for channeling Turkic nationalism against the
Soviet and Kabul regimes.
It is not a mere coincidence that Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of
Pakistan’s army, pursued Pakistan’s forward policy in Afghanistan and trans-
Oxiana. He was a descendant of a Central Asian refugee and was also related
to Azad Beg. Azad Beg had enlisted the support of some Uzbek, Tajik and
Turkmen field commanders, notably Uzbek refugees from the Soviet Central
Asia. Azad Beg operated in Balkh, Djauzdjan, Farib, Sari Pul and Samangan
areas. He was actively involved in shipping weapons to his Islamic supporters
in Tajikistan. That the Central Asian refugees from Tajikistan, who migrated
to Afghanistan during the Bolshevik revolution, were in the forefront of jihad
was confirmed by Mohammad Sharif Himatzade, Chief of Islamic
Renaissance Party (IRP) that operate in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Common
ethnic and religious background of the people inhabiting this border region
facilitated the cross-border smuggling of religious and subversive literature,
arms and ammunition by the Afghan mujahideen into Tajikistan.
The rapid politicization of Islam and the emergence of a militant Islamic
fundamentalist movement in Tajikistan did not take place after the Soviet
action in Afghanistan. The movement had started earlier with support from
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. After the Soviet intervention, the USA also
pitched in. Zbigniew Brzezinski had revealed in his memoirs that on July 3,
1979, unknown to the American public and Congress, President Jimmy Carter
secretly authorized $500 million to create an international terrorist movement
that would spread Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and de-stabilize the
Soviet Union. The CIA called this Operation Cyclone and in the following
years poured $4 billion into setting up Islamic training schools in Pakistan.
Young zealots were sent to the CIA’s spy training camp in Virginia, where
future members of Al Qaeda al Sulbah were taught sabotage skills and
terrorism. Others were recruited at an Islamic school in Brooklyn, New York,
within sight of the ill-fated Twin Towers. In Pakistan, they were directed by
British MI6 officers and trained by the SAS. These inputs irrefutably prove
that like most other theatres of conflict in the world the USA was also a
prominent player in initiating the priming process of setting the Central Asian
Muslim Republics afire on the path of ruinous and protracted Islamic jihad.
Jihad in twenty-first century is a gift to human civilization by the dominant
Christian power—The United States of America and its Islamist client,
Pakistan and its ISI.
Impartial western scholars acknowledge that the USA had been the master
trainer of international terrorists. The Al Qaeda al Sulbah training camps were
kindergartens compared to the world’s leading university of terrorism at Fort
Benning in Georgia. Known until recently as the School of the Americas, its
graduates included almost half the cabinet ministers of the genocidal regimes
in Guatemala, two-thirds of the El Salvadoran army officers who committed,
according to the United Nations, the worst atrocities of that country’s civil
war, and the head of Pinochet’s secret police, who committed innumerable
crimes in Chile.
The Cold War inputs of the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had fortified
Islamist resurgence. It was further strengthened with the success of Khomeini
revolution in Iran. These forces brought a new awakening among the Muslims
of Central Asia. The Central Asian clerics and Sufi brotherhood, which
withstood the Soviet policies, had emerged stronger and came under the
influence of Wahhabism and Deobandi teachings. Their Naqshbandi Sufism
also prodded them to assert their rights and fight against the pro-Soviet
regimes.
The Afghan mujahideen established wide contacts with the Tajiks after the
Soviet troops, many of whom were from Central Asia, landed in Afghanistan.
They started crossing the border into Tajikistan where radical Islamic activists
greeted them. Afghan mujahideen leaders acknowledged that the 1979 Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan helped re-establish links between the
Tajiks and their Muslim brethren in Afghanistan, who share the same
language, same culture, same religion and common ancestors. Masood
Khalili, a mujahideen leader, disclosed that the Soviet soldiers conscripted
from Tajikistan were not only reluctant to fire on Afghans but they even sold
their rifles to Afghan fighters. Afghan resistance parties, namely Jammat-i-
lslami led by Burhannuddin Rabbani and Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar were particularly active enrolling members in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. These Afghan mujahideen groups evoked maximum response
from young Tajiks with high education, especially teachers and engineers.
Reports about the active involvement of Afghan mujahideen in propagating
jihad in Tajikistan began to appear in the Soviet press since 1986, following
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost. K.M. Makhkamov, the then first Secretary of
the Tajik Communist Party, admitted that young people and children were
getting increasingly swayed by propaganda from across the border.
Communist controlled paper Tadjikistana of December 30, 1987, published
a statement of Tajik KGB Chief Petkel confirming the existence of hostile
foreign ideological centers and organizations in Tajikistan. An article in the
same paper of May 13, 1988, disclosed that Islamic revolutionary literature
was being distributed in thousands, which was later confirmed by Afghan
mujahideen sources.
There was wide circulation of audio cassettes, video films etc., to spread
radical Islam in Tajikistan. Works of Maududi, the founder of Jamait-i-lslami,
Said Kutab, Muhammed Kutab and Jamal Uddin Afghani, a Muslim radical
thinker and a pioneer of Pakistan movement, were translated into Russian,
printed at Peshawar, and then smuggled across Afghanistan into Tajikistan.
The entire operation was financed by the ISI, and the Jamait-i-Islami and
Jammat-ul-Ulema of Pakistan did the footwork.
Wahhabism gained roots in the rural areas of Tajikistan especially along the
Tajik-Afghan border. The Wahhabi literature that was smuggled via
Afghanistan laid emphasis on religious absolutism and opposed Sufism and
holy shrines, which represent the traditional and tolerant trend in Islam.
Tajikistan’s Wahhabi leader Abdullo Saidov advocated the creation of an
Islamic State and called for jihad against the Soviets. The smuggling of arms
and militant cadres followed this ideological onslaught across the Oxus. Apart
from the surreptitious cross-border movements and smuggling of arms and
ammunition, Afghan mujahideen leaders openly abetted rise of militancy
among the Muslims of Tajikistan.
Burhanudin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud, both Tajiks and belonging
to Jamaat-i-Islami faction, reacted strongly to the anti-Armenian Dushanbe
disturbances of February 1990. They characterized these disturbances as
freedom movement or internal revolt against the Soviet subjugation. Harping
on the linguistic, cultural, religious and racial affinity of Tajiks and Afghans,
these leaders exhorted the Muslims in Central Asia to break away from
Moscow. Rabbani warned that the Afghans living on this side could create
complications for the Soviets.
*
The story of Islamist jihad in Central Asia is not limited to the US, Pak and
Afghan inputs in Tajikistan alone. The flame of Islamic jihad has
encompassed almost the whole of Central Asia and has infected certain areas
of Xinjiang province of China.
The most important Islamist movements in Central Asia are: Islamic
Renaissance Party (RPI), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-
ut-Tehrir al Islami (HT). Other splinter parties, Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizb-ul-
Islam are supplementary offshoots, which generally follow the main
protagonists. It is necessary to narrate a brief account of the growth of these
organizations, which have added to the strategic concerns of the major
powers, and regional power players like Pakistan, India, Iran and Saudi
Arabia.
Russian involvement in Afghanistan had to depend a lot on the manpower
and resources of its Central Asian Republics (CAR). The Muslim forces were
exposed to Islamic jihadists and foreign agencies like the CIA, MI6, ISI and
Mukhabarat. They were also exposed to Islamic political parties and
ideologies. They were exposed to the concept of Islamic Ummah, which
opposed foreign domination in Afghanistan. This feeling of the CAR soldiers
had further deepened with the perestroika and glasnost policies of Mikhail
Gorbachev. Along with the new message of decentralization, the CAR
countries were fed with the messages of religious resurgence from countries
like Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Around 1985-86, the USA, UK, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan agreed on the
strategy of building up Islamic rebellion inside CAR countries with a view to
pinning down the Soviet regime in its own troubled ground. This was a part of
the Great Cold War game, in which China too rendered indirect services.
Hundreds of Tajik and Uzbek Muslims clandestinely crossed over to
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where they were enrolled in
madrassas and were taught Wahhabi and Deobandi fundamentalist ideas.
Those who went to Iran were taught the Shia brand of Islamic jihad. A good
number were flown to the USA and were imparted training in special combat
facilities in Virginia. This aspect has been elaborated in earlier paragraphs.
With the emergence of CIS concept, the leaders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan were set in a spin motion as they had very little
resources to run the affairs of the state and their economy. Gorbachev’s
glasnost brought instant chaos to the region. Yeltsin era added to the
confusion. The Islamic forces gradually filled in the vacuum created by the
abrupt escape of the Soviet Union. Thousands of mosques and madrassas
sprang up within a short time where Wahhabi and Deobandi messages were
taught rigidly by the foreign funded ulemas. The outsiders fortified
indigenous Islamic revival. Weak economy, instable political regimes and
dictatorial format of functioning had led to serious internal strife and ethnic
clashes.
Civil war in Tajikistan provided the incentive for a coup by indigenous
Islamists. The most important leader Mullah Mohammad Rustamov
Hindustani (trained in Indian Deoband School) had initially organized Islamic
resistance in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. His follower Sayed Abdullah Nuri, a
protagonist of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, eventually formed the
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) at Astrakhan in 1990. Sharif Himmatzoda,
who took charge of the military command of the IRP, assisted him.
Himmatzoda had vast experience in fighting alongside Hekmatyar and ISI
soldiers in Afghanistan. Several of his students were trained in Peshawar and
Quetta camps run by the ISI. The IRP gradually extended its roots to
Uzbekistan (in Ferghana Valley). Besides the IRP, the Ferghana valley also
boasted of the presence of IMU, Tauba (repentance), Islam Laskarlary
(fighters for Islam) and Adolat (justice) parties, which took part in armed
revolt from time to time.
The IRP in Tajikistan took part in the civil war and fought against the pro-
Russian government forces. Under the Russian pressure, the IRP leaders
escaped to Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. They were prominently present in
Kunduz and Taloqan in Afghanistan, which were under control of Rabbani
and Ahmad Shah Massoud. At this stage, the IRP was fully assisted by
Pakistan, Iran, Saudi, Afghanistan and the USA.
After the peace agreement between the Tajik government and the United
Tajik Opposition the IRP slowed down its armed conflict considerably, though
several IRP leaders refused to follow the peace agreement and joined hands
with Jumma Namangani of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
Around this time, Tajikistan witnessed a new Islamic development in the
growth of Hizb-ut-Tehrir (HT), which recruited volunteers from amongst the
urban middle class. The HT stands for uniting Central Asia, Xinjiang
province of China and the entire Ummah and establishing a Caliphate. Sheikh
Abdul Qadeem Zaloom is the topmost leader of the HT. HT was originally
founded in Saudi Arabia and Jordan by the Palestinians under Al Azhar
(Egypt) influence to fight the Jewish infidels. The pattern of activities of the
HT in Arabian Peninsula was emulated in Central Asia with the objective of
establishing a Caliphate through indoctrination, Islamisation and
revolutionary means. Originated in the Wahhabi cauldron of the Middle East,
the Hizb-ut-Tehrir had been close to Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen of Egypt. The
Jamait-i-Islami of Pakistan and Indian subcontinent also follow the ideals of
the Ikhwan-Muslimeen Brotherhood.
The HT has grown phenomenally after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It
was rooted in Tajikistan and expanded to Uzbekistan in 1995 by a Jordanian
called Salhauddin. The mass following of the HT alarmed the Uzbek
authorities, who cracked down on the organisation in 1998. Karimov, the
Uzbek supremo, had foreseen that the HT provided fighting cadres to the
IMU, which indulged in severe armed struggle under Jumma Namangani. The
HT had also spread its tentacles in Kyrgyzstan, Xinjiang and Turkmenistan. It
has recently started emerging as the most important ideological base for the
Islamists who believe in the ultimate restoration of the Caliphate. The HT has
started gathering awe and respect like its terrorist brother in arms—Al Qaeda
al Sulbah. Incidentally, Bangladesh has also recently been blessed by a HT
unit under guidance of Bengali Afghan veterans.
Repression against the HT by the CIS regimes has compelled them to
escape to North Afghanistan. They have been accommodated in IMU camps
in Afghanistan and a large number of HT activists have reportedly taken part
in guerrilla warfare along with the IMU cadres. The relationship between IRP,
HT and IMU is an intricate one. Bound together by Islamist ideology of
Wahhabi and Deobandi variety they also accommodate a large number of
followers of Naqshbandi tariqa.
*
Islamic militancy in Uzbekistan grew up in and around the Ferghana valley
under leadership of Tohir Abdouhalivitch Yuldeshev and Jumaboi
Ahmadzhanovitch @ Juma Namangani. Yuldeshev’s followers were drawn
from the IRP cadre of Uzbekistan. They had established a somewhat free zone
in Namangan area. After severe government crackdown, Yuldeshev travelled
to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. He was hooked up by the ISI, which gave
him arms and money. Between 1995 and 1998, Yuldeshev was located in
Peshawar. There he also came in contact with the Al Qaeda al Sulbah
leadership, including al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. In fact, Yeldeshev
was taken down to Kandahar by the ISI for meeting Taliban leaders. Jammat-
ul-Ulema-Islami, Pakistan, raised funds for him and Uzbek volunteers were
trained in JUI run madrassas alongside the Taliban protagonists.
In fact, madrassas in Pakistan acted as the main nursery for the Central
Asian Muslim terrorists. The Adolat, IRP in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
sponsored the youths. A large number of volunteers were also trained in the
madrassas and the ISI camps in Peshawar area from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Uyghur region of China. It may be mentioned that US funds and
resources, which were being received for the Taliban, were also supplied to
the CIS Islamists. The CIA and Saudi intelligence were interested in
fomenting trouble in the CIS to demolish the Russian influence and
hegemony of the neo-communists. Yuldeshev had also received funds from
Turkey and Iran. He had established contact with the Chechen rebels and
Islamic fundamentalists of Turkey. Some observers have described Yuldeshev
as one of the finest creations of the ISI, for his near-umbilical link with the
Pakistani fulcrum of evil. According to western media reports Yuldeshev and
his group are now camping in Waziristan tribal area of Pakistan: Alleged
Pakistani operations against Al Qaeda have so far not targeted the celebrity
ISI agent of Uzbekistan. The very issue of ISI acting against Al Qaeda was
suspect. In fact, Osama and his followers were often operating from within
Pakistan under ISI supervision.
Yuldeshev’s associate Jumma Namangani was the most important military
leader of the IMU and Adolat. The Tajik IRP volunteers assisted him.
Namangani commanded respect from his troops. He travelled to Afghanistan
and had consultations with Hekmatyar and ISI officials. It is reported that ISI
officer Colonel Shahabuddin had delivered sophisticated weapons to
Namangani at Taloqan. With fresh supplies from Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Namangani had set up a camp at Hoit. At this point of time the Taliban and
Osama bin Laden had become primary sources of supplies to the Adolat and
IMU. In fact, Yuldeshev was given a government house in Kabul and
Kandahar by the Taliban regime, where he regularly travelled to meet bin
Laden and Mullah Omar. In many such pilgrimages to Kandahar Yuldeshev
was accompanied by Namangani. Osama had paid Namangani to acquire two
MI8 helicopters. Between 2000 and the US attack in Afghanistan, bin Laden,
Saudi and Pakistan paid about 50 million dollars, which resulted in escalation
of guerrilla warfare by the Adolat, IMU and Uzbekistan Islamist elements. A
strong nexus was built up between the IMU, Uyghur rebels, Chechens, ISI
trained Sipah Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Tayeba militants. The Pakistani guerrillas
were later accommodated with the IMU fighters in Tajik and Uzbek camps.
In an interesting development, President Musharraf visited Tashkent in
March 2005 seeking reconciliation with the Uzbekistan government, which
has welcomed the US presence in the country and agreed to open up the
closed nation to western investment. Pakistan’s quest is also for seeking
access to oil and energy of the CAR countries. While signing an anti-terrorist
agreement with Uzbek president Islam Karimov, Musharraf declared that
Pakistan would not allow Uzbek terrorists to use Pakistani soil and would
readily extradite such terrorists to Uzbekistan under the new treaty. Musharraf
had also sought membership of Shanghai Cooperation Organization with a
view to fighting terrorism. One has to accept such international
pronouncements on face value though in the past such Pakistani promises had
turned out to be promises of a hungry tiger that assured only to lick the fur of
the rabbit.
Musharraf’s claim was hollow. Yuldeshev and his Uzbek fighters
numbering about 4000 drifted to Pakistan and lived with the tribal warriors
who later declared war on Pakistan in the name of Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan.
He became the ideological guru of Baitullah Mehsud, leader of TTP.
Yuldeshev was also a member of the shura of Al Qaeda formed by Osama bin
Laden.
Tohir Yo‘ldosh, born Tohir Abduhalilovich Yo‘ldoshev (October 2, 1967 –
August 27, 2009) cofounded the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an
Islamist organization active in Central Asia, with Juma Namangani in
December 1991. According to the Defense Intelligence Agencyof USA he
was a key leader opposing US forces during Operation Anaconda. The United
Nations considers the IMU an Islamic terrorist organization. When anti-
Taliban forces killed Namangani, the IMU’s military leader and cofounder, in
Afghanistan in 2001, Yuldeshev took over the IMU’s day-to-day operations as
well.
After Baitullah Mehsud was reported to have been killed by missiles fired
from an American Predator drone the Asia Times reported that Yuldashev had
been Baitullah’s ideological mentor, that Yoldeshev had put 2,500 hardened
fighters at his disposal, and that Baitullah lived with the Uzbek, who became
his biggest ideological inspiration.
On September 30, 2009 Yuldeshev’s bodyguard, reported to the Pakistan
newspaper The News International that Yuldeshev was killed in a US Predator
drone airstrike shortly after Mehsud’s death. US and Pakistan officials
afterwards confirmed Yuldeshev was killed in an airstrike on August 27,
2009. Yoldeshev reportedly lost a leg and arm in the drone missile strike on
August 27, 2009 and was rushed to a hospital in Zhob in Baluchistan, but died
the next day.

The nexus between ISI and Taliban is as strong as the Pakistani agency’s links
with the IRP, HT and the IMU. Pakistan sincerely wanted to be an integral
part of the Great Central Asian game along with the USA, Russia and China
for exploring its energy and mineral resources and to have command on the
trade routes between China and Europe. The US interests in Central Asia have
been underscored by its massive interests in oil production and laying of
pipeline for cheaper supply of energy fuel. Russia on the other hand has
started overcoming the stupor of Yeltsin regime, and under the leadership of
Vladimir Putin it has made clear that the CIS countries will have to be tied to
the geopolitical interests of Russia. The emergence of Shanghai Five group
and its later modifications indicate that Russia, China and the CIS regimes are
keen to maintain peace and order in the region with a view to revitalizing its
economy and security perceptions. For all practical purposes, the post 9/11
incidents have restricted Pakistani ambition in the region, though the ISI and
its front Islamist organizations continue to impart training and provide arms
and financial resources to the Uyghur and Uzbek and Tajik rebels. The USA
too has slightly modified its strategy, as it is required to use military bases in
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for carrying out its unfinished agenda in
Afghanistan.
*
The Chinese geopolitical and strategic interest in the Uyghur affairs is as vital
as its geo-strategic interests in the entire South and South East Asia. China’s
national security is intricately linked with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR). The XUAR has vital borders with Mongolia, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. China is
not likely to lower its guard in the XUAR region as it has a massive nuclear
testing facility in the area and its space programme is also vitally connected to
this remote region. The unexploited oil and energy resources of the region are
considered as the safe deposit vault of future Chinese economy.
Known as East Turkestan, the Xinjiang tract is a potential trouble spot for
the Chinese Republic. This north-western and the largest province of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the homeland of the Uyghur people, a
Turkic Muslim ethnic group. Main Muslim minority communities in China
are the Han speaking Hui Muslims and Arabic using Uyghurs. The Uyghurs
are more integrated with the Islamic people and states of the former Soviet
Muslim republics, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkic traditions. Historically,
this region lay at the crossroads of several civilizations. Until 1949, China
strained to keep a tenuous grip on the region. Frequent Uyghur rebellions and
insurgencies, aimed to free themselves from Chinese bondage had scarred the
region’s political terrain and seriously challenged Chinese authority. Uyghur
nationalists declared independence in 1933 and 1944. Both the secession
attempts lasted several years before being suppressed brutally.
