PHILIPPINE LAW SCHOOL
SUCCESSION
First Semester, AY 2019-2020
Atty. Viferlyn De Vera Villa
vams08@g,ail.com
Concept of Succession
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE
CALUNOD, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.
Facts: On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as
security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo,
Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the
mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to
the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that
purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale was
executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. On January 25, 1984,
the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank’s favor.
Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
Subsequently Rufo died on July 6, 1984. On October 10, 1989,
herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-
third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square
meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions
wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended
to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Issue: WN the questioned land is part of the Estate of Rufo.
Held: No. The subject land is not part of the estate of Rufo. ART
777 provides that the rights to a person’s succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death. The inheritance of a
person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it
only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of
land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father.
Transfer of Property, Rights, and Obligations
(Arts 774, 776, 728, NCC)
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
Facts: May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation
(FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in
the amount of P128,000.00 for the payment of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural Tractor.
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Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one
unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a
promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
later loan.
In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving
heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint
Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for
Edmund and (1) for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father
to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank,
wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a
Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and
there was no information on his address or the date of his return to
the Philippines.
Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did
not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that
the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was
not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided
in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing
of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank
is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibañez; thus, the claim should have been filed with the
probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of
the joint agreement there was already an existing probate
proceeding. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been
subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the
estate, the heirs or third parties.
Issues: WN the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is

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valid
WN the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is
valid;
WN the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
Held: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all
the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he
may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject
tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors
among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves,
is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s
holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold
Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory

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notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As
the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at
most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY
CO., INC., claimant-Appellant
Facts: The company Luzon Surety Co had filed a claim against
the late K.H. Hemady’s Estate based on twenty different indemnity
agreements or counterbonds subscribed by each distinct principal
and solidarily guaranteed by Hemady. It also prayed as contingent
claim the allowance of the value of the twenty bonds it had
executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked
for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps
affixed to the bonds, with 12 percent interest. In its order dated 23
September 1953, the CFI of Rizal (presided by Judge Hermogenes
Calauag, under Spec. Proceeding Q-293) dismissed Luzon
Surety’s claim upon motion of the Estate’s Administratrix and
before an answer was filed by said company, based on two
grounds:
þ The premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not
contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of
the undertaking of the guarantor Hemady, since they were not
liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; and
þ Whatever losses may occur after Hemady's death, are not
chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased
to be guarantor.
The estate’s Administratrix further contends that upon the death of
Hemady, his liability as a guarantor terminated, and therefore, in
the absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the
claim cannot be considered contingent
Issue: WN upon Hemady’s death, his liability as a guarantor was
terminated?
Held: The Supreme Court concluded that Hemady’s liability as a
solidary guarantor is not extinguished by his death, and that in
such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the
Estate a contingent claim for reimbursement. It also ruled that
while the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the
rights of the deceased but also to his obligations, as expressly
provided by Article 774 and 776 of the Civil Code. The Supreme
Court stated that the binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of
the deceased party is not altered by the provision in our Rules of
Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid
from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs.
The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate
is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the
amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares
that the heirs would have been entitled to receive

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The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased
party is not altered by the provision in the Rules of Court that
money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his
estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs. While the
responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive, the principle
remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations, as expressly provided by
Article 774 and 776 of the Civil Code. The reason is that whatever
payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by
the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in
fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have
been entitled to receive
ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
Facts: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine
International Life Insurance Company, Inc. and owned ninety
percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. When he died, he
left three legitimate and five illegitimate children. Rafael Ortañez
filed a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Dr. Ortañez.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings
filed an opposition to the petition for letters of administration and,
in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court
appoint a special administrator.
March 10, 1982 Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, appointed Rafael and
Jose Ortañez joint special administrators of their father’s estate.
Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of
their father which included, among other properties tantamount to
2,0293 shares of stock in Philinterlife, representing 50.725% of the
company’s outstanding capital stock.
The decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claimed that she owned
1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the
estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of
Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its
president, Jose C. Lee.
Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity and claimed that he
owned the remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
inheritance share, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in

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favor of FLAG, represented by its president, Jose C. Lee.

