People vs.

Sim Ben

(PENALTY)

Facts:

Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating
paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic films of
indecent or immoral scenes inside his es+tablishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public
view in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without
the aid of counsel.

What transpired when the appellant was arraigned on January 31,1953 shows that his rights were
fully protected and safeguarded. The Court complied with its duty when it informed the appellant that
it was his right to have the aid of counsel. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains
to ascertain whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered.
Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and
entered a plea of guilty to the information. At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of
P200 be imposed upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months and
1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.

Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine
would be imposed. 

Issue:

Whether or not the promise of leniency renders a penalty void.

Ruling:

The Court held that a promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render the
sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out a penalty which is provided by
law.

The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant seems to bear out
his claim; but such recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty
of the crime charged against him. 

Note: I included the specifics po since maikli lang po yung case pero the one stated above
summarizes what happened.

Additional: What transpired during the arraignment (Specifics)

The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called
for trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired
the aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have the
information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in the affirmative.
The court interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he
entered a plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the
punishment as provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The
Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the
fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the defendant.
 People vs. Bindoy

(Criminal Liability)

Facts:

The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused
is homicide. The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this
instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in
convicting him of the crime of homicide.

The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wine shop in
the barrio market located at the Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of
the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas and his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who
was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done
so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife,
attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio
left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In
the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the
bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of
the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.

Issue:

Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable.

Ruling:

The Court held that the injury was accidental and the defendant should be acquitted.

The Court stated that there is no evidence to show that Bindoy committed the act so deliberately and
with the intention of committing a crime.

If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of
doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully
commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the
case.
 US vs. Ah Chong

(JUSTIFIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES: MISTAKE OF FACT)

Facts:

The Defendant and the deceased were both employed in the same place and usually slept at the
same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to
open the door, and called out twice, "Who is there?" He received no answer, and fearing that the
intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed and again called out: "If you enter the room I will kill you."
At that moment he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he
was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder, who
turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon he called to his employers and rushed back into the room
to secure bandages to bind up the wound. The Defendant was charged with murder.

Issue:

Whether or not a person can be held criminally responsible by reason of mistake of fact.

Ruling:

The Court held that under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, provided that the
ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

if such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a particular intent which, under the law,
is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions governing negligence, and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal
Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different
from that which he intended to commit.
 People vs. Jaurige

(Justifying, Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances)

Facts:

Defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide. From said judgment of conviction,
defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon and in her brief
filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed - That the lower court erred in (1) not holding that said
appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be completely
absolved of all criminal responsibility, (2) not finding in her favor the additional mitigating
circumstances that (a) she did not have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually
committed, and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and (3) in
holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
having been committed in a sacred place."
Note: There are prior events pa po before the killing which explains why Avelina had a knife. Pero I
don’t think kailangan pa po isama sa digest. I’ll include it as an additional para po aware kayo sa
mga ginawa ng deceased sa appellant.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father,
also for the purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest
the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence
of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her
right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on
the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado
Capina, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand
the fan knife, which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's
offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound
about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be completely absolved of criminal liability considering her act
was committed in defense of her honor. (Art 11 Par. 1 of RPC)

Whether or not there should be additional mitigating circumstances stating that the appellant did not
have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that the appellant
voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities.

Whether or not the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.

Ruling:

1. The Court held that she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.

When the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the
door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her
consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people,
about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant; there
was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave a thrust at the
 base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4½ inches deep, causing his
death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive.

2. The Court ruled that The fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant, admitting having stabbed the deceased,
and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the
said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities should be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in her favor.

It appearing that defendant and appellant merely wanted to punish the offending hand of the
deceased with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single
wound, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
actually committed should be considered in her favor.

3. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious
worship, cannot be legally considered, where there is no evidence to show that the defendant
and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel the fatal night.

Additional: Prior events before the killing

On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her
and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and
kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl,
slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the
following morning when she informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long
fan knife, whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.

On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant,
and surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with
the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and
brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room
and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's
mother made an attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that
Amado probably did not realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant,
Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's parents came to the
house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue
was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.

In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely
boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked
him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that Avelina
again received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
 People vs. Guillen

Facts:

The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond unreasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
multiplefrustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President of the Philippines, Manuel
Roxas on March 10, 1947.

During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidate of Manuel Roxas.
According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing to redeem and fulfill the
promises made by President Roxas during the elections. The accused was then determined to
assassinate the President and had the opportunity to do so on the night of March 10, 1947 when the
President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila.

Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost
said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an
American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of
whisky. The accused stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about
seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech,
was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing
his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open
space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the
President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to
the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the
platform. 

It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela — who died on
the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade and several
other.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence

Ruling:

The Court held that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea
of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. 
The case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a
throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave
felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted
murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang
were the injured parties.

Additional:

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder (not homicide through reckless
imprudence) committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the
President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information,
without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating
circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires
that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby
do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of
the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial
court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
 Palaganas vs. People

Facts:

Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but
later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing.
Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. When
Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime got irritated and insulted. He felt
that he was being mocked by Melton that caused him to go to the latter’s table and uttered
statements which began the fight. Ferdinand sought help from Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the
bar and upon seeing the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot
Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was killed,
Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder.