Communist victory in 1949 ended the possibility of Uyghur’s
independence or autonomous rule. Mao Zedong had pledged extensive
freedom for the national minorities. Mao had made such promises during the
darker days of the war, when the then struggling Communists desperately
needed broad support from China’s ethnic minorities. However, after
communist victory, national unification became the overriding priority of the
new regime. In 1955, Xinjiang formally became the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region. The levers of power in Xinjiang did not devolve on the
Uyghurs.
For Beijing, any expression of separatism arouses historically embedded
memories of political disunity. This sense of insecurity has been heightened
by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. China is also very sensitive to any
kind of foreign intervention in Xinjiang affairs.
However, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan formed a strategic regional alliance in June 2001, called the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Shanghai group has
maintained that Western interests should play no role in the internecine power
struggles of Central Asia. Moreover, even if they could overcome their
chronic disarray, Uyghur separatists simply do not have the aggregate
capability to initiate and sustain a full drive toward secession, given the
Chinese military’s overwhelming superiority in numbers and weaponry.
Thus, the Uyghurs remain politically isolated. Beijing’s diplomatic efforts
with Central Asian countries have ensured that no SCO state would support
Uyghur independence. Given the XUAR’s military value, Beijing remains
extremely wary of exogenous threats, particularly mobilized Islamist groups
engaging in organized violence. It is worried about the activities of the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tehrir of Uzbekistan.
At one point of time, during high Chinese collaboration with the USA and
Pakistan in their war against the communist regime in Afghanistan and the
Soviet presence the PRC had encouraged the Uyghurs to be trained by the ISI
and other jihadist groups. It is known that China had supplied weapons and
financial resources to the Afghan mujahideen and the ISI for defeating the
Soviets, whose preponderance in the region had created geopolitical anxiety
to China. During the Afghan war and advent of the Taliban, several hundred
Uyghurs served in Afghanistan and had even forayed into Indian Kashmir for
carrying out jihad. On their return to Xinjiang, they looked forward to
intensified guerrilla warfare against the oppressive Chinese regime. The ISI
and the terrorist outfits in Pakistan had continued to train and support the
Uyghur rebels in facilities dominated by the Taliban in northern and North-
eastern Afghanistan. A special camp was operated by the ISI, under cover of
the Dawa tanzeem at Kunduz for training the Uyghur insurgents along with
the IMU rebels. According to Russian sources Pakistan operated another
camp for the Uyghurs at Mirkhani area of the NWFP bordering Afghanistan.
The camp was run under cover of a Jamait-i-Islami madrassa. In turn, the
IMU also trained scores of Uyghurs in Ferghana valley camps for which
sophisticated weapons were supplied by the ISI. Following these
developments, China had developed a fear of losing Xinjiang. Losing
Xinjiang would be disastrous for China in terms of its geo-strategic position
and national security. Granting independence is not—and never will be—a
viable policy choice for Beijing.
Beijing has grown increasingly concerned that radical Islamist ideologies
and organizations might seep into the XUAR. Giving Xinjiang a truly
autonomous political status might inspire similarly oppressed minorities
across China to engage in organized ethno-nationalist movements as well as
cloud the future of China’s national security vis-à-vis its western frontiers. In
particular, the Tibetans, Mongolians, and Hui Muslim ethnic minority, each of
which has its own autonomous region have watched the Uyghur drama unfold
with great interest.
However, Xinjiang Muslim insurgency has not received as good attention
as the political turmoil in Tibet. Some writers feel that it is a low-key struggle
for self-determination by Uyghur Muslims. A researcher like Sean Yom had
commented in his paper Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang (Self-Determination
Conflict Profile), “Since September 2001, Beijing has vociferously asserted
that Uighur separatists have received substantial aid from the Taliban, Al
Qaeda al Sulbah, and other violent Islamist groups. While most of these
claims lay unsubstantiated, a small number of Uighur volunteers have fought
in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, and some cross-border collaboration
between Uighur separatists and Islamist organizations does exist. However,
such assistance usually manifests itself as localized weapons smuggling,
transportation, and safe harbor for wanted Uighurs rather than coordinated
networking as part of a wider political strategy.”
Whatever the researchers say, China’s action to ban Sala sect of Islam in
Quinghai and Xinjiang prove its repressive attitude. Sala sect founded in
Quinghai in 1935 was an admixture of Wahhabism and Deobandi brand of
Salafist Islam mixed with certain tenets of Central Asian Sufism. The Sala
sect is actively involved in promoting demand for independence and
collaboration with other Islamic powers like neighbouring CAR countries,
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The latest Chinese actions have somewhat
strained Pakistan’s relations with China.
Pakistani author Wajid Shamsul Hasan writing in Middle East Transparent
(16.08.2004) had mentioned, amongst other reasons, the suspected ISI
involvement with the XUAR Muslim terrorists as one of the prominent
causes. He said, “However lately—according to sources in Islamabad—the
relationship is not as warm as it used to be. Reasons are varied and
multifaceted. In the first place, Chinese do not like the interference of
Pakistan-based Islamists in their Muslim-dominated and populated areas
bordering Pakistan. These Islamists that have deep connections with
Pakistan’s overly dominating intelligence apparatus (i.e. ISI) after the success
of the Afghan Mujahideen, Taliban and other Pakistan-based Jihadi
organizations in their Jihad against erstwhile Soviet Union, feel and covertly
encouraged by anti-Chinese forces—that they can repeat history in China and
get independence for the Muslim areas in China.”
Pakistan’s involvement in the Xinjiang region of China is an extension of
its strategic policies in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and other
countries. It aimed at maintaining a strong presence in the energy rich
countries and the Silk Road that is virtually the opening gate for China
towards the countries of central Asia and other Islamic countries in the region.
Pakistan’s accumulated experiences in Afghanistan had spurred the ISI to
entertain Uyghur rebels in its training camps and in camps organized by the
ISI and the Al Qaeda al Sulbah inside Afghanistan. The Xinjiang Muslim
rebels organized under the banner of East Turkestan Islamic Movement
(ETIM) are known to have strong links with the Jammat-ul-Ulema and
Jamait-i-Islami of Pakistan, the Hizb-ut-Tehrir, Taliban and Al Qaeda al
Sulbah.
According to B. Raman, former Additional Secretary RAW, “There are two
Uighur ethnic movements confronting the Chinese. The first is a pro-human
right, pro-democracy movement spearheaded by the Munich-based World
Uighur Congress (WUC), which adopts peaceful methods of advocacy like
those of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and enjoys the political, material and
moral support of the US and other Western countries. The second is the jihadi
movement spearheaded by the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET),
which has an ideology similar to that of Al Qaeda and is based in Pakistan.
The WUC projects itself as a purely Xinjiang-centric ethnic rights movement.
The IMET projects itself as a Central Asia-centric pan-Umma movement. The
Chinese concerns are mainly over the threats which they perceive to the
security of their peripheral regions, which are populated by non-Han ethnic
groups, as a result of the activities of the WUC though peaceful on the one
side and the IMET, which is violent, on the other.”
The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is one of the more extreme
groups founded by the Uyghurs, the Turkic-speaking ethnic majority in
Xinjiang, seeking an independent state called East Turkestan. China’s
communist regime, which fears that China could fragment if regional
separatist movements ever gained ground, has long called the ETIM a
terrorist group. After September 11, China warned the USA that the ETIM
had ties with Al Qaeda al Sulbah. In August 2002, the US administration
announced freezing of ETIM’s U.S. assets.
The ETIM is suspected to have a “close financial relationship” with Osama
bin Laden’s terror network. The U.S. officials are said to have gathered
information about Uyghur militants linked to Al Qaeda al Sulbah from a
handful of Uyghurs captured in Afghanistan and detained at the U.S. naval
base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In January 2002, a Chinese government
study reported that the ETIM had received money, weapons, and support from
Al Qaeda al Sulbah. According to the report, some ETIM militants were
trained by Al Qaeda al Sulbah in Afghanistan, crossed back into Xinjiang,
and set up terrorist cells there. While experts agree that hundreds of Uyghurs
left China to join Al Qaeda al Sulbah and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan,
some experts feel that the ETIM has significant ties to bin Laden’s network.
However, ETIM leader Hashan Mahsum, one of China’s most-wanted men,
has denied any ties between his group and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. It is
interesting to note that Hashan Mahsum had visited Pakistan in 2002 and was
trained by ISI operatives in a facility near Rawalpindi. Some western sources
agree that Mahsum had also received financial support from the ISI. Hashan
Mahsum again visited Pakistan in 2004 and had consultations with his ISI
mentors for supply of weapons. He was reportedly advised to work through a
few ISI spawned tanzeems, as the agency was afraid of US retaliation.
Arrest of a Pakistani national at Urumqi in 2002 had strengthened the
suspicion that the ISI was still active in Xinjiang. The PRC had taken up the
issue of collaboration between the ETIM rebels and the Pakistani terror outfits
like Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Hijb-ul-Mujahideen. Pakistan
had reportedly tied up its loose ends and had directed its agencies to tone
down the thrust in Xinjiang. This was eyewash. The ISI continued to train the
Uyghurs in the tribal areas of NWFP. A special fund was created in X
Division of the ISI to supply weapons to the ETIM jihadists. China continues
to protest and Pakistan continues to throw dust on Chinese eyes. In fact,
Pakistan administration has no access to those tribal areas. At any given point
of time there can be over 1000 foreign jihadists present in the wild tribal areas
of Pakistan.
Recent reports indicate that over 1000 Uyghur jihadists trained in Binori,
Muridke and Peshawar madrassas and in training camps run by Al Qaeda al
Sulbah in Waziristan and other remote areas under Taliban control have
infiltrated the XUAR area. China has declared its intention to fight terrorism
firmly and set up a central anti-terrorist hub in Beijing. Recent enactment of
anti-secession law is not only directed at Taiwan. It also applies to XUAR and
Tibet.
By mid 2004 China had claimed big success against the ETIM insurgents.
The ETIM leaders and the Xinjiang patriots on the other hand claimed that
China had killed more than 300 Uyghurs for alleged involvement in ‘terrorist’
activities. The East Turkestan nationalist websites have cited examples of
mass execution by the Chinese between 1997 and 2003. These records prove
that the Uyghur rebellion has succeeded in establishing firm linkages with the
Islamist elements in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. It
is a matter of time for Pakistan to overcome the US pressure in its war against
terrorism and to reactivate the linkages with the Islamist movements in
Xinjiang and the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan has been transformed into
a pivot of Sunni Wahhabi Islamist jihad, much more committed to the cause
in Islamic International than the Islamist protagonists of Saudi Arabia and
Egypt.
However, according to the Daily Times of Pakistan (26.08.2005) 17
Chinese nationals (Muslims) were charged with gunrunning in Quinghai
province, adjacent to Tibet. The smugglers had procured about 900 guns and
1,500 gun accessories from Pakistan. A group affiliated to the Lashkar-e-
Tayeba supplied these on payment. The weapons were sold in Kashgarh in
Xinjiang and Xining, the capital of Quinghai.
*
 Al Qaeda
A Kindred relative of the CIA and ISI
It is necessary to state briefly the umbilical linkage between the ISI and the
Al Qaeda al Sulbah. It was a strategic friendship. Pakistani rulers and major
segments of the civil society had also identified themselves with the jihadist
world-programme of the Al Qaeda. The Inter Services Intelligence and the Al
Qaeda had been rotating each other like binary stars, from the very inception
of the Al Qaeda movement in the aftermath of USA’s Afghan war. Both the
Islamic jihad breeding organizations had been drawing nutrients from the
same resource pools—Wahhabi Salafist and Deobandi brands of spontaneous
jihad concept and the manufacturing factories in Egyptian, Yemeni, Saudi,
Pakistani and Afghani madrassas and seminaries.
The Al Qaeda al Sulbah had evolved out of the Afghan imbroglio, the last
of the post Second World War’s Cold War confrontation between the USSR
and the USA.
To understand Al Qaeda al Sulbah it is necessary to briefly mention about
the man who has emerged as the reckonable icon of Islamist jihad in the
world. As generally believed, Osama bin Laden was not the founder of the Al
Qaeda outfit. To start with, he was also a foot soldier of the combined US
and Islamic war efforts that had succeeded in humbling the USSR. An
easygoing millionaire Arab youth, Osama was handpicked by the Saudi
Mukhabarat and the CIA for representing the Arab face in the Afghan jihad.
His family connections with the Saudi royal family, his Salafist and Wahhabi
background and his inclination to fundamentalist religious tenets had made
him a ready target of exploitation. The Laden family’s business relationship
with the USA, especially with the Bush family, also tempted the CIA to
target him for the job. It was but natural for bin Laden family to succumb to
the American pressure.
Osama bin Muhammad bin Laden, son of Awdah bin Laden, a Yemeni
Arab and Hamida, a Syrian Arab lady, was born in July 1957. Raised in the
holy city of Medina and Hijaz he studied economics and management in King
Abdulaziz University. Muhammad Qutb, a brother of Sayyid Qutb, the
ideologue of Muslim Brotherhood and Abdullah Azzam, another Egyptian
Islamist, initiated him in Islamic studies of the purest Wahhabi and Salafist
brand of fundamentalism. Osama did not complete his degree. He took keen
interest in family business and had displayed early signs of a good manager
who could exploit talents around him. His youth was not marked by austere
Islamic practices; rather he was flamboyant, fond of drinks and girls.
 Though married to a Syrian Arab lady, a relation of his mother, Osama bin
Laden was a frequent visitor to Beirut, where he made a name as a free-
spending, fun-loving youth in flashy nightclubs and bars. His one-time
Lebanese barber, an Armenian living in Beirut, recalled that bin Laden was
then a heavy drinker who often ended up embroiled in shouting matches and
fistfights with other young men over an attractive barmaid or nightclub
dancer. His Beirut escapades were interrupted by the 1975 outbreak of
Lebanon’s civil war. However, Osama was gradually drawn to the purest
form of Islam after being introduced to the rugged Wahhabi and Salafist
format of Islam by his Egyptian gurus.
Osama was cultivated by the Saudi intelligence, especially Prince Turki,
for assisting the Yemeni Islamists who were fighting the communist regime in
South Yemen. That was the period when Osama had set up a network in
Yemen amongst the tribe of his father and other friendly tribes. The tribal
connectivity later helped him in establishing firm bases in Yemen and in
Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi intelligence and CIA reportedly picked him up for leading
groups of Arab volunteers to Afghanistan, soon after the Soviet intervention
in December 1979. Osama was assisted by the Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) in meeting Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf, the
Afghan theologists and resistance leaders, on the request of CIA. Osama was
gradually introduced to other important leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
Yunus Khalis, and Syed Ahmed Gailani by the ISI operatives. It is said that
the Afghan mujahideen, the Sunnis and Shias, had established independent
contacts with Saudi Arabia and Iran for material help. However, Osama’s
forays into Pakistan and Afghanistan were not connected in any way with
independent approaches by the Afghan leaders opposed to communist
takeover. They had accepted him as a Saudi and the US sponsored Arab face,
which was ready to bring in enough dough.
As stated earlier, the ISI had taken over the responsibility to coordinate
distribution of the US, Chinese, British, Egyptian and Saudi war materials and
logistical support to the Afghan resistance from bases in Peshawar, Quetta
and Islamabad. The Afghan mujahideen as well as other foreign mujahids
were required to canalize their efforts through the ISI, who gave them
political and strategic briefing, supplied them with aerial maps and images
and supplies for the civilian population besides supply of weapons. The CIA
did not get directly involved to avoid international complications and to retain
the right of international deniability. Milton Bearden, a former CIA official
who ran the agency’s covert operation in Afghanistan from 1986 to 1989 in
tandem with the ISI, was of the view that the CIA knew of bin Laden during
the war but had no relationship with him. This was a polite admission of
heavy CIA and ISI involvement with Laden. No spy agency takes part in an
‘identification parade.’
The Arab contingent was organized around MAK (Afghan Service Bureau)
a brainchild of Dr. Abdullah Azzam which worked under the general control
of Afghan Bureau of the ISI. A stalwart of Jordanian Islamic Brotherhood,
Azzam taught at Islamic University, Islamabad. The ISI and CIA supported
Azzam along with the Saudi intelligence to float MAK for coordinating the
Arab and other Muslim mujahideen, mobilised for the war against the
communist regime in Afghanistan. MAK, by arrangement with the CIA, MI6
and Prince Turki had set up a parallel system of disbursing financial aid to the
Arab and other Muslim youths from different countries. To the kitty supplied
by the US and allies, Osama used to add contribution from his personal
fortune and funds collected from the Ummah.
Azzam had cast deep influence on Osama and together they had set up
several mujahideen training camps. Osama’s personal involvement in the
jihad had earned him wide admiration of the Arab and other foreign
contingents numbering about 25-30,000.
He along with Azzam popularized the concept of jihad amongst the
Pakistani tanzeems like Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-
e-Tayeba. Several Pakistani volunteers were also trained in Al Qaeda (MAK)
camps inside Afghanistan and they fought alongside the Arabs and ISI
supported regular and irregular personnel of Pakistan army.
The concept of Al Qaeda al Sulbah (the Base) was developed by Dr.
Abdullah Azzam. He was deeply impressed by the personality of Zia-ul-Haq,
Pakistani President, a religious zealot himself. The idea of floating a new
outfit for providing wider infrastructure to the Islamic mujahideen and street
warriors, was also supported by the then ISI chief Lt. Gen. Akhtar. However,
the underlying philosophy of the Al Qaeda was drawn from pure Wahhabi
tenets and the principles of struggle followed by the Islamic Brotherhood.
That Islam could also be used for spontaneous broadcasting of international
jihad cutting across the boundaries of nations was enunciated by Dr. Azzam
and was picked up by Osama. The concept of spontaneous jihad by Muslims
all over the world echoed the communist theocratic slogan of spontaneous
revolution by the proletariat.
Was the formation of Al Qaeda al Sulbah around 1984 a pure Arab
inspiration born out of Wahhabi theology and the spontaneous jihad against
Christians and Jews preached by the Egyptian school of fundamentalism? No
doubt, these were the basic building blocks of the Al Qaeda. However, during
that historical period of US euphoria about impending collapse of the USSR
and Pakistani presumption of strategic superiority over India and its active
involvement in Indian Punjab had given incentive for the formation of a
consolidated Islamist force. The USA wanted to limit this new Islamist force
to Afghanistan. That such a force could be used against the peripheral Soviet
linkages in the Balkans, Central Asia and East Turkmenistan in China had
also inspired the CIA. There are ground evidences that indicate the CIA
and ISI collaboration and tacit support from Saudi Arabia had given
rebirth to Islamic jihad after that kind of fighting blaze had inspired the
Islamists in the 9th and 10th centuries. The Al Qaeda and the new
incarnation of the ISI were by-products of American Special Operations
against the USSR.
“…Azzam and his Deputy Emir, Osama, worked closely with Pakistan,
especially its formidable ISI. They also had close contacts with the Saudi
government and Saudi philanthropists and with the Muslim Brotherhood. The
ISI was both the CIA’s conduit for arms transfers and principal trainers for the
Afghan and foreign mujahideen. The CIA provided sophisticated weaponry,
including ground-to-air ‘Stinger’ missiles and satellite imagery of Soviet
troop deployments. The Saudi Chief of Intelligence, Prince Turki, worked
closely with Osama to coordinate both fighting and relief efforts.” Inside Al
Qaeda al Sulbah: Global Network of Terror. Rohan Gunaratna. P. 20.
A rupture between Osama and Azzam had taken place on Osama’s nagging
doubt about Azzam’s deeply buried links with the CIA. This seed of suspicion
was planted by the ISI with a view to establishing better rapport with Osama
and using his Arab legion for ‘terrorist’ activities and not pure jihad. With
Osama and ISI jihad included acts of terrorism and with Azzam jihad carried
a different meaning. These differences had finally led to Azzam’s
assassination by the Egyptian family of the Al Qaeda at the behest of Osama
bin Laden. It was a totally different organization in context and structure than
the MAK.
