FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113. April 24, 1902. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. SAMARIN, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

According to the complaint the Moro Samarin, one day in June, 1900, at a place called Sigamay, in the town of Iligan, Province of Isabela, Island of
Luzon, gave Juan Castro a cut with a bolo in the right side, in consequence of which the latter died. The complaint charges the accused with having
subsequently possessed himself of 20 pesos and some pieces of cloth which the deceased was carrying.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, and at the trial stated that the person who killed Juan Castro was Domingo Sipagan, and that the four pieces of
cloth which were shown him had been found in his possession and were part of those which Castro was carrying, but that they had been given him
by Sipagan as a present.

The only witness who charges him with the crime of homicide and the robbery of the cloth is Domingo Sipagan himself, who says that he started, in
company with Juan Castro, to go to a Callingas fiesta; that the accused, the Moro Samarin, sprang upon them in the road and gave Castro a cut,
inflicting upon him a wound running from the base of the neck down to the breast on the right side; that the accused then seized several pieces of
cloth — the same pieces which were shown him at the trial — and that then he, Sipagan, fearing that he might also be killed, ran away; that he
does not know who picked up the body, and can not say whether the deceased had any money.

Domingo Ibarra says that he accompanied the local president of Ilagan to look for the body at the place indicated by the last witness, but that they
could not find the body nor did they see anything there to attract their attention. They concluded that the body had been carried away by some
crocodile or that it had been borne off by the current, as the place was on the bank of a river. Juan Castro is unknown and his relatives are
unknown. It only appears that he was seen passing through the village of Catalañganes.

The corpus delicti has not been proven after an exhaustive investigation. The judgment of conviction by the court below is clearly erroneous.

We therefore acquit Samarin, with the costs of both instances de oficio.

Torres, Cooper, Willard, Mapa and Ladd, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-4354. March 25, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CANDIDO POBLETE, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On the morning of Sunday, the 19th of May, 1907, Gliceria Dolac, a young womans 19 years of age was walking in the direction of the church, for
the purpose of hearing mass, accompanied by her aunt, Toribia Unson, and another young woman, Gliceria Velgrado. When nearing the parish
house she was unexpectedly met by the defendant who seized her with his left hand and immediately attacked her with an open penknife,
inflicting several wounds in her chest, back, sides, arms, and thigh, and although she fell to the ground senseless upon being cut in the breast with
the penknife, the aggressor continued to attack her; as the two women who accompanied the latter promptly attempted to render assistance, the
accused with the same knife also attacked Toribia Unson who was crying out for help, wounding her in the forehead, which scar she showed to the
judge and to other persons present at the time when giving her testimony in the proceedings; the defendant also attacked Gliceria Velgrado, but
the weapon only caught the veil that she carried over her head; the torn veil was exhibited at the trial. The cause of the aggression was that the
offended party had rejected the proposals of love made by the accused. The sixteen wounds received by Gliceria Dolac healed in about three
weeks, through the assistance of a military surgeon in the hospital of the said pueblo of Naic; the doctor’s certificate, the penknife, the tapis
(apron), and neckerchief which the offended party wore and which showed holes corresponding with her wounds, were exhibited as evidence.

A complaint was filed charging Candido Poblete with the crime of frustrated murder, and the corresponding proceedings were instituted; on the
14th of September, 1907, the judge rendered judgment sentencing the accused as guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide, with one mitigating
circumstance, to the penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, to the accessory penalties of article 61 and to pay the costs.

The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the case, constitute the crime of frustrated murder defined and punished by article 403 in
relation with article 3, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the offended party, a girl 19 years of age, was unexpectedly attacked by the
accused who, for the purpose, seized her by the hand and thus held and prevented her from fleeing from her aggressor; neither could she defend
herself, because she was unarmed and by reason of her weakness in comparison with the strength of the accused; at the hands of the defendant,
and by means of treachery, she was wounded several times, for the sudden appearance of the accused, armed with a penknife, already opened
and in readiness, and the instantaneous attack he made on her, must have caused her surprise and fear. all these details prove conclusively that
the crime was committed with perfect safety to the aggressor who employed means in its execution which tended directly and particularly to
insure the consummation thereof without any risk to himself from any sort of defense which his victim might have made.

Notwithstanding the fact that the offended party had the good fortune to be cured in less than one month of the sixteen wounds inflicted on her
thanks to the prompt assistance and to the proper treatment rendered her by a military physician in the hospital of Naic, the crime, however, has
the characteristics of however, has the characteristics of frustrated murder; the accused, with the criminal intent to kill the young woman, out of
spite because she refused to listen to his pretensions of love, as appears of record, did everything that would usually lead to the consummation of
the crime and the death of the assaulted woman, although such death did not occur for reasons independent of the will of the aggressor, because
notwithstanding the fact that he saw her fall to the ground senseless after the first blows upon her breast, he still continued to attack her and
inflicted on her several other wounds numbering sixteen in all. It is therefore undeniable that the accused, with the decided intention to kill the
said young woman, awaited her on the street on the morning in question, and in order to insure the crime which he had premeditated, caught the
woman by the band so that she might not escape, and, after she was lying senseless on the ground, he still continued to attack her, and left her
only after inflicting sixteen wounds, and believing her to be dead and that his wicked intention had been consummated.

The accused, Candido Poblete, the proven and fully convicted author of the above-mentioned crime, as already shown by the result of the
proceedings, pleaded not guilty; his exculpatory allegations have been contradicted by the eyewitness, one of whom, Toribia Unson, was wounded
by him in the forehead, and the other Gliceria Velgrado, was also pursued by the accused, but the blow aimed at her only reached the veil that she
wore over her head.

In the commission of the crime neither aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present; nor was there loss of reason and self-control, said to have
been produced by the fact that the offended party refused to admit proposals of love made by the accused, for the reason that, as he was not
pleasing to her, she was under no obligation to meet his wishes, and, furthermore, it does not appear that she gave any provocation, or that she
gave any offense which might have caused loss of reason and self-control on the part of the accused. On the contrary, the record shows that, from
the time when a correction was imposed on the accused at the court of the justice of the peace in June, 1906, for having gone at midnight to the
house where the injured party lived, without the consent of any of the occupants thereof, at which time he was caught in the interior of the house,
he being no longer able to call on his sweetheart, he threatened several times that he would kill her with the penknife used in committing the
crime, and said threat he repeated one week before the affray. From all of this it appears that, owing to his disappointment in love, and long before
the crime, he conceived the criminal idea to kill her; his purpose to kill her; his purpose to kill the object of his amorous prosecutions is thus
corroborated.

After taking into consideration the circumstances of the deed, and in the present case the trivial nature of the wounds inflicted upon the injured
party, which were cured in less than one month, article 407 of the Penal Code authorizes courts to punish, within their rational discretion, the
crime of frustrated murder with a penalty lower by one degree, imposing in its medium grade the penalty of presidio correccional in its maximum
degree to presidio mayor in its medium grade, which is the penalty next lower to that imposed by article 65 of the Penal Code.

Therefore it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and that the accused, Candido Poblete, should be sentenced to
the penalty of six years and one day of presidio mayor, to suffer the accessory penalties of article 57 of the code, to indemnify the injured party for
her medical expenses without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in view of the nature of the main penalty, according to article 51 of
the code, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15635 March 16, 1920
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FULGENCIO TANDOC, ET AL., defendants.
FULGENCIO TANDOC, JOSE CORPUS and BERNARDINO RUIZ, appellants.

AVANCEÑA, J.:
On or about the 7th of January, 1917, Melecio de Vera, the man in charge of Victorino Navarro's land in the barrio of San Jose, municipality of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, was gathering tobacco on said land assisted by his laborers, Lorenzo de Vera, Luis Moyalde, Celestino Para-an and Fernando
Ferrer. While engaged in this work, they heard the sound of a horn, which was repeated a few moments afterwards, and then towards the eastern
side of the land they discerned many men, more than thirteen in number, coming towards them, and when these persons came the latter
surrounded and attacked them. During the fight Louis Moyalde and Fernando Ferrer were wounded; and when the aggressors saw them fallen on
the ground covered with blood, Jose Corpus, one of the aggressors, sounded the horn and his companions withdrew.
The land where the incident took place was claimed as his property by Jose Bengzon, who in October, 1916, obtained from the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan a preliminary injunction against Melecio de Vera enjoining the latter, his agents and other persons working under him from
disturbing Jose Bengzon or his tenants in the harvest of the palay growing on said land. Later, however, Melecio de Vera, having given an obligation
with sureties to answer for the damages which Jose Bengzon might suffer, that injunction was dissolved. But, although this injunction was dissolved
and Jose Bengzon and his tenants were notified thereof, the latter did not allow Melecio de Vera and his workmen to enter upon said land. Melecio
de Vera accused Jose Bengzon and his tenants of contempt, and the court issued an order requiring Jose Bengzon, Fulgencio Tandoc, Jose Corpus
and Alberto Campanero to appear in court on April 17, 1917, and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt. Things stood thus
when, as has already been said, on the 7th of January, 1917, Melecio de Vera and his workmen were attacked on the same land. The aggressors
were Jose Bengzon's men, among whom were identified the fourteen accused in this cause, led by Fulgencio Tandoc. Luis de Vera, Jose Corpus and
Bernardino Ruiz were identified as among those who wounded Luis Moyalde. Fulgencio Tandoc struck Luis Moyalde's head with a bamboo stick,
the latter falling to the ground; and while in this position, Luis de Vera, Jose Corpus and Bernardino Ruiz also gave him blows with clubs and canes.
On the evening of the same day Luis Moyalde died as a result of the blows received by him, the most serious of which was the one dealt on his
head by Fulgencio Tandoc. The information filed in this cause has to do only with the death of Luis Moyalde.
The fourteen men above-mentioned were charged in the information. The accused Domingo Galvez having died before the trial, the prosecution
was dismissed as to him. After hearing the evidence, the court found Fulgencio Tandoc, Luis de Vera and Bernardino Ruiz guilty and sentenced
them to be imprisoned for four years, to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, Luis Moyalde's heirs
in the sum of P1,000, and to pay each one-fourteenth part of the costs. The rest of the accused were acquitted, with the remaining part of the
costs de officio. From this judgment Fulgencio Tandoc, Luis de Vera, Jose Corpus and Bernardino Ruiz appealed.
The lower court classified the facts proven in this case as constituting the crime of homicide caused in a tumultuous affray. We are of the opinion
that this classification is erroneous. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused
and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. (Arts. 405 and 420
of the Penal Code.) Such were not the facts in this case. The quarrel here was between two well-known groups of men. The party formed by the
deceased and his companions was the one attacked and that formed by the appellants was the aggressor. There was no confusion in the aggression
as well as in the defense. The appellants and their companions were united in their common purpose to attack, as is shown by the circumstance
that they have rallied together under the signal of two sounds of the horn, in order to commence said aggression and they withdrew from the field
also under the signal of one sound of the horn. As is apparent, united they also put into execution this common purpose by cooperating with each
other in inflicting upon the deceased the blows which caused his death. This unity of purpose determines the aggressors' common responsibility for
the consequences of the aggression, for which reason the act cannot be considered as a tumultuous affray for the responsible authors are known.
The act, therefore, constitutes the crime of homicide.
In view of the numerical superiority of the appellants and their companions in relation to the number of the party of deceased and his companions
and the fact that former were all armed and three of them carried deadly weapons, the aggression must be considered as attended with the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the accused to the maximum degree.
The judgment appealed from is modified, and the appellants are sentenced, in accordance with article 404 of the Penal Code, to seventeen years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal. Said judgment is in all other respects affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ. concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141080. September 17, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad," accused-appellant.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

