Name: Khameel Merfatma Ali Section: Al-farabi

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO MARIANO y ALEJANDRO alias

Negro, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. L-45966, November 10, 1978

Facts: On November 11, 1976, Mario Mariano (accused) was charged with the crime of Rape with
Homicide of Luningning Mapola, 6 years old. The victim suffered a traumatic laceration of the vagina,
injuries on the head causing hemorrhage, and other injuries that are fatal and caused her death.

Juanita Mapola declared that Luningning was missing on Thursday, November 11, 1976 and through the
information of the small boy she found the victim on the following day at 3:00 PM in an uninhabited
house in Fernandez St. Tondo Manila. The victim was already dead with the dress rolled up to her
abdomen, without panty, and her eyes swollen with blood oozing from the left eye.

The accused pleaded guilty but denies the intention to kill the victim. The trial court concluded from the
evidence that the accused really committed the offense charged.

Issues: Whether or not the absence of the intent to kill can be used as a defense?

Ruling: No. Under Article 4 of the RPC. Criminal Liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

In this case, The testimonies of Dr. Luis Larion, a prosecution witness, and Dr. Angelo Singian, a defense
witness, established beyond doubt that the death of the victim was due to profuse hemorrhage brought
about by the laceration of the vagina caused by a stiffened male organ or by the insertion of a hard blunt
object.

There is no question base on the evidence that the death of the victim was brought about by the rape
committed by the accused. Therefore, his contention of not intending to kill the victim cannot be upheld
because a person who performs a criminal act is responsible for all the consequences of said act
regardless of his intention.

The court hereby affirmed and the accused-appellant, sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) for the death of the latter, and the
sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs.
[G.R No.4935. October 25, 1909]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

JAMES L. BROBST, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann were engaged in work on a
mine located in the Municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native
laborers. Mann discharged one of these laborers’ names Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back
on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ him again because he was a thief and a
disturbing element to the other.

A few days after, on the morning of July 10, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three or four others, went
to the mine to look for work. The defendant saw Saldivar and ordered him to leave, however, Saldivar
made no move to leave, and although the order was repeated, he merely smiled or grinned at the
defendant, whereupon the latter become enraged, took three steps towards Saldivar, and struck him a
powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where the handle
of Saldivar’s bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw up
his hands, staggered, and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister’s house, which
stood about 200 yards away, and about 100 feet up the side of the hill. He died as he reached the door
of the house.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced him to suffer six years
and one day in prison mayor, and from this, the defendant appealed to this court.

The counsel of the appellant argues that the trial court erred in the following: (1) that the evidence fails
to sustain a finding that the deceased came to his death as a result of injuries inflicted by the defendant
and (2) that even if it be a fact that the defendant, in laying his hand upon the deceased, contributed to
his death, nevertheless, since the defendant had a perfect right to eject the deceased from the mining
property, he cannot be held criminally liable for unintentional injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of
this right.

Issue: Whether or not Brobst liable, given that it was not his intent to kill Saldivar, and he had a right to
expel Saldivar from the property?

Ruling: Yes. The law states that “any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur
criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended
to commit”. In such cases, the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural
consequences of his illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such consequence, but it
does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge in this case.

What has been said sufficiently disposes of all errors assigned by counsel for the appellant, except
certain alleged errors of procedure in the court below which we do not think it necessary to discuss,
because even if it be admitted that such errors were committed, they do not appear to have in any wise
prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant. The judgment of conviction and the sentence
imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
Appellant.
[G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.

FACTS: Policeman Domingo Ural, after he was boxing with Felix Napola on July 31, 1966, put the latter
into fire without the intention of killing him. Napola died on August

25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating “burn” as the cause of death.

ISSUE:Is Ural criminally liable for the death of Napola?

RULING: Yes. Ural is criminally liable for the death of Napola. The Revised Penal code provides that he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. Hence, Ural is criminally liable as his act
towards Napola is identified as the cause of the latter’s death.

[G.R. No. 4490. December 4, 1908. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELICIANO DIVINO, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts: A crime purportedly occurring four years ago on a certain night and consisting of injuries led to
the filing of a complaint. In July 1903, in the municipality of Davao, district of Davao, Moro Province, the
accused, in his home, bound a girl named Alfonsa by the hands and legs, laid her on the floor, stuffed a
piece of cloth into her mouth, and fastened her body to the boards of said floor; he then wrapped her
feet in pieces of cloth, saturating said cloth with petroleum, and set the cloth on fire with a match.
According to the accused, the victim was sent to her by their captain for treatment as she was suffering
from ulcers from her head to toe. Thus, the accused argued that he acted in good faith since his
intention was to remedy the victim’s ulcers and not to injure her.

Issue:Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for physical injuries through imprudence despite
acting in good faith.

Ruling: Yes. It is undeniable that the actions of the accused appear to have been meant as a remedy
rather than to cause an evil; nevertheless, taking into account the imprudence defined in paragraph 2 of
article 568 of the Penal Code, as having been committed by an ignorant person who was prohibited from
exercising the art of healing not only by the regulations governing it but also by the Penal Code.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Even if the defendant did not intend to commit a felony because his intention was to treat the victim, he
is still liable for physical injuries through imprudence since the wrongful act resulted from the
imprudence, a criminal negligence, which is penalized by the law.

Hence, Feliciano Divino was sentenced for simple imprudence to the penalty of four months of arresto
mayor, to suspension from office and right of suffrage during the period of his sentence, and to pay the
costs of both instances.
[G.R. No. 10606 September 11, 1915]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRES VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Tirso de Irureta Goyena for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

Facts:On July 5, 1914, a defendant, Andres Villanueva was charged by the complainant, Isidro Benter,
"while quarreling with his opponent, Isidro Benter, with having suddenly snatched the bolo which the
latter was carrying at his belt and with it inflicting upon him a wound in the palm of the right hand that
incapacitated the aggrieved party from performing work for more than thirty days and which rendered
the said principal member entirely useless."But Villanueva was not Benter's opponent nor was there any
quarrel between the two. Neither did Villanueva inflict a wound upon Benter. The latter injured himself
by an accident arising out of his own act.

On October 10, 1914, the complaint was not able to case immediately last July 5, 1914. Thus, Benter was
able to testify that the wound delayed healing for more than forty days. The trial was held on December
8, and then Benter showed a scar in the right palm that ran from the base of the little finger to the first
joint of the index finger.

The judge noted that the index finger was stiff and that the man could not extend the ring finger.
Neither was the allegation contained in the complaint, to the effect that the right hand had been
rendered entirely useless, proven at the trial. The court asked the cirujano ministrante called as an
expert witness to look at the scar to see if Benter could work as well with his hand in that state as when
it was in its former normal condition. The witness said no, for the reason that it was not entirely healed
inside; that on the other hand no arteries were injured, for if they were, articulation would be
impossible.

Issue:Whether or not Villanueva is criminally liable for the result which is not intended.

Ruling:The judgment appealed is reversed. Andres Villanueva was acquitted with the costs of both
instances de oficio.

Thus, one who, because of curiosity, snatched the bolo carried by the offended party at his belt, and the
latter instinctively caught the blade of said bolo in trying to retain it, is not criminally liable for the
physical injuries caused, because there is no provision in the Revised Penal Code which punishes that act
of snatching the property of another just to satisfy curiosity.