After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the
ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortañez
failed to repurchase the same.
March 4, 1982, Juliana Ortañez and her two children, Special
Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a
memorandum of agreement for the extrajudicial settlement,
partitioning the estate in favor of FLAG.
Several years later, in July 12, 1995, Ma. Divina Ortañez-
Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of
special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This
move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
All the above-mentioned motions were granted.
February 4, 1997, Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the
approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock
and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that
there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer.
Special Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for
execution of the Orders of the intestate court - the intestate court
granted the motion for execution
Issue 1: WN the lower court was correct in not approving the
Memorandum Agreement and in declaring void the deeds of sale?

November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of
Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. December 20,
1995,
Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare
void ab initio the memorandum of agreement, filed a motion to
declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the
decedent’s estate.
March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent
motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of
Philinterlife shares of stock,
Held: Yes. Memorandum of Agreement was correctly not
approved. Deeds of sale are void. Some of the heirs of the
decedent without securing court approval have appropriated as
their own personal property the properties of Estate, to the
exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs.
Parties to the Memorandum of Agreement are not the only heirs
claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez.
Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez
and her children was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by
Juliana
and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was
likewise, void.

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unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation

Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However,
an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given
their shares an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in
the estate, not any specific property.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the
estate in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do
pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants
to the estate, as what happened in the present case. Any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval
Issue 2: WN it correctly issued the order for execution? The
intestate or probate court can execute its order nullifying the invalid
sale.
The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard
to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise
its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of
estate property would be meaningless enforcement is a necessary
adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul
of estate property before final adjudication not dealing here with
the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory of
the estate because there is no question that, from the very start,
the Philinterlife shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned here with the
effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the required approval of
the intestate court. Contention of petitioners that the
determination of the intestate court was merely provisional and
should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is
incorrect.
Obligations limited to value of inheritance (Article 774, NCC)
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO
ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and
JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES,
ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari

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the lots, plus damages. The IAC affirmed except as to damages.

FACTS
- Two parcels of land were registered in the names of the heirs of
Aniceto Yanes, under an Original Certificate of Title.
- Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title.
Santiago then sold the lots to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. The lots
were sold thereafter Rosendo Alvarez.
- The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of the
lots, and prayed for an accounting of the produce of the land from
1944 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the share or money
equivalent due the heirs be delivered to them, and damages.
- During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason.
-
The CFI ordered Alvarez to reconvey and deliver the possession
of the lots to the Yaneses. However, execution of said decision
proved unsuccessful with respect to one of the lots, as it had been
subdivided into two and that that they were "in the name" of
Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that
the lot could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a
party per writ of execution."
- The Yaneses filed a petition for the issuance of a new certificate
of title and for a declaration of nullity of the TCTs issued to
Rosendo Alvarez. The court required Rodolfo Siason to produce
the certificates of title covering the lots, which order was later
nullified by the court in view of a manifestation filed by Siason.
- the lower court found Siason as a buyer in good faith, and
ordered the heirs of Alvarez to pay the Yaneses the actual value of
- Petitioners contend, among others, that the liability arising from
the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of
his estate, after his death.
ISSUE
WON the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by
Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability
of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
HELD
NO.
- It overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the
general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Under our law, the
general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
- The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond

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the value of the property received from the decedent.

- Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.: The binding effect
of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a
deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is
that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a
payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would
have been entitled to receive.
- The general rule (above) is a consequence of the progressive
"depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as
observed by Victorio Polacco, “has characterized the history of
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from
patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no
other.”
- Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they
cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction,
which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners
did not inherit the property involved is of no moment because by
legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the
mass of their father's hereditary estate, and hereditary assets are
always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the
estate.It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable
only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.
Simeon Bitanga for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.
FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin
and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma,
spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued
to declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied.
Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he
left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate
proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his
compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following
such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum
payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by
Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's
Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited
by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of
Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.
ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her
father from her grandfather's estate?

