Pakis Army - Doctrne PDF

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FOREWORD
Pakistan's geo-strategic significance together with the complex global environment
and competing interests of regional and extra-regional players is likely to keep us under
sharp focus in the foreseeable future. The country is confronted with myriad domestic
challenges compounded by unique regional security dynamics thus rendering it vulnerable

to exploitation. Due to its image of being a soft state, Pakistan also stands exposed to
interference by multifarious transnational forces that add to the complexity and diversity of
threat spectrum. Besides, nuclear factor, exorbitant economic cost and a general aversion
to an all-out war have curtailed space for the application of military instrument, and have
incentivized Sub-conventional Warfare (SCW) as an instrument to achieve politico-military
objectives.
The diverse nature of threat demands a robust state security mechanism that is
comprehensive, flexible and responsive to withstand the multitude of challenges; capable
of preventing escalation to a level where application of military instrument may be
warranted. However, due to the limited existing capacity of other state security apparatus
vis-a-vis the security challenges, the employment of Army often becomes inevitable, at
least in the immediate future. Once applied - the military instrument must be appropriate
and selective albeit decisive.
Pakistan Army, in concert with sister services and other Law Enforcing Agencies, is
required to play a central role in dealing with the security challenges. A comprehensive
doctrine is therefore needed to provide employment postulates for conduct of SCW, with
intimate support of other elements of national power under the ambit of Political
Authority.
Rawalpindi, Inspector General Training and Evaluation

Nov 2013 Lietenant General Raheel Sharif
1
INTRODUCTION
"Peace demands the most heroic labour and the most difficult sacrifice. It
demands greater heroism than war. It demands greater fidelity to the truth
and a much more perfect purity of conscience."
Thomas Merton
General aversion to conventional wars due to their destructive nature, convalescent
economies and pervasive international practices of achieving politico-military aims through
means other than war have concentrated compellence and coercion in sub-conventional
domain. Economic interests such as denial and securing of various resources and their exit
routes too are ensured through calibrated instability or stability.
Pakistan, due to its inherent geo-strategic location in the region, has attained
unenviable significance. Whereas her location gives her immense opportunity in terms of
potentially becoming a centre of economic activity regionally and perhaps globally as well, it
also renders her vulnerable to machinations by various players in the complex power game.
Already hemmed in India-centric security dilemma, Pakistan for the past few years has
found itself in another quandary i.e. involuntarily becoming the centre stage of the Tug of
War between various global and regional players pursuing their respective agendas.
Host of domestic, regional and global terrorist organisations perceive Pakistan as a

soft state and are pursuing their respective agendas using our land. The inimical states and
those whose economic, political or religious interests are divergent to that of Pakistan have
found the environment perfect to further their objectives through proxy wars using sub-
conventional means instead of direct confrontation. These states and the various hostile
organisations find their interests converging at several planes and have thus colluded
ominously, albeit their ultimate aims and objectives may not be common in all the cases.
The factors stated above and more make Pakistan's security milieu a complex amalgam of
internal and external challenges.
sew is a conflict between non-state, sub-state or extra-state actors and instruments

of the state, involving use or threat of use of force. Quite often, the sub-conventional threat,
after the State has failed to contain it through its civil law enforcement machinery, has the
proclivity to gradually transcend to a level wherein the involvement of armed forces is
warranted. The kinetic or non-kinetic employment of armed forces under sew environment
are referred to as Sub-conventional Operations(SeO) that are aimed at regaining a state of
'normalcy' so that civil authority can re-assert itself in the post-conflict stage.
Introduction
2
Any meaningful effort to resolve or

Sub-conventional conflicts, even the most
manage the conflict is invariably long term,
localized ones, are far more complex and
involves multi-agency civil-military response
have a far greater post conflict
backed by socio-political and politico-
implications than conventional 'state
economic manoeuvres. Along with the three
versus state' violence. Given this basic
traditional pillars of the state, media assumes
characteristic, once a conflict of the sub-
pivotal and often decisive significance in
conventional variety takes root, there is
shaping perceptions and opinions of domestic
invariably no quick-fix solution for dealing
and international audience.
with it decisively.
This document, referred to hereafter as
"Sew Doctrine" seeks to identify the challenges of sew and provides guidelines for Army's
employment for combating these . Relevant examples from Pakistan Army's experience of
fighting in sew have also been included in the doctrine to highlight specific lessons. The
doctrine ,is not a Zone or operation(s) specific and rather covers entire spectrum of Sub-
conventional conflict.
Introduction
3
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This document provides high - level doctrinal guidelines to all components of the
force for successfu l planning and conduct of operations within the domain of
Sub-conventional Warfare (SCW).
Purpose and Scope

4
CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF

SUB-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge"

T.E. Lawrence
The Perspective
Competing interests of regional and extra regional countries, escalating cost of war,
blowback of extra regional powers' intervention in Pakistan's immediate neighbourhood
and multifarious challenges of internal dynamics have repeatedly compelled coercive
employment of the Army in Aid of Civil Power. Obtaining environment (domestic and
regional) and international practice of proxy war continues to challenge domestic security
apparatus of Pakistan. Hence the employment of the Army in Sub-conventional Warfare
(SCW) is likely to continue for some time and its recurrence in future also remains a
probability. This warrants optimum readiness and sustained capacity building of Army for
employment in sew.
Pakistan Army Doctrine (PAD) provides appropriate top-level guidance for Security
Regime Operations. Within this regime, sew doctrine sits as one of the important
subordinate doctrines and is intended to provide 'comprehensive guidelines' to all
components of Army to undertake operations within the sub-conventional domain.
The Spectrum of sew

-------- ------------- --- ------------ ------ ------------- --- --------- ----------- -----
The term Low Intensity Conflict {UC) has been in use in Pakistan's military parlance
denoting use of force to overcome domestic security challenges for a long time. LIC,
essentially being a foreign terminology has varying interpretations, resulting in certain
notional and conceptual ambiguities in our environment. Hence the term LIC has been
replaced by sew as it is more apt, all-encompassing and relevant in the context of
deliberate use of force in "Aid of Civil Power" against organised militancy.
Sub-conventional conflict covers a wide range of militant activities undertaken by

non-state actors and their abettors, and the Law Enforcement Operations (LEOs)conducted
by instruments of the state. The militant actions are typically insidious and clandestine,
preceded by deliberate infiltration of the targeted society at varying levels and development
of a support infrastructure. The corresponding state response is manifested along multiple
lines employing various elements of national power backed up by law enforcement actions,
with application of the military instrument as a last resort.
Chapter I: Conceptual Aspects of sew

5
sew is marked by the stage, when hostile activities transcend into organised
militancy warranting a sustained use of force. SCW is thus a conflict between violent non-
state or sub-state actors and instruments of the state, involving use of force by the armed
forces (other than the conventional war) or threat of use of such force under overall political
direction. Conduct of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations by the military and additional
resources placed under its control to defeat, destroy, mitigate or contain hostile elements
aimed at achieving the state of normalcy and re -establishing writ of the government is
referred to as Sub-conventional Operations (SCOs).Definitions of various term s within the
ambit of sew are given at the end.
sew is distinct from conventional warfare. Comparison of conventiona l and sub-

conventional warfare is tabulated at Annex A.
Conflict Manifestation
From a conceptual standpoint, every sub-conventional conflict is likely to manifest
indifferent discernible stages from lower to the higher end of the conflict spectrum . Th"!:!
transition from one stage to another may be sudden or protracted, there may be no precise
point or line where one stage ends, and the other begins; the distinctive cha racter of various
stages is apparent nonetheless. A typical expression of the conflict manifestation can be
understood by using modelling, where conflict trajectories are drawn using conflict intensity
and t ime continuum as reference scales (figure-1). It is important to note that Information
Operations (/Os) will have a predominant role throughout the co nflict continuum. The basic
st ages are:-
Latent Con/I/ct Stage

This stage is characterized by emergence of fault lines such as an environment of
perceived dep rivation, societal cleavages and hostile undercurrents that are ripe for
exploitation. Such environment can be exploited by inimical states; non-state or violent sub-
state actors for breeding or instigating pseudo su b-nationalism, ethnic rivalries and
deepening other societal fau lt lines to pursue their agenda. The conflict has, however, yet to
manifest itself in the shape of an organized resistance with visible leadership. Such
phenomena may or may not have popular support of the masses and are driven by a
relatively focused group backed by an aggressive informat ion operations campaign.
Conflict Emergence Stage

The period is marked by an underlying discontent and other contributing factors that
collectively create a 'root cause'. Activities that ensue in this peri od are the emergence of
leadership and building of political and militant organizations to carry the cause. It
manifests itself in the form of demonstrations, increasing media attention, emergence of a
Chapter l" Conceptual Asf)8Cls of SCW

6
politico-militant philosophy, aggregation of resources (funding, access to weapons,

equipment and materials as well as training), cultivation among the masses of general or
focused support and visible signs of foreign involvement. It culminates into expression of
open discontent through sporadic violence and occasional hate crimes. This stage marks the
emergence of the overt face of the conflict and can be subdivided into two distinct sub
stages or phases:-
Normalcy Threshold Phase

This is marked by a transition from constitutional methods of agitation to
increasing defiance and incoherent or less significant use of violence.
Escalation Phase
The escalation phase is determined by the focused and effect based use of
organized violence in defiance of state authority and a readiness to defy legitimate
response of the law enforcing agencies and other state regulating mechanisms. The
escalation phase invariably spirals to a violent conflict phase.
Active Conflict Stage

This stage is marked by a saturation of violence and other forms of coercion and
compellence leading ultimately to the culminating point of one of the contenders in the
conflict. Kinetic operations are the mainstay within this stage of the conflict, whereby the
state endeavours to dominate the conflict through suppression, dispersion, disintegration or
general defeat of the militants' combat capability. Success of the operations is depicted
through visible signs of de-escalation, while as, failure is marked by continued violence and
unrelenting defiance by militants to writ of the state.
De-escalation Stage
Following the Active Conflict Stage is De-escalation Stage where the conflict has been
managed to a level where other state organs can commence to re-assert, re-establish and
take control of the state machinery. Army will continue to conduct Broad Spectrum Security
Operations (BSSOs) in order to facilitate reconciliation, reintegration, reconstruction and
rehabilitation of populace, systems and infrastructure in affected areas to pave the way
towards normalization .
Normalization Stage
State of Normalization is achieved when each component of civil authority is able to
discharge its mandate effectively without intervention or fear of intervention by the
militants. While efforts toward reconciliation conti'nue, state organs, re-assert and start to
function normally and initiatives like reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction are
commenced and consolidated with civil administration in the lead role. Army's employment
Chapter I: Conceptual Aspects of sew

9
Internally Driven Militancy

• Influence perceptions and loyalties of population thus reducing their confidence
in the state.
• Create or accentuate perceived deprivation leading to despondency.
• Create discontentment and discord amongst the populace and raise demand for
greater autonomy.
• Induce divisive tendencies through societal polarisation to cause disintegration
of the state.
• Obtain worldwide, national or local
recognition for their cause by "Guerrillas never win wars but their
attracting media's attention . adversaries often lose them."
• Influence government decisions and Charles W. Thay er
legislation in militants' favour.
Externally Driven Militancy

A cost effective option to perpetrators to achieve one or more of following politico-
military obj ectives :-
• To create calibrated instability by exploiting existing vulnerabilities to achieve

desired ends.
• To disturb or redraw borders.
• International isolation of the target state to curtail diplomatic and economic
leverage.
Military's Objectives
Application of military instrument is aimed at deterring, dissuading, facilitating or
defeating organised defiance to law and authority and is primarily designed for
reconciliation, reintegration and rehabilitation. Military operations should preferably be
short-lived, meaningful and focused with objectives clearly defined and all possible effects
deliberately considered. Some of the objectives of military forces engaged in SCOs are as
follows:-
• Create military effects through focussed, effect based and appropriate use
of force with least collateral damage.
• Defeat militants/miscreants and continuously demonstrate the ability to
dominate the escalation ladder.
• Create enabling conditions, by providing a reasonable level of security for
other state organs to re-establish, reassert and operate.
• Assist civil administration and other elements of national power in
restoration of normalcy.
Chapter I: Conceptual Aspects of SCW

10
Information Operations
Information Operations (IOs) will have a predominant role throughout the sub-conventional
conflict continuum.lOs focus on all segments of society involved directly or indirectly
(neutral majority, pro or anti state elements as well as the militants) with well-conceived
narratives and counter narratives, using different means and mediums.In other words, in
addition to a kinetic fight against the adversary, both the parties are also engaged in a non-
kinetic fight for the hearts and minds of the people. Both sides endeavour to erode
legitimacy of one another and influence
the other to gain or deprive support of, or
"/Os seek to influence the behaviour of
to harass the populace.
selected target audiences and decision
In the modern era, the non-state
makers through creating (if required) and
actors engaged in sew have embraced the
using information to achieve the ends by
modern communications technologies that
themselves or facilitate end objectives of
spread their message exponentially more
the campaign. Defensive /Os seek to shield
effectively than anything seen previously.
or defend friendly decision-makers or
Some have created their own media wings
audiences from being unduly influenced by
to professionally orchestrate their media
an adversary's use of information or
strategy. Thus only by seizing the initiative,
information systems."
and attempting to shape the narrative by
presenting a clear message and getting it
disseminated, can the state hope to undermine miscreant propaganda.
As part of the state response to SCW, IOs are synchronised in all operating
environment and across all lines of operations. A particular harmony is essential with
diplomatic efforts. Public information is a key driver in shaping the course and effectiveness
of 10 themes and may involve careful manipulation of information to attain desired effects.
However, owing to the longevity of SCW and the resultant long-term impact of information
management and manipulation must centre on facts and not be used for short-term
advantages. Whenever applied, the long-term implications and management must be
catered for in advance.
Components of IDs
IOs consist of four core components:-
• Military security and deception.
• Psychological Operations (Psy Ops) .
• Electronic Warfare (EW) .
• Support to public diplomacy (usually as an extension of Civil Military