Paragraph 1 of Article 4 says that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person “committing a felony,”
not merely performing an act. A felony is an act or omission punishable by the R.P.C. If the act is not
punishable by the code, it is not a felony. But the felony committed by the offender should be one
committed by means of dolo, that is, with malice, because paragraph 1 of Article 4 speaks of wrongful
act done” different from that which he intended.”
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA,
defendants-appellants.

Facts: Captain Godofredo Monsod (Provincial Inspector of Cabanatuan) was instructed to arrest
Balagtas, a notorious criminal, and, if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. The same instruction was
given to the Chief of Police Oanis who knew the whereabouts of Irene, the paramour of Balagtas. Upon
arriving at Irene’s house, Oanis approached Mallare and asked her where Irene’s room was. Mallare
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.

Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary) then went to the room of Irene,
and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw
her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants
still firing at him. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas, but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Tecson, Irene’s paramour.

Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with the crime of murder.

The trial court found appellants guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Hence, the present
appeal. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties, both believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong.

Issue: Whether or not Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable for the death of Tecson?

Ruling: Yes, both Oanis and Galanta were criminally liable for the death of Tecson.

Under the law, “Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from which he intended." Appellants’ invocation of honest mistake of
fact is misplaced. In the instant case, appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves and could even effect a bloodless
arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.

This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or
alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. Thus, the crime committed by defendants was not
merely criminal negligence, it was intentional and not accidental.
[G.R. No. 32066 March 15, 1930.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GONA (Mansaca), Defendant-
Appellant.

Facts On October 26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house of Mansaca
Gabriel. There seems to have been a liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men present
became intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took place between the Mansaca Dunca and the
defendant. Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one
Awad. The defendant left the house about the same time with intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the
darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant, he mistook Mapudul for
Dunca and inflicted on him a mortal wound with a bolo. The defendant’s attorney argues that in view of
the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the deceased and committed the crime by mistake,
he should have been found guilty of homicide through negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of
the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide.

Issue Whether or not the mistake of identity of the victim absolves the defendant’s criminal liability and
if it is also a mitigating circumstance.

Ruling No. The mistake of identity of the victim does not absolve the defendant’s criminal liability and
also does not qualify for a mitigating circumstance.

Under paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, “A person committing a felony is still criminally
liable even if there is a mistake in the identity of the victim”. In the case of United States v. Mendieta (34
Phil., 242), the court said: "Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead
of Pedro Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound which he inflicted upon the latter, in no way
could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing one man instead
of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal
responsibility. Neither do we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man
should be considered as a mitigating circumstance”.

Hence, the appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant.
G.R. No. 208719, June 09, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER RINGOR UMAWID, Accused-Appellant.

Facts: The facts of the case are, At around 4 o’clock in the afternoon of November 26, 2002, Vicente
Ringor (Vicente) was staying with his two (2)-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor (Maureen), at
the terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, the accused, Roger
Ringor Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a panabas with neither reason nor
provocation. While Vicente was able to evade Umawid’s blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on
her abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid
walked away. Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five (5) meters away from
Vicente’s house9 where his nephew, Jeffrey R. Mercado (Jeffrey), was sleeping. Awakened by the
commotion, Jeffrey went outside only to see his uncle charging at him with his panabas. Instinctively,
Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety. However, Umawid
was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door of the house, and, as such, the former was able to
barge into the said house. Cornered and nowhere else to go, Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with
his arms to shield him from Umawid’s impending attacks. Eventually, Umawid delivered fatal hacking
blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter’s fingers. Umawid only stopped his barrage upon
seeing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead, leaning on the wall and blood-stained. The accused
set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to attest to the same. The
RTC ruled that the accused was charged with murder and frustrated murder and that he committed the
acts complained of in the information’s and that they were done in a treacherous manner. Aggrieved,
Umawid appealed to the CA. They affirmed the conviction of the RTC. Accordingly, the accussed failed to
provide by evidence that he was actually insane.

Issues: Whether the defense of insanity of the accused has a merit or not?

Ruling: No. The defense of the insanity of the accused is lacking. The decision of the court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed.

Legal Basis Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - the following are exempt
from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same
court.

The accused solely relied on the testimonies of the doctors to substantiate his plea of insanity. Records,
however, reveal that the testimony only showed his mental condition in May 2002, February 2003, and
March 2003. He was only examined six (6) months before the latter committed the crimes and three (3)
months and four (4) months thereafter. These cannot prove the accused insanity.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES (alias FRANCISCO
CAGURO, alias FRANCISCO ADMONES, alias BUCOY, alias FRISCO GUY),

Defendant-appellant

G.R. No. L-38511 October 6, 1933

Facts:

On the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the
corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas. Yu Lon was standing near the
outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the street. While they were talking, a man passed back and
forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take a leave of his father, the man
that had been passing back and forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and suddenly and
without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell
backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. His
assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him through San Fernando, Camaba, and Jaboneros
Streets, and then lost sight of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung, who were walking along
Calle Mestizos, saw the incident and joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lon’s assailant. The wounded man
was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where he died about midnight.

The accused contend that they should only be convicted of slight physical injuries under Art 266 instead
of murder.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should only be charged with slight physical injuries rather than
murder.

Held:No. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended; but in order that a person may be criminally... liable for a felony different from
that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to
wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the... crime committed by the offender.

Under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death
was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant
had not committed the assault in a treacherous... manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of
homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime
with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
[G.R. No. L-47941 April 30, 1985]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON, defendant-
appellant.

Facts: This case was brought by the accused, Jaime Tomortogo, to the Court of Appeals to contend the
decision from the Court of First Instance judging him to reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide
against his wife, Magdalena de los Reyes. On the 23rd of June 1977, the accused caught up with his wife,
who at the time was in the act of leaving him, and hit her with a piece of wood, inflicting serious harm to
her. Shortly thereafter, his wife died due to the injuries inflicted by the accused. He surrendered to the
authorities and pleaded guilty during his second arraignment. The accused established three (3)
mitigating circumstances, (1) voluntary surrender; (2) plea of guilt; (3) obfuscation. The accused
contended that he only intended to commit physical injuries at the time of the incident. That under Art.
49 of the RPC, the maximum penalty of the intended act is to be imposed and not the actual crime
committed. And since there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances
present, the court should have imposed the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be imposed a lower penalty.

Ruling: No. The judgment of the Court of First Instance was correct. Though the accused only intended
to inflict physical injuries to the victim, considering that his act causes the death of the victim, he is liable
for all the consequences of his felonious act.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and
that the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.

Thus, the Court provided the correct judgment of the case. The accused benefited from the
Indeterminate Sentence Law as the accused was given the minimum sentence of reclusion perpetua and
not death. The Court of Appeals upheld the recommendation of the Court to extend executive clemency
to the accused for manifesting a repentant attitude and remorse.
[G.R. No. L-36282 December 10, 1976]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. COSME MONLEON, accused-appellant.

FACTS: At about 7:00 in the evening of June 1,1970, Accused Cosme Monleon arrived home drunk and
asked his wife, Concordia, whether their carabao had been fed by their son, Marciano. Concordia
assured him but upon checking by Cosme, it was not adequately fed and he became furious. When he
was about to hit Marciano, Corcordia intervened, thereafter Cosme placed himself astride Corcodia’s
chest, squeezed her neck, pressed her head against a post and kicked her in the abdomen. The following
morning, Corcordia vomited blood and thereafter, died due to “acute abdomen”. On June 18, 1970,
Cosme thumb marked a confession that he assaulted his wife and that he repented for the wrong act
which he had done to her. The CFI found him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua and payment of damages. After the judgement was read to Cosme in open court, he asked
that the penalty be reduced. The court advised him to appeal if he was not satisfied with the penalty.
The Solicitor General submits that the judgement of conviction should be affirmed but recommends
executive clemency because the penalty of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive considering the
degree of malic exhibited by Cosme Monleon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General to recommend Cosme
Monleon’s case to the Chief Executive for a reduction of penalty.