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HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their
deceased grandfather by representation are not subject to the
payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who
died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the
provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents
his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not
make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by
his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of
inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties
received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs
of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M.
Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from
whom they did not inherit anything.
G.R. No. 171035 August 24, 2009
WILLIAM ONG GENATO, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BAYHON, MELANIE BAYHON, BENJAMIN
BAYHON, JR., BRENDA BAYHON, ALINA BAYHON-CAMPOS,
IRENE BAYHON-TOLOSA, and the minor GINO BAYHON, as
represented herein by his natural mother as guardian-ad-
litem, JESUSITA M. BAYHON, Respondents.
PUNO, CJ.
FACTS: On December 20, 1990, petitioner William Ong Genato
filed Civil Case No. Q-90-7551, an action for specific performance,
before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 79. In his Complaint,
petitioner alleged that respondent obtained a loan from him in the
amount of PhP 1,000,000.00. Petitioner alleged further that
respondent failed to pay the loan and executed on October 21,
1989 a dacion en pago in favor of the petitioner. The dacion en
pago was inscribed and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City.
Petitioner further averred that despite demands, respondent
refused to execute the requisite documents to transfer to him the
ownership of the lot subject of the dacion en pago. Petitioner
prayed, inter alia, for the court to order the respondent to execute
the final deed of sale and transfer of possession of the said lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Bayhon is liable to Mr. Genato in
the amount of Php 5,647,130.00 in principal and interest as of
October 3, 1997 and 5% monthly interest thereafter until the
account shall have been fully paid
The Court proceeded further to state the general rule:
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's
contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
"depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as

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observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from
patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no
other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the
imprisonment for debt.[28](Emphasis supplied)
The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while
the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. While he may
no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against
his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be
transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been satisfied.
Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has
been amply represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are
also his co-parties in Civil Case No. Q-90-7012.
Rights and Obligations not extinguished by death
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor)
and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the
minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA
BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the
Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.
MARTIN, J:
FACTS: Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over
parcels of land. Pending the proceeding, she died. The counsel for
deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the
minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to
substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the
counsel’s prayer for lack of merit, and dismissed the complaint on
the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue.
ISSUE: Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs,
after the death of the plaintiff.
RULING: YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.” From the moment of the death of the
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they
cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law.  When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her
claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon
her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the

G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909 acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RULING: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child
ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant. is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to
C. Oben for appellant. him. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime.
L. Joaquin for appellee. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the
heirs of the child, to wit: (a) if he or she died during his or her
ARELLANO, C.J. minority, (b) while insane, or (c) after action had already been
instituted.
FACTS: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
succession. which to institute the action.

An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However,
Roman Abaya brother of Casiano came forward and opposed said
appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest
relative of the deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be
the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take
possession of all the property of said estate.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or
her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may
exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs.
The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is
not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.

Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ,
she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a Petitioner,
hearing on the matter. She prayed that she be declared to have vs.
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya. OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent.

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CARPIO, J. PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.

FACTS: Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the RTC a Complaint PUNO, C.J.:
against her son, Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for “Annulment of Sale, Opening of Succession (Arts 777, NCC)
Reconveyance and Damages.” After Memoracion finished
presenting her evidence in chief, she died. The RTC was informed, G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
albeit belatedly, of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo vs.
Cruz. MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO
NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO
ISSUE: Whether or not Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action which did
not survive the death of petitioner. Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
RULING: NO. The question as to whether an action survives or not
depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of]
affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA,
incidental. Here, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator,
property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO
petitioner Memoracion. DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco,
appellees,
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007 vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the
vs. Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN

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vs.
G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937 HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN, represented by
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, CRESENCIA DE GUZMAN-PRINCIPE, Respondents.
deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. DEL CASTILLO, J.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven for plaintiff-appellant. CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for defendant-appellant. vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE
LAUREL, J. CALUNOD, Respondents.

G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004 PERALTA, J.

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996

assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO
ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her
husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES
P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents.
TINGA, J.
G.R. No. 165554 July 26, 2010
LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO, Petitioners,
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A.
CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on
behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A.
CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS
MABANAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and
RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL
as attorney-in-fact, respondents.
MELO, J.
Testamentary Succession, Wills in General Art. 783, NCC

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the sole property of the surviving spouse and payable to and

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990 collectible or withdrawable by such survivor
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs. Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA Romarico later filed a motion asking authority to sell certain shares
FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents. of stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover his
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner. advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds
withdrawn from their savings account. Rowena opposed on the
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent. ground that the same funds withdrawn from the savings account
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate. Hence,
there should be no reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico
SARMIENTO, J. insists that the same are his exclusive property acquired through
the survivorship agreement.