For the murder of twenty-four-year old Danilo Laurel, ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias "Lapad" was charged and subsequently convicted by
the court a quo and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
temperate damages, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.1cräläwvirtualibräry
On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to
attend a public dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening,
Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to
have a drink and bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters
from Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo
retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on
Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as
Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any medical assistance.
Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police invited him to the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his statement regarding the
killing incident and, if necessary, to confirm the identity of the suspect who was then in their custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and
affirmed before the police authorities that the man under detention, whom he later identified as accused Anecito Unlagada, was the same man
who stabbed his friend Danilo.
Dr. Rene Ortigas, surgical resident of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, testified that the post-mortem examination showed that
the victim sustained the following injuries: (a) an 8 cm. stab wound, 2nd intercostal space AAL right directed anteriorly, non-penetrating; (b) an 8
cm. stab wound, 4th intercostal MAL, directed postero-medially, non-penetrating; (c) an 8 cm. stab wound, 6th intercostal space, mid-clavicular
line, directed postero-caudially, penetrating diaphragm and right dome of liver causing massive hemorrhage, sequestered at right hemithorax and
abdomen; (d) an 8 cm. stab wound, 6th intercostal space, mid-clavicular line left, directed postero-laterally, non-penetrating; (e) an 8 cm. lacerated
wound, antero-lateral aspect right thigh; (f) a multiple contusion hematoma, postero-medial aspect left elbow; and, (g) a multilinear abrasion,
zygomatic area left face. Dr. Ortigas opined that wound No. 3 proved to be the only fatal injury which lacerated the diaphragm and right dome of
the liver resulting in massive hemorrhage.
The defense presented a different picture of the story. Guglielmo Laurel testified that on the evening of 27 January 1989 he was at the dance hall
when he met accused Anecito Unlagada. He was all by himself. On the same occasion, according to Guglielmo he also met Danilo Laurel and three
(3) other companions although only Edwin Selda was introduced to him. Soon after, Danilo and his friends left the dance hall to drink liquor. An
hour or so later, Danilo's group returned to the dance hall. An altercation ensued when the gatekeeper refused them entry without a gate pass.
From his vantage point of about forty (40) meters away, Guglielmo observed that a rumble erupted. From a distance, he saw a man, whom he later
recognized as Danilo Laurel, fall to the ground. He however belied having seen the accused Anecito Unlagada anywhere near the scene of the
crime. By his account, the melee broke up only when a policeman fired a warning shot in the air and the protagonists scampered away.
On cross-examination, however, Guglielmo Laurel asserted positively that accused Unlagada was inside the dance hall before, during and after the
rumble, and stayed there even after a policeman fired a warning shot. This testimony of witness Guglielmo was corroborated by defense witnesses
Jaime Umbiga and Mariano Salazar.
PO3 Jomarie Sarrosa narrated that at around 11:30 in the evening of 27 January 1989 he was inside his house entertaining some visitors when
suddenly he heard frantic shouts, "fight, fight!" Answering the call of duty, he took his service pistol, went outside and fired a warning shot in the
air to break up the fight that was going on some fifty (50) meters away. Instinctively, the protagonists broke up and scampered away. When he
went near the place of the disturbance, he noticed a man with a deformed hand sprawled on the ground. He however clarified that he described
the place as dark because there were no street lights.
PO3 Sarrosa lifted the prostrate body of the victim and asked a barangay tanod to stay with the victim as he would call a tricycle to seek emergency
medical assistance. According to him, he caused the incident to be entered into the police blotter while Pfc. Tady and Cpl. Taal investigated the
killing incident. The investigators informed him the following morning that they already had a suspect by the name of "Lapad." He volunteered to
look for the suspect since he knew him.
Accused Anecito Unlagada testifying in his defense, recounted that at around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27 January 1989 while he was inside the
dance hall, an altercation ensued near the gate between the gatekeeper and a group of four (4) individuals who, despite their disruptive behavior,
were eventually allowed to get through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock, a gunshot suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a
rumble had taken place and that somebody was killed. But he came to learn the victim's identity only the following morning when he and a certain
Lorenzo Patos were brought by a police officer to the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building, he heard somebody asking who
"Lapad" was and an alleged eyewitness, who later turned out to be Edwin Selda, pointed to him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito
Unlagada and Lorenzo Patos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against them before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile the
case against Lorenzo was dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge of murder.
The trial court gave full credence to the inculpatory testimony of prosecution witness Edwin Selda because he was only three (3) meters away from
the victim when the latter was stabbed to death. If it was true, according to the trial court, that at the Municipal Building Edwin readily identified
the person of accused "Lapad" as the suspect, it was not by reason of any unlawful suggestion but a spontaneous confirmation of his observation
of the perpetrator as vividly recalled by him.
The trial court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and the testimonies of the defense witnesses negating Anecito's culpability. The trial
court explained that it was highly unusual that the defense witnesses had their attention focused on the accused all the time since they were there
to witness and enjoy the dance, characterizing their testimonies as a mere ploy concocted to weave a picture of an innocent man in the person of
the accused.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused Anecito Unlagada now assails his conviction on the ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith and credence to the lone
and uncorroborated testimony of witness Edwin Selda, and in finding that the crime of murder was committed instead of "death caused in a
tumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.
In an attempt to discredit the lone eyewitness, accused-appellant posits the view that the circumstances of the place, the swiftness of the attack,
and the drunken state of the witness engender serious doubt that the witness positively identified the malefactor.
At the epicenter of most criminal cases is the issue of credibility of the witnesses. In the instant case, a thorough review of the records however
reveals no plausible reason to disbelieve the prosecution eyewitness. It will be recalled that when the fatal stabbing occurred, Edwin was only three
(3) meters away from both the victim and his attacker, as opposed to the defense witnesses who were standing fifty (50) or so meters away.
Edwin's physical proximity to the main protagonists and the locus criminis afforded him the unenviable position of observing the ghastly crime at
very close range. The time the accused passed in front of Edwin and when he mercilessly stabbed Danilo may be a fleeting moment but such was
sufficient to make a vivid and lasting impression of the bearded perpetrator's image specially so since the victim was a friend and a companion.
Neither can we accommodate accused-appellant's defense of alibi. Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of
the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitness because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification.3Since no
improper motive has been ascribed to Edwin Selda, it creates the presumption that no such motive in fact existed. In the absence of any evidence
showing why the prosecution witness would have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.4 The findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of the witness being unblemished by
arbitrariness and capriciousness, this Court is bound to accord them great weight and even finality on appeal.
But, accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred in convicting him of murder qualified by treachery and not "death in a tumultuous affray."
"Death in a tumultuous affray" is defined in Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the
affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical
injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course
of which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.5 The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of
individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the
defense suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where several
persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of
one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the
accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant;
the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period which, as correctly imposed by the court a quo, is reclusion perpetua.
The civil aspect of the case should however be modified in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
the heirs of the decedent are entitled to a reduced amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, while temperate damages of P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages of another P50,000.00 should be deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE
a.k.a. "Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus moral damages in the reduced amount
of P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. Nos. 36366-36368 September 23, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HIPOLITO AGBUYA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan, finding the appellants, Hipolito
Agbuya and Agustin Agbuya, guilty of two separate crimes of homicide, and finding the appellant, Agustin Agbuya, further guilty of the offense of
illegal discharge of firearms; and sentencing each of the two appellants, for the two crimes of homicide, to undergo imprisonment for fourteen
years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, and requiring them to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of five hundred
pesos, and to pay the costs, and imposing on Agustin Agbuya, for the offense of illegal discharge of firearms, the penalty of imprisonment for one
year, eight months, and twenty-one days, prision correccional, and requiring him to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
For several years prior to the date upon which the offenses which are the subject of this prosecution were committed, marked enmity had existed
between two families, the Palisocs and Agbuyas, in the municipality of Urbiztondo, in the Province of Pangasinan. On the morning of August 10,
1930, a neighbor named Padua had occasion to go to the house where lived Hipolito Agbuya, with whom also lived a son of Hipolito named
Agustin. Padua found Hipolito cleaning his shotgun, Agustin being with him. When Padua had finished his errand and was about to leave, Hipolito
asked if Padua had seen Martin Palisoc. To this question Padua replied that he had. Later in the day Hipolito and his son Agustin went to the barrio
of Maliuer, where they engaged in selling cloths in the market. The same morning Martin Palisoc also went to Maliuer, accompanied by Emilio
Palisoc. After attending some duties at Maliuer in the course of which they saw Hipolito and his son Agustin sitting near their merchandise in the
market, Martin and Emilio returned to Galarin, the barrio where they lived. Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon Hipolito and Agustin
passed in front of their house, proceeding along a maleconwhich gave a short cut to the north. Hipolito was then carrying his shotgun, which he
had with him during the forenoon and Agustin carried a bolo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
About this time Martin Palisoc, in company with Emilio Palisoc and Raymundo Poquis, made arrangements to go out together passing along the
same malecon towards the north. This took them along the course that Hipolito and Agustin had passed a short while before. The latter two,
however, after proceeding a short distance on the way, stepped aside from the path and waited near some banana and bamboo trees. As Martin
Palisoc with his two companions approached the place where Hipolito and Agustin were waiting, the latter arose and mounted the malecon to the
left of the approaching three. Having reached the path on the malecon Agustin unsheated his bolo but immediately dropped it on the ground and
asked his father for the shotgun. The latter thereupon handed Agustin the gun and Agustin confronted Martin who was then about fifteen or
twenty paces away, at the same time saying, "Now, Don Martin, the end of your life has come." At the same time he fired the gun at Martin and
the latter fell to the ground. Upon this Raymundo Poquis and Emilio Palisoc turned and fled in the direction from which they had come. Upon
arriving in front of a tienda which was owned by Feliciano Palisoc, Raymundo called out that they had been attacked and that Martin (Feliciano's
father) had been wounded and had fallen. Raymundo continued his course and a little farther on met Pioquinto Palisoc to whom he also told what
had happened to Martin. Upon being told of the trouble Feliciano Palisoc at once proceeded in the direction of the scene, but when he was about
sixty meters away from the spot where Martin had fallen, Agustin Agbuya discharged his gun at Feliciano and the latter also fell. Feliciano seems to
have died almost at once, but Martin lived for a few minutes and expired later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Meanwhile Pioquinto Palisoc, upon learning of the trouble, at once went to the scene and approached in time to see Agustin discharge his gun at
Feliciano. Pioquinto was frightened and hid himself a short distance away from the malecon at a spot from which he could see the Agbuyas as they
retired to their home. Pioquinto then came out to look for Martin and Feliciano. The latter was found already dead on one side of the malecon, and
Pioquinto passed on in search of Martin whom he found in a dying state some distance farther along. Upon reaching Martin, Pioquinto grasped his
body to lift him up, but at the same moment Agustin Agbuya raised and discharged his shotgun at Pioquinto from a distance of some two hundred
meters. The latter, in order to avoid the shot, threw himself to the ground and was not hit, after which he got up and run to the tienda of Feliciano
Palisoc. From this point he saw the two Agbuyas approach Martin, and Hipolito caught the dying man by the right arm, while Faustino Agbuya, who
had joined the two, took him by the left, whereupon Agustin again discharged his gun at Martin. The three Agbuyas then went to the body of
Feliciano and Agustin again discharged his gun at him. This done, the three Agbuyas moved in a direction where a number of persons were now
approaching, among whom was Pioquinto Palisoc. As they approached, the Agbuyas moved their hands excitedly and called aloud, "Come on, you
Palisocs. We are going to exterminate you." chanrobles virtual law library
What has been related occurred at about three o'clock in the afternoon. During the remainder of the afternoon the Agbuyas remained on guard
watching the bodies of the two dead men, and only left when the police arrived after dark. In the course of the afternoon Petra Licuanan saw
Hipolito approach the body of Martin Palisoc and attempt to fasten a bolo to his belt. Being unable to do this, Hipolito went to where the body of
Feliciano Palisoc was lying and placed the bolo nearby. When the body of Martin Palisoc was examined a small pistol was found in one of his
pockets, but it had not been discharged and, indeed, had evidently not been taken out of the pocket, supposing that it was there when the tragedy
occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
About daylight the next morning members of the Constabulary arrested Hipolito Agbuya and Agustin Agbuya in Lingayen, as they were alighting
from an automobile at the home of the attorney whom they wished to secure to defend them. As the Constabulary took the shotgun from the
hands of Agustin Agbuya, Hipolito Agbuya said, "I know why you have come, and it is because we are guilty." Upon being asked by one of the
officers what they were guilty of, the accused answered that they had killed Martin and Feliciano Palisoc by shooting
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the foregoing facts it is manifest that both the appellants are guilty as principals in the two homicides which are the subject of prosecution in
the first two of the cases now before us, and the trial court committed no error in so finding. The attorney for the appellants insists that Hipolito at
least should be acquitted as not having participated in those acts in the character of principal. But his acts and attitude before, during and after the
commission of the crimes show that the two accused were acting with a common design in taking the lives of Martin and Feliciano Palisoc. The
preparatory act of cleaning the shotgun was done by Hipolito and his inquiry of Domingo Padua as to whether the latter had seen Martin Palisoc
that morning is suggestive. At the time the two accused went out into the middle of the malecon to confront Martin Palisoc and his two
companions, Hipolito, who had up to that time been carrying the gun, handed it to Agustin, when he must have known that the intention of
Agustin was to use it in killing Martin Palisoc. Then, the occurrence later in the afternoon when the three Agbuyas went up to the dying Martin, and
Hipolito seized one of his arms, while Agustin emptied the shotgun again into Martin's body, and the similar incident repeated over the body of
Feliciano, all show conclusively a design on the part of Hipolito to contribute effectually to the destruction of the two
Palisocs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Attorney-General suggests that the crime committed upon the person of Martin Palisoc was that of murder, inasmuch as the attack was made
upon Martin Palisoc while the latter was passing along the highway and not suspecting attack from the two appellants. We are of the opinion
that alevosia was not present, or its presence does not plainly and manifestly appear, since the two accused made the attack from the front on a
public highway, and although they had been waiting on the roadside possibly with a view to the making of this attack, yet the crime was not
committed by shooting from ambush. Also, while the conditions under which the killing of Martin Palisoc was effected suggest that there may have
been premeditation on the part of the accused, yet nevertheless evident premeditation is not clearly shown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
With respect to the qualification of illegal discharge of firearms on the part of Agustin Agbuya when he discharged his shotgun from a distance at
Pioquinto Palisoc, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in qualifying the offense. The distance from where Agustin Agbuya stood to
where Pioquinto was bending over the body of Martin Palisoc was so great, that it is difficult to impute an intention on the part of Agustin to kill
Pioquinto. Nor does it appear that Agustin really aimed his gun directly at Pioquinto. It is not improbable that the gun was discharged chiefly with a
view to frightening Pioquinto away.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It being understood, therefore, that the penalties imposed in the three cases shall be extinguished in succession, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law in each case, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. So ordered, with costs in the first two cases against the two
appellants, and in case No. 11781 against the appellant Agustin Agbuya.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-39303-39305 March 17, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE KALALO, ET AL., defendants.