RULING: YES, the criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he is intended. The maltreatment inflicted by Cosme on Corcordia
was the proximate cause of her death. He was provoked to castigate his wife because she prevented
him from whipping his negligent son. The trial court did not appreciate any mitigating circumstances in
favour of Cosme. The Solicitor General is correct in finding that the extenuating circumstances of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong and intoxication which was not habitual are present in this case.
Hence, the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua but considering that Cosme had no intention to kill
his wife, the penalty of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive due to lack of appropriate medical
attendance. Therefore, there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General to recommend Cosme’s
case to the Chief Executive for a reduction of penalty
[G.R. No. 10037. December 23, 1914.]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MAXIMO MALLARI, Defendant-Appellant.

FACTS: Defendant Mallari went to the house of the married couple, Vicente Sunga and Canuta Flores on
the morning of September 25, 1913, in the barrio of Batasan, Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, before
going to his work. Beneath the shed, Mallari asked Sunga to cure his wife from a sickness that she had
been suffering for several days, and which he thought was due to enchantment on the part of the said
Vicente.

The latter refused, saying he was not a wizard and that he had not caused the illness of the defendant’s
wife. Mallari became enraged and insulted the said spouses. He threatened to kill them, as he was
carrying a thin, sharp bolo and ascended upstairs. At his wife’s suggestion, Vicente Sunga tried to get out
to report the matter to the teniente of the barrio, a few houses away, but as he met the defendant on
the stairway, he immediately went back inside and jumped out of a window. Sunga was straightway
pursued by the defendant and on arriving almost in front of the house of the teniente, saw that the
defendant was following closely behind him.

Sunga turned to face his pursuer and defended himself as he could with his bare hands. With a single
slash of Mallari’s bolo, Vicente Sunga was wounded in his abdomen, his intestines protruding. In this
condition the victim sat down, endeavoring with his hands to keep his intestines from falling out, while
his assailant took flight.

A few moments later, the justice and peace of Macabebe arrived, and in his presence was a wounded
man, declaring that his assailant was Mallari, who pursued him in his house and who had inflicted him
with his serious abdominal wound. Three days later, Sunga died as a consequence of the cut he had
from Mallari’s bolo.

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of homicide.

RULING: Yes. The accused is guilty of homicide.

A requisite supporting the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, states that “the wrong
done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the felony committed by
the offender.” It does not appear in the case that this was erroneous, for in spite of the statement of the
health officer that the deceased might have been saved if the wound had been aseptically treated from
the first, its seriousness and fatal character being due to lack of antiseptics, still, the person inflicting it is
responsible for all the consequences of his criminal action, and therefore for the death that occurred
some days after the deceased received the wound.

In accordance with the law and the merits of the case, it is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING
y ROVERO, Defendants-Appellants.

Facts: Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, are residents of Barangay Nenita near Mondragon,
Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. Being identical twins, they look very
much alike. The brothers decided to go to Manila to visit their children who were working there.

On January 6, 1955 the twins set out to travel to Manila. They took several trips to get there. They
arrived in Paco, Manila on January 8, 1955 at around seven o’clock in the morning. After travelling
through the city, only Antonio managed to see his daughter. Jose was not able to locate any of his
children.

The twins then decided to go back home to Samar. After buying their tickets hey boarded the night Bicol
express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.

After the train had resumed its speed after stopping in Cabuyao, Laguna, Jose Toling stood up and
stabbed the man directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his feet. While this
was happening, Antonio Tolling stabbed with a knife a sleeping old woman who was seated opposite
him. The victim was not able to get up anymore. It was during this time that the passengers scurried
away for safety but the twins who has run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the
coach. The twins continued their rampage before they were eventually subdued by two
Constabularymen.

When the train arrived at the Calamba station, Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train
and turned them over to the Calamba police. A total of twelve persons died from the bloody incident.
Several were also injured. Eight bodies who were found in the train died from stab wounds while the
other four were presumed to have jumped from the moving train to avoid being killed. The two
Constabularymen who subdued the twins, along with some of the injured victims, each gave statements
for the investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the Toling twins should be criminally liable for the death of the victims who
jumped from the coach.

Ruling: Yes. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that “criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended”.

The twins are criminally liable for the death of the four victims who jumped off the coach of the train
since their rampage was responsible for their jump and eventual death. Even if the twins never had the
intent to kill those four victims specifically, their violent actions led to the victims fleeing from danger
and jumping off the train in a state of panic.

The court stated “if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of
mind is responsible for the injuries which result”. Because of this, the Toling twins, apart from the
charges of murder and frustrated of murder should be criminally liable for the death of the four victims
who jumped off the coach of the train.

But it is important to note that in this particular case, the twins were never charged for the death of the
four victims because of the absence of eye-witness testimony supporting the presumption that the four
bodies who were found in the railroad tracks. The court stated, “Had the necropsy reports been
reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths”.

(G.R. NO. L-16486. MAR. 22, 1921)

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant. STREET, J.:

FACTS: The deceased is a member of the crew of a vessel. Accused is in charge of the crew members
engaged in the loading of cargo in the vessel.

Because the offended party was slow in his work, the accused shouted at him. The offended party
replied that they would be better if he would not insult them.

The accused resented this, and rising in rage, he moved towards the victim, with a big knife in hand
threatening to kill him.

The victim believing himself to be in immediate peril threw himself into the water. The victim died of
drowning. The accused was prosecuted for homicide. His contention that his liability should be only for
grave threats since he did not even stab the victim, that the victim died of drowning, and this can be
considered as a supervening cause.

Issue: Whether or not the accused be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio
Gargantel or convicted of the offense of homicide.

Ruling: Yes, the accused is responsible author of the death of the victim and he was convicted of the
offense of homicide.

As the Supreme Court, enunciated the following Doctrine : That even though the death of the injured
person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which
almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the
circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the
accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the
accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal
wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the
death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation
narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated
homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the
accused." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
[G.R. No. 10615. November 16, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEJANDRO ZAMORA,

FACTS That said accused, Alejandro Zamora, at or about the hour of 6 p. m. of the 8th of December,
1914, in the municipality of Sibulan, Oriental Negros, Philippine Islands, did maliciously, unlawfully, and
feloniously approach Custodio Pisan who was sitting chopping wood at the foot of the stairs of his
house, situated in the center of population of said municipality, and without justifiable motive did
assault said Custodio Pisan with a pocketknife which he was carrying, dealing him by means of the same
a blow in the abdomen, thereby inflicting a wound in the right iliac region which affected the skin, the
subcutaneous tissue, muscular sheath, the peritoneal serous membrane and the intestines. From the
results of this wound said Custodio Pisan died at 3 p. m. on the 10th day of December, 1914, that is, two
days later.

ISSUE Whether or not the defendant is held criminally liable for committing homicide

RULING Yes, the defendant was criminally liable. In connection with the statements made by defendant
himself, it cannot be held that he acted unconsciously in wounding Custodio Pisan, as he claims, nor that
the act performed by him was not free and voluntary. Under the law, Article IV section I of the Revised
Penal Code: By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.