Vitug v. CA ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of
the survivorship agreement were conjugal partnership properties
G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990 and part of the estate

Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship
agreement with the Bank of American National Trust and Savings
Association. The said agreement contained the following
stipulations:
(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their
joint savings current account shall be both their property and shall
be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of
them during their lifetime; and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be
No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a
donation mortis causa nor a donation inter vivos. It is in the nature
of an aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties
reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in
consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the
happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time
or is uncertain, such as death. The Court further ruled that a
survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law and thus is
valid unless its operation or effect may be violative of a law such
as in the following instances: (1) it is used as a mere cloak to hide
an inofficious donation; (2) it is used to transfer property in fraud of

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creditors; or (3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a compulsory

heir. In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances were
present. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of the
survivorship agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As
such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested
right over the amounts under the savings account, which became
his exclusive property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the
survivorship agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account
are not conjugal partnership properties and not part of the estate of
the deceased Dolores.
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD,
PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, Petitioners,
versus
ZENAIDA ALUAD, Respondent.
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent
Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad
(Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).Crispin was the owner of six
lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the
Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde
adjudicated the lots to herself.
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled
“Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos” (Deed of
Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria covering all the six
lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin.
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos.
674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name. On August 26, 1991,
Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property.
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will
and testament,devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria,
and her “remaining properties” including Lot No. 674 to
respondent. Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on
September 24 of the same year.
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for
declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos.
674 and 676, and damages against respondent.
The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that
Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and
676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria
via the Deed of Donation.
By Decision of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was
actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it
had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it
found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two
witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in
accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.

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to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis
causa and have complied with the formalities of a will.
RULING: The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa. The
donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should
have been observedbut they were not, as it was witnessed by only
two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil
Code.Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation
clausethe execution of which clause is a requirement separate
from the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on
the left-hand margins of the pages of the will.
ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil
are inherited by his heirs.
HELD: Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by
his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had
by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by
death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death.

RABADILLA vs. CA
June 29, 2000
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of
testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest
of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla
shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
(25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint,
SEANGIO v. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio. Petitioners, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition,
contending, among others, that Segundo left a holographic will,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for
cause.
Subsequently, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Segundo was filed by petitioners.

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Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting
to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet
the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged
act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo,
and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named
nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition
which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called
upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred
from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the
dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is
clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of
the decedent.
The RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings.
1. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa
can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while
it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition
in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of
the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed
by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to
that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary
to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

ISSUE: Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is

not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be
Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking
considered as a holographic will. into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator.
Whether or not there was preterition.
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
RULING: captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by

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Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him

in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the
will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
2.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It
was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath
his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of
his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one
of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to
institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly
as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have
allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON,
oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give
to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render
any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition
submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the
greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted.
Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be
given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used
the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the
estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her
part to give such properties as devises to the designated
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to
each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial payment
of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note
the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of
the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called
compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative
prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the
testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a

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beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary estate as follows:

dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It
is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is
the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived
by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate
granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the
appellants
Valdez left a will executed in February 1960 and written in
Pampango. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs and six
grandchildren
In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties
(assessed at P1.8 million) which included real and personal
properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt
Co
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was
P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or
properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that
they received in the will less the cash/properties to
complete their respective legitime
The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-
partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas were to receive
considerably less
The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing
that Art 906 and 907 NCC specifically provide that when the
legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed.
The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld,
it will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a
violation of Art 791 NCC

During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered
executor of the deceased’s estate controlling in this case

In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in
accordance with her testamentary disposition where she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her
entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will

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prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the
intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his
will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal
law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly
and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose
mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with
by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither
these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own
criterion for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for
partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent
was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted that
after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well
as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses
for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided
that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following,
whereby she specified each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs
and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the
same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and
authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that
"Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of
partition as the oppositors were adjudicated the properties
respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in
her will and the differential to complete their legitimes were taken
from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were
obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal
provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as
approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would
reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider
as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the
disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to
payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution
by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art
791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and

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obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will
of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all
devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will
and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for
some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning
of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole
estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said
dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes
of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in
this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs
under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here,
distribution and partition of the entire estate was made by the
testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during
her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime
of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which
would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code
on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR
LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to demand completion of
their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no
longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the
estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to
the executrix-appellee.
In Re Will of Abadia
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. v. MIGUEL
ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188, 9 August 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Resident
of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943. He left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one
Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews
who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.