FELIPE KALALO, MARCELO KALALO, JUAN KALALO, and GREGORIO RAMOS, appellants.
Meynardo M. Farol and Feliciano Gomez for appellants.
Acting Solicitor-General Peña for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
On November 10, 1932, the herein appellants Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo, and Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas jointly with Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the first two for
murder, and the last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties said three cases were tried together and after the presentation of their
respective evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, and sentenced the appellants as follows:
In case No. 6858, for the alleged murder of Marcelino Panaligan, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the
corresponding accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the said deceased Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.
In case No. 6859, for the alleged murder of Arcadio Holgado, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the
corresponding accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the aforesaid victim, the deceased Arcadio Holgado, in the sum of P1,000, with
the costs.
In the third case, that is, No. 6860, wherein the court a quo held that the crime committed was simply that of discharge of firearm, not frustrated
murder, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo was sentenced to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional and to pay the
proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings. Felipe Kalalo and Juan Kalalo, as well as their co-accused Fausta and Alipia Abrenica, Gregorio
Ramos and Alejandro Garcia, were acquitted of the charges therein.
The accused in the aforesaid three cases appealed from their respective sentences assigning six alleged errors as committed by the trial court, all of
which may be discussed jointly in view of the fact that they raise only one question, to wit: whether or not said sentences are in accordance with
law.
A careful study and examination of the evidence presented disclose the following facts: Prior to October 1, 1932, the date of the commission of the
three crimes alleged in the three informations which gave rise to the aforesaid three cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo
or Calalo and Isabela Holgado or Olgado, the latter being the sister of the deceased Arcadio Holgado and a cousin of the other deceased Marcelino
Panaligan, had a litigation over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Calumpang of the municipality of San Luis, Province of Batangas. On
September 28, 1931, and again on December 8th of the same year, Marcelo Kalalo filed a complaint against the said woman in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas. By virtue of a motion filed by his opponent Isabela Holgado, his first complaint was dismissed on December 7, 1931, and his
second complaint was likewise dismissed on February 5, 1932. Marcelo Kalalo cultivated the land in question during the agricultural years 1931 and
1932, but when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted thereon.
On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the deceased, decided to order the aforesaid land plowed, and
employed several laborers for that purpose. These men, together with Arcadio Holgado, went to the said land early that day, but Marcelo Kalalo,
who had been informed thereof, proceeded to the place accompanied by his brothers Felipe and Juan Kalalo, his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos
and by Alejandro Garcia, who were later followed by Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt, respectively, of the first three.
The first five were all armed with bolos. Upon their arrival at the said land, they ordered those who were plowing it by request of Isabela and
Arcadio Holgado, to stop, which they did in view of the threatening attitude of those who gave them said order.1ªvvphi1.ne+
Shortly after nine o'clock on the morning of the same day, Isabela Holgado, Maria Gutierrez and Hilarion Holgado arrived at the place with food for
the laborers. Before the men resumed their work, they were given their food and not long after they had finished eating, Marcelino Panaligan,
cousin of said Isabela and Arcadio, likewise arrived. Having been informed of the cause of the suspension of the work, Marcelino Panaligan ordered
said Arcadio and the other laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos to continue the work already began. At this juncture, the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn, approached Marcelino Panaligan.
At a remark from Fausta Abrenica, mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what is detaining you?" they all simultaneously struck with their bolos,
the appellant Marcelo Kalalo slashing Arcadio Holgado, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed Marcelino
Panaligan, inflicting upon them the wounds enumerated and described in the medical certificates Exhibits I and H. Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino
Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received by them in the presence of Isabela Holgado and Maria Gutierrez, not to mention the accused.
The plowmen hired by Arcadio and Isabela all ran away.
Arcadio Holgado's body bore the following six wounds, to wit:
1. A cut wound on the ulnar side of right arm near the wrist, cutting the ulnar bone completely and, the radius partially.
2. A cut wound on the anterior upper portion of the left arm measuring about 7 cm. long and 5 cm. wide extending to the bone and
cutting the deltoid muscle across.
3. A penetrating wound on the left chest just below the clavicle going thru the first intercostal space measuring about 8 cm. long and 2
cm wide.
4. A wound on the left side of the back about 20 cm. long following the 10th intercostal space and injuring the lung, diaphragm, stomach
and large intestine.
5. A small superficial cut wound about 2 cm. long and ½ cm. wide situated on the inner side of the right scapula.
6. A superficial wound barely cutting the skin, about 4 cm. long in the lumbar region just to the right of the spinal column. (Exhibit I.)
Marcelino Panaligan's body, in turn, bore the following fourteen wounds, to wit:
1. A penetrating cut wound in the epigastric region of the abdomen measuring about 7 cm. long and 3 cm. wide cutting the omentum and
injuring the lower portion of the stomach and a portion of the transverse colon, but no actual perforation of either one of the two organs.
2. A cut wound on the head just above the forehead about 6 cm. long and 4 cm. wide lifting a portion of scalp as a flap.
3. A cut wound on the left side of the head measuring about 7 cm. long and 2 cm. wide.
4. A cut wound about 12 cm. long across the face just below the eyes extending from one cheek bone to the other, perforating the left
antrum and cutting the nasal bone.
5. A cut wound on the anterior portion of the left forearm extending to the bone with a flap of skin and muscle which measures about 12
cm long and 6 cm. wide.
6. A cut wound across the dorsal side of the right hand about 5 cm. long and 2 cm. wide cutting the bones of the hand.
7. A superficial wound about 6 cm. long and 4 cm. wide and 2 cm. deep situated in the left axilla.
8. A cut wound about 6 cm. long and 2 cm. wide situated over the left scapula.
9. A cut wound on the right shoulder about 6 cm. long passing near the inner angle of the scapula cutting the muscles of the shoulder.
10. A cut wound about 7 cm. long and 3 cm. wide situated near and almost parallel to the inner border of the right scapula.
11. A wound on the back of the head, oval in shape, about 10 cm. long and 5 cm. wide from which a flap of scalp was removed.
 12. A wound across the back and left side of the neck about 12 cm. long and 7 cm. deep cutting the vertebral column together with the
great arteries and veins on the left side of the neck.
13. A wound about 15 cm. long and 4 cm. wide on the left side of the back.
14. A small wound on the left thumb from which a portion of the bone and other tissues were removed. (Exhibit H.)
The above detailed description of the wounds just enumerated discloses — and there is nothing of record to contradict it all of them were caused
by a sharp instrument or instruments.
After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan had fallen to the ground dead, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo took from its holster on the belt of
Panaligans' body, the revolver which the deceased carried, and fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene inorder to
save his own life.
The appellants attempted to prove that the fight, which resulted in the death of the two deceased, was provoked by Marcelino Panaligan who fired
a shot at Marcelo Kalalo upon seeing the latter's determination to prevent Arcadio Holgado and his men from plowing the land in question. No
such firing, however, can be taken into consideration, in the first place, because of the existence of competent evidence such as the testimony of
Maria Gutierrez, who is a disinterested witness, which corroborates that of Isabela Holgado in all its details, showing that the said deceased was
already lying prostrate and lifeless on the ground when the appellant Marcelo Kalalo approached him to take his revolver for the purpose of using
it, as he in fact did, against Hilarion Holgado; in the second place, because the assault and aggression of the said appellant were not directed
against said Marcelino Panaligan but exclusively against Arcadio Holgado, the evidence of record on this point being overwhelming, and if his claim
were true, he naturally should have directed his attack at the person who openly made an attempt against his life; in the third place, because the
evidence shows without question that Panaligan was an expert shot with a revolver, and among the eight wounds that the appellant Marcelo
Kalalo received (Exhibit 3), not one appears to have been caused by bullet, and similarly, none of the other appellants received any wound that
might, in any way, suggest the possibility of having been caused by bullet; and finally, because the fact that he and his co-appellants, together with
those who had been charged jointly with them, had gone to the place of the crime armed with bolos, determined at any cost to prevent the
Holgados from plowing the land in dispute, cannot but disclose not only their determination to resort to violence or something worse, but that they
did not need any provocation in order to carry out their intent.
They likewise attempted to prove that the appellant Marcelo Kalalo alone fought against the deceased Marcelino Panaligan and Arcadio Holgado
and inflicted upon them the wounds which resulted in their death, said appellant testifying that he was compelled to do so in defense of his own
life because both of the deceased attacked him first, the former with a revolver, firing three shots at him, and the latter with a bolo. For the same
reasons hereinbefore stated, such defense of the appellants cannot be given credit. One man alone could not have inflicted on the two deceased
their multiple wounds, particularly when it is borne in mind that one of them was better armed, because he carried a revolver, and that he was
furthermore an expert shot and scarcely two arm-lengths from Kalalo, according to the latter's own testimony. The two witnesses for the defense,
who witnessed the crime very closely, refuted such allegation saying that Marcelo Kalalo alone fought the deceased Arcadio Holgado and that the
other three appellants went after the other deceased. It is true that Arcadio Holgado also used his bolo to defend himself from Marcelo Kalalo's
aggression but it is no less true that five of the principal wounds of the other deceased Marcelino Panaligan were inflicted on him from behind,
inasmuch as according to Exhibit H they were all found at the back of the head, on the neck and on his back. Neither is it less true that all the
wounds of the appellant Marcelo Kalalo were inflicted on him from the front, which fact shows that it was not he alone who inflicted the wounds
on the two deceased because had he been alone Panaligan would not have exposed his back to be thus attacked from behind, inasmuch as he was
armed with a revolver, which circumstance undoubtedly allowed him to keep at a distance from Kalalo; and in connection with the testimony of
Isabela Holgado and Maria Gutierrez, said circumstance shows furthermore that the three appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos
attacked said Panaligan with their respective bolos at the same time that Marcelo Kalalo attacked Arcadio Holgado, in order that all might act
simultaneously in conformity with the common intent of the four and of their coaccused to eliminate through violence and at any cost, without
much risk to them, all those who wanted to plow the land which was the cause of the dispute between the two parties. And it is not strange that
the three appellants, who inflicted the wounds upon Marcelino Panaligan, should act as they did, because they knew that the latter carried a
revolver in a holster on his belt.
Although it may seem a repetition or redundancy, it should be stated that Marcelo Kalalo's allegation that he acted in self-defense is absolutely
unfounded on the ground that, were it true that the deceased Marcelino Panaligan succeeded in using his revolver, he would have wounded if not
the said appellant, at least the other appellants.
The trial court has acted correctly in not giving credit to the testimony of the appellants Juan and Felipe Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos that they
proceeded to the scene of the crime completely unarmed, with the exception that one of them had a brush in his hand and the other a plane, after
Marcelino Panaligan and Arcadio Holgado had already expired, which is incredible and improbable under the circumstances, knowing, as in fact
they then knew, that their brother Marcelo Kalalo had been attacked by armed men. This court cannot help but agree with the decision of the
lower court where it states:
It is improbable that after having been informed that their brother was engaged in a fight, they went to the scene of the crime, one
merely armed with a plane and the other with a brush. It is improbable that Felipe Kalalo also went to that place simply to follow Juan
Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos upon seeing them run unarmed in that direction. These improbabilities of the defenses of the accused, in the
face of the positive and clear testimony of the eyewitnesses pointing to the said accused as the aggressors of the deceased Marcelino
Panaligan and Arcadio Holgado, cannot, of course, prevail against nor detract from the weight of the evidence of the prosecution,
particularly taking into consideration the numerous wounds of each of the deceased and the positions thereof, which show that the said
deceased were attacked by several persons and that those several persons were the defendants. Furthermore, the established fact that
after the commission of the crime the said defendants had been in hiding in order to avoid arrest, is corroborative evidence of their guilt.
It certainly is a fact of record that the said three appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos were not arrested until after several days,
because they had been hiding or, at least, absenting themselves from their homes.
That the four appellants should all be held liable for the death of the two deceased leaves no room for doubt. All of them, in going to the land
where the killing took place, were actuated by the same motive which was to get rid of all those who might insist on plowing the land which they
believed belonged to one of them, that is, to Marcelo Kalalo, a fact naturally inferable from the circumstance that all of them went there fully
armed and that they simultaneously acted after they had been instigated by their mother with the words hereinbefore stated, to wit: "What is
detaining you?"
The question now to be decided is whether the appellants are guilty of murder or of simple homicide in each of cases G.R. No. L-39303 and G.R. No.
L-39304. The Attorney-General maintains that they are guilty of murder in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength in the commission of the acts to which the said two cases particularly refer. The trial court was of the opinion that they are guilty of simple
homicide but with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
It is true that under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines murder, the circumstance of "abuse of superior strength", if proven to
have been presented, raises homicide to the category of murder; but this court is of the opinion that said circumstance may not properly be taken
into consideration in the two cases at bar, either as a qualifying or as a generic circumstance, if it is borne in mind that the deceased were also
armed, one of them with a bolo, and the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the contending parties and their strength was almost
balanced because there is no doubt but that, under circumstances similar to those of the present case, a revolver is as effective as, if not more than
three bolos. For this reason, this court is of the opinion that the acts established in cases Nos. 6858 and 6859 (G.R. Nos. L-39303 and 39304,
respectively), merely constitute two homicides, with no modifying circumstance to be taken into consideration because none has been proved.
As to case No. 6860 (G.R. No. 39305), the evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion Holgado while the latter was
fleeing from the scene of the crime in order to be out of reach of the appellants and their companions and save his own life. The fact that the said
appellant, not having contended himself with firing only once, fired said successive shots at Hilarion Holgado, added to the circumstance that
immediately before doing so he and his co-appellants had already killed Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and brother-in-law,
respectively, of the former, shows that he was then bent on killing said Hilarion Holgado. He performed everything necessary on his pat to commit
the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or because his
intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark. The acts thus committed by the said appellant Marcelo Kalalo
constitute attempted homicide with no modifying circumstance to be taken into consideration, because none has been established.
Wherefore, the three appealed sentences are hereby modified as follows:
In case No. 6858, or G.R. No. 39303, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellants is homicide and they hereby sentenced to fourteen
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of
P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings of both instances; and by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 4103, the
minimum of the said penalty of reclusion temporal is hereby fixed at nine years;
In case No. 6859, or G.R. No. 39304, the court likewise finds that the crime committed by the appellants is homicide, and they are hereby
sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporaleach, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Arcadio Holgado
in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of both instances; and in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 4103, the
minimum of the penalty of reclusion temporal herein imposed upon them is hereby fixed at nine years;
In case No. 6860, or G.R. No. 39305, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellant Marcelo Kalalo is attempted homicide, and he is
hereby sentenced to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, it being understood that by virtue of the provisions of said Act No.
4103, the minimum of this penalty is six months, and he is furthermore sentenced to pay the costs of the appeal in this case.
In all other respects, the appealed sentences in the said three cases are hereby affirmed without prejudice to crediting the appellants therein with
one-half of the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. So
ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5649. September 6, 1910. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISAAC SAMONTE, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The defendant, Isaac Samonte, was tried in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas on a charge of criminal attempt against an agent
of the authorities, and sentenced to one year eight months and twenty-one days of prison correccional, to pay a fine of P65, in case of insolvency
to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, to the accessory penalties provided in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs. He
appealed to this court.