Cooperation).
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CHAPTER II: ENVIRONMENT AND CHALLENGES

--- --- ---- --- --- ---- ---- ---- ----- ---- ----- --- ---- ---- ------ --- --------- ---- -- -- ----
sew - Historical Perspective
-- --- --- ---- ---- --- -------------- ---- -- ---- ---- ---- -- ---- ---- ------ ------ -- ---- --- -
The impact and preponderance of sub-conventional warfare have increased since
the World War - II. The arena for these conflicts has spanned the globe. Within the
subcontinent, Pakistan has experienced wide variety of security issues ranging from
organized crime, civil unrest of varying amplitude to proxy competitions. While number
of internal and external factors contributed to these episodes and incidents since 1947,
new ones have emerged since 9/11 and define the contemporary environment within
Pakistan in general and the region in particular.
Pakistan Army has frequently been called upon to conduct sub-conventional

operations to defeat militancy in the past and has acquired valuable insight, knowledge,
skill and experience in the conduct of such operations. It is important to understand that
in sub-conventional warfare no two situations are alike, yet many similarities can be
drawn with relevant lessons for future application . Understanding the environment and
the ability to identify and focus upon 'specific drivers' in a particular area or context is
therefore of immense importance.
------- --- ---- ------ -- ------ --- ----- ---- ------ ----- --- --- ------------------------- -
Enduring Internal Dynamics of Pakistan
---- --- --- ---- ----- --- ---- ---- --- ----- ------ ---- --- ---- ----- --- --------- ----- ------
Pakistan is beset with complex internal dynamics, characterised by fragile
economic situation, socio-political disparities, political instability, and religio-ethnic
polarization, further accentuated by an enduring sense of insecurity caused by a hostile
neighbourhood. The security milieu of Pakistan has thus always remained fragile with
recurrent emergence of challenges in sub-conventional domain; compounded by
competing interests of outside powers and their nexus with internal actors. Important
internal factors which render the environment susceptible to sew are covered in the
succeeding paragraphs.
Political
Inability to evolve a workable constitutional arrangement in the early years
resulted in continued political instability and failure to establish credible political
foundations of the state. The persistent political discord aggravated anti-state sent iment
in erstwhile East Pakistan leading ultimately to breakup of the country. Even today,
political disharmony stands as a major challenge confronting Pakistan that has not
Chupter II: EJtvironment ond ChoJJe119e5
12
allowed state institutions to mature and function efficiently. Political factors which
nurture sew stem from :-
Political Instability
Despite achieving a political consensus in the form of 1973 Constitution, a
tolerant, mature and stable political culture could not be evolved that led to
political instability. Such instability provides breeding grounds for dissenting
groups open to exploitation by inimical forces.
Ineffective State Institutions

Due to political influence, the ability of state institutions to perform their
specified functions has substantially degraded. Political interference has im pacted
the state bodies to an extent that they appear more as instruments of political
influence rather than servants of masses. This has led to waning of people's tru st
in the state institutions and hence become prone to exploitation.
Weak Governance
Cumulative effect of political instability, deep rooted corruption and failing
state institutions has manifested in the form of weak governance. Absence of
merit based inductions, influenced by political considerations, inhibits the capacity
of state institutions to govern and ensure the rule of law. Resultantly, the
institutions are not able to address aspirations of the people thus spreading
discontent and despondency amongst the masses.
Pseudo Sub-nationalism
Political disharmony and unequal distribution of resources has given rise to
the sense of deprivation amongst smaller provinces. Situation in Baluchistan is a
case in point where failure to administer
and afford equitable developmental Nin situations ofmilitary conflict, civil .
opportunities has created serious strife, lawlessness, bad governance, and
dissatisfaction amongst the people. This human right.s violations: terrorists find
it easy to hide, train and prepare their .
has resulted in the emergence of pseudo attacks."
sub-nationalist sentiment amongst few Gijs De Vries
groups rendering them vulnerable to
exploitation.
Chapter II: Environment and Challenges

13
Ethnic Diversity
Pakistan is situated at the crossroads of various civilizations and is a melting

pot of diverse ethnicities and cultures. Lack of vision and foresight on the part of
successive governments has prevented emergence of a united and cohesive
nation, free of ethnic fissures. Ethnic divide therefore becomes an easily
exploitable factor.
Growing Influence of Non -State Actors

The space afforded by short-sighted state policies and weak governance has
been successfully exploited by non-state actors. Today, Pakistan is a victim of
vario us shades of militancy and is perceived as a 'sanctuary for violent non-state
and extra-state actors.
Economic
Flawed · policy formulation, deep-rooted distortion and structural constraints

result in continuous economic distress of the
common people. The widening of gulf between "The lack of needs being fulfilled in
haves and the have-nots leads to economic daily life leads to crime, gangs and
street violence. Terrorism is
polarisation. Poverty and sense of deprivation
perpetuated by dlsempow erment at
tend to lead the poorer segments of society the local levels and by inequities in
towards resentment, disenchantment with the the international system. N
state and recourse to any available means to give Kevin J Gree e
vent to their frustration. Economic factors

affecting the environment are:-
• Inability of the state to ensure provision of basic necessities of life to its

subjects.
• Widening of gap between rich and poor {pushing them below abject
poverty).
• Hopelessness caused by red uced economic activity.
• Economic deprivation and lack of opportunities.
• Inadequate basic infrastructure.
• Asymmetric development of various regions.
Social
The societal polarisation fuels the desire of racial, ethnic, linguistic and political
groups for upward social mobility. They resort to low level of violence, perceived as part
Chapter fl: Environment and Challenges

14
of their struggle, and are more often than not exploited by anti-state forces. The social
factors which impact on the environment are:-
• Low literacy rate and inadequate education system.

• Lack of equal opportunities.
Injustice.
• Broad Contours of Militants' Manoeuvre Intolerance.
• Ideological polarisation.
EJltnmlsm
Being predominantly moderate Muslim society, majority of people in Pakistan
desire a progressive democratic state, respect religious, cultural and ethnic diversities
and possess spirit of tolerance and co-existence. Some hard-line elements within the
society however exist on the fringes, which exploit the religious and ethnic cleavages in
their favour, question the legitimacy of the system and seek to enforce their version of
values. Pakistan's geographical proximity and relevance to regional conflicts and
unavoidable engagement with the global powers in the recent past has provided
opportunity to extremist religious segments in the country to manipulate common
masses (in the name of religion)for pursuit of their own agenda. The resultant societal
polarization leads to militancy and perpetuates an environment of violence.
External Factors Impacting the Security Calculus

The nuclearization of South Asia, event of 9/11 and global reactions thereof, coupled
with the competing interests of major powers, have increased complexities of the
regional environment. There are a host of factors which keep the region in a state of
turmoil; some of these are:-
Comptttjng lntettsts of R~lonol and Extnl-ttglonol Powers
Pakistan's geo-strategic location has rendered it to become a focal point of
regional, extra-regional and even apparently friendly states. All these have their vested
interests in the region for which they work to keep Pakistan destabilized through the
use of sub-conventional means. Main objectives of such inimical states and non-state
actors are:-
• Create calibrated instability in Pakistan in order to render state

infrastructure ineffective.
• Tarnish the image of Pakistan and isolate it internationally to undermine its
stature.
Chaptrr fJ:. Environmvrt and ChoIJenges

15
• Embroil Pakistan's Armed Forces in protracted sub-conventional conflict for

its eventual degradation .
• Erode the credibility of Law Enforcement Agencies, thereby reducing public
confidence.
• Weaken Pakistan's economy and accentuate societal polarization to create
anarchical situation in the country.
• Undermine Pakistan's existence as a viable state.
Support of Inimical States and Organizations to Non-State Actors

The splinter groups and organisations, thriving on militancy in various parts of the
world as their ideology and livelihood, also join the extremist forces in the region. These
non-state actors are supported by inimical states with funding, weapons, ammunition,
t raining and organisational planning to operate against LEAs. Some militant factions also
exploit the porous borders and fuel the militancy, which is effectively exploited by other
inimical states.
Threat from Transnational Forces

Pakistan is faced with a threat of SCW from a mix of players interconnected in the
acts of violence. These components range from militant organizations operating globally
to multinational corporations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with covert
agendas, fin ancial institutions, drug mafia and criminal gangs.
Fallout of Regional Dynamics

Domestic security challenges have been exacerbated by the fallout of regional
developments in Pakistan's immediate neighbourhood. Foreign intervention in
Afghanistan during eighties and 2001 onwards, on-going proxy war from India and blow
back of complex regional dynamics has significantly impacted Pakistan's internal
dynamics. Some of the effects of these factors are:-
• Eroded writ of the State on various institutions.

• Exploited ethno-cultural make-up of metropolitans and impacted the social
fabric of the society.
• Contributed to the growth of religious extremism, sectarianism and
radicalization of Pakistani society.
• Introduced the culture of gun-running, smuggling and drug-trafficking
besides negative socio-cultural trends.
• Ingress of a large number of foreign nationals and organizations with long-
term security repercussions for the country.
Chapter I.I: EnYk<mment aod Challenges

16
• Overburdened Pakistan's economy due to huge influx of refugees.
--- ----------------------- ------- ---- ------ ------------------ --- --------------- ----

Nuclear factor
----------------------- --- -- ---- -------- --- -- ----- -- ---------- ------------ ---- -----
Pakistan's nuclear capability has effectively deterred direct application of military
instrument for achieving politico-military objectives by its arch enemy. Beside this
environment of nuclear overhang; factors like escalating cost of wars and international
aversion to direct use of force has pushed the conflict in sub-conventional domain.
FIGURE 3: IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE

ENVIRONMENT
Envisaged Nature of sew

In the evolving environment, sub-conventional conflicts have assumed global
proportions with regional and state-on-state conflicts seemingly receding. The projected
environment is likely to be extremely complex with multi -dimensional challenges posed
by contiguous as well as non-contiguous state(s) or actors and conflicts spread beyond
geographical boundaries having no clear battle lines. Enabled by non-traditional
infrastructure, the enemy would often be nebulous. There would be blurring of
distinction between front and rear, strategic and tactica l actions and combatants and
non-combatants. Violence, once triggered, may not remain restricted to specific areas.

17
In addition, global connection driven by mass media and information preponderance

will further complicate the nature of sew.
Broad Contours of Militants' Manoeuvre

SCW covers a wide range of activities which may follow a spectrum at varying
amplitudes. Broad contours of militants'
"Ify ou know the enemy and know
manoeuvre with corresponding possible actions by yourself,your victory will not
the state are:- stond in doubt; ifyou know
Heaven and know Earth, you may
• In the formative stage (Latent and make your victory complete"
Conflict Emergence Stages), the Sun Tzu
miscreants/ militants create uneasy
peace in the society and create a sense of insecurity through the use of
psychological operations including subversion, acts of violence, political and
economic destabilization and creating societal polarisation.
• Escalating the conflict further, militants undertake organized violence
through established network(s) at relatively large scale, calling for an
en~anced response of LEAs.
• At higher end of the spectrum (Active Conflict Stage), militants organise
themselves into bigger organisations and establish linkages with
international network(s) of militants. They undertake overt and wide spread
militancy in particular geographical zone(s), thus attempting to induce
culminating point of the entire state security apparatus. Creating paralysis
of state's apparatus, they aim to carve out a geographical zone to establish
their own writ replacing the state authority. This warrants comprehensive
response from the entire state's security apparatus, which is subsequently
followed by De-escalation/Normalization Stages.
Targeting Methodology
The impoverished segment of society because of inequitable political, economic
and social dispensation has the potential to be exploited in the name of religion,
sectarianism, ethnicity and pseudo sub-nationalism etc. They are prone to easy
manipulation by internal and external inimical forces towards achievement of their
objectives. Such slogans thus become an effective targeting tool whereby the hostile
entities manipulate the populace's sentiments to dominate mental and physical
domains. The means adopted for this purpose are generally:
Chapter II: Environment ond Challenges

18
Information Operations by the Militants

SCW is mostly won and lost in ideological and information domain. Militants
seek to exploit the religio-ethnic and politico-economic fault lines through
imaginative use of IOs to mould the public opinion in their favour. Thus, the public
opinion and support become centrepiece both for militants and the state.
Intended targets of militants' IOs are local populace, LEAs, military and the
International audience. Militants use imaginative means and modes to build a
narrative that supports their cause and discredits the state and its institutions.
The commonly used means may include local and international electronic and
print media, social networking, internet websites, local FM radio stations,
distribution of pamphlets, leaflets, CDs and infiltrating educational institutions,
schools, colleges and religious seminaries to target the youth.
It is equally important to understand various effects which the militants/
terrorists aim to create in physical and cognitive domains by the use of IOs.
Immediate effects are created on occurrence of a terrorist incident as media is
attracted and leads to intermediate effects by communicating further to mass
audience. Major effects are created when various stakeholders in National/
international hierarchy are influenced (recognize militants/ terrorists as important
player in impacting the contemporary environment}.
Immediat e Effects Mai or Effec t s