After Azzam’s assassination, Osama was free to use the Al Qaeda and
several groups affiliated to MAK in terrorist activities for promoting so-called
jihad against the designated kafirs. He also came under the influence of
Ayman Muhammad Rabi’ al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian having links to Islamic
Jihad and the Islamic Group of Egypt. Osama was transformed to a terrorist
from an Islamist guerrilla. Both Zawahiri and Osama belong to the Wahhabi
and Salafi strand of Islam, which believes in implementation of Islam in its
purest form. They evolved the philosophy of Islamist terror to fight Christian
and Jewish powers and to establish supremacy of the Sword of Islam.
It is difficult to ascertain the degree of mutual influence exercised by the
ISI and Al Qaeda on their respective jihadist and terrorist operations. From a
minute study of the events and analysis of the personalities and tanzeems, it
appears that in their quest for international jihad the two main breeding
wombs of Islamist terror had complemented each other. In Afghanistan, the
ISI and the Al Qaeda often took up joint ventures and on other occasions the
Al Qaeda complimented the jihad efforts of ISI controlled Pakistani tanzeems.
In the European, Central Asian, Southeast Asian theatres, and Indian
subcontinent the ISI and the Al Qaeda worked in tandem and later heavily
drew upon the resources of the Taliban regime. In operations inside
Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo and Xinjiang, the ISI and the Al
Qaeda drew upon each other’s manpower and resources. Till the blatant attack
on the WTC and other targets in the US the ISI, Al Qaeda and the Taliban
travelled in the same caravan of International Islamic Jihad.
*
Osama’s return to Saudi Arabia after withdrawal of the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan heralded the beginning of his disenchantment with the Saudi
ruling family and the USA, basically on the issue of inviting kefir US forces
on the holy soil of Islam. After being threatened in Saudi, he returned to
Pakistan in April 1991 but carried on terrorist activities against the US and
western targets and the Saudi ruling family. Osama’s stay in Peshawar was
facilitated by the ISI, which often refused to accept CIA allegations that
Osama was using Pakistani soil against the US interests. He was allowed to
utilize the existing camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan to train his Arab
fighters and fighters joining him from other countries. Most of the arms
requirements of Al Qaeda was met by the ISI operatives who often colluded
with the Afghan warlords in arranging huge caches of weapons for the Al
Qaeda fighters. The ISI utilized Osama not for expelling the communists but
to strengthen the staunch Islamist groups headed by Hekmatyar and the
emerging Taliban forces. After the rise of the Taliban, Osama had established
an independent relationship with the fanatic regime and its chief. The ISI was
not pleased over this independent connectivity.
By 1991, Osama had come under pressure from the US. Pakistan could not
easily overlook his prejudicial anti-US and anti-Saudi activities from
Pakistani soil. It had come to the US notice that Osama had organized several
Al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia and the USA. His cells were active in the UK,
France, Germany and other European countries. Certain elements of the ISI
and Al Qaeda operatives were dispatched to the Philippines, Chechnya,
Bosnia and other theatres of jihad to the utter discomfort of the CIA and US
administration.
Around that time, Osama managed to get closer to Dr. Hasan al-Turabi of
the National Islamic Front of Sudan. Under Turabi’s influence, he came to the
conclusion that the USA could also be defeated by sustained jihad like the one
conducted in Afghanistan by the mujahideen. For this purpose, Osama
required a friendly political base. He had three target locations: Sudan,
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, a self-proclaimed jihadist and
former ISI chief had collaborated with Osama behind the backs of Benazir
Bhutto and Lt. Gen. Shamsur Rahman Kallue, the new ISI chief appointed by
Benazir. The ISI and the army had even conspired to overthrow Benazir by
using Osama’s money to bribe the National Assembly members. Osama had
reportedly spent $ 200,000 to finance some important MNAs of Pakistan.
Two subsequent attempts on her life were also attributed to the joint efforts of
the Al Qaeda and the ISI. After Benazir’s dismissal the ISI chief Major
General Assad Durrani and Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir protected Osama in every
possible manner.
However, under the US, Saudi and Pakistani pressure Osama agreed to
relocate himself in Sudan, though a large contingent of Afghan, Arab and
other foreign Islamist jihadists were left behind in Pakistan. These elements
were deployed by the ISI alongside the Taliban. Some of these fighters were
deployed in Kashmir, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, the
Philippines and Indonesia. They were ideologically attached to Al Qaeda but
operationally the ISI handlers and the Islamist tanzeems operating from
within Pakistan guided them.
*
From Indian perspective of understanding ISI’s collaboration with Al Qaeda
in spreading worldwide jihad, the happenings in Kashmir and Islamist
terrorist activities in India are not the only ingredients. There always was a
CIA linkage. ISI’s global operations were often conducted under direct or
indirect CIA patronage in the Balkans and Central Asian Muslim nations. The
RSI was already working as a satellite unit of the CIA. The direct attack on
the USA by Al Qaeda finally unmasked the developing conflict situation
between two important fulcrums of evil. Therefore, a quick glancing over the
events triggered off by the direct attack on the USA on 09.11.2001 and
subsequent attack on the Indian Parliament on 13.12.2001 is necessary.
Some strategic thinkers and political leaders claim that September 11,
2001, had changed the history of the world. In a way, it had. For the first time
the Eastern Fulcrum of terror and its twin the Al Qaeda had directly
confronted the Western Fulcrum of evil, the USA, which had earned the
monopoly of changing governments, kicking away and catapulting leaders of
their choice in different parts of the world. Some western pundits have even
claimed that the Islamist terrorists had initiated a global war against
democracy and secularism by attacking the very heartland of the modern
world order. Exaggeration apart, there is no doubt that the synchronized attack
on the targets in New York and Washington, which symbolize the seat of the
only surviving superpower of the post Cold War era, the Islamist forces have
shifted the centre of gravity of the ‘civilisational war’ to the inner core of the
symbol of the new world order. Some proofs have now emerged that the ISI
was responsible for funding some of the accused in 9/11 assault on the World
Trade Centre. These attacks were followed by big demonstrative events like
Bali bombings and attacks in Spain, Britain, Egypt and other allies of the
USA.
Some analysts have even gone to the extent of comparing the Al Qaeda
attack on the US with the cataclysmic events like the First and the Second
World Wars. However, they do not speak so loudly about the geopolitical
changes architectured by the Islamist terrorists by attacking the symbol of the
second largest secular democracy in the world, India. December 13, 2001 and
26/11 attack on Mumbai, were as important as September 11 is as far as the
multinational Islamist attacks on the regional and global targets were
concerned. If the Al Qaeda attack on the US targets on September 11 was a
challenge to the ‘western power’, the dastardly ISI engineered attack on the
Indian Parliament on December 13, was a calculated assault on the only true
secular democracy between Rome and Tokyo.
Globally, the jihadist movement is apparently directed against the
Christians and the Zionists and the most important regional target is Hindu
Bharat and the US ‘coalition partners’, wherever they exist. These jihadist
forces are firm believers in the resurrection of Islam in its purest form and re-
building the hubs of Islam, which were established between the 8th and 15th
centuries: the African Hub, the Middle Eastern Cradle, the Sub-continental
Hub, the Southeast Asian Hub and the Central Asian Hub. Islamist
protagonists like Osama bin Laden, who prefers to imitate the symbols of the
Prophet, do believe that Islamic Hubs can be stretched into the heartland of
Europe, a task that could not be completed by the early warriors of Islam. He
believes in the revival of the Caliphate.
Collapse of the communist monolith has created a Unipolar World Order
that does not brook challenge from any other ‘ideological and civilisational
force’. This neo-imperialism and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc have,
however, given rise to a new World Force with incalculable potential of
disturbing world peace. This is the so-called purest force of Wahhabi and
Deobandi Islam. This force had been endowed with military prowess by the
American, Chinese and Saudi support. The ISI and Al Qaeda transformed the
endowed military prowess to terrorism. This was an ideological resurgence
that vastly changed the Islamic civil societies from symbolic use of jihad
against infidels to use of mindless terror for establishing supremacy of Islam
and for regaining global political supremacy. The ideological resurgence of
this force is yet to be fortified by the concurrent emergence of an invincible
singular State Power backed by superior military machine. The emerging
force is yet to break the barrier of nationalities, ethnicities and cultural
diversities. Yet, it thinks that religion is the most potent force to forge the
unified field of nationhood, cutting across the barriers of continents and seas.
This new Islamist force has taken upon itself a strategy of war, the War of
World wide Organised Terror against the jahiliya (non-believer) forces, who
are, per se, perceived to be enemies of Islam. Such wars, the Islamist
protagonists believe, would weaken the enemies of the Faith and re-establish
the common bondages in the Ummah leading to the restoration of the glory of
Islam. These neo-Islamist forces have made their presence felt in Algiers,
Cairo, Riyadh, Kabul, Manila, Dushanbe, Bishkek and Urumqi, Washington,
Madrid, London and Delhi. That the world, dominated as it is by the United
States of America, the only super power, has woken up to the reality of a
conflict situation with the Islamist Jihadist is a passage from history in the
making.
The West, basically defined as the US and its strategic allies, politico-
economic partners and security collaborators, is not new to the threats from
terrorist outfits of different hues: ideologically fired urban terrorists, narco-
terrorists and terrorists born out of social frustration, etc. However, the threat
from Islamist Jihadists, spearheaded by ‘Al Qaeda al Sulbah, the prime
multinational terrorist group of the twenty-first century…confronts the world
with a new kind of threat.’ Inside Al Qaeda al Sulbah, Rohan Gunaratna.
It has transformed the weapon of ‘terror’ as an instrument of protest to a
global war-machine with a view to restore the glory of Islam by humbling the
‘corrupting civilisational forces of the West and its surrogates’. Ironically
enough, the CIA had provided both the ISI and the Al Qaeda al Sulbah with
the ‘ideological, technical and financial sinews of the new global war in its
bid to humble the Soviet Bloc.
After the momentous events of the Iranian revolution and the Russian
intervention in Afghanistan, the Islamist movements manifested with renewed
vigor in the Middle East, South East Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and the
Balkans and in parts of Western Europe. The Al Qaeda al Sulbah symbolized
the global Islamist thrust. Its collaboration with the ISI, which had an
established record of accomplishment of carrying out sabotage, subversion
and proxy war against India, had endowed it with a broad-spectrum canvass
in spreading jihadist terror.
The Islamist Jihadists were transformed into ‘Islamist Rapid Strike Forces’
(IRSF) under the very nose of the CIA. While Azzam provided the
theological and ideological fundamentals of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah, Ayman
Muhammad Rabi’al-Zawahiri of Al-Azhar mosque finally turned the Arab
millionaire from a CIA-ISI molded mujahid into a ‘global Islamist terrorist’.
While the intelligence machineries of the USA, France, W. Germany,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan played along the ‘inherent ambitions’ of
Osama bin Laden, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan protected
and promoted its strategic and tactical linkages with the global terror-
mastermind, for promoting its own geopolitical agenda.
In a way, the Al Qaeda al Sulbah strike against the USA is something like a
‘blowback’ of CIA’s Afghan episode as the Iranian revolution was another
earthshaking ‘blowback’ of CIA-engineered assassination of Muhammad
Mussadegh and installation of a corrupt Pehlvi regime. That historical
experiment by the CIA had finally ended up in Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic
revolution. The Afghanistan blowback was symbolized by three elemental
Islamist forces: The ISI, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the Taliban. Blowback, in
CIA lingo, is adverse fallout of covert politico-terrorist action carried out by
the Agency at the behest of the White House.
We have analyzed the events that prove beyond doubt that the Inter
Services Intelligence played dual roles in propping up the Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
It helped the Arabs to get closer to the Pakistan-trained Taliban and it
provided jihadist cadres to fight Islamist war in theatres outside Afghanistan.
Direct ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah collaboration in Kashmir came to notice
after Brigade 055 of Osama had succeeded in humbling the Northern Alliance
and he was considerably free to pay attention to the ‘oppressed Kashmiri
brethren’. Pakistan, like the USA, has been an important promoter and
collaborator of the Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Only a few months before the 9 /11 attack General Pervez Musharraf told
in an interview: “The Western demonization of OBL (Osama Bin Laden), as
he is known in Pakistan, made him a cult figure among Muslims who resent
everything from the decline in moral values….America’s lack of support for
Palestinians being killed by Israeli occupation forces, to what Russia is doing
to Muslims in Chechnya, what the West did to Muslims in Bosnia and
Kosovo, India’s oppression of Muslims in Kashmir…It is a long list of
complaints that has generated a strong persecution complex that the OBL cult
figure has come to embody. He is a hero figure on the pedestal of Muslim
extremism.” Arnaud de Borchgrave—interview by The Washington Times,
March 21, 2000.
What else could be cited as the highest Pakistani endorsement of the
relentless jihad by ISI-Al Qaeda al Sulbah combine? However, Pakistani
collaboration with Osama was camouflaged, albeit temporarily, after the US
intervention in Afghanistan. Musharraf and his Generals were left with very
little option but to retie the not-so-ancient knot with the USA and its
intelligence machineries. Musharraf was the second Pakistani military ruler to
rent out Pakistan to the US interests. He was preceded by Zia-ul-Haq. As we
stated earlier Osama and his family and close associates continued to live in
Pakistan since 2003, till he was killed by US Navy Seals at Abbotabad.
Musharraf was aware of Osama’s sojourn in Pakistan. Under his command
General Kayani, the present army chief provided full protection to OBL.
Even Musharraf had found it difficult to rein in the ISI, which continued to
maintain linkages with the Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah leaders. The ISI-
Al Qaeda conduit did not dry up in spite of collaborative gestures made by
Musharraf. Ehsan-ul-Haq, a Corps Commander at Peshawar, was well
connected with the mujahideen and Al Qaeda al Sulbah forces. He was
required to maintain direct linkages with the Kandahar hubs of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. As a former Counselor to the Pakistani High Commission in
New Delhi, he was well informed too about the Indian fault lines and ISI’s
exploitation of the same. With the appointment of Haq as ISI chief, Pakistan
sent a friendly message to the USA. Nevertheless, very little changes were
carried out on the Indian front, even though the USA visibly and hesitatingly
advised Pakistan to lessen and limit its involvement in Jammu and Kashmir.
*
The inter-linkages of covert intelligence and sabotage and subversion
operations between the CIA, Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI are required to
be understood in the context of America’s strategic move to turn Afghanistan
into Moscow’s Vietnam, resurgence of Islamist jihadists and historical
adherence of the ISI to the state policy of Pakistan to destabilize India and
infuse Islamist fervour and militancy in the second largest secular democracy.
Pakistan’s direct, proxy and covert wars, according to Pakistani scholars like
Dr. K. K. Aziz, are continuations of the Islamic quest to convert the Indian
Dar-ul-Harb to Dar-ul-Islam.
Linkage between the ISI and the Al Qaeda al Sulbah is not umbilical. But
these two organizations, one a part of the State Establishment of Pakistan and
the other, a modern terrorist outfit, believe in the goal of spreading Islamic
jihad. That certain segments in the ISI believe in spontaneous global jihad by
the true soldiers of Islam is supported by the organizations, involvement in
terrorist actions in America, Europe, Africa and Asia.
Al Qaeda al Sulbah’s ISI and Pakistan link was confirmed beyond doubt in
February 1998, when Osama’s World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the
Jews and the Crusaders (al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-‘Alamiyyahb Li-Qital al-
Yahud Wal-Salibiyyin) was formed. In this venture, the co-signatories were al
Zawahiri, Taha of Islamic Group of Egypt, Shayakh Mir Hamzah, Secretary
of the Jammat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Pakistan) and Fazlur Rahman, leader of the
Jihad Movement of Bangladesh.
The ISI’s operational tradecraft is akin to the tradecraft used by intelligence
agencies all over the world, especially agencies like the CIA, KGB and
Mossad. The unique part of ISI tradecraft is the spawning of jihadist tanzeems
and spearheading jihad through these well-trained street warriors. The jihadist
tanzeems operate in guerrilla fashion, in cells, groups and modules, following
instructions imparted by the ISI. They are not state controlled organizations
but the state of Pakistan normally winks at their activities, whenever they
work as agencies of the ISI.
On the other hand the Al Qaeda al Sulbah (‘The Base’) is a conglomerate
of groups spread throughout the world operating as a network. It has a global
reach, with discernible presence in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, XUAR region of China, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia,
Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and in the West Bank
and Gaza. Recent reports generated by the US Homeland Security department
indicate that ‘white’ Al Qaeda al Sulbah adherents are being trained in the
USA and several countries in Europe. Since its creation in 1988, Osama bin
Laden has controlled Al Qaeda al Sulbah. He is both the backbone and the
principal driving force behind the network.
Al Qaeda al Sulbah’s hardcore membership strength is estimated to be
between 5,000-8,000 men, most of who fought alongside the Taliban against
the Northern Alliance and were designated as the 055 Brigade. It had
established camps in Khowst, Mana, Kabul, Jalalabad, Kunar, Kandahar, and
depots in Tora Bora and Liza. Cell and module members all over the world
could exceed over 20,000. In addition to that, independent groups functioning
under Al Qaeda al Sulbah brand name are numerous.
In terms of recruitment of experienced fighters, bin Laden had benefited
from his vast mujahideen database, created during the anti-Soviet campaign.
Al Qaeda operational cells comprised ‘commandos’ that operate under
Mohammad Atef, alias Abu Hafs. They are mostly members of the suicide
brigade. The organization also has a Security Service headed by Mohammad
Mousa. It is interesting to note that between Al Qaeda al Sulbah and ISI, the
terror masterminds have fronted over 50 Islamist websites, which enlist jihad
recruits from all over the world, including north America.
 To put his ideology of all-pervasive spontaneous Islamic jihad into
practice, bin Laden dispatched several hundred Afghan veterans to join
Islamic groups in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, boosting the domestic
and international guerrilla and terrorist groups. Osama’s cadres are drawn
from a 50,000 strong pool of two generations of Afghan veterans. The first
generation fought in the multinational Afghan campaign in 1979-89, the
second generation in campaigns in Tajikistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kashmir,
Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria and Egypt.
Osama supports three types of groups. The first group fights Muslim rulers,
which they believe, are not pure Muslims as in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi
Arabia. The second group is directed at fighting regimes perceived as
oppressing and repressing their Muslim populace (as in Bosnia, Kosovo, India
and Indonesia). The third group is encouraged to fight regimes to establish
real Islamic states as in Palestine, Somalia, Chechnya, Dagestan and
Mindanao. Laden has also directed his efforts and resources to fight the USA,
a country he sees as a direct threat to Islam, closely followed by Europe,
Israel, Russia and India in importance as targets. Al Qaeda al Sulbah’s broad
ideology has enabled it to infiltrate many Islam-driven groups. In fact, after
Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran Osama has emerged as the most important
rallying point for the continuous and spontaneous Islamic jihad all over the
world with a view to restoring pristine glory of Islam.
In these efforts of Al Qaeda al Sulbah, the ISI did not play second fiddle. It
maintained a delicate balancing relationship between the Taliban and Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan and acted as equal partner in exporting Islamist jihad
wherever the targets were perceived as appropriate and the causes inspiring. It
would be seen that the Islamist tanzeems of Pakistan (ISI sponsored) had
fought alongside the Al Qaeda al Sulbah fighters in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the Philippines and Indonesia. The common linkage is
palpably present everywhere.
Most of Al Qaeda al Sulbah’s membership is drawn from the two Egyptian
groups: Islamic Group of Egypt (Gamaya al Islamiya) and Egyptian Islamic
Jihad (Al Gamaya Al Islamiya). Khamareddine Kherbane, an Afghan veteran,
was close to both the GIA and Al Qaeda al Sulbah leaderships. Two Algerian
groups, the GIA of Antar Zouabri and the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat-GSPC) of Hassan
Hattab, developed ties with Al Qaeda al Sulbah early on, but large-scale
penetration of Algerian groups came in 1997-8. Bin Laden also cemented ties
with Jaish Aden Abin al Islami of Yemen, and members of several small
Islamist parties from Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco.