Counsel for appellant insists, first, that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the policeman, Gregorio Glindo,
attempted to arrest the accused; and, second, that if said policeman did attempt to arrest the defendant at this place he, not having a judicial
warrant, was not, under the circumstances, authorized to make the arrest which he attempted to make.

About 8 o’clock on the night of September 6, 1908, the appellant, Isaac Samonte, and Basilio Rabe were together in the house of one Demetrio
Pandeñio in the barrio of Macalalong, jurisdiction of Pitogo Province of Tayabas. They both left this house and met shortly afterwards in the street
(Verdades) in said barrio. On meeting there they became engaged in quarrel, the appellant knocking or pushing Rabe down, then proceeded to
maltreat him. At this moment Rabe called "police! police!" Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman of Pitogo, being on patrol duty that night in said
barrio, hearing these words went to the scene, arriving just as the offended party was getting up, and attempted to arrest the appellant, saying to
him: "In the name of the United States, don’t move." The appellant, on seeing the policeman and hearing this command, said: "Don’t come near,
because I will take your life." The policeman continued toward the appellant and when very near him the appellant struck at the policeman with a
knife. On account of this resistance the policeman could not arrest the appellant at the time, so he went immediately to the house of the
councilman of that barrio, Demetrio Pandeñio, and reported the matter. Pandeñio ordered him to arrest the Appellant. He returned to obey this
order, being followed by Pandeñio. They found the appellant in a place called Mutingbayan. The policeman attempted to take hold of the
appellant, but he resisted, striking at the policeman again with his knife. The councilman then ordered the appellant to submit himself, and on
receiving this order the appellant said: "I do not recognize anyone," and struck at the councilman with the knife.