Populat,on and various
Media 1s attracted to
;tJkeholder; Jre ,nfluenced
militants violence
Recognize
militants as
important
player
Intermediate Effects
Media is conduit to mass
audience (National/
International)
FIGURE 4: EFFECTS INTENDED THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

19
OPERATION 8.AH-£-RAAST
/Os ASA TOOL OFMILITANCY
The rise of mJjjtancy in Swat provides a classic exnmple of how militm1ts
effectively made use of cheap FM teclmology lo i11doctri11ate and harass the local
population and harness anti-state sentiments. During the active periods of
i11surge1Zcy in Swat Maultu1a Fazlullah (Mullah Radio), the militant leader. set up
an illegal FM radio station broadcasting on 92 megahe1tz. The tecl111ology used
was not 011ly qtdte affordable; it was also conveniently porlable, thus allowilzg its
owners to ea.si1y outpace the t1uthorities' attempts to shut them down The station's
transmissions nm for two hours d111Jy. h1itinlly, Fazlullal1 co11fined his rhetonc to
reformation, which 1°IJCluded the recitation a11d tra.nslntio11 of the Qura11 and
Hndith (traditio11s), as well as the observance of purdah for women. However,
later he openly resoJted to 1i1cite locals against state 011d the m1JitaJy. His
broadcasts also included daily account of Jrlllitant actions and false projection of
mih'tary losses. One particularly msidious eleme11t of Fazlu!lal1's docfline wa.s to
influence the local population by indoct.rinating the women folk Fazlullah's
nightly tirades aga1i1st the state proved vezy effective 1n coercing local populBce
into submission 011d discrediti11g the state insfituhons.
Indoctrination
As militants start to establish themselves in a particu lar area, t hey begin
indoct rination of the people through use of "Extremely subtle, even to the
information tools and other means such as:- point of formlessness, extremely
mysterious, even to the point of
• Use of scriptures and symbols to soundlessness; they seek to be the
provide authenticity to their directors of the opponent's fate."
propaganda and mould people's Sun Tzu
opinion in favour of their
agenda.
• Insidious progressive ingress into the targeted people is affected
through unnoticed access. This is done by implanting t heir
accomplices on positions that can mould the pub lic sent iment.
Chapter ff:; Envirorrment arrd Cfial[enges

20
Exploitation of Poor Governance

Poor governance and inefficient state systems are easily prone to
exploitation. Militants propagate ~------- - --------,
"Guerrilla warfare offers ample evidence of
that state has failed to protect systematic victimization of civilians in an
people's basic rights and offer their attempt to control the population"
own self-styled ideologies and Alist.air Home
governance tools as alluring
alternatives.
Disruption of State Machinery

Militants scare away or physically remove instruments of governance with
a view to usurping particularly law enforcement, education and other welfare
means of the state. This is aimed to create a sense of insecurity and chaos
amongst the people and pave way for their system of governance to replace the
state authority. People's trust in state's authority gradually erodes and militants'
writ tends to establish.
Discrediting the Target State

Militants would invariably undertake those activities that would discredit
and affect international image of the target state. Hostile acts like abduction or
killing of foreigners may be executed that are aimed at discouraging foreign
investment, tourism, or foreign · assistance programmes etc. affecting the
economy and foreign support of the target state.
Tactics and Techniques used by the Militants

Harassment of Public
Militants attempt to deepen sense of insecurity in the public through a
variety of means. Bomb blasts, often remotely operated, are used to explode
small quantities of ordnance. Other means to harass the public include fire brand
speeches, threats, distribution of threatening and hate literature etc. One of the
purposes of public harassment is to embarrass the government security forces so
that government overreacts and appears repressive.
Recruitment of Sympathisers within the LEAs

Militants would usually endeavour to penetrate the security apparatus of
the state through recruitment of sympathizers for obtaining their support in the
form of accurate intelligence and physical subversion to enhance their liberty of
action and effectiveness.

21
Decapitation
Political, social and key administrative leadership is targeted/ killed to

further erode writ of the state and dent public confidence in it. The 'vacuum' thus
created is attempted to be filled by the militants' leadership that emerges to
portray itself as a saviour of the people.
Sniper Operations
This is a highly effective technique. It is stealthily done to kill individuals,

often of law enforcement agencies to spread fear. It is a routine activity where
resources are not exhausted and small scale but often highly visible effects are
created.
Raids and Ambushes
Such techniques are generally employed to target high value assets.

Militants being conversant with the terrain, select the best possible site and
targets for launching raids and ambushes. They aim is to cause harassment,
demoralization and undermine state security apparatus. Likely targets include:
• Important personalities like political, social and executive figures

causing leadership vacuum.
• Critical or valuable assets like oil fields, gas wells, airports etc. to
deeply hurt the state.
• Law enforcement institutions, their installations and personnel to
cause demoralization and weaken their will and capacity to fight back.
• Military convoys to cause destruction or disruption of logistics and
reinforcements.
• Key installations and infrastructure like schools, hospitals,
communication services etc. to cause disruption of administrative
machinery.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) including Vehicle Borne /ED Attacks
Such techniques are employed against a variety of targets. These devices

are built with immense ingenuity and are
both manually or remotely triggered or "When the enemy advances, withdraw;
when he stops, harass; when he tires,
timed. IEDs/VBIEDs vary in size and scale
strike; when he retreats, pursue."
from a small parcel bomb to several Mao Zedong
hundred kilograms of buried, concealed
or vehicle borne explosives.
~---------~
/.~
rhnntPr II· FnvirnnmPnt nnrl rhnllPnnP<
22
Suicidal Attacks
This technique is used for greater effects such as spread of panic, fear and
large-scale killing of innocent people. Suicide Bombers (SBs) are usually poorly
trained and often drugged. Highly motivated SBs may operate independently and
initiate the explosive devise by a wilful act. Less motivated or less trained SBs
frequently have a secondary remote initiation also built in to the IED which is
initiated by the SB's handler or escort. Use of double or multiple SBs is a common
practice where first explosion is relatively smaller. As the people and other
emergency and disaster management services gather at the site, a second and
bigger explosion takes place causing much more devastation.
Circumstances Leading to Use of Military Instrument

State's response to various forms of sub-conventional threats primarily resides in
the 'political domain'. As and when dissident elements pose a serious challenge to
security of the state; employment of military may be warranted especially when all the
reconciliatory efforts by political authorities have failed and the conflict management
has gone beyond the capacity of LEAs (other than the military). Application of military
instrument within the frontiers of a state is a difficult decision and will be taken as a last
resort by the highest political authority. The predominant objective of military
instrument remains 're-establishment of the writ of the state' using selective kinetic
means while ensuring minimum collateral damage.
Chapter II: Environment and Challenqes

23
CHAPTER Ill: GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCT OF SCOs
"Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife"
T.E. Lawrence
General
The application of military instru m ent takes place in the broader fra mework of
National Security Strategy. At initial stages of the confl ict, national security apparatus
must st rive to prevent the conflict and keep it
below the threshold, where use of kinetic
means becomes essential. If t he militancy
It must be realised that in sew,
application of military force can
continues to escalate, it must be cont ained
only create enabling
primarily by Police, Civil Armed Forces (as
environment as a supporting
second tier response and Army must not be
manoeuvre for the political
used as a first responder).The political
effort to succeed.
leadership may decide to employ Army as th e
decisive force, if all other law enforcement
agencies fail to conta in the conflict. It is however, imperative to shape th e environment
before application of military instrument -pri marily through IOs and political astuteness,
aimed at exposing militants' agenda and seeking legitimacy and public support for
military application. Political patronage must however, be ensu red during entire
spectrum of the conflict even once military operations are in progress. It must be
realised that in SCOs, application of force can only create enabling e nvironment as a
supporting manoeuvre for the political effort to succeed. While the Law Enforcement
Agencies are applied against th e militants, other elements of national power must
address internal and external political dimensions.
-- -- ---------- ---- ----- ----------- ---- ---- -- --- --------- ----- ------- ---- -------- ---
Fundamentals/Cardinals of SCOs
The principles of war as enunciated in th e PAD, adequately guide the sew as well.
However, cardinal aspects are mentioned in the succeeding paragraph s essentially suite
th e nature and charact er of SCOs.
Primacy of Political Authority

Political authority provides guidance to all element s of national power and stee r
decisions at every level of sew. All commanders and staff must understand t he political
Chaoter Ill: Guidelines for Conduct ofSCOs

24
objectives and impact of use of force on their accomplishment. Military operations must
be directed to support and achieve political o bjectives.
Political and Moral Legitimacy

It is 'the acceptance of use of kinetic means' by the masses as a legitimate
requirement for national security. Legitimacy is also derived from the perception that
authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for rational purposes. The
security forces and all other elements must be convinced about the justification of use
of force and need to pursue it within the confines of law . Morale, w hich is vital for
success in protracted conflicts within sub-conventional domain, is also a derivative of
political and moral legitimacy.
Population Centric Approach

More often, in sew population emerges as the centre of gravity, which instead of
incapacitating has to be protected, reinforced
and empowered to function closely with Law "Key terrain in an insurgency is not a
physical space, but the political
Enforcement Agencies. The population must
loyalty of the people who inhabit that
be convinced that the operations against space."
the militants are for their security. The David Galula
development effort of the operations must
conform to the local needs and con ditions, keeping in view aspirations of the masses. All
efforts must keep the population as their focus.
Unity of Effort
It im plies that all the elements of national power dedicated for sew should be
employed cohesively. It also stresses that politico-military components must have
convergence of effort. To ensure attainment of the objective, all t he agencies must
present a united front following the overall campaign design. It invo lves cooperation
between all arms and services, between civi l and military components and allies, if
operating in concert with own forces. The overall command of the operations in a
particular zone must rest with the military component once army is em ployed as the
ma in effort; however, it will transfer t o civil administration as it resumes functioning.
Appropriate, Effect Based and Focused Use of Force

Force used against the militants must be appropriately scaled, effect-based and
focussed in application . Disproportionate and wanton use of force may undermine
public support at any st age of the operation. The military comma nder must never flinch
from using sufficient force, however, he must never use more force than is absolutely
Chanter Ill: Gu/defines for Conduct of SCOs

25
necessary to achieve the objective. While determining the end state, required attrition
must be examined, acting in a spirit of humanity and force configured accordingly. This
may also entail selective or complete displacement of populace to minimise collateral
damage.
OPERATION RAH-£-RAAST
Operation R.oh- e- Raa.st conducted by Pakistan Army to nd Swat valley from

militancy in 2009 p1vvides a pertinent example ofsuccessful application of mos/ of
the fundamental principles of SCOs. Tehn:ek-e-Nifa.ze Shana.le Muhammadi
(TNSM) used the den10Itd for enforceme11t of Sluiria in the region by exploiting the
religious se11tim ents and prevalent social and economic injustice n1 Swat to establish
their writ in the region The 11wJta.nts through a systematic ctunpaJg11 attempted to
estabhsh their contml by ta.c;getin.g the state institutions and coerciltg the population
mto submission by committing atrocities n1 the name of religion. As a political
response for 1-eco11c1Jiation, mJlitants were afforded full opportzmity for peaceful
settlement of most of their demands through sustained political dialogue m cluding
enactn1g of Nizam-e- Adl regulation in accordance with the pe1'Ceived popular
demand of the masses. However, the m11it~·mts' actual objective of seeking territonal
control and enforcing thei1· writ over the area was successfully exposed by their
w ·1compronusing stance and continued atrocities over the populace. This eroded
their c1-edibility and prov,ded jusHfied cause to the political autl10rities to apply
milittuy instrume11t to re-assert the wiit of tl1e state, having exhausted other options.
A well coordi.11t1.ted mih'ta.ry campaign with full political ownership a.nd popular
support across the country was launched to dJsfodge the 111ilita.J1ls and restore
normalcy. The hallmtu'k of thls operation was that approximately two mJJJion
civilian population was not only temporarily relocated to ensure mini.mum
collateral damage, but also fed, shelle1'ed and rehabilitated itt their hearths and
hamlets withii-1 a short period of foui · montl1s wi'th complete suppo1t of the nation.
This allowed conduct of smooth, focused and targeted operations to flush out the
1mlitt1.11ts. 1J1e m11ittuy success of operation Rah-e- Naast 1s primarily attnbuted to
political ownership, primacy ofpolitical authority, support of the masses and medJa.
population centric approach a11d effective rehabilitation of displaced personnel.
Operation was stralegized and conducted under the precepts of "Clear, Hold, Build
and 'Jra.11sfer". While first hvo stages met sig11i1Jcanl success, however, the
subsequent stages of 'bu1ld' and 'lrtu1sfer' e11c0tmte1'ed problems mainly due to Jack
ofadministrative capacity and political will of the civilian goverJ1.111e11t necessitating
sustai.ned deployment of troops.
26
Perseverance
Perseverance is the exhibition of strategic patience, resolute and persistent pursuit of
objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them
"Victory belongs to the most
and requires long term commitment by the forces persevering. N
involved. SCW is 'protracted' in nature and victory
generally does not come easily or quickly.
Motivation level, morale, mental and physical endurance of LEAs will play a key role in
their ability to engage in a protracted conflict.
Adaptability
Adaptability is the skill, willingness and ability of a force to operate effectively in
varying conditions. SCOs vary in nature, intensity,
'7 his is a game of wits and will.
scope and situations in each operation may change
You've got to be learning and
frequently. Therefore, a force employed in such adapting constantly to survive."
operations must be able to adapt itself to sudden General Peter J. Shoomaker
turn of events. The force must retain its
effectiveness across the entire spectrum of conflict. Commanders and staff must be
adaptable t o the varying situations, frequent changes in affiliations and operational
arrangements and be flexible to absorb the diverse roles dictated by the nature of
conflict. This warrants mental and physical flexibility, foresight and imagination.
Initiative
The success in SCOs is contingent upon early wresting of initiative from the
militants, who invariably enjoy this at the early . - - - - - - - -- -- - --,
"The counterinsurgent needs a
stages of SCOs. The commanders at all levels must
convincing success as early as
be proactive to pursue their own course and force possible in order to demonstrate
____________
the militants in a reactive mode, thereby curtailing that he has the will, the means, and
their ability to plan and execute operations. It the ability to win."
David Galula ....
demands aggressiveness, forward thinking,
imagination, information, intelligence, quick decisions and mobility. It also entails
reducing own and exploiting militants' vulnerabilities.
Chapter Ill: Guidelines for Conduct of SCOs