So in this case, there was intention, there was will on the part of the defendant, And although it be
considered that his purpose was to cause the harm to his. Sweetheart, Francisca Fonollera, and that,
while frantic and controlled by this Purpose, he chanced to wound Custodio Pisan whom he met on his
way. He must be Held liable for the act he performed and for all its consequences, notwithstanding That
such act and its effects were inflicted upon and suffered by a different person Than the one upon whom
he intended to wreak his vengeance

[G.R. No. L-204 May 16, 1947]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO CORNEL, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: On June 8, 1945, the appellant attacked Fabian Burca with a bolo while the latter was descending
the stairs of his house in Barrio of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay. When the
victim fell after being wounded in the forehead, the appellant also threw a rock at the victim hitting his
left clavicle. After this the appellant was seen rushing towards his house.

A few days after this altercation, the victim died of tetanus which was diagnosed by Dr. Mariano Cruel
on his last medical visit on June 15, 1985.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable for the death of the victim.
RULING: Yes, the appellant is criminally liable.

It is stated in Article 4 Section 1 of the Revised Penal Code that, Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

In this case, the death of the victim was a result of the initial felony committed by the appellant. The
victim would not have died if he had not contracted tetanus and he would not have contracted tetanus
if the appellant had not attacked the victim, hence, the appellant is liable for the victim’s death.

[GR No. 234190, October 01, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee vs FERDINAND DE GUZMAN Y BUHAY, Accused-

Appellant

Facts: On, March 08, 2005, a case was filed in RTC with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape against the
accused. Criminal case no. 05-29405 was filed for the incident that happened on May 07, 2003 wherein
the accused went to the bedroom of his nine (9)- year old niece by affinity at 4’oclock in the morning
and threatened and forcibly had carnal knowledge with the girl. Same as with the case no. 05-29406,
that happened on the 17th of June 2003, the accused threatened and forcibly did carnal knowledge with
his nine (9)- year old niece by affinity at 4’oclock in the morning. These acts were revealed by the child
to her parents leading to filing of these cases. On September 15, 2015, RTC ruled guilty for the two (2)
counts of statutory rape with Ferdinand de Duzman Y Buhay and must pay the civil damages and
reclusion Perpetua. Accused appealed to CA for dismissal of the case but affirmed the decision of RTC in
June 29, 2017. Accused appealed again to Supreme Court and still, affirmed with the decisions of RTC
and CA and also modified the charges on civil damages to a higher cost, made the case qualified
statutory rape and suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Issues: Whether or not the accused has criminal liability under felony.

Ruling: Yes. The accused has criminal liability under felony. Under the law, the requisites on the
paragraph 1 are the intentional felony committed is present and the wrong done to the aggrieved party
be a direct, natural and logical consequence of felony. In this case, the requisites for felony were
complete in which RTC, CA and SC ruled the accused guilty finding all the requisites of felony in the case
of rape under the circumstance that the child was forced and threatened to do carnal knowledge with
him. Therefore, the accused has a criminal liability under felony
[ G.R. No. L - 32076 March 14, 1930]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NATALIO ILUSTRE, defendant-
appellant.

Facts: In the morning of June 24, 1929, on St. John's day, a procession was held in the barrio of
Canlurangbayan, Balayan. The procession includes the rounds of the town with a roasted pig on a
piece of cane. To direct the procession and prevent the people from consuming the whole animal
before reaching the end, a man is placed in charge, who on the day of record, June 24,1929, happened
to be the defendant Natalio Ilustre.

Juan Magsino, delicate and suffering from incipient tuberculosis, tried to secure a piece of the crackling.
To punish his boldness, Ilustre ran after him, boxed him, and left him sprawling on the ground. Upon
being struck Juan Magsino suddenly became very ill and his companions took him home. At about three
o'clock in the afternoon he expired.

Based on the autopsy performed by three doctors, Magsino's death was due to a contusion on the liver
accompanied by an internal hemorrhage.

Issue: Whether or not Ilustre’s blow caused the death of Magsino.

Ruling :Yes. An internal hemorrhage caused by a blow on the right hypochondrium resulted to the death
of Magsino.

The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and suffered from incipient pulmonary
tuberculosis does not affect the defendant's criminal liability, for even if it rendered the blow more
fatal", the efficient cause of the death remains the same.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
The circumstance that the defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not
exempt him from criminal liability
[No. 7123. August 17, 1912.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ROSALINO

RODRIGUEZ, defendant and appellant.

FACTS:A crippled right hand man named Rosalino Rodriguez is charged with homicide after

killing a man named Marciano Magno who was as per the daughter of the defendant said that Marciano
had caught hold of her hand with unchaste designs. Rosalino caught this whichcaused him to strike two
punches (one to the left side toward the stomach and the other one tothe back) which knocked him
down. He got up with the help of the two witnesses who werepresent at that time but then testified
against Marciano. The Trial Court found RosalinoRodriguez guilty of homicide and sentenced to twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporalbut was modified by the Court of First Instance to eight years
and one day of Prision Mayor afterthe defendant filed an appeal cause it appears that the defendant’s
act was preceded by animmediate provocation on the part of the deceased and, evidently, the
defendant did not intendto cause so grave on injury as he produced.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of homicide.

RULING: When the fact is well established that the accused struck the victim twice with his fist, in the
abdomen and in the back, wherefore the latter fell to the ground and had hardly risen andstarted to
walk when he again fell down dead, the crime committed is rightly classified ashomicide and the
accused is responsible therefor

G.R. No. L-42117 March 29, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO REYES, defendant-
appellant.

Facts: Fausta Tavera, deceased, and Gregorio Reyes, appellant, had been living together for a couple of
weeks before her parents had persuaded her to come home and were demanding that appellant pay a
dowry of P30 before the date of the celebration of the marriage could be fixed. On the evening of April
30, 1934, during an impromptu dance for a barrio procession, the deceased and appellant were talking
in the yard of the house. The deceased informed the appellant that she could not return to him and she
was going with her parents in Catanduanes. Appellant dragged the deceased towards the street and
stabbed her in the chest with a fanknife. The deceased ran to the house of the barrio lieutenant, a short
distance away, falling deed at the foot of the staircase, although the wound was only a slight one, it not
having penetrated the thoracic cavity, having hit a bone. The three relatives of the deceased attempted
to seize the appellant but the latter immediately ran away. The appellant attested in his own behalf
claimed that he was attacked by the three relatives of the deceased and that the wound he inflicted on
the deceased is purely accidental provoked by the affray.

Issue: Whether or not the act done by the appellant is accidental

Ruling: No, the court held that the act done by the appellant is not accidental.
Article 4 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states that, “ By any person peforming an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not or the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.”

In the present case, the trial court considered provocation as a mitigating circumstance based on the
testimony of appellant that he had been attacked, overlooking the fact that the law requires that the
provocation come from the offended party. Certainly the deceased did not attack appellant, and her
refusal to renew her illicit relationship with him can hardly be construed as legal provocation. The
appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without either aggravating
or mitigating circumstances. He is sentenced from eight years of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight
months, and one day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the sum
of P1,000.

G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012

RODOLFO BELBIS JR. AND ALBERTO BRUCALES, Petitioners VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent

FACTS: Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay.
On the night of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m., Veronica
Dacir, Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was and
saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy
(petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was brought to
Albay Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days. Jose was brought back to the hospital on
January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys had inflamed due to infection. And he died the
next day.

Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in engaged in a conversation
with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their way home, they
heard Jose’s whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and
the latter replied, “What about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the latter was able
to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. During the commotion,
petitioner Alberto was only watching and told Jose and petitioner Rodolfo to stop fighting. Thereafter,
petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner Rodolfo to their house because he suffered a hand injury and
was then brought Rodolfo to hospital.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would
warrant his acquittal.

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to the Justifying Circumstances of
self-defense and the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense.

RULING: No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed to
defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to
escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.
The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the victim ceased when petitioner
Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same
weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a person
claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be
averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In the present
case, four stab wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to prevent the alleged continuous
unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already without a weapon.

Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the death of the victim is not
controlling since what really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of
his death. It can be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds, the victim
could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused
his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. The petitioners are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

G.R. No. L-12702 March 30, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FILEMON CUTURA, defendant-appellant.

Facts: As a result of certain incidents that had taken place between Jesus Cimafranca and some soldiers
of the guerilla forces stationed in Bohol, he was arrested under the authority of the commander of said
forces two days after, and upon being brought before the commander, he was manhandled and
tortured. As a result of the injuries inflicted on him, he died on the very occasion. Several men assaulted
Cimafranca: one gave several fist blows, one struck his head with a piece of iron, one stabbed him on
the abdomen with a bolo, and it appeared clear on record that defendant-appellant Cutura hit
Cimafranca on the head with a big piece of wood which contributed to his death. The trial court found
the accused guilty of murder.

Issue: Whether or not Cutura actually participated in the assault which culminated in the victim’s death?

Ruling: Yes, Cutura actually participated in the assault which culminated in the victim’s death. A blow
inflicted may not have been mortal, but if it certainly accelerates the death of the victim, the person
participating in the assault is responsible for his death. It is not necessary that each of the separate
injuries be necessarily fatal in itself. It is sufficient if they cooperated inbringing about his death or
contributed mortally thereto. In this case, even if each of the accused assaulted Cimafranca in different
ways, it was proven on record that his death was accelerated when Cutura hit him on the head with a
big piece of wood. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
[G.R. No. L-204 May 16, 1947]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO CORNEL, defendant-appellant.

Facts: This case was an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Albay, sentencing the
defendant for the crime of homicide.

The counsel of the defendant argued on two things: first, the alleged inadequacy of evidence for the
prosecution to establish the defendant’s identity, and second, the cause of death of the victim possibly
be from other diseases which may exhibit tetanus-like symptoms.

The identity of the defendant was established through the testimonies of the witnesses. According to
them, the defendant assaulted Fabian Burac (deceased) with a bolo as the latter was descending the
stairs of his house and caused him to fall off, the defendant then threw stones which hit Fabian’s right
clavicle, and fled in the direction of his own house. The positive testimony of the witness, Fabian’s wife
Trinidad, was given full credit by the trial court as Trinidad knew the defendant well. Bendicio, on the
other hand, testified that Fabian told him he had been boloed by the defendant before he died. Fabian
survived the initial injuries sustained from the bolo and stones but eventually died because of tetanus a
few days after the incident.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable for the victim’s death even though the latter survived the
initial injury caused by his felonious act.

Held: Yes, the defendant is liable for the victim’s death even though the latter survived the initial injury
caused by his felonious act.

Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that “Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.”

In this case, the victim died of tetanus as a complication of the felony committed by the defendant.
Thus, the defendant must be held liable for the death of the victim as the natural consequence of his
wrongful action. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment with costs against the defendant.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN,
plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS: The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by
Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst
and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help,
while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the
neighborhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the
bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud
Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim
damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwarded the
case to the Supreme Court due to the amount involved.

ISSUE:Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus,
but rather, the fire that burned the bus.

RULING: NO. Under the law, Proximate cause is 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result there from.

In this case, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light
with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;
and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the
aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was
to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
[ G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005]

MELBA QUINTO, Petitioner Vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents

Facts:

November 13, 1995 Edison Garcia and Wilson Quinto of the same age, eleven years old, were at
Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth
of a drainage culvert. They invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson
assented, but when Garcia saw that it is dark inside, he opted not to join them.

Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with the respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the
drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with
water about a foot deep. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the
drainage system and left without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside,
and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boy’s
lifeless body down in the grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the
scene. For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother,
and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent
Andres followed her.

The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted. The police
authorities of Tarlac did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents for Wilson’s death.

Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators
took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto. Respondent Pacheco
alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and
Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while
riding on his carabao.

On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI performed an
autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings: CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries,
contributory.

NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and Pacheco with the RTC

Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head
could have hit a blunt object, That the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson’s head could
have rendered the him unconscious so he drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of
Wilson’s face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by
contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was
no sign of strangulation. The RTC granted demurer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. The CA Affirms the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not there is a preponderant evidence to hold the respondents criminally liable.
Ruling: No, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. If a person inflicts a wound
with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of
their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if
his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondent’s rest, that the
petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages. The trial court gave credence to
the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit
his head on the pavement, However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and
admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on... the person of the deceased. In
this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill
the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner
testified that respondent. Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latter's
death.

[No. L-10126 October 22, 1957]

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, ET AL, plaintiffs and appellees vs. MARIANO MEDINA,
defendant and appellant.

Facts: Shortly after midnight, Juan Bataclan (deceased) was on a bus owned by MedinaTransportation,
owned by Mr. Mariano Medina, traveling from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus
was speeding through and when he applied the brakes (after the tires burst) it caused the bus to be
overturned. The driver, theconductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus
except Bataclan and 3 others. The 4 stranded passengers called for help. Help arrived soon thereafter
and as it was dark, the villagers brought torches with them. The driverand the conductor failed to warn
the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline had spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued
which engulfed the bus

thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial thatthe tires of the bus
were old.The Court of First Instance awarded P1,000 to plaintiffs plus other fees. The plaintiffs and
defendants appealed the decision to CA, but CA endorsed to SC the appeal because of the value
involved in the claim.

Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by the
torches which ignited the gasoline.

Ruling: No. The driver’s negligence was the proximate cause. Under Article 1755, “a common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely asfar as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of verycautious persons, with a due regard for all circumstances.” Further Article 1756 also
states, “in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence”. In this
case, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the
driver because he was speeding. Also, he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did
not. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the
villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not
have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all
over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
Thus, the defendant carrier is liable.