The appellant was not arrested on that night on account of this resistance. He did not lay hands on or touch with his knife either the policeman or
the councilman, but he did refuse to submit himself to the authorities, and resisted arrest. The policeman did not see the appellant knock the priest
down, neither did he see him kick the said priest, but he heard the cries of the priest calling for help, saying "police! police!" and when he arrived
on the scene the priest was just getting up and freeing himself from the Appellant. When the policeman heard these cries for help he was only a
very short distance — some 6 or 8 brazas — away, and when he arrived the trouble had not terminated, although no active fighting took place after
his arrival. Under these facts and circumstances it was the duty of this police officer to stop this disturbance by placing the defendant under arrest.

Any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest, without a warrant, any person who is committing, or has committed, a
breach of the peace in his presence. (3 Cyc., 881; Carolina v. McAfee., 10 L.R.A., 607; Commonwealth v. Tobin, 11 Am. Rep., 375; People v. Rounds,
35 N.W., 77; and Douglas v. Barber, 28 Atl. Rep., 805.)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant,
when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof; or
the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made. (3 Cyc., 886; Ramsey v. State, 17 S. E. 613; Dilger v. Com.,
11 S.W., State v. McAfee, 12 S.E., 453; State v. Williams, 15 S.E., 554; and Hawkins v. Lutton, 70 N.W., 483.)

In the case at bar Gregorio Glindo, being a peace officer, not only had authority to arrest the defendant at the time, but it was his duty to do so, he
having heard the priest call for help and having arrived on the scene before the disturbance had finally ended.

Article 249 of the Penal Code provides that the following commit criminal attempt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

"2. Those who attack the authorities or their agents, or employee force against them, or gravely intimidate them, or offer an equally grave
resistance while they are discharging the functions of their office or on occasion thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 250 of the same code fixes the penalty to be imposed for those guilty of an attempt against the authorities or their agents, as provided in
the above article.

The accused in this case, after an attempt had been made to arrest him by a duly authorized police officer in the discharge of his duty as such,
offered grave resistance by refusing to submit himself to arrest and by striking at the policeman with a knife, thereby attempting a personal injury.
Although the policeman was not wounded or touched by the accused, these facts do not relieve him from criminal responsibility.

The penalty imposed by the court below being in accordance with the law and the proofs presented, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 280. July 25, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELEUTERIO MARASIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

About 7 o’clock on the evening of the 17th of September, 1892, Engracio Ronimo, a lieutenant of the town of Calaca Batangas, being in front of the
house of Geronimo Ramos in said town, noticed that a quarrel was going on upstairs. He immediately went up to investigate the affair, and found
that the quarrel was between Eleuterio Marasigan and Severo Magsino, the latter charging Marasigan with having stolen a bull owned by Magsino.
Lieutenant Ronimo tried to take them to the municipal building, but at that moment Arcadio de Joya, the justice of the peace, appeared before the
house and, upon being informed of what had happened, ordered all those who were in the house to come down at once; everyone did so and after
a conversation in Spanish which took place between Marasigan and the justice of the peace, Lieutenant Ronimo became aware that they were
arranging, to settle the matter. Ronimo objecting thereto, Marasigan caught hold of the gun which the justice of the peace was carrying with him
and fired a shot at Lieutenant Ronimo who, in consequence, was wounded in the head and fell to the around. All the foregoing happened in the
presence of several witnesses who, upon examination, so testified.

The wounded man was promptly assisted by two curanderos, and, although the injured party declared that it took him one month and two days to
recover, that during the first twenty days he was unable to work, and that he spent P7 which, together with other damages, amounted to P12, yet
one of the curanderos stated that the cure took twenty days, while the other said that it took only ten days. The wounded man was later on
examined by the municipal physician, who stated that he found a scar in the left parietal region of the head as the result of a gunshot wound; that
the bullet only affected the scalp without penetrating the skull, the wound having entirely healed without further consequences; and that by
proper treatment, barring accidents or complications, cure should have been effected in from twenty to thirty days.

Proceedings were instituted against Fleuterio Marasigan and Arcadio de Joya for the crime of lesiones graves, and the trial court rendered
judgment on the 2d of May, 1896, sentencing Eleuterio Marasigan, for the crime of discharging a firearm and lesiones menos graves, to the penalty
of three years and six months of prision correccional with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the injured party in the sum of P18, or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the costs, one-half of the time of his detention to count in his favor. Arcadio
de Joya was acquitted, and the other half of the costs was declared de oficio. Counsel for the accused Marasigan appealed from the above
judgment, but after the appeal was admitted, the latter disappeared and in consequence was declared in default, the proceedings being suspended
until such time as he should present himself or be arrested. This occurred on the 3d of November, 1902, and the case was proceeded, with, the
Solicitor-General asking that the judgment appealed from be affirmed, and counsel for the accused moving that the criminal liability of the accused
be declared extinguished because he had been pardoned by the Government of the former sovereignty. However, notwithstanding the time
elapsed since February of 1903, neither he nor his counsel have been able to produce the original of the decree of pardon alleged by them. It
further appears that the accused Arcadio de Joya, who was acquitted, has since died.