27
OPERATION Al-MIZAN
JJEFENCE OF LA./JHA FORT
Ladl10 Fort, an 1solnted outpost in South Waziristan Agency became a scene

of i11te11se battle between the LEAs and militants in 2007 Situated 23 kins from
Razma.k tmd 74 kms from Agency HQ Wana, Ladhn Fozt, 01-ving to its historica.1 and
tacfiail value assumedgreat psychological importance parlicufa11y dwing the peak
peliod of Operaticm Almi21m, when it became the nucleus of Baifu/Jal1 1Vfel1sud Jed
militants. In October 2007, Number I Wing of Dir Scouts FC KPK commm1dcd by
lvfajor Abdul Kareem was tasked to relieve 7 Baloch Reg! and 3 l,Ving Bajaur Scouts
11t Ladlza Forl Owing to the recently signed peace deal in the wake of the
Kaizigu1wn incident, the force was to carry light weapons and ammunition only
Howeve1; Major Abdul Kareem, foreseeing a tense showdown 1-vilh the militants
eager to take control ol Llldha Fort, displaying unprecedented Ji1it.iative. took a
calculated dsk and carried along substantial quantity of heavy weapons a11d
r1111111umhcm to cater for i111y eventuality. His apprehensions proved correct soon
after ta.king over the defence of Lndha Fort, militants demonstrated their aggressive
desig11s ,111d started spon1dic firing aJJd harassment ush1g 11nss11es, mckets, 011d
12. 7 111111 and 14.5 mm guns. La.dha Fort was eventually subjected to eighteen fierce
physical attacks by large mtmbers of hard co.r e militants between 'l'" Ja1wary and
l :f"Febzwzry 2008. while all supply routes to La.dlw Fo1t had been cut-off. A
detenrzi11ed, aggressive and effective response thwarted the 111ilita.J1~s repeated
attempts to take over the fort evezy time. Tbe brave li"ghti11g men of Dir Scouts
conti.nued to defy U1e aggression by the ovezpoweni1g majority of militants for 57
days without tJny respite. 1J1e successful defence ofJ,adhu Fort de~pile till odds and
massive casualties caused to attacking mifittmts was only possible because of
initiative. nwtch/ess /caderslzip qualities. perseverance and aggressiveness of Major
Abdul Kanin and /11s men.
Dominate the Information Domain

IOs must be synchronised in all operating environments and across all lines of
operations to dominate the information domain. While the broader themes and
narrative are orchestrated at the state level, the IOs conducted by the military
Chapter Ill: Guidelines for Conduct ofSCOs

28
component during SCOs must be focussed and in sync with the state narrative. Within
the affected zone, responsibility for planning "Words are, of course, the most
and conduct of IOs should rest with the overall powerful drug used by mankind. H
operational commander to suit t he operational Rudyard Kipling
design w hile ensuring a 'Population Centric

Approach'. It must be understood that dom inating information domain is not in the
purview of military alone. All related elements of national power including media will
have to be harnessed in an overarching national strategy, led by po litical prong,
primarily through information operations. Essential steps for shaping the environment
may include following:-
• Well articulated IOs campaign to legitimise the application of military

response.
• Winning of public support and confidence through perception

management.
• Effective media handling to achieve moral high ground.
Intelligence
The operations in sew are mainly intelligence driven and continue t hrough all
stages of t he conflict. It is imperative to have an
integrated approach by all civil and military "Intelligence is the principal source
ofinformation, and intelligence has
intelligence agencies, w hile employing all to come from the people, but the
methods of human and technical intelligence. population will not talk unless it feels
Intelligence gathering is an all time activity that safe, and It doesn 't feel safe until the
insurgents' power has been broken."
must continue through the latent conflict stage
David Ga/ula
till t he attainment of end state and
normalization. The focus of intell igence effort should be to ascertain maximum
information about the infrastructure of the militants, their ideology, domestic and
foreign support and support base in the civil population. Intelligence gathering can be
meaningfully accomplished by undertaking Intelligence Preparation of the Zone of
Operations (IPZO) which is similar to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield {IPB)
done for conventional operations. Detailed guidelines on IPZOs are attached as Annex B.
In order to construct a coherent and integrated intelligence mosaic, and achieve
meaningful results, it is important that the operational commander of a particular zone
of operations should exercise overall control of all the int elligence resources made
available for the purpose.
Chacter Ill: Guidelines for Conduct ofSCOs

29
Sustainability
In an unstable and violent enviro11ment of SCW, logistic support often extends
beyond sustainability of military forces alone; the support to civil populace gains added
importance. The logistic system must be able to respond to the challenges posed by
nature of the conflict. There will be a requirement to make flexible logistic bases with
enhanced inventories and capacities customized to the needs of prevailing environment
in a particular geographic zone.
Avoidance of Premature Declaration of Success

Sub-conventional operations, being protracted in nature, should not be
considered as successful until the situation has returned to normal. The temptation to
announce success with ostensible suppression of the miscreants should be avoided as
far as possible. The operations should only be considered as concluded once the civil
administration has re-established the writ of the State.
Preconditions for Force Employment

Following pre conditions be kept in mind for employing security forces in SCW:-
• Military operations should be acceptable to public at large with political
ownership.
• Should aim at w inn ing public confidence and encourage local participation.
• Have due regard to geography, history and culture of the area.
• Should create friendly environment for sustained development and
bringing about socio-economic change.
Spectrum and Lines of Operations

Based on the incremental progression of the conflict, the sequencing and timing
of variou s lines of operation can be logically discerned. To achieve the desired success, it
is essential to understand the lead-time necessary before a particular line of operation
can be initiated and the lag-time required before effects are accrued. An inherently
interactive strategy would therefore be needed to gauge the operationa l pulse. It will
involve a variety of actions that range from information operations at national level,
intelligence and counter intelligence operations, Broad Spectrum Security Operations
(BSSOs), Combat Operations and Stability/Normalization Operations. These are
explained as follows:-
Chapter Ill: Gukielines for Conduct of SCOs

31
------ -- -------- ---------- ------- --------- ------ -- -------- ------- ---------- ------ --
Conduct of SCOs
----- --- --------------------- -- ------- --------- ----- -- -- ------- ------ -- ---- ------ --
"The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple
when the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but
few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory
and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
is by attention to this point that I can foresee
who is likely to win or lose".
Sun Tzu
Planning Stage
Initial planning for SCOs must start as early as possible consistent with the
perceived employment of Army. Continuous monitoring of the situation and
coordination with civilian state machinery must start during the SCAN operations stage.
This will help in deciding the opportune moment of Army's induction and provide
sufficient lead time for conduct phase. Following actions are necessitated during the
planning stage.
Estabiishment of Intelligence Network

SCOs are essentially intelligence based targeted operations. Before the
conduct of operations, an effective intelligence grid must be established between
Army, corps, division, brigade and unit levels integrating all available intelligence
gathering means . Human Intelligence (HUMINT} plays an important role in
conduct of SCOs. An effort must be made to cultivate sources from within the
area of operation to obtain timely and accurate intelligence about the militants.
These would include assessment of militants' objectives, their strengths, support
bases and tactics.
Identification of Centre of Gravity

The militants' centre of gravity must be identified before undertaking
operations, as it links to their support infrastructure (including local support}, their
critical capabilities and requirements. Centre of gravity of militants is invariably
located either in their support base, ideology or leadership. In the overall gamut
of activities, once the militants' support base lies in the local populace, indeed
fighting the public perception is the most frustrating part of sew. Simultaneously,
an assessment must be made as to what centre of gravity (within own system of
forces or government infrastructure} the militants are striving for and appropriate
safeguards must be put in place to protect and deny the same.

32
Define End State

SCW is protract ed in nature and character. The campaign must have an end
state with the desired timelines. M ilitary
end state entails creating conditions that "No one starts a war-or rather, no one
are conducive to the attainment of in his senses ought to do so-without
first being clear in his mind what he
political objectives, which is restoration of
Intends to achieve by that war and how
normalcy, through negotiated
he intends to conduct it."
settlement/resolution of the conflict. Clausewitz
Army's employment must be for a specific
time, a phased programme be chalked out where the civil administration takes
over as the lead agency for lasting peace and stability in post operations scenario.
Continuous Monitoring of the Situation

In the latent conflict and conflict emergence stages of sew, Army should
continuously monitor the situation. This wil l be accomplished by employing
intelligence means of the formation in whose Area of Responsibility (AOR), the
conflict is emerging. As far as possible, maximum intelligence should be gathered
about militants' ideology, their leadership, hideouts, capabilities and local
sympathize rs including within the LEAs .Accordingly, army formations to
undertake SCOs should be earmarked and trained.
Assessment/Anticipation of Army's Induction and De-induction

Army shou ld assess and anticipate the point at which it may be called upon
in aid of civil power. The decision to commit Army for SCOs shall however be
taken on t he directions of political authority. Employment of all available sources
to acquire accu rate and timely intelligence would be of immense value to the
subsequent actions of force commander.
Integration of Civil-military Complements

Military operations must be in concert with the political effort. SCOs must
have ful l compliments of civil agencies well integrated in the overall campaign
plan. The local administration as well as Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to
include Police, Rangers, Frontier Co rps and Levies must be optimally employed to
create synergy .

33
Conduct Stage
This stage is marked by conduct of intelligence based targeted kinetic and non-
kinetic operations. It should involve appropriate, effect based and focussed use of force
with least collateral damage ensuring that this stage is kept as short as possible. And
culminate when conditions are created for the civil authorities to resume routine state
functions. Guidelines for conduct of Sub-conventional Operations {SCOs) during this
stage are as follows:
Proactive Approach
While conducting SCOs, military component must maintain offensive spirit

and be proactive in dealing with the
"Given the same amount of
militants. It is important to forestall
militants' activities, wrest the initiative ......,
intelligence, timldlt;y will do a
and proactively engage them to inflict than audadt;y. •

requisite damage with a view to degrade Clausewitz
their combat potential and eliminate their
will to resist.
Regulated Tempo of Operations
The tendency to storm the opposition must be curbed in the conduct of

sew. The operations must follow a well regulated tempo in the overall design to
achieve the end state in the desired time and space matrix.
Unpredictability In Pattern of Operations
Due to SCW's usually protracted nature, the LEAs tend to follow obvious
pattern of operations. Militants carefully
observe routine, drills and procedures
and exploit the weaknesses. Operations
must not follow a predictable pattern; in/fnlte w,rlety ofcin:urnstanm. •
innovative methods, variations in Sun Tzu
procedures and heterodox approach in
conduct of operations must be the hallmark of a force operating in sew.