[G.R. No. 7123. August 17, 1912. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROSALINO RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts: Rosalino Rodriguez is charged with having dealt Marciano Magno two blows with the fist, one on
the left side toward the stomach and the other on the back, which knocked him down. He got up by the
assistance of two witnesses who were present at the time of the occurrence and by their aid
endeavored to return to his home, which he did not reach, for the reason that, having gone a distance of
twenty brazas from the place, he again fell to the ground, this time dead. Two witnesses testified to
having seen the defendant strike those two blows. The defendant defenses to counter the charge
against him were, First, the testimony of his daughter and two other witnesses; Second, the fact that his
right hand was disabled; and Third is the medical certificate issued by a physician as a result of the
autopsy. The defendant’s daughter averred that it was she who struck Marciano Magno the blow with
the fist, for the reason that the deceased had caught hold of her hand with unchaste designs, and
testified that her father arrived after Magno had fallen to the ground, which testimony was supported
by two witnesses. This defense was not sustained by the trial judge. But on the contrary, the judge
accepted the preponderance of evidence for the prosecution, sustained by three witnesses, of whom
two were eyewitnesses to the crime, and the other, of the confession alleged to have been made to him
by the defendant when arrested by this witness, to the effect that the victim’s death was an unlooked-
for misfortune. Nor was the defense advanced by the defendant to the effect that his right hand was
crippled and he was unable to work with it sustained by the trial court, and rightly, since, as the
defendant testified, he worked with his left hand and sometimes used a spoon with his right; moreover,
it was proved that it was impossible for him to strike blows with either hand. After the autopsy of the
victim’s corpse, the Physician declared that he had observed hypertrophy of the heart, a discharge in the
spleen, an increase of this latter organ to four times its ordinary size, and abdominal peritonitis cannot
be determined for the blows the victim received that could have coincided with the traumatism, and
"the traumatisms which that body received hastened the death of the said individual;" and, finally, this
witness being questioned by the defense as to whether the cause of death was a traumatism or a shock,
replied that he was unable to determine which it was.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of homicide and his act was preceded by an
immediate provocation on the part of the deceased

Ruling:The trial judge found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal, to the accessory penalties and an indemnity of P1,000 to the
heirs of the deceased, and to the payment of the costs; from which judgment he appealed. Though in
the complaint it is alleged that the cause of the assault was the fact that the defendant saw the
deceased catch hold of his daughter Roberta’s hand, for the purpose of making love to her, and the
provincial fiscal stated at the trial that this assertion was the result of a careful investigation made by
him, which was indeed confirmed by the facts proven. However, It appears to have been well proven
that the defendant did strike Marciano Magno in the abdomen and in the back two blows with his hand,
as a result of which the latter fell to the ground, and scarcely had he gotten up and started to walk when
he fell down dead. The court decided based on the reason that a blow with the fist or a kick, though
causing no external wound, may very well produced inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and
cause death; and although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if,
because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, the victim’s death was hastened, beyond
peradventure the defendant is responsible therefor in producing the cause for such acceleration as the
result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANICETO MARTIN, defendant-appellant.

GR No. L-3002, May 23, 1951

Facts: Aniceto Martin was a farmer and married to Laura Luiz. Aniceto Martin courted Laura Luiz of the
same barrio where they lived in the Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. They had sexual intercourse
before marriage and Laura Luiz became pregnant. Laura Luiz got pregnant before they got married.

On August 1, 1948, the corpse of Laura was found inside the family toilet. Around her neck, leaving
circular marks around it with the exception of the tape which was unmarked undoubtedly due to her
long and thick hair covering.

When the chief of the police arrived, the defendant had not yet returned home. A relative looked for
him and found him in a farm. Upon being interrogated by the police officer the defendant denied any
knowledge of the event but later made his confession about the death of his wife.

At about 4 o’clock in August 01, 1948, Laura and the defendant had an argument. The defendant told
Laura Luiz that he doesn't love her and has no interest in marrying her since he was not the author of
her pregnancy. He married her because she would file an action against him.

With major personal necessity of the defendant, Laura Luiz came after him to the toilet, placed the rope
around his neck. He snatched the rope and in turn he placed it around her neck and tightened the rope
which caused the death of Laura Luiz.
Dr. Roman de la Cuesta, a physician , performed an autopsy on the corpse of Laura Luiz. That the cause
of death was heart failure due to fright or shock; that the deceased was eight months pregnant at the
time of her death; that there was no expulsion of the foetus ; and that the foetus must have been alive
at the time of the death of Laura. The trial Court consideredthe defendant acquitted of abortion and
found guilty of parricide. The trial court considered two mitigating circumstances in favor of the
defendant.

Issue: Whether or not the death of Laura was not due to the strangling but to her heart disease.
Whether or not the defendant was responsible for the death of Laura Luiz.

Ruling: In the case of People vs. Reyes (61 Phil. 341, 343,) a person is responsible for the consequences
of his criminal act and even if the deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart
(which was not shown), appellants assault being the proximate cause of the death, he would be
responsible.

In the case of U.S. vs. Brobst (14 Phil. 310), the following doctrine was established: Where death results
as the direct consequences of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of
criminal responsibility.

The Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the trial court. There being two mitigating circumstances
without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, the penalty next lower in degree should be
imposed which is that of reclusion temporal. The court imposed upon appellant the penalty of from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and P6,000.00 of accessory
penalties of the law.

People vs Red

Facts: This is an appeal from the order by which the Court of First Instance of Marinduque dismissed the
thirty-six informations, submitted together for consideration.

The provincial fiscal of Marinduque, conducting the prosecution, contends that the court has committed
an error in ordering the dismissal of these cases. The judge of Lucena never called either Fiscal Aquino or
Fiscal Rivera to be examined as to the merits of the information in the cases above enumerated. From
the numbering of the papers in the record it is evident that the district judge issued the warrant of
arrest upon the simple strength of the information and the letter explaining its transmission, without
making the investigation provided for in section 13, Code of Criminal Procedure. The undersigned judge
will have nothing to do with a proceeding against the law, considering that the scope and intent of
section 13, General Order No. 58, is to safeguard the individual’s sacred rights, such as the right to life,
liberty, property, etc.

Issue: Whether a warrant of arrest should issue on the information filed by the prosecution

Ruling: No. To deprive a citizen of his freedom without following a procedure specifically required by
law, namely, that the judge entertaining an information, particularly, one filed by the provincial fiscal,
must, under the present law, examine under oath the prosecuting fiscal and such witnesses as he may
desire to make use of, reducing into writing the testimony of the witnesses. Only when the judge, after
conducting this investigation, considers that the crime charged has been committed, and that there is
reason to believe the defendant guilty of it, that the warrant of arrest or detention may be issued
against the accused person. It is clear that the warrant should not issue before such an investigation has
been made by the judge.

[G.R. No. 42122. December 1, 1934.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INOCENTES MOLDES, Defendant-

Appellant.

Fidel J. Silva for Appellant.

Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for Appellee.

Facts Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte of the crime of homicide. On the
night of the 3d of April in the barrio of Maya, municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte, there was a
dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master of ceremonies at that dance. The appellant
insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the deceased. Appellant then went to the porch of
the house and with his bolo began cutting down the decorations. He descended into the yard of the
house and challenged everyone to a fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the
bamboo trees and repeated his challenge for a fight. The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs,
speaking to him in a friendly manner, and as the deceased had about reached the ground, appellant
struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm. As the deceased fell to the ground,
appellant inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of action.

The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the
deceased remained in the care of a local "curandero." This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and
the deceased died on the 15th of April 1934.

The Attorney of the appellant averred that if the deceased had secured proper medical treatment, the
wound would have not been fatal, and she wouldn’t have succumbed to her death. Averring that the
inability to seek proper medical attention was the cause of the death of the deceased.

Issue: Whether the appellant is acquitted of the crime despite the deceased succumbing to death
because of the improper medical treatment

Ruling: No. The appellant cannot be acquitted from his crime.

According to article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a person committing a felony is criminally liable
although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him. In the case of People v. Moldes,
the court declared that “he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is
dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death
was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment”. Unskillful and improper treatment may be an
active force, but it is not a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act.
Therefore, the defendant still has criminal liability despite the cause of death being the lack of proper
medical attention.