The above related facts fully proven in this case, really constitute the crime of discharge of a firearm causing lesiones menos graves; the act can not
be classified as an armed aggression by Marasigan upon an agent of the authorities, inasmuch as it does not appear that Lieutenant Ronimo was
acting or had any occasion to act in the performance of his official duties on the night in question, as the justice of the peace, whose duty it was to
make the investigation, was on the spot; the quarrel arose from the loss of a bull which Severo Magsino charged Marasigan with having stolen.
Neither can such act be classified as frustrated murder or homicide because the case does not contain sufficient proof that it was the intention of
the aggressor to deprive Ronimo of his life.

The accused Eleuterio Marasigan is convicted of the crime of discharge of a firearm thereby causing lesiones, and it has been fully proven that he is
the sole author thereof, since, notwithstanding his exculpatory allegations, the case contains full evidence of his guilt as being the only person who
fired a shot at Engracio Ronimo who, in consequence, was wounded in the head and fell to the ground on the spot; moreover, several witnesses
saw the accused fire the weapon at the injured party, and against the testimony of these witnesses the declarations of certain others presented by
the accused, they being his relatives or next of kin, can not prevail. It is, therefore, unquestionable that the accused is the only one liable for the
crime with which he is charged.

Whenever one sole act constitutes two or more crimes, or if one of them is the necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
corresponding to the more serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum degree, as provided in article 89 of the Penal Code.

The discharge of a firearm by the accused against the injured party, inflicting on the latter lesiones menos graves about the head, according to the
criminal law produced two offenses, one being for discharging a firearm against a given person, defined by article 408 of the Penal Code, and the
other, that of lesiones menos graves, penalized under article 418 of said code, and as both oftenses were the result of one sole criminal act, the
adequate penalty, according to article 89 aforesaid, is that imposed by the laws upon the more serious one, the same being applied in its maximum
degree. No mitigating or aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the crime herein, therefore the penalty should be imposed in
the medium grade of the maximum degree, and the penalty of three years and six months of prision correccional and accessories imposed on the
accused, is in accordance with the law.

In view of the foregoing considerations, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed in all of its parts with the costs
against the accused, with the approval of the order in connection with the proceedings for attachment. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. Nos. 42128, 42129, December 19, 1935 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE CO ARQUIZA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This appeal concerns two criminal cases tried and decided by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis and numbered 817 and 818,
respectively, in the docket of that court. In case No. 817 appellant was convicted of the crime of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of
obfuscation and voluntary surrender, and sentenced to suffer from eight years and one day to ten years of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Irineo Clarete in the sum of Pl,500, and to pay the costs; and in case No. 818, wherein he was charged with the crime of discharge of
firearm with serious physical injuries, appellant was likewise found guilty, and sentenced to one year and eight months of prision correccional, to
indemnify the injured party, Lorenzo Enerio, in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs.

In support of this appeal, counsel for the appellant have assigned six errors against the judgment below. All the alleged errors relate to the
question of the weight of evidence. No new or important question of law is involved.

In view of the mass of conflicting evidence presented in the two cases under consideration, it is by no means an easy task to arrive at a definite
conclusion as to the truth of the opposing claims advanced by the prosecution, on one side, and by the defense, on the other. Considering,
however, the appellant's admission that he fired the shot which caused the death of Irineo Clarete and inflicted wounds on Lorenzo Enerio, the
inquiry is reduced to the question of whether the appellant acted in self-defense. The trial court, after an extended discussion of the evidence,
rejected the claim that the appellant fired the fatal shot because he was assaulted by Clarete and his men. The following quotation from the
decision of the trial court is, in our opinion, substantially in accordance with the weight of evidence:

"The Court finds proven, beyond all rational doubt, and declares that the defendant Vicente Co Arquiza is criminally responsible for the death of
Irineo Clarete and the firing of his firearm in the person of Lorenzo Elnerio. It is evident that this accused knew in advance of the purposes of Irineo
Clarete to collect the palay in the night of cars. Tomas Siachon Ie had seen on that night before the event, in the coca field of Leoncio Cajita,
distarite about 200 fathoms of the palayero land, armed with a shotgun and accompanied by Eugenio Baloran carrying a spear and Roman Arquiza
carrying a sack, It is also evident that said defendant, for the same reason that he had prepared with his shotgun leaving his house in the potency of
Aloran and becoming accompanied by his two co-defendants also armed to go to the place of cars, harbored a preconceived intention to prevent
by force of their weapons Irineo Clarete and his people collect the palay. The same defendant told Sergeant Nagal, when he appeared in
Oroquieta after the event, who shot someone for having found stealing his palay. The evidence conclusively demonstrates that this defendant shot
Lorenzo Enerio and Irineo Clarete when he found these and their companions on the same sandy ground walking one after the other over the dike
of the irrigated land to withdraw to the house of Francisco Mutia who It was on the other side of the provincial road.
The defendant had no justification for using his shotgun or taking justice by his hands to prevent them from collecting the palay, even if he had
found them doing it. The harvest of cereal. He should have gone to court if he believed he was entitled to the land of the beach, which was the
insinuation of this Court when he ordered the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 744 and 745 in which one of the defendants was the deceased,
taking into account he tells us that this same land of land was disputed between Ponciano Montes, son-in-law of Irineo Clarete, to whom Filomeno
Querque sold the land in question in civil case No. 3078 and Julia Ancheco, mother-in-law of the defendant Vicente Co Arquiza, even though he
assures his testimony that the land of the land where the event took place is different from the litigation in said civil case.
There is no doubt that the defendant Vicente Co Arquiza, when he went to the landscaping area that knew the purposes of Irineo Clarete to collect
the palay on the night of the cars, was in a mood that naturally caused him an obfuscation when he surprised said Irineo Clarete and its people
within that land, and although the evidence shows that they did not achieve their purposes, because they withdrew from that place heading to the
house of Francisco Mutia to sleep, the defendant, who, as he has been able to observe the Judged, it is impulsive, could not restrain his passion and
thus finding those shot his gun to Lorenzo Enerio and Irineo Clarete who were ahead, obsessed with the idea that they stole his palay. It is
therefore possible to prove to the accused his obfuscation as a circumstance that attenuates his responsibility. "

We are inclined to disagree with the trial court as to the existence of the mitigating circumstance of obf uscation. It seems more fitting to
appreciate in favor of the appellant the mitigating circumstance of provocation, which, in addition to that of voluntary surrender, requires the
imposition of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the crime of homicide, under article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, in
criminal case No. 817, the applicable penalty is that of prision mayor. (Revised Penal Code, article 64 [5].) Pursuant to the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer not less than two years of prision correctional and not more than eight
years and one day of prision mayor.

In criminal case No. 818, the Solicitor-General suggests that the penalty prescribed for the crime of discharge of firearm under article 254 of the
Revised Penal Code should be applied in its maximum period, in accordance with article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. From the testimony of Dr.
Jose M. Contreras, the wounds of Lorenzo Enerio required medical attendance for a period of from ten to fifteen days. The offense thus committed
by the appellant against Lorenzo Enerio comes within the purview of article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, and constitutes the crime of less serious
physical injuries. The provisions of article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 4000, relate to two or more grave or less grave
felonies resulting from the same act, and is therefore applicable here. Appreciating in favor of the appellant the two mitigating circumstances
already mentioned, without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the crime of discharge of firearm with less
serious physical injuries, should be imposed on the appellant, that is to say, from one year, eight months and twenty-one days to two years, eleven
months and ten days of prision correctional Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is further sentenced to suffer not less than
six months and one day and not more than one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correctional.

Modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Hull, Vickers, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-4127. March 17, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES J. KOSEL, Defendant.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The accused was acquitted of the crime of frustrated assassination, with which he was charged, but was convicted of unlawfully discharging a
firearm at another person as defined and penalized in article 408 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to six months and one day of prision
correccional.

It was proven at the trial that the accused attempted to intimidate the complaining witnesses by pointing his revolver in their direction, whereupon
they threw themselves upon him and disarmed him. In the course of the struggle the accused discharged the revolver so close to one of the
complaining witnesses that his side was burned by the flash of the discharge and a number of particles of burnt powder were imbedded in his skin.

The accused swore that the revolver was discharged accidentally during the struggle, but the testimony of the witnesses leaves no room for
reasonable doubt that the accused willfully fired the revolver, not with the intention of killing or wounding his opponents but for the purpose of
intimidating them and frightening them away.

A majority of the court are of opinion that this constitutes the offenses of "discharging a firearm at a person" (disparar una arma de fuego contra
cualquiera persona) as defined and penalized in article 408 of the Penal Code, and that the judgment of conviction by the trial court should
therefore be affirmed.

Counsel for the accused insist that the crime of frustrated assassination and the crime of which the accused was convicted are two separate and
distinct offenses, not necessarily included one in the other, and that the complaint having charged two offenses was for that reason fatally
defective.

It does not appear, however, that the accused made any objection on this ground in the court below, and we are therefore of opinion that he can
not be heard to raise this objection for the first time on appeal; and in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the case of the United States v.
Paraiso 1 (1 Phil. Rep., 66), affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States December 16, 1907, the trial court did not err in convicting the
accused of any offense sufficiently charged in the complaint of which the evidence of record sustains a finding of his guilt.