34
Effect Bq~ed, Intelligence Driven Operations

Effect based operations on accurate actionable Intelligence must always
take lead in military sphere and speculative military action be avoided . All
operations must achieve specific effects contributing towards overall success of
the campaign, such as:-
• Saps militants' will (Leadership, support base etc.).
• Curtails militants' liberty of action .
• Enhances public confidence in milltary's capability .
• Expands support base within the population In favour of mil itary.
• Helps achieve force conservation .
• Prevents and mitigates collateral damage .
Chaoter Ill: Guidelines for Conduct of SCOs

35
OPERA T/ON AL- MIZAN

BANDA POST OPE.RATION-NORTH WAZIR/STAN
Intelligence based targeted operations can sometimes achieve massive
dividends in overall campaign and significantly alter the future cow-se of
events. Operation Al-Mizan carried out by Pakistan Aimy a3ainst the mJJitanls
in FATA proVJdes a number of examples. Banda Post Operab"on canied out in
July 2007 is a case i11 point A strong militant group was suspected of using a
particular route to conduct terrorist activities agaiJzst both milita1y and civil
ta.rsets in the area. A Strike group compnsing of elements of Special Operations
Task Force was tasked to engage the militants. The Strike Group patiently
obseived the militants and gathered all intelJisence necessary to conduct the
operation. Detailed plans were made incorporating all available resources. On
the day of operation, blocking positions were established on dominating
features, and militants were engaged il1 an isolated t1.1'C8, inco1poratilig f.li'e
support from all available direct and indirect firing weapons. followed by a
ground assault by Infantry eleme11ts. Fleetilig mih·tants were effectively engaged
by both blockins positions and Attack Helicoptei-s. After m11e hours of intense
engagement. militants were completely an111h1Jated and eighteen dead bodies of
ha.rd core militants were recovered The operation not only dented militant's
false myth of invincibility but also gave confidence to local population to sla.11d
agaiJ1st the militants. In all. 14 tribes, sub tribes and vi1/ages around Mir Ali
vowed to stand with the state against the mih"ta.nts which proved to be a
significantgain in the overall success.
Chapter /If· Guidelines for Conduct ofSCOs

36
Integrated Use of Force Multipliers including Air
Synergy, synchronisation and coordination are of immense importance for

successful SCOs. In the conduct of SCOs,
technology plays a vital role towards early
"..... In other words, for every ten
achievement of the set objectives. enemy you kill, you bring 011 twe11ty
Integration of all force multipliers including new recruits to their cause; then
air power, in the overall plan and their essentially you are working
against y ourself."
optimum use must be ensured for attaining
John Abizad
military ascendency in t he conflict zone.
Avoid Unnecessary Dispersion of Force
The operations in sew must be launched from an established firm base and
unnecessary dispersion of force must be avoided before consolidation. Primary
objectives must be the militants' hideouts, training establishments and weapon
caches instead of seizure of territory.
Choke Logistic Support "The guerrilla must swim in the

people as the fish swims in the sea."
As a precursor to use of kinetic means, MaoZeDong
it is essential to isolate the militants from
internal and external support. An effort must be made to cut off militant logistic
support by effectively dominating and controlling all lines of Communications
(LOCs) before conduct of operation. This also requires effective sea ling off the
contiguous zones to preclude spill over of militants and material.
Segregate Reconcilable from Irreconcilables
As all support to the militants is cut and they stand isolated, some of them
may be ready to reconcile while others might still opt to fight. The reconcilable
should be segregated from irreconci lables. Some of the reconciling militants may
prove source of invaluable information for launching subseq uent operations.
However, zero tolerance be shown against the extra state actors(foreign militants)
who must not be allowed to operate within our land. The final disposal of all the
militants regardless of their category (reconcilable and irreconcilables) will be
decided by political and legal authorities.
Avoid Collateral Damage
Indiscriminate use of firepower which causes collateral damage to innocent

civilians be avoided. Use of air and arty must be selective and effective. Efforts
should be made to depopulate the area of operations not only to help control the

37
collateral damage but also enhance own liberty of action by isolating the militants.
Collateral damage can be reduced through accurate, actionable and timely
intelligence and selective but effective use of force. As a principle, no collective
punishment is to be meted out. A suggested Code of Conduct is given at Annex C.
Sustained Logistic Support

Army needs colossa l logistics to maintain itself while engaged in SCOs. In
order to assert itself, it must ensure own liberty of action and deny the same to
militants; for which redundancy in logistic support and communications is
essential.
Monitoring of NGOs
A conflict prone zone will invariably have presence of NGOs undertaking
various relief activities. Whereas these organisations may play a positive role in
mitigating the sufferings of local population, sometimes their activities may be in
conflict with design of operational plan or may pose hindrances in execution of
SCOs. All NGOs' activities in the conflict zone during conduct of operations should
preferably be suspended, however, once allowed to operate; they must be
monitored and regulated.
Careful Handling of Prisoners

Prisoners reveal information which can be significantly useful in con9uct of
operations. Skilful interrogation by expert intelligence operators must, be
organized at every tier. Dedicated teams equipped with talent of local dialect,
knack and art of interrogation may be constituted at division and brigade levels.
Initiatives like De-radicalisation and Emancipation Programme may also
contribute in main streaming of the militants and bring a gradual social change.
The maltreatment of prisoners brings embarrassment and can prove
counter-productive.
Post Operations Stage

Post Operations Stage generally corresponds with the normalization stage of the
sew Conflict Model (figure-1). During this stage the focus shou ld sh ift to denying the
militants space to re -organise, creating conditions and assist civilian authorities for the
re-establishment of control to function normally. During the post operations stage
following should be kept in mind:
Chanter Ill: Guidelines for Conduct of SCOs

38
Graduated Transition to Civil Authority
Before starting to clear or secure an area, plans for its transition to the
civilian authority and subsequent development and rebuilding should be evolved.
Security and rehabilitation of the population must be accorded high priority.
Transition to civil administration should be gradual. In order to prevent
resurgence of militant elements, military must maintain adequate presence even
after bulk of the combat elements has withdrawn.
Provide Enabling Environment for Reconciliation
Reconciliation is primarily a
political function. While political "The soldier must then be prep to become a
authority promotes reconciliation with propagandist, a social worker, a civil
engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy
a view to bring the militants into social
scout. But only for as long as he cannot be
mainstream, military is expected to replaced, for It Is better to entrust civilian
provide enabling environment for such tasks to civilians"
function by ensuring requisite security David Galula
to state apparatus and local populace.
Assist Civil Administration in Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
In order to maintain sustained stability in the conflict zone, reconstruction

and rehabilitation activities should start immediately. Reconstruction would
involve building of affected infrastructure while rehabilitation would necessitate
returning to normalcy. Rehabilitation initiatives being long term have to be
spearheaded by the political/civil administration, however, Army due to its
inherent organisational strength can assist the civil administration in speeding up
the reconstruction process to restore normalcy. Army can provide some specific
assistance besides creating enabling environment for initiating the process of
rehabilitation. Such initiatives may include:
Quick Impact Projects (Qf Ps)
As part of overall strategy, to provide immediate relief to the people
and improve Army's image, QIPs should be initiated as soon as the violence
recedes. The QIPs should be carefully selected and should be the ones that
have visible effect on public perceptions. In the interest of completing
these projects in shortest possible time, provision of uninterrupted funds
and resources must be ensured.
ChnntPr Ill· G11irlPlinP~ fnr Cnnrl11rt n f <;en~

39
Restoration of Essential Services

SCOs disrupt the routine civic activities and usually civil administration
becomes momentarily dysfunctional. Sequel to the conduct of military
operations, an efficient and coordinated plan must be articulated to restore
civic order at priority. The civil administration should be assisted in
restoring essential services in the conflict zone as early as possible. Such
efforts go a long way in winning hearts and minds of the populace.
Legal Aspects and Ethical Considerations
Legal Aspects
Due cognizance of legal aspects must be taken while undertaking operations.
Armed Forces assist the civil authority under the provisions of Chapter 2, Article 245 of
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Under the above article, whenever,
the Armed Forces are called upon to act in aid of civil power, the jurisdiction of High
Court is ousted so long as the Armed Forces remain employed in aid of civil power. In
Army Regulations (Rules) 557 to 559, employment of Army has been further elaborated.
As per the Constitution of Pakistan, functions of the Armed Forces are as under:-
• The Armed Forces shall under the directions of the Federal Government
defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to
law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so.
• The validity of any direction issued by the Federal Government under clause
{1) shall not be in question in any court.
• A High Court shall not exercise any jurisdiction under Article 199 in relation
to any area in which the Armed Forces of Pakistan are, for the time being,
acting in aid of civil power in pursuance of Article 245, provided that this
clause shall not be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court in
respect of any proceeding pending immediately before the day on wh ich
the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power.
• Any proceeding in relation to an area referred to in clause (3) instituted on
or after the day the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power and
pending in any High Court shall remain suspended for the period during
which the Armed Forces are so acting.

42
Local ROEs
In the absence of ROEs from higher authority, commanders in the field

would still be required to frame local ROEs in keeping with their mission, assigned
tasks and the operating environment. Local ROEs are superseded immediately on
receipt of instructions from higher competent authority.
Need to Keep Troops Updated
ROEs may frequently be modified. It is a command responsibility to ensure

that troops are aware of and understand the latest rules governing engagements.
Chapter Ill· Guidelines for Conduct ofSCOs

47
CHAPTER V: CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

-------------------------- ----------- --- ----- --- ------- ---- ---- ------ ------- ---- --
CIMIC - Definition and Purpose
-- ---- ------------ -------- ----- ----- ---------- -- ------ ----------- --- ---- --------- -
CIMIC is central to the manifestation of the principle of multiple lines of operation. It
constitutes a basic tenet during planning and execution of SCOs. CIMIC is necessary for
shaping the operational environment to the mutual benefit of both military and civil actors
and should be an integral part of the planning process right from the outset.
Definition
CIMIC is defined as the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission,
between the military and civil actors,
including civil authority, the national or local C/M/C is defined as the coordination
population and NGOs. While largely dealing and cooperation, in support of the
with the same function areas as CIMIC, the mission, between the military and civil
term Civil Military Coordination {CiMCoord) actors
emphasises on the legal and humanitarian
aspects in greater detail. CiMCoord is defined as the essential dialogue and interaction
between civilian and military actors to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid
competition, minimize conflict, and when appropriate pursue common goals.
Purpose
Delivering tangible results in SCW may require commanders to be allocated greater
resources and the authority to achieve the
effects required through consolidating and "Weapons are an important factor In war, but
not the decisive factor; it is people, not things
channelling additional resources from
that are decisive. The contest ofstrength is not
outside the military establishment. only a contest of military and economic power,
Effective CIMIC allows military but also a contest of human power and morale.
commanders to interact productively with Military and economic power is necessarily
wielded by people.#
the civil counterparts and the environment MaoZeDong
as a whole. It encompasses cooperation,
co-ordination, mutual support, planning
and information exchange between military forces and the in-theatre civil actors. CIMIC
works as a force multiplier because of its potential to rel ease military resources for other
operational tasks or by increasing effectiveness and efficiency of ensuing military activity. It
is also essential when switching from fighting to law-enforcement and development. It
covers the security gap between soldiering, policing and the judicial process that needs to
be appropriately addressed and streamlined. In a wider sense CIMIC contributes to the
following:-
Chapter V.· Civil Military Cooperation

48
Planning and Preparations
Military liaison with civil agencies provides a fundamental input to military
planning processes and contributes to the setting of conditions for mission success. It
also enables an accurate picture of the scope and effectiveness of potential civil
support both material and moral domains.
Support to the Military

Through mutual understanding and trust, CIMIC potentially influences attitudes
and conduct of civil agencies in general and affected populations in particular. CIMIC
can therefore maximise moral and physical support to SCOs, reduce unnecessary
interference or negative influence of hostile propaganda and increase liberty of
actions of the military. It indirectly contributes to force protection, security,
intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.
Support to the Civil Community

CIMIC enhances support to the civil community in the form of information,
personnel, materiel, equipment, communications, specialist expertise or training.
Support to civil community and civil authority is not bargained against reciprocal
actions as the purpose and object of SCOs is the people and the civil authority. SCO
forces are invariably configured for conduct of tasks normally the responsibility of civil
authorities. These tasks are progressively delegated to the civil authority as normalcy
returns.
----- ------ -- --- ------------ --- --- --- --- ---- ----- ---- ------ ---- ------- --- --- ----- --
Essentials of CIMIC
Availability of Legal Advice for military operations
Miscreants, militants and particularly terrorists invariably and frequently overstep

ethical and legal boundaries. The military never acts in contravention to law and the legal
instrument requisitioning its current operations. Legal advice must be sought at an early
stage in planning and should remain available throughout the operations. Even if legally
provided for, commanders must seek to reduce the effect of military operations on non-
combatants and, where possible, facilitate maximum support to them. All military
commanders will ensure that operations are conducted within the law, including
international humanitarian law, the law of the territory in which operations are taking place
and Pakistan's domestic law.
Sharing of Information with Key Actors/Agencies
Military commanders must clearly understand the structure, interests, mandates,

methodologies and capabilities of the key civil agencies involved. This knowledge allows for
classification of the exact nature of support to or from these actors. It also identifies what
Chapter V.· Civil Mil itary Cooperation

49
can or cannot be achieved. The most effective way to understand the skills, knowledge and
capabilities of various non-military organisations in the zone of operations is to establish
relationships before entering an area of operations.
Cultural Awareness
Pakistan has diverse cultures united under a common identity. It is important for
commanders and particularly the troops that come into frequent contact with civilians and
civil authority to understand local culture and practices. In a sensitive operating
environment, an unintentional violation of a local law or custom may seriously alter the
local perception .
Co-operation, Respect and Trust

The hierarchical and regimented functioning of military organisations is often
unknown to civilians as too is the notion of command. Military commander will need to
approach cooperation from a diplomatic and cooperative perspective as opposed to
authoritative instructions. Developing an environment of co-operation and consensus is
generally most productive.
Effective Communication
Effective communication with civil actors will be vital to maintain consent and
generate understanding and co-operation. The establishment of special facilities to meet
this requirement needs to be considered carefully. There is a balance to be struck between
accessibility, force protection and operations' security.
Situational Awareness and Transparency