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During the hearing, it was established that Father Sancho wrote
out the will in longhand in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood, and that he signed on the left hand margin of the front
page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and
that he signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page.
All this was done in the presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will. The said three witnesses signed
their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his
presence and in the presence of each other.
The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will.
Although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law, still,
because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the
trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in
form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to
probate the will as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho
Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision, and because
only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was
certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will which purportedly is a holographic will
executed before the New Civil Code may be considered for
probate as such during the effectivity of the same.
RULING:
No.
At the time Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not
permitted. The law at the time imposed certain requirements for
the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page
in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by
the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not
complied with. The failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign
on the left hand margin of every page vitiates the testament.
What is the law to apply to the probate of the will of Father
Abadia? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which
not allows holographic wills? But article 795 of this same new Civil
Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is
made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of
the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be
judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or
at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or

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when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator,
the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among
his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at
the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest
then becomes a completed act.
more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in
the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the will concerned is denied probate.

Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should
be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies
and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said
intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the
will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities
required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we
should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he
leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of
the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding
new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate
such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which
is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at
the time of its execution then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with
In Re Will of Riosa
Issue: Whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the
date of the execution of the will, or the law existing atthe death of
the testator, controls.Facts: Jose Riosa died on April 17, 2917. He
left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which
he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will
was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force,
namely,section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was
not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatoryof said
section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for
the signing and attestation of wills, in force on andafter July 1,
1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator,
and attested and subscribed by threecredible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by
the testator and thewitnesses on the left margin of each and every
page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law,
therefore,went into effect after the making of the will and before the
death of the testator, without the testator having left a willthat

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conforms to the new requirements.Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure reads:No will, except as provided in the preceding
section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by the testator'sname written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
andsubscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. Theattestation shall
state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be
signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and
subscribed itin his presence and in the presence of each other. But
the absence of such form of attestation shall notrender the will
invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as
in this section provided.Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section
read asfollows:SEC. 618.
Requisites of will  may or may not be a will, the law in force at the testator's death
. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be
valid topass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the
same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the
testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written
by some other person inhis presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnessesin
the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the
person requested by him to write hisname and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every
page thereof,on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of eachsheet. The
attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and thefact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name,under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the willand all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and
the death occurred after the enactment of this law 
.Three views:
1)
The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that
the statutes in force at the testator's death arecontrolling, and that
a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid,
although its execution wassufficient at the time it was made. The
reasons assigned for applying the later statute are the following:
"Asuntil the death of the testator the paper executed by him,
expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mereinchoate act which
applies and controls theproof of the will." (Sutton
vs.
Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing
proposition andthe reasons assigned for it, it would logically result
that the will of Jose Riosa would have to be held invalid.
 
2)
Justice Sharswood (Taylor 
vs.
Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best
considered. In thisopinion is found the following:Retrospective laws

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generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so
construed only when themandate of the legislature is imperative.
When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to
therequirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it
would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it
a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.While it is
true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in
fact is inapplicable to such a case;for he would have an equal right
to presume that no new law would affect his past act, and rest
satisfied insecurity on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every
will is ambulatory until the death of the testator, andthe disposition
made by it does not actually take effect until then. General words
apply to the property of which the testator dies possessed, and he
retains the power of revocation as long as he lives. The act
of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when the will is
executed, though to go into effect at a futuretime.3) A third view,
somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding
support in the States of Alabama and New York, is that statutes
relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the necessary
formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a
will already made and, when they lessen the formalities required,
should be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of their making
Held: It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as
this court has said, that "all statutes are to be construed as having
only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of
the Legislature to give them aretrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every
case of doubt,the doubt must be resolved against the
restrospective effect."Our statute announces a positive rule for
the transference of property which must be complied with
as completed actat the time of the execution, so far as the act of
the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent
tothe enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to
testaments made antecedent to that date.To answer the question
with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the
second rule, particularlyas established by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.The order of the
Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29,
1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the
record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit
the said will toprobate, without special findings as to costs. So
ordered
Formalities for Notarial or Ordinary Wills
Manner of Signing Article 805
Matias vs. Salud
G.R. L-10907 June 29, 1957
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
Facts: 
1. This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate of the
will of Gabina Raquel. The document consist of 3 pages and it seems that
after the attestation clause, there appears the signature of the testatrix
'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged in violet ink claimed by the
proponents as the thumbmark allegedly affixed by the tetratrix. On the third
page at the end of the attestation clause appears signatures on the left