The judgment and sentence of the Court of First Instance are affirmed with the costs of this appeal against the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 131421. November 18, 2002
GERONIMO DADO,, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No.
16886, which affirmed the decision2 dated April 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056,
finding petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso were charged with murder allegedly committed
as follows:
That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons,
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.4 Trial thereafter followed.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas5 and Rufo Alga6 are as follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the
Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team,
composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike at
Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves between
petitioner, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They were all facing
southwards in a half-kneeling position and were about 2 arms length away from each other. At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw
somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Though it was a moonless night, they noticed that he was half-naked. When he was about 5
meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso, who was on his right side, was making some movements. Balinas told
Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter,
Petitioner, who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim shouted, Tay Dolfo, ako ini, (Tay Dolfo,
[this is] me)7 as he fell on the ground. The victim turned out to be Silvestre Butsoy Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler
the team were ordered to intercept. Repentant of what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas saying, Pare, this was not intentionally
done and this was merely an accident.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The post-mortem examination conducted on his cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T.
Antenor, yielded the following results:
Gunshot wounds located at:
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially and exiting at the right inner arm, about 4 cm below
the elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter (Point of Exit).
No powder burns noted.
2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm from the ischial spine. Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood
vessels and the surrounding tissues along the femoral triangle. The wound coursed upwards toward the pelvic area through the inguinal canal with
blast injuries noted [at] the urinary bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of the ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the surrounding
vessels and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding was noted along the injured pelvic area. Three (3) pieces of irregularly shaped metallic slugs were
recovered from the body; one, silvery colored, along the iliac spine almost glued to the bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary
bladder substance; three, copper colored, embedded in blasted substance almost on the pelvic floor. Hematoma noted along the penile area.
No other injuries noted.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet
pierced through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor added that
the position of the victim at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She
added that the wound on the victims right outer lateral arm alone, would not bring about death, unless not immediately
treated.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out
to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet, thus:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
xxx
1. Evidence marked SB-1 is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56mm
firearms.
2. Evidence marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the lead core of evidence copper jacketed marked SB-1.
x x x .11cräläwvirtualibräry
On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit SB-2 and SB-3) recovered from the
fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of SB-1 which is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.12cräläwvirtualibräry
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. He claimed that while waiting for the cattle
rustlers, he and his team positioned themselves beneath a big hole from which a big tree had been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his
companions, CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, were facing southwards. When he heard rapid gun bursts, he
thought they were being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso embraced
and asked forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot.13cräläwvirtualibräry
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun burst which he thought to be from their enemies came from 2 meters
behind him. He explained that his arm was then broken making it difficult for him to move. Thus, when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to
face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared that his purpose in firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite
the source of the rapid gun burst was to demoralize their enemy.14cräläwvirtualibräry
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late
Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in relation to the expenses incurred for the complete funeral services
given to the deceased victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1997.16cräläwvirtualibräry
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 11, 1998, 18 which became final
and executory on March 30, 1998.19 Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has
become final.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in
conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and (2) in finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal
wound inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that the prosecution failed to allege the circumstance of
conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information states: x x x the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-
mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death. x x x Undoubtedly, the information
does not satisfy the requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed in appropriate language. 20 The words conspired, confederated, or the phrase
acting in concert or in conspiracy, or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. The language used by the prosecution in
charging the petitioner and his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from the information.
Absent particular statements in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy, the same cannot
be considered against the petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his own acts or omissions.21 In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To ensure that the due process rights of an accused are
observed, every indictment must embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused,
the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the agreement need
not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself,
conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy.23cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather
than the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Simultaneity alone would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of
action and purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar, the incident
occurred at the spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be proved to have been committed by him personally. In other
words, his criminal accountability, if any, should be determined on an individual rather than on a collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to
answer for the acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated directly and personally in the commission of
those acts. It becomes important therefore to determine whether petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the death of the victim.
The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance wound as compared to a 5.56 mm. bullet which is of a lower caliber. It
concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of the victim must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance
than the wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral arm.25 However, this conclusion is entirely devoid of basis because no evidence
was presented to substantiate said conclusions. What is decisive is the result of the Ballistic Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D.
Piedad, on the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that one of said fragments, marked SB-1, is a part
of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm,26 and not a part of a .45
caliber bullet.27 Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:
Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper marked A-1. This refer to the very same Exhibit A-1?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet; how did you arrive?
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is upper part of the bullet, sir.
Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a] 5.56 mm., and I found out that the lands and grooves of the
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they have the same lands and grooves.
Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?
A: A bullet comparison microscope.28
xxx
ATTY. PASOK:
xxx
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the bullet of [a] .45 caliber and that of [an] armalite?
A: Copper jacket.
Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of armalite?
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).
Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit 2, SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be bullet from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-16?
A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead core evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the
copper jacket evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29
xxx
Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit 3-A, in page 2 under the column, Findings and Conclusions and I quote: Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and
SB-3 could be parts of the lead core of evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked [as] SB-1. My question, you said could be part of copper jacket marked
SB-1, are you telling the Court, you are sure that this Exhibits SB-2 and SB-3 [are] not part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1?
A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
COURT:
Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber ammunition, would you say that the same would be part of the
lead core of the copper jacket of a different caliber or ammunition?
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could be parts. We cannot evidently conclude. It could be parts of copper
jacket evidenced marked SB-1.
There is no basis.
COURT:
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38 copper jacket, rubber putted and lead (sic).
Q: How about .45 firearm?
A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic)or lead.
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
COURT:
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the
lead core or the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: Could be, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross for the prosecution.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
xxx
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings in Exhibit 2, particularly SB-1, you made it appear that this is part of a
copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not from a .45 caliber?
A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.
Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm because it is only a part.
COURT:
Q: But you said it could be a part?
A: It is a part, Your Honor.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of .45 caliber?
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm. copper jacket fired from armalite under a microscope, the
lands and grooves of the copper jacket and the standard bullet fired from 5.56., they are the same in width.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1?
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide, the lands and grooves of .45 caliber is very wide.
They are not the same.
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide.30cräläwvirtualibräry
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit SB-2 and SB-3) are
indeed parts of the lead core of the SB-1, which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of
petitioner; that is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner.
Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party
having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to
convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.31cräläwvirtualibräry
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that
emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of
homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there
is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioners .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol
towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus
interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim. 32Intent to kill
cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. 33 Animus interficendi must be established with the
same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.34cräläwvirtualibräry
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article
254 of the Revised Penal Code.35 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2)
that the offender has no intention to kill that person. 36 Though the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted
of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, affirming the conviction of
petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34866 August 18, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEVERA JACA and PROCESO RASALAN, defendants.
PROCESO RASALAN, appellant.
D. C. Mayor for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The information describes the offense in question as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of November, 1930, in the municipality of Tayabas, Province of Tayabas, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the above-named accused, Severa Jaca and Proceso Rasalan, aiding and abetting each other for the purpose of concealing the
dishonor of said Severa Jaca, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously put to death the child which she had given birth to, before it was 3
days old.
A separate hearing was requested and granted after the first witness for the prosecution, Dominador Santiano, had testified; but the other
witnesses for the prosecution, Aurea Zabella, Tomas Jaca, Agapita Navaja, Luis Arraya, and Ubaldo Potenciano, testified against Severa Jaca in the
presence of the appellant Proceso Rasalan and his counsel, and were cross-examined by the latter. Jose Velez Martinez was presented as witness
against the appellant Rasalan.
Having heard the case, the Court of First Instance of Tayabas acquitted Severa Jaca, but convicted Proceso Rasalan of the crime charged and
sentenced him to life imprisonment, the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, in the sum of P1,000, and one-half the
costs.
Proceso Rasalan appealed from this sentence, making the following assignments of error:
1. In basing the judgment upon the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, namely Aurea Zabella, Agapita Navaja, and Tomas
Jaca.
2. In finding the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. In admitting as evidence against the appellant, Exhibit C of the prosecution, being the defendant's alleged confession.
4. In sentencing the accused.
There is no dispute about the fact that Severa Jaca's new-born babe die a violent death; this has been sufficiently proved. The evidence for the
prosecution points to Proceso Rasalan as the offender; but Margarita Jaca, the latter's wife, affirms that it was Aurea Zabella, the midwife who
attended Severa Jaca in her delivery, who caused the death of the child.
This accusation of Margarita Jaca against Aurea Zabella is not supported by the evidence of record. The appellant himself does not blame Aurea for
the death of the infant, for he assured in his testimony that he had only heard the child cry once, and when Aurea Zabella, who was assisting the
woman in labor, went to attend to the babe, she found it already dead (pages 145, 146, t. s. n.). Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to
show what motive Aurea Zabella might have had to take the life of that unfortunate new-born babe.
Rejecting, then, this incrimination of Aurea Zabella as unlikely and unproved, let us see if there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the
trial court convicting Proceso Rasalan of the infanticide.
Two eyewitnesses, Aurea Zabella and Agapita Navaja, both of them related to the appellant, the first by consaguinity and the second by affinity,
testify that Proceso Rasalan wrapped up the baby in a cloth which asphyxiated it — resulting in its death. Tomas Jaca, the appellant's father-in-law,
testified that when the latter handed to him the corpse of the newly-born child in order that he might secretly throw it into the river, the accused
revealed to him that he, Proceso Rasalan, had killed it in order to conceal the dishonor of Severa Jaca, which cast a reflection upon them, for Severa
was the witness Tomas' Daughter, and the defendant's sister-in-law. The defendant questions the veracity of these three witnesses, especially of
the two last, Agapita Navaja and Tomas Jaca, alleging that they had a grievance against him and his family. The grievance mentioned is not, to our
mind, sufficient to make the witnesses tell a falsehood in accusing their own relative of so serious crime.
In addition to this evidence, there is the plain, clear, and evident proof of the appellant's own admission contained in Exhibit C, assailed on the
ground that the defendant signed it under pressure of the Constabulary Lieutenant Santiano and the justice of the peace Velez Martinez, without
knowing its contents. That the accused signed said exhibit knowingly and willingly has been satisfactorily proven by the testimony of said justice of
the peace, whose veracity there is in the record no reason to doubt.
That the infant really died, through asphyxiation, is amply shown by the testimony of Doctor Potenciano, who examined the exhumed corpse, thus
corroborating the other witnesses for the prosecution.
As it has been established in the record that the crime charged was committed, and that the defendant committed it; that, inasmuch as he is not an
ascendant of the dead child, he has incurred, according to the law (art. 409, par. 3, Penal Code) the penalty for murder and is guilty of this crime (U.
S. vs. Aquino and Casipit, 34 Phil., 813). Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the exception of the indemnity, which a majority
of this court is of opinion, should not be adjudicated, in view of the facts proved.
Nevertheless, the writer of this opinion, with whom Chief Justice Avanceña and Associate Justice Imperial concur, voted for an indemnity of P500
to the heir or heirs entitled thereto according to law.
Wherefore, in accordance with the majority vote on the elimination of the indemnity, which is accordingly omitted from the decision appealed
from, the latter is hereby affirmed with the costs of both instances against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4779. November 20, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTORIA VEDRA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

This prosecution was instituted for the crime of infanticide, and the record shows that the accused, an unmarried woman, gave birth to a living
child in the early morning of November 16, 1907; that a nephew of the accused, who lived in the same house, awakened by the cries of the newly-
born child, got up in order to strike a light because the room was in darkness, that the accused, noticing this, hastily left the house, taking the infant
with her, and as her nephew asked where she was going, she said she was going to the toilet; that after an hour she returned alone, no longer
carrying the infant; that the nephew reported the affair to the lieutenant of the barrio where it occurred, at daybreak the same day, and the latter
at once made an investigation; that at first, the accused denied that she had been confined, but finally confessed, stating that she had buried the
child and pointed out the place of burial and the body was there found; and, that upon examination of the body by the municipal inspector of
health and by the provincial physician, it was found to be that of a newly-born child, fully developed and of a good constitution, and showing
abrasion on both sides of the nose which might have been caused by pressure exerted by another person, and might have produced the death of
the child by suffocation.