With the exception of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the
Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG), Al Qaeda al Sulbah links with Asian Islamist
groups, notably those fighting in Kashmir, developed in the second half of the
1990s. Osama’s Brigade 055 members were drafted by the ISI for fighting
against Indian army in Kashmir. Al Qaeda al Sulbah has umbilical ties with
Jamait-e-Islami, Jammat-ul-Ulema-Islami, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and Jamat-ud-Dawa
etc. jihadist organizations of Pakistan, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Jamait-
ul-Mujahideen and Al Hiqma in Bangladesh. Documents recovered by USA
after killing Osama revealed steady connectivity between OBL and Hafiz
Saeed Ibrahim of MuD on whom the USA has declared a bounty of $ 10
million.
Other Al Qaeda al Sulbah constituents or affiliated organizations include al
Jamaa Essalafya lid Daawa wal Qit, Sipah e Sahaba Kashmir, Hizb-al-Islami
in Kashmir, Harakat-ul-Mujahjideen and Harakat-ul-Jihad al Islami,
Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Occupied Territories and the Islamic
Party of Turkestan. From Indian mainland, the SIMI is reported to have firm
linkage to both Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the ISI. In recent times, Iraq has also
emerged as a playground for the Al Qaeda al Sulbah affiliated mujahideen. Al
Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb has emerged as the linchpin of jihadist attacks in
the USA and Europe.
Al Qaeda al Sulbah’s direct involvement in the twin towers attack on
9/1/2001 has been well established. Many US analysts, political stalwarts and
media persons had loudly spoken about involvement of Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. However, these voices were muted for protecting strategic allies of
the US—Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s direct involvement in the
WTC attack on 9/11 has been inferred from a number of circumstantial
evidences. Pakistan’s chief spy Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad was in the US
when the attacks occurred. According to the New York Times, “he happened to
be here on a regular visit of consultations.”
Some press reports confirmed about Lt. General Ahmad’s two meetings
with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, on the 12th and 13th. After
September 11, he also met Senator Joseph Biden, chairperson of the powerful
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. He had a regular visit of
consultations with the US officials during the week prior to September 11,
and with his US counterparts at the CIA and the Pentagon. Did the Pakistani
spy chief warn the USA in any manner? He did not. Though he should have,
after all he was responsible for part financing of Mohammad Atta, one of the
hijackers, out of the hostage booty taken out of Kolkata, by a cohort of Omar
Sheikh, an ISI agent.
On the 9th of September, the leader of the Northern Alliance, Commander
Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated. The Northern Alliance had
informed Bush Administration that the ISI was allegedly implicated in the
assassination. The Northern Alliance had confirmed in an official statement
that a ‘Pakistani ISI-Osama-Taliban axis’ was responsible of plotting the
assassination by two Arab suicide bombers.
More generally, the complicity of the ISI in the ISI-Osama-Taliban axis
was a matter of public record, confirmed by US Congressional transcripts and
numerous intelligence reports. However, Bush Administration consciously
took the decision to directly cooperate with Pakistan’s military intelligence
(ISI) despite its links with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban and its alleged
role in the assassination of Commander Massoud. The reason was not far to
seek. The USA and Pakistan had jointly crafted the Al Qaeda al Sulbah and
the Taliban and only jointly they could dismantle the terrorist demon. The
western media also played along. Most major print and electronic media
remained silent about the role of the ISI.
On the other hand, Pakistan had been heralded as a friend and ally of
America. The US media had concluded in chorus that the US officials had
sought cooperation from Pakistan because it was the original backer of the
Taliban, the hard-line Islamic leadership of Afghanistan accused by
Washington of harboring bin Laden.
The Bush Administration had sought the cooperation of those who were
directly supporting and abetting the terrorists. After intervention by Pakistan’s
trusted friend Richard Armitage on September 13th, Pakistan President
Pervez Musharraf confirmed that he would send chief spy Lt. General
Mahmud Ahmad to meet the Taliban and negotiate the extradition of Osama
bin Laden. This decision was at Washington’s behest, most probably agreed
upon during the meeting between Armitage and General Mahmud. At
American urging, Ahmad travelled to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Mahmud’s
meetings on two separate missions with the Taliban ended in failure. There
were reliable reports that the ISI chief had bargained for time for allowing the
top Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah leadership to melt into the mountains and
caves. Certain quarters in the US Congress had expressed these doubts loudly.
Meanwhile, senior Pentagon and State Department officials had been
rushed to Islamabad to put the final touches on America’s war plans.
Moreover, a few days prior to the onslaught of the bombing of major cities in
Afghanistan, Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad was sacked from his position as
head of the ISI. While the Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations claimed
that former ISI director-general Lt-Gen Mahmud Ahmad sought retirement
after being superseded the day the US started bombing Afghanistan, the truth
was more shocking. The US authorities sought his removal after confirming
the fact that $100,000 was wired to WTC hijacker Mohammed Atta from
Pakistan by Ahmad Omar Sheikh at the instance of Gen. Mahmud. Mahmud
was directly in touch with Mullah Omar and Osama when Al Qaeda ordered
action against USA. The Pakistani hand was clearly visible. But the USA did
little to rein in the rogue state.
A direct link between the ISI and the WTC attack could have enormous
repercussions. The US could not but suspect whether or not there were other
senior Pakistani Army commanders who were aware of things. Evidence of a
larger conspiracy could shake the US confidence in Pakistan’s ability to
participate in the anti-terrorism coalition. According to FBI files, Mohamed
Atta was the lead hijacker of the first jet airliner to slam into the World Trade
Centre and, apparently, the lead conspirator.
Was Pakistan’s ISI behind September 11 attack? Certain quarters in the
USA suggested that the September 11 attacks were not an act of individual
terrorism organized by a separate Al Qaeda al Sulbah cell, but rather they
were part of coordinated military-intelligence operation, emanating from
Pakistan’s ISI and executed by Al Qaeda al Sulbah recruits.
In assessing the alleged links between the terrorists and the ISI, it should be
understood that Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad as head of the ISI was a US
approved appointee. He was in liaison with his counterparts in the CIA, the
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Pentagon, as head of the ISI
since 1999. Pakistan’s ISI remained throughout the entire post Cold War era,
until the present, the launching pad for CIA’s covert operations in the
Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. In other words, General Mahmud
Ahmad, as head of the ISI, was serving the US foreign policy interests. His
dismissal on the orders of Washington was not the result of a fundamental
political disagreement.
Moreover, the assassination of the leader of the Northern Alliance, General
Ahmad Shah Massoud, in which the ISI was implicated, was not in
contradiction with the US foreign policy objectives. Since the late 1980s, the
US had consistently sought to sidetrack and weaken Massoud, who was
perceived as a nationalist reformer. The US provided support to the Taliban
and the Hizb-e-Islami group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against Massoud.
Massoud, contrary to the US expectations, was getting closer to Russia and
India. He was deadly opposed to the ISI and CIA ally Hekmatyar. In fact, the
USA wanted a more pliable Afghan leader to head the administration.
Pakistan did not necessarily agree with Washington.
Corroborated by the House of Representatives’ International Relations
Committee, the US support funnelled through the ISI to the Taliban and
Osama bin Laden had been a consistent policy of the US Administration since
the end of the Cold War. The existence of an ‘ISI-Osama-Taliban axis’ was a
matter of public record. Pakistan’s ISI has been used by the successive US
administrations as a go-between. There always existed a firm linkage between
the Global and the Eastern Fulcrum of Evil. Pakistan’s military-intelligence
apparatus constitutes the core institutional support to both Osama’s Al Qaeda
al Sulbah and the Taliban. Without this institutional support, there would have
been no Taliban government in Kabul. Without the support of the US
government, there would have been no powerful military-intelligence
apparatus in Pakistan.
*
The US global policy to defeat its Cold War enemy was responsible for
strengthening the ISI and creating Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Taliban. Dr.
Azzam and al-Zawahiri, the political and strategic gurus of Osama bin Laden,
had fought for the CIA in Lebanon and Palestine. They turned against the CIA
as Osama did a little later. Similarly, the ISI was used by the USA to
destabilize India on suspicion that Delhi was veering closer to the USSR.
Pakistan was used by Nixon administration for building bridges with China.
Pakistan had its own proxy war game to play against India and it took full
advantage of the opportunity offered by the Afghan war of the USA.
Washington feigned to be blind when Pakistan was bleeding India in the
North East, Punjab and Kashmir. That the ISI was playing a big role in
conjunction with Al Qaeda al Sulbah and Taliban and Muslim Brotherhood in
exporting Islamic jihad to other countries was not hidden from the CIA and
the White House.
The Afghan Arabs, who had taken part in Al Qaeda al Sulbah bombing of
US diplomatic premises in East Africa, and were engaged in the planning to
blow up 11 jets over the Pacific and assassination plot against Clinton, Fidel
Ramos and Hosni Mubaraq, were trained in Al Qaeda al Sulbah and ISI
managed camps in Peshawar and Khowst in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
Arab Salafist Wahhabi elements were in the front of these accomplished and
planned actions, but Pakistani members belonging to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and
Harkat-ul-Ansar were equally involved.
It is now clear that Dr. Azzam, al Zawahiri, Osama and Mullah Omar were
not the only pioneers of the resurgent Islamist jihad which changed the face of
the world for some time to come. The Al Qaeda al Sulbah and the Taliban are
the end products of international foreign policy and clandestine intelligence
operations by three Fulcrums of Evil—the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
and their agencies the CIA, RSI and the ISI.
We have briefly discussed ISI’s connectivity with Al Qaeda al Sulbah. The
following paragraphs are devoted to unveiling the intricate relationship
between Pakistan, the USA, Saudi Arabia and their notorious intelligence
agencies-the CIA, ISI and the Royal Saudi Intelligence. Without a good look
into these aspects it is difficult to comprehend the present global turmoil
around Islamist jihad, which often manifest in mass killings and use of suicide
squads. In post-Iran revolution and post-Soviet misadventure towards the hot
waters of the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan these intelligence agencies
mapped out the future course of a tortuous history in the Middle East, West
Asian countries, Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and almost all over the
world. The forces of jihad were reincarnated courtesy CIA’s boorish handling
of the Islamist forces for the earthshaking objective of demolishing the Soviet
Bloc and consequently establishing a Single World Order, under the US
hegemony. To understand these new dynamics a clear understanding of the
linkages is necessary.
General Hamid Gul in a recent write up in The Nation, a leading Pakistani
daily, had demanded “super power” status for Al Qaeda al Sulbah. Hamid Gul
deserves the right to stake such a claim on behalf of Al Qaeda. As the
Director General of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), he was the chief
coordinator of linkages between the CIA created Islamic jihadist front,
Afghan mujahideen and Pakistani jihadist tanzeems. Gul’s demand for
conferment of “super power” status on Al Qaeda was fabricated after taking
into account the presumption that Al Qaeda had emerged as the global
Islamist force that had vowed to renew the war on the Christians, Jews and
other jahiliya kafir nations. Pakistan, according to General Gul, had become
an integral part of the Islamist International and a co-warrior of Osama bin
Laden. One can perhaps coin the word ISLINTERN to mimic the forgotten
terminology, the dreaded COMINTERN. Both these isms had bred the idea of
worldwide revolution—one based on religion and the other based on an
innovative economic and political science.
Like the KGB, the ISI has already earned the distinction of emerging as the
‘power core’ in Pakistani Establishment. The Al Qaeda had not hijacked the
“super power” status from the ISI. They continued to work as partners till the
US intervened in Afghanistan and declared its own jihad against ‘Islamist
terrorism’, rather a little late in the day. Creating geopolitical monsters and
later demolishing them has become the national characteristic of the USA.
This blatant advocacy of General Gul was based on historical linkages
between the ISI and CIA and Osama bin Laden—the Cold War pawns of the
USA transformed to devastating Frankensteins. The CIA, ISI and Saudi
Intelligence crafted the global Frankenstein, on whom General Hamid Gul
wanted to confer the status of a “super power”. It is a different story that
Osama was later treated as a villain, the same way Manuel Noriega in
Panama, Muammar Khaddafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq were
treated as rogues, though they were also shadow mimes of the CIA at some
point or the other.
Saudi Arabia was also severely worried over the developments in Iran and
then Afghanistan, and saw an immediate threat to its vast oil resources.
According to Prince Turki al-Faisal, chief of Saudi intelligence, the Soviets
had firmly lunged in Iran and intended to have tighter control on Saudi oil
resources. The same strategic consideration also moved Carter administration
to engage in covert operations in Afghanistan. Having close control on the bin
Laden financial empire, the Saudi intelligence and CIA worked on Osama.
Some details of the umbilical relationship between the ISI and the Al
Qaeda al Sulbah have been narrated in the previous paragraphs. However,
ISI’s global involvement cannot be fully understood without going into a few
finer aspects of the linkages between the two partners in worldwide Islamist
jihad.
Osama bi Laden did not transplant Saudi and Egyptian variety of Islamist
jihad on Pakistani soil. In Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq did the groundwork
for total Islamisation and the task was carried on by the regimes headed by
Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf. A major segment of the
Pakistani civil society that was converted to extreme form of fundamentalism
and jihadist ideology also aided and abetted the efforts of the Pakistan army,
its intelligence machine, the ISI, and the government. Creation of the Al
Qaeda by the CIA, ISI and Mukhabarat added to the resurgence of
Islamist jihad. Islamic resurgence is a continuous process that has occurred
time and again, with the avowed objective of restoration of the Caliphate,
introduction of the purest form of Sharia and Hadith, as they existed during
and soon after the demise of the Prophet. This spirit of Islamic reform has
always pushed back the great Islamic community by centuries.
The allegations of Al Qaeda al Sulbah’s umbilical bondage with the CIA
and the ISI are too well known. Washington’s policy in Afghanistan was
shaped by US President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, and was continued by his successors. His plan went far beyond
simply forcing the Soviet troops to withdraw; rather it aimed at fostering an
international movement to spread Islamic fanaticism in the Muslim Central
Asian Soviet republics to destabilize the Soviet Union.
Brzezinski’s grand plan coincided with Pakistan’s military dictator General
Zia ul-Haq’s own ambitions to dominate the region. US-run Radio Liberty
and Radio Free Europe beamed Islamic fundamentalist tirades across Central
Asia.
 John Cooley, a former journalist with the US ABC television network and
author of Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism,
had revealed that Muslims recruited in the US for the mujahideen were sent to
Camp Peary, the CIA’s spy training camp in Virginia, where young Afghans,
Arabs from Egypt and Jordan, and even some African-American “black
Muslims” were taught “sabotage skills”.
The British Independent in its issue dated November 1998 had reported
that one of those charged with the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, Ali Mohammed, had trained “bin Laden’s operatives” in 1989.
These “operatives” were recruited at the al Kifah Refugee Centre in
Brooklyn, New York, given paramilitary training in the New York area and
then sent to Afghanistan with the US assistance to join Hekmatyar’s forces.
Mohammed was a member of the US army’s elite Green Berets. These
mujahideen were first filtered through the ISI and were given orientations to
mix perfectly with the Afghan Pushtun and other Pakistani tanzeem members.
These steps were taken in Peshawar and Quetta with a view to integrating the
operational techniques of the CIA, ISI and the Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
Tom Carew, a former British SAS soldier who secretly fought for the
mujahideen, told the August 13, 2000, British Observer, “The Americans
were keen to teach the Afghans the techniques of urban terrorism — car
bombing and so on — so that they could strike at the Russians in major towns
… Many of them are now using their knowledge and expertise to wage war
on everything they hate.” Spurt in terrorist activities in Russia, attributed to
the Chechen rebels is actually a result of CIA-ISI and Al Qaeda’s combined
war strategy against the Russian government. Laden and ISI have simply
continued to do the job they were asked to do in Afghanistan during the 1980s
— fund, feed and train mercenaries. All that has changed is Osama’s primary
customer. Earlier it was the ISI and, behind the scenes, the CIA. Later his
services were utilized primarily by the reactionary Taliban regime. And
Osama himself took upon the holy duty of exporting Islamic jihad all over the
world. The ISI and a section of Pakistan army ably assisted him.
Prior to the devastating September 11 attack on the twin towers of World
Trade Centre, the US ruling-class leaders remained unrepentant about the
consequences of their dirty deals with the likes of bin Laden, Hekmatyar, ISI
and the Taliban. Since the awful attack, they have been downright
hypocritical. They tried to bluff the Americans that Al Qaeda al Sulbah was
the Fulcrum of Evil and Osama its leader. They promised the Americans that
all such evils would be destroyed by the declaration of war on terrorism.
Could there be a greater fraud perpetrated on an elite nation by a few
fraudulent rulers? Perhaps not.
 In an August 28, 1998 report posted on MSNBC, Michael Moran quoted
Senator Orrin Hatch, who was a senior member of the Senate Intelligence
Committee which approved US dealings with the mujahideen, as saying he
would make “the same call again”, even knowing what bin Laden would
become. “It was worth it. Those were very important, pivotal matters that
played an important role in the downfall of the Soviet Union.” Hatch today is
one of the most active voices demanding military retaliation against Al Qaeda
al Sulbah and Taliban. Outside the CIA he is one of the symbols of the
western Fulcrum of Evil, which has been destabilizing the world
continuously.
Vincent Cannistrano, described as a former CIA chief of “counter-terrorism
operations,” is an expert on terrorists like bin Laden. He directed their
“work”. He was in charge of the CIA-backed Nicaraguan contras during the
early 1980s. In 1984, he became the supervisor of covert aid to the Afghan
mujahideen for the US National Security Council.
The last word goes to President Carter’s National Security Adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski: “What was more important in the world view of
history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few stirred up
Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?” In
his view the communists were greater evils. He preferred a smaller evil called
Islamist jihad, which was not the jinni of the bottle. It was, however, a jinni
with shadows of past historical ghosts mummified into it. The USA ignored to
notice that this mummy had the capability of rising out of the dusts of history
and strike back against its rescuers.
History of modern times has left well documented markers on time to
prove that the three main fulcrums of evils—the CIA of USA, Royal Saudi
Intelligence and Pakistani ISI—worked hands in glove to create Osama and
the Taliban. These entities are required to be studied together and cannot be
understood in isolation.










 Some Joint Operations by
Al Qaeda al Sulbah and ISI
This chapter is devoted to highlight a few selected collaborative and
supplementary operations by the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah. It also briefly
touches on the theme of CIA’s role in such operations. Description of such
operations can fill a bulky volume. Three personalities have been chosen—all
of Pakistani origin, to illustrate the nature of mind-boggling activities of the
mindless Islamists.
The matter of ISI-Al Qaeda and Taliban collaboration in promoting
Islamist terrorism around the globe has been well documented. However,
Operation Oplan Bojinka (explosion-in Bosnian language) planned by Al
Qaeda and ISI affiliates Ramzi Yousef and Mohammad Khalid Sheikh, both
of Pakistani origin, involved hijacking of 11 US aircrafts operating in the
Pacific region, assassination of Bill Clinton and Pope Paul II during their
visits to the Philippines. These were more ambitious than the 9/11 attacks on
the USA. The plan also involved ISI input as Khalid and Ramzi were
nurtured, sheltered and trained by the ISI in its Peshawar camp and they had
also undergone training in Khowst camp in Afghanistan. The stories of
Ramzi, a nephew from the sister of Khalid Sheikh, and Khalid Sheikh himself
are intriguing.
Khalid Sheikh would eventually become deeply involved in the world of
the ISI, as well as Al Qaeda al Sulbah. But initially he seemed an unlikely
candidate for a career in espionage and terrorism. His father, a Baloch
Pakistani, had migrated to Kuwait as a religious preacher. Khalid was born in
Kuwait. He studied in the USA, a brilliant student attending the best private
schools. While still at school, he excelled in studies and displayed little
devotion to his religion.
His life took a turn when the CIA, for aiding the Muslim rebels in Bosnia
in late 1992, allegedly picked him up. That was the time when he was also
contacted by the ISI. The rebel of Pakistani origin returned to Pakistan a
committed Muslim radical after his CIA sponsored Bosnian sojourn. Because
of his impressive abilities in engineering, as well as fluency in English and
complete understanding of Western society he was a very valuable asset to
any terrorist group.
In 1993 Khalid and Ramzi Yousef, his nephew, planned the WTC bombing,
with the knowledge of the ISI operatives and the Al Qaeda al Sulbah
supremo. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, birth name Abdul Basit Karim, was one of
the masterminds behind the first World Trade Centre attack. Yousef attended
college in the USA. He studied electrical engineering there. Starting in the
late 1980s, Yousef started making trips to Pakistan, where he was tutored by
his maternal uncle and an ISI operative, simply called Rahmatullah. The same
Rahmatullah had latter arranged a tanzeem orientation course for Ramzi at a
Markaz-ud-Dawa camp near lahore.