Classification of information is often the greatest impediment in developing good
situational awareness. While military have many elements of information that need to be
kept secret for operational reasons there are many more that can be easily disseminated to
increase awareness. Similarly, civil actors will also have information that they would be
unwilling to share. Situational awareness can be substantially improved through a dialogue
emphasising information sharing. Following must be considered:-
• The focus must initially be on creating a congenial environment between

political, military, humanitarian and other components of the operational
environment.
• Confusion and misunderstanding may be aggravated by political bias, media
inaccuracy and poor communications.
• Every effort should be made to pass timely and relevant information to the
appropriate civil actors and not to classify information unnecessarily.
• The perception that CIMIC is supporting intelligence gathering or is propagating
disinformation should be guarded against.
Chapter V.· Civil MH,tarv Coooeration

so
Graduated Transition of Responsibility
When planning support to the civil community, it is important to encourage a culture

of ownership and self-help within the local population . Tasks conducted merely to employ
additional capacity or winning of hearts and minds to generate a feel good factor can create
false perceptions of the military mission. Inadequate infrastructure or materiel may result in
dependency on military resources, rendering military disengagement and follow-on civil
activity more difficult. This situation in turn may retard the public confidence in the military.
Before committing resources and initiating Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), commanders must
have a plan for transition of responsibility, including key milestones, measures of
effectiveness, and when and to whom responsibility will transfer. Such transition must be in
line with civil authority's ability, outlook and its capacity to sustain the projects.
Incorporation of Local Perceptions
There are often marked differences between the perceptions of peace and security
held by different communities. For example, gun display in settled areas as compared to
FATA. Commanders require a realistic interpretation of the security needs of the affected
societies and of specific communities, including ethnic denominations within them.
Particular effort should be made to include the views of those who might otherwise be
silent (such as women, the elderly or certain ethnic groups) but who might have a significant
impact on post-conflict reconstruction and long-term stability. Incorporating local
perceptions into the operational planning processes is integral to the planning precepts.
Planning Considerations
Planning considerations for CIM IC include:
Demography and Geography

A complete understanding of demography and geography of the zone of
operations including cultural factors for example religion, ethnicity, gender, cultural
makeup etc is essential for effective planning and conduct of SCOs. Civil
administration has invaluable information which can be of great value and must be
acquired for the planning process.
Human Needs
An accurate assessment of humanitarian and health needs including existing
civil emergency planning and preparedness levels in the zone of operations should be
undertaken. This would help in identifying support needed to civil community in areas
like medical, water supply, sanitation, essential food and shelter etc that may have to
be provided during the SCOs.

51
Local Perceptions about Security Forces
Local perceptions of the security imperatives and attitudes towards security

forces or various tiers of LEAs have implications on the conduct of SCOs. These must
be accurately gauged and taken into consideration at the Planning Stage. Favourable
public perception in support of the operations must be built and maintained
throughout the operations.
Availability of Funding
CIMIC will require availability of requisite funding both for military operations as
well as support to the local community. While planning, therefore, issues related to
requirement and provision of funds should be assessed and coordinated with
concerned government agencies at the appropriate level.
Effectiveness of Civil Structures
The effectiveness of civil society and local community organisations including

their leaders as well as indigenous civilian resources and management skills will have
to be taken into consideration while planning CIMIC. Efforts required to strengthen
the civil structures and to garner their support should be identified and incorporated
in the plan .
Development Plans for the Zone of Operations
While planning CIMIC, national development plans including international

support available for economic or social development of the zone of operations
should be taken into account. Th is will prevent duplication of effort and complement
the post conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Legal Aspects
The interpretation of the legal cover provided to Army by the Constitution and
the political authority (as mentioned in Chapter- Ill) should be clarified and
coordinated. with the concerned civilian authorities. In addition, developmental
activities undertaken in the domain of CIMIC like QIPs and WHAM etc. Must ensure
adherence to local byelaws. This will ensure avoidance of any legal complications at a
later stage.
Coordination Mechanism at Various Levels within the Army
Army Level
A Civil-Military Coordination mechanism will be instituted under GS Branch at GHQ
preferably from within the existing organizational structure to coordinate CIMIC at the Army
level. Necessary assistance may be drawn from dedicated or specially created temporary
team of experts in accordance with the dictates of the situation.
Chaoter V.· Civil Military Cooperation

52
Command, Corps and Div;siona/ Levels
The size, structure and composition of the CIMIC staff will vary depending on the
specific operational circumstances. However, formal organisations will be created at the
Command, Corps and Division levels from within the existing staff duly supplemented by
specialists and experts so as to be able to build requisite capacity for the duration of
operations. An organisation headed by a brigadier/colonel with requisite staff would be
necessary.
Creation of Expert Groups
Various headquarters will invariably need different levels of expertise. Expert groups
will therefore be created to suit the needs of the headquarters. The expertise to be
incorporated will range, depending on the nature of CIMIC, from:-
Departmental Liaison Officers
These are individuals who are familiar with the capabilities, motivation and
limitations of civil actors and with a detailed understanding of their processes.
Legal Advisors
These include individuals conversant with domestic law, LAC and IL. Within the
latter category, humanitarian adviser may also be engaged who have experience of
NGOs as they potentially provide links to humanitarian actors.
Technical Advisors
Rebuilding and rehabilitation effort needs to be planned well in advance.

Availability of engineers and other technical advisors as well as subject matter experts
to inform this vital area should be catered from the outset.

53
CHAPTER VI: GUIDELINES FOR FORCE

DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING REGIME
Force Development for sew
For successful operations across all regimes, the Army must possess two core
capabilities i.e. fighting successful conventional wars and dominating sub-conventional
warfare spectrum. In the past Pakistan Army has been intermittently involved in sub-
conventional warfare, however, lately it has become a major commitment necessitating
enhanced competencies in the sub-conventional domain.
Dominating the sew domain is the most challenging of military capabilities. It entails
conflict management, conduct of SCOs and general security in an environment charged with
uncertainty and an extreme caution on the use of force to ensure minimum collateral
damage. The military relies on basic military skills and training, the sub-conventional conflict
spectrum elevates certain competencies to
higher pedestals. Current capability and skill HFight no battle unprepared, fight no battle
you are not sure of winning; make every effort
level of Pakistan Army is though adequate
to be well prepared for each battle, make
to meet the challenges of sew, some every effort to ensure victory in the given set
realignment in force structure and ofconclitions as between the enemy and
additional skills are essential to orchestrate ourselves."
a robust and comprehensive response. This
chapter provides guidelines for force
development and training of Army for employment in SCOs. The reorientation would be
necessitated in three distinct domains as following:
• Conceptual and moral

• Physical
• Organizational/Equipment
Conceptual and Moral Domain

The envisaged employment of Army in SCOs demands a shift in psychological and
cognitive domains. Areas requiring focus include:
54
Conviction in the Righteousness of Cause
The force being employed in SCOs should have firm convict ion in the
righteousness of cause and complete faith in
the leadership as well as the decision to use "On the eve ofembarking on a major
effort, the counter-insurgent faces
force for establishment of writ of the state.
what is probably the most dlf/lcult
Measures should be taken to guard against problem of war; he has to arm
unfounded and misplaced propaganda aimed himself with a competing cause. H
David Ga/u/a
at creating obscurities about the cause.
Re-orientation for Sub-conventional Mode

Army's employment in SCOs necessitates essential re-orientation and force
readiness from conventional to sub-conventional mode. Presently, this important
transition has been fairly well achieved but would require continual improvements.
Mental Flexibility and Agility

These virtues are hallmarks of any modern and progressive force and are
especially necessitated when a situation of two-front war is confronted; where the
force is required to maintain orientation both for conventional as well as sub-
conventional domains.
Physical Domain
National Security strategy must provide essential direction to all elements of national
power for a cohesive approach to capacity building/enhancement for sew. Army must
acquire core capabilities and competencies as per the dictates of impending challenges
which may include some or all of the: following:
Integration of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (/SR) Capability

for seas
Acquisition and maintenance of credible ISR capability is equally important for
SCOs. It is important that all available ISR resources are integrated to formu late a
synergized intelligence picture of the zone of operations.
Enhanced and Integrated Intelligence Capability at Various Tiers

Meaningful SCOs are not possible without accurate, timely and actionable
intelligence. To this end, intelligence potential of various levels should be effectively
integrated. Capacity building of intelligence setups at successive tiers, starting from
unit level, should be a high priority area requiring appropriate focus.
Chaoter VI: Guidelines for Force Development and Training Regime

55
Ability to Conduct Quick/ Surgical Operations
In seas, there will always be requirement to wrest initiative from the militants
by conducting quick/surgical operations. Force development should focus on this vital
aspect and acquisition of necessary capabilities like mobility, force protection and
related training etc.
Proficiency in Utilizing Vertical Dimension
Aerial platform has emerged as a force multiplier in seas as much as in the

conventional operations. Army's experience in Operation Rah-e-Raast (Peochar Valley)
conducted by SSG is a case in point. Availability of SSG cannot be guaranteed in all the
circumstances, therefore, requirement of conducting such an operation by field
formations will remain a possibility. For this requisite capability needs to be
developed.
Ability to Use the Available Resources in All Dimensions
As force would invariably be stretched over vast areas in seas, requisite number
of trained manpower of different supporting components would not be available at all
locations. Therefore, the troops employed in seas should as far as possible possess
the ability to utilize all available combat resources in their dimensions and should thus
be equipped with basic all arms employment skills.
Redundancy in Logistic Support and Communications
In SCOs, there will be several occasions when entire force or a particular

segment thereof may be deployed in isolated areas for extended periods of time. Such
areas are vulnerable to severance. In order to ensure uninterrupted logistic support
there is a need to build sufficient stocks as well as redundancy. The logistic support
should not be dependent upon single MSR only. Alternative options must always be
explored and should form part of the planning process. Similarly, communication
arrangements (line/wireless) should also have redundancy built-in.
EmpJo.,,ment of Other ArM ,; 'ln Infan try Role
Protracted nature of sew often warrants employment of other arms on infantry

role. Infantry may not be expected to remain fully involved in the entire spectrum of
sew. In order to avoid operational fatigue and make it available for other critical
tasks, infantry may be de-inducted at an appropriate stage and other arms especially
armour, artillery and air defence may be assigned specific roles. This will conserve
fighting potential of infantry to a great degree. Preferable stage for employment of
other arms on infantry role is post Active Conflict Stage.
Chapter VI: Guidelines for Force Development and Training Regime

56
Organizational/Equipment Domain
Re-orientation and Re-structuring of Intelligence Setups
Role of integrated and modern intelligence capability has been sufficiently
highlighted in this document. Thus far our intelligence setups have been largely
oriented and structured for the conventiona l threat environment. There is thus a need
to review the same to bring this important asset in line with the demands of sew.
Force development initiatives need to focus on this vital aspect.
Standardization and Issuance of Equipment for SCOs

Hitherto, the formations/units have been acquiring some of t he essential
equipment for SCOs on ad hoc basis lacking standa rdization without any Gores. It is
imperative that equipment required for the conduct of SCOs should be standardized,
procured and issued to the formations/ units earmarked for SCOs.
Improvement of Means of Mobility

Conduct of SCOs would entail undertaking quick/surgical operations. Necessary
capabilities like improved means of mobility (road/air) should be specifically targeted
in force development. Appropriate number and type of vehicles and helicopters
should be procured to enhance the capacity.
Induction of Protected Vehicles

While conducting SCOs, zones of operation are likely to be infested with IEDs
and other such hazards. Vehicles used for carrying of troops should have sufficient
safeguards like armour plating or Kevlar coating to minimize the impact of blasts etc.
Modification of Existing Equipment where Required

Vehicles and other equi pment may need to be suitably modified for SCOs.
Pakistan Army, over the past decade, has learnt valuable lessons and integral
engineering resources are now capable of carrying out necessary modifications in line
with the dictates of an operation. Further improvement in this area may continue to
be pursued.
Acquisition of State-of-the-Art Electronic Warfare (EW) Equipment

Terrorists and miscreants frequently use remote control devices to initiate IEDs.
In addition, they also use sophisticated communication means such as GSM, and
satellite mobile phones and FM radios etc for coordinating and synergising IOs and
terrorist acts. Jammers that block mobile communications and other radio frequencies
are useful and inexpensive security measure. Development and capacity building in

57
EW technology and procurement of state-of-the-art EW equipment including broad
spectrum jammers should be given high priority while planning force development for
SCOs.
/ED Detection and Disposal Equipment
This can be done through application of advanced technologies or simple

techniques in the field such as:-
• Bomb Disposal (BD) Parties. BD Parties use metal detectors, prodders,

magnetic anomaly detectors and other visual techniques to locate IEDs.
• Neutralisation. This is best achieved by fire from cover at a safe distance
as miscreants frequently employ secondary devices to maximise impact.
Induction of Incapacitating Equipment
During SCOs, Army would not be required to eliminate the militants/ miscreants
in all the circumstances. The first effort would invariably aim at apprehension of the
militants. If it does not succeed, actions to inca pacitate and apprehend would be
taken for which necessary equipment should be procured.
Crowd Control and Screening Equipment

Use of crowd control and screening equipment would often be necessitated
during SCOs. Some of the equipment item to be procured for this purpose includes:-
• Barricades and barriers.