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margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each left margin appears
the same violet ink smudge accompanied by the written words 'Gabina
Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte' underneath it.
2. The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent allegedly
instructed Atty. Agbunag to drat her will and brought to her on January 1950.
With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the decedent affixed her
thumbmark at the foot of the document and the left margin of each page. It
was also alleged that she attempted to sign using a sign pen but was only
able to do so on the lower half of page 2 due to the pain in her right
shoulder. The lawyer, seeing Gabina unable to proceed instructed Lourdes
Samonte to write 'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each
thumbmark, after which the witnesses signed at the foot of the attestation
clause and the left hand margin of each page.
3. The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent.
4. The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation
clause did not state that the testatrix and the witnesses signed each and
every page nor did it express that Lourdes was specially directed to sign
after the testatrix.
Issue: Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with
the law despite the absence of a description of such in the attestation
clause
HELD: YES
The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another person
wrote the testatrix' name  at her request is not a fatal defect, The legal
requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a requirement satisfied
by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him.
As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be
dependent on the aleatory circumstances. Where a testator employs an
unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause and the will are
silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against the
authenticity of the testament. However, the failure to describe the signature
itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate when evidence fully satisfied
that the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law.
Garcia v. Lacuesta
90 P 489
FACTS:
This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among
other defects was signed by the testator through a cross mark (an
“X”). The will was signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name of
Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly wrote a cross mark after
his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it because
its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will
was signed by Atty. Javier at the express direction of the testator, 2)
that the testator wrote a cross at the end of his name after
Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that the 3 witnesses signed the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of
the attestation clause since the testator had placed a cross mark
himself as his signature.
HELD:
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that
Mercado directed Javier to write the testator’s name under his express
direction. Petitioner’s argument that such recital is unnecessary
because the testator signed the will himself using a cross mark which
should be considered the same as a thumb-mark (which has been held
sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the
same as a thumb mark, because the cross mark does not have the
same trustworthiness of a thumb mark.

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Barut v. Cabacungan
21 P 461
FACTS:
Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon.
The testatrix stated in the will that being unable to read or write, the
will was read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and
that she had instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as
testatrix. The probate was contested by a number of the relatives of
the deceased on various grounds.
The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate
because “the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the
name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like
the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than to the
person whose handwriting it was alleged to be” (i.e. The probate court
denied probate because the signature seemed to not have been by
Severo Agayan but by another witness).
ISSUE:
Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the
will?
HELD:
No. The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing
is sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the
witnesses that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo
Agayan. It is also immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix
provided it is written at her request and in her presence and in
the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
Based on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that
with respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the
person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The
important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix
was signed at her express direction in the presence of 3 witnesses
and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in
the presence of each other. It may be wise that the one who signs the
testator’s name signs also his own; but that is not essential to the
validity of the will.
The court also held that the 3 cases cited by the lower court was
not applicable. In those cases, the person who signed the will for the
testator wrote his own name instead of the testator’s, so that the
testator’s name nowhere appeared in the will, and were thus wills not
duly executed.
Nera v. Rimando
18 P 450
FACTS:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due
execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is
whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small
room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he
was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with
the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which
made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the
other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the
instrument.
HELD:
Citing Jaboneta v. Gustilo, the court held that “The true test of presence of
the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they
actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each
other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental
and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment
of inscription of each signature.”
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to
each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be
such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
The question is whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an