Asserted Facts presented by the defense:

According to the appellant, before reaching the bar, he was suddenly stoned by the Ferrer brothers
and was hit on different parts of his body, so he turned around and struggled to run towards his
house. He then met his brother, Ferdinand, going towards the bar, so he tugged him and urged him
to run towards the opposite direction as the Ferrer brothers continued pelting them with large stones.
Rujjeric then noticed that Ferdinand was carrying a gun, and, on instinct, grabbed the gun from the
latter, faced the Ferrer brothers and fired one shot in the air to force the brothers to retreat. Much to
his surprise, however, the Ferrer brothers continued throwing stones and when (sic) the appellant
was again hit several times. Unable to bear the pain, he closed his eyes and pulled the trigger.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be absolved from criminal liability on the grounds of self-
defense.

Ruling:

The Court held that the reasonableness of the means employed by the person defending himself
may take into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other circumstances
showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.

It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are
constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.

In the case at bar, the petitioner’s act of shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable and
necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly
stated by the trial court, petitioner’s gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the
Ferrer brothers. Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer brothers allegedly threw stones at
the petitioner, the latter had other less harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers. Such act
failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or repelling an
unlawful aggression.
 People vs. Ritter

(Art. 266 A to D: Rape)

Facts:

On October 10, 1986, about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and
Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These
two children were chosen from among a bunch of street children.

Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. When Rosario came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then
placed himself between the two children and accused started fingering Rosario. Ramirez saw
accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario. After what he saw, Ramirez fell asleep.

The following morning, the accused paid Ramirez P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. After Ritter left,
they went downstairs, and Rosario told Jessie that the American inserted something in her vagina.
The following day, Ramirez claimed that he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her
vagina and when he asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed.

(7 months after)

On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging saw Rosario
being ogled by people because Rosario’s skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul
smelling. He took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an
unconscious condition.

Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged in her
vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor.

Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but several
attempts proved futile because the said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was
covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis.

The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for an operation on May 19, 1987,
after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr.
Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained.

It was on the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen. He
found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the peritoneum, and the
pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have
septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been caused
by infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario.
The foreign object which is a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario
while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus, and blood. Dr. Rosete considered
the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz.

Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following
day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her dead at 2:00 to 2:15 in the
afternoon of May 20, 1987.

Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated
therein that the cause of death was a cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by
the foreign object lodged in the intra-uteral vaginal canal.

Sis Palence and others were able to trace, and informed her that her granddaughter was already
dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor.

Rosario’s grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla filed a case against Ritter. Ritter pleaded not guilty.

Olongapo RTC’s ruling:

Ritter is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Rape with homicide under Art. 335 (now Art. 266 A to D) of
RPC.

Penalty: Reclusion Perpetua.

Issues:

Whether or not Ritter was liable of rape with homicide.

SC’s ruling:

It is held that the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. The
established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a
foreign object inside Rosario’s vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the
appellant could be the guilty person. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore
should not be taken against the accused.

If the device inserted by the appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to
endure the pain and discomfort until May 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident.
Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.

It was also improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active
properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a young
girl’s vaginal canal.

It is also held that no rape was committed. The prosecution didn’t satisfy the evidence for age. It
is of doubtful value. Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more
reliable document as to Rosario’s birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on
December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident
on October 10, 1986.

The evidence also shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In
fact, she appears to have consented to the action as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while
her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00.The environmental circumstances coupled with
the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a
poor street child, was a prostitute in spite of her tender age.

The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot.

People vs. Beronilla

(CRIMES COMMITTED UPON ORDERS OF SUPERIOR OFFICERS;

LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT)

Facts:

Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico filed an appeal from the
judgement of the Court of First Instance of Abra, which convicted them of murder for the execution of
Arsenio Borjal, the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be
aiding the enemy.

Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats he received and was succeeded by Military
Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the
15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his
appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo
men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or abetting the enemy.

Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra to escape the bombing in Bangued, he was placed
under custody and was tried. The Trial lasted for 19 days and the jury found Borjal guilty on all counts
(espionage, aiding the enemy, abuse of authority). Death penalty was imposed.

Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. The records were
returned by Lt. Col. Arnold adding that the matter was best handled by the La Paz Government and whatever
disposition taken was approved. Col. Arnold also stated “…I can only compliment you for your impartial
but independent way of handling the whole case.”

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the
murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which
granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted
on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was
committed after the expiration of time.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for
obedience to lawful order of superior.

Ruling:

The Court held that the accused acted upon orders of superior officers that they, as military
subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality,
without any fault or negligence on their part, the act is not accompanied by criminal intent. The
maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea—a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent.