• Roadblocks and filters.
• Walkthrough gates.
• Physical search .
• Use of detectors, cameras and other technologies.
Improved Communication Down to Individual Level

The key to small unit actions which form the backbone of SCOs is good
communications. Ideally, communications should exist down to individual soldiers
when employed on specialized missions however, in a general employment, wireless
communication down to section level would be essential.
Chapter VI: Guidelines for Force Development and Trainina R8{Jime

58
Guidelines for Arms and Services
Experience of SCOs in different terrain and environments reveals that as a common
denominator, following developmental aspects need to be addressed for different arms and
services:-
Armour
The massed employment of armour is generally not visualised in SCO
environment. It would be quite rare to have regimental or squadron sized unified
manoeuvres. Tanks will frequently be required to operate in pairs or as a troop; on
rare occasions a single tank may even operate within a defended locality. The ability
to articulate to such an extent and operate effectively places added demands on
communication, crew skills and command confidence.
• Threat. Main threat to tanks and APCs will emanate from shoulder fired
weapons, particularly RPGs, and on rare occasions recoilless rifles.
• Targets. Rarely will tanks be asked to engage heavily armoured vehicles.
Pillboxes, houses/hutments, bunkers and other soft targets as well as
concentrations of miscreants will constitute the bulk of engagements.
• Choice of Ammunition
o High Explosive Ammunition. Keeping in view the type of targets,
armour-piercing shots of various kinds will have limited utility and
need to be replaced with high explosive ammunition.
o High Explosive Squash Head {HESH). This type of ammunition has
wide utility for destroying walls and bunkers. It has a more
destructive impact than High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) ammo
utilised for the same task.
o HEAT. Has focused utility limited to bunker bursting and taking out
armoured vehicles. HEAT has a very low kill radius as it produces no
primary or secondary splinters.
• Tank as Mobility Pillbox. The tank can be gainfully used as a mobile

pillbox; however, its greatest utility remains in exploiting both mobility
and firepower to achieve shock action.
Arti/frrv
Artillery provides deterrent value through reach, speed and flexibility. During
the entire range of security operations, availability of artillery support is essential.
However, concept of Artillery support in SCOs varies from its employment in

59
conventional role. As opposed to conventional operations, its use in SCOs must be

very selective, focussed and well targeted. Some of the salient aspects are:-
• Overarching Control. Typically, ROEs for artillery, as for other area

weapons, would emphasise a central control. As such, the notion of direct
support becomes redundant in SCOs and is replaced by artillery in range.
• Deployment and Coverage. Traditional battery size deployments under a
regimental framework may seldom be possible. Generally, batteries
would need to be split into sections to cover the entire zone as well as the
selected defensive fires .
• Use of Mix Calibre. Use of mix calibre guns within a gun position may be
resorted to increase range and provide flexibility.
• Use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). In order to minimize
collateral damage, PGMs when available; may be used particularly against
high value targets. However, a cost-benefit analysis should be carried out
before using these expensive munitions.
• Affiliations. Unlike conventional war, it will rarely be possible to maintain
peacetime affiliations of artillery during SCOs.
• Command and Control. Both command and control in the artillery sense
will usually be centralised.
• Local Protection. Local protection of gun position assumes more
importance in SCOs. Gun positions must not be sited in isolation and
enhanced measures should be taken for its local protection.
• Nature and Purpose of Artillery Support. As already alluded, use of Arty
must be minimum, focussed and targeted. As opposed to conventional
operations, the concepts of harassing fire, counter bombardment etc are
not applicable in the conventional sense in SCOs.
Air Defence
Air Defence has limited utility unless hostile air threat from neighbouring hostile
powers is visualized. Nonetheless, a generic aerial threat analysis and planning must
be put in place as part of contingency options. Units and formations must make local
plans based on integral AD assets.
Engineers
The nature of employment mirrors that of conventional warfare with greater
emphasis on survivability tasks during certain phases of operations. Engineers will
frequently be called upon to support civil society in addition to mobility, counter-
mobility and survivability tasks in support of the military effort. During stability and

60
normalisation phases, engineers may constitute the main effort. Areas of emphasis
include:- ~
• Greater capacity for IED detection and bomb disposal.

• Demolition tasks in urban environment.
• Civil engineering tasks in support of construction and development.
• Water supply and other civil engineering tasks.
• Employment in infantry role.
Aviation
Aviation over the period of time has assumed enhanced prominence in sew. Aviation
provides secure aerial platform for variety of tasks including reconnaissance, air lift/
airdrops, convoy escorting, force protection, casualty evacuation, small size snatch, sting or
search and rescue operations and fire raids etc.
Combat aviation is a force multiplier and should be effectively but selectively applied
based on actionable intelligence against important targets with their precision guided
weapon systems. Important tasks/roles that can be assigned to aviation are:-
• Observation . FUR and other state-of-the-art Electronic Warfare

equipment on aviation assets provide vital pre and post engagement
input to commanders. Helicopters also serve as an ideal command
platform or tactical headquarters during operations.
• Combat Aviation Elements
o Attack Helicopter. Provide capability for precision engagement,

area engagement, general harassment and shock action. They
potentially replace major ground operations especially when such
actions are required to be conducted within or through unsecured
zones.
o Gunship. Simple helm punted automatics can provide effective
support to ground forces and serve as scouts or rescue platforms in
the sub-conventional environment.
• Vertical Delivery and Extrication of Forces. Small size snatch, sting or
search and rescue forces can be effectively inserted · using aerial
platforms .
• Logistic Support including Air Ambulance. Sustaining small isolated

posts and casualty evacuation are well-established aviation tasks.
Chapter VI.· Guidelines for Force Development and Training Regime

61
Signals
Aspects related to communication requirements are:-
• Enhanced communication down to various special teams and operational

groups which will invariably place great demand on existing resources. In
most cases, communications assets would need to be supplemented in
accordance with the actual requirement.
• Signal intelligence (sigint) assumes great importance. In addition to radio
companies, formations would need to set up local monitoring stations
and collect signal intelligence.
Logistics
In SCOs, logistics assume greater importance as compared to conventional
operations. The logistic system must be able to respond to the challenges of
operational environment effectively and transform itself to support formations/ units
with special weapons, equipment stores that are over and above the routine
authorisation. Moreover, there may be a need to create additional logistic bases with
enhanced capacity customized to the needs. Basic considerations while planning
logistic support in sew environment are:-
• In SCOs, logistics planning should be flexible and suited for prolonged

duration.
• Logistic Preparation of the Zone of Operation (LPZO) has to be
environment specific where existing civilian logistics, economic and
administrative set ups will play an important role.
• Security of logistic bases, units and convoys is of special significance as
these bases, convoys and units are usually targets of the militants.
Training Regime for SCW
Training Philosophy
sew has emerged as a potent threat in addition to traditional conventional threat for
which armed forces are fundamentally tra ined . These hybrid scenarios constitute two core
capabilities for which Pakistan Army must comprehensively train i.e. fighting conventional
wars and dominating the sub-conventiona l spectrum. Accordingly, training must be planned
and executed keeping in view the diverse nature and multiple dimensions of the challenges.
Troops therefore must be imparted specialized and focused training commensurate with
environment of the conflict zone.
Chapter VJ.- Guidelines for Forr:e Development and Training Regime

62
Training Perspective
Training for sew should focus on enhancing the individual and collective combat
capabilities. The individual training should emphasize on faith in doing what is right, that
requires emphasis on motivational training, stress on individual combat skills, and
development of leaders to take timely/logical decisions and initiation of integrated and
synchronized response at every level.
An objective evaluation system is equally essential to ensure that training in the Army
is standardized as a whole and formations are following the training guideline spelt out by
the GHQ. The evaluation system should focus to bring about progressive improvement in
the training methodology by continually revising and revisiting the training regime.
Training Guidelines
Broad Areas of Focus
Training is a command responsibility. Training guidelines for sew are:-
• Focus essentially on junior leaders' traits such as initiative,

aggressiveness, perseverance, and quick and correct decision-making.
• Focus on least experienced i.e. newly posted recruits; by organizing
additional sew training before assigning operational responsibilities.
• Focus on tactics and hands on training, with emphasis on back to basics
and practical application.
• Train the trainers and ensure availability of adequate nucleus staff and
qualified training teams to befittingly implement the training policy and
instructions.
• Institutionalize the system of feedback to address gray areas and ensure
mid course corrections and improvements.
• Ensure availability of training resources .
Thrust Lines
The spectrum of sew requires a broad range of individual skills and general
awareness including knowledge of the militants' ideological moorings, tactics, local
customs, social values, language and the civilian population in the area. Individual
training aspects should focus to deal with a variety of challenges. All forms of training
must be directed towards developing following essential personality attributes in a
soldier:-
• Faith.
• Trust in the cause.
Chapter VI: Guidelines for Fon::e Development and Training Regime

63
• Courage.
• Comradeship.
• Discipl ine and patience.
• Initiative.
• Physical fitness and mental endurance.
• Adaptability.
Basic Training
The basic skills across all arms and services can be summed up in the catch phrase
'Field-craft, Firing and First aid' (FF&F). Commanders at all levels must stress upon and
implement the philosophy of "back to basics" . Every soldier must physically and
psychologically prepare himself to deal with sub-conventional threat. Our training
philosophy should aim to instil the essence of "train hard" into our soldier.
Pre-induction Training (PIT}
Sub-conventional threat should be acknowledged at par with the conventional threat

and mind-set should transform accordingly. After a formation/unit has been earmarked to
undertake SCOs, its pre-induction t raining should commence in line with GHQ and
concerned formation's training guidelines/policy. Proficiency level to be achieved should be
fixed as per the role/task of a particular unit. Before induction, GHQ Doctrine and Evaluation
Directorate should evaluate the training standards achieved by the unit.
Specialized Training
Depending on the zone of operation and nature of role/task to be performed by a

unit, specialized training should be organised by SSG specialists/qualified teams.
Training Methodology
Most of the training requirements for conducting SCOs revolve around the basic
principles of conventional training. However, some adjustments and essential changes
through additional training will be needed to convert from the conventional to
unconventional. GHQ training guidelines, formations training instructions and relevant
General Staff Publications (GSPs) such as Counter-Intelligence (AP 2275E), Interrogation
(AP 2276E), Counter-Insurgency Operations, Part -1 and 2 (GSP 1841) and Operations in Aid
of Civil Power (AP 3305E) may also be referred while planning for t raining. Some of the
training pre-requisites are as under:-

64
Additional Training Skills

Individuals earmarked to take part in SCOs will require additional training in
areas applicable to their roles in the operations. Training for SCW should include
achieving proficiency in the following:-
• Drills and mechanics involved in fighting in built-up areas in rural and
urban settings.
• Route and site surveys/surveillance and escort duties.
• Drills/procedures involved in protection while on the move. Drills/
procedures for move of foot convoys in hostile areas especially in cities.
• Expert handling of weapons with different firing positions.
• Short distance shooting techniques in different conditions and close
quarter battle environments.
• Cordon and search operations.
• Establishment of roadblocks/checkpoints.
• Sniping skills and stage protection duties.
• Ambushes, raids and apprehension of miscreants/terrorists.
• Basic knowledge about use of explosive devices.
• Unarmed combat.
• Training of negotiators for dealing with hijackers/hostage-takers.
• Psychological training of all ranks, especially the junior leaders, to respond
to complex situations.
• Driving skills by all ranks and awareness about handling of hi-technology
equipment, which are in use of terrorists.
• Search and rescue operations using helicopters.
Emphasis on Practical Training

Maximum emphasis is laid on practical tainting at various tiers with a view to
make both officers and men proficient and confident to operate under stressful
conditions. Anti Terrorist Training (ATT} exercises be structured to ensure that each
individual is physically and mentally inoculated to cope with high-risk situations.
Different scenarios of situational training be simulated and dovetailed realistically in
training exercises.

65
Multi Echeloned Training
SCOs training should be institutionalized at all levels. It should include training

at Army level schools of instructions, regimental centres, formation HRDCs and at the
unit level, as under:-
• Schools of Instructions/Training Centres
o Appropriate syllabi dealing with conceptual aspects of sew should

be included in Young Officers' course and mid-career courses.
The curriculum may includ e introduction to doctrine, operating
procedures, planning and conduct of operations at battalion and
company level.
o Command and Staff Co llege should train officers in SCW planning
and execution processes at varied comma nd and staff levels.
o In training centres, recruits training should improve individual skills
in basics such as weapon handling, fi ring in close quarter battle,
unarmed combat and general awareness about sew environment.
• Formation Level. Major responsibility of sew training lies wit h the

form ation as under:-
o Battle schools must organize Anti Terrorist Training (ATT) at

formation level through nucleus st aff at t heir ATT complexes.
o The training must be contingency specific as visualized by the
respective formations.
o Conduct of tactical exercises in settin~s similar to likely operational
areas (built-up areas and mock-up villages) followed by detailed
discussion on models / sketches and air photographs of the same
areas.
o Conduct of study periods including central discussions, model
discussions, tactical exercises without troops, presentations and
demonstrations for all ranks. Representatives from civil armed
forces, rangers, police and concerned civil departments may also be
invited.
• Unit Level. Basic individual/collective skills should be enhanced through

ATT; more emphasis should be laid on physical fitness and weapon
handling.