The defense alleges that the above facts do not prove that the death of the infant was caused by the accused; it might very well, it is alleged, have
been the result of some unforeseen accident. No proof has been offered, however, that an accident of any sort had occurred which might have
produced the death of the child. Inasmuch as it was born alive and in a healthy condition, it is not to be presumed, without some just reason
therefor, that it died a natural death within the extremely short time that elapsed between its birth and its burial. The latter took place
immediately after without further interval of time than that which was strictly necessary to carry the child a distance of about 150 meters from the
house of the defendant to the site where the infant was buried. On the contrary, all of the acts related above, performed by the accused
immediately after her confinement, reveal in a clear and unquestionable manner her decided intent to kill the newly born child in order to conceal
her dishonor; and the signs of violence found on the body demonstrate that she actually effected her purpose. The aforesaid signs, together with
the above mentioned conduct of the accused, constitute conclusive proof of her guilt as the author of the crime of infanticide herein prosecuted.

In view of the foregoing facts, the judgment appealed from is confirmed, and the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of two years, four
months and one day of prision correccional, with the corresponding accessory penalties and costs, provided, that she shall be credited with one-
half of the period of the prision preventiva that she may have suffered, with the costs of this instance against her. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 11653. August 19, 1916. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENOVEVA AQUINO and LAZARO CASIPIT, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

The present proceedings were brought by a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal on January 31 of the present year in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Pangasinan, charging Genoveva Aquino and Lazaro Casipit with the crime of parricide; on February 9, following, judgment was
rendered in which Genoveva Aquino was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for parricide, and Lazaro Casipit, to cadena perpetua for
murder, to the accessory penalties, to pay jointly and severally an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and each of them to pay one-
third of the costs. From this judgment the defendants appealed.

The record shows it to have been duly proven that on January 1st of the present year, 1916, Genoveva Aquino, a widow, and the married couple
Lazaro Casipit and Antonina Bautista were engaged in reaping rice in a field of the pueblo of Binalonan, Pangasinan. At about six o’clock in the
evening the first-named, Genoveva Aquino, commenced to feel the pains of approaching childbirth. They therefore requested lodging in a house
near-by belonging to one Pedro Zabala where the woman Genoveva, in the last stage of pregnancy, awoke her working companion, Casipit, in
order that he might assist her, as she was about to give birth. In effect, a few moments afterwards she did give birth to a child, which, as it was
born dead and lifeless, was wrapped in one of its mother’s dresses and Genoveva arranged to have Casipit bury the body. Casipit therefore carried
the newly-born child out of the house in its wrapping and, on account of the darkness of the night, instead of digging a grave to bury it, deposited it
in a hole, one meter deep, partly filled with water, which he accidentally found in the field at a distance of about 150 meters from the house above
mentioned.

On the following day, the 2d of January, the lieutenant of the barrio of San Felipe, where situated the hole in which Casipit had left the dead child,
having learned of the occurrence, reported to the justice of the peace of Binalonan that the body of the child was in said hole and when this latter
official and the policemen who accompanied him reached the spot they found the dead child in said hole wrapped in a dress, together with the
placenta. The justice of the peace forthwith ordered that the body be taken up and carried in a box to the municipal building.

After some investigation, it was discovered that Genoveva Aquino was the woman who, the night before, had give birth to the child whose body
had been found in the pit.

Upon the married couple Pedro Zabala and Magdalena Cortes, the owners of the said house, and their relative Felipe Cortes, being examined, they
all testified that they awoke at a late hour of the night of January 1 when Genoveva aquino was giving birth to a child; witnesses stated the child
was born alive, for which reason they believe that it was thrown into the pit by Lazaro Casipit while still alive, in obedience to the orders of its
mother, though they all testified that they had not approached the said Genoveva to aid her in her travail, nor had they seen the newly-born child
at close range; that they did not get up, but that when they awoke, they saw, by merely raising their heads, that the child was born alive.

The defendants pleaded not guilty. Genoveva Aquino shore that according to her calculation she had been pregnant since she ceased
menstruating, eight months prior to the date of her childbirth; that when she felt the pains of approaching childbirth in the afternoon when she
was working in the fields, two days had elapsed during which she had noticed that the child she carried in her womb did not move; that at about six
o’clock in the evening of that day, realizing that she was in danger of giving birth, she went with her companions to beg lodging in a house nearby
and she gave birth to a child therein at a late hour that night; that the child was born dead, which she knew to be a fact because it did not cry, nor
move, nor show any signs of life; that it was therefore wrapped in a skirt, together with the placenta, and she directed her companion Casipit to
bury it; that she afterwards learned that he had deposited and left it in a small pit containing a little water. The defendant added that while she was
being delivered the owners and inmates of the house were lying down and asleep and that she did not know whether all or any of them
approached her after the child was born because she was dizzy and for quite a while was unconscious.

Lazaro Casipit corroborated the testimony of the defendant Aquino, and stated that the child to which the latter gave birth was born dead, did not
move and showed no signs of life, as it did not cry; that therefore, in compliance with the directions given him by its mother he proceeded to bury
it, not in the grounds of the house where they had taken lodgings, but in a pit 150 meters away which he had discovered in spite of the darkness;
that he put the child’s corpse in this pit and covered it with earth; and that the owners and inmates of the house remained lying down and did not
get up. This witness’ wife, Antonina Bautista, also corroborated her husband’s testimony and said that the child to which Genoveva Aquino gave
birth was born dead, for it did not cry, an that during its birth the owners of the house and the other inmates thereof continued to sleep and did
not approach the mother.

From the foregoing facts, it cannot be concluded that any of the crimes of parricide, infanticide, or of abandonment of a child under 7 years of age
with danger of causing its death were committed, nor the crime of murder, inasmuch as it was sufficiently and satisfactorily proven that the child of
Genoveva Aquino was stillborn for this is shown by the testimony, not only of its mother, but also of Lazaro by the testimony, not only of its
mother, but also of Lazaro Casipit and his wife Antonina Bautista; this testimony cannot be considered as offset by that of the owners of the house
and a relative of theirs, since these latter stated that, though awake, they remained lying down and did not approach the defendant her travail.

The record discloses nothing which tends to show that Genoveva Aquino was actuated by the need of hiding the disgrace of being pregnant as a
motive which may have induced her to have her codefendant Casipit throw her child into a pit in order that it might die. Genoveva Aquino was a
widow and had no scruples in going about the town in a pregnant condition and about two before her confinement, in company with others, she
worked for several hours exposed to the hear of the sun in a field flooded with water. nor, so long as the contrary be not fully proven, is it to be
supposed that she wickedly intended to deprive of its life the child she had brought into the world because, against this supposition, the natural
law of maternal love would prevail and consequently there in much less reason to suppose that, through her codefendant Casipit, she intended to
abandon her own child and expose it to the danger of certain death.

The suspicion that might arise from the testimony of the owners of the house in which the defendant gave birth is on no wise sufficient to establish
the truth of the criminal charge preferred, nor to convict the defendants. A post mortem examination of the body of the defendant’s child would
have shown whether it was born dead or alive, but the record does not show that such an examination was made, as it ought to have been, and the
failure to make such examination ought not to prejudice the woman who gave birth to the deceased child.

With respect to the defendant, Casipit, the record discloses no circumstantial evidence of his having had any malevolent intention of burying a live
child. In compliance with the instructions given him by Genoveva Aquino, he proceeded to inter the dead child which she had given birth to, and as
in the darkness of the night he found a shallow pit containing a little water, he took advantage of it to save himself the trouble of digging grave to
comply with his instructions to bury the child’s body. At most, the defendant Casipit may have incurred provided in article 334 and 581 of the Penal
Code for having violated the laws relating to the burial of the dead.

Therefore, in view of the evidence taken in the investigation of the criminal charges against the defendants, and as it was indisputably proven that
the child delivered of Genoveva Aquino at a late hour of the night of January 1 of the present year, was stillborn and showed no signs whatever of
life, it is evident that the record contains no proof whatever of the commission of any acts that would constitute parricide, infanticide, or the crime
of the abandonment of a child under 7 years of age to the danger of death, or of the crime of murder; in consequence, strict justice demands the
defendant’s acquittal.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is reversed and Genoveva Aquino and Lazaro Casipit should be, as they hereby are,
acquitted of the crimes of which they were prosecuted, with the costs of both instances de officio. The defendants will be set at liberty forthwith, if
not held for any other crime. So ordered.

Johnson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.