In 1992, Yousef entered the United States with a false Iraqi passport with
his partner, Ahmed Ajaj, who also had a false passport. Yousef rented a Ryder
van. On February 26, 1993, the van was loaded with explosives and driven
into the garage of the World Trade Centre, where it exploded. He escaped to
Pakistan. After meeting Khalid Sheik Mohammed, he stayed in safe houses
funded by the ISI. There are reports that Khalid had brought Ramzi in close
touch with Osama, who also funded the firebrand Islamist.
While staying in those safe houses, he attempted more terrorist attacks. He
and Khalid had chalked out a plan to assassinate Benazir Bhutto allegedly in
collaboration with some ISI operatives, who wanted to get rid of the
democratically elected prime minister. It was alleged that the ISI had paid
Osama to mastermind the assassination plan. The plan was compromised and
Ramzi was dispatched by Khalid and Osama to the Philippines. While in the
Philippines he had planned for the assassination of President Bill Clinton and
Pope Paul II, which did not materialize due to accidental disclosure of his
bomb preparation activities.
While in Manila, his first bombing was at a mall in Cebu City, which
detonated several hours after Yousef placed it in the generator room. Nobody
was hurt. Yousef masterminded the bombing of the Miss Universe pageant at
PICC and Roxas Boulevard, both on May 21, 1994. On November 13, 1994,
he masterminded the bombing of a Wendy’s hamburger stand at Nataghan
Corner at J.P. Laurel Sts. On December 1, his friend Wali Khan Amin Shah,
another ISI trained Pakistani, bombed the Greenbelt Theatre in Manila. It may
be mentioned that Amin Shah was trained at Peshawar and Muridke camps in
preparing explosives and carrying out targeted shooting.
The trial run for the 9/11/2001 attack on the USA was hatched by Khalid
Sheikh, Ramzi, Osama bin Laden and a faction of the ISI operatives, in which
it was planned to hijack 11 US aircrafts plying over the Pacific and blow them
up. The grand Operation Oplan Bojinka had not remained a secret to the ISI
operatives, though none in the ruling Pakistan government was involved. But
the ISI had failed to tip off the CIA and the other US security agencies. The
Filipino intelligence sources later confirmed that Wali Khan Amin Shah had
visited the Pakistani embassy in Manila twice to meet the ISI station in
charge. In all fairness Pakistan should have alerted the US intelligence and
security agencies about the grand Islamic attack against the U.S. properties.
On December 11, Yousef boarded Philippine Airlines Flight 434, which
was on a Manila-Cebu-Tokyo route. Yousef assembled a bomb and planted it
under his seat on the first leg of the flight. He left the plane at Cebu. The
bomb exploded on the second leg, killing one passenger. The plane made an
emergency landing in Okinawa, Japan. The dry run was successful. Yousef
and Khalid Mohammed had already started crafting Operation Oplan Bojinka.
The plot would have had catastrophic consequences if it was carried out. The
plot was abandoned after an apartment fire occurred in Manila, Philippines.
Yousef’s plan was discovered on a notebook personal computer inside his
apartment, two weeks before the apocalyptic acts of terror were contemplated.
Murad, an accomplice of Ramzi, was sent to the apartment to retrieve the
computer after the fire was extinguished. Ramzi left for Pakistan, and was
housed in an ISI safe house but was arrested under the US pressure.
On February 7, 1995, Ramzi Yousef was arrested by a group of FBI, U.S.
Diplomatic Security Service, and Pakistani police officers at the Su-Casa
Guest House in Islamabad, Pakistan. On September 5, 1996, Yousef, Murad
and Shah were convicted for planning Oplan Bojinka.
While Ramzi Yousef was finally neutralized, his maternal uncle Khalid
was encouraged by the ISI to migrate to Pakistan in 1992 and continue his
jihadist activities under ISI guidance and in collaboration with bin Laden and
Mullah Omar of Taliban. Khalid played important roles in training the Al
Qaeda al Sulbah and foreign mujahideen in ISI facilities in Peshawar, Karachi
and the training camps set up by Mullah Sayyaf and bin Laden. As an
engineer he had helped Al Qaeda al Sulbah in establishing an information
network based in Karachi, Lahore, Gujarat, Kuwait and Dubai. His
involvement in the recruitment of fidayeens for the 9/11 attacks on the USA
was known to the ISI but he moved around as a free man till the US
authorities compelled Pakistan to arrest him.
Some claims have been made by Pakistani authorities that Khalid was a
Kuwaiti national. There is no doubt that Khalid was a Baloch Pakistani born
in Kuwait. For his first visit to the USA as a student Khalid had introduced
himself as a Pakistani national and Pakistan had issued him the first passport.
Khalid had made Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore his main theatres for Al
Qaeda al Sulbah operations, with occasional trips to Afghanistan, to meet
Zawahiri and Osama and frequent trips to the Arabian Peninsula to recruit
fidayeen volunteers to carry out attacks against the US targets. His arrest, trial
and subsequent revelations by western intelligence agencies prove beyond
doubt that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was one of the most important links
between Osama bin Laden and the Inter Services Intelligence. Pakistan had
fully supported him till such time it was forced to succumb under US
pressure.
In an interview with Al Jazeera television, recorded in May 2002, Khalid
Mohammed described himself as the head of Al Qaeda’s military committee.
He said, “About two and a half years prior to the ‘holy raids’ on Washington
and New York, the military committee held a meeting during which we
decided to start planning for a martyrdom operation inside America.” That
would date the inception of the 9/11 plot to early 1999. Later, that same year
the men who would execute the 9/11 operations were chosen, he said.
In the months after Sept. 11, 2001 Mohammed was moving back and forth
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. One Afghan General, Ziaudeen Deldar,
said ‘Khalid Balochi’ was among hundreds of Al Qaeda al Sulbah fighters
who escaped on foot to Pakistan from a camp near Shahi Kot in south eastern
Afghanistan when American forces launched Operation Anaconda — an
attempt, they said, to finish off Al Qaeda al Sulbah. He disappeared in
Pakistan and for a while remained under ISI protection, before he was
arrested.
*
The third illustrative face of ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah collaboration is
Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, s/o Saeed Ahmed, a cloth merchant of Pakistani
origin. Omar alias Omar Sheikh alias Saeed Sheikh was born in the UK and
was educated there. He grew up in London, a brilliant student, attending the
best private schools. He studied mathematics and statistics at the London
School of Economics. There are reports that Omar was baptized in terrorism
under CIA patronage in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In 1993 he emerged in Pakistan as a member of a militant group fighting
for the liberation of Kashmir from India. Omar Sheikh drifted closer to
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. He was given training by the ISI at Peshawar and
Muridke. In 1994, he began training at a training camp in Afghanistan.
Omar Sheikh was arrested in India in 1994 while on a kidnapping mission
designed to trade Western tourists for Kashmiri separatists. The ISI paid his
legal fees openly; nonetheless, he was sentenced to a long prison term in an
Indian jail. While in prison, his natural abilities soon allowed him to become
the leader of the jail’s large Muslim population. By his own admission, he
lived practically like a Mafia don. Indian intelligence fraternities were certain
of Omar’s Pakistan linkage. The same was the case with Maulana Masood
Azhar, another ISI backed militant, who took part in crimes along with
Sheikh. Masood had earned distinction as a jihadist after taking part in Bosnia
and Somalia jihad, especially in killing of the US army personnel in the
Mogadisu helicopter (Black Hawk) downing incidents. According to
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/02: “There are many in Musharraf’s
government who believe that Saeed Sheikh’s power comes not from the ISI,
but from his connections with our own CIA. The theory is that … Saeed
Sheikh was bought and paid for.” However, the western intelligence sources
are silent about the queer triangular connectivity of Omar and Masood,
spanning the handlers in the ISI, CIA and Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
In December 1999, terrorists hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft and flew it
to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Kathmandu and Pakistan based ISI operatives and
Afghanistan had masterminded the hijacking with a view to retaliate against
the Kargil discomfiture, as well as to secure release of its two important
agents –Omar Sheikh and Masood Azhar. Omar was later to play a vital role,
in collaboration with the ISI chief and Osama, in organizing the 9/11 attacks
on the USA.
After an eight-day standoff at Kandahar, 155 hostages were released in
exchange for Omar Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar and other two
Pakistani terrorists held by India. Masood Azhar, at the instance of ISI, started
a new outfit Jaish-e-Mohammad. Indian intelligence operatives, who had
visited Kandahar to negotiate with the hijackers, were convinced that the ISI
operatives sheltered in the ATC tower were in constant radio contact with the
Taliban leaders and the hijackers. Omar must have been already highly valued
by the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah, because the hijacking appeared to have
been largely funded and carried out by them. Omar stayed at a Kandahar
guesthouse for several days, conferring with Taliban leader Mullah
Muhammad Omar and Osama bin Laden. An ISI colonel later escorted him to
a safe house in Pakistan.
In his roughly two years of freedom before 9/11, Omar was a very busy
terrorist. According to Newsweek, once in Pakistan, he lived openly and
opulently in a wealthy Lahore neighborhood, hired by the ISI. The US
sources had noted that Omar did little to hide his connections to terrorist
organizations, and even attended swanky parties attended by senior Pakistani
government officials. He visited his parents in Britain in 2000 and again in
early 2001. The British citizens kidnapped by Omar in 1994 called the
government’s decision not to arrest and prosecute him a ‘disgrace’ and
‘scandalous.’ This mystery has still remained unsolved. Did he have a secret
understanding with the MI5 and MI6? It appears that he had either struck a
deal with the MI6 or the CIA influenced the British agency. Why was the CIA
protective of Omar, the key figure who financed the 9/11 perpetrators at the
instance of the ISI chief? Only Washington can reply these gnawing queries,
if the American people are interested to know the degree of accountability of
their secret services.
It has been reported that Omar Sheikh helped train the hijackers and others
in Afghanistan, where he travelled regularly. He also reportedly helped to
devise a secure, encrypted Web-based communications system for Al Qaeda
al Sulbah. His future in the network seemed limitless; there was even talk of
his one day succeeding bin Laden.
At the same time, much of his time was spent working with the ISI. He
worked with Ijaz Shah, a former ISI official in charge of handling terrorist
groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Laskar-e-Tayeba, Lieutenant. General
Mohammad Aziz Khan, also a former deputy chief of the ISI, in charge of
relations with Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Brigadier Abdullah, a former ISI
officer, who oversaw ISI operations in Kashmir and sabotage and subversion
of Indian Muslims vulnerable to Islamist jihad and related propaganda. He
was well known to the senior ISI officers of Joint Intelligence North, Joint
Intelligence Miscellaneous and Joint Intelligence X—three important
divisions of the military intelligence establishment. He was constantly seen in
their company and some dare devil journalists also speculated on his open
participation in social events attended by senior army and intelligence
officers. It is, however, not known if these ISI officials had prepared Omar for
the grand attack on the USA. There is apparently no one to ask these
questions as the USA has developed diplomatic amnesia.
During this period Omar made several trips to Kandahar and Kabul to
consult Osama bin Laden. He also visited Kuwait, Dubai and Yemen and was
constantly in touch with his collaborators in Europe and the USA. The
contours of the 9/11 operations were finalized by mid 2000. Someone was
transmitting huge funds from the UAE to 9/11 plotters in the USA. Omar
Sheikh was suspected to be in the centre of these financial transactions.
On October 6, CNN revealed, ‘US investigators now believe Sheik, using the
alias Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad, sent more than $100,000 from Pakistan to
Mohamed Atta.’ CNN also asserted that this was in fact the same Omar
Sheikh who had been released from an Indian prison in 1999.
Soon after the 9/11 attack, President Pervez Musharraf transferred out Lt.
Gen. Mahmood Ahmad, the head of the ISI. It was revealed in Indian and the
US media that he was fired for his suspected involvement in the 9/11 attacks.
For instance, a Pakistani newspaper stated, “Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmad has
been replaced after the FBI investigators established credible links between
him and Omar Sheikh, one of the three militants released in exchange for
passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane in 1999… Informed sources
said there were enough indications with the US intelligence agencies that it
was at Gen. Mahmood’s instruction that Sheikh had transferred 100,000 US
dollars into the account of Mohammed Atta…” Dawn, 09.10.2001.
Indian newspapers claimed that Indian intelligence had been instrumental
in helping to establish the connection. Western media did not highlight this
news. In the US, only Wall Street Journal mentioned that, “The US authorities
… confirm the fact that $100,000 was wired to WTC hijacker Mohammed
Atta from Pakistan by Ahmad Omar Sheikh at the instance of General
Mahmood.” Wall Street Journal, 10/10/01.
The story would strongly suggest that the ISI played a key role in the 9/11
attacks. Why was the White House silent on such an important piece of
evidence of Pakistani collaboration with the 9/11 attackers? The reason was
palpably clear. Bush regime had no other option but to cajole Pakistan into a
partnership in its war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It simply did not want
to antagonize the President of Pakistan, who was rather forced to collaborate
with the US war machine. The two fulcrums of evil have had excellent track
record of cohabitation for strategic reasons.
With these developments Omar Sheikh, an ISI agent and a collaborator of
the CIA, became a persona non grata. He was again mentioned as the 9/11
paymaster the day before the Mahmood story broke and then suddenly, all
mention of him ceased. While the FBI and media have been putting forth a
series of names sounding remarkably similar to Sheikh or the aliases he used,
they had been ignoring solid evidence that linked Sheikh to the funding of
9/11. Such assertions by US agencies would have confirmed Omar’s ISI ties,
and the possibility that he was acting on orders from Mahmood, or even
President Musharraf. There are reasons to believe, if one trusts secret repots
of Indian Intelligence Bureau and the R&AW, President Musharraf was fully
aware of the ISI plan of hijacking the Indian airline flight from Kathmandu to
Kandahar and the demands put forth by the hijackers. However, diplomatic
compulsions have forced India to maintain silence on this earthshaking event.
During the five years Omar Sheikh spent in an Indian prison, he developed
friendships with some underworld mafia. One such person was Aftab Ansari.
Ansari, an Indian gangster, who was released in 1999 on bail, had fled the
country. Omar also met a prisoner named Asif Raza Khan, also released in
1999. Ansari moved to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and began
expanding his India-based criminal network with Asif Raza Khan and others.
By early 2001, they had organized a kidnapping network. They kidnapped
rich Indian businessmen and used the money to fund terrorist activities. Omar
had provided training and weapons to the kidnappers in return for a
percentage of the profits.
Ansari’s criminal underground network also assisted the ISI in conducting
terrorist attacks inside India. He had set up networking with the HUJI and
Jamait-e-Islami of Bangladesh for carrying out jihadist attacks against Indian
and US targets in India. In late July 2001, a wealthy Indian shoe manufacturer
was kidnapped in Calcutta, India. In early August, his ransom was paid to
Ansari’s group, and the victim was released. According to Los Angeles Times,
1/23/02, Ansari gave about $100,000 of the approximately $830,000 in
ransom money to Omar, who sent it to 9/11 hijacker Mohamad Atta.
A series of e-mails recovered by intelligence agencies showed that the
money was sent just after August 11, 2001. This $100,000 could be the same
amount ISI Director Mahmood supposedly told Omar to send to Atta. It could
refer to a separate approximately $100,000 sent to Atta from Dubai, UAE,
between June and September 2000. There were probably other transactions,
since it is believed the hijackers spent between $500,000 and $600,000 in the
US. At least $325,000 came from the person using the alias “Mustafa
Ahmed” and variants on that name, which is identical with Omar Sheikh. It
does not stand to reason to assert that the ISI had conducted only a single
money transfer on orders of General Mahmood. Even rudimentary reasoning
can lead to the inference that the Pakistani Establishment—may be the
President included—were aware of the linkages between Omar, Ansari and
money transfer to Mohammad Atta. Musharraf was the CEO of Pakistan at
the time of the catastrophic event. Or was it being run by the ISI at the behest
of OBL (Osama bin Laden)?
The FBI later confirmed that many of the 9/11 hijackers had passed
through Dubai and had met with the paymaster. They were given Visa credit
cards, travelers cheques, and help in opening bank accounts. This further
confirmed that the paymaster was Omar, since he was making frequent trips
to Dubai at this time. It may be interesting to note that during this period
Omar Sheikh had befriended another ISI/Al Qaeda al Sulbah operative Khalid
Sheikh, who was also frequenting the Middle Eastern countries in connection
with the 9/11 attack. According to intelligence sources both Khalid and Omar
had at least two meetings with Osama bin Laden before they met in Dubai for
consultations. Reliable reports also indicate that Khalid Sheikh had two
meetings with a top ISI Deputy Director at Karachi prior to the 9/11 incidents.
*
The presumption is not correct that ISI sponsored jihadist outfits fighting
against India are not connected to the jihadists fighting against the USA, and
other western countries. This distinction does not exist in reality. For instance,
terrorist Maulana Masood Azhar was freed with Al Qaeda al Sulbah and ISI
help in the 1999 Indian airplane-hijacking swap that freed Omar Sheikh.
Azhar quickly returned to Pakistan in January 2000, but didn’t face arrest.
Instead, a few days after being freed, he told a cheering Pakistani crowd of
10,000 supporters: “I have come here because this is my duty to tell you that
Muslims should not rest in peace until we have destroyed America and India.”
AP, 1/5/00.
He then toured Pakistan for weeks under the protection of the ISI. Omar
had drifted closer to Azhar in Indian prison. In early 2000, Omar and the ISI
helped Azhar to form a new terrorist group called Jaish-e-Mohammad, and
soon Azhar was behind more terrorist acts, mostly in Kashmir. Jaish-e-
Mohammad worked with the ISI, Omar Sheikh and Ansari in numerous
attacks against Indian targets. For instance, shortly after the October 2001
series of Kashmir bombing, Indian intelligence claimed that Pakistani
President Musharraf was given a recording of a phone call between Jaish-e-
Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar and ISI Director General
Mahmood, in which Azhar reported the bombing, was a ‘success.’ In early
January 2002, the FBI was interested in questioning Maulana Azhar, and a
Pakistani official agreed that the Americans were aware of Azhar meeting bin
Laden often, and were convinced that he could give important information
about bin Laden’s whereabouts and even on the September 11 attacks.
Besides direct contact with bin Laden, the ISI had maintained through
these proxy terrorist groups, deep ties with Al Qaeda al Sulbah. In 1993, the
same Azhar and Omar had helped Al Qaeda al Sulbah train and fund Somali
warlord forces so they could kill the US soldiers stationed in Somalia. Reports
about ISI funding the Somali warlords were never confirmed by the US
intelligence agencies, though Indian intelligence fraternities were aware of
such connectivity. These attacks forced the US to withdraw from that country.
“None of these details will be unfamiliar to US intelligence operatives who
have been compiling extensive reports on these alleged activities.” Jane’s
Intelligence Digest 9/20/01. The US media later reported that bin Laden had
emergency medical care in Pakistan the day before September 11. He was
spirited into a military hospital in Rawalpindi for kidney dialysis treatment.
Pakistani military forces guarded him. They also moved out all the regular
staff in the urology department and sent in a secret team to replace them. The
same issue of Jane’s Intelligence Digest also commented, “It is becoming
clear that both the Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah would have found it
difficult to have continued functioning—including the latter group’s terrorist
activities — without substantial aid and support from Pakistan.”
*
After the 9/11 incidents, General Musharraf had come under severe US
pressure to restrict the activities of ISI’s top agent Omar Sheikh. He was
shifted to an ISI safe house in Lahore, Pakistan. In January 2002, he
celebrated the birth of his baby at a party he hosted in the city. During this
hibernation period Omar Sheikh had acted as a go-between for bin Laden and
the ISI. The US aggression in Afghanistan had temporarily disrupted ISI’s
communication lines with Osama. Omar Sheikh and the tanzeem members of
Lashkar-e-Tayeba and Jaish-e-Mohammad helped out the ISI in maintaining
contact with Osama and Mullah Omar.