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alleged will signed the instrument in the presence of each other does not
depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon
the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that
moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other
were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could
have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the
door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and
would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in
the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.
Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of
the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor
thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix,
filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March
1959, Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he
then filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent
had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and
that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26
May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its
duplicate was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by
the oppositors.
Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert
testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are
not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the
original, and further averthat granting that the documents were genuine, they
were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure
because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and
testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions
of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding
the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof,
whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them
as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned
therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other
properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate
given the allegations of forgery of the testator’s signature, or that the will was
executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and
pressure?
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in
Sir’s book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will
fatal to its validity?
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its
duplicate are valid in all respects.
On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:
The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been
complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of
the testatrix’s signature failed to convince the Court, not only because it is
directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity
of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering
the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and
the effect of writing fatigue.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted
and questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering that
standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper,
with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of
the oppositor’s expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the
two instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were presented
by Celso during the trial.

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Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that
some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the
decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the
heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the
distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the
free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear
motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by
ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being
diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these
clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It is
also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and
exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows
absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages
in the duplicate:
The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and
while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature
of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof;
but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is
signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every
page.
Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the
original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he
signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.
The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of
the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of
the attestationclause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public
likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
Therefore, Atty. Natividad’s failure to sign page 3 of the original through
mere inadvertence does not affect the will’s validity.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its
bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law
should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix
on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the
testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and
literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the
law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this
Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by
testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be
probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the
requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to
mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez
vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to
require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud
and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence
and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed
probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is
easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the
original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly
signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid
and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be
considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate
serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the
original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
Acknowledgment before Notary Public `

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Atty. Viferlyn De Vera Villa
vams08@g,ail.com

Javellana vs. Ledesma testator and the witnesses cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments
G.R. No. L-7179 should be completed without interruption.

Facts: Ortega v. Valmonte

1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the
deceased Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This testament was deemed
executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant was the sister and
nearest surviving relative of the deceased.  She appealed from this decision
alleging that the will were not executed in accordance with law.  more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a
2. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other
hand, the codicil was executed after the enactment of the New Civil Code
(NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged before a notary public. Now,
the contestant, who happens to be one of the instrumental witnesses
asserted that after the codicil was signed and attested at the San Pablo
hospital, that Gimotea (the notary) signed and sealed it on the same
occasion. Gimotea, however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of
signing and sealing was done afterwards.
2. One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the
codicil was signed somewhere else or in the office of the notary. The ix and
the witnesses at the hospital, was signed and sealed by the notary only
when he brought it in his office.
Issue: Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in
the absence of the testator and witnesses affects the validity of the will
RULING: NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not
require that the signing of the testator, the witnesses and the notary be
accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The
subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor
of the testamentary act. Their separate execution out of the presence of the
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the
age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little
notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of 2
pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9 August
1983. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia,
Placido’s sister. According to the notary public who notarized the
testator’s will, after the testator instructed him on the terms
and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to
come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator
and his witnesses returned on the appointeddate but the notary public
was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9
August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He
reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983
because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already
83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of
the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or
trickery.

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 PHILIPPINE LAW SCHOOL
SUCCESSION
First Semester, AY 2019-2020
Atty. Viferlyn De Vera Villa
vams08@g,ail.com

HELD: its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with

1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able
to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his
shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects
of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole
beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect
its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by
which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the
testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the
document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to
make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving
the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show
otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing
of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does
not invalidate the document, “because the law does not even require
that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed
execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively
explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.
Guerrero v. Bihis
521 SCRA 394
FACTS:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and
respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the
RTC QC. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister’s petition on the
following grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by
fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and
improper pressure and influence. Petitioner Guerrero was appointes special
administratrix. Respondent opposed petitioner’s appointment but
subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the probate of
the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with
because the will was “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the witnesses at
the testatrix’s residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty.
Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in
Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses
before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the
requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution
of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. 6 This formal requirement is one of
the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. 7 In other words, a
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. —
The jurisdictionof a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the
province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-
extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied
with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached.
Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all
completely void.

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 PHILIPPINE LAW SCHOOL
SUCCESSION
First Semester, AY 2019-2020
Atty. Viferlyn De Vera Villa
vams08@g,ail.com

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