66
Miscellaneous Training Aspects
Regional Languages Proficiency
Corps would organize regional language courses (as applicable in accordance

with Area of Responsibility (AOR)) to improve the language proficiency of the
individuals. As a policy, all ranks of Quick Reaction Force (QRF) should have reasonable
regional language proficiency to facilitate operations in sub-conventional
environments.
Capacity Enhan cement for Training in Special Operations
Capacity for training of troops in special operations should be enhanced with

focus on training of Junior Commissioned Officers/Non-Commissioned Officers with
adequate bias towards SCO training.
Aned,a Hand/mg Train,ng
In the present environment, media both friendly and hostile has emerged as an
influential player in shaping opinions at domestic and international levels. Interaction
with media should therefore, as far as possible, be institutionalized. There is a need to
train officers, preferably down to the unit level, on effective media handling skills so
that correct perspective is communicated while remaining within the overall
Information Operation (10) policy of the Army. Formalized media handling training
should therefore be incorporated in the curricula of various training institutions.
Traming for Intelligence Collection
In order to be fully abreast with the situation and to avoid any intelligence
vacuum, formations should keep their integral intelligence set-ups appropriately
deployed and adequately functional at all times. Threat prone areas, hard-core
militants and activities of anti-state elements should be constantly monitored.
Intelligence agencies must also establish close liaison with their civil government
counterparts to gain additional information and early warning about the activities of
terrorists, saboteurs and suspected persons. To achieve this, training for intelligence
collection processes must be imparted at all levels.
Development of TSDs
All formations should formulate comprehensive TSDs on fighting in sub-

conventional environment. The TSDs should include important aspects like
intelligence collection, planning and execution of operations; special emphasis should
be laid on 'cordon and search operations' and protection during move.

73
• Headquarters and bases for security forces-necessary for the

security forces to function .
• Police stations, courthouses, and jails-necessary for countering
crime and very beneficial for SCO.
• Communications and media infrastructure, such as rad io towers,
television stations, cellular towers, newspaper offices, or printing
presses-important to information flow and the opinions of the
populace .
• Roads-allow for movement of populace, goods, insurgents, and SCO
forces.
• Bridges-allow for movement of populace, goods, insurgents, and
SCO forces.
• Ports of entry, such as airports and sea ports-allow for movement of
populace, goods, militants, and SCO personnel.
• Dams-provide electric power, drinking water, and flood control.
• Electrical power stations and substations-enable functioning of the

economy and often important for day-to-day life of the populace.
• Refineries and other sources of fuel-enable functioning of the
economy and often important for day-to-day life of the populace.
• Sources of potable water-important for public health.
• Sewage systems-important for public health.
• Clinics and hospitals-important for the health of the populace; these
are protected sites.
• Schools and universities-affect the opinions of the populace; these
are protected sites.
• Places of religious worship-affect opinions of the populace; often of
great cultural importance; these are protected sites.
Capabilities
Capabilities refer to the ability of local authorities to provide the populace
with key functions or services. Commanders and staff ana lyse capabilities from
different levels, but generally put priority on understanding the capability of the
civil authority to support the mission. The most essential capabilities are those
required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that order. Some of the more
important capabilities are:
• Publ ic administration -effectiveness of bureaucracy, courts, and
other parts of the government.
• Public safety-provided by security forces, military, police, and
in~elligence organizations.
• Emergency services-fire departments, ambulance services, and so
forth.
• Public health-clinics, hospitals.
Appendix I to Annex B: Information Imperatives of Civil Considerations
74
• Food.
• Water.
• Sanitation.
Civic Services
Providing these services is a measure of a government's capabilities. In

addition, the relative demand for these services is a measure of some of the
interests of the populace:-
• Security.
• Water.
• Electricity.
• Academic (schools and universities).
• Medical.
• Sewage.
Trash (waste disposal).
Organizations
Organizations include non-military groups or institutions operating in the

ZOO. Because such organisations interact with the populace, LEAs and military
forces, and each other, they are influenced by and in turn influence the function
of those with whom they interact with. Some organizations may be indigenous to
the area. These may include:-
• Religious organizations.
• Political parties.
• Labour unions.
• Criminal organizations.
• Community organizations.
Other organizations may come from outside the ZOO such as:-
• Multinational corporations.
• United Nations agencies.
• NGOs.
People
• This refers to non-military personnel in or rel-ated to the ZOO. The term

includes all civilians as well as those outside the ZOO whose actions, opinions,
or political influence can affect the mission.
Appendix I to Annex 8: Information Imperatives of Civil Consk!erations

75
• An analysis of 'People' should focus on and distinguish them through:-
• Capabilities.
• Needs.
• Affiliations.
• Intentions.
It is useful to separate people into distinct categories. When analysing people,

following factors need to be considered:-
• Historical.
• Cultural.
• Ethnic .
• Political.
• Economic .
• Humanitarian factors .
• An understanding of the people in a ZOO is developed using socio-cultural

factors analysis. This analysis addresses the following factors:-
• Society
o Populations with a shared political authority and

identity.
o There will usually be one society in a ZOO; the

presence of more than one society in a region may
contribute to the development of an uneasy peace.
• Social Structure. Social structure describes the relationships

between groups within a society. It can be analysed in terms of
the following :-
0 Groups.
0 Networks.
0 Institutions.
0 Roles and statuses.
0 Organizations.
Appendix I to Annex B: Information Imperatives of Civil Considerallons

76
• Groups
o Racial, ethnic, religious, or tribal identity groups exist
within any society. It is important to know the following
about them:
0 The types of groups present in the ZOO.
0
The size of the groups.
0 The locations and distribution of the groups.
0 Formal connections and relationships between
and within the groups, such as treaties or
alliances.
0 Informal connections and relationships
between and within groups, such as tolerance,
vendettas, and cooperation.
o Is the militant leadership composed of one
particular group?
o Is the militant rank and file composed of one
particular group?
o Is the government leadership composed of one
particular group?
o Do key leaders belong to more than one group?
If so, do they have conflicting values that may
be exploited?
0 Are the groups organized as networks,
institutions, or organizations?
• Networks. A network is a series of direct or indirect ties within a

social structure that serve a purpose, such as business,
emotional support, or criminal activity .
• Institutions. Institutions are groups engaged in patterned

activity to accomplish a common task. It is important t o know
which institutions are in the ZOO and their relative importance.
• Social Norms. Social norms are unspoken rules associated with
statuses and roles. Understanding norms allows soldiers to
interact with p eople positively.
• Values. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of
conduct or end state is preferable or desirable. Each gro up to

77
which an individual belongs inculcates that individual with its

values. It is important to understand the following about values:
o What are the values of each group? Such values may
include the following: tolerance, stability, prosperity,
social change, and self-determination .
o Do the values promoted by the militancy correspond to
the values of all the social groups in the ZOO?
o Do the values promoted by the militant movements
correspond to the values of the government?
o Can the differences in values be exploited by other
hostile forces including foreign?
• Attitudes. Attitudes are affinities for and aversions to groups,
persons, and objects. It is very important to evaluate public
attitudes toward the government, the militants, and own forces.
It is important to understand the following about values:
o Attitude toward other social groups.
o Attitude toward militant ideology or ideologies.

o Attitude toward the government that may contribute to
the militancy.
• Interests. Interests comprise the needs, desires, and other core
motivations that drive behaviour. An interest that has been
frustrated may become a grievance, meaning a resentment that
motivates action. A group or individual's interests can be
satisfied or frustrated by militants or LEAs to gain the support of
the people. Interests fall into the following basic categories:
o Physical security
o Use the following questions to assess the status of
physica l security:
o Is the civilian popu lation safe from harm?
o Is there a functioning police and judiciary
system?
o Are the police fair and non-discriminatory?
0 If the police are not providing civi lians with
physical security then that is satisfying this
basic need?
Appendix I to Annex B : Information Imperatives of Civil Considerations
78
o If the government fails to provide security to civilians,
they may look for alternative security guarantees from
armed groups i.e. militants. Failure to provide security
may erode the government's legitimacy in the eyes of
its citizens.
• Economic Resources. Use the following questions to assess the
status of physical security:-
o Does the society have a functioning economy?

o Are production, distribution, and consumption systems
functioning?
o Do civilians have fair access to land and property?
o Is a multinational corporation or central/ provincial
government monopolizing the natural resources?
o Who provides basic services (sewage, water, electricity,
education, sanitation, medical)?
• Political Participation . Use the following questions to assess
the status of physical security:-
o Do all members of the civilian population have a

guarantee of political participation?
o Is there ethnic, religious, or other discrimination?
o Is the government (or the elements within it) violating
human rights?
o Are there legal, social, or other policies that contribute
to the militancy?
Additional Civil Considerations

The following civil considerations should be evaluated:-
• Languages and dialects spoken by the populace .

• Education levels, including literacy rates, and availability of
education.
• Means of communication and its importance to the populace .
• Mass media, such as print publications, radio, television, or the

Internet.
• Local and political history.
• Events leading to the militancy.

79
• Events contributing to the development of the militancy.
• The availability of weapons to the general population .

86
• Rule 128
o Prisoners of war must be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities.
o Civilian internees must be released as soon as the reasons which
nece.ssitated internment no longer exist, but at the latest as soon as
possible after the close of active hostilities.
Displacement and Displaced Persons
• Rule 129
o Parties to an international armed conflict may not deport or forcibly transfer

the civilian population of an occupied territory, in whole or in part, unless
the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so
demand.
o Parties to a non-international armed conflict may not order the
displacement of the civilian population, in whole or in part, for reasons
related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand.
• Rule 131. In case of displacement, all possible measures must be taken in

order that the civilians concerned are received under satisfactory conditions of
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition and that members of the same
family are not separated.
• Rule 132. Displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in sa fety to
thei r homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their
displacement cease to exist.
Other Persons Afforded Specific Protection
• Rule 135. Children affected by armed conflict are entitled to special respect
and protection .
• Rule 136. Chi ldren must not be recruited into armed forces or armed groups.
• Rule 137. Children must not be allowed to take part in hostilities.
• Rule 138. The elderly, disabled and infirm affected by armed conflict are
entitled to special respect and protection.
Implementation
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law
• Rule 141. Each State must make legal advisers available, when necessary, to
advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of
international humanitarian law.
Annex D: Customary International Humanitarian law

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viii

challenges compounded by unique regional security dynamics thus rendering it vulnerable

incentivized Sub-conventional Warfare (SCW) as an instrument to achieve politico-military

of preventing escalation to a level where application of military instrument may be

Rawalpindi, Inspector General Training and Evaluation

Host of domestic, regional and global terrorist organisations perceive Pakistan as a

sew is a conflict between non-state, sub-state or extra-state actors and instruments

Any meaningful effort to resolve or

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Purpose and Scope

CHAPTER I: CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF

"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge"

The Spectrum of sew

Sub-conventional conflict covers a wide range of militant activities undertaken by

Chapter I: Conceptual Aspects of sew

sew is distinct from conventional warfare. Comparison of conventiona l and sub-

Latent Con/I/ct Stage

Conflict Emergence Stage

Chapter l" Conceptual Asf)8Cls of SCW

politico-militant philosophy, aggregation of resources (funding, access to weapons,

Normalcy Threshold Phase

Active Conflict Stage

Chapter I: Conceptual Aspects of sew

Internally Driven Militancy

Externally Driven Militancy

• To create calibrated instability by exploiting existing vulnerabilities to achieve

Chapter I: Conceptual Aspects of SCW

• Psychological Operations (Psy Ops) .

• Electronic Warfare (EW) .

• Support to public diplomacy (usually as an extension of Civil Military

CHAPTER II: ENVIRONMENT AND CHALLENGES

Pakistan Army has frequently been called upon to conduct sub-conventional

Ineffective State Institutions

Chapter II: Environment and Challenges

Pakistan is situated at the crossroads of various civilizations and is a melting

Growing Influence of Non -State Actors

Flawed · policy formulation, deep-rooted distortion and structural constraints

state and recourse to any available means to give Kevin J Gree e

vent to their frustration. Economic factors

• Inability of the state to ensure provision of basic necessities of life to its

Chapter fl: Environment and Challenges

• Low literacy rate and inadequate education system.

External Factors Impacting the Security Calculus

• Create calibrated instability in Pakistan in order to render state

Chaptrr fJ:. Environmvrt and ChoIJenges

• Embroil Pakistan's Armed Forces in protracted sub-conventional conflict for

Support of Inimical States and Organizations to Non-State Actors

Threat from Transnational Forces

Fallout of Regional Dynamics

• Eroded writ of the State on various institutions.

Chapter I.I: EnYk<mment aod Challenges

• Overburdened Pakistan's economy due to huge influx of refugees.

--- ----------------------- ------- ---- ------ ------------------ --- --------------- ----

FIGURE 3: IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE

Envisaged Nature of sew

Chapter II: Environment and Challenges

In addition, global connection driven by mass media and information preponderance

Broad Contours of Militants' Manoeuvre

Chapter II: Environment ond Challenges

Information Operations by the Militants

Immediat e Effects Mai or Effec t s

FIGURE 4: EFFECTS INTENDED THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Chapter ff:; Envirorrment arrd Cfial[enges

Exploitation of Poor Governance

Disruption of State Machinery

Discrediting the Target State