Meanwhile, Omar collaborated with the ISI and Ansari. On October 1,
2001, a suicide truck-bomb attack on the legislative assembly in Indian-
controlled Kashmir killed 36 people. On December 13, 2001, terrorists
attacked the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. Fourteen people,
including the five attackers, were killed. On January 22, 2002, gunmen
attacked some West Bengal policemen guarding the US Information Service
building in Kolkata; four policemen were killed and 21 people injured. It was
proved that Omar Sheikh and Ansari were behind all of these attacks. Ansari
even called from Dubai to take credit for the Kolkata attack. Jaish-e-
Mohammad, Maulana Masood Azhar’s group, was also involved in these
attacks. He had mobilized Bangladesh based cadres of the HUJI.
Pakistan was alerted by rumors floating after the 9/11 incidents about
involvement of Saeed Omar. It was an open secret that Omar was an active
agent of the ISI. British intelligence had begun asking Pakistan for assistance
to arrest Omar probably for kidnapping a Briton in India way back in 1994. In
November 2001, a US grand jury secretly indicted Sheikh for kidnapping a
US citizen seven years earlier. Pressure was put on Pakistan for arresting him.
The US ambassador to Pakistan officially requested the Pakistan government
for help in arresting and extraditing Omar. It took the events relating to the
decapitation of Daniel Pearl for Pakistan to ‘finally discover’ Omar Sheikh’s
location. It was an open secret in Lahore and Islamabad that Omar was living
in an ISI safe house and was attending official parties as an honored guest.
The ISI was suspected for supplying the blueprint of kidnapping of Daniel
Pearl, a Wall Street Journal reporter. Pearl was allegedly snooping around for
facts to establish definite proof of connectivity of the ISI with bin Laden,
Omar Sheikh and the 9/11 hijackers. Pearl had become fascinated in a number
of stories involving the ISI. On December 24, 2001, he reported about ties
between the ISI and a Pakistani organization that was working on giving bin
Laden nuclear secrets before 9/11. The latter discoveries made by the ISI
about top Pakistani nuclear scientists selling nuclear secrets to North Korea,
Iran and Libya had conveniently forgotten to admit that the father of Pakistani
nuclear bomb had maintained steady connections with Osama. It could also
not be beyond the knowledge of the ISI and Pakistani President that the father
of their nuclear technology was selling nuclear secrets to the countries
described by Bush as ‘axis of evil.’ However, the USA is well known for
developing periodical diplomatic and strategic amnesia and collaborating with
strange bedmates.
A few days later, Pearl reported that Jaish-e-Mohammad still had its office
running and bank accounts working, even after President Musharraf had
claimed to have banned the group. He began investigating links between shoe
bomber Richard Reid and Pakistani militants connected to the ISI. His
investigation also took him to the secrets of connectivity between Indian
mafia don Dawood Ibrahim, a powerful terrorist and gangster, and the ISI.
Robert Baer, a former CIA agent, later claimed that he was working with
Pearl on investigating 9/11 masterminds, Omar Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed.
On January 23, Omar took part in the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl. The FBI
Director went to Pakistan next day from India and discussed Omar Sheikh’s
involvement in terrorist activities with President Musharraf. Mueller then
flew to Dubai on his way back to the US to pressure the government there to
arrest Ansari and deport him to India. Ansari was arrested on February 5 and
deported four days later. The USA was convinced by Indian intelligence
reports about Ansari’s and Omar’s involvement in the attack on the US
consulate in Kolkata.
Around January 31, 2002, his kidnappers murdered Daniel Pearl as he had
reportedly gathered plenty of evidence of ISI’s involvement in terrorist
activities all over the world. Pearl was the first western journalist to spell out
Pakistan as the Eastern Fulcrum of Evil. Musharraf even brazenly stated,
“Perhaps Daniel Pearl was over-intrusive. A media person should be aware of
the dangers of getting into dangerous areas. Unfortunately, he got over-
involved.” Hindu, 3/8/02. Did Musharraf know about the ISI plan to
assassinate Pearl? It is speculated that Musharraf had decided around the
same time to silence Omar Sheikh to hush up ISI involvement in 9/11
incident.
Under pressure, Omar Sheikh finally ‘surrendered’ in February to his ISI
boss Ijaz Shah. He and the ISI worked out a deal how much to say to the US
authorities. Neither the Pakistani police nor the US Embassy nor the FBI, who
were in Islamabad investigating the kidnapping, was informed that Omar was
being held by the ISI during this period. The deal done, a brazen Omar Sheikh
gave himself up to police, telling them of Pearl’s capture but misleading them
on every possible fact, including his ISI linkage. Omar’s surrender was made
public on February 13. He then confessed to the murder of Daniel Pearl.
President Musharraf was reluctant to extradite Omar to the USA for fear of
exposure and wanted to “hang him myself.” The US media had extensively
reported on Omar’s connectivity with the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
However, under extreme diplomatic pressure the US Secretary of State Colin
Powell ruled out any links between “elements of the ISI” and the murderers of
reporter Daniel Pearl. The Guardian had boldly contradicted Powell, “If he
was extradited to Washington and decided to talk, the entire story would
unravel. His families are fearful. They think he might be tried by a summary
court and executed to prevent the identity of his confederates being revealed.”
Colin Powel was also contradicted by his colleague Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, when he “acknowledged reports that Omar Sheikh may have been
an ‘asset’ for the ISI. However, under compulsion of having Pakistan as an
ally in war against Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah, the US authorities lapsed
in incurable amnesia and embraced Pervez Musharraf and the ISI as dearest
friends.
A month after, Omar Sheikh was given death penalty Vanity Fair in August
8, 2002 issue, explored all his connections, but the article seemed to make no
impact at all. There was no doubt that 9/11 mastermind Omar Sheikh was the
killer of Daniel Pearl as well, and may even have cut Pearl’s throat himself.
This not only showed that Al Qaeda al Sulbah worked to benefit the ISI in
silencing Pearl, but also helped to confirm the theory that Omar had been
supported by the ISI. Since Sheikh has been linked to almost many attacks
against the United States that in turn raises the possibility that the ISI had also
been involved in all of those attacks, at the very least by not helping to arrest
Omar and his cohorts.
Has the ISI been leashed by Musharraf? He was hailed for firing ISI
Director General Mahmood, and generally has been presented as a pro-
Western figure trying to root out the pro-terrorist factions of the ISI. On
January 12, 2002, in the face of US pressure, Musharraf made a forceful
speech condemning Islamic extremism, and arrested about 2,000 extremists
around the same time. Yet, by the end of the month, at least 800 had been
quietly released. Since then, almost all of those arrested have been released.
The fact remains that the Islamist Jihadi tanzeems continue to flourish.
They are accruing strength and their activities have also been directed against
pro-American policies of Musharraf. Pakistani military actions against Al
Qaeda al Sulbah in the tribal areas have so far resulted in minor losses to the
Arab elements of Al Qaeda. The self-ruling tribal communities have been
alienated and it is now openly discussed in Pakistan that without ISI
connivance Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar could have not survived the
US and Pakistani onslaught.
The case studies of Ramzi Yusef, Khalid Mohammad Sheikh and Omar
Sheikh have been narrated in detail as these three players typify Pakistan and
its intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence’s (ISI) umbilical
connectivity to the CIA, Royal Saudi Intelligence, Al Qaeda al Sulbah,
Taliban and acts of the Islamist jihadists in all the continents—America,
Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia. The ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah are equal
partners in global Islamist terrorism, fought in India, Central Asian Muslim
Republics, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Algeria, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Indonesia, Southern Thailand, and Malaysia
and to a lesser extent in Australia, especially the Australian targets abroad.
Pakistan’s emergence as a global exporter of Islamist terrorism has been
well documented by scholars and media persons all over the world, though
the USA and UK are now feigning that the terror breeding and exporting
country is their great ally in war against International Islamist Terrorism.
The Islaim jihadist forces, of which the Jamait-e-Islami, Jammat-Ulema-ul
Islami and Markaz-al-Dawa-al-Irshad are spearheads, were encouraged to
mill out jihadis from over 50,000 madrassas, which preached unabashed
jihadist messages and basically prepared Pakistani and foreign students for
jihad against India, communist regime in Afghanistan and for getting
involved in global jihad against the Christian and Jewish targets.
Pakistani establishment was the prime moving force that spawned scores of
terrorist organizations with the main objectives of fighting jihad against India,
assisting Afghan jihadis, coordinating with foreign jihadis recruited by the
CIA, ISI and Saudi intelligence and several International Islamist
organisations. The Islamist forces of Egypt, who acted as guiding angels,
facilitated the resurgence of Islamic jihad by formulating new jihad
policies.These jihadist forces were funded by the state of Pakistan, Saudi
intelligence, Saudi financed NGOs, and the ISI. Proliferation of jihadist
organisations have become a self-activated mechanism of the societal growth
of Pakistan. A vast segment of Pakistani society has been subverted by the
mullahs and ISI operatives in collaboration with the Arab jihadists of
Egyptian, Saudi and assorted origin. They are now treated as the flag bearers
of Islamist jihad all over the world. They are as bigoted as the Al Qaeda al
Sulbah, Taliban and other Islamicized groups are in almost all the continents.
These new societal elements in Pakistan often stray beyond the briefs
provided by the ISI. A number of such jihadist organizations have drifted
closer to Al Qaeda al Sulbah and other Islamist organizations that have
sprung up all over the world. A new ‘Islamist International’ has emerged
mainly due to shortsighted foreign policy of the USA and its allies. The
present volume, however, does not have the scope to discuss the issues related
to Islamisation of the greater parts of Pakistani civil society and its
establishment.
*
 Future of the Fulcrum of Evil
Sincere and objective efforts have been made to unfold and unmask the ISI,
the fourth most sinister fulcrum of evil, state and military controlled
intelligence agency of Pakistan, which took to terrorism for furthering some
of Pakistan’s extra-political and extra-diplomatic ambitions.
In normal cases, the state and the military are two different entities. In the
USA, the military is under effective control of the state. In the former Soviet
Union, the state and the military were inseparable. Saudi government and
army draw power and authority from the court of the king. In Pakistan the
army more often controls the state than the elected people of the country
manage to steer its affairs. It is neither a monarchy, nor a functioning
democracy. It is a military dictatorship with some added prop of modern
democratic tools. Pakistan represents a unique face of Islamist rule in a
country that was born out of democratic British traditions. Incidentally the
very fear of the functioning of democracy in post-British India had spurred
the Indian Muslim leaders to opt for a homeland, where they would be in
absolute majority. Probably, that was the reason behind Pakistan’s prolonged
tryst with military rule after Liaquat Ali Khan. The army has superseded all
other power fountains by establishing firm control on all aspects of its civil
and military matters. In fact, as a nation Pakistan is grappling with the ghosts
of the past, present day sorcerers and is unmindful of the phantoms of future.
One of the main executive wings of the armed forces is the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI). It is synonymous with the core-controlling authority of
Pakistan—the Punjabi dominated army. It is the Fulcrum of Evil of Pakistan.
The Soviet Union has undergone dramatic changes and the intelligence
agencies of the present Russian Federation cannot be described as the Central
Fulcrum of Evil. These agencies are going through the process of evolution
along with the political, economic and social contours of the Russian
Federation. Their main concern is the preservation of the Russian entity from
burgeoning threats unleashed by the USA, in the guise of movements for
restoration of democracy.
The United States continues to be the most stable political power that has
emerged as a true global force—a new type of empire that is characterized by
brute military hegemony and blatant jingoistic approach towards the rest of
the world. Like the God of the fables, it is trying the remake the world in its
own image—cutting across civilisational identities and socio-political
diversities. A world recreated after the US image is the ultimate aim of the
present power mongers in America. The CIA is a major tool in the hands of
these neo-imperialists. It is likely to continue to be the visible face of the chief
Global Fulcrum of Evil—enforcing forward clandestine intelligence policies
of the US all over the world. The CIA has not proved to be a useful watchdog.
It failed miserably to foresee the 9/11 attacks and misjudged the Iraq
developments.
The Royal Saudi intelligence Mukhbarat is the Middle Fulcrum of Evil. It
is not likely to shed its present role of exporting fundamentalist Wahhabi
Islam all over the Muslim world and non-Muslim world with sizeable Muslim
population. It is likely to germinate Islamist jihadis, even if the present ruling
dispensation is replaced by Osama bin Laden brand jihadists. The Muslim
world in the Middle East and elsewhere is not likely to divorce their present
ways of governance. If at all, Islamists that are more rabid may force them, to
embrace the toughest rules of the Sharia and Hadith. For them the arrow of
time is apparently moving in reverse direction. Saudi Arabia continues to be
the spiritual magnetic pole for the entire Islamic world.
Post-Afghanistan and Iraq developments indicate that the Islamist countries
of the Middle East are under attack from more radical forces represented by
Al Qaeda al Sulbah and scores of other domestic jihadist organizations. Only
history can tell if the new force can destroy the existing fulcrum and emerge
as a new Islamic order—creating more chaos in future decades. The jihadist
upsurge continues unabated and Pakistan is very much a part of that upsurge
as well as a very vulnerable target for the Islamist forces.
There are speculations about the future of Pakistan. Many doomsday
soothsayers predict that Pakistan may break up and continue to use the
nametag of Pakistan only for the territory dominated by the Punjabis. One
need not agree with these speculations. In case Pakistan withers away as a
state, the ISI will also discontinue to be the Eastern Fulcrum of Evil that
breeds and exports Islamic jihad.
Is there any such possibility? The world stands up when the USA makes a
prognosis about the future of any country. According to ‘Global Trends 2015’
tabulated by the CIA and National Intelligence Council, “Pakistan, our
conferees concluded, will not recover easily from decades of political and
economic mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness, corruption and
ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in the
face of opposition from an entrenched political elite and radical Islamic
parties. Further domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who
may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup
and cohesion of the military—once Pakistan’s most capable institution. In a
climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government’s control
probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of
Karachi.”
It is next to impossible to forecast the future of an instable country like
Pakistan and its rogue intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence.
Pakistan is not a collapsed state, but according to international rating it is on
the borderline. The state of Pakistan and the ISI are integral constituent of a
formidable Establishment. It is not like the Indian Intelligence Bureau, a mere
department that can be controlled by executive order and by an Act of the
Parliament (if enacted). The ISI lives and breathes through the same
esophagus used by Pakistan army and the state. The established
administrative system has no control on it.
Functional characteristics of an intelligence agency are determined by the
constitutional, legal, moral, historical and functional ethos of a nation state.
Fairly evolved democracies in the western hemisphere have fashioned their
intelligence agencies according to the tactical and strategic needs of their
respective countries. Both the US and UK models have exercised
considerable influence on the post-Second World War intelligence agencies of
nations like India, Japan and Korea.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian intelligence agencies
have undergone considerable changes and have put on some facades of
democratic functioning, as much openness as allowed by the present systemic
evolution in the country. However, it cannot be said that the refashioned KGB
and GRU have totally shed the characteristics of the Fulcrum of Evil as was
represented by the global thrust of the Soviet Empire.
The incumbent presidents have frequently used the intelligence community
for securing their stranglehold and for expanding the neo-imperial designs of
the USA. The neo-imperialism is not territorial. This power does not sail the
waves and conquer countries through the B power—Bible, Boot and Bayonet.
It is more dependent on M power—military, money and muscle powers. The
USA has used these tools to promote and demote tin-pot dictators, invoke
military regimes and unleash war in the name of restoring democracy. That is
how the CIA has earned the acronym of Fulcrum of Evil in the global context.
Pakistan has fashioned its intelligence agencies in a manner that suits the
long-term objectives of the ruling military class and not along the aspirations
of the civil society of the country. All nation-states evolve along the lines of
historical, geo-economics, geopolitical and geo strategic developments
concerning their national, nation-club and international grouping interests.
The Inter Services Intelligence has evolved as the core formation of Pakistani
Establishment along the lines of constant and accelerating importance gained
by the Military. Democracy and Constitutionalism have been substituted by
continuous military rule interspersed by intermittent civilian interludes.
Rather, the ISI has been used by the Military and Pakistani Establishment to
chaperon the apparent elected democracies that are allowed to function from
time to time. Reversely, the ISI command has also often determined the
political parameters adopted and defined by the military for Pakistan. To
quote Ian Talbot, “…it is important to see the army as part of a wider
establishment with which the politician had to contend. This included the civil
bureaucracy, the President who wielded considerable autonomous power, and
the intelligence agencies, which were prone to act independently in pursuit of
gains in their turf wars. Any assessment of the army’s role must take into
consideration the growth in importance over the last decade and a half of its
intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The organization
worked closely with the CIA during the Afghan war and channelled weapons
to Pakistan’s client faction of the Mujahideen under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s
leadership. Although headed by a senior army officer, the ISI has operated
autonomously of the Pakistan Army and has kept as careful a watch on
generals as on politicians to ensure their ‘reliability’…” Pakistan –
Nationalism without a Nation, edited by Christopher Jaffrelot. p. 313.
Well before its tryst with the Afghan war and Al Qaeda al Sulbah Pakistan
had graduated to the operational levels of the CIA by procreating Islamist
mujahideens to carry out proxy war against India in Kashmir. However, after
dismissal of Z.A. Bhutto and introduction of Islam as the major weapon of
running the state mechanism, President Zia-ul-Haq had given open license to
the Islamist madrassas and jihadist organisations to mill out mujahideens to
fight in Afghanistan, India and other countries. Pakistan was identified with
terrorist organizations, which were pedaled as mujahideen tanzeems. Only
vested geopolitical interests of the USA and its allies prevented to declare
Pakistan as a terrorist state and a vanguard of Islamist terror exporting cartel,
of which the Al Qaeda al Sulbah was another prominent affiliate. In fact, the
USA assisted the ISI to earn the distinction of a Fulcrum of Evil in the east.
Terrorist organisations and acts of terrorism are often identified with
political and religious ideologies. Such acts of terrorism are treated differently
from simple acts of violence carried out during commission of crime of
passion and crimes committed out of gain-motive. This definition often gets
distorted when ideology based terrorism is transported to the realm of
perfidious crime committed against humanity and pedaled as acts of idealistic
thrust against ‘enemies of the cause.’ Criminalisation of ideological terrorism
was witnessed in several communism inspired ‘wars of liberation’ almost all
over the world. In several cases, terrorist organizations are identified with
liberation movements—liberation for ethnolinguist, sub-national groups and
liberation from oppressive occupation forces and regimes.
 Terrorist outfits and liberation movements (both criminal and ideological)
have often been used by nation-states for advancing their strategic and
geopolitical agenda, regionally and globally. In recent times, Pakistan has
successfully exploited certain Indian malcontent groups and militant outfits to
carry out acts of proxy war and so-called war of liberation. The Islamic
jihadist groups, which fought against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, were
upgraded to the status of liberation warriors by Pakistan and the USA with a
view to bring the Cold War to a favorable conclusion. The present turmoil in
the Crescent triangle from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, Iran to Afghanistan and
Uzbekistan is the direct fallout of American exploitation of the Islamist forces
in some form or the other. The Arab elements, which finally converged under
the ideological banner of Al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda al
Sulbah, were also extensively exploited by the USA, Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia for promoting their strategic and geopolitical objectives. An effort has
been made to inexorably link the CIA and other US secret service agencies
with the formation of Al Qaeda al Sulbah or at least for initiating the churning
effect that had coagulated as the core and heart of the dreaded terrorist
organization: Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
The Al Qaeda al Sulbah is often described as the most dreaded terror
(jihad) breeding and spreading organization. There is no doubt that Al Qaeda
al Sulbah has grabbed the historical opportunity at the end of the Old Cold
War to fashion itself as the womb of terror spinning ideas and action plans.
Islamic militancy and fundamentalism have been given a new lease of life by
the shortsighted global policy of the USA and support given by Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and China. In stellar terms, the Inter Services Intelligence of
Pakistan is the ‘dual womb of terror’. Until the US invasion of Afghanistan,
the ISI and Al Qaeda al Sulbah moved in perfect unison and encircled each
other to breed and export Islamist jihad all over the world. It is difficult to
predict the likely duration of the thaw in the First Cold War and the beginning
of the Second Cold War. The USA and its allies are engaged in isolating the
Russian Federation by engineering ‘democratic’ revolution in the federated
countries or the countries in the orbit of Russian influence. However, the
cycle of history is repeated inexorably and the likely emergence of another
phase of violent war and Second Cold War are very much in the womb of
immediate future. Time is always in transition.