[77 Phil 1038 February 28, 1947]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAYMUNDO RELLIN, defendant-appellant

Facts: Raymundo Rellin was walking along Tavera Street, Marinduque, at about eleven o'clock on the
night of April 4, 1944, coming from his house and heading for the patrol headquarters to see the head of
the neighborhood association, he saw three suspicious-looking people in the opposite direction and
shouted at them asking, "stop, who are you?" They answered, "We are members of the patrol inspecting
the guards of the neighborhood association." Surprised or indignant, under the influence of the "tuba",
by the answer, since he was assigned that night to inspect the guards of his neighborhood, he asked
them, "What kind of patrol?" They, without answering, stopped;

He approached to recognize them: but since the first one had a suspicious attitude, the accused
punched him twice which knocked him to the ground on the spot. The other two who were following,
out of fear, began to run. Graciano Rodas, that was the name of the man who fell to the ground, stood
up and attacked the accused, hitting him in the forearm. Then he snatched his gun, threw it later, and
immediately punched him until he was lying on the ground again. As a result of these blows, Rodas had
a hemorrhage and died at half past one in the afternoon of the following day. The lower court rendered
a decision that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide.

Issue: Was the injury inflicted by the accused the proximate cause of death of the victim?

Held: Yes. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused and it is constant jurisprudence that the one who inflicts
injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal action, such as the death that occurs as a
result of such injuries.

In the present case, there is no evidence that the death of the victim was caused by any other reason
than the hemorrhage produced by the punches given to him by the accused. Two extenuating
circumstances have in his favor the accused: that of not having had the intention of causing an evil as
serious as the one he produced and that of having committed the crime under the influence of the
"tuba" and there is no evidence that it is habitual in the drunkenness, nor is there evidence that he has
taken it for the purpose of committing a crime, however, due to the punches of the accused which
caused the victim to fall down on the ground and eventually causing hemorrhage were direct, natural
and consequence of the latter’s death. Hence, the accused is liable for the crime of Homicide.
People v. Rockwell

Michigan Supreme Court

39 Mich. 503 (1878)Oct. 29, 1878

Facts: Respondent was convicted of manslaughter for killing one Wilber. The death occurred during a
dispute concerning the possession of a horse. Rockwell was shown to have struck Wilber with his fist
and knocked him down. It was not shown directly how he was killed, but it appeared distinctly this blow
did not kill him. The facts indicated either that Rockwell kicked him after he -fell, or else that he was
killed by the horse trampling on him. On a first trial the jury disdistinctly this blow did not kill him.The
charge before given was unqualified that if the blow was not justifiable and Wilber so fell that the horse
jumped and struck Wilber and killed him with his feet, or kicking him, respondent was guilty.

It is impossible to maintain such a charge without making every one liable not only for natural and
probable consequences, but for all possible consequences and circumstances which immediately follow
a wrongful act. There Was no necessary connection between the act of respondent and the conduct of
the horse, which he cannot be said from the record to have been responsible for. And the case was not
even put as permissive. The liability was laid down as positive.The conviction cannot be maintained. And
inasmuch as it is clear from the record that the jury would not have convicted except upon this
instruction, we think the court below should be advised to stop the prosecution.

Issue Whether or not that Rockwell is guilty of the crime of Murder even there was no connection
between the conduct of the respondent and the conduct of the horse.

Ruling Yes, Rockwell is guilty of the crime of Murder againts Wilber.

Under the law provided in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines; Any person who, not
falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

(6). With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.

Thefore, the coviction of the abovementioned respondent with the crimes of Murder even there was no
necessary connection between the conduct of the respondent and the conduct of the horse once it was
not falling within the provisions of Article 246 and when the felonious act was done it will remain guilty
with the said crime.
[G.R. No. 25302. July 31, 1926. ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRACIANO PALALON, Defendant-

Appellant

Facts: In the morning of July 20, 1925, the defendant, Graciano Palalon, was acting as a foreman in the
plantation of Andres Mendiola in Basac, municipality of Bais, Oriental Negros, and charge of a small
group of children, among whom was the deceased Roman Megio, who was a 10 year old boy gathering
and piling sugarcane. The deceased was reprimanded and ordered to work by the defendant for sitting
down and resting and not displaying the activity expected by the defendant. The deceased treated the
accused in an insolent manner that lead the latter to lose his temper striking the boy with his backhand.
According to the witnesses the boy fell on his back on the tramway with his mouth and nose bleeding.
However, according to the witnesses of the defense the incident happened some distance away from
the tramway and the boy’s mouth and nose did not bleed. Despite what happened to him, the deceased
continued to work until 2 o’clock in the afternoon the following day. The deceased had fever and was
taken home by his father. 2 and a half days later, he died. There is no doubt that the deceased was
struck. However it is doubtful that the stile caused the death since it is also likely that it was caused
naturally. During July 1925, fever was prevalent in the locality. The theory of the prosecution, is that as
the boy fell on the tramway when he was struck, he acquired lethal injury that caused him to be sick and
eventually die. They based their theory on the testimony of Dr. Jose V. Valero, who stated in substance
that he examined the body of the deceased on the day following the death and found ecchymosis on the
right shoulder and on the stomach and that, as a result of the former, there was a congestion of the
right lung, which was the principal cause of the death; that the blows causing the ecchymosis must have
been of such force as to have made its effect felt immediately; and that the victim could not have
continued working. Which contradicts what happened when the boy continued working for the next two
days. No proper autopsy was done. The ecchimosis as testified by the doctor, might have been
suggillations or “death spots”. The court of first instance, in Negros declared the defendant guilty of the
crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer twelve years of reclusion temporal, with the accessory
penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs. Thus, the
appeal.

Issue: Does the defendant have any criminal liability in this case?

Held: No.According to Article 8 of the revised penal code of the Philippines, “1. By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 2.
By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.” In this case, the defendant struck the deceased, however, it does not guarantee or
mean that the harm or action perform against the victim caused the death.

Under the law, a person is not criminally liable for all possible consequences that might occur after
his felonious act. In this case, despite having been struck the victim still worked for more than two days
thus there is a reasonable doubt as to the cause of the deceased’s death. The post mortem examination
was done more than 24 hours after the death and there was no incisions done to examine the body
thoroughly, and therefore unwarranted conclusions cannot be done. There is more than a reasonable
doubt as to the deceased’s cause of death, therefore the defendant must be acquitted of the charges.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant-appellant is hereby acquitted of the crime
charged in the information, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 1614. April 9, 1904. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. ANACLETO EMBATE, Defendant-Appellant.

Eleuterio Rodriguez, for Appellant.

Facts: The accused was charged with homicide after punishing the child for disobedience. He struck him
upon the thighs with a slipper and pulled, or as the complaint says, pushed and dragged him toward it,
throwing him heavily upon the floor. One or two days after the child died. The doctor testifies of his
findings after examining the child that he found out the bruises on the thigh and the child has serious
heart disease, and that the bruises could not be the cause of death but might contribute to the fatal
result of the illness. He testifies further that “if in the first place the age of the child is taken into
consideration, and in the second its surrounding circumstances, its conditions were such as to lead one
to expect a fatal result, no physician being in attendance and as no other proximate cause is known that
the great excitement produced by those blows, it may be inferred that they were the sole cause which
precipitated the fatal result of the illness of the child."

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of homicide

Ruling: No. Based on the result of the examination of the body and sufficient evidence as the true cause
of death, the accused is not guilty of homicide. He committed only misdemeanor which should be
punished under the provisions of section 29 of general orders, No. 58.