(U. S. vs. Católico, 18 Phil., 507; People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of
Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CEILITO ORITA

G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990

Facts:

The accused appellant, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of Frustrated Rape before
the Regional Trial Court in Eastern Samar, lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
Cristina S. Abayan, complainant, against her will and without her consent. The facts stated that the
appellant forced himself to enter complainant’s room with a knife to complainant’s neck. Both in
complainant’s room, appellant then ordered complainant to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina.
She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant
could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving.
Complainant escaped and was brought to a hospital where she was physically examined. The trial
court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
victim, as stated in the medical certificate and from the testimony of the medico-legal officer, and
thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only. Not satisfied with the decision, the accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals set aside its decision and forwarded it to
the Supreme Court, with the appellant stating that the trial court erred in and declaring that the crime
of frustrated rape was committed by the accused. The accused contends that there is no crime of
frustrated rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused appellant’s conviction for frustrated rape is proper.

Ruling:

No. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that, “A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.”
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito
Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA

G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1931

Facts:

Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson with the former as
principal by direct participation and the latter as accomplice. Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo
Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her codefendant Martin Atienza in the barrio of
Masocol, municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan. Domingo Joaquin filed a complaint of
adultery against the two, but dismissed the complaint, with the promise that they would leave the
barrio. The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño . Months
later, accused Romana Sivestre then met her son in Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him for
some nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. Accused
Martin Atienza then followed. Martin Atienza then told Silvestre’s son and his wife to take their
furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it, as revenge to the barrio of Masocol,
who he said instigated the adultery complaint. With Atienza armed with a gun, Silveste fell silent for
the whoe act of arson by Atienza. Counsel of the accused- appellants prayed for the affirmance of
the judgment with reference to the appellant Martin Atienza, but states that the lower court erred in
convincing Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime charged in the information.

Issue:

Whether or not Romana Silvestre should be convicted as an accomplice of the crime.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that in the case of Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material
cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and
silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation.

Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be
one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other
to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous
actions.

By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference
to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-appellant
Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NARCISO CABUNGCAL

G.R. No. L-28451 August 1, 1928

51 Phil 803

Facts:

The appellant, Narciso Cabungcal, was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the
crime of homicide. Appellant, together with several persons, among which were his wife and son.
Deceased Juan Loquenario, who was a fellow passenger, started rocking the boat. Fearing that
deceased Juan Loquenario might capsize the boat, appellant told the deceased no to do it. Paying
no attention to warning, appellant hit struck deceased on the forehead with an oar. Deceased fell in
the water but a little while after emerged and rocked the boat again, saying he was going to capsize
it. Appellant hit deceased on the neck with the same oar, submerging the deceased again. With the
movement that the appellant made in giving him the second blow, the boat upset and then the
appellant proceeded to save his passengers. The appellant, after having thus saved his passengers,
proceeded to search for the deceased but was unable to find him and his body was recovered later.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be exempt from criminal liability.

Ruling:

In view of all the circumstances of the case, in doing what the appellant did was in lawful defense of
the lives of the passengers of the boat, two of whom were his wife and child.

The appellant having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat and
the means employed having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it was at the cost of
the life of the deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability.
Reversing the judgment appealed from, the appellant is acquitted, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RAMON MABUG-AT

G.R. No. L-25459 August 10, 1926

Facts:

The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon Mabug-at found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime of frustrated murder. The accused was in a
relationship with Juana Buralo. When accused asked Juana for a walk, she refused. The accused
then went to where Juana is found, revolver in hand, demanding to see her. The accused waited
until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs, when they went in the direction of their
house. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway,
fired a shot from his revolver which severely wounded Perfecta Buralo. The appellant appealed from
this judgment and contends that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a
firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven that it was the accused’s intention to kill.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be criminally liable for frustrated murder.

Ruling:

Yes. The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his
criminal liability.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

Facts:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively,
were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence The
defendant-appellants were tasked to bring escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and
Irene in Cabanatuan and get him dead or alive. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the
room of Irene, and seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. It turned out later
that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. While Tecson was sleeping in his room
with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or
successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any
reasonable inquiry as to his identity.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant-appellants are criminally liable for the murder of Serapio Tecson.

Ruling:

Yes. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder. There is, however, a
mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in
article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to it, a person incurs no criminal liability
when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two
requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants
have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to
arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered.
But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in
the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any
resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JUAN QUIANZON

G.R. No. 42607 September 28, 1935

Facts:

Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte ,
Juan Quianzon appeal for the review of the case. A novena for the suffrage of the soul of the
deceased person was being held. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food
of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen who had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third
time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly
peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where the people were gathered
exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying. He showed to those present a wound in his abdomen.
Aribuabo died as a result of this wound days after the incident. The prosecution claims that it was
Juan Quianzon who wounded Aribunao. Quianzon confessed that he had applied a firebrand to
Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a bamboo spit. Before it could put this confession
of Quianzon in writing, he retracted, denying that he had wounded Aribuabo. It is contended by the
defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted in
Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries
because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not
twice removed the drainage to control or isolate the infection.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused should be convicted for homicide.

Ruling.:

Yes. The Court ruled the contention without merit. One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed
by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of
such other. The fact that the other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.) Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the
drainage, had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to
his health. It much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his pathological
condition and to his state of nervousness and restlessness.