Similarly, it is difficult to make any prediction on the future of the ongoing
resurgence in Islamist militancy and terrorism. Al Qaeda al Sulbah has
declared a war on America and its allies. The USA has reciprocated by
declaring all-out global war against ‘terrorism’. By focusing on Muslim
countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, and by pursuing relentlessly the Islamist
extremists in its sphere of influence the USA, according to certain Muslim
intellectuals and sectarian groups, has declared war on ‘Islam.’
Coincidentally, the USA has so far not displayed its commitment to fight
Islamist jihad in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, India, and western China.
America’s war ‘against Islamist terrorists’ has so far remained limited to
defending its home against Al Qaeda al Sulbah inspired attacks and
containing the Arab dominated territorial locations in the Middle East and
countries in Central Asia. Russian allegations that the CIA is in collaboration
with its Islamic terrorist groups cannot be dismissed without critical
examination of USA’s global oil and political hegemonic intentions in those
areas. There is no doubt that the USA wants to increase the degree of
interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation in the name of
promoting democracy, but in effect, for extending its military and fiscal
empire to the territories covered by the former Soviet Union. Herein lies the
danger of re-emergence of a Second Cold War and the process of the
beginning of the decline of the Great American Empire.
Pakistan, on the other hand, had continued to cultivate ‘anti-Indianism’ and
total identification of nationalism with Islam as the cornerstones of its
existence. Both the concepts have become inextricably intertwined. President
Zia and the Afghanistan episode had turned Pakistan to a hardcore Islamist
state, dominated by the armed forces, Punjabi vested interests, sectarian
skirmishes and growing alienation of the non-Punjabi provinces like Sind,
Balochistan, and NWFP. Forced by the USA to join the global war against
terrorism (read Islamist jihad) Pakistan has shown no significant advances
towards modifying its philosophy of nationhood. Islamist extremism, jihad
against India and western forces as well as intra-sectarian groups of the
society have generated a situation of internal implosion, which might result in
external explosion threatening the very existence of Pakistan as a nation-
state.
It is not appropriate to enter into the hypothetical debate on the future of
Pakistan as a nation-state. However, evolution of the building blocks of a
nation, i.e. its people, political system and national economy, quality of
governance and comfort level of security determine the stability of a nation.
Near absence of these factors and the factors of mutual distrust and blatant
denial of the basic rights had forced the people of East Pakistan to rise up
against Punjabi domination and cruelties committed by the armed forces.
Similar distrust against Punjabi domination is clearly visible amongst the
people of Sind, Balochistan and NWFP.
The background to the unassimilated civil society mass of Pakistan is
required to be understood.
The Muslim League, a political party dominated by the Urdu-speaking
mainland Indian Muslims, spearheaded the Pakistan movement. The Muslims
of Punjab, Sind and NWFP did not overwhelmingly support the Muslim
League, till it dawned on them that the British Crown was keen on partition of
India and creation of Pakistan comprising the territories inhabited by Sindhi,
Pashto, Hindco, Seraiki and Balochi speaking people, besides the dominant
Punjabi-speaking people. The Pakistan movement did create a nation but
there were visible symptoms that it was a nation without a composite
nationality. The Bengalis, who were most vocal supporters of Pakistan, had
revolted against their dream nation, once they realized that the Punjabi-
speaking minority were not keen to share political power with the Bengali-
speaking majority.
Pakistan Army had arrogated the state power to itself just within a decade
of the emergence of the new nation. The combination of bureaucracy, military
and landed gentry of Punjab had ensured that political power and other state
powers remained with them and lesser ethnolinguistic communities were
denied their democratic rights. Z.A. Bhutto and his daughter broke this taboo,
but these interludes have either been characterized by some form of
‘parliamentary dictatorship’ and ‘military guided democracy’.
Both the Bhuttos were finally removed by the army, the father suffering a
legal execution and the daughter a long banishment. Though a Punjabi,
Nawaz Sharif also suffered ‘democratic toxicity’ and was finally exiled by the
army. The army had become suspicious of his ultimate political motives after
present President Musharraf developed differences with him over Kargil war
and normalization process with India.
General Zia-ul-Haq had transformed Pakistan to an Islamist State. Since
1978, Pakistan has been chronically suffering from carcinogenic growth of
Islamist mujahideen of different shades. The Islamic fundamentalists and
jihadists hijacked a vast section of Pakistan’s civil society and jihad was made
the core political philosophy of Pakistan.
The Islamist elements do not consider Pakistan as a mere Muslim
dominated nation. They wanted to revert to the purist form of Islamic rule as
prescribed by the Book. Besides driving at total conversion of Pakistan to a
theological state they aspired to ‘liberate the Muslims of India from Hindu
domination.’ This Islamist attitude had given rise to the concept of jihad at the
social level, which was encouraged by the ruling elite on several fronts. We
have discussed some of the thrust areas of the Islamists and the ISI in
previous chapters. In short, destruction of Hindu India and restoration of
Islamized Hindustan is the dream goal of this category of Islamists. That also
appears to be the goal of the Pakistani Establishment.
The defeat in 1971 war and aversion for Ayub’s brand of ‘secularism’ had
turned Z. A. Bhutto to accept ‘Islamic socialism’ as a model for the state of
Pakistan. To Zia-ul-Haq Pakistan was not a geographical identity; it was an
ideological miracle. His policy was pursued by his successor army chief
General Aslam Beg, and it was further pushed to the extreme by the ISI chief
General Hamid Gul. He and other ISI chiefs were entrusted to implant the
‘ideological miracle’ on Indian Muslims as well. The State of Pakistan has
deftly used its main intelligence agency— the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)
—in achieving these goals.
According to Khaled Ahmed (Daily Times, 23.02.2005), “It is not
surprising that some retired Generals who headed the ISI have recently come
up opposing the ongoing trend of normalization of relations between India
and Pakistan.”
The former ISI Chiefs (Javed Nasir, Hamid Gul, and Asad Durrani) are
reportedly busy in building up opposition to Musharraf. They have been
joined by General Faiz Ali Chishti.
Post Musharraf events indicate that the ISI was emerging as the most
powerful organ of the state of Pakistan. Under Mohammad Shuja Pasha and
General Kayani Pakistan started playing double role in Afghanistan. On the
one hand it was supporting the Afghan Taliban against the US and NATO
forces. The ISI facilitated Osama bin Laden’s stay in Pakistan since 2003. He
and his family lived at least in four Pakistani cities before sheltered at
Abbotabad.
ISI’s hobnobbing with the jihadist tanzeems created chaotic situation in
Pakistan. Terhrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Punjab Taliban, Sipah Sahaba, Lashkar-
e-Tayeba and about a dozen other jihadist tanzeems have declared war against
Pakistan. The ISI even ganged up with a section of the judiciary to malign the
President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. Constant US pressure on Pakistan,
especially announcing bounty on Hafeez Sayed Ibrahim and his brother in law
have created flutter inside the ISI and the Pakistani establishment. A long time
collaborator of the ISI Hafeez is a valuable asset for Pakistan. Diplomatic
tussle between US and Pakistan has forced General Pervez Kayani to rush to
Saudi Arabia for intervention in the matter.
In the meantime, China has again lodged protest with Pakistan for training
Uyghur Islamist militants. It appears that gradually the state of Pakistan was
lapsing more into the quicksand of IAI-Army whirlpool.
*
As far as India is concerned, the most important question is: Will the ISI
continue to be the Fulcrum of Evil, will it continue to grow and continue to be
used by Pakistan as a tool for promoting terrorism, insurgency and religious
fundamentalism inside India and elsewhere? It is difficult to formulate an
answer to these questions without examining the approximate prognosis about
the future of Pakistan and its Establishment.
Pakistan does not have the same geographical contours and ideological
existence as it had at the time of its creation as a nation-state for the Muslims
of the Indian subcontinent. East Pakistan is now Bangladesh. The rest of
Pakistan is also not a homogeneous nation. At the moment of its birth as well,
Pakistan lacked geographical and cultural homogeneity.
Over years, Punjab has come to dominate the army, bureaucracy and
landholding classes. Several volumes have been written on these aspects of
ethnic conflict in Pakistan and its likely impact on the future of the country.
For our studies, it is sufficient to state that Pakistan continues to be a
disorganized nation without any tangible ideology to sustain it. The major
bond of religion may be able to hold on for sometime to come but other
aspects of ethnicity, economic interests and political status are surely
impacting pressure along the seams and thinly papered fault lines.
To these anxieties were added the problem of fast sacralisaton and
Islamisation of the nation and its tryst with fundamentalist religious entities
like the Jamiat-e-Islami, Jammat-ul-Ulema-Islami and several other
fundamentalist tanzeems created by the impetus received from leaders like
Zia and Pan-Islamic organizations. Pakistan’s tryst with the Afghan war,
Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah has proved that the Islamic tiger on which the
Pakistani people were put by its political, religious and army leaders are on
the verge of being devoured by the same animal that has lost vision and
direction. Pakistan’s radical Islam is now synonymous with terrorism. Though
India (Kashmir) continues to be the main target, terrorism has been adopted
by Pakistan (ISI) as the tool for dominating the entire Muslim world and
Muslim population in Europe, the USA and Russia.
However, chronic political uncertainty in Pakistan and continued growth of
Islamist jihadism cannot but affect the stability of India and other countries in
the region. The armed forces alone cannot bring stability to the building
blocks of Pakistan. They are, more or less, continuously in power since 1958.
The armed forces have encouraged the growth of Islamist jihadism and have
used agencies like the Inter Services Intelligence to strengthen their
stranglehold on the people. Kashmir continues to be on the top of agenda and
anti-Indianism is still the main basis of Pakistan’s nationhood. Unless there
are dramatic changes in the underlying cornerstones of Pakistan’s nationhood
it can be rationally deduced that Pakistan and its ‘Establishment’ will continue
to pose threat to India’s national security and security ambience in the region,
including Afghanistan and Central Asian countries.
 In the context of India, Pakistan suffers from a deeply entrenched
philosophy of hundred and thousand years’ war against the country that was
once the bastion of Islam. Even after 58 years of separation, Pakistan and its
Establishment have not erased these fantasies from their psyche. Rather they
encourage the Islamists to prepare for unlimited war against India. How can
Indo-Pak peace be restored without basic transformation in the core psyche of
the Pakistani Establishment? A recent observation by Husain Haqqani, the
noted Pakistani scholar, is relevant to note: “Deep down, Pakistan’s generals
expect an American role in getting them a territorial settlement in Kashmir.
Moreover, the ascendancy of the Pakistani military in internal decision-
making militates against early normalisation of relations with India.
Musharraf wants to keep the spectre of an Islamist Pakistan alive to secure
western assistance….
“What, then, can India and the international community (especially the US)
do to engage Pakistan more fruitfully and permanently in the peace process?
They should work towards changing Pakistan’s internal power structure,
weakening the military-intelligence combine and gradually empowering civil
society. Then, Pakistan’s insecurities vis-à-vis its identity and territorial
integrity must be comprehensively addressed. India would have to take an
interest in Pakistan’s stability and prosperity rather than being seen as
Pakistan’s rival or enemy.” (The Hundred Years War in Mind, Indian Express
30.04.05).
This is a pious desire and most Pakistanis with balanced world vision will
welcome the idea. However, such earthshaking event may never take place till
such time the Global Fulcrum and its allies continue to treat the military
dictators in Pakistan with special favors. They do not appear to be keen to
restore democracy in the country they have taken on rent.
Besides India and other countries Pakistan itself is now being threatened by
the impact of regional imbalances, economic stagnation, sectarian violence
and jihadist elements that grew up under state protection over last two and a
half decades. There is a possibility of collapse of the US-Pakistan honeymoon
on the make-believe issue of war on global terrorism. This may transform
Pakistan as the main pivot of Islamic jihad. These complicated issues are
required to be briefly discussed as the future of the Inter Services Intelligence
is intricately linked to the character of the Pakistani Establishment and
capability of Pakistan army to hold on to power for an indefinite period. The
other clear alternative is restoration of functional democracy, constitutional
freedom and liberty and return of the army to the barracks. The last scenario
appears to be well nigh impossible, at least in near future.
Pakistan comprises certain distinct ethnolinguistic and ethnocultural
groups. About 95% of the population profess loyalty to generic Islam, though
sectarian feuds often threaten the very fabric of the nation. Sind is associated
with the Sindhi people, though large number of Urdu-speaking Mohajirs
(refugees from post-partition India), have settled down in the urban pockets
and Punjabis and Balochis have acquired landed properties in rural Sind.
Punjab is identified with the generic Punjabis of different castes, though the
Seraikis claim to be different ethnolinguist group inside Punjab. Balochistan
is predominantly inhabited by the Balochis with sizeable incursion by the
Pashtuns. The Pashtuns are the dominant inhabitants of North West Frontier
Province and the tribal people of Pakistan are concentrated in the Federally
Administered Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan. The people of Pakistan
occupied Kashmir also count as a different variety of sub-nationality.
The Urdu-speaking Mohajirs had flourished in Pakistan politics,
bureaucracy and business for a while, but after the assassination of Liaquat
Ali Khan and takeover by Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan they gradually lost
out to the Punjabis and Sindhis. They are very poorly represented in the army,
though a couple of Generals managed to grab power. General Musharraf is a
distinguished Mohajir from Delhi with a permanent address in Karachi.
Gradually the Urdu-speaking refugees developed conflict of interest with
the Sindhis and Punjabis. It is not our intention to elaborate the factional
differences within the Mohajir community and their dwindling political and
economic status in Pakistan. The Mohajirs are basically an unassimilated
group of Muslims in Pakistan who are hanging in the undefined territory of
‘creators without their created critical mass’ under their feet. The Mohajir
community has been blamed by the indigenous Sindhis and Balochis for
scores of violent incidents, assassinations and internecine killings. About 400
to 600 assassinations take place in any given year only in the city of Karachi.
The city and the surroundings have become safe haven for Islamic jihadist
organizations and Al Qaeda al Sulbah cadres. Plenty of Taliban cadres are
also reported to be present in numerous urban hideouts. With increased
pressure from the Sindhis and Punjabis, the Mohajirs are getting progressively
alienated and overtaken by their competitors in matters of civil service,
recruitment to the army and business enterprises.
The Sindhi people are also living on the edges due to pressure from the
Punjabis, Balochis, Pashtuns and the Mohajirs. Traditionally a secular
province, Sind had produced secular regional political parties and did not opt
for the Muslim League. However, the events of 1940-47 forced the Sindhis to
align with the Muslim League. Post-partition realities had started
disillusioning the Sindhis as the Mohajirs and Punjabis had started eating into
their vital interests in irrigated and non-irrigated agricultural lands,
bureaucracy, armed forces and business interests. The Sindhis consider
themselves as the only ethnolinguist group that can challenge Punjabi
domination. Sub-nationalist political crosscurrents are still plaguing the
province of Sind and it continues to be a major fault line in Pakistan.
The Pashtun nationalist movement has always worried the staunch Pakistan
protagonists who believe in exclusive Islamic character of the state. The
Pashtun movement had rocked Pakistan for a prolonged period. However, the
Pakistani leaderships were totally averse to the idea of Pashtun autonomy as
across the border a large number of Pashtun population lived in Afghanistan.
A combined homeland for the Pashtuns would have seriously undermined the
existence of Pakistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had given Pakistan
an opportunity to exploit the Pashtun population of Afghanistan. Later the
Taliban movement had offered Pakistan near-total control on Afghanistan and
diminished the threat from Pakistani Pashtun nationalists.
Recent developments of the Islamist parties capturing political power in the
NWFP has given rise to a new reality. The Islamists in conjunction with the
Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah forces are likely to pose challenge to Punjabi
domination. The Afghan Pashtuns are not averse to the idea of encouraging
the Islamist Pashtun elements for forging an alliance against Punjabi
dominated Pakistan. This fault line is yet to reveal its contours. A weaker
Pakistan can face a different kind of challenge from this rugged frontier
terrain. Pak-Afghan relations in near future will also determine the depth and
width of the fault line.
Sub-nationalist portends have also been noticed amongst the distinct
ethnolinguist group—the Seraikis. The Seraiki language is spoken by large
number of Sindhis and Punjabis and Multan and Bahawalpur are considered
as the epicenters of this movement, which was not averse to forge ties with
the Seraikis living in India.
The Northern Areas of Pakistan (forcibly annexed parts of Balitistan and
Gilgit region of the kingdom of Kashmir) are also seething with discontent.
There are 8 major ethnic groups—Baltees, Yashkuns, Mughals, Kashmiris,
Pathans, Laddakis and Turks. The people owe allegiance to Shia, Sunni and
Nurbakhshi sects of Sufism. The predominant Shia community and the
Ismailis have come under planned attacks from the Sunnis. In recent months
there have been serious clashes leading to considerable loss of lives and
properties. The demand for separate political entity has become more vocal
and demonstrative. Quoted by daily Insaf (January 7, 2005) leader of Jamaat
Dawa (former Lashkar-e-Tayeba) Hafiz Saeed claimed that the Northern
Areas of Pakistan were being turned apostate (murtad) through the Aga Khan
Foundation. He said Pakistan was not Islamic; therefore, each Muslim should
enforce Shariat in his house. According to him Hindus, Jews and Christians
were active in the garb of NGOs and were being protected by them. Hafiz
Saeed is known for strong sectarian views. It is obvious that he was building
up the mythical case of an Ismaili conspiracy in the Northern Areas. The
word murtad is significant because the punishment for a murtad is death in
the eyes of the Islamists. It is clear that some vigilante groups may try to
punish the Ismailis and Shias. Unfortunately, the military administration has
not yet woken up to the hard emerging fissures in the Northern Areas.
There are distinct demands for separate statehood for united J&K and
amalgamated areas of Baltistan, Gilgit and Ladakh. Demand for responsible
government and constitutional rearrangement are becoming louder by the day.
Continuous military rule and imposition of Punjabi domination are being
resented often with expression of violent methods.
The people of so-called Azad Kashmir (Pak-occupied Kashmir) are still
smarting under disillusionment with Punjabi domination and they are more or
less tired with the activities of Islamist jihadis, most of whom are from Punjab
and who carry out ISI designed proxy war inside Indian held Kashmir.
Administratively AJK is divided into five major units: Muzzaffarabad, Bagh,
Rawalkot, Kotli and Mirpur. Though most of the PoK people there are Sunnis,
they are more organized on lines of biradari, like the Abbasi and Sithan, etc.
Recent developments indicate that the people of PoK are restless over
demands of better political and economic status. However, Pakistan continues
to keep the occupied territory under iron-control through military means. The
likely impact of opening lines of communication between the two Kashmirs
will be a study in the process of Pakistani grip on the people of occupied
Kashmir. Democracy, liberty and freedom have more corroding effect on tin-
pot dictatorships than any other form of human governing system. Perhaps the
virus of democracy and common ethnolinguist bondages with Indian Kashmir
will also infect the people of occupied Kashmir. According to Pakistani media
the banned jihadi tanzeems have regained prominence in AJK in the aftermath
of the great earthquake. They have taken advantage of apathy of the army and
have endeared the people through relief work. The USA has recently
requested Pakistan to exclude the jihadi tanzeems from relief work. Similar
concern has been expressed by Hansjoerg Strohmever, chief of the UN
Humanitarian Affairs. About 20,000 Lashkar-e-Tayeba, Al Badr, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen and Al Khidmet Foundation (Jel) are operating in the area.
Besides these micro-sub-nationalities, the widest fault line has emerged
again in Balochistan. Balochistan has been at the heart of ethnolinguistic
discontent in Pakistan. The Baloch people are considered as the most
backward in education, economic activity and representation in the
bureaucracy and the armed forces of Pakistan. Though some Baloch people
have settled down in northern Punjab and parts of Sind the tract has witnessed
at least four uprisings and resistance movements in 1948, 1958, 1962 and
1973-75. On all these occasions, Pakistan handled the rebel tribes often
mercilessly with aerial bombing of the people and their livestock.