In Article 4 of the revised penal code, it states that: Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

In this case, the accused is criminally liable for physical injury but not liable for homicide.
[G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988]

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents

Facts:

Javier was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal of the petitioner Urbano, the latter got
angry and demanded the former to pay for the his soaked palay. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and
hacked Javier, hitting the latter on his hand. Javier went to the police station to the report the said
incident. Later on, they agreed to settle their differences, however, Javier was rushed to the hospital and
was diagnosed with tetanus toxin and died the other day.

The RTC and CA charged Urbano of the crime of homicide.

Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until
his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability.

Held: None. Under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. An
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom.

In the said case, the proximate cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence and that
Javier got infected with tetanus toxin after two weeks he returned to his farm and used his bare hands
which wound was exposed to harmful elements. The rule is that the death of the victim must be direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. In the circumstances
presented, there is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s
death with which the petitioner have nothing to do.

Hence, there was no intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability
G.R. No. 5098. October 29, 1909]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VENANCIO MONASTERIAL ET. AL., defendants-Appellants

Facts:

On July 21, 1908 at about 9 p.m., Fruto Payoyo was passing through one of the streets of the town Ligao,
Albay Province, coming from the house of Jose Nieves, and was attacked by certain Aurelio Monasterial
and Venancio Monasterial for the reason that Payoyo had told the father of the attackers that they had
been hiring out the carabaos belonging to their said father, to which the latter denied. Payoyo got
fractured arm on the said incident which prevented him from working, and it took more than ninety
days to heal. It turned out that Payoyo could never use his said arm as freely as he did before he was
injured. With this, a complaint was filed on August 19, 1908, charging Aurelio and Venancio with the
crime lesiones graves.

Issue: Whether or not Aurelio and Venancio were responsible of the said crime committed and should
be charged with lesiones graves.

Held: Yes.Under the Revised Penal Code, lesiones graves is a criminal responsibility where two
individuals, acting in common accord and mutually assisting each other, attack a third person, one after
the other and within a few seconds, if not simultaneously, they are criminally responsible for the
unlawful injury caused by their acts, inasmuch as each of them took a direct and material part in the
aggression with the common intent of injuring the attacked person.

In this case, if Aurelio and Venancio had not attacked or maltreated Payoyo, the latter would not have
suffered fracture of an arm which required not less than ninety days to heal, owing to complications that
ensued; persons who are responsible for an act constituting a crime are also liable for all the
consequences arising therefrom and inherent therein, other than those due to incidents entirely foreign
to the act and executed, or which originate through the fault or carelessness of the injured person,
which are exceptions to the rule not arising in the present case.

Therefore, Aurelio and Venancio Monasterial are both responsible of the said crime and should be
charged with lesiones graves.
G.R. No. 1272 January 11, 1904]

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL., defendants-

appellants.

FACTS:

According to information, the defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano, are
charged with the crime of illegal detention under Articles 481 and 483 of the Penal Code. They are said
to have entered Felix Punsalan's home in Matang-tubig, Province of Bulacan, one night around the
middle of November 1902 with other unidentified individuals, armed with revolvers and daggers, and
kidnapped the said Felix Punsalan.

On appeal, the defendants' attorneys claimed that the law's provisions effectively forced a defendant to
testify in his own defense or face a considerably harsher punishment. The weight of proof falls on him if
he wants to reduce the punishment, or, to put it another way, if he wants to incriminate himself. After
all, just stating the victim's whereabouts or proving that the defendant released him amounts to a
confession that the defendant wrongfully detained the person. The counsel for the defendants claimed
that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

HELD: Yes. The defendants’ rights against self-incrimination were violated.

Under the law, the right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and
humanity because, if a party were required to testify, the witness would be most likely to be persuaded
to commit the crime of perjury, and because it would prevent the coercion of confessions.

In this case, it is the prosecution's responsibility to convict a defendant of a crime and to present
evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the accused cannot be asked to contribute to the
gathering of this evidence through express words or deeds, and his silence should not be used as
evidence against him. Until the prosecution can establish that he is guilty of every aspect of the crime
for which he is charged, he has the right to depend on the presumption of innocence.
[GR No. L-5070, December 29, 1952]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs PEDRO PETILLA, defendant-appellant

Facts:

On August 31, 1949, a case was filed in the Justice of Peace against Petilla, for slight physical injuries and
enjoin with a frustrated homicide. During the hearing at Justice of Peace, the wound of the victim was
found to heal within thirty (30) days against the claim of eight (8) days. The case was then forwarded to
the court of the first instance, together with the frustrated homicide believing the lower court lacked
jurisdiction over the said case. In December 17, 1949, the provincial fiscal amended the case to serious
physical injuries. On February 22, 1950, the accused prayed for a petition to quash, alleging among other
grounds that if the case were to be continued, he would be placed in jeopardy and was also granted its
petition dated February 28, 1950. It underwent a series of trials from the court of first instance and
justice of peace. As for finality, the court affirmed the petition in favor of the accused since there was no
motion filed by prosecution after February 28, 1950 resolution thus, made the judgment final and
executory.

Issue:

Whether or not the case of Petilla held under double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. The case of Petilla was not under double jeopardy. Under the Constitution, “no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy or punished for the same offense." (Art. III, section 120.) In an attempt to implement this
constitutional mandate, the Rules of Court (Rule 113, section 9) make conviction or acquittal of the
accused a bar to his subsequent prosecution, not only for the same offense, but also "for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information." In this case, there is no question that the offense of serious physical injuries charged in the
last information necessarily includes the lesser offense charged in the first complaint and of which the
accused was convicted. Thus, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be said in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Belmores

85 Phil. 493,496

Facts:

Crime of estafa thru falsification of a security directly by overt acts... tearing off at the bottom in a cross-
wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing
the true and real unidentified number... writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket... the
figure or number 074000... presenting the said ticket so falsified... that he is entitled to the
corresponding... amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket... but the said accused failed to perform all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of estafa thru falsification of a security as a
consequence by... reason of some causes other than his spontaneous desistance... one Bayani Miller, an
employee to whom the said accused presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
discovered that the said ticket... to suffer not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not
more than 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, and to pay a fine of P100 and the costs.

Issues:

(1) W/N the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense and

(2) W/N the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of guilty because, being illiterate, he
was not assisted by... counsel

Ruling:

The fact that appellant was illiterate did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to convict him on a
plea of guilty although he was not assisted by counsel. The decision expressly states... that appellant
waived the right to be assisted by counsel, and we know of no law against such waiver.

but the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the
purview of... paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal .
[G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992]

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Facts:

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya’s house in Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
residence of Bernardina Palangpangan. Afterwards, the men had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalangan.
He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them,
that Mandaya should accompany the four other men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

On the same day, 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Intod and the four other men arrived at Palangpangan’s
house in Misamis Occidental, all armed with firearms. Mandaya pointed to the bedroom of
Palangpangan. The men fired on the said room but it happened that Palangpangan was in another city.
Her home was occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room of Palangpangan, thus
no one was hit by the gun fire. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. A
witness testified that the men threatened them before they left the premises.

The Regional Trial Court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals charged the petitioner of attempted
murder. Petitioner seeks a modification of the judgment citing Article 4 (2) of the Revised Penal Code,
pleading that he shall be liable only for an impossible crime.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of attempted murder.

Ruling:

No. The petitioner is not guilty of attempted murder.

Under the law, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime.

In this case, the petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality,
the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The factual
situation in this case presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder
because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will
render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense
will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies. In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.