There has been considerable Pashtun influx in the Baloch areas and
unaccounted numbers of Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah elements have taken
refuge in the area. These elements are suspicious about the present entente
between Pakistan and the USA. Several madrassas were set up by the jihadist
maulanas in Balochistan to train the Taliban cadres. These fundamentalist
groups have identified themselves with the Baloch nationalists and have
formed organizations like Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The Baloch
Ittehad (Baloch Unity) movement seeks to bring an end to the exploitation of
Baloch resources by Islamabad, particularly by North Punjab. They want to
secure fair royalties for Baloch gas (sui), secure employment for locals in
projects being executed in Baloch areas and to ensure that revenues from
various projects in Balochistan are invested in the province
itself.
The current insurgency is radically different. Presently, a major part of
Balochistan is covered by it, and almost all tribes have been united in their
opposition to Islamabad in the enveloping Baloch Ittehad. The political
leadership of the Ittehad comprises Khair Buksh Marri, Akbar Bugti,
Attaullah Mengal, Abdul Hayee Baloch and Hasil Bizenjo. Marri rejects the
Parliamentary system, and is more prone to ‘direct action’. Bugti leads a
political party – the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), but also retains armed
cadres. Mengal has adopted the path of political protest and mobilization, and
is the Chairman of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM).
Hayee Baloch and Bizenjo are leaders of the National Party (NP).
Marri, Bugti and Mengal are Sardars, while Baloch and Bizenjo come from
ordinary middle class backgrounds. All have come together in a loosely
cooperative structure under the banner of the Ittehad. The present movement,
consequently, is an all-inclusive movement representing wider Balochi
interests, not just the Sardars, and there has been increasing popular
consciousness of exploitation among the Balochi people that now transcends
elite interest groups. This has resulted into a calibrated and widely dispersed
campaign of attacks virtually across the length and breadth of Balochistan.
However, vital installations, including sui gas facilities and state assets, have
been repeatedly targeted, and the strife in Balochistan is emerging as a critical
internal security problem for Islamabad.
Bombing of army vehicles and killing of over 14 armed personnel,
kidnapping and killing of Chinese workers, attacks on Sui gas facilities and
sporadic sabotage of the Gwador port facilities prove beyond doubt that the
Baloch disaffection has the potential of developing into an insurgency
situation. According to The News (23.02.05) “Jamhoori Wattan Party chief
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti threatened armed resistance on Tuesday if the
government uses force to tame tribesmen amid an “alarming” situation in
Balochistan…
“The situation in Balochistan is alarming and there could be an armed
resistance if a military option is opted, which I can see coming soon,’ Bugti
told a telephonic press conference from Dera Bugti.
“Balochi people may die in large number but there can be casualties on the
other side as well,’ he told reporters at the Karachi Press Club. Regular and
paramilitary forces have moved into the area and Bugti said the large Army
presence around Sui indicated ‘an Army operation is possible.”
Akbar Bugti’s latest warning to Islamabad, as quoted above from The News
(Jang group) has not softened Islamabad’s attitude. President Pervez
Musharraf said recently, “Don’t push us … it is not the 1970s when you can
hit and run and hide in the mountains. This time you won’t even know what
has hit you…. There are some sub-nationalists and some call themselves
nationalists. And we are closely watching their activities. I have been warning
them time and again. I warn them through you, do not push us.” Interview to
Geo TV, 12.01.05. Daily Times, Pakistan.
Pakistan has made indirect references to ‘foreign’ intervention in
Balochistan—hinting at possible involvement of Indian R&AW and Afghan
intelligence agencies. Though Iran has a sizeable Baloch population the
Teheran Shia regime is not likely to support the predominantly Sunni Baloch
sub-nationalists. However, it is evident that the Baloch malcontent elements
can easily procure weapons from the former Taliban and Al Qaeda al Sulbah
formations that are taking shelter in parts of Baloch terrain. Opening of a new
front in Balochistan is likely to divert Pakistani attention from the FATA
region, where it was recently engaged in anti-Al Qaeda and anti-Osama
operations with US assistance.
Ethnolinguistic differences, Punjabi domination of Pakistan army and
Establishment, political inequity and economic imbalance had broken up
Pakistan in 1971. In case the ethonolinguist minorities are denied their rights
and are subjected to brutal repression by the Punjabi-dominated army, there
are distinct possibilities of these fault lines widening in the near future.
Pakistan can count on conditional U.S, Chinese and Saudi support till such
time the Pakistani Establishment is willing to rent out the country to them. A
country on hire cannot escape the fire of disintegration. The USA has faced
this reality in Korea and Vietnam and the White House has to think twice
before taking Pakistan on rent to use it for America’s geostrategic purposes.
*
In addition to ethnolinguist and ethnocultural differences and exploitive
attitude by the Punjabis, Pakistan is also seriously challenged by another
internal fault line. Sectarian cleavage between the Sunni majority and Shia
minority on the one hand and unwillingness of the Sunni Wahhabis and
Deobandis to accept the Ismaili (Bohra) and Ahmadia (Kadiani) sects has
resulted in serious conflict situations. Instead of laying the foundation of
Pakistan as a safe geopolitical haven for the Muslims, the later day
fundamentalists had made strenuous efforts to convert it to an Islamist
country. Pakistan was converted to a warring field for the Sunni Wahhabi
Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. Iraq had also supported the Sunni sects with a
view to neutralize Iran’s influence. The Islamic fundamentalists of Muslim
Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations of Egypt aided Deobandi and
Wahhabi sects. Even a modern leader like Z. A. Bhutto had to pamper the
Islamists after he assumed power from the debris of balkanized Pakistan.
Pakistani urge for strengthening the Islamist elements was accentuated
after the country agreed to rent itself out to the USA, Saudi Arabia and China
for hosting the west-resourced war against the USSR in Afghanistan.
Suddenly Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq prepared the grounds for rapid Islamisation
of the state. This thrust had finally culminated in the generation of the Al
Qaeda al Sulbah and the Taliban. Simultaneously Pakistan also encouraged
the Islamist jihadists to open shop inside Pakistan to train the mujahideen for
Afghan and Indian theatres and Islamist struggle all over the world. The loss
of East Pakistan had weakened the ideological base of Pakistan. Leaders like
Bhutto and Zia strengthened the fundamentalists in the remaining Pakistan
with a view to giving it a new ideological identity. Islamist paranoia that has
gripped Pakistan originated in the early seventies. The ISI was used by the
Pakistani leaders to create and support Islamist tanzeems as the country had
very little to offer to its people except poverty, depravation and further threats
of balkanization. They invented Islamist fervour to ensure integrity of
Pakistan by the garlanding effect of religion.
Pakistan’s dalliance with the mujahideen in Afghanistan, India and
elsewhere had finally infected its social structure. Unbridled growth of
Wahhabi and Deobandi brand of madrassas all over the country and churning
out of fundamentalist jihadists had infected the vital sections of the
population, mostly rural and urban lower middle class, who had no access to
secular education and decent employment. The upper crust of the Pakistani
society remained insulated from this vast segment of population who grew up
as staunch jihadists and who proved that Pakistan was living in a time wrap-
21st century coexisting with 9th and 10th century brands of Islamist revival.
This inner contradiction is likely to polarise the people beyond reconciliation.
Besides ethnolinguist strife, this situation may create a situation of class
struggle—a conflict situation between the feudal landlords and the depraved
masses. No people can afford to simply have a drink of religion and thrive.
The ISI’s support to the hardliner Islamist groups had created an
impression that Pakistani Muslims were commissioned for carrying out jihad
anywhere in the world. Spread of jihadism in the civil society, encouraged by
the ISI and army had serious corrosive effect. The politicized civil society
abhorred the idea of converting Pakistan to another theological state.
Nevertheless, the Islamist forces had already started taking control of the
country. The 9/11 attacks against the US targets had finally forced the world
to view Pakistan as ‘sponsor of terrorism.’ The pragmatic and opportunist
regime of Pervez Musharraf has started making fresh evaluation of the
jihadist organizations. However, it is difficult to make any forecast about the
course that Pakistan is likely to take in coming years towards restoration of
the civil society along with honorable rehabilitation of the democratic tenets.
Attempts on the life of President Musharraf and other important leaders
indicate that the Islamists are not likely to accept the present phase as the final
one. The Islamists are likely to strike back with support from a section in the
army, the ISI and some religious parties.
*
We have briefly stated about the sectarian fights that threaten Pakistan’s
national unity. This requires elaboration, as it constitutes another major fault
line. The Shia and Sunni forces are organised on militant lines. The Tehreek-
e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP), led by Allama Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi, is a well-
organized outfit with a significant following in Jhang. This outfit represents
the interests of the Shia community. The TJP has several affiliated
organizations, including Sipah-e-Abbas, Sipah-e-Ahl-Bait and youth bodies
like the Imamia Students Organisation and the Imamia Organisation, which
are reported to play an active role. Since 1994, the Sipah-e-Muhammad
Pakistan (SMP), a splinter group of the TJP with a significant following in
Jhang, has emerged as a prominent Shia terrorist outfit involved in anti-SSP
campaigns, violence and target killings. The TJP is one of the five outfits that
have been banned by President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002.
The current violent phase between the Shias and Sunnis is traced to the
1980s when a group of Deobandi militants formed the Anjuman Sipah-e-
Sahaba (ASS), to wage ‘war’ against the Shia landholders in Jhang. The ASS,
later re-named as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), was established during
the Islamisation campaign of the then President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, and
coincided with the Iranian revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini.
The Shiite ulema perceived these measures as an attempt to spread Sunnite
norms of Hanifite types in the Shiite community. According to analysts,
sectarian violence among the rival outfits intensified in the wake of the ‘jihad’
in Afghanistan as Pakistan, particularly the central and southern Punjab,
served as a base for ‘mujahideen’ recruits. Most of these ‘mujahideen’
returned to Pakistan after the Russian forces pulled out and brought with them
a sizeable supply of arms, ammunition and a proclivity for violence. They
joined the extremist sectarian outfits and since then, sectarian rivalry was
largely expressed through extreme violence. Rivalry between the two outfits
intensified when the SSP founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was killed in March
1990. The same year also witnessed the killing of an Iranian diplomat, Sadiq
Ganji, in Lahore. In 1997, Jhangvi’s successor Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi and 26
others were killed in a bomb blast at the Lahore Sessions Court. In the
aftermath, Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali Rahimi and six locals were killed
in an attack on the Iranian Cultural Centre in Multan. On April 12, 2000, three
hand grenades were lobbed at a gathering in a Shia mosque in Mulawali, the
hometown of Syed Sajid Naqvi, killing 13 persons, including five members of
the family of Syed Sajid Naqvi. The grenade was reportedly hurled from an
adjacent Sunni mosque. Shortly thereafter, a TJP leader, Syed Farrukh
Barjees, was killed at Khanewal near Multan on April 26. On November 23
2000, Anwar Ali Akhunzada, the central general secretary of TJP in
Peshawar, was assassinated by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).
To counter the Sunni militancy, the Shias formed Sipah-e-Muhammad
Pakistan (SMP) in 1993. It is generally believed that Maulana Mureed Abbas
Yazdani created it in 1993 after he was convinced that the TJP would not
allow its young cadres to physically counter the SSP. The Shia youth had been
asking the TJP to take notice of what they called excesses of the SSP whose
members were alleged to be targeting some of the Shia’s beliefs. Allama
Hamid Ali Musawi did not endorse the move. SMP adopted a more militant
stance against the SSP than the TJP would allow. The history of the growth of
multiple Shia and Sunni organizations is a long one. Multiplicity of splinter
organizations amongst the Sunnis was encouraged by the Wahhabi, Salafist,
Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith ideologies, which spread religious intolerance.
Efforts by Pakistan administration to curb activities of the sectarian
organizations including token ban on mujahideen tanzeems like Jaish-e-
Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayeba have yielded negligible response. The trouble
has spread to Gilgit and Baltistan areas and in the rural areas of Sind, Punjab
and NWFP. With the growing popularity of Salafist and Wahhabi fighters of
Al Qaeda al Sulbah and emergence of the religious parties to positions of
power in NWFP and Balochistan, the possibility of deterioration of the
sectarian troubles has increased manifold.
Sectarian intolerance may not break up Pakistan. However, these sectarian
clashes are bound to weaken the fabric of national unity and provide
encouragement to internal and external forces to support one or the other
groupings to enlarge the arch of violence and convert Pakistan to a medieval
country bogged down in religious fundamentalism. These aspects do not add
an encouraging portend to the stability of the state.
Diplomatic, strategic and economic pressures brought about Pakistan’s
sudden switchover from path of perilous support to the Taliban, Al Qaeda al
Sulbah and mujahideen of all sorts to the orbit of collaboration with the USA.
Though he has been trying to cast himself in the model of Kemal Ataturk,
Pervez Musharraf is trying to strike balances inside the army, ISI and the
bureaucracy. He has desperately clung to power and has been trying to try
another sham format of collaboration between the army and civilian political
forces. Pakistan’s volte-face from a terror sponsoring state to a frontline
fighter against Islamist terrorism is not a new experiment. General Zia had
also rented out Pakistan for overcoming international isolation and to fend
Pakistan’s regional and geo-strategic interests in Afghanistan and Central
Asia. He also wanted to mobilize tacit Chinese, Saudi and US silence, if not
support, for Pakistani ventures inside Indian Punjab and Kashmir. He was
faced with deep economic crisis.
Musharraf’s Pakistan was also on the verge of bankruptcy and international
isolation. Well-identified collaboration between the ISI, Al Qaeda al Sulbah
and the Taliban did not take time to sink in the psyche of the ‘free world’
especially after well-planned attacks against the US and other western targets.
The gradual emergence of facts of clandestine trading of nuclear technology
to Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and North Korea had also exposed Pakistan’s
status as a rogue nation. Surprisingly the USA has maintained tactical silence
on Pakistan’s role in sharing nuclear technology with the Islamic nations and
North Korea. It, however, threatens Iran day in and day out for acquiring
technology to develop nuclear power. The US policy makers have not spelt
out their strategy to contain the possible sharing of nuclear technology by
Pakistani scientists with Al Qaeda al Sulbah and similar other Islamic jihadist
groups. The latest US revelation that Musharraf himself was responsible in
stealing nuclear components from the USA through a notorious arms peddler
has raised eyebrows in the political and diplomatic circles. How reliable is
Musharraf, an SSG veteran, a supporter of OBL (Osama bin Laden) and a
perpetrator of the sinister Kargil adventure?
 All said and done, Pakistan continues to be an instable and vulnerable
nuclear power. This fault line itself can threaten its existence.
That Musharraf has started losing support of the religious parties and
mujahideen tanzeems is clear from repeated attempts on his life. The first
attempt on the life of President Musharraf happened in Karachi in early 2003.
The terrorist captured in connection with that act told the investigators that he
and his comrades had also planned to blow up the President’s car by
exploding a vehicle loaded with explosives by remote control when his
cavalcade drove from the airport to Army House. However, fortunately the
remote control device did not work. For this purpose, they had parked a
Suzuki high-roof vehicle full of explosives near the Falak Naz Centre on
Shara-e-Faisal. This turned out to be the same vehicle, which was later used
for the suicide bombing attack on the US Consulate General. Pervez
Musharraf narrowly survived a second assassination bid in less than two
weeks when suicide car bombers attacked his motorcade, killing themselves
and at least 12 others. Officials said the two cars used in the attack were
driven out of two petrol stations just 200 metres from a bridge on a main road
in the city of Rawalpindi where Musharraf escaped a bombing on December
14. The powerful blasts scattered debris and body parts over a wide area and
damaged the windscreen of the President’s armoured Mercedes, but he was
unhurt. The terrorists were found to be linked to the jihadi organisation
Harkat Jihad al Alami. It was also discovered that one inspector of police was
their accomplice in the plot.
Harkat al Mujahideen al-Alami, which suddenly made its appearance in
Karachi in 2003, was previously unknown in Pakistan. The man who founded
it was Asif Zaheer who had trained as an explosives and chemical expert at Al
Qaeda al Sulbah camps in Afghanistan. He belonged to the Binuri Masjid
seminary but was inspired by Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami of Qari Saifullah
Akhtar, also a graduate of Binori Masjid seminary, and was in Karachi
making bombs for half a dozen Deobandi groups. Asif Zaheer was sentenced
to death for masterminding the killing of the French engineers, but his
organisation merged with others to form the World United Army, taken
seriously by police only after it blew up 21 petrol stations owned by Shell in
Karachi in May 2003.
When an attempt was made on the life of the Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz,
through a suicide bomber in 2004, the threads of investigation led to the chief
of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, who had fled from
Kandahar to the NWFP after 2001, and had later been whisked away to the
Gulf region by his Arab friends. The ISI arrested him from Dubai and he is
now in state custody. Qari Saifullah Akhtar was once a member of Harkat-ul-
Ansar, the first jihadi organization to be banned for its savagery in Indian
Kashmir. Harkat-ul-Ansar had come into being through a merger of his
organisation with Harkat-ul- Mujahideen of Fazlur Rehman Khaleel who has
been released by the government after a brief incarceration. Both have been
known to be very close to Osama bin Laden. Qari Saifullah was one of the
accused in the 1995 unsuccessful military coup by Major General Zaheerul
Islam Abbasi (caught in India for espionage), but was let off in mysterious
circumstances.
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The present format of muted tug of war between the army and ISI on the one
hand and the hardliner religious parties can go out of control if Musharraf is
obliged to fall back on the support of the Islamists for securing his power
base. His future will be determined by the tenure of the US support and
support from key army and ISI officers and not by the people of Pakistan.
It appears that Pakistan is likely to go through another critical phase of
uncertainty. The Islamist parties are likely to emerge stronger, though the
army and the intelligence services (basically ISI) are likely to retain a
stranglehold on power. The army is likely to remain united, because by
maintaining unity alone it can continue to rule Pakistan, albeit with brief
democratic interludes. Under pressure from the provinces like Sind,
Balochistan and NWFP, the Punjabi-dominated army may agree to
experiment with the civil political forces, and to avoid more ethnolinguist
uprisings it may agree to share power with the regional forces. In that event,
the ISI will suffer some erosion in its authority and cease to be a state within
the state. However, the possibility of weakening of the Pakistani
Establishment is not foreseen in near future. The nuclear arsenal is under the
firm control of the army. It retains absolute control on almost all segments of
Pakistani society. Countries like the USA and China are likely to extend their
lease on Pakistan and continue to pull Pakistan more to their power orbits. In
the event of such scenario, it appears that Establishment segments like the
Army and the ISI are likely to retain their stranglehold on the country. The
face of the military ruler may change, but overall control of Pakistan is likely
to remain with the armed forces and the ISI.
Neighboring nations like India, Afghanistan and countries in Central Asia
may expect some respite because of the continued US dependence on
Pakistan as a strategic launching ground. Deterioration of the US-Iran
relations may strengthen this tie-up. However, under that scenario the ISI is
likely to emerge as a stronger intelligence operational body with increased
support from the CIA, the Global Fulcrum of Evil. The Eastern Fulcrum of
Evil is expected to threaten Indian security in connivance with the Global
Fulcrum and the Middle Fulcrum. In all probability the White House will not
be able to afford disintegration of Pakistan with the distinct possibility of re-
emergence of another spell of Cold War between the Russian camp and the
Western camp headed by the neo-imperialist—the United States of America.
Pakistan continues to be a client of vital US strategic interests and the
Pakistani Establishment is expected to derive advantage out of American
compulsion. Under this scenario, there is very little possibility of the ISI
scaling down its operations against India. For Pakistan, ‘Hindu Bharat’ is a
visible enemy and destruction of this enemy has emerged as the new elixir for
the concept of Pakistani nationhood. Recent cautious steps by India and
Pakistan for normalization of relations have been provoked both by internal
compulsions and external pressure. This particular window of history will be
under the glare of the world community for some time to come, till the people
of Pakistan bury the ghost of the past and deactivate the present day sorcerers.
Finally it must be stated that Pakistan is not yet a failed State. But it is one
of the deepest fault lines in the comity of nations that can jeopardize global
peace. An unstable country owning nuclaear weapons and numerous jihadist
groups trying to capture state power, Pakistan cannot depend only on the
Army and the ISI. Restoration of real democracy and uprooting of religious
jihadists can stabilize Pakistan and add quantum value to world peace.

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